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Book Reviews


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PROFESSIONAL READING

BOOK REVIEWS

Berman, Ronald, ed. *Solzhenitsyn at Harvard: The Address, Twelve Early Responses, and Six Later Reflections*. Washington: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1980. 143pp.

Solzhenitsyn's Harvard commencement address in 1978 was sufficiently big to create a new elephant for exploration by those groping for support for their own predilections, such as the tail is a rope, etc. This book is an attempt to reinterpret the speech and early "journalistic" responses by compiling them with six "new interpretive" essays. The book is organized into three sections; the speech, early responses and later reflections. Ronald Berman is both editor and contributor, and because his is the overarching view and voice, it is tempting to zoom past Solzhenitsyn to Berman. However, it seems essential at least to read the speech and, at the start, to accept what the speaker says to the letter and in the spirit of his major concern—the purpose of life. In this respect, it might be best to start at the end—the 17th part of the speech—then go back to the beginning. In the end, Solzhenitsyn is pleading for a spiritual life and even provides a way, "Only by the voluntary nurturing in ourselves of freely accepted and serene self-restraint can mankind rise above the world stream of materialism" and it is clear that he is a believer in God and man's responsibility to God and to society as the source of spirituality with which to

oppose technological materialistic emptiness and legalistic selfishness.

The second part of the book, the early responses, mainly demonstrates the natural defensive tendencies of those who represent the groups directly connected with the aspects of Western life most criticized, e.g., the press. The criticism in these 12 pieces may be hasty, but is not entirely superficial. Olga Andreyev Carlisle's "Solzhenitsyn's Invisible Audience" coincides with a similar point made in the *Naval War College Review* article, "Solzhenitsyn in Harvard Yard: An Old Believer Spoke from the New World" (February 1979). Without referring to Solzhenitsyn's 5 September 1973 "Letter to the Soviet Leaders," which provides rich detail, she identifies him with the new Russian nationalists, the *Russity*, their fear of China and contempt for Marxism, etc. Ms. Carlisle is an artist and writer who helped in the publication of two of Solzhenitsyn's books in the West before he was exiled. The thrust of her thought (and mine expressed in the *Review* article) is at odds with Berman's "Through Western Eyes."

In part three, Berman says, . . . The most important single thing that can be said of "A World Split Apart" is that it is a reading of the West through Western eyes. The early commentators had one reaction in common: they found the speech to be different from

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their expectations. Having done so, they were ready to think that it was outside their experience and traditions. But to read his speech in scholarly tranquility is to be aware of its intellectual familiarity. Any basic library of Western thought will contain its ideas; dozens of writers from St. Augustine on would find in it some of their own thoughts But the common reader will find even more. We recognize in "A World Split Apart" the literature of our own century It is not particularly the Slavophile movement but modernism that has shown us the great artistic themes of conflict within the human mind, hollowness in our social and political ideas, and the responsibility that has been thrust on every mind capable of consciousness There are then two levels of discourse in this speech, and for the most part only one has engaged its critics. To identify Solzhenitsyn only with Russian Orthodoxy and its intellectual disabilities is to dismiss the likelihood that he participates in another tradition as well. It may be that we have confused the two kinds of criticism of the West It is critical of the West but not mordant The heart of the speech is about the nature of freedom, the constraints on freedom, and the value of freedom. Its form and some of its incidental remarks brought it more criticism than its central message warrants. Perhaps Solzhenitsyn could have learned from Auden, who thought art should teach the free man how to praise. And perhaps his adversaries should have thought of Yeats, who warned us that an intellectual hatred is the worst.

Berman's field is literature. He demonstrates extensive knowledge and versatility in his essay and I think he is right

about everything except his conclusions. To prove that someone in the Western World said similar things first is to miss the major point entirely. Berman wants to coopt Solzhenitsyn on the basis of shared problems that Western thinkers have addressed and, therefore, to give him "Western eyes." He may have universal eyes—maybe all eyes are the same—but he does not have a Western view. It seems strange—even dangerous—to assess a moral and political work on a general literary basis. This was not the basis for the viewpoints of Richard Pikes in his essay "In the Russian Intellectual Tradition." His observations reflect the major points recorded in both *Naval War College Review* articles in February 1979, particularly that of William R.D. Jones, "Solzhenitsyn and the Quest for the Holy Grail." The essays by the philosopher Sidney Hook, the historian William H. McNeil and the religious view of Michael Novak are all compelling and excellent works in and of themselves; and we owe Solzhenitsyn some thanks for providing an audience for these men by his bold words at Harvard,

The early publication of articles on Solzhenitsyn's Harvard speech by the *Naval War College Review* is vindicated by this book and other serious attentions to this major event. The big question, however, is, "Should this book be recommended?" Today there are too many books, too many comments, altogether too many words making strident demands for attention. Why should anyone, particularly a military professional, read this book in which no identifiable military mind participated?

There are, I believe, three reasons to take the hour or so required to read this book—the first time, at least. First: it is good for Americans to get acquainted with a real Russian, divorced from the emotional aura of communism (for which read Marxism, because there are many communal ideas, traditions and experiences, particularly in Russia, not

associated with a politicized Marx). Solzhenitsyn is a respectable (even venerated) Russian, persecuted and exiled by Communists. Yet, he does not choose—does not love—the “free” world. Second and related: A non-Communist Russia may not be a comfort to the Western World, if Solzhenitsyn and the right wing surging *Russity* throw off Marxism (which they view as an outmoded Western conception—foreign to Russia, and therefore, antipathetical). There can be little expectation of a lessening of tensions. In fact, antagonism to the West is essential to their existence. And finally: perhaps those who suffer as has Solzhenitsyn (and Admiral Stockdale) reach moral conclusions and dimensions beyond communication to any but their peers—of which there are only a few alive in any epoch. However, even if we cannot probe their depths, it is useful to learn that the deep is not destructive of every human spirit—quite the contrary.

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Clausewitz, Carl von. *Vom Kriege. Neunzehnte Auflage . . . von Prof. Dr. Werner Hahlweg*. Bonn: Duemmler, 1980. 1406pp.

Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, May-June 1980, containing the proceedings of an international Clausewitzsymposium held in Hamburg in 1980.

Clausewitz-Gesellschaft, ed. *Freiheit ohne Krieg? Beitrage zur Strategie-Diskussion der Gegenwart im Spiegel der Theorie von Carl von Clausewitz*. Bonn: Duemmler, 1980. 412pp.

The three items under review dominate the literature, both policy-oriented and historical, occasioned by the 1980 bicentennial of the birth of Clausewitz.

From 1853 to 1952 the real Clausewitz was hidden from view by the serious corruption of all editions of *On*

War on the crucial point of civil-military relations. After World War I Rothfels supplied the first intellectual biography of Clausewitz; this was reprinted in 1980 with an epilogue by J. Niemeyer. The interwar period produced numerous examinations of the philosophical, political, and strategic aspects of *On War*. In 1952, finally, Professor Hahlweg's massive 16th edition restored the original text and signaled the start of the contemporary Clausewitz renaissance.

Hahlweg's 19th edition cited above begins with a brief new preface and acknowledgments; the preface of the 18th edition (1973) is reproduced together with its very substantial study of Clausewitz' interpretation past and present. This study examined the life and personality of Clausewitz, the genesis and emphases of *On War*, its reception by contemporaries, Moltke, Ludendorff, Seeckt, Engels, Marx, Lenin, and Stalin and his critics. A section on World War II contrasts General Beck with Hitler, touches on American attitudes, and compares the German defeats of 1918 and 1945 in Clausewitzian terms. A brief description of the first 15 editions of *On War* (1832-1937) is followed by an account of its reception before and after the two world wars in Europe including Russia, Japan, and the English-speaking world. A section on the contemporary relevance of Clausewitz ranges from guerrilla warfare to strategic theory, and surveys American, Chinese, English, German and Vietnamese analysts and commentators. Some pages on textual and editorial problems conclude this introduction of 1973.

The story is then brought up to date in another 100 pages showing the progress of Clausewitz' scholarship with respect to contemporary international relations, socialism, revolutionary movements, and Soviet perceptions. Hahlweg takes into account practically all American writings including the works of

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Paret and valuable essays in the journals of our senior service institutions. Similarly, British authors (Howard, Mason, Trythall) and Danish, Dutch, and Italian contributions are covered. The chief concentrations of extant scholarship are identified and the philosophical foundations and aspects of the work of Clausewitz are emphasized. The most recent scholarship on Clausewitz from around the world is surveyed; this includes Hahlweg's own most meritorious edition of the unpublished (and, in part, previously unrecognized) memoranda, studies, and correspondence of Clausewitz. An assessment of the Clausewitz renaissance to date touches on the relevance of Clausewitz to peace research and concludes with a research agenda. There follows a bibliography of writings by Clausewitz and a selective bibliography of the most important literature about him and his work. An international list of editions of *On War* covers the years from 1832 to 1980. Finally, the index refers to the 19th edition sandwiched between the introductory study of 1973 and the study of 1980 just described. The advantage of this arrangement is that page references to the text of Clausewitz are the same for the 18th and the 19th editions. All in all, Hahlweg's 19th edition ranks with, complements, and updates the Howard-Paret edition of *On War* (discussed in the Fall 1977 issue of this journal).

Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau records the remarks of General de Maizière, president of the Clausewitz Society, at the opening of an international symposium. General J. Brandt, chief of staff of the Bundeswehr, then discusses the military contribution to the securing of peace. Professor Arndt (Heidelberg) examines maritime and economic aspects of security policy. The West German defense minister, H. Apel, reflects on the principles of contemporary international security, stressing the fundamental differences between the contemporary European state

system and the concert of Europe in the days of Clausewitz. Apel specifies German perceptions of a deteriorating international environment and the required Western responses. Professor Wallach (Tel Aviv) concentrates on the economic and political aspects of military assistance, while Professor Paret (Stanford) compares the balance of power as a peacekeeping device in the days of Clausewitz and at present. Finally, Professor Hahlweg (Muenster) highlights recent major research on Clausewitzian topics by Aron, Gembruch, Kitchen, Marwedel, Paret, Tuerpe, and others. He concludes by emphasizing the two major desiderata, namely a critical edition of the complete works of Clausewitz and a comprehensive and thorough biography.

The Clausewitz Society, founded in 1961, sponsored a notable anthology of defense studies in 1971 (*Clausewitz in unserer Zeit*, ed. R. Elble). In *Freiheit ohne Krieg* the Society has produced an even more commendable volume. This book begins with a brief introduction by Maizière and eight pages by Apel on West German security policy. Major General Wagemann, lately commandant of the *Führungsakademie* of the Bundeswehr, then juxtaposes the conceptual resources of Clausewitz and the intellectual needs of the contemporary defense analyst. The remainder of the book is devoted equally to politico-military subjects and to the dimensions of contemporary strategy. Only the concluding 80 pages study Clausewitz with respect to his conception of theory (Hahlweg), his political views (Paret), guerrilla warfare (Hahlweg), and his reception in the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, and in Japan since the Meiji Restoration.

The section on politico-military matters contains essays by Aron on political strategy and on coalitions. Maizière then compares civil-military relations in communist and noncommunist systems, discussing some of the

most sensitive aspects of national command authorities. Dr. Pauls, the West German permanent representative to NATO, examines the political environment, structure, deterrent philosophy, and strategic problems of NATO, concluding with references to the Warsaw Pact and the prospects for the eighties. Major General Pilster rounds off this part of the volume with a very incisive picture of policy and strategy in the Warsaw Pact.

In part two Dr. Woerner, chairman of the defense committee of the West German legislature, places the current concern with theater nuclear weapons into its historical context and outlines a general American-European consensus in the NATO Nuclear Planning Group. Professor Arndt makes a contribution of particular interest to devotees of Corbett: he confronts head-on the apparent contradiction between the claim of Clausewitzian theory to have grasped the whole of war and the indisputably continental limitations of its empirical foundations. The essay presents the deepest and most acute statement of the issue known to the reviewer. As Clausewitz also failed to treat airpower for obvious reasons, the examination of "the validity of Clausewitz' judgments for the sphere of air and space war" by Lieutenant General Furlong, USAF, provides an extreme test of the longevity of the Clausewitzian constellation of insights. An equally contemporary perspective underlies the chapter by Colonel F.J. Wissing on the technological variable in strategy: this concentrates on the era from flexible response and the Harmel Report to the current intricacies of rationalization, standardization, and interoperability. The very different but concomitant dimension of civic support is examined by L. Ruehl. Professor Wallach presents Israel as an example of the importance of spiritual and moral factors emphasized by Clausewitz, tracing his theme back to the

"haganah," the illegal underground army in Palestine during the British mandate. A very knowledgeable point of view finds expression in Dr. Kurz' exposition of the congruence between Swiss security concepts and Clausewitzian axioms. Finally Colonel E. Sobik delineates politicomilitary control in the Soviet Union and the concomitant training of military forces.

Enough has been said, perhaps, to suggest that the Clausewitz renaissance girdles the globe and fans out into all major functional specialties. The American reader will be struck by the new circumstance that American contributions are now part of the mainstream of Clausewitz' scholarship. The harvest has begun from the seeds of postwar scholarship.

JOHN TASHJEAN

Delbrück, Hans. *History of the Art of War within the Framework of Political History, Vol. 2, The Germans*. Translated by Walter J. Renfroe, Jr. Westport, Conn. and London: Greenwood Press, 1980. 505pp.

Walter Renfroe has now reached the midpoint in his valuable work of translating *Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte*. The first volume has already been reviewed in this journal with a general comment on Delbrück's work (*NWCR*, Winter 1979, pp. 104-5).

In the second volume, Delbrück continues his work in attempting to explain the broad course of military developments while relating them to the major developments in general European history. His subject is *The Germans* in the period between the first century A.D. to the ninth century. Of the four volumes that spanned the ages from ancient history to Napoleon, Delbrück believed that the second volume was the most important for its contribution to our understanding. In his preface, he stated,

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This volume affects most deeply of all four our inherited concepts of world history, through its elimination of the legendary ideas on the fall of the ancient world and on the migration of peoples as well as its positive contributions, especially those concerning the substantiation of the alliance between Constantine and the Christian Church as postulate of the changing military system and institutions, and the clarification of the system of feudal institutions and knighthood.

Delbrück, himself, valued more highly the explanation he offered for the ways in which military affairs developed in history, rather than the concepts of strategy that he has offered in his first and fourth volumes. His aim was the larger quarry: knowledge of man's development. In searching for this end, he suggested that military accomplishment stems from two roots of very different types. The first is the courage and physical capacity of individual warriors. The second is the formation of individual warriors into a cohesive, tactical body. Analyzing in detail the fragmented evidence of military affairs at the end of the Roman Empire, Delbrück argued that the Roman Army gradually became Germanic. The Roman legions were not defeated and overthrown by the barbarians in battle, but the individual Roman soldiers were slowly replaced by Germanic mercenaries. This development led to the migration of a large number of Germans, with their wives, children and possessions, into the Roman Empire. This was the basis for the great "Barbarian invasion" that led to the downfall of Rome, Delbrück declared. The new peoples came in search of military service "for war, pay, booty and domination." The new breed stressed their individual and natural warlike tendency that served to break down the organized tactical discipline of the old Roman

legions. The entry of complete tribes into Roman service, Delbrück believed, was the decisive factor that determined the decline of the ancient world and the formulation of new, unique political systems. As the Germanic mercenaries gained power as provincial military commanders, the Empire began to split into separate kingdoms. Along with this outward change, the Germanic political system, with its legal and social concepts, gradually was integrated into or replaced the old Roman organization. These new changes that stressed the individual warrior and the tactical ability of the individual were maximized by mounting warriors on horseback. With this development, the way was opened for the military system and tactics of knighthood.

The translation of Delbrück's work will undoubtedly revive the academic disputes that raged half a century ago among German historians. Modern research has brought forward new details that may well show more faults in his explanations. Today, we may find that his arguments are too narrowly defined. We have become accustomed to seeing a complex group of forces at work behind any development and we will not be entirely convinced by the stress laid on one factor as a determining force. Despite those obvious faults, Delbrück's work remains important. His stress on the rise and fall of tactical organizations and their relationship to more general political organization is an important concept. Delbrück was the first to attempt to trace systematically this thread through history. His interest was not in detail, although there is much of it in his study. Feeling deeply the need to understand the past, he valued detail for its illustration of general ideas and reflections of broad tendencies. In this sense, he used detail in an attempt to understand the past in conceptual terms. In our time, when historians have become increasingly devoted to more detailed studies of smaller and smaller

subjects, Delbrück's work is a timely antidote. It reminds us of the work that needs to be done in grappling with the meaning and broad effect of warfare and military institutions in human history. Renfroe has done a great service in making this early study more readily available to the English speaking community.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF
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Gabriel, Richard A. *The New Red Legions: An Attitudinal Portrait of the Soviet Soldier*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980. 246pp. and *The New Red Legions: A Survey Data Source Book*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980. 252pp.

It appears that these two books are being marketed, separately and together, although they would more properly be considered two volumes of one work. The price for the source book alone, \$40.00, reflects the cost of the research and publication, I would assume, but not its value to the reader for reasons explained below. This volume contains the questionnaire on which the study is based and the statistical manipulations of the responses as well as an introduction. (It largely duplicates what is said in the *Attitudinal Portrait*.) While the statistical work seems perfectly competent, considering the formidable obstacles to research of this sort, and while this reviewer and the great majority of readers of this journal will only wish for a continuation of this kind of project, it is a fact that the data were collected from only 134 respondents recalling their military experiences over a 45-year span. With all good will, one still must face the fact that the sample has a very limited validity, not because it is composed of immigrants and not because they are largely Jews, but because they are a tiny fraction of the population being discussed.

Nevertheless, 134 responses can be significant in other ways depending upon the insights they give and this is the subject of the far more interesting volume of the pair of books, *An Attitudinal Portrait of the Soviet Soldier*. Here, Professor Gabriel makes use of his experiences with the U.S. Army—he comes across as an enthusiastic reservist—for comparison with Soviet ways as well as displaying his knowledge of the Soviet system and the scholarly literature. His method is to put such subjects as morale, fighting spirit, combat effectiveness, etc., into a useful context that draws heavily on generally received conceptions. Then he presents the data from his questionnaire with commentary, and finally draws conclusions that, more often than not, repeat the ideas of the introductory remarks, but with variations.

The importance of Gabriel's work is that it comes towards the end of an orgy in American military thought of concentration on capabilities and neglect of intentions, a concept the implications of which I am convinced even the JCS has at times only vaguely comprehended. That we are out of that phase signifies that the lessons of Vietnam have finally been understood, lessons the Soviets have never needed to learn, that a superior force can be defeated by an inferior force regardless of capabilities. In any case, there has been a painfully, slowly growing awareness in Washington and at the war colleges, accelerated by the conquest of Afghanistan, that we have not understood Soviet intentions. This has magnified the importance of questions that were only halfheartedly considered in the past about the human element in war. The human element is Gabriel's critical subject.

The great strength of this study is that it is, as far as I know, an original work in a very complex field. It is true, as the author says, that with the raw data all around them in the form of, by now, some 250,000 émigrés from the

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Soviet Union, our analysts continued to be dazzled by numbers and by the printed word, by *Pravda* and *Red Star*, largely to the exclusion of the human information available to them. Why that happened in itself would make a fascinating study. We can speculate that it is because of a cultural infatuation with the printed material that carried more weight than human experience. We have deserved, I suppose, the manipulation by Soviet propaganda organs to which we have been so massively subjected. (I no longer even feel the anguish I used to when I read another "authoritative" statement about the Soviet Union referring to the steady improvement in the standard of life in a country where even in Moscow for the last few years there has been an extreme scarcity of meat, eggs, medicine and toilet paper.) In any case, Professor Gabriel's work is evidence of our military sector emerging from the thrall-dom of some of its preconceptions.

This transformation was reflected in the comment by Colonel Bartos on the jacket (Colonel Bartos is an experienced Chief of the Foreign Intelligence Division for the Army) that the study "makes a unique contribution to Western scholarship on the Soviet Union and affords fresh insights into areas previously masked by Soviet propaganda and counter-intelligence efforts." I think he exaggerates, especially when he calls this a "remarkable book," but it is certainly a useful book and, I hope, the beginning of a much larger undertaking. But remarkable is a very strong word. Gabriel's conclusions correspond with the evidence from other sources, from Goldhamer's *The Soviet Soldier* (also researched almost entirely in English) and from what we can read in Soviet and Russian war memoirs and historical documents and records. There has long been plenty of evidence, as Gabriel found, that food, sex and drunkenness are severe problems, that discipline is doubtful and that political control is a

first priority. The picture he paints, derived from his questionnaire, leads one to think that his book should not be entitled *The New Red Legions*, for legions they are not, but perhaps *The Scruff of the Russian Bear*. (One cannot but regret sensationalism of his title, for this is not another of "the Russians are coming" kind of book.)

Professor Gabriel set out on a very ambitious project—he clearly likes the grand scale—posing and proposing to answer some of the most important and elusive military questions of our day: in a war, how well would the Soviet forces fight? Had he come up with a definitive answer, he would, indeed, have marked himself for glory. He deserves some of that for even trying.

He set for himself the most difficult of all conceivable questions, involving history, culture, psychology—the entire gamut of epistemology and of the social sciences—and this without, as I understand it, a knowledge of the Russian language. He proposed to describe "the attitudinal dimensions of the mind of the Soviet soldier." He claimed that his was the "first attempt to 'get inside the Soviet soldier's head' and it is the first study in which a research has been able to arrange a body of empirical data dealing with the subject longitudinally over time." (I will return to his use of the word "longitudinal.") When one talks about getting inside anyone's head, one is obviously talking about perceptions of reality. I think that involves many more complexities than Gabriel's study has attended to.

First, there is the "longitudinal" problem. Gabriel, with that phrase, apparently means that his sample contains responses from different periods of Soviet history. Such longitudinal computations make enormous demands upon both the statistical sample and the "attitudinal" comparison. For example, is the group of the decade of the seventies comparable in all other variables but age, when he discusses

combat effectiveness, perhaps, with the sample from the fifties, or sixties? I do not believe so.

That leads to the second problem of the gross sample itself. When I began reading *The New Red Legions*, I promised myself that I would not quarrel with the statistics. Professor Gabriel was quite right in asserting that the interview technique was nearly the only way (with all of its admitted shortcomings) to deal with a subject that had been egregiously, if not almost criminally considering its importance, neglected. (The government has spent millions of dollars on much less useful research based upon the contents of largely propaganda organs of the Soviet state while this magnificent resource, the émigrés, dwindled and evaporated.)

Gabriel made much of the fact that 30,000 émigrés had left the Soviet Union per year since the Helsinki Agreement. There are now over 250,000 in exile. But he was able to mail his questionnaire to only 1,059 and only 134 responded. Thus, he is talking about a very minute sample of the millions of Soviets (probably over 50 million) who have served in the armed forces during the period of his inquiry. When he writes that 11.5 percent of his respondents served since 1973, he is talking about 15 or 16 individuals! His data base for the period between 1964 and 1973 is only 44. Fifty-six percent of his sample, or 75 men, served prior to 1964.

My unsolicited advice, given these small numbers, would have been to rely very little on statistical manipulation of the data and very much more on the evidence from interviews. That way, he could have discussed more interestingly the different periods of ideological indoctrination, the variations in diet, and most importantly, the quintessential nationality problem that his statistics seem to me only to confuse. As it is, Professor Gabriel is tied to his data even when discussing the most contradictory problems of fact and spirit. Like anyone

else's, his oil and water do not mix. He is frequently forced into extreme positions to use his questionnaire.

For example, he points out that "The NCO corps of the Soviet Army as described so far is likely to be addicted to avoiding responsibility." (p. 141) That is undoubtedly true on some level. But what does it mean? In all armies, NCOs are expected to avoid some responsibilities. That is what separates them from the officers, normally. Gabriel's data show that the men also have a low opinion of the officers, longitudinally, no doubt. But isn't that true also of most armies? It is difficult in isolation to know what such statements mean.

A similar confusion develops in the discussion, and this is very critical, of the fighting spirit of Soviet soldiers. He writes that "An examination of Soviet military doctrine makes it very clear that the Soviets regard combat effectiveness as rooted in motivation and cohesion, which in turn is rooted in ideology and ideological indoctrination." From this he concludes that "Soviet units may have some grave weaknesses in the level of cohesion" because answers to the questionnaire showed that ideology was not considered important. The implication is, of course, that there is an Ideology and that if that is not strongly believed, then there is nothing. That is certainly far from possible.

There are many other subjects about which the questionnaire was illuminating and Professor Gabriel's comments are often intriguing. One, which I wished he had discussed more fully, was his notion that the Soviet military is prevented from becoming a modern organization because the Soviet state has not been transformed into a post-industrial society. This idea, which he refers to again and again, deserved some very systematic treatment. As I understood it, the whole point of the Russian revolution was to transform the Soviet state without imitating the "post-

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industrial" societies of the West. But an important question is whether or not because it is more sophisticated, or more "post-industrial," a state fights better. Mao, Ho Chi Minh and Stalin thought not, and proved it.

Gabriel has tackled this vast, intractable subject with courage and daring. We must be grateful to him for doing it at all, and apparently with little assistance. He deserved better support from his respondents and greater access to the émigré community. As all ex-Soviet citizens whom I have met bitterly criticize the naiveté of Americans in the face of the Soviet threat—"You are acting like fools and you will die a fool's death," said one ominously—it is surprising that more of them did not step forward to help in a study that would document their cause. We are reminded of even Lenin's complaint that it was the Russian nature to talk endlessly and not to act.

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Gottlieb, David, *Babes in Arms: Youth in the Army*. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1980. 173pp.

Babes in Arms presents results of individual interviews with 115 first-term Army enlistees conducted at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, in June 1978. David Gottlieb and four associates questioned members of the group regarding why they enlisted, whether they would reenlist, how they felt about their own combat readiness and that of their peers, their attitude toward their Army job assignment and whether that assignment measured up to their prior expectations, their assessments of their social life in the Army, and their attitudes and opinions on a variety of other aspects of their military experience. The sample included 103 men and 12 women. Forty five of the respondents were nonwhite. While all were in their first term of enlistment, some interviewees had

been in the service for only a few days, while others had served for several years. The author specifically disclaims that his sample is representative of all first termers, although he does state the belief that "these young enlistees are not dissimilar to their counterparts in other Army units."

In large part, the author lets the interviews speak for themselves. All the interviews were tape recorded, and quotations are verbatim, with each speaker identified by age, sex, and race. There is relatively little text apart from the quotations. Chapter 1 provides a brief description of the sample. Chapter 9 presents some conclusions and policy recommendations. The intervening chapters typically contain a short introduction and a short summary section. Otherwise, they present as many as 70 quotations, with text intruding only to introduce a series of quotations concerning a particular topic.

Gottlieb's interviews lead him to conclude that there is considerable job dissatisfaction among enlistees and a widespread feeling among them that they have been misled by recruiters. He also finds that many believe that their Army experience has resulted in personal growth and maturity. Many expressed the view that they are better off than friends who did not join. Accordingly, he recommends that the military should place less emphasis on advertising specific vocational training in its recruiting and, conversely, more emphasis on the maturity that enlistees are likely to gain. He also suggests 2-year enlistments, a restructuring of recruiter incentives, a "cooling off period" before induction in which enlistees have an opportunity to change their mind about their enlistment decision, expansion in the availability of education and training opportunities, and other policies that he believes will reduce the extent of job dissatisfaction.

Babes in Arms is an interesting, indeed entertaining, volume. Unless

one can generalize the impressions one gets from reading it, however, the work is of little value except as entertainment. The author cautions that his sample may not be representative, yet he does generalize, and in my view, rightly so, in drawing conclusions and making policy recommendations. Still, I would be more comfortable with the generalizations and with the validity of my impressions about first-term enlistees if the author had provided more information.

First, it would have been helpful to provide the reader with the interview protocol. This was promised (p. 16) as an appendix, but unfortunately it was omitted.

Second, one would like more information about the sample as a whole and about the speakers of individual quotations. For example, one knows that the sample includes people at various stages of their enlistments but one is not told the mix. More important, one does not know if a particular statement is that of a person viewing the Army after 2 weeks of experience or after 3 years, unless that information happens to be revealed in the quoted passage. Knowing the duration of Army experience is important in evaluating a quotation on such matters as attitude toward combat or on the probability of reenlistment.

Third, one would like to know more specifically how many interviewees expressed certain opinions. Instead the reader is told that a "significant number" do not feel that racial conflict is a major problem, that "most" tend in retrospect to perceive their recruiters as having been hustlers and con artists, that there is a "substantial consensus" that training is inadequate for combat, that "the majority" experience serious dissatisfaction with work training and job assignments. The reader is left to speculate whether the "significant number" who note the absence of racial tension is, say, 35 of the 115

respondents, or perhaps 100 of them. Only at the end of Chapter 4, which concerns reactions to basic training, did the author provide a frequency distribution of any of the responses. I wish he had done this more often. Such information could have been included in appendices to avoid interrupting the flow of the book.

Finally, a major purpose of collecting and presenting in-depth interview data is to complement studies using larger data samples containing narrower ranges in information. The book would have been improved with references to relevant theoretical and empirical literature. There is no bibliography, nor any footnotes. Reference to at least a few key statistics would also have helped. For example, about half of Gottlieb's respondents say they might reenlist. It would have been useful to point out that in fact the first-term Army reenlistment rate for fiscal 1978 was 36 percent. (Department of Defense, *Defense/80*, p. 21)

One other point that relates to the validity of the impressions the reader gets from the quotations should be mentioned. Although it is somewhat difficult to be sure inasmuch as speakers are identified only by age, sex, and race, it appears that some respondents are quoted far more often than are others. This is certainly true of the 12 women, who are quoted more often than their proportion of the total sample in all chapters except Chapter 6 on combat readiness, in which no women are quoted at all. One woman, a chaplain's assistant, is quoted at least once in every chapter except Chapter 6. The reader knows her story quite well by the end of the book. It is not necessarily invalid to quote the women disproportionately often, of course. The differences in attitudes between the women and the men are certainly of interest. However, when 60 percent of the quotations in the chapter on recruiters and the recruiting process are from the female respondents,

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one wonders whether the impression one gets regarding feelings about recruiters is really the way most first termers feel. One might also wonder whether 12 women is a large enough sample from which to generalize about women's attitudes.

In sum, *Babes in Arms* provides some interesting anecdotal evidence on the attitudes of first term enlistees. The conclusions drawn, while perhaps valid for first term enlistees in general, need further confirmation from other sources.

J. ERIC FREDLAND
U.S. Naval Academy

International Institute for Strategic Studies. *The Military Balance 1980-1981 and Strategic Survey 1979*. London 1980. 119pp. and 139pp.

Military Balance presents, in easily usable form, survey statistics of military forces around the world. Figures are provided for armaments, manpower and defense expenditures for U.S., Soviet Union, NATO and Warsaw Pact States, as well as for some 100 others with standing defense forces. The types and quantities of specific weapons systems and the organization and strength of defense elements are listed. This year there is also a map of Soviet military districts and groups of forces, and charts showing French and Chinese divisional organization. Treaties, agreements and other regional arrangements are described succinctly for each major geographic region of the world, and some activities resulting from these alignments are reported. Additionally, for countries that have forces operating or stationed out-of-country, the location and size of deployed forces are indicated.

In the tables published in Section Two of this edition are data showing comparative strengths and characteristics of nuclear delivery vehicles; also, defense expenditures and military manpower statistics for the 1975-1980 period for some 65 countries are

tabulated, and a summary of major arms agreements made between July 1979 and June 1980 is provided. Particularly topical for the American reader is the table of NATO defense expenditures, by NATO country, for the past 20 years, and the two analytical essays in Section Three on the East-West conventional and theater nuclear balance in Europe. An assessment of the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union introduces the force level statistics sections for the two super-powers.

In sum, *Military Balance* very nicely fills the need for a concise, unclassified ready-reference source of information on military forces around the world.

Strategic Survey 1979 recapitulates that year's security-related events in an analytical style that gives new insight to the significance of the events themselves. A chronology of events is presented by geographic area, but most information is provided in a concise but comprehensive and highly readable text. The world's security-related actions and interactions are analyzed and brought into perspective in terms of their objectives, political and economic factors and repercussions, and results. Prospects or possible outcomes are offered for issues that were unresolved at year's end.

The 1979 edition, published in mid-1980, includes elucidations of new factors in security, such as the challenges to nuclear nonproliferation in South Asia, the expanding Soviet naval forward deployment policy, and uncertainty and insecurity of international oil supplies. The phenomenon of détente is examined in light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, normalization of U.S./Chinese relations, and conflicts occurring outside of Europe.

Arms-control issues are discussed in several of the articles; in addition, an 11-page section treats SALT and other arms-control negotiations exclusively. An arms-control chronology lists the

major arms-control conferences and proclamations made during the year.

Reflecting the degree of international concern with events in Asia and Africa, *Strategic Survey* devotes over one-third of its pages to background and analysis of the situations in these parts of the world. The discussions of Iran, Afghanistan, and the Maghreb are particularly useful to an understanding of the events occurring now and will aid in interpreting the reports of affairs still in store.

The conclusion presented in *Strategic Survey 1979* is that Third-World crises will occur increasingly in the 1980s, and that these crises will be less soluble by military power than the traditional challenges to international order and stability have been. The prescription is for political resolutions—negotiation and compromise—to remove the irritants to peaceful coexistence among neighboring states. But *Strategic Survey 1979* provides much more than this and merits a cover-to-cover reading by both serious and casual students of international security affairs.

J. HINDS
Commander, U.S. Navy

Keliher, John G. *The Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions: The Search for Arms Control in Central Europe*. Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon Press, 1980. 203pp.

This book describes recent efforts to reduce armed forces in central Europe by international agreement. Specifically, it deals with negotiations with the official title of Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe, but known in the West as Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions or MBFR. The book details the proposals and counterproposals of the major parties involved from the start of preparatory consultations in January 1973 through the formal negotiations of October 1973 to

December 1979. With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a decade of intensive East-West arms control negotiations came to an end, so in a sense the book is complete.

The proposals are not only described, but are summarized and explained in tabular form, and clear references to public sources of information are provided for each. There are also brief essays discussing problems of finding a common data base for negotiations, building confidence in this kind of arms control agreement, verification of compliance with a treaty once negotiated, and the special role of nuclear weapons.

The author has strong credentials for writing this book. He is a career officer, a colonel in the U.S. Army. His research and academic writing earned him a Ph.D. degree. He has studied and taught Soviet military strategy. And most important are his 4 years of work directly on MBFR, including service on the U.S. delegation at Vienna.

The strong point of the book is its explanation of the proposals made at the negotiating table by both sides. The mechanics of attempted mutual force reductions in Europe are tedious for even the most interested of laymen. Thus, Colonel Keliher's lists and tables, not only summarizing negotiating positions but projecting their effects on the balance of forces, are welcome tools for analysis.

At the root of the technical side of MBFR is the arcane business of comparing armies. Such comparisons are of broader interest than to only military professionals and those associated with arms control. They figure in critical policy decisions, in the assessment of a nation's political influence as well as its military capabilities in a region, and in budgetary considerations. Yet armies, with their numerous variations in organization, equipment, and skills of their personnel, are intractable subjects for quantitative analysis, even in today's world of computers and mathematical

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models. Much more quantifiable are strategic nuclear forces. With all of its problems, measuring the strategic balance is much simpler. That is probably a major factor in the popularity of assessing the strategic balance while neglecting analysis of land forces.

The author's discussion of the technical problems associated with MBFR addresses these issues directly. He goes further in explaining some new approaches that might be taken in future negotiations and the necessary conditions for the success of each. In this respect he presents the reader with the problems and some alternative solutions as well.

In spite of these strong points, there are important deficiencies. With the author's background in mind, his book turns out to be somewhat of a disappointment. As a participant in the talks, the author might be expected to provide some insights into what went on at the negotiating table. Colonel Keliher obviously wrote under constraints imposed by convention on any official who has participated in negotiations that are still under way, but he concentrates too much on press coverage instead of recounting what happened and why. This is partly a matter of style, but it is prominent enough that the reader must continually remind himself that Soviet proposals were actually made at the negotiating table and not just released in pieces to the Eastern bloc press. On the other side of the table, there is not nearly enough on Western proposals and negotiating options. The author discusses "Option III," but not in his section on negotiations, and the reader is given no idea about what the other options were.

Another disappointment is that there is not much new in the way of analysis presented here. The final chapters on problem areas and alternative approaches are particularly clear and useful, but they merely present the thinking of Frederick Wyle, Joseph Coffey,

Steven Canby, and others. This the author is careful to acknowledge, but more is to be expected than even good summaries of what is already in print.

For those unfamiliar with MBFR, the book is slow to put the problem into geopolitical perspective. It is not until well into the fourth chapter that we are told that an offensive into Western Europe remains unattractive for the Soviets. There is more than a small chance that such an offensive could bog down, and a stalemate could precipitate the dissolution of Soviet control in Eastern Europe, if not over national minorities within the Soviet Union as well. The important threat, Keliher tells us, is from political influence over West European governments that will accrue to the Soviets when there is a gross disparity of military power in Europe. The geographical facts of proximity of the Soviet Union and remoteness of the United States are mentioned but not given the discussion they deserve. The fact that large numbers of Soviet troops are necessary to retain control over Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, East Germans, and Hungarians is mentioned only incidentally. These are fundamental parts of the MBFR problem. They should be explained and discussed at the outset. Instead, the first chapter is an essay on why Marx and Lenin thought Germany was important to socialist revolution.

This book is worthwhile for its summaries of the various negotiating positions at MBFR. It brings together some thought-provoking ideas on arms control in Europe. Its footnotes and bibliography are particularly useful. What it lacks is overall balance in presentation and discussion of the problem it addresses.

KARL LAUTENSCHLÄGER
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory

Klessig, Lowell L., and Strite, Victor L.
The ELF Odyssey: National Security

Versus Environmental Protection.
Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press,
1980. 310pp.

The development of the FBM (Fleet Ballistic Missile) submarine in the late 1950s provided the impetus for the Navy to develop a way to communicate with these submarines while on station without requiring them to come near the surface. One promising method of communicating with submerged submarines is based on ELF (extremely low frequency) radiowaves that have the capability to penetrate seawater to great depths. Prototype ELF systems operated in North Carolina (1963-1970) and at Clam Lake, Wisconsin (1970-present) have demonstrated that the concept is technically feasible. However, a full-sized system that would provide near-global coverage would require at least 10 megawatts of input power driven into a large (from 200 to 3,000 square miles) grid of insulated copper cables, grounded at each end, in order to radiate an ELF signal. Measures would need to be taken to protect telephone lines from interference and fence wires from induced currents. Communication would be one way to the submarine. Data rates at such low frequencies would be very slow and the primary use of this system would probably be to send a "bellringer" message to the submarine to position itself to receive another message at a particular time and place.

In *ELF Odyssey* Professors Klessig and Strite review the stormy history of the Navy's attempts to build a large-scale ELF system from the point of view of environmentalists concerned about the effect of prolonged low levels of ELF radiation on both people and the environment where the ELF antenna would be constructed. To their credit they declare their position at the start: "Our personal histories of opposition to ELF are acknowledged, but chiefly, we are advocates of active citizen involvement *per se*." Indeed, the book uses the "ELF Odyssey," as they call it, primarily as a

case study to demonstrate how citizen involvement, primarily at the grass roots level, can be employed to stop major projects with potentially undesirable environmental effects. It does an excellent job of this. Indeed, as a Michigan resident as well as a Naval Reserve officer, I have long followed the controversy over proposals to build an ELF antenna system in Michigan. The book accurately describes how the public outcry against *Seafarer* (as the project was then named) reached a peak in 1976 when then Presidential candidate Jimmy Carter promised Governor Milliken that *Seafarer* would not be built in Michigan against the wishes of its residents. To date it hasn't but the ELF issue probably has not been finally resolved as yet.

Readers seeking to learn the principles of ELF communication system operation won't find them in this book. Only the first of five approximately equal parts of the book is devoted to explaining the principles of ELF communication in general terms and the national security needs it would fulfill if constructed. The material given is informative, but not complete, perhaps a reflection that neither author apparently has a scientific background and that both authors, as they clearly state, have a primary interest in the environmental aspects of the ELF controversy. Valuable references omitted include the *IEEE Transactions on Communications, Volume Comm-22* of April 1974 (the entire issue is devoted to unclassified technical papers on ELF) and the *Seafarer Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) Submarine Command and Control System*, printed by the Special Communications Project Office of the Naval Electronics Systems Command. Greater depth in the technical material, perhaps in the form of an appendix, would have been useful to readers with as great an interest in national security matters as in environmental affairs.

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The remainder of the book provides valuable insights into the working of local voluntary action groups opposed to ELF in Wisconsin, Texas and Michigan, each at one time the Navy's preferred location for building the ELF antenna system. In each of these states voluntary action groups opposed to ELF came into being and successfully opposed the construction of ELF in their state. Klessig and Strite's conclusion is worth repeating to understand their intent in writing *ELF Odyssey*

Ultimately the Navy, or any other federal agency, is only responsive to Congress and the President. Ultimately the only power of citizens is political pressure applied to elected officials in the context of representative and constitutional government. That power can be shared most efficiently at the ballot box. It can be used most effectively if applied on election day, reapplied when public participation programs provide a formal opportunity and reapplied in every available informal setting.

It is important for those readers who may have supported the construction of the ELF system to note that all means of expressing opposition put forth by Klessig and Strite are entirely legal and appropriate in our system of government.

Throughout the book the authors urge citizens interested in environmental affairs to learn from the ELF experience how to organize to oppose other large projects with potentially undesirable environmental effects. Presumably these could be nonmilitary in nature as well, such as proposals to build large dams or drill for oil on public lands. But there is another side to this coin. The Navy and other agencies can also learn from *ELF Odyssey* how better to promote projects they feel are in the national interest. The authors note that, "Unlike some other agencies, the Navy was not accustomed to explaining its

operations or soliciting comments on them from citizens." I feel this is an accurate assessment of the Navy's overall approach to ELF, at least in Michigan. The Navy never really accepted the concept that local citizens should have much of a say on matters relating to national security. In the future, if the Navy and other governmental agencies can take deliberate steps to solicit and answer questions of interest to concerned local citizen groups, it will increase the likelihood of local acceptance of such projects as ELF. Indeed, the Department of Defense itself may not have to wait long to apply the lessons put forth in *ELF Odyssey*. The proposed land-based MX missile system will certainly arouse the concerted interest, if not outright opposition, of citizen and environmental action groups in whatever state is ultimately selected for its construction.

In summary, this is a useful book because it draws together in one volume a detailed history of the Navy's ELF programs, including an extensive set of references. It also shows what can be accomplished when highly motivated, well-organized local citizen action groups apply to elected officials through the legitimate means at their disposal.

HENRY H. BEAM

Western Michigan University

Love, Robert William, Jr., et al., eds. *Changing Interpretations and New Sources of Naval History; Papers from the Third United States Naval Academy Naval History Symposium*. New York: Garland, 1980. 471pp.

The Naval History Symposium at the Naval Academy are justly famous for their fanfare. These 37 papers assembled by Professor Love and his coeditors clearly demonstrate, however, that the Third Naval History Symposium was a good deal more than outward show. For the most part avoiding strictly battle history, the

contributors directed their attention to "those 'conditions' which define navies" and thus often dictate victory or defeat at sea. Somewhat less than half wrote on the U.S. Navy. To this reviewer, the more rewarding papers were commonly those dealing with non-American navies. Institutional history is especially well represented. Happily, most contributions are commendably short, straightforward, and fresh.

This review can only suggest the variety of materials in the volume by pointing to a few representative essays, necessarily omitting many of considerable merit. The tone is established by the fine initial essays by J. Richard Sheffley on Greek ship construction as revealed in nautical archeology and by Laurence Evans on the maritime logistics that provided the food essential to support the urban populations of the Roman Empire. A half dozen pieces deal with British and French naval institutional operations during the early modern period. Joel Best is enlightening on three types of English piracy 1550-1750. Peter G. Cornwell's research on training in the Japanese Navy and Daniel C. Evans' observations on recruitment of Japanese naval officers during the Meiji Period are important both for what they reveal about the Japanese Navy and for the comparisons that readers will inevitably draw with 19th century Western practices. Among the American chapters, Robert Seager's elucidation of Alfred Thayer Mahan's difficulties with Nelson's morals is an entertaining reading as it was hearing. Whereas Jeffrey Dorwart's appreciation of American naval intelligence in the New Navy includes a deft critique of Peter Karsten's *Naval Aristocracy*, John C. Reilly enthusiastically invites research in the little used naval attaché reports at the National Archives, and William Heimdahl and Geraldine Roberts review the recently opened records of the Pearl Harbor Liaison Office as sources on the Pearl Harbor

investigations. There are also authoritative observations on the influence of radio intelligence on the Battle of the Atlantic from British (Patrick Beesley), German (Jürgen Rohwer), and American (Kenneth A. Knowles) points of view.

Professor Love and his associates see the essays as a "benchmark" demonstrating the breadth and professionalism of naval historians today. They confirm that naval history is alive with new approaches and interpretations. Moreover, the variety of the materials notwithstanding, the essays often interplay with each other, providing sources of comparison, contrast, and continuity between the various naval services of different ages.

WILLIAM R. BRAISTED
University of Texas at Austin

Rothenberg, Morris. *The USSR and Africa: New Dimensions of Soviet Global Power (AISI Monographs on International Affairs)*. Washington: Advanced International Studies Institute, 1980. 288pp.

Considering the intensive and persistent pattern of activities conducted by the Soviet Union and its surrogates across the vast African continent beginning with the Angolan conflict of 1975-1976, this work has particular value as a timely and incisive assessment of Soviet strategic goals and interests focused on that resource-rich and politically volatile region. A former U.S. Foreign Service Officer with diplomatic experience both in the U.S.S.R. and at Third World posts, Rothenberg contends that these post-1975 Soviet efforts in Africa represent the most sophisticated and multifaceted campaign mounted to date in furtherance of its global strategy to minimize or deny U.S. and Western interests in the Third World, while simultaneously accruing influence and advantage for its own policies among the world's lesser-developed countries. Just

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as Soviet pronouncements have consistently portrayed the oil-rich Middle East as a "strategic backdoor" to secure advantage over the industrial West, he argues that post-1975 Soviet initiatives on the African continent, also with a vast wealth of resources, stand as yet another variation of that indirect, though potent, challenge to the politicoeconomic well-being of Western Europe and the United States. As an end-game objective in Africa, Rothenberg also maintains that the ultimate Soviet goal is the neutralization and eventual elimination of the Republic of South Africa as a key regional anti-Soviet bastion in the broader fabric of the East-West struggle.

In his comprehensive introduction, AISI Director Mose Harvey takes note of a recent Soviet work on contemporary national liberation movements in which Karen Brutents, a leading CPSU theoretician, characterizes the ongoing Soviet ventures in Africa since 1975 as "a total offensive against imperialism and world capitalism as a whole in order to do away with them" (pp. vii-viii). Both Harvey and Rothenberg furnish succinct outlines for the structure and dynamics of this broad, multifaceted Soviet thrust into Africa's regional and internal affairs in their respective introductions. For his part, Rothenberg perceives post-1975 Soviet/surrogate efforts in Africa as a qualitatively refined campaign that both differs from, and, yet furthers, the U.S.S.R.'s Third World policies already underway since the immediate post-Stalinist period, and his 11 chapters progressively develop the specific goals of these recent efforts. Successive chapters in the initial section (Chapters II-V) cover the Soviet/Cuban interventions in the Angolan conflict of 1975-1976 and the Ethiopian-Somali clash on the strategic Horn of Africa from early 1977, the Soviet/Cuban-assisted incursions into Zaire's Shaba Province in both 1977 and 1978, along with the continent-wide array of Soviet-led programs and activities over the

latter half of the 1970s. In assessing their cumulative effect, Rothenberg clearly indicates that the U.S.S.R. has achieved a firm strategic foothold, with the potential for further gains, throughout Africa.

In the following section (Chapters VI and VII), the author examines the nature of "consolidation" measures that the Soviet Union and its surrogates have planned and executed to guarantee their presence in those African LDCs where a foothold has been gained and, conversely, to preclude any recurrence of the reversals suffered in earlier Soviet relationships with Egypt, Somalia, Ghana and Mali. Chapter VI, for example, features a number of somewhat cautionary Soviet writings of recent vintage that openly admit to inherent risks and hazards in its ongoing relations with various types of Third World political regimes while also suggesting a fair combination of possible political, economic and military programs designed to assure continued Soviet influence with these young nations. Recent applications of these consolidation activities are then discussed in the following chapter with respect to Mozambique, Angola and Ethiopia. Rothenberg next explores further horizons of the Soviet Union's African campaign, particularly Rhodesia in its perspectives on Zimbabwe, Namibia and the Republic of South Africa, in his final section (Chapters VIII-X) as he emphasizes that the RSA marks the final Soviet target for conquest on the African continent in the years ahead.

Assessing Soviet advances in Africa as a "challenge of new dimensions," Rothenberg presents an excellent case in his concluding chapter for the meaningful viewpoint that the U.S.S.R. no longer perceives its Third World activities, especially its firm and consistent support for radical political regimes and national liberation movements, as anything less than a righteous, all-out

offensive against the West. In highlighting the predominant post-1975 Soviet propensity to intervene in the internal and regional affairs of African and other Third World states with large contingents of surrogate military forces that are underwritten with considerable amounts of Soviet arms aid under the dubious guise of "proletarian internationalism," the author clearly sets forth the broadest possible bounds for this new Soviet challenge to both the West and the young nations of Africa. If he does stop short of offering any policy options, it becomes obvious that the United States and the nations of both Western Europe and Africa must cooperatively generate an innovative, dynamic set of programs that assure African development, while meeting and defeating this huge and sophisticated Soviet campaign. With extensive Soviet and regional source materials along with a strong array of useful tabular data, this volume is at once a timely and valuable analysis that deserves both careful reading and thoughtful consideration for its treatment of the massive Soviet offensive now underway against both the young and older nations of the free world.

JOSEPH E. THACH, JR.
OASD (PA)

Smith, Myron J., Jr. *The Soviet Navy, 1941-1978: A Guide to Sources in English*, The War/Peace Bibliography Series, R.D. Burns, ed. Santa Barbara: ABC-Clío, 1980. 211pp.

Bibliographers, like translators, are insufficiently honored in our land. Both crafts involve a large measure of art and intellect; both perform an inestimable service; but both are, for the most part, taken for granted.

That I have bracketed the two together may seem curious as they require widely different talents, but the bibliographer, Myron Smith inevitably reminds us of the material in Russian

that we probably have not read.

The work at hand is exceptionally fine. A bibliography should be judged on completeness, accuracy, organization and usefulness. This one, on all counts, belongs in the first rank. In a random way of checking, I have not thought of a single article that is not listed and I have noticed several translations from Russian that I did not know were available in English; and there are many, many entries for articles that I did not know (some with titles I cannot understand such as "Castration Round and Tattletale Ships: Big Russian Cruisers Beefing Up Carriers," entry number 1371).

This bibliography, then, inspires confidence, which is a necessary function of bibliographies. As to the other functions, being handy and well organized, it also wins top honors. The entries are numbered so that they are easily found. They are organized into chapters with sensible subheadings so that no one can look up specific subjects, and they are indexed according to author so that one can look up one's friends. (In saying so, I just noticed that Leon Martel is missing, perhaps justified on the grounds that he wrote about the merchant fleet.)

Certainly that is all that a bibliography is required to do unless it is a critical bibliography, containing commentary by the author on the value and relevance of the entries. But in a book of this scope, that would be an impossible, and unwelcome, addition. This book, however, contains several delightful surprises. There is an article by Steve Kime at the beginning, written with his usual brilliance and insight, "The Soviet Navy, Present and Future." There is also a very helpful guide to research containing the most standard reference works for this sort of study. Each section is introduced nicely and briefly and there are appendixes, one of which contains a very useful brief listing of naval biographies. The latter is very helpful to those of us who need

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reassurance that Gorshkov really is 70 years old.

This is, altogether, a very competent job resulting in an admirable and very useful book that will certainly be needed in every library where research on military matters is performed. It will be valuable for many years to come and then we hope that Myron Smith will bring it up to date again for at the rate the articles and books are proliferating, we need someone keeping track. The author of this book has proved himself equal to the task.

ROBERT B. BATHURST
Harvard University

Till, Geoffrey, *Air Power and the Royal Navy, 1914-1945: A Historical Survey*. London: Jane's Publishing Company, 1979. 224pp.

There have been a number of operational histories of the Fleet Air Arm, but this is not one of them. Written by a faculty member at the British counterpart of the Naval War College, the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, this study is a serious historical analysis of the influence of aviation on the Royal Navy. Dr. Till's work is the result of careful research and expresses a balanced judgment based on a deep understanding of both technical matters and the broad strategic issues of the period. The basic problems that the author examines are centered around the questions why the Royal Navy was unable to develop fully her initial innovations in naval aviation and why her lead in this field was shortly overtaken by the American and Japanese Navies. In dealing with these questions, one can see the manner in which airpower affected the role of the navy in the defense of Britain, and in those terms one can see some of the fundamental issues in British defense policy.

In approaching his subject, Till has analyzed six broad subject areas: people, ships, aircraft, bureaucracy, battle

doctrine and war experience. He shows that the shortage of men in the Fleet Air Arm as compared to the U.S. Navy symbolized the extent to which Britain's war resources had been surpassed by 1945. In other areas, he sees a similar relationship. For example, the British carrier construction program and aircraft production emphasize the industrial disparity between Britain and America. In terms of bureaucracy, he shows that there was too little coordination among those responsible. The division of responsibility for naval aviation between the Air Ministry and the Admiralty created competition without the means to plan, to direct and to administer the development of aviation at sea. In the same period, British battle doctrine tended to be based on the traditional assumption that sea battles would be decided by the concentration of battleships. Tactics were developed for the Fleet Air Arm that emphasized the role of the carrier in this situation. The use of aircraft in other roles was not fully worked out in terms of tactics and training. Tactical manuals dealing with such alternatives were not fully completed or made available to pilots. Till's discussion of the development of naval aviation in combat is the shortest of his chapters. This is understandable in view of his desire to avoid an operational history. However, given the experience of the U.S. Navy in this area, one might have expected a longer discussion here. Certainly, the U.S. Navy's carrier tactics were largely developed in actual war operations, not during the interwar period. One gleans from his remarks that this was also true of British naval aviation, in its rapid development between the Norwegian campaign of 1940 and its performance later in the war. This aspect of development could have been more fully explored. The author opens with a detailed discussion of the naval and air aspects of the Norwegian campaign to show the effect of interwar planning on wartime

operations. What he has to say here is most interesting and useful, but in light of his ultimate conclusion, it might have been even more appropriate to examine all aspects of that campaign, including the military side and the coordination of high command. It is a campaign that still wants an unbiased historian, but in its broad aspects it presents some of the very fundamental issues in which Dr. Till deals.

In his final chapter, Till concludes that the Royal Navy yielded the race in developing airpower at sea by 1939. The tendency to underrate the performance and potential of naval aviation, as well as to deny it appropriate resources, was the result of many factors. Among them was the lack of a bureaucratic organization to support progress and expansion. Another factor was the economic climate of the times which required cutbacks. Simultaneously, there was a lack of vision and leadership for naval aviation. Perhaps this in itself was because of the Fleet Air Arm's position as a hybrid between the advocates of seapower and those of airpower. It was caught in the rivalry and friction between two views that were attempting to exclude the other. Moreover, the struggle between air and naval advocates was as much a conflict between prophetic views as it was a struggle for scarce national resources. This was Britain's particular dilemma. She lacked resources for defense on land, at sea and in the air, but she needed all three. The battle for priority among the three was a partisan struggle that missed the essential point.

Dr. Till's analysis of this topic is an excellent contribution to naval history. By effectively breaking out of the narrow mold of naval historians, one can find here a valuable case study in some of the most basic issues in defense policy.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF
Naval War College

Valle, James E. *Rocks and Shoals: Order and Discipline in the Old Navy, 1800-1861*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1980, 341pp.

During the past decade the study of naval history has expanded into several areas not previously examined to any degree. Since Harold Langley's path-breaking *Social Reform in the United States Navy, 1798-1862* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1967) historians have increasingly studied not just ships, their commanders, and their battles, but also the enlisted men of the Navy. This work is a welcome addition to this trend.

In it Valle examines the nascent years of the American Navy, a time during which it was "a singular military organization characterized by smallness, scattered deployment, and peculiar values and ethos." His opening chapters sketch the Navy's system of administration, "among the [world's] most backward and poorly organized," and examine its judicial system that was not designed to dispense justice but to maintain discipline.

Valle next analyzes the provisions of the Articles of War of 1800, which served the Navy relatively unchanged from their passage until 1950, when they were replaced by the Uniform Code of Military Justice. In many cases the "Rocks and Shoals," as they were known, were nebulous, leaving much to the discretion of the enforcer. As in so many other ways, Commodore Edward Preble set the standard for their implementation. He disliked formal courts-martial and courts of inquiry because he believed that too many resulted from trivial matters, that they wasted time, but most importantly, that they gave the defendant too favorable an opportunity of either being acquitted or of receiving a light sentence. Thus he avoided formal proceedings whenever possible by such expedients as breaking major offenses down into a series of subjudicial charges that could be tried at captain's mast or imposing combined modes of

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punishment, e.g., lashes and time in irons, so as not to exceed permitted maximums in any one category.

The pattern was similar for officers. If an offense was grave Preble would seek an officer's resignation rather than formally try him. Even if found guilty few officers suffered harsh penalties for their transgressions and political influence was regularly used to reduce or overturn guilty verdicts and sentences. Enlisted men generally lacked political connections to obtain such favors and sentences given were almost invariably carried out unless the death penalty was involved, in which case it was usually reduced to a number of years at hard labor. Flogging was accepted by officers and seamen and preferred to other forms of punishment inasmuch as it meant quick justice which once endured was over.

"Preble's Boys" accepted these practices and followed his example thus establishing an unwritten and basically *illegal* system of naval justice, but one that was effective and accepted by persons in authority both inside and outside of the Navy as being in the best interest of both the service and the nation. These early sections are basically sound, though Valle has an annoying habit of linking the views of officers on discipline to the views of the major political parties in incorrect ways. For example, he says that "like the Federalists in Congress, Preble believed in different treatment for officers and enlisted men." Such an attitude was certainly shared by Jeffersonian Republicans as well.

The remainder of the book is devoted to an examination by category of offenses committed, trials conducted, and the sentences meted out. Most interesting were the capital offenses. Valle shows that charges of mutiny were often used to cover lesser offenses which threatened officers. It is ironic that the closer an incident came to real mutiny, i.e., to endangering the safety of

a ship, the more reluctant officers were to identify it as such. Murder was an enlisted man's crime and like true mutiny, quite rare, while desertion was so common that death was an impractical penalty and rarely imposed except during the period from 1812 to 1819.

In chapters examining all cases of homo- and heterosexual misconduct that came to trial and the more nebulous crimes of disobedience and disrespect, Valle again shows that a double standard of punishment existed for officers and enlisted men.

That the author has made an important contribution to our understanding of the Old Navy cannot be doubted, but his work does suffer from serious weaknesses. Some of his conclusions, e.g., "that the navy's use of the death penalty was arbitrary, capricious, occasionally irregular, and almost always justified by the 'good of the service' rather than the merits of the cases," may be true, but they are not convincingly supported by the evidence presented.

More importantly, indeed his fatal flaw, is the shallowness of his research. After explaining how officers took careful pains to avoid formal legal proceedings, Valle goes on to base almost his entire analysis of misconduct and discipline on records of those formal proceedings as contained in the "Records of General Courts-Martial and Courts of Inquiry of the Navy Department, 1799-1867," in the National Archives. In his introduction he notes that "one can tap a rich body of manuscript material" including "old logbooks and accounts of voyages and expeditions . . . letters, diaries, books, pamphlets, and even novels." It is unfortunate that he has made so little use of these sources, as they would reveal much about the subjudicial proceedings and the levying of combinations of punishments used by officers to avoid formal proceedings. It is also of note that the novel he makes most use of as a source material is *White Jacket*, Herman

Melville's propagandistic attack on flogging, a practice that Valle says was generally supported by enlisted men and officers alike.

Valle's main contribution is his careful analysis of the formal judicial proceedings and his extraction from them of a great deal of information. It remains for him, or someone else, to broaden the research and to place the naval judicial system in the context of its times. Until then his conclusions must be considered tentative as applied to the Navy as a whole.

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Von Müllenheim-Rechberg, Baron Burkhard. *Battleship Bismarck: A Survivor's Story*. Trans. by Jack Sweetman. Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1980. 290pp.

In the words of Admiral Sir John Tovey, Commander in Chief, Home Fleet, as the British closed in on *Bismarck*, "the sinking of the *Bismarck* may have an effect on the war as a whole out of all proportion to the loss of the enemy of one battleship." In retrospect, it is not surprising that the sinking of *Bismarck* took on more significance than the loss of one battleship—small as the German Fleet in 1941 was—or that the story continues to attract popular and scholarly interest. Before *Exercise Rhine* was over, the British had lost its largest warship and deployed four battleships, two battle cruisers, two aircraft carriers, three heavy cruisers, ten light cruisers and twenty-one destroyers in a chase that covered an area of more than a million square nautical miles. *Bismarck* demonstrated the technical achievements of German naval architecture and the culmination of German naval gunnery in its duel with *Hood* and *Prince of Wales*. In the final 90-minute action, *Bismarck*, unable to defend herself, demonstrated almost unbelievable staying power absorbing

2,876 hits before the crew set the scuttling charges and opened the sea-cocks. Another facet of this phase of the Anglo-German Atlantic battle, which has intrigued students of modern naval warfare, is the role of naval intelligence. Fueled by the publications beginning in 1974 about ULTRA and the British success in breaking the German naval code, there was speculation that Admiral Tovey's forces had substantial, if not decisive, aid from this source in tracking *Bismarck*.

As the senior survivor and fourth gunnery officer of *Bismarck* during her training period and first and final sortie, Baron Burkhard von Müllenheim-Rechberg provides an entirely new perspective to the ship's 8-day operation. The author's account, written 40 years after the sinking of *Bismarck*, represents the first and only detailed account of the battle from the German side.

Supplemented by new archival sources and the author's vivid recreation of events and the morale of the officers and crew, he has made a major contribution to this chapter of World War II and naval history in general. Not only does Müllenheim demonstrate his objectivity and scholarship but his writing holds the reader in suspense throughout the chase. His description of the ship's fitting-out and training period and the photographs provide a rare opportunity to experience what life was like on board *Bismarck*.

The book also presents Müllenheim with an opportunity to provide some counterinterpretations and necessary corrections to the various battle reports in the *Bismarck* literature. Müllenheim's *Battleship Bismarck* thereby joins Russell Granfell's *The Bismarck Episode* and Brian Schofield's *Loss of the Bismarck* as the classic accounts of the pursuit and destruction of *Bismarck*.

Müllenheim poses the difficult questions that Lütjens, the Fleet Commander, had to face at each critical

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phase. He contends that, viewed strategically, *Exercise Rhine* was a failure from the moment the ship left Norway inasmuch as the British had detected the breakout of *Bismarck* and her companion, *Prinz Eugen*. Commerce raiding was the primary objective of German surface forces in the Atlantic, not the destruction of enemy warships.

The contact with *Suffolk* on 23 May, the *Hood* action off Iceland and the persistent shadowing of British cruisers created the most likely reason for Lütjen's pessimism that became so noticeable in his tactical decisions and dispatches. As Müllenheim suggests, Lütjens may have been influenced by what the admiral regarded as superior British radar which, as Lütjens radioed to Group West on 25 May, "has a strong adverse effect on operations in Atlantic."

Lütjen's decisions not to close with the British cruisers, not to pursue the damaged *Prince of Wales*, his precipitate order to break off the mission and reach port and then to steer for St. Nazaire by the shortest route and, perhaps most significant, his failure to realize that *Bismarck* had managed to break away from its pursuers on 25 May are all symptoms of a larger issue that is somewhat outside the scope of this book. The weight of German naval tradition, the failure of the High Seas Fleet in World War I, placed a heavy burden on the *Seekriegsleitung* and Admiral Raeder whose conception of German naval strategy and planning went beyond the resources available to them. Although they maintained the goal of achieving command of the sea in the North Atlantic, even the admonition of the *Seekriegsleitung* to strive for "local and temporary" command of the sea was unrealistic. In spite of its limited surface forces which, according to Raeder, could only show they knew how to die gallantly, it was imperative that those limited forces be used to demonstrate their value to Hitler and to atone

for Germany's inactivity on the high seas in World War I. Lütjens had initially expressed reservations against deploying *Bismarck* alone without heavier surface forces but acceded to the position of the *Seekriegsleitung* and Raeder. In this light, Lütjens' 25 May "victory or death" speech with its deleterious effect on morale or his premature 26 May radio dispatch "we will fight to the last round" are expressions of resignation that did not appear justified by events at the time and may have prevented Lütjens from taking action such as the erection of the dummy smokestack designed to confuse enemy air attacks. As Müllenheim states, after 24 May immediate needs dictated most of the actions of the fleet staff and ship's command. In the end, it was Lütjens' two radio messages on the morning of 25 May that enabled the British to get a fix on *Bismarck* and direct Force H and its *Swordfish* to the target. Conventional methods of intelligence and reconnaissance and not ULTRA provided the British with their success against *Bismarck*. ULTRA and the *Bismarck* operation did, however, have a decisive effect on the war at sea because the British were able to destroy the German resupply organization in the Atlantic thereby making it impossible for surface forces to operate effectively in the Atlantic and forcing Dönitz to rely upon refueling his U-boats and U-boat tankers ("Milchcow").

In the final analysis, the German errors and failures doomed *Bismarck*. Not all the errors, however, were made by the Fleet Commander. Poor German aerial reconnaissance, the inaccurate report on 22 May that the British ships were at anchor in Scapa Flow and the encouragement by Group North marked the fateful beginnings of the voyage. Müllenheim is unwilling to ascribe the loss of *Bismarck* either to "unforeseeable fate" or a "fatal flaw" in Lütjens' character. No one can deny, of course, the role of the "fortunes of war" in the

misattack on *Sheffield* that caused *Ark Royal's* airplanes to switch from the unreliable magnetic detonators to contact detonators for the critical torpedo attack on *Bismarck*. As Müllenheim points out, the rudder damage and the inability to repair or steer the ship were only part of the reason *Bismarck* was left helpless in the Atlantic. Without U-boat or air support, *Bismarck* was, in Müllenheim's words, "consigned to a fate that she did not have the resources to avert."

Müllenheim does offer new insights into the actions and motivations of his superiors, although he does not claim definitive answers. In fact, the loss of the War Diary and the few survivors (115) mean that we can never be certain of the command decisions made by Lütjens. The author's excellent portrayal of Lütjens does suggest more strongly than he is willing to do that the Fleet Commander was involved in an operation that he did not fully support and each setback simply confirmed this attitude. The description of *Bismarck's* captain, Ernst Lindemann, and the differences between the two German officers does raise the question of whether another Fleet Commander might have acted otherwise. The failure of the German Navy to produce an outstanding naval commander of Hipper's caliber in World War II and the failure to develop and implement a viable naval strategy is a larger story of which the *Bismarck* episode is a significant and now clearer chapter.

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Whynes, David K. *The Economics of Third World Military Expenditures*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979. 165pp.

There was something distinctly Woodrow Wilsonish about President Carter's quest to achieve longrun goals

that were certifiably visionary to the "hardheaded realist." This was never more true than in his attempts to control arms sales to Third World nations. Reasonable men cannot but question the mortality of abetting the diversion of scarce development resources into local arms rivalries. Yet as a practical matter the net effect of Carter's policy appears to have been to have slowed such arms races little while causing the tanks of the world's arms suppliers to increase, at the expense of both U.S. arms sales and influence. Thus, at the advent of the Reagan administration, arms sales policy is once again an open and nettlesome issue.

The Economics of Third World Military Expenditures is a timely and thought-provoking work. Whynes assumes that because defense expenditures inherently require diversion of resources that are more directly welfare-promoting, there is a clear benefit from minimizing their net cost. Net cost is the financial (accounting) cost minus the social value of whatever civil benefits arise from defense expenditures. Civil benefits arise both directly through effects on the civilian economy and indirectly as the military acts as a "modernizing" influence on both the economy and the polity. Whynes, by his admission, fails to prove entirely the case he is interested in arguing—that greater emphasis should be placed on policies of "military-social integration" to reduce the net cost of defense. But he does succeed in providing a broad-ranging and imaginative review of evidence and thinking on the role of the military in the nation-building process.

After stating the problem, Whynes deals with why military expenditures have grown, their costs and benefits to the civilian economy, arms imports and foreign aid, and whether defense spending rises under military regimes. The empirical evidence he reviews is notable equally for the insights it provides and the confirmations it fails to provide.

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Regarding the latter, statistical analyses consistently fail to support the more commonsense suppositions about military spending. Specifically, it is found that:

—military expenditures do increase with GNP but the increase is not at the expense of nondefense expenditures; they increase also. Indeed, it appears military expenditures play the curious role of "leading" public expenditures, rising at times of crisis and causing the public's level of tolerance of taxation to go up and then receding as the crisis passes, creating room in the undiminished public expenditures for more non-defense expenditures;

—military burden (military expenditures as a percentage of GNP—typically in the 2 to 4 percent range) falls as income rises. This finding in part reflects the way the calculation was undertaken, the highly burdened U.S. and U.S.S.R. having been excluded from the analysis;

—military spending does not retard economic growth; on the contrary the evidence indicates highly burdened economies if anything have grown more rapidly than others;

—military spending does not increase significantly after military takeovers.

These findings do not suggest so much that Third World military expenditures are less burdensome than suspected as that the issues are more complex than can be captured by simple analytical models. In any given case, quantitative analyses are useful to frame the issue but can hardly substitute for professional, multidisciplinary judgment in suggesting policy conclusions.

Whyne's final chapters are the least successful. In them and drawing on the experiences of India, Burma, China, Tanzania, and North Vietnam, he argues the case for increased emphasis on arms control, civic action, "military-social integration," and nonmilitary mobilization for defense as ways to lessen the net cost of defense. Though

he provides a useful review of experience and thinking in these areas, he fails to come to grips with the issue in quantitative terms. Granted the lack of relevant data, the discussion might have been couched in terms of suggestive relative magnitudes. Instead Whyne presents an essentially conceptual discussion that provides no basis for gauging what cost savings might be realized if such policies were pursued.

The discussion of the economic benefits of military expenditures is one of the more provocative sections of the book. Viewing the military as an economic sector, "spillover benefits" of three types are considered: stimulus to industrial growth from military hardware manufacture and repair; regional multiplier from military expenditures, which tend to be geographically dispersed; and positive influence on human aspects of economic development, especially on employment, skills training, formal education, and manpower development in general. The latter produces significant "bridging effects"—the enhancing of the quality of a nation's people technically and organizationally as the military draws broadly from the populace, exposes individuals to modernizing influences at all levels of organization, and eventually returns them to the civilian labor force and to society. These effects are considerably broader than those of simple "education and training" and are important dynamic effects of an expanding, modernizing military.

Whyne has provided a useful discussion of an issue that is likely to move increasingly to the fore in the 1980s. Third World nations are aspiring to increasingly capital-intensive defense establishments. They are requesting increased external support from competing supply nations for both the importation of arms and their coproduction. This short book is not the definitive work on the subject. Yet it is the only comprehensive discussion available and

sets the stage nicely for further inquiry. U.S. arms sales policy will be the more coherent, and persuasive, the more it reflects the range of issues suggested by Whynes, including in particular innovative deterrent strategies, the overall "productivity" of alternative weapons systems, and the bridging effects of military programs.

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Zartman, I. William, ed. *Elites in the Middle East*. New York: Praeger, 1980. 252pp.

One of the most unfair things that a reviewer might do is to wish that the author had written a different book (which is not at all the same as wishing for a better book). So as not to be accused of falling into this trap, let it be said at the onset that *Elites in the Middle East* is not an up-to-date descriptive treatment of those in power in the Middle East. Instead this is a book expressly intended for political scientists dealing with Middle Eastern politics. Its foci are largely theoretical and conceptual, and its explicit object is to take stock of the present state of elite studies and to indicate or intimate new directions that might be taken by the academic specialist. Of its seven chapters, four are more likely to hold interest for the scholar than the informed layman. However, three of the chapters are of wider appeal, and it is those chapters that will be highlighted in this review.

Charles Butterworth provides a competent overview that contrasts the normative underpinnings of Western and Middle Eastern philosophies of government. While readers are not likely to be surprised by the author's treatment of such well-known luminaries as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, his discussion of the work of Alfarabi (A.D., 870-950), Averroes (1126-1198), Nizām al-Mulk (1018-1092), and Kai

Ka'us may provide a unique introduction to the work of these Islamic philosophers. Butterworth clearly shows that while the Western philosophers of politics concerned themselves with the form of governance (e.g., democracy vs. autocracy), their Middle Eastern counterparts were more likely to concern themselves with the relative goodness of a government as measured by the quality of its goals rather than its form (although it must be added that their view of politics as an art capable of mastery by few led them to conclude—or assume—that rule by the one or the few was preferable). Accordingly, what we encounter is an emphasis upon the proper behavior and skills of rulers. This is all of more than passing interest as the work of these Moslem thinkers is, according to Butterworth, often standard fare in the universities and secondary schools of the Middle East. The only criticism that might be made of Butterworth is that his 38-page chapter only mentions the work of one of the greatest of Arab philosophers, Ibn Khaldun, but he is still to be applauded for introducing his readers to the work of men who are likely to be obscure for many.

The centerpiece chapter of *Elites in the Middle East* is a provocative theoretical statement by I. William Zartman, a well-known scholar of Middle Eastern (and especially North African) politics. "Toward a Theory of Elite Circulation" treats the absorption, cooptation and exclusion of those who aspire to positions in the elite strata. While fair treatment of Zartman's work is not possible in a short review, it may be suggestive to note that he sees elite circulation as a developmental process that tests the incumbent's ability to cope with the continuing realignment ("bunching") of aspiring elites brought about by the political decisions (and nondecisions) of the elite. Zartman's rich exposition treats the clusters of challenges that may lead to the

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realignment of the political elite as a result of differing generational, regional, ideological and socioeconomic interests. These interests are in turn related to the natural history of independence enjoyed by a respective country. While Zartman's chapter is decidedly preliminary, he does offer a number of essential insights toward understanding the process of elite circulation. And after all, the smoothness with which elites move into power is at the very essence of political stability. We need not be reminded of the importance of the latter, especially in the Middle East.

The final chapter of concern is of considerable merit and appeal. Marvin G. Weinbaum's "Structure and Performance of Mediating Elites" is a superbly written discussion of that most typical Middle Eastern role—the mediator. In a society marked by stark distinction in statuses, omnipresent codes of modesty and honor, and widespread illiteracy, the performance of mediatory functions (*wasita*) is essential, and those that do so display a mark of elite status. The role of the mediator may range from arranging a marriage, acquiring routine or exceptional government assistance, interpreting or amplifying communications to a target audience (e.g., a village), or exercising control (e.g., collecting

taxes). Weinbaum explains the functions of local, party and legislative, special interest, administrative, military and media elites with respect to their roles as intermediaries between the rulers and the ruled. Of particular note is his emphasis on the influence that mediating elites have upon societal change. For example, the ubiquitous transistor radio illustrates the potential significance of media elites for affecting the masses' attitudes towards government policies. Also there is the enhanced significance of local mediators who can interpret and amplify the news (and who often do so very subjectively). While the role of a given elite as mediator is not immutable, given the differing circumstances of the respective Middle East states, Weinbaum makes it quite clear that the mediation institution will endure because its "indispensability ultimately rests on the enduring material and psychological gap that exists between masses and elites in the Middle East."

While some readers may be put off by the academic wrappings, *Elites in the Middle East* does offer some rewarding nuggets for those who choose to persevere.

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RECENT BOOKS

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Annotated by

Doris Baginski, Stephen Maffeo,
Jane Sanfilippo, and Mary Ann Varoutsos

Aldridge, Robert C. *The Counterforce Syndrome: A Guide to U.S. Nuclear Weapons and Strategic Doctrine*. Washington: Institute for Policy Studies, 1978. 86pp. \$3.95

All three divisions of the Pentagon's "strategic triad" (land-based ICBMs, intercontinental bombers, and ICBM submarines) are being geared for first-strike capabilities. Contrary to what most Americans believe, or want to believe, "counterforce" has risen to replace "deterrence" as the prevailing