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

SET AND DRIFT

SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE: WHY MOST HAVE FAILED

by

F.J. West, Jr.*

Of the 14 Secretaries of Defense, six were fired and five others dismissed after Presidential elections. It is a post that has been called "the graveyard of political ambitions." This paper explains the pitfalls of the office in terms of the conflicting roles a Secretary must play. Despite their impressive prior experiences, Defense Secretaries tend to confuse priorities among their roles and spend too much time and energy on the wrong issues. More than any other Cabinet member, a Defense Secretary is bushwhacked—caught off balance by a crisis that pertains to one role while he is concentrating on another role. The Pentagon staffs unwittingly abet this unpreparedness by demanding that the Secretary devote himself to rhe role of internal management. No Secretary has come to grief directly through charges of mismanagement; it is the other roles of the Secretary, as this paper will show in a brief history, that can and do result in failure.

History of Defense Seeretaries

JAMES VINCENT FORRESTAL
Age: 55
Tour: 18 months (September 1947-March 1949)

Perhaps humorless and too intense, Forrestal had an understanding of the nature of the cold war that was more realistic than was Truman's. The problem was that he could not secure fiscal or policy agreement among the Chiefs nor could he persuade Truman to give DOD anywhere near adequare funding. Truman lost confidence in Forrestal, on personal and domestic political grounds (Forrestal played footsie with Dewey), and fired him after the 1948 Presidential election. Forrestal, who committed suicide, has been held as a model and a warning to all his successors. His gloomy portrait is the centerpiece of the Secretary's office. He saw his duty; he knew the threat; he lost the confidence of his President.

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LOUIS ARTHUR JOHNSON
Age: 58
Tour: 18 months (March 1949-September 1950)

Depicted as tough, inexperienced and poorly staffed, Johnson antagonized the military. He lost control of the Pentagon when he cancelled the Navy's supercarrier and provoked "the revolt of the admirals." The Navy in turn attacked the concept of U.S. Air Force power in a nuclear war. More serious still, Johnson endorsed Truman's pell-mell demobilization. Historians depict Johnson as the worst Secretary of Defense because he claimed he was eliminating fat when he was cutting muscle. Although in early 1950 Truman ordered less spending for Defense, he made Johnson the scapegoat for our tragic unpreparedness when the Korean war broke out. Consequently, Johnson was fired just as MacArthur was seizing Inchon.

GEORGE CATLETT MARSHALL
Age: 70
Tour: 12 months (September 1950-September 1951)

Brought in to restore DOD morale and public image, General Marshall saw the Defense budget tripled in one congressional session. Marshall endorsed Truman's decision to fire MacArthur and led the effort on the Hill to explain the decision.

ROBERT A. LOVETT
Age: 56
Tour: 15 months (September 1951-January 1953)

Well qualified and groomed by Marshall (as his Undersecretary of State and then Deputy Secretary of Defense), Lovett viewed his job as a holding action, with Democrats seeming sure losers in the upcoming Presidential elections. Lovett, a master of negotiation, liked the Chiefs and was able to strike short-term fiscal bargains acceptable to all parties.

CHARLES E. WILSON
Age: 62
Tour: About 5 years (January 1953-October 1957)

Master of the malapropos statement—what was good for General Motors was good for the country—Wilson was only the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Procurement. Eisenhower believed that as President he needed no advice on military strategy and policy, while Dulles ran foreign policy. Wilson was supposed to look after weapons systems, but he couldn't convince Congress that he could do that job. While Ike's policy of the "New Look" relied upon airpower and nuclear retaliation, the "Bomber Gap" hearings and the Bison "fly-by" in the 1955 Moscow May Day parade hurt Wilson's credibility. "Massive Retaliation" frustrated the Army and Navy, who argued their cases in the press. Ridgway was especially outspoken and alienated from Wilson and Eisenhower. Wilson did not know how to whet the proper organizational incentives when there was no profit and loss statement against which to measure investment in different Services, policies, and weapons. He was pressured to resign.

NEIL H. McELROY
Age: 53
Tour: 26 months (October 1957-December 1959)

The Proctor and Gamble man served under the shadow of *sputnik*, his tour dominated by fearful public perceptions of the strategic arms race and by congressional insistence that any successful Soviet test flight proved the existence of a full-blown weapon system. His first priority was Congress, which pushed more money at him than Eisenhower would allow him to spend. With the Services engaged in missile rivalry, McElroy tried to manage by constraining systems and parameters (e.g., an Army missile could not exceed a 200-mile range). Frustrated by the Services'

effort to overcome his strictures, he came, like Wilson, to long for the simplicity of business management. He could neither understand nor really control the Services. Although his procurement decisions were later proven to be sound, Congress and the public had scant faith in him. As Forrestal had said: "You not only have to do a good job, but the public has to be convinced you are doing a good job."

THOMAS GATES
Age: 53
Tour: 14 months (December 1959-January 1961)

Gates felt comfortable, drawing on 6 years' experience in the Navy Secretariat, with the Chiefs and worked hard to persuade them to pull together. He was, however, unable to knock down the politically inspired "missile gap" allegation in the 1960 election. Eisenhower did not permit Nixon even a token increase in Defense. Gates was a better Secretary than John F. Kennedy could publicly admit.

ROBERT STRANGE McNAMARA
Age: 44
Tour: Almost 7 years (January 1961-November 1967)

McNamara centralized peacetime control of defense. He tightened managerial control despite the hostility of the JCS because the fiscal environment was benign: Congress was appropriating successively higher budgets and the readiness of general-purpose forces improved. His procurement practices ran to mixed reviews. While he cancelled the nuclear aircraft, *Snark* and *Skybolt*, his assumption that centralization meant efficiency met disaster in the TFX. The notion of total package procurement, partially the fault of Congress, was ultimately shown to be wasteful. He enjoyed a fine press, legitimacy in academia, and extraordinary relations with JFK and liberal Democrats, a power position that enabled him to influence foreign policy and national security strategy. During the Vietnam War, he lost faith in the methods and purposes that he had initiated. When he lost the trust of the military, the Congress and the White House, he ceased to be Secretary of Defense. In an accidental act of mercy, President Johnson fired him.

CLARK CLIFFORD
Age: 62
Tour: 13 months (December 1967-December 1968)

Chosen for his political skills and counsel to LBJ, Clifford delegated to his subordinates all DOD matters save Vietnam. After Tet of 1968, he was convinced that the war was lost and devoted himself to convincing LBJ in order to minimize the political damage to the Democratic Party.

MELVIN R. LAIRD
Age: 47
Tour: 4 years (January 1969-December 1972)

During Laird's tenure, the public image of the military was at its nadir with My Lai, the Lavelle case, the secret Cambodian bombings and Kent State. The Administration was slashing military manpower, and Congress was growing more hostile each year. But by returning to the Services considerable voice in allocating their shares of the budget, and by assuring them that he was warding off a voracious Congress, Laird succeeded in reducing DOD without provoking disgruntlement—a considerable feat. Intellectually uninterested in strategic or managerial matters, Laird allowed his Deputy to run the building while he concentrated upon politics and withdrawal from Vietnam. In this latter task, because he had an independent power base, he was moderately able to pressure and to disagree with Nixon and Kissinger. Laird understood how to use power and influence.

ELLIOT RICHARDSON
Age: 53
Tour: 4 months (January 1973-April 1973)

Richardson had no effect upon the Department of Defense.

JAMES RODNEY SCHLESINGER
Age: 44
Tour: 29 months (May 1973-October 1975)

Well prepared by intellect and experience (RAND, OMB, AEC, CIA), he modified strategic nuclear doctrine and bolstered general-purpose forces. He dealt well with the Chiefs, using organizational incenrives to induce change (16 divisions vice headquarters, the F-16 vice the F-15). Schlesinger's focus was outside the Pentagon, as both Vietnam and Cambodia were falling. His main concern was the trend in rhe worldwide balance between the Soviets and the United States. Singleminded in his determination to turn around 8 years of reductions in the Defense program, he clashed with Kissinger and he was cut off from communication with President Ford and lost his trust. He was fired, owing to personalities and the impending Presidential elections.

DONALD R. RUMSFELD
Age: 47
Tour: 13 months (November 1975-December 1976)

Ambitious and shrewd, Rumsfeld moved from being Chief of Staff in the White House to the Pentagon. He had the President's trust and was able to resrore funding lost under Schlesinger. Although his tenure was overshadowed by the Presidential election and by the media focus on Kissinger, his greatest achievement was preventing an unequal SALT II.

HAROLD BROWN
Age: 52
Tour: 4 years (January 1977-December 1980)

Acclaimed as intelligent and shy, Brown understood fully Defense programs. However, he was caught in an impossible dilemma: remaining steadfastly loyal to a President who did not believe force should be a major component of international relations, while trying to strengthen U.S. forces. DOD followed the budget and the budget followed domestic politics. Gradually Brown lost considerable support within the military as well as within the Congress. In accordance with Mr. Carter's campaign promise, he initially reduced the Ford defense budget and imposed major cuts in naval forces in favor of land forces for the NATO Central Front. After the Soviers invaded Afghanistan, however, he changed force priorities in favor of non-NATO forces.

Roles of the Secretary of Defense. Even this brief history reveals five key requiremenrs and roles of a Secretary:

1. Retain the confidence of rhe President and the Congress.
2. Manage in war or severe crises.
3. Set policy.
4. Procure adequate resources/dollars.
5. Manage the Department of Defense.

Retaining Confidence. It would seem superfluous to say thar a Defense Secretary must retain the confidence of the President, the Congress and the public. Yet four Secretaries were fired when a President lost faith in them, while three others incurred the severe displeasure of the Congress.

The problem is not resrricted to the capture of a Cabinet officer by parochial special-interest groups. There is an institutional tension between the White House expectation of Cabinet loyalty to the President as a politician and the Defense/military expectation of the Secretary's integrity as the "Keeper of National Security." Clifford was determined to persuade Johnson that the Vietnam War was wrong for the

Democratic Party and for the country. Laird, Packard, Scheslinger, Rumsfeld and Clements—strange bedfellows—had in common opposition to Kissinger's SALT terms and public promises. This opposition was not just about power and personalities; at base the issue was about national security.

Although Defense-White House relations are essential to the job of Secretary of Defense, very few members of the Secretary's staff are involved. Consequently, there are few channels of information and of two-way communications. Too often a Defense Secretary has been blindsided by the White House, because there have been inadequate signals and inadequate dialogue. Therefore, the Reagan administration's proposed increase in White House-Cabinet interaction is of as much benefit to the Defense Secretary as to the President. It will, of course, entail reorganization of the Secretary's staff.

A Secretary must also retain the faith of the Congress. Wilson and McElroy failed to do so because such Soviet spectaculars as *sputnik* evoked no White House agreement with Congress to raise Defense spending even by a token amount. McNamara and Brown also lost the confidence of the Congress.

Crisis/War Management. The second role of the Defense Secretary is as the manager of crises or wars. Eight Secretaries have served during wars. Louis Johnson and Robert McNamara failed in this role, while Marshall, Lovett, Laird and Schlesinger did well. From a management perspective, this role merits a note of caution. Most often, wars and crises involving the United States are not occurring. Therefore, there is a tendency on rhe part of staffs to press for Secretarial decisions on important but rather routine matters. For the past two decades, for instance, most Secretaries have devoted their summers to reviewing OSD budgetary issue papers. Yet whenever a crisis came along, whoever was the Secretary quickly passed the issue paper review to his deputy. Indeed, Clifford's performance in 1968 showed how many tasks could be handled by an able deputy (as Paul Nitze was). A Defense Secretary should, then, insure that there are institutional mechanisms that relieve him of routine decisionmaking yet allow him to intervene on managerial matters of overriding importance.

Set Policy. In the 1950s, Eisenhower and Dulles determined military and foreign policy, while the Secretary of Defense was expected only to look after procurement. The arrangement was not to the benefit of national security nor of the Secretary of Defense. In the sixties, McNamara executed the "Flexible Response" strategy and concocted his one-sided policy/theory of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). In the seventies, Defense and State fought each other. Laird struggled against Kissinger, as did Schlesinger. The latter dismantled MAD, while Kissinger stressed détente, negotiations and "linkage," seeking China as a counterweight. Over the past 4 years, friction between State and Defense has grown, especially as regards Southwest Asia and the Middle East.

It would be a mistake to reapply the Eisenhower model to the 1980s. Even given good will among key personalities (which has not existed for a decade), State and Defense represent different interests that are bound to conflict on many occasions. The first task of State, today, is to regain allied confidence and cooperation. The first role of Defense is to strengthen deterrence in the Persian Gulf. The danger is that a rush to SALT would deemphasize both priorities. In the longer run, Defense must articulate a coherent overarching security policy, as Massive Retaliation was to the fifties, Flexible Response was to the sixties and Strategic Retreat was to the seventies. Defense cannot abdicate to State responsibility for security policy, although it will be tempting to do so.

Secure Resources. This role brought to grief Wilson, McElroy, Gates and Schlesinger. For the next few years, money should not be a major issue, provided the Services will agree and provided military pay is a firm Secretarial priority. Laird kept the loyalty of the Chiefs on a decreasing budget; SecDef concern and honesty about the limits to Republican (and national) largesse can prevent stories about "hollow" armies and "unready" navies. This is not meant to be either Rafshoonian or Pollyannaish. Unless there is a remarkable change in our allies, within 4 years some tough, radical policy options will be needed for determining the type, missions and deployments of U.S. forces. For this reason, Defense must establish a respected policymaking role. If rhe international security environment does continue to deteriorate, the Secretary must eventually be able to speak out on the basis of a reputation for thoughtful policymaking.

Manage DoD. Forrestal said: "The peacetime mission of the Armed Services is to destroy the Secretary of Defense." Drucker, in his book *Management,* claims DoD is "unmanageable" because of its size and complexity. According to polls, the public believes the poor state of military readiness is caused by inefficiency, not by a lack of funds. Obviously, Defense suffers from a severe image problem.

But it is not evident that Defense is less efficient now than it was, say, 20 years ago; or that it is less efficient than other areas of the public sector or the military establishments of other nations. Lacking such evidence, it would be a mistake for the Secretary to place internal management as his rop priority. That is the full-time task of one of his Deputy Secreraries. Moreover, there is no profit goal or share of the market against which to measure progress. "Reducing cosr overruns" is a dubious and long-run measure; (e.g., the F-18 cost overruns became a major problem 5 years after the initial development decision).

Still, routine management is seductive. An examination of the records of one Defense Secretary showed that his allocation of time closely paralleled that of a Chief Executive Officer of a large corporarion. See Table 1.

Note that the time period of the sample of the Secretary is 1975. That was during the srewardship of James Schlesinger, hardly a hero to American management theory. Presumably the

TABLE I—ALLOCATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICERS' CONTACT TIME

	SecDef[1]	U.S. CEOs[2]	
Congress	14%	Directors	7%
Cabinet Level Peers	21%	Peers	16%
Military	16%		
Own Staff[3]	32%	Subordinates	48%
Press	6%	Clients	20%
Self	11%	Other	8%
	100%		99%

[1]*Source:* 1242 hours in SecDef "In/Out" log for 1975.

[2]Harvard Business School article on *The Manager's Job,* by H. Mintzberg, July, 1975.

[3]Includes military on OSD staff end SecDef military assistants.

records of other Defense Secretaries, more prone to internal management, would show more time devoted to discussions with line subordinates.

Hazarding Predictions About the Pivotal SecDef Issues, 1980-84.

Role 1. *Confidence of the President.* Does not present a problem.

Role 2. *Managing Crises/War.* This may emerge as the most serious issue. Our physical and economic security is affected by conflicts around the globe; allied solidarity does not exist; the effective use of American power has waned.

Role 3. *Setting Policy.* An absolute must. Our nuclear doctrine, especially in regard to extended deterrence and the nuclear umbrella for NATO, needs clarification. Equally as critical is a coherent military strategy, in a global context, for Southwest Asia.

Role 4. *Procuring Resources.* Dollars will not be the major problem, provided the military and the Secretary agree from the very start on a set of reasonable, mutual expectations and provided the Secretary is strong on military pay.

Role 5. *Internal Management.* Manpower, not procurement, will be the issue in 1982 or 1983. How to draft—or not to draft—will be the question that will challenge the Secretary's ability to retain credibility and confidence on the Hill, with the President and with the military. This issue could well be dramatized by a serious crisis or conflict.

Heretical though it seems, there is probably too much emphasis upon the role of Secretary as internal manager. Several of his other roles loom as more critical in the 1980s; Defense does not lack for managers throughout the Secretary's staff and the military; and history shows that no Secretary has failed for poor management, while many have failed because they neglected other roles.

NAVAL TACTICS: EXAMPLES AND ANALOGIES

by

Frank Uhlig, Jr.*

> The naval neglect of tactical study, the absence of tactical textbooks, and the secrecy which by custom had enshrouded the meagre instructions, have ever been a source of wonder to soldiers, who know from history and experience that good and flexible tactics in an army are essentially the product of ceaseless reflection and discussion by many minds.
>
> B.H. Liddell Hart,
> *The Real War 1914-1918,* 1930

Naval tactics consist of the actions taken by a commander to seek battle or avoid it, to continue battle or break it off, and, when engaged, to bring the optimum amount of fire possible upon the enemy as quickly as possible for as long as necessary to achieve his purpose.

The tactics a commander will employ will depend largely on his given task and that he believes to be the enemy's; on the nature and number, or "capabilities," of the sensors and weapons he has and believes his opponents to have; and on the prevailing natural conditions.

Naval tactics are said by some to be in disarray, by others to be stagnant. Either way, the reasons given for the condition usually arise from the vast changes that have taken place in the last generation or so in naval sensors and weapons. Indeed, some observers even have questioned whether there any longer is such a thing as naval tactics.

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The point of this inquiry is to structure the tasks of the naval tactician and to describe the means by which he accomplishes them. Both examples from the past and suppositions for the present are employed to illustrate the various categories of these tasks and means.

Two tables are included, one showing the nature of naval sensors and weapons from the time of galley fleets to our own time and the other showing the ranges of these sensors and weapons. Also listed are the tactical situations likely to occur in naval war and the natural conditions likely to affect or perhaps even govern those tactics. In each case at least one example, usually from a 20th-century war, occasionally from an earlier one, is provided. Finally, analogies are made between the tactics of the past and those of the present.

The tactical tasks a naval commander is likely to face appear to number six: to protect a valuable entity, afloat or ashore; to thwart an enemy purpose or harm a valuable entity, afloat or ashore; to seek out and engage an enemy force; to avoid an enemy force; to break off a battle; and to mislead an enemy. Of these, the first two are of greatest importance. To accomplish them, a commander usually must employ one or more of the other four. In contrast, a commander may pursue one of the lesser four without concerning himself about valuable entities, friendly or hostile. The battles of Santiago in 1898 and Jutland in 1916 provide examples of the latter.

Some examples of the former: first, to protect a valuable entity. This can be done by avoiding battle, by protecting without battle (though making no effort to avoid battle), and by engaging in battle. An example of the first might be found in the action of any convoy escort commander in any war who, in contact with an enemy, changes course when darkness falls in order to get the convoy out of danger. This happened, or it was attempted, frequently enough in the North Atlantic in World War II. Two examples from that same war in the Pacific, rather different because in both cases the foe, though near, never was in contact and never sensed what was happening, were the Japanese evacuations of Guadalcanal early in 1943 and later that same year of Kiska in the Aleutians. At Guadalcanal all the Japanese efforts took place at night. Despite the presence nearby of American troops, aircraft, and ships, every living Japanese soldier on Guadalcanal was removed to safety by the Imperial Navy.

At Kiska there were no American troops on the island, but American airbases were close and American ships were conducting a blockade. But the evacuation was a complete success, largely through the use of cover provided by dense fog.

To protect without either engaging in battle or attempting to avoid it implies that contact, at least, occurs between the opposing forces. After their initial action in the spring of 1862, both *Monitor* and *Virginia* protected valuable entities without action. Behind the shield provided by *Monitor*, General McClellan was able to land his army on the Peninsula and carry out his long, if eventually unsuccessful, campaign to capture Richmond. At the same time, *Virginia* protected the rear of the Confederate forces, and Richmond itself, from an attack by McClellan up the James.

A more recent example occurred in the winter of 1941 when the slow but heavily armed battleship *Ramillies*, by her mere presence, frustrated an attack by the German battleships *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* on the convoy under her care. A month later another old battleship, *Malaya*, performed the same service for the convoy under her protection when those same German ships approached. In both cases as a result of the inferior speed of their ships the

TABLE I—NATURE OF WEAPONS AND SENSORS

	Weapons	Sensors
Galley fleets:	Ram ship (to cut oars) Bows and arrows Catapults (for launching rocks or fire pots) Boarders	Eyes and ears
Sail fleets:	Gun Boarders Fire ships	Eyes and ears
19th-century steam:	Gun Mine	Eyes and ears
Early 20th-century steam:	Gun Mine	Eyes and ears Torpedo
WWI:	Torpedo (sub and surface) Mine Gun Depth charge	Eyes and ears Radio intercept (ashore)
WWII:	Torpedo (sub, air, surface) Bomb (air) Mine (sub, air, surface) Gun (surface, air) Rocket (air) Depth charge (surface, air) Thrown ASW weapon (surface)	Eyes and ears Radio intercept (ashore) Sonar Radar (afloat, aloft, and ashore)
Present:	Ballistic missile (sub, shore) Guided missile (sub-surface, surface-surface, surface-air, air-surface, air-air) Torpedo (sub-sub, sub-surface, surface-sub, surface-surface, air-sub air-surface) Depth charge (air-sub, surface-sub) Gun (surface-surface, surface-air, air-surface, surface-shore, air-air) Rocket (air-surface) Bomb (air-surface) Nuclear weapons Electronic measures, ECM, ECCM	Eyes and ears Electronic intercept Radar Sonar Photography Infrared and laser (Fixed undersea and ashore, afloat, aloft, and in satellites)

TABLE II—WEAPON AND SENSOR RANGES

Galley fleets:	
Sensors:	as surface visibility permitted, to horizon.
Weapons:	a few hundred feet or vessels touching.
Sail fleets:	
Sensors:	as surface visibility permitted to horizon.
Weapons:	half mile or less, often vessels touching.
19th-century steam:	
Sensors:	as surface visibility permitted, to horizon.
Weapons:	3 miles or less, sometimes vessels touching.
Early 20th-century steam:	
Sensors:	as surface visibility permitted, to horizon.
Weapons:	3 miles or less, to a few hundred yards for torpedoes.
WWI:	
Sensors:	as surface visibility permitted, to horizon. Some air. Radio intercepts: hundreds of miles.
Weapons:	guns 7 or 8 miles; torpedoes, 1 mile; depth charges, right over.
WWII:	
Sensors:	radar to horizon independent of surface visibility, to 100 miles to or from air. Sonar: one-half mile or less. Radio intercept: thousands of miles.
Weapons:	airborne, 100-200 miles; guns, 12 miles or less; torpedoes, 12 miles or less; depth charges, right over; ahead-thrown ASW, one-quarter mile or less.
Present:	
Sensors:	Eyes and ears; radio intercept thousands of miles; radar, to surface horizon, to air over 200 miles; sonar, to 10 miles or less (sometimes more, often less); airborne radar, to hundreds of miles fixed undersea unknown; satellite to thousands of miles from force.
Weapons:	ballistic missiles, hundreds, more commonly thousands, of miles; SSM to horizon and, with help, hundreds of miles; Sub-SSM, to 60 miles; SAM, 3 to 40 miles; ASM, 3 to 150 miles; AAM, 3 to 75 miles; torpedoes, to 10 miles; depth charges, to 5 miles; guns, to 8 or 9 miles; bombs and rockets, near; All airborne, to hundreds of miles from base or force; EM, ECM, ECCM to hundreds of miles.

defending captains had to be content with their pacific achievements. Though strategically, and in every other way, it would have been desirable to sink the swift raiders, tactically the results were satisfactory, for the convoys the old battleships were sent to protect were indeed protected.

Whether the decision to protect a beach or a harbor entrance with coastal fortifications or with a minefield is a tactical decision may be debated. But certainly the result intended is tactical: to prevent an enemy from landing here, from bombarding that place, or from using this harbor. The German minefields off Normandy had such purpose, and failed. The strong coastal fortifications at Malta and Gibraltar, though untested, may be said to have succeeded because they were not tested. The 15-inch guns protecting the entrance to Singapore succeeded, for no enemy fleet attempted invasion, bombardment, or entry into the harbor. The Japanese invasion was carried out successfully elsewhere and it was the other elements of defense that failed. The same could be said of the coastal defenses at Corregidor which, without firing a shot, kept Japanese ships out of Manila Bay until long after the shores of the Bay had been taken from the landside.

Of course, except in the case of the minefields and coastal forts, one doesn't often expect to defend without battle. That certainly was not the desire of the commanding officers of *Ramillies* and *Malaya*. It was simply the best they could do with the instruments at hand, and for their immediate purposes it was good enough. But the pacific defense succeeded because the instruments, if not fast enough to force an action on an unwilling foe, clearly were powerful enough to sink an enemy who dared to come within range of their weapons.

But when his foe is prepared to risk damage to his force—as Admiral Lütjens, commanding *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, was not—the defender must then fight. His purpose, of course, is defensive—to protect the entity—be it ships or a city within his care. Any convoy in any war will illustrate that.

In 1794 Admiral Villaret-Joyeuse was sent out from Brest with 26 ships of the line to cover the passage of a convoy of 117 ships filled with grain for the starving millions of revolutionary France. His instructions were "to avoid a battle unless it were necessary to save the convoy." Villaret-Joyeuse did find it necessary to fight and he did lose against Admiral Howe's more skillful officers and seamen, also in 26 ships of the line. But the convoy got through.

On most occasions in the Civil War Confederate warships had a similar tactical purpose, although the entity to be protected was a port or city rather than a convoy. For example, in 1864 the ironclad ram *Tennessee* and her accompanying gunboats at Mobile Bay, in conjunction with the harbor defense forts, fought to defend the port of Mobile from Farragut's fleet. In the event they proved unsuccessful, but first Farragut had to build up his squadron to a size he thought sufficient for success. In the meantime the port was available to those fast cargo ships that could evade the Federal blockade.

For more recent examples, one may look at the Japanese invasion of Java at the end of February 1942. When the Allies, under Dutch Admiral Doorman, sailed to intercept the invasion convoys, though they were strategically on the defensive, tactically they were on the offensive. Japanese Admiral Takagi, defending the convoys, intercepted the Allies, defeated them soundly, and the invasion transports went forward to land their troops on Java. Later that same year, at Guadalcanal, the Japanese began shelling the American airbase on the island, Henderson Field. To defend that airfield the American Fleet met the Japanese in three fierce night actions, Cape Esperance and the two battles of Guadalcanal.

In June 1944 when the Japanese Fleet under Admiral Ozawa responded to the American invasion of Saipan, Admiral Spruance, even though he had greater power than his opponent, fought a defensive action for he felt that his primary requirement was to protect the troops and invasion shipping which were placed in his care.

Later that same year, after the American invasion of Leyte and rhe ensuing Japanese response which, strategically, was defensive, the American destroyers and destroyer escorts screening Admiral Sprague's escort carriers found themselves in a desperate defensive battle against Admiral Kurita's battleships and heavy cruisers. Kurita's ships threarened to wipe out the escort carriers and those amphibious ships that had nor yet left the invasion beaches. Between the airplanes of the escort carriers and the destroyers and DEs, the defense was successful.

So much for the tactical defensive. But each defense, whether successful or not, presupposes an attack by someone else. Offensively, there is not so clear-cut a trio of roles. It is hard to thwart or harm without fighting, much less by avoiding a bartle, as Lütjen's example suggests. It is not impossible, but usually this is a matter of srrategy—the imposition of a blockade, for example—rather than something within the tactical reach of a commander at sea. The surface raider of past wars who found a merchant ship sailing singly and, after removing her crew, sank her or perhaps sent her into port as a prize, might be said to have destroyed or seized an entity without battle. And the same might be said of the cruiser or gunboat who captured a blockade runner. Once such actions were a commonplace in naval warfare, but no longer.

It might be said that a minefield, such as that laid off Haiphong in 1972, was an example of deterrence without destruction, but the decision to lay that field was not taken by a tactical commander. Rather it was a strategic decision and, though it did serve its purpose in deterring the enemy's ships from attempting passage into Haiphong with the goods of war, it does not qualify in this search for tactical deterrence withour destruction. A better case might be made for the surveillance of the South Viernamese coast by ships, boats, and airplanes of the U.S. and South Vietnamese Navies. True enough, the decision to conduct such surveillance was a strategic one, taken in order to foil the supply of arms to enemy forces in South Vietnam. And, no doubt, it was on a strategic plane that the surveillance was most effective. But on occasion trawlers did attempt to run the surveillance forces. Those that attempted the run but were prevented from entering a forbidden zone off the South Vietnamese coasr by the presence nearby of patrolling vessels or aircraft may be said to have been deterred tactically from achieving their purpose.

Another interesting example, clear in its effect, took place as a result of the Battle of the Komandorski Islands in March 1943 when an American squadron attacked a Japanese convoy destined for the garrisons on Kiska and Attu in the Aleutians. As it turned out, the Japanese escort was too strong for the American attackers. Even so, the eventual result, without any ships sunk, was that the Japanese were deterred from their purpose because their admiral turned around and brought his convoy home. Thereafter the Japanese attempted no more supply convoys to the Aleutians. But this nearly bloodless Japanese frustration turned out that way as a result of an American attempt to destroy the convoy, not because the Americans attempted to deter the Japanese without fighting.

A similar example of much greater importance occurred off the Chesapeake Capes in 1781 when Admiral de Grasse, with 24 ships of the line, foiled an attempt by Admiral Graves, with 21

ships, to enter the Chesapeake and bring support to the British Army besieged at Yorktown. A battle occurred. No ships were sunk. But when it was over, Graves was headed back to New York and de Grasse was still at the mouth of the Chesapeake. Cornwallis' surrender soon followed.

In both cases, the Komandorski Islands and the Chesapeake Capes, though one side frustrated the efforts of the other without having either sunk or lost any ships, a battle was fought. It was a matter of determination, or rather the absence of determination, that decided the result. It is difficult to see how in either case the successful commander could have achieved the result he did without offering battle.

In the main, it seems clear, the tactical effort to deter an enemy, or to destroy, disable, or seize an entity, will lead to battle. The convoy battles mentioned, whether the attackers were submarines, surface ships, or airplanes (for example, the Battle of the Bismarck Sea in March 1943 when U.S. Army light bombers sank all eight transports and four of eight escorts bound for New Guinea), depended on the attacker forcing a battle. When Admiral Kurita engaged American destroyers and DEs at Samar, he did so in order to get at the escort carriers in the distance (which he mistook for fleet carriers) and at the transports over the horizon. The same is true if the entity is ashore, as was Henderson Field. The only way the Japanese could harm that field tactically was to attack it. Because American warships placed themselves in the way, a battle first had to be fought. In short, almost invariably, the tactical offensive, unlike the tactical defensive, requires battle in order to be successful.

There are other situations in which the objective is the enemy's force, irrespective of whether there is an entity to be attacked or defended. Sometimes there is nothing but the enemy's force, as at Jutland in 1916. In such cases the foe must be sought out, lured if necessary, as Beatty sought out and engaged Hipper, as Hipper then lured Beatty into the range of Scheer's guns, and as Beatty, in turn, lured both unsuspecting German commanders into the trap Jellicoe was setting.

More examples of cases in which the objective was the enemy's force come easily: Howe against Villaret-Joyeuse in 1794, Spruance at Midway with his deadly strike at Nagumo's carriers, Mikawa against the American cruisers at Savo Island, Halsey with his pursuit of Ozawa's carriers at Cape Engano, and the Allied air and surface sweeps against U-boats at sea in World War II.

In the strategic sense not all of these were as successful as they might have been. An argument can be made that Howe should have sought out the grain convoy rather than spend time destroying Villaret-Joyeuse's command, that Mikawa should have gone on to sink the American transports after disposing of the cruisers. Such questions are after-the-battle critiques, but they really address the basic issue most tactical commanders should consider before they engage: whether they should seek out the enemy's fighting ships or the entity those fighting ships so often are at sea to protect. Does destruction of the enemy's fighting ships mean that the entities they had been protecting would inevitably be destroyed eventually by the successful attacker? Or should the attacker, if at all possible, bypass the defending fighting forces and go straight for the valuable entity?

In both World Wars the German U-boats sought to get at the entities directly. There is no question of that being the role of today's ballistic missile submarines.

On the other hand, Spruance's attack on the enemy's fighting ships did halt the invasion of Midway even though he did not sink a single Japanese transport. Halsey's similar attack on what he took to be the enemy's primary fighting

ships did nothing for the safety of the invasion force he was trying to protect. He sought the tactical offensive when his proper role was the tactical defensive. Likewise the air and surface sweeps against U-boats, more strategic than tactical in nature (they found few submarines against which to bring tactics to bear), were by and large a failure—not one of the spirit, for it is right to seek out an enemy, but of the mind, for it is wrong to seek out an enemy where he is not when at the same time he is sinking ships at other places.

It is common enough to avoid the enemy when his force is much more powerful than one's own. To avoid him, however, and still seek to do him harm, is difficult. One example: Somerville's effort in April 1942 off Ceylon to avoid getting in range of Nagumo's five carriers and 300 airplanes during the day, and closing with his two carriers at night so that his 80 antiquated airplanes could strike. He succeeded in his first aim, but not in his second.

Suppose one finds oneself in a battle he has sought and then discovers his foe is far stronger than he, as indeed Scheer did at Jutland when he found himself under the guns of the entire Grand Fleet, or as the American McMorris did at the Komandorski Islands when he found his opponent not to be a weakly defended convoy but one guarded by an enemy twice as powerful as he?

His tactical task, then, suddenly changes from an offensive effort to crush a weak foe into an effort to break off from a powerful one. These examples, and many another—Iachino at Cape Matapan, the surprised Goto at Cape Esperance, Kinkaid at Santa Cruz, Omori at Empress Augusta Bay in 1943, and Ozawa at the Philippine Sea in 1944—show that breaking off can be done, and the frequency of such events suggests it is in the tactical commander's interest to have the skill to do so.

One other tactical situation remains to be examined: that of misleading an enemy. Already mentioned is the best known example in the 20th century, the occasion when Ozawa with his four toothless carriers ostentatiously sailed south toward the Philippines, luring Halsey's powerful carrier force away from the invasion shipping he was supposed to protect. This afforded Kurita's battleships and cruisers the freedom to fall upon the American ships who imagined they were being shielded by Halsey. Unfortunately for the Japanese, the stout American defense by the escort carriers and their screen foiled Kurita's tactical offensive. Another example of a successful effort at misleading the enemy occurred in April 1940 when the German battleships *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* lured Admiral Whitworth and his force, built around the battle cruiser *Renown*, away from the entrance to Narvik for long enough to permit 10 German destroyers bearing troops for the capture of that port to reach their destination unmolested.

What are the natural elements that can affect, and may even govern, the tactics of naval forces? Are they the same as in times past? Are there more of them? Or fewer of them?

There now appear to be eight, a number substantially higher than in the days of the galley, the square rigger, or the early steamer. They are: the presence of land nearby, the depth of water, the force and direction of the wind, the sea state, the visibility from the surface, the visibility from aloft, the electronic conditions, and the sonic (water condition for sonar) conditions.

Of these one can go back as far as the Battle of Salamis and find how the presence of land shaped the tactics of the opposing commanders, and he can come right up through World War II. For example, in the Solomons, Japanese destroyers could steam close enough to the many islands as to be invisible to the

American lookouts while their radar returns on American scopes were masked by the returns of the island. In the dash up the English Channel by *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* in February 1942, the presence of land meant not only that the ships could be provided air cover the entire distance by shore-based German fighters but that they could also be attacked by shore-based British aircraft and by motor torpedo boats. Equally, it meant that they were not likely to be attacked by any of the more powerful British battleships, which preferred to operate far from land.

The depth of water has always been a concern to a naval commander, for where he cannot go he cannot fight. More than that, if the foe's ships are bigger, one can escape by fleeing into water too shallow for the enemy to enter. The Federal blockade of the southern ports in the Civil War provides examples of this for, at the beginning of the war, most Federal warships were of too deep draft to maintain a close blockade, and commercial ships did not have a hard time passing in and out of those harbors. Similarly in the Vietnam war, in order to control coastal and inshore shipping off South Vietnam, such seagoing ships as destroyers, destroyer escorts, and minesweepers proved unsatisfactory. It was only after small Coast Guard cutters, drawing 6 feet, and even smaller Swift boats, drawing 4½ feet, came onto the scene that the coastal surveillance became effective. And even those boats were too deep draft for control of river traffic. That had to wait until the coming of the PBRs, which drew only 18 inches.

The Civil War example and that in Vietnam are not different from those of the days of galleys and square riggers. But now the depth of water is even more important to the tactician than it was in olden times, for now it influences where submarines and mines can be found. Generally the deeper the water the more likely the presence of the submarine, the shallower the more likely the presence of the mine. Most of the Channel dash took place in shallow water and on that occasion the mines of both sides had a major influence on events. During the Korean war the American fast carriers supporting troops ashore eschewed the shallow, easily mined Yellow Sea, taking their chance in the deep Sea of Japan where neutral Soviet submarines (and, for that matter, airplanes and surface ships) might intervene, but didn't. Even there, the carriers chose to avoid crossing inside the 100-fathom curve where mines might be lying.

The Allied debacle at the Java Sea in 1942 was followed by attempts by the surviving Allied warships to escape. Four American destroyers slid through a shallow passage between Bali and Java and reached safety. But the cruisers, too deep draft for that, all perished under the fire of superior Japanese forces while attempting to make it to safety via the Sunda Strait.

The modern antisubmarine ship equipped with a large, low-frequency sonar will probably find it easier to detect a lurking submarine in deep water than she will where the water is shallow. Because of her great size, the modern submarine will also probably prefer to be in deep water than in shallow.

The force and direction of the wind, important to the oar-driven galleys, continued to dominate fighting during the age of sail. After the coming of steam, this factor appeared to be in eclipse as a consideration for the tactician. But even at Jutland, where there was little wind, it was important, for when one's own funnel and gun smoke rolled between one's own ships and those of the enemy, it became impossible for the gunners to see. Under the same circumstances it also made escape possible under cover of a smoke screen. In our own time the carrier, if not nearly so beholden to the

force and direction of the wind as was the square rigger, still finds her movements during launch and recovery of aircraft dictated by the wind. Though it took place nearly 40 years ago, the Battle of the Philippine Sea between two carrier forces makes this point clear: When the Americans wanted to launch or recover aircraft, they had to turn and steam rapidly away from their enemy because the wind they needed was from the east. But the Japanese could keep right on going while launching and recovering, for east was where they were going anyway. While airplanes and their carriers have changed a lot since 1944, these facts haven't.

Sea state is closely associated with the force and direction of the wind. If the sea is rough it is difficult, or perhaps impossible, to fight. When surprised in very heavy weather by a lone British destroyer, the German destroyers en route to Narvik in 1940 found it almost impossible to shoot their guns; it was not until a cruiser showed up that the lone enemy was sunk. Later on, while the German destroyers were slipping into the fjord, the state of the sea prevented British destroyers with *Renown* from raking an effective part in the action with *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* when those German ships lured *Renown* force away from the entrance to Narvik.

And at Coronel in 1914 it was the rough sea off the Chilean coast that prevented Cradock's cruisers from firing their low, casemated guns and made even worse their inferiority to Graf Spee's ships.

The visibility at the surface usually decided whether there would be a battle at all, for if there was no enemy to be seen, there was no enemy to be fought. Jutland, of course, even though fought by steam-driven ships armed with long-range guns, was an example. The mist, compounded by the smoke of funnels and guns, meant that ships seldom were able to shoot at the ranges they could fire in clear weather. It meant, also, that the commander of the British Fleet, Admiral Jellicoe, seldom saw his opponents and then only fleetingly, three or four ships at a time.

Nearly 30 years later, at Samar, the surprised American escort carriers successfully made use of every patch of rain they could find in order to hide from the Japanese gunners, while the destroyers and destroyer escorts further reduced the visibility artificially with smoke screens, protecting both themselves and the carriers from Japanese fire.

The foregoing natural factors have been important since men began fighting at sea. The next three are new to this century. The first of these is visibility from aloft. Rain clouds made themselves useful in the Coral Sea in 1942, this time against attackers from the air. The Japanese *Zuikaku*, ducking under a cloud, made herself invisible to American torpedo planes and dive bombers and so saved herself from attack. At Jutland more than half a century ago it was the low-lying cloud that made the German scouting zeppelins useless to Scheer. It also made useless the lone British seaplane that took part in the battle, for when the airplane was aloft in the action it had to get above the clouds to be high enough to see both fleets. And, of course, when it was above the clouds it could see nothing at all.

At Midway it was the opposite condition, excellent visibility, that permitted the searching American dive bombers to find the Japanese carriers when they proved not to be in their anticipated position, and quickly led to the destruction of three of them.

Nowadays darkness, heavy cloud, and rain will keep all aircraft on the ground or flight deck except those that are truly "all-weather."

Even more recent a natural influence on the naval tactician than visibility from aloft is that of electronic conditions in the atmosphere. Normally the atmosphere has little influence on what

is seen on the radar scope. But there are times when it will cause scopes to show what is not there or fail to show what is there. The best known example of this is the "Battle of the Pips" that took place off the Aleutians in 1943. A powerful American force fired for hours during the darkness at targets that, at dawn proved to be totally imaginary. More than 30 years later, in the Gulf of Tonkin in 1964, even though something showed on the scopes of one American destroyer, the conditions were such that there is no certainty, even to this day, whether there really was a second attack, at night, by North Vietnamese torpedo boats against the American destroyers. Of the first attack, which took place by day, there is no question.

The final natural condition, also a fairly new one for the tactician to consider, is that of sonic conditions. No great battle so far has been won or lost because of sonic conditions in a particular place at a particular time. But when conditions were good, as often in the North Atlantic, an otherwise suitable antisubmarine escort had a good chance of prospering. When conditions were bad, as often in the Mediterranean, a similar escort might fail when confronted by submarines.

It would be hard to believe that the tasks enumerated and the natural influences listed will not be part of the tactical scene in the future. Who is to say that never will he have to protect some important place ashore or, perhaps, have to evade some more powerful foe? Who is to deny that submarine captains often find it useful to see the enemy they are about to engage and that, when they do, surface and aerial lookouts have an opportunity to see them if the visibility is good enough?

But, in an age of instant long-distance communications, satellite-borne sensors, missiles launched from afar, and nuclear weapons, do naval tactics really have a place? Do they exist? Have these material advances abolished naval tactics? Or have they simply provided new instruments that the tactician must learn how to use and, when they are in the enemy's hands, to overcome?

Tactically, the long-distance communications from some headquarters or capital can be useful to the commander at sea if they inform him of developments affecting his situation: friendly forces or enemy entering or leaving his area of concern, for example. This is no different from the radio signals Jellicoe received in 1916 or the cables sent Sampson by his scouts in 1898. Indeed, satellites are to be seen in the same way as Sampson's auxiliary cruisers were—far distant, perhaps useful in providing information, but sometimes subject to delay and mistake. The distance of the source of information appears immaterial. Jellicoe was ill-served both by his cruiser commander, Beatty, when the latter was only 5 or 6 miles away and by the Admiralty in London, hundreds of miles away which, not long before contact was made with Scheer, informed Jellicoe that the German Fleet was still in harbor. The tactical leader of the future should be prepared for more of the same, whether the source be satellites, radio intercepts, or whatever.

And just as Scheer could do little about British intelligence of his movements to sea, neither can the modern commander protect himself against satellites. He can be grateful for what cover clouds and darkness provide, and for the inefficiencies and delays perhaps inherent in satellite systems, and he can be hopeful that some other commander is either destroying those satellites or in some way ruining their communications. Be that as it may, he, just as Scheer, will have to face whatever the foe sends his way.

The main things about modern naval warfare as they affect the tactician appear to be the range of sensors and weapons, their variety, their destructive power (especially if nuclear), and the

speeds at which they can be used by him or against him. Modern naval weapons also are largely independent of the launching ship's course and speed. True enough, for their aircraft to become airborne (and ro be recovered), carriers must usually turn into the wind. But once rhe aircraft are airborne, they have their own tacrics that are independent of the launching ship's movements. Missiles have even greater independence of the launching ship's course and speed than do airplanes, for they can be launched regardless of ship's heading and can also maneuver to meet the situation at the target. The essence of this seems to be that tactics revolves about sensors and weapons, rather than about the ships bearing them. The main advantage or threat they offer, stemming from their range, speed, destructive power, and variety, is surprise. Concentration there must be, of course, but it is a concentration of weapons arriving at the target, not a concentration of weapon-bearing ships.

The ranges at which battles likely will be fought may have made the speed of ships less important tactically than formerly: While one may still wish to close a distant enemy or open out on him rapidly, there is no need for a burst of high speed so one can cap the T of an enemy 5 miles away.

It is clear that the surface force commander armed with long-range missiles has been provided with some of the qualities carrier and other aviation commanders have long enjoyed. His tactics should begin to resemble those of the carrier commander, for not only does he now have some of the advantages of range, speed, and variety, but he also has the disadvantages of having only a few launching platforms and, per platform, only a few weapons. His weapons are expensive and, if some of them have nuclear warheads, there may be military, political, or scientific considerations that bar their use, thus reducing further the number of weapons readily available.

The convoy escort commander is faced with an invisible, quiet foe, often faster than he is, but one who has become expensive (hence, scarce), large (hence, less willing than ever to enter shallow water), and perhaps harder to replace than many of his porential victims (hence, perhaps inclined to caution). The submarine's main weapon, if a torpedo, has a range of a few miles; if a missile launched from a submerged position, a range from below the horizon; and if a missile launched from the surface, a range of 100 miles or more. The escort commander may not know which of these, or how many of each, oppose him. But against the torpedo-armed submarine he has a sonar and usually a rocket-assisted torpedo of range similar to that of the submarine's torpedo. Against a submarine able to fire from below the horizon, he has helicopters to bear his sensors and weapons. And against a submarine firing from hundreds of miles distant, he has his short and medium-range weapons for use against the enemy's source of target information that must not be far distant. He is also being provided with weapons to aim at incoming missiles themselves which, unlike shells and bombs, are large enough, slow enough, expensive enough, and scarce enough to warrant the effort. Moreover, he, like his foe, might well have access to distant sources of information with which best to employ his weapons.

Tactical analogies with the past exist in profusion. For example, the modern tactician using chaff to protect his force from radar-homing missiles is doing the same thing as the destroyer commanders at Jutland and Samar did when they threw up a smoke screen to protect friendly forces from the fire of a powerful enemy. Indeed, smoke itself could still be useful against TV-guided or other optically dependent missiles.

The electronically active destroyers who lure the enemy's airplanes in their direction while the convoy they are protecting proceeds silently and safely under EmCon are performing the same service Ozawa provided Kurita in 1944. The submarine commander who takes advantage of the protective layers of water while he prepares to launch his weapon against a carrier is doing the same thing as the Japanese destroyer captains in the Solomons who launched their torpedoes in darkness against American cruisers from beyond the effective range of the cruisers' guns. The fleet commander who brings to bear simultaneously on an enemy squadron the aircraft of a couple of widely separated carriers, or the missiles from half a dozen widely separated submarines, is performing the same task as Togo did when, with his concentrated battleline, he capped Rozhestvensky's T.

In brief, what the tactician of today must do is to widen his horizons to those of his sensors and his weapons. It is they, more often than his ships, that he must manipulate. Assuming forces of similar power, the commander who best does this is the one most likely to win. Tactics live!