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The New Red Legions

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subjects, Delbrück's work is a timely antidote. It reminds us of the work that needs to be done in grappling with the meaning and broad effect of warfare and military institutions in human history. Renfroe has done a great service in making this early study more readily available to the English speaking community.

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Gabriel, Richard A. *The New Red Legions: An Attitudinal Portrait of the Soviet Soldier*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980. 246pp. and *The New Red Legions: A Survey Data Source Book*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980. 252pp.

It appears that these two books are being marketed, separately and together, although they would more properly be considered two volumes of one work. The price for the source book alone, \$40.00, reflects the cost of the research and publication, I would assume, but not its value to the reader for reasons explained below. This volume contains the questionnaire on which the study is based and the statistical manipulations of the responses as well as an introduction. (It largely duplicates what is said in the *Attitudinal Portrait*.) While the statistical work seems perfectly competent, considering the formidable obstacles to research of this sort, and while this reviewer and the great majority of readers of this journal will only wish for a continuation of this kind of project, it is a fact that the data were collected from only 134 respondents recalling their military experiences over a 45-year span. With all good will, one still must face the fact that the sample has a very limited validity, not because it is composed of immigrants and not because they are largely Jews, but because they are a tiny fraction of the population being discussed.

Nevertheless, 134 responses can be significant in other ways depending upon the insights they give and this is the subject of the far more interesting volume of the pair of books, *An Attitudinal Portrait of the Soviet Soldier*. Here, Professor Gabriel makes use of his experiences with the U.S. Army—he comes across as an enthusiastic reservist—for comparison with Soviet ways as well as displaying his knowledge of the Soviet system and the scholarly literature. His method is to put such subjects as morale, fighting spirit, combat effectiveness, etc., into a useful context that draws heavily on generally received conceptions. Then he presents the data from his questionnaire with commentary, and finally draws conclusions that, more often than not, repeat the ideas of the introductory remarks, but with variations.

The importance of Gabriel's work is that it comes towards the end of an orgy in American military thought of concentration on capabilities and neglect of intentions, a concept the implications of which I am convinced even the JCS has at times only vaguely comprehended. That we are out of that phase signifies that the lessons of Vietnam have finally been understood, lessons the Soviets have never needed to learn, that a superior force can be defeated by an inferior force regardless of capabilities. In any case, there has been a painfully, slowly growing awareness in Washington and at the war colleges, accelerated by the conquest of Afghanistan, that we have not understood Soviet intentions. This has magnified the importance of questions that were only halfheartedly considered in the past about the human element in war. The human element is Gabriel's critical subject.

The great strength of this study is that it is, as far as I know, an original work in a very complex field. It is true, as the author says, that with the raw data all around them in the form of, by now, some 250,000 émigrés from the

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Soviet Union, our analysts continued to be dazzled by numbers and by the printed word, by *Pravda* and *Red Star*, largely to the exclusion of the human information available to them. Why that happened in itself would make a fascinating study. We can speculate that it is because of a cultural infatuation with the printed material that carried more weight than human experience. We have deserved, I suppose, the manipulation by Soviet propaganda organs to which we have been so massively subjected. (I no longer even feel the anguish I used to when I read another "authoritative" statement about the Soviet Union referring to the steady improvement in the standard of life in a country where even in Moscow for the last few years there has been an extreme scarcity of meat, eggs, medicine and toilet paper.) In any case, Professor Gabriel's work is evidence of our military sector emerging from the thrall-dom of some of its preconceptions.

This transformation was reflected in the comment by Colonel Bartos on the jacket (Colonel Bartos is an experienced Chief of the Foreign Intelligence Division for the Army) that the study "makes a unique contribution to Western scholarship on the Soviet Union and affords fresh insights into areas previously masked by Soviet propaganda and counter-intelligence efforts." I think he exaggerates, especially when he calls this a "remarkable book," but it is certainly a useful book and, I hope, the beginning of a much larger undertaking. But remarkable is a very strong word. Gabriel's conclusions correspond with the evidence from other sources, from Goldhamer's *The Soviet Soldier* (also researched almost entirely in English) and from what we can read in Soviet and Russian war memoirs and historical documents and records. There has long been plenty of evidence, as Gabriel found, that food, sex and drunkenness are severe problems, that discipline is doubtful and that political control is a

first priority. The picture he paints, derived from his questionnaire, leads one to think that his book should not be entitled *The New Red Legions*, for legions they are not, but perhaps *The Scruff of the Russian Bear*. (One cannot but regret sensationalism of his title, for this is not another of "the Russians are coming" kind of book.)

Professor Gabriel set out on a very ambitious project—he clearly likes the grand scale—posing and proposing to answer some of the most important and elusive military questions of our day: in a war, how well would the Soviet forces fight? Had he come up with a definitive answer, he would, indeed, have marked himself for glory. He deserves some of that for even trying.

He set for himself the most difficult of all conceivable questions, involving history, culture, psychology—the entire gamut of epistemology and of the social sciences—and this without, as I understand it, a knowledge of the Russian language. He proposed to describe "the attitudinal dimensions of the mind of the Soviet soldier." He claimed that his was the "first attempt to 'get inside the Soviet soldier's head' and it is the first study in which a research has been able to arrange a body of empirical data dealing with the subject longitudinally over time." (I will return to his use of the word "longitudinal.") When one talks about getting inside anyone's head, one is obviously talking about perceptions of reality. I think that involves many more complexities than Gabriel's study has attended to.

First, there is the "longitudinal" problem. Gabriel, with that phrase, apparently means that his sample contains responses from different periods of Soviet history. Such longitudinal computations make enormous demands upon both the statistical sample and the "attitudinal" comparison. For example, is the group of the decade of the seventies comparable in all other variables but age, when he discusses

combat effectiveness, perhaps, with the sample from the fifties, or sixties? I do not believe so.

That leads to the second problem of the gross sample itself. When I began reading *The New Red Legions*, I promised myself that I would not quarrel with the statistics. Professor Gabriel was quite right in asserting that the interview technique was nearly the only way (with all of its admitted shortcomings) to deal with a subject that had been egregiously, if not almost criminally considering its importance, neglected. (The government has spent millions of dollars on much less useful research based upon the contents of largely propaganda organs of the Soviet state while this magnificent resource, the émigrés, dwindled and evaporated.)

Gabriel made much of the fact that 30,000 émigrés had left the Soviet Union per year since the Helsinki Agreement. There are now over 250,000 in exile. But he was able to mail his questionnaire to only 1,059 and only 134 responded. Thus, he is talking about a very minute sample of the millions of Soviets (probably over 50 million) who have served in the armed forces during the period of his inquiry. When he writes that 11.5 percent of his respondents served since 1973, he is talking about 15 or 16 individuals! His data base for the period between 1964 and 1973 is only 44. Fifty-six percent of his sample, or 75 men, served prior to 1964.

My unsolicited advice, given these small numbers, would have been to rely very little on statistical manipulation of the data and very much more on the evidence from interviews. That way, he could have discussed more interestingly the different periods of ideological indoctrination, the variations in diet, and most importantly, the quintessential nationality problem that his statistics seem to me only to confuse. As it is, Professor Gabriel is tied to his data even when discussing the most contradictory problems of fact and spirit. Like anyone

else's, his oil and water do not mix. He is frequently forced into extreme positions to use his questionnaire.

For example, he points out that "The NCO corps of the Soviet Army as described so far is likely to be addicted to avoiding responsibility." (p. 141) That is undoubtedly true on some level. But what does it mean? In all armies, NCOs are expected to avoid some responsibilities. That is what separates them from the officers, normally. Gabriel's data show that the men also have a low opinion of the officers, longitudinally, no doubt. But isn't that true also of most armies? It is difficult in isolation to know what such statements mean.

A similar confusion develops in the discussion, and this is very critical, of the fighting spirit of Soviet soldiers. He writes that "An examination of Soviet military doctrine makes it very clear that the Soviets regard combat effectiveness as rooted in motivation and cohesion, which in turn is rooted in ideology and ideological indoctrination." From this he concludes that "Soviet units may have some grave weaknesses in the level of cohesion" because answers to the questionnaire showed that ideology was not considered important. The implication is, of course, that there is an Ideology and that if that is not strongly believed, then there is nothing. That is certainly far from possible.

There are many other subjects about which the questionnaire was illuminating and Professor Gabriel's comments are often intriguing. One, which I wished he had discussed more fully, was his notion that the Soviet military is prevented from becoming a modern organization because the Soviet state has not been transformed into a post-industrial society. This idea, which he refers to again and again, deserved some very systematic treatment. As I understood it, the whole point of the Russian revolution was to transform the Soviet state without imitating the "post-

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industrial" societies of the West. But an important question is whether or not because it is more sophisticated, or more "post-industrial," a state fights better. Mao, Ho Chi Minh and Stalin thought not, and proved it.

Gabriel has tackled this vast, intractable subject with courage and daring. We must be grateful to him for doing it at all, and apparently with little assistance. He deserved better support from his respondents and greater access to the émigré community. As all ex-Soviet citizens whom I have met bitterly criticize the naiveté of Americans in the face of the Soviet threat—"You are acting like fools and you will die a fool's death," said one ominously—it is surprising that more of them did not step forward to help in a study that would document their cause. We are reminded of even Lenin's complaint that it was the Russian nature to talk endlessly and not to act.

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Gottlieb, David, *Babes in Arms: Youth in the Army*. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1980. 173pp.

Babes in Arms presents results of individual interviews with 115 first-term Army enlistees conducted at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, in June 1978. David Gottlieb and four associates questioned members of the group regarding why they enlisted, whether they would reenlist, how they felt about their own combat readiness and that of their peers, their attitude toward their Army job assignment and whether that assignment measured up to their prior expectations, their assessments of their social life in the Army, and their attitudes and opinions on a variety of other aspects of their military experience. The sample included 103 men and 12 women. Forty five of the respondents were nonwhite. While all were in their first term of enlistment, some interviewees had

been in the service for only a few days, while others had served for several years. The author specifically disclaims that his sample is representative of all first termers, although he does state the belief that "these young enlistees are not dissimilar to their counterparts in other Army units."

In large part, the author lets the interviews speak for themselves. All the interviews were tape recorded, and quotations are verbatim, with each speaker identified by age, sex, and race. There is relatively little text apart from the quotations. Chapter 1 provides a brief description of the sample. Chapter 9 presents some conclusions and policy recommendations. The intervening chapters typically contain a short introduction and a short summary section. Otherwise, they present as many as 70 quotations, with text intruding only to introduce a series of quotations concerning a particular topic.

Gottlieb's interviews lead him to conclude that there is considerable job dissatisfaction among enlistees and a widespread feeling among them that they have been misled by recruiters. He also finds that many believe that their Army experience has resulted in personal growth and maturity. Many expressed the view that they are better off than friends who did not join. Accordingly, he recommends that the military should place less emphasis on advertising specific vocational training in its recruiting and, conversely, more emphasis on the maturity that enlistees are likely to gain. He also suggests 2-year enlistments, a restructuring of recruiter incentives, a "cooling off period" before induction in which enlistees have an opportunity to change their mind about their enlistment decision, expansion in the availability of education and training opportunities, and other policies that he believes will reduce the extent of job dissatisfaction.

Babes in Arms is an interesting, indeed entertaining, volume. Unless