

1981

The Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Forces Reduction

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Recommended Citation

Lautenschlager, Karl (1981) "The Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Forces Reduction," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 34 : No. 2 , Article 15.

Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol34/iss2/15>

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major arms-control conferences and proclamations made during the year.

Reflecting the degree of international concern with events in Asia and Africa, *Strategic Survey* devotes over one-third of its pages to background and analysis of the situations in these parts of the world. The discussions of Iran, Afghanistan, and the Maghreb are particularly useful to an understanding of the events occurring now and will aid in interpreting the reports of affairs still in store.

The conclusion presented in *Strategic Survey 1979* is that Third-World crises will occur increasingly in the 1980s, and that these crises will be less soluble by military power than the traditional challenges to international order and stability have been. The prescription is for political resolutions—negotiation and compromise—to remove the irritants to peaceful coexistence among neighboring states. But *Strategic Survey 1979* provides much more than this and merits a cover-to-cover reading by both serious and casual students of international security affairs.

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Keliher, John G. *The Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions: The Search for Arms Control in Central Europe*. Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon Press, 1980. 203pp.

This book describes recent efforts to reduce armed forces in central Europe by international agreement. Specifically, it deals with negotiations with the official title of Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe, but known in the West as Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions or MBFR. The book details the proposals and counterproposals of the major parties involved from the start of preparatory consultations in January 1973 through the formal negotiations of October 1973 to

December 1979. With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a decade of intensive East-West arms control negotiations came to an end, so in a sense the book is complete.

The proposals are not only described, but are summarized and explained in tabular form, and clear references to public sources of information are provided for each. There are also brief essays discussing problems of finding a common data base for negotiations, building confidence in this kind of arms control agreement, verification of compliance with a treaty once negotiated, and the special role of nuclear weapons.

The author has strong credentials for writing this book. He is a career officer, a colonel in the U.S. Army. His research and academic writing earned him a Ph.D. degree. He has studied and taught Soviet military strategy. And most important are his 4 years of work directly on MBFR, including service on the U.S. delegation at Vienna.

The strong point of the book is its explanation of the proposals made at the negotiating table by both sides. The mechanics of attempted mutual force reductions in Europe are tedious for even the most interested of laymen. Thus, Colonel Keliher's lists and tables, not only summarizing negotiating positions but projecting their effects on the balance of forces, are welcome tools for analysis.

At the root of the technical side of MBFR is the arcane business of comparing armies. Such comparisons are of broader interest than to only military professionals and those associated with arms control. They figure in critical policy decisions, in the assessment of a nation's political influence as well as its military capabilities in a region, and in budgetary considerations. Yet armies, with their numerous variations in organization, equipment, and skills of their personnel, are intractable subjects for quantitative analysis, even in today's world of computers and mathematical

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models. Much more quantifiable are strategic nuclear forces. With all of its problems, measuring the strategic balance is much simpler. That is probably a major factor in the popularity of assessing the strategic balance while neglecting analysis of land forces.

The author's discussion of the technical problems associated with MBFR addresses these issues directly. He goes further in explaining some new approaches that might be taken in future negotiations and the necessary conditions for the success of each. In this respect he presents the reader with the problems and some alternative solutions as well.

In spite of these strong points, there are important deficiencies. With the author's background in mind, his book turns out to be somewhat of a disappointment. As a participant in the talks, the author might be expected to provide some insights into what went on at the negotiating table. Colonel Keliher obviously wrote under constraints imposed by convention on any official who has participated in negotiations that are still under way, but he concentrates too much on press coverage instead of recounting what happened and why. This is partly a matter of style, but it is prominent enough that the reader must continually remind himself that Soviet proposals were actually made at the negotiating table and not just released in pieces to the Eastern bloc press. On the other side of the table, there is not nearly enough on Western proposals and negotiating options. The author discusses "Option III," but not in his section on negotiations, and the reader is given no idea about what the other options were.

Another disappointment is that there is not much new in the way of analysis presented here. The final chapters on problem areas and alternative approaches are particularly clear and useful, but they merely present the thinking of Frederick Wyle, Joseph Coffey,

Steven Canby, and others. This the author is careful to acknowledge, but more is to be expected than even good summaries of what is already in print.

For those unfamiliar with MBFR, the book is slow to put the problem into geopolitical perspective. It is not until well into the fourth chapter that we are told that an offensive into Western Europe remains unattractive for the Soviets. There is more than a small chance that such an offensive could bog down, and a stalemate could precipitate the dissolution of Soviet control in Eastern Europe, if not over national minorities within the Soviet Union as well. The important threat, Keliher tells us, is from political influence over West European governments that will accrue to the Soviets when there is a gross disparity of military power in Europe. The geographical facts of proximity of the Soviet Union and remoteness of the United States are mentioned but not given the discussion they deserve. The fact that large numbers of Soviet troops are necessary to retain control over Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, East Germans, and Hungarians is mentioned only incidentally. These are fundamental parts of the MBFR problem. They should be explained and discussed at the outset. Instead, the first chapter is an essay on why Marx and Lenin thought Germany was important to socialist revolution.

This book is worthwhile for its summaries of the various negotiating positions at MBFR. It brings together some thought-provoking ideas on arms control in Europe. Its footnotes and bibliography are particularly useful. What it lacks is overall balance in presentation and discussion of the problem it addresses.

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Klessig, Lowell L., and Strite, Victor L.
The ELF Odyssey: National Security