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How to stretch a finite and limited Royal Navy to cover two- (or three-) ocean commitments was a problem Great Britain faced in the 1930s. Japan had announced her intention to achieve parity and no accommodation seemed possible; a major shipbuilding program might trigger a competition with Germany similar to that that had contributed to the seeming inexorability of World War I; a naval arms limitation treaty with Germany appeared to be an attractive and achievable option. The 1935 Anglo-German Naval Agreement resulted. It was no solution.

THE ANGLO-GERMAN NAVAL AGREEMENT OF 1935: AN ASPECT OF APPEASEMENT

by

Richard A. Best, Jr.

Policy Considerations. The Agreement between Germany and Great Britain signed on 18 June 1935 limiting the size of the German Navy to 35 percent of that of the British Commonwealth¹ has been often criticized for the damage it did to the efforts of Britain, France and Italy to form a common front against Hitler's unilateral repudiation of the Versailles settlement. It led also to the embittering of relations between Britain and France at a time when Anglo-French unity *vis-à-vis* Germany was essential. Nonetheless, the Agreement had a broader significance: it was part of the extensive but ultimately futile effort in naval arms control in the interwar years and at the same time an important first step in Britain's policy towards Nazi Germany that came to be known as Appeasement.

discuss the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935 in the context of British policy regarding naval limitations on one hand and a resurgent Germany on the other. The negotiating tactics of von Ribbentrop are worth attention as they so effectively accomplished the Führer's goals, but the documentary record should not obscure the larger issues that led to the eager acceptance of Hitler's offer and to the approach of war.

Throughout the interwar years, serious attention was given to efforts to limit the dangers of war resulting from an unrestrained arms race and particularly from naval competition. The movement to limit naval arms was launched by the United States in 1921 and, by 1935, had resulted in a series of agreements, principally the Five Power Treaty of 1922 and the London Naval Treaty of 1930. These pacts resulted in,

inter alia, parity in major surface ships between the world's two greatest maritime powers, the United States and Great Britain, and in smaller fleets for Japan, France and Italy. Germany, for her part, had been severely restricted to essentially coastal forces by the Treaty of Versailles. By the mid-1930s, however, this situation was under great strains, largely from pressures by the Japanese to achieve parity with the United States and Britain and to build a navy consistent with her imperial ambitions in East Asia. There were, in addition, strong differences between the British and Americans regarding questions of qualitative limitations—the Americans preferring heavier cruisers with larger guns, the British needing larger numbers of less powerful ships to protect imperial lines of communication. The British particularly sought to limit qualitative innovations, i.e., new ships outclassing all those currently in existence, that could render her heavy investment in the Royal Navy largely obsolete.

Differences in naval policy were certain to cause diplomatic difficulties inasmuch as the 1922 Treaty was due to expire in 1936 and the Japanese were determined to attain parity. After extensive negotiations with both British and American officials, the Japanese finally announced on 29 December 1934 the termination of their adherence to the Five Power Treaty. This action increased the urgency of maintaining some kind of naval limitations system. The British not only favored limitations on principle, but undoubtedly considered that an agreement would preclude other nations' efforts to outbuild the world's largest navy.

Although the British were concerned about the growth of the Japanese Navy and Tokyo's aggressive policies in Manchuria and northern China, there was little fear of threats to Hong Kong, Singapore or the Dominions of Australia and New Zealand. Accordingly, there

was a potential for reaching an accommodation with Tokyo, recalling the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, and a number of important officials favored efforts in this direction.

Such a course of action was, however, doomed from the start. The Japanese did not prove willing to be accommodating to British interests² and, much more importantly, an effort to reach a rapprochement with Tokyo would have exposed London to fierce opposition from Washington. Traditional American concern about Japanese expansion and a perceived threat to American interests in Hawaii, the Philippines and various Pacific possessions worked to insure that the Roosevelt administration would insist upon joint U.S.-British opposition to Japanese expansion on the Asian mainland and to the growth of the Japanese Navy as the *conditio sine qua non* for cooperation with Britain across the board. As President Roosevelt wrote to his negotiator on naval armaments, Norman Davis:

Simon and a few other Tories [*sic*: John Simon, the Foreign Secretary, was a National Liberal] must be constantly impressed with the simple fact that if Great Britain is even suspected of preferring to play with Japan to playing with us, I shall be compelled, in the interest of American security to approach public sentiment in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa in a definite effort to make these Dominions understand clearly that their future security is linked with us in the United States.³

Although it is not often explicitly articulated in British documents, there is little doubt that good relations between Britain and the United States were fundamental to British policy. Thus opposition by Washington to any British accommodation of Japanese desires regarding naval parity meant that the naval treaty would have to be completely renegotiated in the mid-

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thirties and, secondly, that British defense planning had to continue to take the Japanese Navy into consideration. The need to maintain a naval capability in the Far East had major implications not just for the Admiralty but also for the Foreign Office as well.

The needs of the Pacific meant a reduction in the number of ships that would be available in European waters—principally the Mediterranean, which was part of the sea route to India and potentially vulnerable to interdiction by the Italian Navy. Until the advent of Nazi government in Germany in 1933, there had been no need to concentrate forces in the North Sea. France was presumed to be friendly and the small German Navy could present no challenge beyond coastal waters. However, if German rearmament, already underway by 1935 in air and ground forces, were extended into the maritime sphere, then a much graver threat would exist requiring additional naval forces to be maintained in northern waters.

Admiralty and Foreign Office officials alike had reason to recall the contributory effects of the naval competition before World War I to the permanent estrangement of Britain and Germany. There was a determination to avoid a repetition of another naval race if at all possible. There was at the same time an acute perception that the Royal Navy's capabilities were dangerously limited even if a rebuilding campaign were launched. The likely outcome of a war in the Far East against Japan and in Europe against Italy and Germany was grave, especially as there was little expectation of support from the United States beyond a benign neutrality. Such spreading of forces would be strategically dangerous and could lead to global defeat.

There were a number of possible ways to approach these problems. The option of reaching an accommodation with Japan that would remove the need

to maintain major forces in the Far East was, as noted above, precluded by U.S. opposition (even benign American neutrality being too valuable to sacrifice under any conceivable condition). Another theoretical option was to build up the Royal Navy to an extent that would allow a two-ocean war. There was, indeed, after the Nazi takeover in 1933, a realization that there would have to be greater defense expenditures, but there were limits to which an already overburdened Treasury could be expected to finance a vastly larger Navy. The National Governments of the thirties were also laboring under orthodox economic policies that argued against deficit spending on one hand and higher taxation on the other. The political costs would also have been high.⁴

If it was impossible to come to terms with Japan or to build a much larger navy, the Admiralty focused on another possibility—negotiating a ceiling on the expected growth of the German Navy. If some naval rearmament was inevitable, given the drift of Hitler's policies, it would at least take some time before the German Navy would pose a significant threat to Britain. There was a hope to bring Germany into the international system of naval arms limitations that the British aimed to reconstruct despite Japanese recalcitrance. The Germans, it was considered, might accept some openly negotiated force levels once freed from the constraints of the dictated peace. If German naval rearmament could in fact be constrained by agreement, then it might be just possible that Britain would have adequate forces to preserve the naval balance of power both in European and Pacific waters. There can be little doubt that some limitation on Germany's Navy was seen by senior Admiralty officials as well as by some in the Treasury and the Foreign Office as the one possibility that could provide hope for imperial security in the years ahead.

Thus by late 1934 some form of a naval agreement with Germany appeared to be an attractive option. It was hoped by the British that an agreement would be part of a worldwide treaty that even Japan would eventually join and that an international system for regulating naval forces could be reestablished. Thus when the Germans began hinting that their goal was only to build up to a third of the size of the British Navy, they found receptive listeners. The British began work for the next London conference and their tasks included consultations with the Germans regarding their plans.

Lack of British Policy. Turning aside for the moment from considerations of naval policy, it is important to recall the difficulties faced by the makers of British foreign policy in the first years of the Nazi regime in Germany. The British did not, as is sometimes imagined, fail to perceive the brutal nature of the Third Reich. The atrocities, which were perpetrated by the German Government and acquiesced in by the German people, were well known to British officials and public alike. Nor was there any simplistic conviction that Nazi foreign policy would be a positive contribution to the comity of Europe. There was instead a realization that Britain was faced by a challenge of the first magnitude and that a real possibility existed that the carnage that had stopped in November 1918 might be renewed. Because of the deeply felt losses of the First World War, the British were determined to avoid any further conflict. The desire for peace permeated British society and Cabinet members bent their minds towards maintaining it. They were, however, under no illusions about the difficulties under which they would be working.

At the same time, there had been a widespread discrediting of the Versailles settlement. The attacks of John Maynard Keynes in his *The Economic*

*Consequences of the Peace*³ were followed by over a decade of revisionist historiography. It was widely believed that there were genuine German grievances with Versailles and that these grievances had contributed to the Nazi triumph. In addition, the wartime alliance with France had passed into years of peacetime acrimony. The French were often viewed as overly antagonistic to Germany, hostile to British efforts at reconciliation and unwilling to develop new policies to suit changed circumstances. Anglo-French relations were vexed and troubled during the interwar years by constant suspicion and an inability to work together for mutual interests.

By 1935 British diplomacy was faced with the necessity of dealing with a resurgent Germany determined to free herself from the restrictions of Versailles while France was internally divided but nonetheless adamantly opposed to any changes in the 1919 settlement. The British considered that there was nothing that could be done that would actually prevent some German rearmament and that the French refusal to come to terms with this reality was futile.

British policymakers, although aware of the need to improve Britain's defense position and to deal in some way with German rearmament, had not by 1935 developed a consistent strategy. There were those—particularly Sir Robert Vansittart, the Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Ralph Wigram, head of the Central Department in the Foreign Office that handled German matters—who favored a policy of firm resistance to any German moves towards unilateral revision of Versailles. On the other hand, the officials most directly concerned with military questions, such as Sir Robert Craigie of the Foreign Office's American Department (which dealt with questions of naval disarmament) and some outside the Foreign

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Office such as Maurice Hankey, Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence and to the Cabinet, Warren Fisher, the Permanent Secretary of the Treasury, and Neville Chamberlain, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, considered that financial exigencies required some way of coming to some kind of terms with the Germans.

It cannot be said, however, that any resolution of these differences had been made by early 1935. Different approaches—particularly regarding the most appropriate way to deal with Italy—were still being weighed. The Prime Minister, J. Ramsay MacDonald, was failing and had not been providing strong leadership in foreign affairs. The Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, was not a commanding figure and had few deep insights into British policy alternatives. He too was ending his term at the Foreign Office; he would shortly be replaced by Samuel Hoare, then at the India Office. Hoare would recall later that when in June 1935 he arrived at the Foreign Office, "there appeared to be no generally accepted body of opinion on the main issues. Dramatically opposite views were pressed upon me . . ."⁶

As a result of the absence of strong leadership and the imminence of Cabinet changes, British policy toward Germany by mid-1935 was in a state of flux. A British and French offer to Berlin of an air pact had not been accepted. The creation of the "Stresa Front" in mid-April 1935 in which Britain, France and Italy condemned Germany's reintroduction of general conscription had reflected the goals of Vansittart and Anthony Eden, the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, but it had not been built on settled principles accepted by the Cabinet and the higher levels of the bureaucracy. The doubts and uncertainties of Craigie, Hankey, Chamberlain and others had not been resolved. Thus, an apparently attractive German proposal on naval limitations, which would

incidentally and cavalierly override important provisions of the Versailles treaty, could not be carefully assessed in its relation to a settled British policy towards either Germany or Europe as a whole inasmuch as none existed.

German Policy: British Acceptance. Germany's goals, unfortunately for Britain, had been more cogently established. The German Chancellor was himself aware of the undesirable results of the prewar Anglo-German naval rivalry and, as is well known, was from time to time seized with the idea of an Anglo-German alliance. He was, nonetheless, determined to improve the German Navy's capabilities along with the expansion of his Army and Air Force.⁷ He authorized Adm. Erich Raeder, the Chief of the German Naval Command, to proceed with plans that would provide for naval superiority in the Baltic and cause grave anxiety to a France which had to divide its fleet between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean.⁸ Whether in the years 1933-1935 Hitler and the German Navy were actually planning an eventual war against Great Britain remains controversial;⁹ Hitler was, however, no doubt planning on drastically altering the European balance of naval power in a way that would work to French and British disadvantage.

The German Navy had for years been involved in submarine construction abroad despite the prohibition in the Versailles Treaty on Germany possessing a submarine force. In April 1935 Hitler authorized the Navy to begin construction of twelve 250-ton submarines. This fact was eventually relayed to the British Government,¹⁰ but despite the violation of the Versailles treaty, neither the British Ambassador in Berlin nor the Foreign Secretary lodged a formal protest; the latter contented himself, in a conversation with the German Ambassador, to note the "unpleasant surprise."¹¹ When Lt. Cdr.

Leopold Bürkner of the German Naval Command advised the British Naval Attaché in Berlin, Capt. G.C. Muirhead-Gould, of German plans for surface ship construction in April 1935, the German officer felt he could have provided "simultaneous information about submarine construction without arousing more unfavorable reactions; [Muirhead-Gould] is certainly thoroughly prepared to hear such news, and so, I suppose, is the Admiralty."¹²

Germany could, of course, have proceeded with her ship construction efforts without British approval; a preventive war in 1935 aimed at forcing compliance with Versailles was unthinkable. Yet firm British opposition would have caused Hitler major diplomatic difficulties and might have endangered the Führer's larger goals. That general political aims and not merely naval planning motivated Hitler at this point is indicated in Raeder's comments when the decision was reached to try to arrive at a naval agreement with Britain; the effort, he affirmed, was "based on considerations of European politics."¹³

The willingness to accept a navy approximately one-third the size of Britain's had been conceived by Hitler before he became Chancellor. It was apparently an arbitrary figure; there is no evidence that exhaustive studies were conducted to reach this percentage.¹⁴ It was, however, roughly consistent with German ship construction capabilities and Raeder made no effort to dissuade his leader.

Hitler first mentioned the 35 percent figure to Ambassador Sir Eric Phipps in a conversation in November 1934.¹⁵ Phipps had complained about German rearmament and Hitler was indicating the "limited" character of his plans. In a subsequent visit to Berlin by Lord Lothian, the Secretary to the Rhodes Trust and a keen student of foreign affairs, the Chancellor indicated his desire to settle all outstanding issues between the two countries, "including

the conclusion of a Naval agreement designed to recognize Britain's supremacy at sea."¹⁶ Lothian proposed a visit by the British Foreign Secretary to Germany. The suggestion was taken up and a visit was subsequently arranged for March 1935.

Despite Hitler's announcement on 16 March 1935 of his intention to resume conscription and to enlarge the Army (both in violation of Versailles), the visit by Simon and his deputy Anthony Eden was carried out. The British were desirous of finding some means to achieve a general disarmament arrangement that Germany would accept. During these talks, which were inconclusive, Hitler again broached his proposal for a naval arrangement. At that time Simon told Hitler that:

a figure which he believed had been mentioned to the British Ambassador of 35 per cent of the British fleet would appear to the British Government—apart from any other question—to be so large as to make general agreement almost impossible. The result would therefore be, if that figure were insisted upon, to promote the unlimited armaments race which the Chancellor said the German Government wished to avoid.¹⁷

Hitler did not, however, give up on his proposal; in an address to the Reichstag on 21 May 1935 he would publicly mention it once again.¹⁸ This official speech should have resolved any remaining doubt that Hitler was going to continue to push the 35 percent concept. British preparations for general naval disarmament talks went forward nonetheless, oblivious to the need to deal with Hitler's goals.

In preparing for summoning another naval conference in 1936, the British had discussed with the French, in the summer of 1934, the need to sound out the Germans regarding their plans.¹⁹ The French had not objected and Simon had, in his March 1935 talks with Hitler,

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suggested that detailed conversations between the two countries' naval staffs be conducted in London. It was hoped that such talks would lay the groundwork for bringing Germany into a worldwide treaty system. The offer was accepted by Hitler and, after some shuffling of schedules, it was arranged that a German delegation would arrive in London for talks in late May 1935.

Disregarding the likelihood of the Germans reiterating the 35 percent formula, the Admiralty pressed forward with its own ideas that were directed at general considerations of naval limitation and not specifically toward the emergence of a threat from the German Navy. As finally articulated, they included:

a. German support for a general international convention to deal with qualitative limitation and notification of the construction of new vessels;

b. Elimination in any future naval treaty of ratios of naval strength between the signatories;

c. Negotiation of an understanding regarding the form and substance of declarations to be issued by each Power indicating future construction programs; and

d. A provision in the new treaty recognizing the equality of national status of each signatory of the new treaty, regardless of the size of its navy.²⁰

Perhaps somewhat exasperated, Simon on 25 May asked Craigie, "Do we reject 35 percent or accept it or sidetrack it? That is the main point for public and parliamentary purposes." The reply was,

The answer is that we attempt to sidetrack it in favour of our own proposal for declarations of building programmes, which if adopted, would obviate the necessity of agreeing upon any particular ratio between the two fleets.²¹

It is noteworthy that Phipps, writing from Berlin, was much in favor of

accepting the German proposal²² and Muirhead-Gould in discussing the need for advance notification of German ship construction plan with the German Navy's liaison officer gratuitously used the 35 percent figure as an example.²³ The Cabinet Paper on the proposed agenda for the talks, dated 3 June 1935, reiterated British goals for the talks, but noted,

Presumably Herr Hitler will insist on his 35 percent It would be unwise to make a frontal attack on this declared objective and preferable to concentrate on persuading the Germans to moderate the rate at which they will seek to achieve this new objective.²⁴

The German delegation that participated in the talks was headed by Joachim von Ribbentrop, not a professional diplomat but rather the head of the *Dienststelle Ribbentrop*, a Nazi agency created to collect and analyze foreign intelligence. The *Dienststelle* had been increasingly meddling with Foreign Office affairs and especially those regarding relations with Britain. For the naval talks Ribbentrop, who considered himself an expert on British affairs, was designated Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary on Special Mission much to the disgust of the traditional diplomats. Along with Ribbentrop came Adm. K.G. Schuster, of Raeder's staff, and various other naval and diplomatic officials.²⁵ The British delegation was headed by Simon and included Craigie, Vice Adm. C.J.C. Little, the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, and Capt. V.H. Danckwerts of the Admiralty Plans Division as well as other officials. Significantly, however, no Foreign Office officials who dealt with European political questions were included.

The initial meeting, held on 4 June 1935, was opened by Simon who made a general welcoming speech. Ribbentrop, however, in his response made a categorical demand that the Führer's decision to establish a 35:100 ratio with the

British Navy be accepted as final and not subject to alteration or negotiation. Ribbentrop maintained that the "Germans had assumed the 35 percent ratio was an accepted decision and felt that adjustment could only proceed if this ratio was taken as a basis." Further, "no bargaining on this point could be accepted. In no case did Herr Hitler, after making a serious decision, change his mind one inch."²⁶ Simon was non-plussed at this first exposure to classic Nazi negotiating tactics but, having another meeting to attend, turned discussions over to Craigie who managed to calm Ribbentrop by indicating that only the Cabinet could make a decision on whether to accept the German proposal.

Several further meetings ensued, but Ribbentrop was adamant that the ratio had to be accepted or rejected. On the next day, 5 June, Ribbentrop interrupted the British presentation to reiterate his point:

Could the British Delegation tell the German Delegation, that day or the next day, their reply to the question he had put yesterday? Namely: could they give a clear and formal *recognition of the decision* taken by Herr Hitler in laying down a 35 to 100 ratio between the two countries?²⁷

The British did not in fact take long to make up their minds. According to the biographers of the incoming Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin,

The effective decision was taken on [5 June]. MacDonald gave luncheon to the British and German Delegations and, after the guests had left, he called together a small group of senior Ministers, explaining that Baldwin (to whom he had already given charge of the negotiations) wanted to have a word with them. The discussion was brief . . . the Admiralty and the Foreign Office were in favour of acceptance. Did anyone else object? All the senior Cabinet Ministers who were

present appeared to favour the proposed agreement. Only Mr. Eden had reservations, namely the probable strain that it would place on our relations with France. . . .²⁸

This interpretation is supported by the documents indicating that Craigie had gone to the Carlton Hotel on the afternoon of 5 June with a draft memorandum to show to Ribbentrop to ensure that the German position was correctly described. Craigie also indicated that he intended to submit his memorandum to the Cabinet "if possible on the evening of the same day."²⁹ It may be assumed that Craigie was tying up loose ends left over from the earlier informal Cabinet meeting.

The Cabinet changes that were occurring at this time—Baldwin becoming Prime Minister on 6 June, Hoare going to the Foreign Office, Simon becoming Home Secretary—did not cause any postponement of the negotiations with Ribbentrop. This is one of the more curious aspects of the negotiations. In the midst of a change in governments it seems unlikely that responsible ministers had time to study with care the crucial decisions that had to be made. Indeed, the documentary record suggests that attention to the Agreement was perfunctory and that almost total reliance was placed on Admiralty advice combined with Craigie's recommendations.

In accordance with the decision taken on 5 June, Simon informed Ribbentrop on the following morning that

His Majesty's Government intended to recognise the Reich Chancellor's decision as the basis of future Naval discussions between the British and German Governments, and . . . agree to a permanent relationship between the two fleets in the proportion of 35 for the Germans and 100 for the British Fleet.

Ribbentrop was of course pleased with

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the announcement but insisted that foreign governments being notified of the agreement be advised of a decision by the British Government and not given a chance to state objections. Simon calmly replied that "our language means that we had *decided*."³⁰ Thus did the German representative ensure that maximum consternation would be caused for the French.

The agreement stipulated that the 35 percent ratio would be taken on a category basis, i.e., Germany would build up to 35 percent of the tonnage of British battleships, cruisers, destroyers, etc. Transfers above the 35 percent limit in one category would have to be at the expense of decrements in another, but any proposal to do this would have to be on the basis of conversations between the two Governments "in the light of the Naval situation then existing." The British considered that this language would preclude Germany from outbuilding the Royal Navy in any one class of ship.

The talks then broke for the Whitsuntide holiday and Ribbentrop and his party returned to Berlin. It was decided that another series of sessions would provide for the exchange of ship construction plans and the final signing of the Agreement. The British hoped to avoid a formal treaty as such an action would, in the circumspet words of Craigie, "make it more difficult to meet the argument that we were condoning or confirming Germany's breach of the Treaty of Versailles."³¹

In the second stage of negotiations beginning on 15 June 1935, the Germans made an additional demand that the 35 percent arrangement not include submarines in which category they intended to seek parity with the Royal Navy. The British had to accept this although a compromise was worked out whereby the German Navy could build up to 45 percent of the British submarine tonnage unless Germany felt it necessary to exceed this percentage in

which case notice would be given and the matter "would be the subject of friendly discussion before the German Government exercise that right."³² The desire for more than a 35 percent ratio in the case of submarines had been hinted at by Ribbentrop on 6 June.³³ A German Navy staff document prepared on 12 June 1935 provides background for this claim:

When announcing our claim for parity of submarine tonnage in principle . . . , it seems best to limit ourselves to the near future (perhaps for the period of expansion) to a smaller tonnage, in order not to give the British unnecessary cause for suspicion, particularly since on personnel grounds we cannot go substantially beyond our present programme (35 per cent).³⁴

From this assessment arose the 45 percent figure that apparently did not give the British cause for suspicion. As Professor Watt has written,

The inclusion of the 100 per cent clause in the 1935 Agreement showed that the intention to build up to these limits was always present, and it was invoked as soon as necessary to make the continuing flow of submarine construction beyond the 45 per cent limit legitimate.³⁵

The Agreement, in the desired form of an exchange of diplomatic notes, was signed on 18 June 1935 by Ribbentrop and Samuel Hoare, the new Foreign Secretary. There were several additional meetings of the technical staffs to exchange information about their respective naval construction programs.

When Ribbentrop returned to Berlin, Hitler received him warmly and claimed that because of the Agreement and good news from his doctor about a recent ailment, it was the happiest day of his life. It was undoubtedly not a sad day for Ribbentrop. There had been skepticism among the professional diplomats regarding the possibility of Britain's

acceptance of the arrangement and even a desire to see Ribbentrop sustain a major failure.³⁶ Nonetheless the former champagne salesman had triumphed and gained an increased measure of the Führer's favor.

There can be no doubt that the positions of the Admiralty and of Craigie, who usually reflected Admiralty influence, were decisive in the British acceptance of the German proposal. Admiralty support was publicly alluded to in press and Parliamentary announcements. Indeed Captain Danckwerts told the German Naval Attaché after Ribbentrop had returned to Berlin that, the Admiralty had in the strongest possible manner advocated the new course which had resulted in our 35 per cent "agreement," and had succeeded in this, despite the fact that British Government circles were by no means all convinced that a showdown by force with Germany was beyond the realm of possibility.³⁷

A Naval Staff Memorandum circulated on 5 June 1935 bears out the conclusion of the Admiralty's support referred to in public:

From the point of view of general limitation of naval armament it would be greatly to our advantage to recognise the decision of the German Government lest the demand be increased.³⁸

There is an underlying assumption, evident throughout, that the Germans were only trying to redress grievances and lacked malign ambitions:

It is quite apparent from the attitude of the German representatives that it is a question of *Gleichberechtigung* which is really exercising their minds, and not the desire to acquire a submarine fleet. In the present mood of Germany, it seems probable that the surest way to persuade them to be moderate in their actual performance is to grant them every consideration in theory.³⁹

It might not have been expected that the Admiralty would have spent much time trying to fathom the nature of the Nazi psyche, but what of the Foreign Office officials who were charged with the conduct of British policy regarding Germany? Unfortunately, their role in the acceptance of the German proposal cannot be closely followed. Eden was, as noted above, concerned about the French reaction, but he did not press his concerns very hard and it was he who was later sent to explain the rationale behind the British decisions to both the French and the Italians. Vansittart says little about the Agreement in his memoirs⁴⁰ and there is little written by him on the Agreement in the published documents. Ribbentrop thought he was opposed to the pact, but Hoare said later that on this issue, "Vansittart strongly supported me."⁴¹ It is quite possible that Vansittart was primarily concerned with restraining spending on the Navy to provide funds for the Army and Air Force to put Britain in a better position to challenge Germany. He may then have seen the Agreement as a way to limit naval expenditures, or at least undercut the demands for a larger navy. Wigram's situation is even more strange. Writing in 1963, Valentine Lawford, a retired British diplomat who worked for Wigram in the thirties, recalled Wigram as being highly exercised about the Agreement and particularly by the fact that it was handled by the Admiralty and Craigie of the American Department. When they delved into questions of tonnages, Wigram

was far more exercised by the plain fact—at least it seems plain, even trite, today—that by actively conniving at this further breach of the limiting clauses of the Treaty of Versailles so soon after publicly condemning Hitler's unilateral repudiation of the military restrictions of the Treaty in the spring, Britain was not only encouraging

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German rearmament but gratuitously providing the German Government with just the kind of opportunity they so much relished to drive a wedge between her and her closest friends . . . his private comments on the whole interlude were scathing.⁴²

Yet, curiously, Martin Gilbert's volume of the biography of Churchill that covers this period records a letter from Wigram to Churchill on 18 June 1935 in which the Foreign Office department head wrote in support of the Agreement:

I think anything that will help to extricate us from the disarmament muddle is to be welcomed—and that in the end the French will not regret that we cut the Gordian Knot for them. And after all we are the people who bear the brunt on the sea.⁴³

Wigram carried on an extensive correspondence with Churchill and it is doubtful that he was merely parroting the official line; it is possible that he initially went along with the Admiralty position until the French views became known and it was his later opinions that were recalled by Lawford.

Oddly, it is Simon who may have offered the most resistance. His initial rebuff to Hitler in March has been noted. Professor Norman Gibbs writes, based on extensive research in the Cabinet papers, that

in this particular case Simon had clearly warned his colleagues, and more than once, against the 35 per cent provision and against concluding a separate arrangement with Germany outside a general treaty to supersede those of Washington and London.⁴⁴

Simon says almost nothing about the Agreement in his memoirs while Hoare defends it extensively in his.⁴⁵ Simon may have been reluctant to lead the fight against the Admiralty, especially at the very end of his

tenure at the Foreign Office.

It is probable that Treasury officials were quite pleased with the Agreement although there is no specific evidence of any direct Treasury involvement in the negotiations. However, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Neville Chamberlain, was a constant defender of the Agreement and considered it then and later a prime example of the possibilities of Anglo-German cooperation.

Thus the British accepted Hitler's offer of a naval arrangement. The Admiralty and Robert Craigie, head of the American Department in the Foreign Office, had undoubtedly the major influence on the decision. For one reason or another, the political experts responsible for Anglo-German relations supported the Admiralty or else made their objections quietly. It was a difficult time for the political leadership: the attention of all was focused on the change in governments and quite possibly the decision to approve the pact result in some measure from absence of mind.

Hostile reaction from abroad was nonetheless quick in coming as was criticism in Parliament. More significantly, however, the signing of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935 was the first stop on a 4-year excursion along a policy of appeasement that ended with Britain and Germany once again at war.

Reaction to the Agreement. The immediate reaction to the Agreement by the other naval powers was mixed. The Japanese were pleased, knowing that a larger German Navy would inevitably tie up British forces in Europe. Drawing diametrically opposite conclusions, Washington was also pleased inasmuch as Germany "is prepared to regard a ratio between the British and German fleets . . . as final, irrespective of future construction by third powers."⁴⁶ The State Department thought that the Agreement would in

fact enable the British to maintain strong forces in the Far East:

Our first concern is with relations in the Pacific, where the navies of the United States, Great Britain and Japan are the controlling factors. The immediate influence of the naval armaments of the Continental states is confined to the Eastern Atlantic and to European waters in which our interest is relatively small.⁴⁷

Accordingly, the State Department was careful to avoid commenting on any matter affecting European arrangements.

The Russians considered the agreement as a setback for Britain. According to William Bullitt, the American Ambassador to the Soviet Union,

The Russians point out that the construction of the new German fleet will make it necessary for England to retain the greater part of her naval forces in the North Sea, that she will have to diminish her forces in the Mediterranean and that it will be absolutely impossible for her to send a fleet to Singapore.⁴⁸

The signing of the Agreement only a few weeks after Stresa convinced Mussolini of the undependability of British policy. Seeing the British accept the breaking of the Versailles Treaty led the Italian dictator to believe that he could pursue his aims in Abyssinia without undue concern. The subsequent strong British reaction may have been the major factor in his ultimate alliance with Germany.⁴⁹

The French more than any other power had the most to lose from any breach in the Versailles settlement. That Britain would sign an agreement flagrantly in contradiction with Versailles and with previous agreements with Paris was a grave shock and the French protest was sent in strong terms.⁵⁰ It arrived, however, too late to be considered before the Agreement

was officially signed on 18 June and, in any event, futilely as Ribbentrop had already ensured that the British decision was final. As Professor Watt has written,

By the conclusion of the Agreement, which amounted in French eyes to sheer betrayal and certain ruin of French efforts to win naval independence from Great Britain throughout the 1922-34 period, the admiralty had fatally ruined all chances of friendly co-operation with the French navy. At one stroke all France's efforts were rendered useless.⁵¹

The effect of the Agreement was deep; the sense of British unwillingness to stand against Germany probably influenced France's willingness to stand by when Germany invaded the Rhineland only 9 months later. The British had not expected that the Agreement would be so ill-received in Paris. They were focusing almost single-mindedly on questions of international arms control and questions relating to the European balance of power were not given full weight. In addition, the British felt that French intransigence over the air clauses of Versailles may have already precluded an agreement with Berlin that would have limited the buildup of the German Air Force.⁵²

A special problem was the naval situation in the Baltic. The Scandinavian countries had only recently supported the protests of Britain, France and Italy against German conscription. Now the British agreed to the creation of a German Navy that could easily control the Baltic (at least unless the Russians sought to provide a challenge). It is curious that the available British documents do not reflect concern with this aspect of the problem despite Britain's historic concern with the naval balance of power in both the Baltic and the adjoining North Sea.⁵³

In the British Parliament the Agreement came under heavy criticism,

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especially for the influence it was having on Anglo-French relations. Winston Churchill, who had long been out of favor among his fellow Conservatives, said in the House of Commons:

I do not believe that this isolated action by Great Britain will be found to work for the cause of peace. The immediate reaction is that every day the German Fleet approaches a tonnage which gives it absolute command of the Baltic, and very soon one of the deterrents of a European war will gradually fade away. So far as the position in the Mediterranean is concerned, it seems to me that we are in for very great difficulties.

The British Fleet, when this programme is completed, will be largely anchored to the North Sea. That means to say the whole position in the Far East has been very gravely altered, to the detriment of the United States and of Great Britain and to the detriment of China⁵⁴

In response Hoare and Sir Bolton Eyres-Monsell, the First Lord of the Admiralty, argued that Britain had to face the facts of German rearmament and endeavor to find a way to place limits on the expansion of the German Navy. They stated that an agreement Germany voluntarily entered into would be respected. When asked about the submarine provisions of the Agreement, Government speakers answered that Germany had agreed to abide by the provisions of Part IV of the 1930 London Treaty that prohibited what had been known as unrestricted submarine warfare.⁵⁵ This supposedly was a secure protection of British sealanes. Despite the criticism, the Government was supported in the House of Commons on 22 July 1935 by a vote of 247 to 44 (with Churchill voting in the majority).

It is interesting to note the reaction to the Agreement of the semiofficial

Journal of the Royal United Services Institution. In May 1935 the *Journal* noted the German Government's announcement regarding the intended acquisition of submarines:

In effect, therefore, it is the obvious intention of Germany to recover everything she lost in the War. In spite of her protestations of peace, it is plain that, unless the late allies are sufficiently well armed to make the risks too great, she will, sooner or later, fight for what she wants if she cannot obtain it by any other means.

However, in August of the same year, the tone was changed:

. . . those who are not anxious to make political capital by distortion of facts cannot fail to appreciate that the British Government have seized an opportunity which it would have been unpardonable to have evaded or allowed to slip through procrastination.⁵⁶

Results of the Naval Agreement.

There are many ways to interpret the implications of the Agreement for subsequent Anglo-German relations. It is true that until Hitler denounced the Agreement on 28 April 1939 the Germans did substantially live up to it. It is equally valid to note that it would have been very difficult, if not impossible, for the Germans to have found the resources to have built more ships and submarines in the years 1935 to 1939 and that plans for further expansion were in any event proceeding. Professor Watt argues that, while a few orders were taken by German firms from foreign countries after 1935, this resulted from the German need for foreign exchange and "in fact the German naval construction programme suffered considerably during 1936-38 from the general strain of rearmament upon the German economy."⁵⁷ In 1938 Hitler did decide to build submarines up to 100 percent of the British tonnage

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and it was these boats that came to pose the greatest threat to Britain in World War II.

There are a number of reasons why the Admiralty in 1935 was not sufficiently concerned about the potential submarine threat—overconfidence in sonar (then known as *asdic*), the prevailing belief in the effectiveness of surface ships in antisubmarine warfare, and an understandable inability to foresee that German submarines would eventually be operating out of French ports on the Atlantic.⁵⁸

Admiral Charfield, the First Sea Lord in 1935, continued to defend the Agreement after the end of World War II:

It was a unique treaty, this voluntary acceptance of armed inferiority on the seas, advantageous on balance to this country and the Empire and from practical considerations equally so to France.⁵⁹

The fundamental assumption of British naval planning had been that,

if Britain's ratio with Japan were preserved, and if Germany accepted thirty-five percent of British strength "we can face hostilities against Germany in Europe, with France as our ally, and at the same time preserve a defensive position against Japan."⁶⁰

In actual fact the Agreement did not prove to be advantageous; the growth of the German Navy meant that the British could not maintain a defensive position in the Far East and the French Navy was not in a position to cooperate. The arguments made by Hoare⁶¹ that the Agreement effectively restrained the expansion of the German Navy have been dealt with by Professor Watt who notes that the Germans would have been unable in any event to exceed the limits they accepted in the Agreement; in fact, the British Admiralty did not even expect the Germans to be able to exceed the 35 percent limit. Watt argues that, compared to the Luftwaffe and the Army, the German Navy "was a luxury."⁶²

It is also noteworthy that while the British focused on the Agreement's supposed beneficial effects on their naval balance with the Germans, the latter took a broader, more political outlook. An August 1935 German Naval Staff memorandum, after noting the implications of the Agreement for naval planning, claimed that,

The success of the Agreement lies principally in the political sphere. In this respect its consequences should not be underrated. As a result of the Agreement the most powerful of our former enemies and of the signatories of the Versailles Treaty has formally invalidated an important part of this Treaty and formally recognized Germany's equality of rights. The danger of Germany's being isolated, which definitely threatened in March and April of this year, has been eliminated. A political understanding with Great Britain has been initiated by the naval settlement. The front recently formed against us by the Stresa Powers has been considerably weakened by the Agreement.⁶³

Thus the evidence from the German side, available only after the war, gives a clear indication that the British were set up for the purpose of discrediting Versailles. The plans of the German Navy were not in fact constrained by the Agreement; when the submarine construction program began to reach the agreed-upon limits, the Germans demanded the 100 percent ratio and within a few months the entire Agreement was denounced. It can of course be argued that Hitler may have actually intended that the Agreement be the first stage in an evolving Anglo-German condominium, but this concept does no credit to those responsible for signing the Agreement as such an alliance could have been made only at the cost of all British interests as traditionally understood.⁶⁴

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It is extremely difficult to see in retrospect how the British could have solved the dilemmas of their naval policy in the thirties. To have reached an agreement with Japan, had one been possible, in order to concentrate on Europe would have alienated Washington and might have precluded the fruitful Anglo-American naval cooperation of 1940-1941. The failure to provide adequately for the defense of Singapore and the impetuous decision to send *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse* to the Far East in 1941 were reflections of the more serious problems that afflicted Britain's strategic planning. The acceptance of the 35 percent ratio was but another. Unfortunately, it only made the difficulties worse.

Britain's unwillingness to coordinate defense and foreign policy with France in the interwar years is a constant and tragic theme that is clearly seen in the Anglo-German Naval Agreement. The fact that inadequate thought was given to either the political or naval implications for France reflects great discredit upon the British Governments of the day. While it might not have been possible to have prevented German naval rearmament, closer cooperation with the French could have strengthened the military and diplomatic positions of both countries. At the least a greater willingness to undertake naval cooperation with the French who faced a "two-ocean" threat could have been useful and not very costly.

That British diplomats and Cabinet members would so supinely yield to Ribbentrop's badgering was an unfortunate portent. It is occasionally necessary to make a diplomatic retreat, but a voluntary capitulation can only induce heavier pressure. The same tactics that carried the day for the Germans in June 1935 would be employed continually and usually with success by Hitler, reaching their culmination at Munich in September 1938.

Beyond the failure of British nego-

tiating techniques, however, lies a larger failure to conceive a successful strategy for dealing with an aggressive Germany. As indicated earlier, British policy toward Germany was in flux at the time of the naval negotiations in 1935. It would continue to move in fits and starts for the next 2 years only to be solidified by Neville Chamberlain when he became Prime Minister in May 1937. Chamberlain unfortunately believed that the precedent established by the Agreement was a sure guide to future British policy. The importance placed by the Chamberlain government in the 1935 Agreement is reflected in a long message from Lord Halifax, Chamberlain's Foreign Secretary, to the British Ambassador in Berlin in August 1938 at the time of the Czechoslovakian crisis:

This is not to say that we have not every interest in avoiding a denunciation of the Anglo-German Agreement of 1935, which would create a present state of uncertainty as to Germany's intentions and the ultimate threat of an attempt at parity with our navy which must be regarded as potentially dangerous Indeed, so important is the naval Agreement to His Majesty's Government that it is difficult to conceive that any general understanding between Great Britain and Germany . . . would any longer be possible were the German Government to denounce the Naval Agreement.⁶⁵

Chamberlain's policy of appeasement implied Britain's willingness to accept the end of the Versailles system, to ratify the growth of German power in international agreements and to let ties with France go slack—all portended in the Naval Agreement of 1935. It is not without significance that Chamberlain and Hitler would refer to the Naval Agreement in the document that the British Prime Minister would so proudly wave on his return from Munich:

We regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again.⁶⁶

The extent to which Chamberlain saw the Naval Agreement as a model for his larger policies had already been revealed to the House of Commons on 26 July 1938. When Hitler proposed the Naval Agreement, according to the Prime Minister, he

made a notable gesture of a most practical kind in the direction of peace, the value of which it seems to me has not ever been fully appreciated as tending towards this general appeasement. There the treaty stands as a demonstration that it is possible for Germany and ourselves to agree upon matters which are vital to both of us.⁶⁷

Such trust in the peaceful intentions of Adolf Hitler was to have its reward. All that the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935 had accomplished was, in Churchill's words, "to authorize Germany to build to her utmost capacity for five or six years to come."⁶⁸ All that Chamberlain's policy of appeasement accomplished was to ensure the outbreak of world war.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



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NOTES

1. Published as "Exchange of Notes Between the Government of the German Reich and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom Regarding the Limitation of Naval Armaments. London, June 18th, 1935," *League of Nations Treaty Series*, 1935, No. 3701. Also, *British Treaty Series* (1935), No. 22.

2. Some knowledgeable historians argue that it was much more Japanese recalcitrance than American pressure that precluded an Anglo-Japanese rapprochement in the 1930s despite tentative feelers from London. See Norman Gibbs, "The Naval Conferences of the Interwar Years: A Study in Anglo-American Relations," *Naval War College Review*, Summer 1977, p. 61; and Ann Trotter, *Britain and East Asia 1933-1937* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 88-114.

3. Quoted in Meredith William Berg, "Admiral William H. Stanley and the Second London Naval Treaty, 1934-1936," *The Historian*, February 1971, p. 224.

4. There was another important aspect to this question. The Navy was not by itself in making claims to higher expenditures; the Army and the Air Force also needed improvement if some viable effort was to be made to keep up with a rearming Germany. The nature of the conflict for which planning should be undertaken was necessarily uncertain and controversial. Nonetheless, there was a determination to avoid the commitment of large ground forces to continental warfare in the light of the experience of World War I. Countering the new threat of aerial bombardment was, however, recognized to have a high priority and would require major investment. The Royal Navy, despite skillful infighting and the sympathy that was accorded to the "senior service," did not receive adequate funds to increase its capabilities against the threat in the Far East. Priorities were judged to be higher elsewhere. See G.C. Peden, *British Rearmament and the Treasury* (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1979), p. 167. It is also noteworthy that not only public antipathy to higher defense expenditures but also opposition from the United States served to limit expanded ship construction; the Roosevelt administration wanted parity with the Royal Navy but did not want to have to embark on a major building campaign of its own.

It should not be overlooked in considering the background of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement that those officials most determined to counter the German challenge, particularly Sir Robert Vansittart and Warren Fisher at the Foreign Office and Treasury respectively, were arguing for increased Army and air defense funding. They, too, recoiled from the necessity of heavily increased naval expenditures as such might have detracted from higher priority efforts. There seems to be a good possibility that this factor may have inhibited Vansittart in particular from opposing the Anglo-German Naval Agreement to the extent

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that otherwise would have been the case. See Michael Howard, *The Continental Commitment* (London: Temple Smith, 1972), especially pp. 96-120 and Stephen E. Pelz, *Race to Pearl Harbor: The Failure of the Second Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), especially pp. 104-110.

5. John Maynard Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (London: Macmillan, 1919).

6. Viscount Templewood (Sir Samuel Hoare), *Nine Troubled Years* (London: Collins, 1954), p. 137.

7. Articles 181 through 197 of the Treaty of Paris limited the German Navy to six battleships, six light cruisers, 12 destroyers and 12 torpedo boats. Article 191 forbade the construction or acquisition of submarines.

8. Stephen Roskill, *Naval Policy Between the Wars: Vol. II, The Period of Reluctant Rearmament, 1930-1939* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1976), p. 302.

9. Raeder wrote in his memoirs that, "Not until Hitler's conference of 22 August 1938 had the Navy ever had any real concern over having to meet England as a definite opponent." See his *My Life* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1960), p. 279. Some recent research, however, indicates that "as early as 1934 . . . Britain was once again seen as the future enemy" and Raeder was in fact planning at the time for a Navy 50 percent as large as Britain's. Fritz Fischer, "Recent Works on German Naval Policy," *European Studies Review*, October 1975, p. 459. Fischer was commenting on Jost Dülffer, *Hitler und die Marine, Reichspolitik und Flottenbau 1920-1939* (Dusseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1973).

10. *Documents on British Foreign Policy*, Ser. 2, v. XIII, No. 129. (Hereafter cited as *DBFP*.)

11. *Ibid.*, No. 157, No. 165 and *Documents on German Foreign Policy*, Ser. C., v. IV, No. 66. (Hereafter cited as *DGFP*.)

12. *DGFP*, Ser. C., v. IV, No. 25.

13. International Military Tribunal, *The Trial of the Major War Criminals* (Nuremberg, Germany: International Military Tribunal, 1948), v. XIV, pp. 24-25.

14. D.C. Watt, "The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935: An Interim Judgment," *Journal of Modern History*, June 1956, p. 174.

15. *DBFP*, Ser. 2, v. XII, No. 230; *DGFP*, Ser. C., v. III, No. 358.

16. D.C. Watt, *Personalities and Policies: Studies in the Formulation of British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century* (London: Longmans, Green, 1965), p. 127.

17. *DBFP*, Ser. 2, v. XII, No. 651.

18. Norman H. Baynes, ed., *The Speeches of Adolf Hitler April 1922-August 1939* (London: Oxford University Press, 1942), pp. 1242-1243.

19. N.H. Gibbs, *Grand Strategy: Vol. I, Rearmament Policy* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1976), pp. 156-157.

20. *DBFP*, Ser. 2, v. XIII, No. 282, Annex 1.

21. *Ibid.*, No. 211, fn. 3.

22. *Ibid.*, No. 230.

23. *Ibid.*, No. 271. This blunder did not go unnoticed; the unfortunate attaché had to explain to the German Liaison Officer that no significance should be given to his use of this percentage. *Ibid.*, Nos. 280 and 285.

24. *Ibid.*, No. 304.

25. See Gordon A. Craig, "The German Foreign Office from Neurath to Ribbentrop," in Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, eds., *The Diplomats: Vol. II, The Thirties* (New York: Atheneum, 1965).

26. *DBFP*, Ser. 2, v. XIII, No. 289.

27. *Ibid.*, No. 304. Emphasis in original.

28. Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, *Baldwin: A Biography* (New York: Macmillan, 1970), p. 827.

29. *DGFP*, Ser. C., v. IV, No. 135.

30. *DBFP*, Ser. 2, v. XIII, No. 311.

31. *Ibid.*, No. 329.

32. *Ibid.*, No. 348, Annex.

33. *Ibid.*, No. 311.

34. *DGFP*, Ser. C., v. IV, No. 148.

35. Watt, "Anglo-German Naval Agreement," p. 172.

36. "The conclusion of this agreement, which effectively destroyed the Stresa front, was Hitler's greatest victory to date, and it was one which redounded especially to Ribbentrop's credit. This was due less to the fact that he had negotiated the agreement personally—although that, of course, had its importance—than to the fact that he had done so after the professional diplomats had declared categorically that an agreement was impossible," Craig, p. 424.

37. *DGFP*, Ser. C., v. IV, No. 161.

38. *DBFP*, Ser. 2, v. XIII, No. 305, Annex.

39. *Ibid.*

40. Sir Robert Vansittart, *The Mist Procession: The Autobiography of Lord Vansittart* (London: Hutchinson, 1958). Nor is there much on the Agreement in Ian Colvin, *Vansittart in Office* (London: Gollancz, 1965).
41. Joachim von Ribbentrop, *The Ribbentrop Memoirs* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1954), pp. 42-44; Templewood, p. 145.
42. Valentine Lawford, *Bound for Diplomacy* (London: John Murray, 1963), p. 262.
43. Martin Gilbert, *Winston S. Churchill: Vol. V, 1922-1939* (London: Heinemann, 1976), p. 655.
44. Gibbs, *Grand Strategy*, p. 166.
45. Sir John Simon, *Retrospect: The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Viscount Simon* (London: Hutchinson, 1952); Templewood.
46. *DBFP*, Ser. 2, v. XIII, No. 328; *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1935, v. 1, Hull to Bingham, 11 June 1935, p. 165. (Hereafter cited as *FRUS*.)
47. *FRUS*, 1935, v. 1, Hull to Bullitt, 7 May 1935, p. 162.
48. *Ibid.*, Bullitt to Hull, 28 June 1935, p. 168. The Soviet attitude was also conveyed directly to the British; see *DBFP*, Ser. 2, v. XIII, No. 359.
49. Watt, "Anglo-German Naval Agreement," pp. 158-159.
50. See *DBFP*, Ser. 2, v. XIII, No. 345.
51. Watt, "Anglo-German Naval Agreement," p. 173.
52. See Templewood, p. 145.
53. *The Times* (London), 6 July 1935, p. 11; also Fletcher Pratt, *Sea Power and Today's War* (New York: Harriman Hilton Books, 1939), pp. 107-108.
54. Quoted in Winston S. Churchill, *The Gathering Storm* (New York: Bantam Books, 1961), p. 126.
55. 303 H.C. Deb. 5 s., 25 June 1935, cols. 948-949.
56. *Journal of the Royal United Services Institution*, May 1935, p. 407; August 1935, p. 627.
57. D.C. Watt, "Anglo-German Naval Negotiations on the Eve of the Second World War," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institution*, May 1958, p. 203.
58. Insufficient appreciation of the capabilities of submarines was not limited to British admirals; Raeder had a similar lack of confidence in his submarines. He was dilatory in carrying out Hitler's orders for increased submarine construction and, partially for this reason, was eventually replaced by Admiral Dönitz, the head of the German Navy's submarine force. See D.C. Watt, "Anglo-German Naval Negotiations on the Eve of the Second World War," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institution*, August 1958, pp. 386-391.
59. Sir Ernle Chatfield, *It Might Happen Again* (London: Heinemann, 1947), p. 75.
60. Quoted in Pelz, p. 153.
61. Templewood, pp. 135-148.
62. Watt, "Anglo-German Naval Agreement," pp. 171-173. In 1938, the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, wrote in a cable to the Ambassador in Berlin, "At the time of the conclusion of the Agreement, the German Government were well aware that 35 per cent of our navy was probably the most that they could hope to achieve for a considerable period of years." *DBFP*, Ser. 3, v. III, Appendix VII.
63. *DGFP*, Ser. C., v. IV, No. 275.
64. Hitler's interest in an alliance with Britain (which apparently did not die until after Munich) is described in Klaus Hilderbrand, *The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970).
65. *DBFP*, Ser. 2, v. III, Appendix VII.
66. *Ibid.*, v. II, No. 1228, Appendix.
67. 338 H.C. Deb. 5 s., 26 July 1938, cols. 2959-2960.
68. Churchill, p. 128.

