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## History of the Art of War within the Framework of Political History, Vol 2

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most sensitive aspects of national command authorities. Dr. Pauls, the West German permanent representative to NATO, examines the political environment, structure, deterrent philosophy, and strategic problems of NATO, concluding with references to the Warsaw Pact and the prospects for the eighties. Major General Pilster rounds off this part of the volume with a very incisive picture of policy and strategy in the Warsaw Pact.

In part two Dr. Woerner, chairman of the defense committee of the West German legislature, places the current concern with theater nuclear weapons into its historical context and outlines a general American-European consensus in the NATO Nuclear Planning Group. Professor Arndt makes a contribution of particular interest to devotees of Corbett: he confronts head-on the apparent contradiction between the claim of Clausewitzian theory to have grasped the whole of war and the indisputably continental limitations of its empirical foundations. The essay presents the deepest and most acute statement of the issue known to the reviewer. As Clausewitz also failed to treat airpower for obvious reasons, the examination of "the validity of Clausewitz' judgments for the sphere of air and space war" by Lieutenant General Furlong, USAF, provides an extreme test of the longevity of the Clausewitzian constellation of insights. An equally contemporary perspective underlies the chapter by Colonel F.J. Wissing on the technological variable in strategy: this concentrates on the era from flexible response and the Harmel Report to the current intricacies of rationalization, standardization, and interoperability. The very different but concomitant dimension of civic support is examined by L. Ruehl. Professor Wallach presents Israel as an example of the importance of spiritual and moral factors emphasized by Clausewitz, tracing his theme back to the

"haganah," the illegal underground army in Palestine during the British mandate. A very knowledgeable point of view finds expression in Dr. Kurz' exposition of the congruence between Swiss security concepts and Clausewitzian axioms. Finally Colonel E. Sobik delineates politicomilitary control in the Soviet Union and the concomitant training of military forces.

Enough has been said, perhaps, to suggest that the Clausewitz renaissance girdles the globe and fans out into all major functional specialties. The American reader will be struck by the new circumstance that American contributions are now part of the mainstream of Clausewitz' scholarship. The harvest has begun from the seeds of postwar scholarship.

JOHN TASHJEAN

Delbrück, Hans. *History of the Art of War within the Framework of Political History, Vol. 2, The Germans*. Translated by Walter J. Renfroe, Jr. Westport, Conn. and London: Greenwood Press, 1980. 505pp.

Walter Renfroe has now reached the midpoint in his valuable work of translating *Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte*. The first volume has already been reviewed in this journal with a general comment on Delbrück's work (*NWCR*, Winter 1979, pp. 104-5).

In the second volume, Delbrück continues his work in attempting to explain the broad course of military developments while relating them to the major developments in general European history. His subject is *The Germans* in the period between the first century A.D. to the ninth century. Of the four volumes that spanned the ages from ancient history to Napoleon, Delbrück believed that the second volume was the most important for its contribution to our understanding. In his preface, he stated,

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This volume affects most deeply of all four our inherited concepts of world history, through its elimination of the legendary ideas on the fall of the ancient world and on the migration of peoples as well as its positive contributions, especially those concerning the substantiation of the alliance between Constantine and the Christian Church as postulate of the changing military system and institutions, and the clarification of the system of feudal institutions and knighthood.

Delbrück, himself, valued more highly the explanation he offered for the ways in which military affairs developed in history, rather than the concepts of strategy that he has offered in his first and fourth volumes. His aim was the larger quarry: knowledge of man's development. In searching for this end, he suggested that military accomplishment stems from two roots of very different types. The first is the courage and physical capacity of individual warriors. The second is the formation of individual warriors into a cohesive, tactical body. Analyzing in detail the fragmented evidence of military affairs at the end of the Roman Empire, Delbrück argued that the Roman Army gradually became Germanic. The Roman legions were not defeated and overthrown by the barbarians in battle, but the individual Roman soldiers were slowly replaced by Germanic mercenaries. This development led to the migration of a large number of Germans, with their wives, children and possessions, into the Roman Empire. This was the basis for the great "Barbarian invasion" that led to the downfall of Rome, Delbrück declared. The new peoples came in search of military service "for war, pay, booty and domination." The new breed stressed their individual and natural warlike tendency that served to break down the organized tactical discipline of the old Roman

legions. The entry of complete tribes into Roman service, Delbrück believed, was the decisive factor that determined the decline of the ancient world and the formulation of new, unique political systems. As the Germanic mercenaries gained power as provincial military commanders, the Empire began to split into separate kingdoms. Along with this outward change, the Germanic political system, with its legal and social concepts, gradually was integrated into or replaced the old Roman organization. These new changes that stressed the individual warrior and the tactical ability of the individual were maximized by mounting warriors on horseback. With this development, the way was opened for the military system and tactics of knighthood.

The translation of Delbrück's work will undoubtedly revive the academic disputes that raged half a century ago among German historians. Modern research has brought forward new details that may well show more faults in his explanations. Today, we may find that his arguments are too narrowly defined. We have become accustomed to seeing a complex group of forces at work behind any development and we will not be entirely convinced by the stress laid on one factor as a determining force. Despite those obvious faults, Delbrück's work remains important. His stress on the rise and fall of tactical organizations and their relationship to more general political organization is an important concept. Delbrück was the first to attempt to trace systematically this thread through history. His interest was not in detail, although there is much of it in his study. Feeling deeply the need to understand the past, he valued detail for its illustration of general ideas and reflections of broad tendencies. In this sense, he used detail in an attempt to understand the past in conceptual terms. In our time, when historians have become increasingly devoted to more detailed studies of smaller and smaller

subjects, Delbrück's work is a timely antidote. It reminds us of the work that needs to be done in grappling with the meaning and broad effect of warfare and military institutions in human history. Renfro has done a great service in making this early study more readily available to the English speaking community.

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Gabriel, Richard A. *The New Red Legions: An Attitudinal Portrait of the Soviet Soldier*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980. 246pp. and *The New Red Legions: A Survey Data Source Book*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980. 252pp.

It appears that these two books are being marketed, separately and together, although they would more properly be considered two volumes of one work. The price for the source book alone, \$40.00, reflects the cost of the research and publication, I would assume, but not its value to the reader for reasons explained below. This volume contains the questionnaire on which the study is based and the statistical manipulations of the responses as well as an introduction. (It largely duplicates what is said in the *Attitudinal Portrait*.) While the statistical work seems perfectly competent, considering the formidable obstacles to research of this sort, and while this reviewer and the great majority of readers of this journal will only wish for a continuation of this kind of project, it is a fact that the data were collected from only 134 respondents recalling their military experiences over a 45-year span. With all good will, one still must face the fact that the sample has a very limited validity, not because it is composed of immigrants and not because they are largely Jews, but because they are a tiny fraction of the population being discussed.

Nevertheless, 134 responses can be significant in other ways depending upon the insights they give and this is the subject of the far more interesting volume of the pair of books, *An Attitudinal Portrait of the Soviet Soldier*. Here, Professor Gabriel makes use of his experiences with the U.S. Army—he comes across as an enthusiastic reservist—for comparison with Soviet ways as well as displaying his knowledge of the Soviet system and the scholarly literature. His method is to put such subjects as morale, fighting spirit, combat effectiveness, etc., into a useful context that draws heavily on generally received conceptions. Then he presents the data from his questionnaire with commentary, and finally draws conclusions that, more often than not, repeat the ideas of the introductory remarks, but with variations.

The importance of Gabriel's work is that it comes towards the end of an orgy in American military thought of concentration on capabilities and neglect of intentions, a concept the implications of which I am convinced even the JCS has at times only vaguely comprehended. That we are out of that phase signifies that the lessons of Vietnam have finally been understood, lessons the Soviets have never needed to learn, that a superior force can be defeated by an inferior force regardless of capabilities. In any case, there has been a painfully, slowly growing awareness in Washington and at the war colleges, accelerated by the conquest of Afghanistan, that we have not understood Soviet intentions. This has magnified the importance of questions that were only halfheartedly considered in the past about the human element in war. The human element is Gabriel's critical subject.

The great strength of this study is that it is, as far as I know, an original work in a very complex field. It is true, as the author says, that with the raw data all around them in the form of, by now, some 250,000 émigrés from the