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Britain's successful Peninsula campaign against Napoleon was sustained through her seapower. Indeed, Britain's first offensive actions in the area were from the sea but, almost forgotten and always overshadowed by later events, these actions were prompted not by Napoleon's movements but by the existence of a Russian squadron lying in Lisbon harbor and were directed toward the capture of that squadron.

PORTUGAL AND THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN NAVAL CRISIS (1808)

by
Donald D. Howard

During the Napoleonic period several critical decisions had a major influence on the future of the French Empire. Unquestionably, one of the most catastrophic decisions centered around Napoleon's efforts to subjugate Portugal and Spain. This in turn, forced Great Britain to commit its wealth, manpower, and ultimately its future to the struggle for control of the Peninsula. In the initial stages of this conflict, the Royal Navy became the cutting edge of Britain's new offensive. Through a series of closely related circumstances the British Government was first drawn into the Peninsula by its attempts to capture a Russian squadron in Lisbon harbor. This was soon complicated by the Spanish and Portuguese insurrections against the French and led Britain to commit a land force that was to carry on the struggle, with close naval support,

until Napoleon's abdication in April 1814.

The events that led to Napoleon's involvement in Iberia were set in motion following the Treaty of Tilsit between Napoleon and Alexander I in July 1807. Russian naval operations in the Mediterranean Sea were halted against France and its satellites while Napoleon offered safe harbor and provisions for any vessels of the Tsar's squadrons still in the Mediterranean. When the Baltic Fleet commanded by Vice Adm. Dimitri Siniavin was ordered home from Corfu, the commander of the French Squadron at Cadiz, as well as the maritime prefects at Brest, Rochefort, and Lorient were alerted to his possible arrival and ordered to fulfill his every request.¹

In early September the Russian Baltic squadron was instructed to sail from Corfu to Cadiz en route to the Baltic although there was some concern that a British squadron might try to intercept

it. After several weeks had passed and Siniavin's fleet had not reached Cadiz, Napoleon became anxious. He had suggested that Siniavin should sail in August in order to reach the Baltic before December when the Russian Tsar was expected to declare war on Britain, but the Russian admiral delayed his sailing from Corfu until 20 October. When Napoleon learned of Siniavin's departure, he also heard from the Governor of Corfu, Gen. Cesar Berthier, that the Russian commander had sailed with a British naval officer in command of one of the Russian vessels. Initially, Napoleon regarded Berthier's objection as a "little affair" but he cautioned that Siniavin should "watch out for the English."²

Siniavin had been instructed to sail to Cadiz from Corfu but a week later the bewildered Napoleon wrote to his brother, Joseph, King of Naples, "How is it that Admiral Siniavin went to Messene when he had orders, that I myself have seen, to go to Cadiz or Toulon or one of our ports?"³ On 19 October Siniavin sailed past Cadiz without putting in. Napoleon wrote to Alexander, "I suppose he will enter Lisbon or Corunna or one of my ocean ports," but he wrote to the Duc de Rovigo, Jean Savary, complaining, "I regret that the admiral did not enter this port [Cadiz], since the British were not in force to hinder him, and my squadron was ready to sail to support him." Despite Napoleon's growing concern regarding Siniavin's good will and intentions, he was relieved to learn of the safe arrival of the Russian squadron at Lisbon harbor. "Fortunately, my troops are there at the same time that he is," he wrote to Alexander, and he suggested that control of the squadron be given to the Russian Ambassador in Paris, Comte Peter Tolstoy, so that it might be employed without further orders from Saint Petersburg. Napoleon also pointed out that such an arrangement would have a positive effect "to

halt the distrust that often agitates the feelings of the commanders against France."⁴

After sailing past Cadiz and through the Strait of Gibraltar, Siniavin turned north along the coast of Portugal. As it neared the 39th parallel, his squadron was caught in "a violent gale of wind," forcing it into the Tagus River. Siniavin navigated up the Tagus to Lisbon "to seek shelter and to refit in the port of a friend and ally." Despite regulations limiting the number of warships that might enter the harbor at one time, the Portuguese ruler, Prince Regent João, welcomed the Russians cordially between 10 and 13 November, promising "every succor that the port of his capital could supply."⁵

Admiral Siniavin's decision to enter Portuguese waters led to a curious series of events that not only transformed the status of his squadron and sealed its fate, but also served indirectly as a catalyst in Britain's decision to contest Napoleon's goal of dominating the Peninsula. Portugal, as a traditional ally of Great Britain, had maintained a precarious neutrality between 1801 and 1807 despite the efforts of both Britain and France to gain its support in the continental struggle. However, following the Treaty of Tilsit, Napoleon resolved to force Portugal into his Continental System. He insisted that Portugal sever all political, economic, and diplomatic ties with Britain by closing its ports, recalling its ambassador, and declaring war. If acceptance was not forthcoming by 1 September, a French army, supported by Spanish forces, would invade the Kingdom. While the Portuguese Government procrastinated, seeking some acceptable solution to their problem, Napoleon ordered Gen. Andoche Junot, commander of a newly formed army at Bayonne, to march through Spain and invade Portugal. Hoping to prevent an actual French invasion, Prince João ordered Portuguese ports closed to

British vessels, the arrest and detention of all British nationals, and the embargo of all British vessels in the harbor.⁶ As a result, the British Ambassador, Viscount Sir Percy Strangford, demanded his passport on 10 November and made arrangements to leave immediately. Owing to the inclement weather and heavy seas, Strangford was unable to leave Lisbon until a week later. Instead of boarding *Raven* for his return to England, he joined a squadron of six men-of-war under the command of Rear Adm. Sidney Smith that had just arrived to escort the Prince Regent and the Portuguese Fleet to Brazil. If Prince João decided to remain in Lisbon, Smith was instructed to establish a blockade of Lisbon harbor. Hence, when Strangford arrived aboard Smith's flagship, *Hibernia*, Smith issued a proclamation on 20 November announcing, "the mouth of the Tagus is declared in a state of strict blockade . . . so long as the present state of misunderstanding exists."⁷

Despite the blockade of the Tagus, the attention of Prince João and the Royal Council was directed toward the advance of the French Army, marching across Spain toward the Portuguese frontier. Early on the morning of 10 November the Royal Council in Lisbon resolved to transfer the court to Brazil if Junot's Army actually crossed the frontier into Portugal. On 21 November when the French Army, supported by invading Spanish Armies in the north and south, advanced into Portuguese territory, Prince João decided to sail with his Court and fleet for Brazil.⁸ Hoping not only to dissuade the Prince Regent from leaving Portugal but also to capture the Portuguese Fleet, Junot issued a cordial proclamation from the village of Rosmanihal announcing that he was entering the country to support the Portuguese "against British domination." He promised to reach the capital by forced marches to protect it from the same fate that befell Copenhagen at the

hands of "the perfidious English Government."⁹

With the French driving directly on Lisbon, Prince João established a Regency Council on 24 November and completed plans for his departure for Brazil. Meanwhile, Strangford, aboard *Hibernia* and unaware of the Prince Regent's decision, resolved to return to Lisbon to pressure him into sailing for Brazil. When he arrived at Lisbon for unofficial conversations on 28 November, Strangford found the Royal Court aboard vessels of the Portuguese Fleet, ready to sail while Prince João was preparing to embark himself. On 30 November as the last vessel of the Portuguese Fleet was crossing the bar and Prince Regent João was receiving a 20-gun salute from the British squadron, 1,500 ragged French soldiers of Junot's advance guard paraded into Lisbon.¹⁰

While this strange scene was played out on the banks of the Tagus, Admiral Siniavin and the bewildered men of his squadron watched passively as the Portuguese Fleet sailed off to Brazil. If the Russian admiral, Sir Sidney Smith, or Junot had known that Tsar Alexander, after severing all intercourse with His Britannic Majesty's government in October, was about to declare war on Britain on 2 December, the flight of the Portuguese ruler might have been prevented.¹¹ Smith learned of this declaration of war in early December but Junot was only informed of the situation on 27 December and he passed the information on to Siniavin who was less than enthusiastic about the turn of events.¹² The safety of his fleet was now dependent upon the good will of his former enemy, while his former ally blockaded his squadron tightly in Lisbon harbor, far from his home port in the Baltic.

Soon after the famished French troops reached Lisbon, Junot learned of the presence of the Russian squadron in Lisbon harbor. Communications were opened quickly and Siniavin wrote

requesting provisions for his squadron. Junot authorized the Russian admiral to continue his daily food procurements, totaling 8,000 rations. If they could cooperate in securing provisions, Junot obviously believed they might unite forces against Britain. He expected Siniavin to visit him soon after his arrival, but when he wrote to Napoleon on 2 December, he had not yet seen the Russian admiral because of an epidemic in the squadron. "They are tranquil," he wrote, "and I have heard no complaint against them. If they wish to support us, we will have all that they possess as well as a large treasury and squadron but they preserve an impassive neutrality."¹³ On 6 December Admiral Siniavin sent Junot his greetings through André Dubatchersky, the Russian consul in Lisbon, and the next day the indignant Junot wrote to Jean Baptiste Nompere de Champagny, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, "He is not very polite but that does not prevent me from treating him as a friend while I await your instructions." Finally on 10 December Admiral Siniavin traveled to Junot's headquarters for their initial meeting and the following day the French general returned the visit.¹⁴

As soon as the British Government received Russia's Declaration of War, the Lords of the Admiralty began working on plans to capture the Russian squadron at Lisbon as well as to induce the Prince Regent to sail for Brazil with his fleet (they were still unaware of his 28 November departure). Vice Adm. Sir Charles Cotton, an experienced and highly competent sea commander, was designated to take control of the "Red Squadron" off the Tagus. "You are hereby required and directed," wrote the Secretary of the Admiralty, William Pole,

to repair without loss of time to Plymouth and hoisting your flag on board his Majesty's ship *Minotaur* . . . and taking under your convoy the transports having on board the troops

under the orders of Major General Spencer . . . to put to sea the moment wind and weather will permit, proceeding with the utmost expedition off the Tagus to take command of Smith's squadron. Besides inducing the Portuguese Fleet to sail for Brazil, Cotton was to employ the 7,000 troops under Spencer's command, supported by a similar force sailing from Sicily, under Lt. Gen. Sir John Moore, to seize the forts on the Tagus "for the purpose of effecting the capture of the Russian squadron . . . [that] has become an object of the greatest importance."¹⁵

Accompanied by several warships destined for the "Red Squadron" Cotton sailed from Plymouth with 70 transports and Spencer's 7,000 troops. He reached Falmouth on 31 December but a heavy storm scattered a part of the convoy so he waited for their arrival until 7 January when he received a secret dispatch from the Admiralty. According to a report from Ambassador Strangford the Russian Fleet was short of supplies and would "shortly be reduced by the continuance of the blockade, to a state of utmost distress . . . and in such a state, it [might] not be impossible that a proposal for the surrender of that fleet, upon favorable conditions, might be listened to by the Russian admiral." Cotton was instructed to propose a surrender on condition that the officers and men be returned to their homeland at "the earliest opportunity, at British expense."¹⁶ Within 3 days Cotton left Falmouth escorted by *Talbot* and *Cheeful* and on 14 January he joined Smith's "Red Squadron" of nine ships of the line on station beyond the mouth of the Tagus.¹⁷

As soon as Cotton joined his squadron, he attempted to open communications with Admiral Siniavin. On the pretext that he had several packets of letters from Mr. Alepeus, the Russian Minister in London, Cotton attempted unsuccessfully to "convey to the Russian

admiral a proposal for the surrender of the fleet to His Majesty."¹⁸ He admitted, "I have yet found no direct means of communication with Vice Admiral Siniavin [,] all intercourse with the squadron under my command being entirely forbidden by the most rigorous decrees, imposing fines, imprisonment, and corporal punishment on any breach of such restrictions." On 20 January, however, Cotton sent several Spanish prisoners, taken in a small lugger, ashore under a flag of truce to announce the arrival of mail for Siniavin and the Russian consul in Lisbon. This letter proposed a meeting under a flag of truce and concluded cordially, "Lamenting most sincerely that the correspondence between two nations like ours, which have been so long in amity with each other . . . should for a moment be subject to any difficulty."¹⁹ On 1 February Cotton learned that his letter had not reached Siniavin so he sent another dispatch the same day. This correspondence was intercepted by the French and Junot, aware that it might be a ploy, had the letter for Siniavin opened, copied, and resealed before sending it on to the Russian admiral.²⁰ Once it was agreed to collect the mail packets from the British squadron, Junot sent an officer to accompany a Russian officer to *Hibernia*. Siniavin, however, sent two officers, one to attract the attention of his French counterpart while the second officer spoke confidentially with the British officer, indicating they were "extremely dissatisfied with their situation." In the course of the conversation the British were surprised to learn that, contrary to Strangford's opinion, the Russian vessels were well supplied with "provisions of every description, completed to ten months; all the Irish provisions, etc., that were in store previous to the entry of the French army, having, in preference to its falling a prey to them, had been sent to the Russian squadron."²¹

Without immediate prospects of a Russian capitulation or a successful attack by his squadron, Cotton, under increasing pressure to use Spencer's men aboard his transport convoy, resolved to send the convoy on to Gibraltar. He was aware of the formidable topographic position of the fortifications on the Tagus but he could not have known of their extraordinary armaments. At the entrance of the harbor Forts São Julião and Cascais housed 156 heavy guns; Forts Belem and Bugio had 43 pieces, while another 183 artillery guns were established in strategic positions along both banks of the Tagus to thwart any enemy attack.²²

Despite the threat of the British squadron beyond the Tagus, Admiral Siniavin appeared sympathetic to the British. Several of his captains and line officers were on loan from the Royal Navy, remnants of their previous alliance with Russia. Moreover, British families fleeing the French occupation had been granted asylum aboard his vessels. British bankers and merchants escaping French imprisonment also made their way to the Russian squadron and were given protection. Conversely, Junot's relationship with Siniavin had begun poorly and degenerated as the weeks passed. He continually complained of the Russian consumption of French rations that reached 10,000 a day while his own troops suffered with reduced rations. "If it [squadron] were not of value to us," he wrote, "I would gladly see it leave, but I suspect it is a strong intermediary between Lisbon and the enemy squadron."²³ As dispatches reached Lisbon from Russian Ambassador Tolstoy, Junot expressed a willingness to work closely with Siniavin, even to deliver dispatches personally, but this cooperative inclination soon passed and Junot's direct contact with the Russian admiral was greatly restricted. Similarly, Siniavin was less than enthusiastic about his relations with Junot who treated him,

with a certain disdain and "did not sit down with him."²⁴ Even when attending formal banquets, their meetings were not without friction. Perhaps to repay Junot for firing salvos from one of his vessels amidst the Russian squadron, Siniavin ordered his entire squadron to open fire with 680 naval cannon in the midst of a dinner for Junot. "All the bottles on the table were upset; the pictures hanging on the cabin bulkheads were shaken from their hooks and fell on the deck [and] our vessel creaked all over," recalled Junot's chief of staff.²⁵

Although strained relations between Siniavin and Junot continued, both men were vitally concerned about the safety of Lisbon harbor. Fortunately, Junot found 19 Portuguese vessels in the harbor in various stages of construction or refitting. Several had been abandoned in the harbor by Vice Adm. Manuel da Cunha Souto-maior when the fleet sailed for Brazil because crews or rigging were lacking. Hence, several ex-Portuguese vessels were pressed into service to survey the movements of the British squadron. The crew of *Vigis*, in particular, carefully observed and reported on the position and makeup of Cotton's squadron. Each arrival and departure of British vessels was closely recorded and reported to Junot who seriously considered sending a ship of the line and two frigates down the Tagus to disrupt the maneuvers of Cotton's squadron of eight vessels. This force was soon increased to 17 ships of the line, 2 frigates, and 2 corvettes that effectively ruled out any French sorties.²⁶ Nevertheless, Junot hoped to contest Britain's control of the waters off Portugal so he issued orders for the creation of a French squadron which, in conjunction with the Russian squadron, would form a formidable force. Three ships of the line, *Vasco da Gama* (74), *Maria I* (64) and *São Sebastião* (64), in various stages of construction were assigned a large number of carpenters and workers to prepare them for sea.

The frigates *La Carlota* (54), *La Fénix* (44), and *La Amazona* (44) were to be refitted and rearmed; the corvettes *Andorinha* (9) and *Benjamin* (6) were made seaworthy while *Gaiivota* (20) was pressed into service immediately to patrol Lisbon harbor.²⁷

With both Siniavin and Junot concerned about British penetration of the Tagus River and Lisbon harbor, coupled with Cotton's determination to halt all passage of the Tagus, it was only a matter of time until their forces came into contact. British longboats and barks patrolled the mouth of the Tagus each night to observe the Russian squadron and ex-Portuguese frigates anchored in a long line near Belem, protected by the fort batteries. On the night of 13 February a cutter and a jollyboat from *Confiance*, under command of Master's Mates Trist and Lague, rowing guard duty across the mouth of the Tagus, sighted a French gunboat at anchor below Fort São Pedro. Trist attacked immediately "in a most gallant manner" with his crew of 16. The French vessel, *Le Canonnière No. 1*, commanded by Ensign Gandolphe, opened fire but the British seamen boarded the vessel and after "ineffectual resistance" captured it along with 50 men and 100 stands of arms. The crews of the British squadron were elated with the news of this victory as Trist had suffered no casualties although heavily outnumbered while the French losses were placed at three dead and nine wounded.²⁸

On occasion British brigs and longboats approached the Tagus forts, especially Fort Bugio, but they were always driven off by gunfire and several times rowing patrols were taken by the French. The most serious incident, however, occurred in April when five longboats with 150 men from *Nymphe* and *Blossom*, led by Captain Shipley, attacked the French sloop *Gaiivota*. The sloop was boarded twice by Shipley's seamen and beaten back with pike and pistols. When a third assault was

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attempted, the British were "received with so warm and well directed a fire, that they only thought of saving themselves by leaving to their fate such of their men as got entangled in the ropes, and who were then thrown into the sea." M. Leblond-Plassan, commander of the sloop, killed Shipley himself, recovering his har and pistol; he placed the British losses at 40 while acknowledging one French casualty. Captain Pigott, in command of *Blossom*, abandoned the attack after Shipley's death. This was the last major encounter between the opposing navies but the nightly patrols continued.²⁹

As the weeks passed, the British maintained their blockade of the Tagus, the Russian squadron rode at anchor in a line near Belem, and Junot began the transformation of Portugal into a French satellite. He first dismantled the Portuguese military establishment. The militia was abolished, the regular army was disbanded, with the exception of 6,000 troops sent off to France for service with the Imperial Army. The Portuguese fortresses, magazines, and military installations were placed under French command, the population was disarmed, high-ranking military and civil officials were replaced by pro-French appointees, heavy indemnities were levied, French military law was introduced, and the Portuguese economy faltered under the demands of the French Army, threatening the population with famine.³⁰

As a result of the food scarcities toward the end of March, Junot sent his commissary procurer, Mr. Satarro, formerly a supply agent for the British Armed Forces, to Cotton's squadron under a Portuguese flag. He requested permission for the importation of flour to supply the "native inhabitants of Portugal." The French Army had secured a 6-month supply of food, Satarro claimed, but the Portuguese had food for only 2 or 3 weeks. Cotton refused the request indicating such an

agreement would be incompatible with his orders for the establishment of a strict blockade of the Tagus. He also denied passage for 15 merchantmen in the Tagus, although they were reported to be destined for Brazil, unless he were permitted to examine the passengers and cargo of each vessel. Cotton immediately informed the Admiralty of this appeal, requesting further instructions.³¹

Although considerable numbers of Portuguese citizens had been making their way to the British squadron since December in response to a proclamation by Cotton which encouraged them "to repair on board the ships of the squadron, or transports . . . for the purpose of being conveyed to the Brazils," this number increased markedly as famine began to spread. By 5 April 173 Portuguese refugees had sailed aboard *Hindustan* for Plymouth en route to Brazil and 2 days later *Caladonia* set sail with 210 Portuguese refugees, primarily from the army, navy, and trades.³²

Hoping to halt this illicit traffic, Junot issued a harsh decree on 5 April that produced immediate results. "Understanding many soldiers and inhabitants of the Kingdom of Portugal have allowed themselves to be deluded by false proclamations . . . [and] hereafter become the victims of the perfidious insinuations of the commanders of that squadron," Junot declared all communication between the Portuguese and the vessels of the British squadron were to be "strictly prohibited." If any vessel approached the Portuguese coast, even under a flag of truce, they were to be fired upon or the commanding officer would be broken and brought before a court-martial. Anyone seeking to board an enemy ship would be imprisoned for not less than 6 months and might suffer death. According to this decree, anyone guilty of transporting others to the British squadron would be tried as "a spy and unlawful seducer" and punished,

by death. A similar penalty was decreed for those seeking to induce desertion among the French and Portuguese soldiers. To gain the active support of the citizenry, Junot offered from 100 to 200 *cruzados* for information leading to the capture of those fleeing to British vessels. If a refugee did succeed in reaching Cotton's fleet, his property would be sequestered and any vessel without a posted copy of the edict would be seized and sold to pay informants.³³

The flight of refugees was almost halted by this decree but there were some glaring exceptions that sent Junot into a rage. When the Papal Nuncio in Lisbon applied for a passport to leave Portugal by sea, Junot denied his request, indicating he would only be given passage through Spain and France back to Rome. "Twenty times he has given me his word of honor," Junot complained to Champagny, that "he would not leave Portugal by sea." Yet, when the Papal Nuncio did leave, much to Junot's disgust, he ignored his pledge and took refuge aboard a vessel of the British squadron.³⁴

When the Lords of the Admiralty learned of Satarro's visit to *Hibernia* and his request for the relaxation of the blockade to import flour for the citizens of Portugal, they resolved to use the opportunity to open negotiations for the surrender of the Russian squadron. Denying England's intention of inflicting "the calamity of famine on the natives of Portugal," the Admiralty claimed the Tagus had been blockaded to prevent attacks upon His Majesty's dominions from originating in Portugal. They pointed out that "relief for the suffering inhabitants of Portugal rest . . . entirely with those who exercise the powers of Government at Lisbon." However, Cotton was authorized to offer "most liberal terms of maritime capitulation" by which the blockade would be raised. It called for the surrender of the Russian squadron that would be returned 6 months after

the cessation of hostilities while the crews would be sent to their homeland as soon as possible. The Portuguese vessels would be surrendered until arrangements could be made with Prince Regent João, all merchantmen of belligerent powers would be placed in British custody until 6 months after the conclusion of the war, neutral vessels could sail out of the harbor and continue their voyage after inspection by the British squadron, and finally, non-military goods would be given free movement through Lisbon harbor. Cotton acknowledged receipt of his instructions but he cautioned, "I much fear being able to open any direct communications with the inhabitants of Portugal by a flag of truce, General Junot having expressly forbidden the entry or receiving of any [truce flag] within the Tagus, and directed vessels of such description to be fired upon." Cotton concluded his letter questioning the veracity of Satarro's earlier information noting that a month had passed and he had not heard of any acute famine in Lisbon as Satarro predicted. Yet, he drew up the proclamation and had it distributed along the coast from St. Ubes to Porto, hoping the offer of free grain trade in return for a maritime capitulation would induce the population to pressure the French Government into accepting the proposal.³⁵

While Cotton awaited a response to his proclamation, he continued to improve relations with the Russian admiral. Already they had come to an amiable agreement concerning six British officers on loan to the Russian Navy and still serving in Siniavin's squadron. When Cotton learned of their presence, he requested that they be returned to his fleet so "they may be sent to England, there to await the pleasure of their King." Cotton noted that Russian officers and cadets serving in the Royal Navy had been repatriated to their homes and he hoped the Russian admiral would do likewise. He

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also took the opportunity to thank Siniavin for the protection he afforded British nationals who had sought safety aboard his vessels during the past months. In the same tone Siniavin responded on 7 March apologizing for his belated response. He acknowledged "a particular pleasure in being able to add, that all said officers have received . . . marks of honorable distinction" from Saint Petersburg and were only relieved of their commands to remove them from embarrassing predicaments. He promised that as soon as the British officers had presented their accounts to a grateful government in Saint Petersburg, they would be returned to Great Britain.³⁶

Although relations continued to improve between Cotton and Siniavin, thanks in part to the "little cordiality" between Junot and the Russians, Cotton was surprised to learn on 1 April that the Russian squadron, resting at single anchor near Belem was preparing to sail after a disagreement with Junot. This rumor, however, was unfounded for actually Junot was offering to do "anything that would be useful" for Siniavin. In May as the French labored to complete refitting the captured Portuguese warships, Junot received surprising information from his patrols that the British squadron was no longer on station at the mouth of the Tagus. Junot was elated and he wrote to Champagny, "For some days the English squadron has not appeared. I believe it has gone either to Cadiz or Ferrol." He wanted to send out a frigate and a corvette, augmented by five or six Russian vessels to determine "if the enemy fleet has quit these waters."³⁷ Junot's hopes were soon dashed when the British squadron was again observed in the Tagus roadstead.

To assure himself of the exact position and condition of the British squadron, Junot decided to send Satarro to the enemy flagship on the pretext that he had just received a copy of Cotton's proclamation of 12 May

offering to raise the blockade and permit the entry of flour in return for a maritime convention. Announcing that a copy of the proclamation had been sent to Napoleon at Bayonne, Satarro expressed Junot's interest in learning the provisions of the proposed convention to expedite possible negotiations while awaiting Napoleon's response. Cotton questioned the possibility of serious negotiations since Junot had prohibited the entry of flags of truce, and threatened one even though it was carrying one of his wounded countrymen. If Junot would accept a truce flag, Cotton offered to send an officer of rank to open negotiations.³⁸ In fact, when Napoleon saw the proclamation he wrote to Junot, "Regarding the maritime capitulation, I do not know what the Admiral wishes to say. A capitulation is a dishonorable act in military terms. It is only necessary to respond with cannon fire." Junot replied to him, "I am so disposed to receive the dishonorable provisions by cannon fire, that I have announced in Lisbon . . . that I will fire on any parliamentarian if he refuses to take to the open sea, and I will have nothing to do with the commander of the enemy squadron."³⁹

During Satarro's interview with Cotton, their discussion turned to the disposition of the Russian squadron in light of the recent uprising in Spain against Napoleon's treatment of the Spanish royal family. How would the Russians react if the revolt spread to Portugal? Satarro intimated that the Russian admiral regarded the situation from the viewpoint of a neutral since Russia was at peace with both Spain and Portugal. However, if the British squadron entered the Tagus, the Russian vessels would "fight them . . . unless a very commanding and superior force rendered such a measure improper."⁴⁰

As the Spanish insurrection spread across northern Spain, Cotton realized the increasing importance of the Russian

squadron. The French forces in Spain faced mounting opposition and as Junot's force became more isolated, the value of the Russian squadron became more vital for the safety of his army. Accordingly, Junot attempted to formalize his relations with Siniavin. He not only offered the Russian admiral all necessary munitions and provisions but he also offered to transfer the recently refitted *Vasco da Gama* (74).⁴¹ Napoleon instructed Junot to organize a small squadron of three ships of the line, three frigates, and three corvettes to prepare for an expedition. Work on *São Sebastião* and *Maria I* was to be completed and the frigates *Carlota*, *Fénix*, and *Amazona* as well as the corvettes *Andorinha*, *Benjamin*, and *Gaiivota* were to be readied for sea. Napoleon also stipulated the number of French cannoners, crewmen, and officers to be allotted to each vessel. Within 2 weeks Napoleon was ready to employ his ships. "The moment has arrived when I have need to employ my nautical means, already considerable, in order to cause the English trouble." He ordered 450 French seamen and officers, 300 French cannoners, and 1,200 Portuguese sailors to man two ships of the line and two frigates. Provisions for 6 months and water for 4 months were to be aboard for a 1 July sailing. Although Napoleon promised 500 naval conscripts to Junot and 100 marines were ordered to Lisbon from *Atlas* at Vigo, it was impossible for him to organize a full complement for Napoleon's proposed squadron. He also appealed without success to Adm. Francois Rosilly for sailors and experienced petty officers. Siniavin was also instructed by Napoleon to increase his complement, especially aboard *Rafael*, by pressing crewmen from the Danish and north German merchantmen in the harbor.⁴² At the same time Junot and Siniavin discussed efforts to fulfill Napoleon's instructions on at least two occasions in late May but it was obvious

that they could not secure adequate crews for their vessels. Indeed, Junot's naval commander, Magendie, "judged it impossible" to provide crews for three ships of the line, three frigates, and three corvettes as Napoleon ordered.⁴³ Nevertheless, with the Tsar's transfer of the Russian Fleet to Napoleon's control, the French Emperor expected to create a joint fleet of Russian and French vessels to contest the British squadron off the Tagus. These plans were never realized, however, because of the eruptive forces that swept across Spain at the end of May.

The first weeks of June were relatively peaceful for the French but on 7 June the Spanish insurrection spread into Portugal when Gen. Domingos Bellesta, commanding Spanish troops at Porto, learned of the scope of the revolts in Spain against the French. He arrested the French commander at Porto, Gen. François Jean Quesnel du Torpt; the Corregidor mór, Taboureau; Colonel Picoteau of the artillery and several other officers and after encouraging the Portuguese to overthrow French rule, he marched back into Spain. When Junot learned of the insurrection at Porto, he wrote to the members of the Porto Senate encouraging them to remain peaceful and obedient, asking them to "remember that you are Portuguese and your neighbors are Spanish."⁴⁴ Early the next morning the French troops in Lisbon quietly picked their way among the 6,000 Spanish troops there, disarming them "without bloodshed." The officers kept their swords, the regiments retained their colors, but the rank and file were transported to the hulks in the Tagus where they were held prisoner. Simultaneously, Junot wrote to the pro-French Governor of Porto, Luiz de Oliveria da Costa, promising aid in the form of a powerful relief column from Almeida. He concluded by assuring Oliveria that Lisbon was in the "greatest tranquillity" and that

there would "be no trouble in the rest of Portugal."⁴⁵

Junot also appealed to the citizens of Portugal: "After six months of tranquility, the peace of the Kingdom appears again likely to be disturbed by the constantly increasing agitation of the Spanish troops who entered your country" to partition it. Junot was in a critical position. His communication and supply lines with France had been cut, his army was isolated from other forces in the Peninsula, and he could only survive by his own efforts and resources. To mollify the Portuguese he declared, "I am satisfied with your good disposition . . . Continue to repose confidence in me; I will give you my word that I will preserve your country from all invasion, [and] from all dismemberment. If the English should come, we will defend you." Similarly, Junot turned to the Portuguese soldiers promising them salary, lodging, and provisions comparable with those enjoyed by French troops.⁴⁶ However, Junot's appeals were ignored by the Portuguese who had suffered under French subjugation for the past 7 months.

Admiral Cotton, on the contrary, found the British position improving daily. When he first learned of events at Porto from Captain Greyke aboard *Eclipse*, he realized he would have an opportunity not only to capture the Russian Fleet but, perhaps more important, to encourage the spread of revolt against the French. "The population of Portugal," Cotton wrote to Pole, "are loud in expressions of detestation at the French and hundreds of them, daily assemble upon the hills to view the British fleet without concealing their wishes for its speedy entry into the Tagus. The inability," he observed, "of the small remains of the French army to resist such an impulse and a revolt is speedily looked for in Lisbon." Consequently, Cotton issued an inflammatory proclamation to the citizens of Lisbon

announcing, "Your enemies and oppressors the French, have been driven out of Porto by your loyal countrymen, and the brave Spaniards; the Government instituted by the Prince Regent is reestablished, and the Portuguese colours again flying upon your forts. All the assistance His Britannic Majesty's fleet can afford," he promised, "shall be readily given to you . . . in the noble attempt to emancipate your capital from the severe oppressions it has suffered since the French army marched into it."⁴⁷

When Admiral Cotton learned from a British refugee named Wilson that between 3,000 and 4,000 troops held Lisbon he wrote directly to the Admiralty suggesting that 5,000 to 6,000 troops be sent to the fleet "to gain possession of the forts on the banks of the Tagus, and cooperating with His Majesty's fleet, give to us possession of the whole of the maritime means now collected in the Tagus." On 20 June Cotton received additional details of events transpiring in Porto, encouraging him to take a more determined stand on behalf of the Portuguese nation. Captain Greyke wrote that on the Feast of Corpus Christi, the pro-French Governor Oliveira had attempted to replace the Portuguese flag with the French tricolor in a procession, sparking violent reaction. The citizens "were excited to such a degree of fury, that countenanced by the priests, the people now in mass broke open depots and supplied themselves with 25,000 stand of arms." They formed themselves into "a most determined and enthusiastic army; from this moment all French authority ceased." All those supporting the French regime were arrested and imprisoned, the Bishop of Porto, Dom António José de Castro, was elected governor of the city, and an army of 20,000 men was quickly organized to defend Porto against any French columns sent to subjugate them again.⁴⁸

The people appealed to Captain Greyke for immediate aid; he pacified

them with "promises of every assistance which a sloop of war can afford." British cannoners were sent to man the guns of a large Brazilian vessel in the harbor and an Englishman was given command of it. Accompanying Greyke's letter to Cotton was a document from the Porto Senate that declared open war on the French and claimed "the protection of our most intimate and most faithful ally, the King of Great Britain and his respectable squadron of which you, sir, are the commander."⁴⁹

As the insurrection spread along the coast, scores of Portuguese refugees fled to Cotton's squadron, followed by those of the Irish colony. Cotton, anticipating the momentary return of Spencer's troops, moved decisively to support the insurrectionaries. *Antelope* was ordered off Porto while Captain Galoway was instructed to sail with *Blossom*, *Talbot*, and *Eclipse*, and to "use every possible means of rendering assistance to the loyal inhabitants of the northern provinces of Portugal." When the Portuguese learned of Britain's willingness to support their cause, they organized town committees to appeal for aid. The people of Sines requested support and Cotton immediately dispatched Captain Smith in *Britannica* with the ringing call "to resist the perfidious designs of the French." The citizens of Faro in the Algarve made a similar appeal and the British admiral initiated immediate plans to aid them. When an appeal from Coimbra, the third largest city of Portugal, reached Cotton for support in attacking Fort Santa Catarina, held by the French at the mouth of the Mondego, he resolved to actually commit marines from the fleet. "We hope you will send us succor," wrote José Correra Felles, "for the sake of the Prince Regent of Brazil, and of the faithful Portuguese, the ally of England." Before Cotton could react, another letter reached him announcing the capture of Fort Santa Catarina with a French garrison of 78 men. "Illustrious

sir," wrote the new Governor of the fort, "I find myself so destitute of arms and other necessities that I am obliged to send for succor which it is strongly hoped Your Excellency will send."⁵⁰

Grasping the consequence of the uprising, Cotton decided to extend his resources to the limit in order to capitalize on the Portuguese patriotism. Capt. John Bligh of *Alfred* was ordered to sail for Figueira and land 200 marines under Capt. George Lewis from the fleet to occupy Fort Santa Catarina; he was instructed to run up the Portuguese flag, post proclamations, distribute arms and munitions, and give "every assistance in your power for the purpose of enabling the loyal inhabitants of Portugal to reestablish the government of their lawful prince and emancipate their country from French oppression." To justify this drastic action he wrote to the Admiralty secretary,

I thought it my duty, in order to manifest a disposition of rendering something more than promises in support of a cause so extremely interesting, to dispatch a party of 200 marines . . . to garrison the fort at that place and I entertain the most sanguine hope that however trifling their numbers, the effect may be highly beneficial for the spirit that the presence of British soldiers must at this moment create.⁵¹

On 7 July appeals for aid reached Cotton from Leiria and Figueira followed by requests from Lagos and Nazaré. Cotton was gratified and the same day he issued instructions for arms and munitions to be dispatched to Porto, Lagos, Nazaré, Leiria, and Figueira. By 10 July British men-of-war were on station to support the Portuguese insurrection. Capt. Edward Galoway was off Porto with *Antelope* and *Eclipse*, Captain Bligh was on station off Figueira aboard *Alfred*, Captain Pigott was beyond Viana with *Blossom*, and a week later Captain

Smith sailed aboard *Comus* to support the people of Sines.⁵²

By the middle of July, Cotton began promising the citizens of Lisbon "that a British army is now on the way to assist the Portuguese in the present glorious struggle . . . The spirit of patriotism will create soldiers, and let it be remembered the oppressors of the Portuguese are but men and few in number; they cannot stand against a justly indignant and exasperated people." Cotton cautioned the Portuguese, "Although every assistance Great Britain can yield to her ancient ally, in so virtuous, just, and honorable a course, will be afforded; yet all must depend upon the energy and effort of the native inhabitants of Portugal; tis for them to evince the spirit of their godfathers," and he concluded indicating, "The only universal cry is 'Conquer or die' and the only badge of honor is inscribed 'Liberty and vengeance.'"⁵³

While Cotton was promising aid to the Portuguese, the British Government was organizing an expedition to be sent to the Peninsula under the command of Lt. Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley, the future Duke of Wellington. On 30 June specific instructions were issued by Lord Castlereagh, Secretary of State, for an expedition to Spain and Portugal in order to achieve "the entire and absolute evacuation of the Peninsula, by the troops of France." When Castlereagh received Cotton's enthusiastic reports about the uprising in Portugal, he organized a large force supplied with transport, horse, and supply vessels for an immediate sailing. He promised Cotton a force of almost 10,000 men (and 30,000 stands of arms) would sail to rendezvous with the squadron at the Tagus "for the purpose of cooperating with you in the reduction of the enemy force in that port."⁵⁴

While the British expeditionary force was gathered at Cork for the voyage to the Peninsula, General Spencer was instructed to move his force of 5,000

men from Cadiz to Gibraltar to await Wellesley's orders for a joint landing in Portugal. Moreover, a force of some 5,000 men, en route from the Baltic under Lt. Gen. Sir John Moore, was instructed to "proceed without delay, off the Tagus."⁵⁵ With his army already at sea, Wellesley sailed from Cork aboard *Crocodile* on 13 July. He reached Corunna within a week and held discussions with the Spanish insurrectionaries before sailing on to Porto where he received an urgent dispatch from Castlereagh informing him "that the attack up on the Tagus should be considered as the first object to be attended to." Nevertheless, Castlereagh later modified his instructions so Wellesley's troops could "be embarked at any point on the coast of Portugal, north of the Tagus."⁵⁶

When Wellesley reached Porto on 24 July, he was carefully briefed by Lieutenant Colonel Brown concerning conditions in northern Portugal and the concentration of some 14,000 French troops within the environs of Lisbon. Based on his initial observations and judgments, he wrote a highly perceptive letter to Castlereagh, "I am convinced that the most effectual mode in which Great Britain can serve the Spanish cause is by driving the French out of Portugal."⁵⁷ With the bulk of his convoy collected off the mouth of the Mondego, Wellesley sailed down the Portuguese coast the evening of 25 July to the British squadron where he joined Admiral Cotton in lengthy discussions about their joint operations. "After a full consideration of the subject," recorded Wellesley, "it appeared to us that a landing in the bay . . . was a very difficult and precarious operation, whether viewed in relation to the strength of the works erected for their defenses, to the impossibility of approaching them with ships of war, or to the state of the surf and its increase with different winds."⁵⁸

After it was agreed that a landing would be made at Mondego Bay or southward at Peniche, Wellesley sent a dispatch to Spencer at Gibraltar instructing him to join his force at once for a landing. Wellesley left *Hibernia* on 27 July and rejoined his army 3 days later at the mouth of the Mondego. After issuing orders for his troops to disembark, he wrote to Castlereagh declaring, "The enemy's position in the neighborhood of the Tagus appears so strong, that it is considered impracticable to make a landing in that quarter, without diverting the attention by an attack to the northward."⁵⁹

On 2 August Wellesley and Cotton jointly issued a nationalistic appeal to the Portuguese:

The time has come to rescue your country, and restore the government of your lawful prince. His Britannic Majesty . . . in compliance with the wishes and ardent supplications for succor from all parts of Portugal, send to your aid a British army, directed to cooperate with his fleet already on your coast . . . The glorious struggle in which you are engaged is for all that is dear to man—the protections of your wives and children; the restoration of your lawful prince; the independence, nay, the very existence of your Kingdom; and for the preservation of your holy religion.⁶⁰

Wellington's troops continued to land in heavy surf until 5 August when they were joined by a force of 5,000 "badly armed and equipped" Portuguese soldiers under General Freire.⁶¹ On 6 August Spencer began disembarking his force of almost 5,000 men to bring Wellesley's total force to 14,000 British augmented by 5,000 Portuguese soldiers. Even before all the troops had landed, Wellesley began his march southward toward Lisbon. He was followed along the coast by Capt. Pulteney Malcolm in *Donegal* and Bligh in *Alfred* escorting

a convoy of transports laden with food, munitions, and armaments for his army. After landing supplies at Nazaré and Maceira, the tiny convoy was joined on 18 August by another squadron carrying 4,000 additional men from the brigades of Gens. Wroth Acland and Robert Anthruther.⁶²

Amidst the turmoil of the British invasion and French defense, Admiral Siniavin could hardly anticipate what the future held for his squadron. Time was running out. It seemed obvious that the neutral status of his fleet would be challenged by the French who would demand the active support of an ally or by the British who might soon seize Lisbon and threaten his vessels from the forts on the Tagus. Siniavin's relations with Junot and Cotton were ambiguous. Although his government was at war with the British, he had forged an understanding relationship of mutual respect with Cotton while the French seemed arrogant and opportunistic, making little effort to hide their contempt for the Russian except when it was to their benefit. In fact, on 30 July Siniavin received a letter from Cotton describing information that he judged "expedient and absolutely necessary" for the Russian admiral to have "in order to enable him to guard against surprise and treachery from the French." Siniavin immediately sent Mr. Sass, a "diplomatic character in the Russian service," and his flag lieutenant, Mr. Mackaren, to board *Hibernia* under a flag of truce. The British admiral provided information claiming the French had seized two Russian warships at Livorno while two other ships of the line had been taken at Portoferraio and sent to Toulon. The Russian representatives appeared "extremely thankful" for the intelligence. Before leaving they discussed current rumors of peace negotiations between Britain and Russia and they agreed to establish a signal for future communications.⁶³

Junot, in the meantime, had seen his political and military position in Portugal deteriorate rapidly in spite of his frantic efforts to stabilize the situation. He had already written to Napoleon complaining of the Russian admiral's attitude. Siniavin had shown little interest in Junot's problems while clinging to his status as a neutral and consuming 10,000 rations daily from the French magazines. Perhaps hoping to put pressure on Siniavin through Tsar Alexander, Junot asked Napoleon for his personal written authorization in order to continue the food distribution.⁶⁴

As the English and Portuguese initiated plans to expel the French from the Kingdom, "General Junot supposed that the moment had come to overcome the intransigence of Admiral Siniavin."⁶⁵ No longer could Siniavin evade the struggle as he would now be confronting the English—the enemy of Russia. On 15 July Junot wrote to the Russian admiral acknowledging "the difficult circumstances in which I find myself," the importance of defending "the squadron of His Majesty, the Emperor of Russia, and the necessity of mutual cooperation for the interests of the two sovereigns." Junot proposed that Siniavin disembark several hundred men to join his troops in guarding the left bank of the Tagus. Not only would this relieve his troops for duty elsewhere but it "would produce an incalculable effect upon public opinion." Noting that the blockading squadron had been reduced to seven vessels he wrote Siniavin, "I do not doubt a moment that if Your Excellency made a demonstration to leave the port, we would see the very prompt return of the ships that are separated from the enemy squadron," thereby neutralizing their effect. In more aggressive terms, he recalled that the Tsar had put his squadrons in the Mediterranean and the port of Lisbon at the disposition of Napoleon. If the Emperor were on the scene, Junot assured

him, he would not permit Siniavin's fleet to remain inactive. Hoping to humiliate the Russian admiral into supporting his forces, Junot exaggerated his position. "The principal goal of all my land movements is to conserve the squadron," and he questioned whether the Russian admiral's goal was not to second his army. He promised, "If you decide to leave tomorrow when the blockading squadron is much weaker than you are, I will give Your Excellency the *Vasco da Gama* and if possible the frigate *Fénix*." Finally Junot concluded on an ominous note,

You understand how important it is for the interests of our two sovereign powers, that we proceed together and that we coordinate perfectly the forces that are confided to us. I have the honor to say to you, and I repeat it, that I would rather sacrifice all my army than to abandon the Russian squadron. I would like to think that the feeling would be reciprocated if circumstances presented themselves.⁶⁶

The appeals of the frustrated Junot had no discernible effect on Siniavin who still claimed the status of a neutral in a neutral port.

With the advance of Wellesley's army from the Mondego toward Lisbon, Junot ordered his outlying regiments to join him as he concentrated perhaps 13,000 troops on 19 August just north of Lisbon at Torres Vedras. Because Siniavin refused to relieve his troops in the forts along the Tagus, Junot was forced to leave some 6,000 men in the Lisbon area to control the capital and the harbor, indirectly protecting the Russian squadron from British attack.⁶⁷ Two days later Junot's army was confronted by Wellesley with 17,000 British soldiers supported by 5,000 Portuguese troops at Vimeiro. By midafternoon the French Army had been defeated with the loss of over 1,800 men and 24 cannon and was in full retreat toward Lisbon.

A council of war was called early the morning of 22 August to chart Junot's future course of action. Considering the defeated, demoralized, outnumbered, and isolated condition of his army, it was soon decided to propose a negotiated settlement for the complete evacuation of the French Army from Portugal. Gen. Etienne Kellermann was designated as chief negotiator owing to his distinguished career, experience, and command of the English language. Late that afternoon he arrived at British headquarters to propose an armistice in order to arrange a convention. In the meantime, Wellesley had been superseded first by Lt. Gen. Sir Harry Burrard and then by Lt. Gen. Sir Hew Dalrymple who agreed to consider Kellermann's proposal. In lengthy discussions on conditions for a French withdrawal, Kellermann inserted an article providing for the unmolested return of the Russian Fleet to the Baltic. Wellesley opposed this provision, suggesting that the Russians should negotiate their own arrangements. Initially Kellermann acquiesced only to bring up the subject later. Despite the objection of both Wellesley and Burrard, Dalrymple agreed to Article 7 which stated: "The neutrality of the port of Lisbon will be recognized for the Russian fleet, that is to say, that the army and the English fleet will be in possession of the town and port, the Russian fleet will not be threatened during its stay, nor halted when it wishes to leave."⁶⁸ Both Wellesley and Burrard objected to this article because of the earlier conversations with Cotton who expected Siniavin to claim the neutrality of the port of Lisbon; however, if the British land forces struck quickly, the Portuguese would not have the time to establish Lisbon as a neutral port and the Russian squadron could be attacked. Still not satisfied with Article 7 Kellermann insisted on the free departure of the Russian Fleet without British pursuit but Dalrymple declared that the Russian

squadron had no more rights than those of neutrals.⁶⁹

The next morning Dalrymple appointed Lt. Col. George Murray to take the preliminary convention, signed by Kellermann and Wellesley, to Admiral Cotton for his reaction. Early the same morning Wellesley sent a letter to Dalrymple encouraging him to write to Cotton, suggesting he open direct negotiations with Siniavin. "Whatever might be the results of the negotiations between Sir Hew [Dalrymple] and the Duc d'Abrantes," he wrote, "the Russian fleet should not be molested if they conduct themselves as they ought in a neutral port and took no part in the contest."⁷⁰

When Murray arrived aboard the squadron flagship that night, Cotton bitterly denounced several provisions of the proposed convention. He had learned of the confusion, the reduced garrison, and the talk of a capitulation in Lisbon from Mr. Powell who had conversed with Junot's secretary; hence, a convention seemed premature indeed. Armed with Cotton's objections, Murray hurried back into Dalrymple's headquarters the night of 25 August. Wellesley supported Cotton's views although his motives were different. He believed the Russian squadron should be isolated from the French and kept in Lisbon harbor where it could not become a threat. Wellesley suggested that Dalrymple write to Junot to indicate Cotton's rejection of the agreement, but without detailing his specific objections, and to limit the truce for only 24 hours. This, he believed, would pressure the French into offering further concessions.⁷¹

Following Wellesley's suggestions, Dalrymple wrote to Junot announcing that Cotton could not "agree to the question, representing the disposal of the Russian fleet in the Tagus, being in any manner brought under discussion on the basis of the 7th article of the agreement for the suspension of

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hostilities." He sought to assure Junot that "the objection on the part of the British admiral does not proceed from any desire to push to the utmost the advantage which the actual state of war in this quarter might present to the British forces." Dalrymple attempted to assure Junot about the fate of the Russian Fleet as a result of the "intimate connection, which so lately existed between the British government and that of Russia, as well as the personal regard which the British admiral entertains for Admiral Siniavin, leave little reason to doubt of an understanding acceptable to both . . ." ⁷² Before Murray left British headquarters to meet with Kellermann, Dalrymple instructed him to point out to the Frenchman that the article concerning the Russian squadron was "exceedingly inconvenient and disadvantageous to the British army," and without the elimination of this provision, the armistice would come to an end at noon, 28 August. When Murray presented his reservations to Kellermann it was agreed, after consultation with Siniavin, that the Russian admiral would "treat directly with Admiral Cotton." This response must have demonstrated how desperately the French wanted to conclude a convention with the British. ⁷³ Yet Dalrymple and his representatives were content to negotiate on the basis of the preliminary agreement hastily drawn up 3 days earlier.

Simultaneously, Cotton continued efforts to thwart any acceptance of the convention. On 25 August he suggested a landing by Sir John Moore with 5,000 men at Sr. Ubes to cut the French retreat route toward Elvas "on the presumption that the preliminary articles I read yesterday can never be acceded to so as to form a definitive treaty so much in favor of the French army, twice beaten [Roliça and Vimeiro], and 30,000 British troops in Portugal. Without great alteration of these articles, I can never accede to such a treaty." When

Murray informed Cotton of the extension of the armistice for 4 days to continue discussions, the admiral expressed considerable reservation. The previous day he had written, "I was in hopes that . . . all suspension of hostilities was over, and our army was in full march toward Lisbon." ⁷⁴ Cotton was convinced the British Army could defeat Junot's forces, capture Lisbon, and force the French to surrender. However, Dalrymple disagreed, later declaring that Cotton "had all along formed very erroneous opinions as to the force of the French, and had frequently written home that five or six thousand men was fully sufficient for the recovery of Portugal." ⁷⁵ Nevertheless, Cotton as a naval officer saw the importance in occupying Forts Bugio and São Julião as soon as the convention was signed. He also wanted all French requisitions canceled, all reference to the Russian Fleet struck from the agreement, and finally "all French ships of war, and all vessels, to be delivered over with their stores, sails, and equipment" until arrangements could be made between the British Government and the Prince Regent. Dalrymple responded the following day to Cotton's objections noting that since Article 7 of the agreement had been "expunged," Murray had been instructed to continue his negotiations. Concerning the "French ships," Dalrymple maintained that they did not "come under consideration, as the General [Kellermann] did not include them in his demands of things to be retained; they are to be left of course; but I believe there are no French ships, as the *Vasco da Gama* and the other Portuguese ships seem no more French property than the church plate." Dalrymple finally concluded noting, "I think it is now too late to object to any part of the basis itself, which was at first acquiesced." ⁷⁶

In responding to Dalrymple, Cotton again objected to provisions of the convention and he sent Maj. Gen.

William Carr Beresford to express his reservations. He opposed "the conveyance of the plunder of France, which may be greatly covered by the unqualified allowance to respect all nominal private property" of the Portuguese and French emigrés leaving the country. He saw this as a "means of adding some millions perhaps to Buonaparte's treasury." Based on Cotton's stinging criticisms Murray insisted on several alterations that were accepted by Kellermann, including arrangements concerning French baggage, the occupation of Forts São Julião and Bugio and the neighboring forts as soon as the convention had been signed, the return of all "French" vessels to the Portuguese, especially *Vasco da Gama*, and most important for Cotton, the elimination of any provisions concerning the Russian squadron. Any further alterations in the agreement would alter the basis of the initial convention and be unacceptable. The draft of the "Definitive Convention for the Evacuation of Portugal by the French Army" was completed on 28 August with 23 articles, and 5 provisions. After an additional day of discussion and alterations, the Convention, now referred to as the Convention of Sintra, was signed by both Junot and Dalrymple, thus ending the French occupation of Portugal.⁷⁷

Just before the convention was signed between the English and French commanders, Siniavin contacted Admiral Cotton to determine his intentions as British forces would take command of the Tagus forts and his squadron would be at their mercy. He asked if the

chiefs of His Britannic Majesty's sea and land forces, and particularly yourself, will consider Lisbon as a neutral port, in taking possession of it and its forts in the name of the Prince Regent of Portugal, or if they are to consider it as a place making part of the British dominions; and whether the

British or the Portuguese flag is to be hoisted in Lisbon?

Siniavin was particularly concerned about legalities so he also wrote asking Dalrymple to inform him "which flag will be flown in the fortresses of this capital after the French evacuation, and after the occupation of the forts by your troops?" If the flag were Portuguese, Siniavin felt the port would be neutral and "my fleet will be neutral." Dalrymple responded referring him to Admiral Cotton as the only official authorized to negotiate with him.⁷⁸

The British admiral was particularly anxious to work out an acceptable convention because the season of inclement weather had just begun. Moreover, both he and Dalrymple wanted to disembark Sir John Moore with over 10,000 troops at Lisbon harbor rather than land them at some unprotected point up the coast. The entire fleet of transports and "vietuallers" were anxiously awaited by Dalrymple whose army was in acute need of provisions. "The immediate use of the Tagus," wrote Dalrymple, "seemed of the utmost consequence to the safety of the army on shore as well as the vast number of transports and vietuallers which were in the offing, to whom no other resource was left in case of a continuance of bad weather."⁷⁹

Hence, when Siniavin's letter arrived aboard *Hibernia* Cotton responded at once sending Captain Halsted to indicate that he could not accept the neutrality of Lisbon, that the Russian squadron would have to be surrendered for deposit in England until 6 months after peace had been reestablished between England and Russia, and that his crew would be repatriated as soon as possible. The Russian admiral expressed deep disappointment, "I see with grief, and not without astonishment, that you cannot consider the port of Lisbon in its proper situation now, after the French troops have evacuated it as a neutral port." There were rumors of peace between the two powers but this did not

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obscure the harsh fact that the proposed convention called for the surrender of the Russian squadron. Yet, "guided by the principles of honor and loyalty, as well as the inviolable zeal for the interests of the service of my most august sovereign," Siniavin wrote, "I consent to accede to your proposal by a formal Convention; with one condition nevertheless, that this Convention cannot and shall not be valid, without the English flag is hoisted on the forts and the port of Lisbon is acknowledged as a port belonging to His Britannic Majesty." Siniavin was also concerned about formalities and honor and so, before Halsted left *Twerdoi*, he insisted, "The flag of His Imperial Majesty shall remain untouched, and not struck, till the captains and the ships company quit their respective ships."⁸⁰

At the same time Siniavin felt the necessity of sending a second letter to Cotton detailing the circumstances that forced him to seek shelter in the Tagus and the gracious welcome afforded him by the Prince Regent; he noted the neutral status of his squadron had not been altered despite the occupation of the Kingdom by the French. Siniavin recognized Cotton's orders did not permit him "to let the Russian fleet return to the Baltic," but he observed, "it does not follow that it should be disturbed in the port of a prince, and the ally of his sovereign." Pointing out his strict observation of neutrality during the 10 months his squadron had been in the Tagus and his "constant refusal to take any part in the hostile measures which were proposed" by the French, Siniavin concluded appealing. "The neutrality which belonged to me will be preserved to my fleet during the remaining time I remain in the Tagus."⁸¹

Aware of Siniavin's sensitivities concerning the form the surrender would take, Cotton wrote to Dalrymple detailing his progress in the negotiations and his concern about the flags.

I am doubtful of the propriety of hoisting the British colours on the Portuguese forts, and I know that on another occasion, that measure produced great jealousy and discontent. I shall therefore take it as a favor if you will acquiesce in a measure of which I feel the importance, namely the immediate hoisting of the Portuguese colours in lieu of the British: for which purpose I shall order necessary orders to be immediately given.

Cotton responded tersely by return mail, "I am well assured that if the Portuguese flag should be hoisted instead of the English, it may prevent the final conclusion of a convention which, I trust, when settled will be acceptable to our government. I have therefore to request that the English flag remain hoisted on the forts until it is so." Fortunately for Cotton, men of the 3rd and 43rd Foot landed from the fleet, in accordance with the Definitive Convention signed near Sintra on 30 August. They took command of Forts São Julião and Bugio, hoisted the British rather than the Portuguese flag when the French tricolor was lowered, and opened Lisbon harbor to the British convoy.⁸²

On 3 September Siniavin's representative, Mr. Sass, met with Admiral Cotton's equivalent, James Kennedy. They signed the Convention "on board the *Twerdoi* in the Tagus and the *Hibernia*, beyond the bar" of the river. By the provisions of the agreement, the Russian squadron would be "delivered up to Admiral Sir Charles Cotton immediately . . . to be sent to England and there to be held as a deposit by His Britannic Majesty, to be restored to His Imperial Majesty within six months after the conclusion of the peace." The officers and crews of the Russian vessels would be returned to their homeland "without any condition . . . at the expense of His Britannic Majesty."⁸³

Although one copy of the Convention had been signed, Cotton soon faced

another perplexing problem concerning the proper ceremony "to be observed on the occasion of the surrender of the squadron of His Imperial Majesty, . . . to His Britannic Majesty." Aware of the "delicate nature" of surrendering the squadron, Cotton wrote to Siniavin, "[It will be] left for your adaptation in the manner that might appear least likely to wound your feelings; but you must be sensible, sir, some act of surrender is absolutely necessary." To soothe Siniavin's wounded pride, Cotton proposed "that any act of surrender (the mode still left for your adaptation) should be made in the presence of an officer of superior rank to Lt. Bellamy, and for that purpose I send Your Excellency Rear Admiral Tyler, the second officer in command of this fleet." Tyler was rowed to the Russian flagship and after a point by point discussion of each provision of the Convention, the second copy was signed by Siniavin and the agreement became final. On 6 September a translated copy of the Convention was sent to Siniavin and later that day the two admirals met in a gesture of good will and mutual understanding.⁸⁴

As soon as the Convention had been formally signed, the British admiral sent Captain Halsted to London to present and explain the provisions of the agreement to the Lords of the Admiralty and William Pole since he had taken part in the negotiations and was able "to explain every particular." However, the Convention was altered 3 days after it had been signed; Siniavin requested that two additional articles be attached. Cotton accepted them "without hesitation . . . in order to gratify the Vice Admiral" since he regarded them as "being of so unimportant a nature." First, the Russian colors would not be struck from any vessel until the admiral and his captains had left their vessels and secondly, when the vessels were returned to the Russian Government, they would be in the same state in which they were delivered. As an afterthought

Siniavin also requested that *Yaroslav* and *Rafael* remain in Lisbon harbor for repairs as he considered them unseaworthy; their crews were to be distributed among the other vessels of the squadron for the voyage to Britain.⁸⁵

On 7 September Cotton took possession of 21 Portuguese vessels in Lisbon harbor for the Prince Regent and soon the national banner was flying atop their mainmasts.⁸⁶ Four days later, Admiral Tyler sailed down the Tagus to the open sea with seven ships of the line. Early on the morning of 12 September seven Russian vessels sailed across the bar and joined Tyler's squadron in the offing for the voyage to England. Before sailing, however, Cotton gave Tyler detailed instructions,

Use every exertion to prevent separation, and in event of any decisive act, as a disposition to proceed in a contrary direction to the course you may prescribe, you are to use every means in your power by signal, remonstrance, or if absolutely necessary by actual force to compel their proceeding agreeably to the articles of the Convention entered into.

It was ironic that as the Russian squadron set sail down the Tagus for its voyage to England, two divisions of Junot's army had already been returned to France and the Portuguese colors were flying atop São Jorge, the various city churches, and their vessels in the harbor.⁸⁷

Two weeks after the Russian squadron sailed for Great Britain Cotton received a rather critical letter from the Lords of the Admiralty. They praised him for refusing to accept Article 7 of the preliminary agreement and the neutrality of the Russian squadron. However, "their Lordships observe with regret, in the Convention you have concluded with the Russian Admiral, the adoption of a new principle of maritime surrender, by qualified detention and eventual restoration of the ship

of war of the enemy." Considering the demands of the moment, and the fact that Cotton acted under the misapprehension that the temporary orders of 16 April were still applicable, the Lords of the Admiralty expressed "their entire approbation of the zeal, vigilance, and discretion manifested" by Cotton during his command off the coast of Portugal. Cotton responded expressing "regret and grief" but he hoped his letter of 7 September would justify his reasons for "such formidable terms."⁸⁸ In another letter dated 11 September and delivered to Cotton at the same time from the Lords of the Admiralty, they complained that the Russian squadron had been sent to England "in an equipped state." Cotton explained, "I was activated solely by a sense of honor on the part of Vice Admiral Siniavin and by my consequent desire to avoid any measure on the occasion that would tend to wound his feelings." He concluded noting Tyler's squadron was equal in number to the Russian squadron but superior in force.⁸⁹

When the Lords of the Admiralty received Cotton's letter granting two additional conditions to the Russian admiral, he was informed that the provisions could not be accepted as they were, both in form and substance, a supplementary convention rather than explanatory in nature; in addition, the modifications had been added without negotiations after the Convention had been ratified and signed. The Lords of the Admiralty declared in candid terms. "His Majesty cannot allow the flag of an hostile power to be displayed in the ports and harbors of his dominions." Accordingly, when Admiral Tyler dropped anchor at Spithead, he was instructed to inform Admiral Siniavin that the Russian colors would be "removed from the mast-head and flag staves of the said ships as soon as they shall have come to anchor." In a conciliatory gesture Tyler was ordered to display no other colors aboard the

vessels and their respective commanders would be at liberty to land and remain ashore until their return to Russia. Tyler communicated the decision of the Admiralty to Siniavin who issued "directions that his flag and the colours of the Russian ships shall be hauled down at sun-set this day, and not be hoisted again."⁹⁰ Hence, when Siniavin's vessels dropped anchor at Spithead, their crews fired down the gangplanks to salute the colors for the last time. While the officers and men were to be returned to their homeland, the ships of the Baltic squadron rode at anchor and rotted until 1812 when England and Russia reestablished their alliance against Napoleon.

Despite the successful completion of his assignment in Portugal, Cotton remained in Lisbon to superintend the evacuation of Junot's army to France. The last units of Junot's force were delayed in sailing until mid-December as a result of a plague among the men. Cotton was ordered home on 10 December so he began completing arrangements to turn his vessels over to Captain Bradley inasmuch as *Conqueror* had not arrived with Adm. George Berkeley to assume command of the squadron.⁹¹ Thus ended Cotton's tour of duty as commander of the "Red Squadron," gratified that he had earned the "complete approbation" of the Lords of the Admiralty.

The reaction in Saint Petersburg and Paris to the evacuation of the French Army from Portugal and the surrender of the Russian squadron was initial shock because neither Napoleon nor Alexander ever envisioned such a reversal of their plans. At first Alexander had been satisfied with Siniavin's decision to seek shelter in Lisbon harbor.⁹² His satisfaction had been enhanced by the arrival of the French Army in Lisbon. Both Ambassador Tolstoy in Paris and General Armand Coullaincourt, Napoleon's Ambassador in Saint Petersburg, sought

to improve Siniavin's relations with Junot over a period of months. Siniavin was encouraged to support Junot's policies but it soon became obvious that the Russian admiral had little interest in the French cause. Similarly, Junot's haughty and self-serving manners did not improve the situation. Although Champagny and Tolstoy, as well as Napoleon himself, attempted to minimize the differences between the two commanders in their correspondence, the efforts clearly collapsed with the arrival of the British expeditionary force in August 1808.

Napoleon was perplexed and frustrated by Junot's decision to sign the Convention of Sintra. He wrote to his Minister of War, Clarke, "I do not know whether I ought to approve it . . . but I see nothing in the act which is contrary to honor." To Junot he observed, "You have done nothing dishonorable . . . You have gained this convention by your courage, not by your dispositions; and it is with reason that the English complain that their generals signed it."⁹³

Alexander, on the other hand, was dismayed with Siniavin's conduct. When he learned of Junot's critical position in Lisbon he was encouraged that his squadron would be of aid. He told Coullaincourt that "he had no other desire than to learn that his admiral had rendered himself useful to the service" of Napoleon. Two weeks later Alexander, in a conversation with the French Ambassador, declared, "I hope that Siniavin will bravely second Junot on land even if he is not able to on sea, because he will have two brave battalions." When Coullaincourt provided the Russian Tsar with some details of Siniavin's capitulation, including the admiral's correspondence with Junot, he was appalled. Perhaps Alexander was more shocked by the fact that even though Siniavin had maintained strict neutrality throughout his stay in Lisbon harbor, the British had denied him

neutral status and forced him to accept the ignominious fate of surrendering his squadron. In a letter to Napoleon, Coullaincourt wrote, "His Majesty spoke to me yesterday. He said that he had observed the conduct of his admiral with much pain, [and] that he recognized the old [anti-French] spirit that still motivates some people." Considering Siniavin's "ridiculous reasons" for signing the Convention, Alexander promised that "it would not be forgotten."⁹⁴

When the British Government learned of the details of the Convention of Sintra, orders were sent to Lisbon immediately for the return of Wellesley, Burrard, and Dalrymple to appear before a Court of Inquiry to investigate "all the circumstances connected therewith." Writing for the Crown, J.A. Pultreney declared,

We think it necessary that an Inquiry be made . . . into the conditions of the said Armistice and Convention, and into all the causes and circumstances which led to them, and into the conduct, behavior, and proceedings of the said Lieutenant General Hew Dalrymple, and of any other officer, or said officers who may have held command of our troops in Portugal.

The Court of Inquiry convened on 14 November 1808 in Chelsea College and did not end proceedings until each major and most minor participants had testified and been cross-examined several times. Public reaction to the Naval Convention, however, was markedly different. The Naval Convention was discussed in Parliament and a decision was made to publish the *Papers Presented to the House of Commons relative to the Russian Fleet in the Tagus*. These papers were made available in four stages between 9 and 20 February 1809 and there appears to have been few negative repercussions since concrete evidence of Cotton's

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success could be seen anchored safely at Spithead.⁹³

In considering Portugal and the Anglo-Russian naval crisis of 1808, it seems clear that seapower became a major factor in determining the outcome of the struggle. Cotton's squadron not only succeeded in extricating the Portuguese royal family and the Portuguese Fleet from certain capture at a most critical moment, but they also succeeded in bottling up a formidable Russian squadron in the Tagus for 10 months. The "Red Squadron" served as a catalyst in giving aid and comfort to the Portuguese when rebellion erupted in the Kingdom. With the French Army isolated and highly vulnerable to attack, the Royal Navy performed an extraordinarily complex operation in coordinating the landing and providing support for the forces of Wellesley, Spencer, and Moore, arriving from different points of the compass.

During Wellesley's advance on Lisbon, ships of the Royal Navy escorted supply convoys along the coast in order to land needed provisions. Early on the morning of 21 August when the only decisive battle of the campaign was fought at Vimeiro, 4,000 infantry were disembarked just in time to take part in this struggle and assure victory. Indeed, the British squadron had been unable to attack the Russian squadron in the Tagus, but Cotton achieved his goal by arousing the Portuguese citizenry and cooperating with Wellesley in the capture of Lisbon, which placed the enemy squadron in his hands. Moreover, without the active participation of Cotton's squadron Wellesley's task would have been infinitely more difficult and the Russian squadron would have slipped down the Tagus and made its way to the Baltic to take part in operations against Britain's ally—Sweden.

Obviously Junot, without the support of seapower, was at the mercy of the Royal Navy. He went through the

motions of creating a fleet to contest British control of the waters off Portugal but, in fact, he had only one ship of the line ready for sea by the time his army was evacuated from Lisbon. Admiral Siniavin, on the contrary, had opportunities to use his naval resources in attempting to escape from Lisbon harbor. Several times he outnumbered the British vessels blockading the Tagus and on more than one occasion Cotton's squadron was blown off station by inclement weather. Nevertheless, the Russian admiral was satisfied to remain inactive and take his chances hoping that his claims of neutrality would be recognized if the English gained control of the Tagus forts. No doubt Siniavin's negative attitude toward the French and his sympathetic relations with the British influenced his actions but it hardly justified his disobedience of orders. He gambled on British good will and his own powers of persuasion to save himself from a critical predicament. Ultimately, it led to the surrender of his squadron and dishonor to his flag and himself.

In evaluating the role of the participants, Cotton appears to be the only commander to survive the operations with an unblemished record. Siniavin, Junot, and the three English generals, Wellesley, Burrard, and Dalrymple all suffered to various degrees for their actions in Portugal. Yet Cotton's achieve-

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



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ments and career seemed to have been forgotten or minimized in the company of such distinguished contemporaries as Jarvis, Collingwood, Saumarez, Smith, and of course Nelson. There were no naval engagements during his command of the "Red Squadron" but his successful operations certainly characterize the strengths and versatility of

British seapower during the Napoleonic years. It was from the sea that the British offensive first began in the Peninsula and it was ultimately through seapower that the Duke of Wellington's land operations were sustained, culminating in the reconquest of Iberia, the invasion of France, and the collapse of the Napoleonic Empire 6 years later.

NOTES

1. *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier publiée par ordre de l'Empereur Napoléon III* (Paris: Imprimerie Imperiale, 1858-69), No. 12865, Napoleon to Alexander, 6 July 1807, v. XV, p. 490.

2. *Ibid.*, Nos. 13149, 13229, 13253, Napoleon to Joseph, 14 September 1807; Napoleon to Savary, 8, 14 October 1807, v. XVI, pp. 32-33, 88-89, 103-105.

3. *Ibid.*, No. 13305, Napoleon to Joseph, 27 October 1807, v. XVI, p. 145-46.

4. *Ibid.*, Nos. 13338, 13339, 13383, Napoleon to Alexander, 7 November 1807; Napoleon to Savary, 7 November 1807; Napoleon to Alexander, 7 December 1807, v. XVI, pp. 171-72, 172-74, 220-221.

5. England, House of Commons, *Papers, presented to the House of Commons, Relative to the Russian Fleet in the Tagus, and to the Convention concluded with the Russian Admiral* (London: House of Commons, 9-20 February) (Part II) (hereafter cited as *Papers*), Siniavin to Cotton, 2 September/21 August 1808, p. 10. See also Alexander S. Trachevski, *Diplomaticheskiia snosheniia Rosii s epokhu Napoleona I* (St. Petersburg, 1809-93), Champagny to Kurakin, 7 December 1807, LXXXVIII, p. 338. When the Tsar learned of the arrival of his fleet in Lisbon on 19 November, he sought out the Portuguese diplomat, Rodrigo Navarro de Andrade at the Empress' birthday ball to express his gratitude. See Portugal, Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, MSS, Legação de Portugal na Rússia, Navarro de Andrade to António de Araújo de Azevedo, 26/14 January, Caixa No. 12, Doc. 175.

6. Donald D. Howard, "Portuguese Neutrality and Mobilization: 1801-1810," *International Commission of Military History* (Bucarest, 1978) Acta No. 3, Teheran 6-16 VII 1976, p. 276. Smith ignored orders to communicate these instructions to Sir John Moore.

7. Maximilian S. Foy, *History of the War in the Peninsula, Under Napoleon . . .* (London: Treuttel and Würtz, 1827), Official Declaration of the Blockade of the mouth of the Tagus, signed W. Sidney Smith, 20 November 1807, v. II, p. 551; John W. Fortescue, *A History of the British Army* (London: Macmillan, 1902-30), v. VI, pp. 99-101.

8. Howard, p. 277.

9. France, Archives de la guerre, Service Historique de l'armée, Vincennes, MSS, Correspondance: Armée de Portugal, Proclamation of Junot, 19 November 1807, Carton C⁷ 16. Without a declaration of war a British squadron bombarded Copenhagen and seized the Danish Fleet.

10. Christovam Ayres de Magalhães Sepúlveda, *História Orgânica e Política do Exército Português*, (Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade, 1896-1932), v. XII, pp. 1xxxvi-1xxxvii. This work includes a list of vessels that sailed to Brazil with Prince João. See also England, Public Record Office, Admiralty, MSS (Hereafter cited as P.R.O. Adm.), 1/339, Smith to Vice Consul, Azores, 5 January 1808; P.R.O., Foreign Office, 63/56, Strangford to Channing, 29 November 1807.

11. Torre do Tombo, Legação de Portugal na Rússia, Declaration, 26 October 1807, Caixa No. 12, *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier*, No. 12865, Napoleon to Alexander, 6 July 1807, v. XV, p. 490.

12. Portugal, Biblioteca da Ajuda, Palácio da Ajuda, (Hereafter cited as Ajuda), MSS, Junot to Napoleon, 27 December 1807, Cod. 46, XIII, 29.

13. Ajuda, Junot to Napoleon, 2 December 1807, Cod. 46, XIII, 29.

14. Correspondance: Armée de Portugal, Junot to Champagny, 7 December 1807, Carton C⁷ 16; Ricardo Raimundo Nogueira, "Apontamentos e Documentos para a Historia de Portugal desde 1807," in Sepúlveda, v. X, p. 57.

15. P.R.O., Adm., 1/365, Pole to Cotton, 9 December 1807; See also *Papers* (Part I), Hawkesbury to Moore, 4 December 1807, p. 4.

16. *Papers* (Part I) Canning to Castlereagh, 28 December 1807; P.R.O., Adm., 1/339, Cotton to Pole, 28 December 1807. See also Cotton to Pole, 19, 31 December 1807; 9 January 1808.

17. P.R.O., Adm., 1/339, Cotton to Pole, 16 January 1808. Cotton joined the *Hibernia*, *Alfred*, *Defence*, *Ganges*, *Ruby*, *Plantagenet*, *Conqueror*, *Agamemnon*, *Fondroyant* with *Nautilus*, *Milbrook*, *Antelope* and *Minotaur*.

18. *Ibid.*, Cotton to Pole, 28 December 1807.

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19. *Papers* (Part I), Cotton to Siniavin, 18 January 1808, p. 5. See also Cotton to Pole, 25 January 1808, P.R.O., Adm., 1/339.
20. Ajuda, Junot to Napoleon, 4 February 1808, Cod. 46, XIII, 29.
21. P.R.O., Adm., 1/339, Cotton to Pole, 8 February 1808; *Papers* (Part I), pp. 5-6.
22. Sepúlveda, v. X, pp. 109-58; Ajuda, Junot to Napoleon, 6 December 1807, Cod. 46, XIII, 29.
23. Ajuda, Junot to Napoleon, 21 December 1808, Cod. 46, XIII, 29. See also P.R.O. Adm., 1/339, Cotton to Pole, 2 February 1808.
24. P.R.O., Adm., 1/339, Intelligence report from Messrs. Carpenter and Lord, 27 January 1808. See also Correspondance: Armée de Portugal, Junot to Champagny, 27 December 1807, Carton C⁷ 16.
25. Paul Charles Thiebault, *Mémoires du général Thiébault* (Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1894-95), v. IV, pp. 166-67.
26. Ajuda, Junot to Napoleon, 27 December, 9 January 1808, Cod. 46, XIII, 29; Correspondance: Armée de Portugal, Junot to Clarke, 27 December, 8 January 1808, Carton C⁷ 16.
27. *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier*, No. 13842, Napoleon to Junot, 10 May 1808, v. XVII, pp. 97-98; Correspondance: Armée de Portugal, Junot to Magendie, 19 May 1808, Carton C⁷ 16. For the other Portuguese vessels see footnote 86.
28. P.R.O., Adm., 1/339, Captain Yeo to Cotton, 14 February 1808.
29. Correspondance: Armée de Portugal, Junot to Clarke, 4 March 1808, Carton C⁷ 16; P.R.O., Adm., 1/340 Thomas Innes to Cotton, 30 June 1808; P.R.O., Adm., 1/339, Cotton to Pole, 23 April 1808; Foy, *Order of the Day*, 24 April 1808, v. II, p. 563.
30. Howard, p. 278.
31. *Papers* (Part I), Cotton to Pole, 29 March 1808, p. 6.
32. P.R.O., Adm., 1/365, Pole to Cotton, 29 December 1807; P.R.O. Adm., 1/339, Cotton to Pole, 7, 18 April 1808. The departure of the Portuguese officers did alleviate a curious situation in which the British officers were expected to entertain them at considerable personal cost.
33. Correspondance: Armée de Portugal, Proclamation of 5 April 1808, Carton C⁷ 16.
34. *Ibid.*, Junot to Champagny, 8 May 1808, Carton C⁷ 16; P.R.O., Adm., 2/652, Navy Board, 13 May 1808.
35. P.R.O., Adm., 1/365, Pole to Cotton, 16 April 1808; P.R.O. Adm., 1/339, Cotton to Pole, 27 April 1808; Proclamation, 28 April 1808, *Papers* (Part I), Castlereagh to Admiralty, 16 April 1808, p. 7.
36. *Ibid.*, 1/339, Cotton to Siniavin, 29 February 1808; Siniavin to Cotton, 7 March/24 February 1808. These officers included Rear Admiral Alexander Greig, First Capts. William Krove and Robert Elphinstone, Cdr. Thomas Chandler, Lt. Samuel Moffet, and surgeons Brit and Lind. They left Lisbon on 20 April en route to St. Petersburg but had not reached Paris until after 13 May. See *L'ambassade du Comte P.A. Tolstói à Paris; 1807-1808, De Tilsit à Erfurt* (St. Petersburg, 1893) Correspondence dated 13 May 1808, v. I.XXXIX, pp. 535-36.
37. *Ibid.*, Cotton to Pole, 13 March, 1, 7 April 1808; Correspondance: Armée de Portugal, Junot to Champagny, 16 May 1808, Carton C⁷ 16. Napoleon received similar information. See *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier*, No. 13973, Napoleon to Junot, 24 May 1808, v. XVII, p. 222.
38. *Ibid.*, Cotton to Pole, 18 May 1808; *Papers* (Part I), p. 11.
39. *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier*, No. 13968, Napoleon to Junot, 23 May 1808, v. XVII, p. 219; Ajuda, Junot to Napoleon, 3 June 1808, Cod. 46, XIII, 29.
40. P.R.O., Adm., 1/339, Cotton to Pole, 18 May 1808.
41. Correspondance: Armée de Portugal, Junot to Magendie, 19 April 1808; Junot to Siniavin, 21 May 1808, Carton C⁷ 16; Ajuda, Junot to Napoleon, 21 May 1808, Cod. XIII, 29; *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier*, Nos. 13841, 13842, Napoleon to Junot, 10 May 1808, v. XVII, pp. 97-98. Napoleon later ordered Junot to give Siniavin a frigate of 40 guns and a brig in exchange for a Russian frigate and brig at Trieste or Venice. See No. 14032, Napoleon to Junot, v. XVII, pp. 285-86.
42. *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier*, Nos. 13841, 13840, 13896, 14023, Napoleon to Junot, 10, 29, 31 May 1810, Napoleon to Siniavin, 10 May 1810, v. XVII, pp. 96-98, 155-56, 271-72, Ajuda, Junot to Napoleon, 24 May 1808, Cod. 46, XIII, 29.
43. Ajuda, Junot to Napoleon, 21, 24 May 1808, Cod. 46, XII, 29.
44. Correspondance: Armée de Portugal, Junot to Kellermann, 9 June 1808, Carton C⁷ 19. See also Simão José da Luz Soriano, *Historia da Guerra Civil e do estabelecimento do governo parlamentar em Portugal . . .* (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1866-92), Segunda Epocha, v. I, p. 247-48.
45. *Ibid.*, Junot to Senate of Porto, 10 June 1808; Junot to Oliveira, 11 June 1810, Carton C⁷ 16; Soriano, pp. 254-55.
46. *Ibid.*, Proclamation to the Army of Portugal, Proclamation to the Inhabitants, Decree, signed by Junot, 11, 14 June 1808, Carton C⁷ 16.
47. P.R.O., Adm., 1/339, Cotton to Pole, 9 June 1808; Cotton to Inhabitants, 9 June 1808.
48. *Ibid.*, Cotton to Pole, 12 June 1808; Greyke to Cotton, 20 June 1808. A column composed of two battalions of infantry and fifty horsemen was sent from Almeida under General Louis Henri Loison, the

hated "Maneta," to occupy Porto. He was halted by an irregular force at Meão Frio and forced to turn back. See Soriano, p. 258; Foy, p. 436.

49. *Ibid.*, Greyke to Cotton, 16 June 1808; President of the Porto Senate to Cotton, 20 June 1808.

50. *Ibid.*, Cotton to Pole, 28, 30 June, 1 July 1808; Citizens of Faro to Cotton, 27 July 1808; José Carrera Fells to Cotton, 27 June 1808; José Soares to Cotton, 27 June 1808.

51. *Ibid.*, 7/41, Cotton to Pole, 4 July 1808. Thirty-five men each were provided by *Hibernia, Conqueror, Ganges, Barfleur* and 25 men each were sent from *Alfred* and *Ruby*.

52. *Ibid.*, 1/330, Cotton to Pole, 10, 15 July 1810; Bligh to Cotton, 10 July 1810; Galway to Cotton, 10 July 1810. Porto received 200 muskets and 8,200 rounds; Lagos 100 muskets and 3,000 rounds, Nazaré was sent 60 muskets and 3,000 rounds; Leiria received 50 muskets and 3,200 rounds; Figueira was sent 300 muskets, ammunition and 200 marines. See Cotton to Pole, 7 July 1810. It should be noted that once Arthur Wellesley landed in Portugal he opposed any further distribution of arms to the Portuguese citizens. See Arthur Wellesley, *Supplementary Despatches, Correspondence, and Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur Duke of Wellington, Edited by His Son, The Duke of Wellington*, (London: John Murray, 1858-72), v. VI, pp. 125-26.

53. *Ibid.*, Cotton to Pole, 15 July 1808.

54. Arthur Wellesley, *The Dispatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington, during his various campaigns . . . from 1799 to 1818* (hereafter cited as Wellington's Dispatches). Compiled by Lt. Col. Gurwood. (London: John Murray, 1837-39), Castlereagh to Wellesley, 30 June, 15 July 1808, v. IV, pp. 16-21, 27-30. It should be noted that both the Spanish and Portuguese sent delegations to London to seek aid. See also *Copy of the Proceedings upon the Inquiry relative to the Armistice and Convention, & made and concluded in Portugal, in August 1808, between the Commanders of the British and French Armies* (hereafter cited as *Proceedings*) (London: House of Commons, 1809), Castlereagh to Cotton, 2 July 1808, p. 133.

55. *Wellington's Dispatches*, Castlereagh to Wellesley, 30 June, 15 July 1808, v. IV, pp. 19-21, 27-30. See also Wellesley to Castlereagh, 8 July 1808, v. IV, p. 25; *Proceedings*, Castlereagh to Spencer, 28 June, 2 July 1808, pp. 129-30; Castlereagh to Moore, 20 July 1808, p. 139.

56. *Proceedings*, Castlereagh to Wellesley, 15, 21 July 1808, pp. 133, 135.

57. *Wellington's Dispatches*, Wellesley to Castlereagh, 26 July 1808; Wellesley to Spencer, 26 July 1808, v. IV, pp. 44, 47-48.

58. *Ibid.*, Wellesley to Gordon, 11 August 1808, v. IV, pp. 80-82. For more details see Wellesley's testimony in *Proceedings*, p. 24.

59. *Ibid.*, Wellesley to Castlereagh, 1 August 1808, v. IV, pp. 51-54. See also Wellesley to Burrard, 8 August 1808, and Wellesley's testimony, in *Proceedings*, pp. 24, 153-54.

60. P.R.O., Adm., 1/340, Proclamation to the People of Portugal, signed by Cotton and Wellesley, 2 August 1808. *Wellington's Dispatches*, v. IV, pp. 58-59.

61. *Proceedings*, Wellesley to Castlereagh, 26 July 1808, pp. 46-47.

62. P.R.O., Adm., 1/340, Cotton to Pole, 20 August 1808; *Proceedings*, Wellesley testimony, pp. 25-28; *Wellington's Dispatches*, Wellesley to Castlereagh, 16 August 1808; Wellesley to Bligh, 9 August 1808, Wellesley to Cotton, 30 July 1808, v. IV, pp. 91-95, 77-78, 50-51.

63. P.R.O., Adm., 1/340, Cotton to Pole, 30 July 1808. In fact Napoleon had swapped Portuguese vessels in Lisbon for Russian ships of similar size that were to be sent from Portoferraio to Toulon. See *Poroljstvo grafa P. A. Tolstago v Parizje v 1807 i 1808 gg ot Tilzita do Erfurta*. Gjdano pod redantoiu N.K. Chiljdera, (1893), Tolstoy to Kurakin, 19 February 1808; Tolstoy to Rumiantsev, 13 May 1808, v. I.XXXIX, pp. 429, 536. See footnote 41.

64. Ajuda, Junot to Napoleon, 30 May 1808, Cod. 46, XIII, 29.

65. Foy, p. 499.

66. Correspondance: Armée de Portugal, Junot to Siniavin, 15 July 1808, Carton C⁷ 16.

67. Ajuda, Junot to Napoleon, 29 March 1808, Cod. 46, XIII, 29; Foy, pp. 499-500. The 47th Line occupied Forts Bugio and Trafaria and several vessels and prison hulks in the harbor; the 66th line held for Cascais; the Legion du Midi occupied São Julião; the 26th Line was posted at Belem, Bom Succeso and Ericeira; the 15th Line garrisoned Lisbon and the Sacavem magazine, and a battalion of 1,200 men occupied the fortress of Sao Jorge above the capital.

68. *Proceedings*, Dalrymple testimony and Wellesley testimony, pp. 40-41, 57; Paul Charles Thiébault, *Relation de l'Expédition du Portugal, faite en 1807 et 1808 . . .* (Paris: Magimel, Anselin et Pochard, 1817), pp. 208-210; *Wellington's Dispatches*, Suspension d'armes, 27 August 1808, v. IV, pp. 116-17.

69. *Wellington's Supplementary Despatches*, Wellesley to Castlereagh, 23 August 1808, v. IV, pp. 122-24. See also *Proceedings*, Wellesley testimony, pp. 57-60 and Dalrymple testimony, p. 41.

70. *Proceedings*, Wellesley to Dalrymple, 23 August 1808, pp. 59-60.

71. P.R.O., Adm. 1/340 Cotton to Pole, 9:00 a.m., 15 August 1808; *Proceedings*, Wellesley testimony, pp. 60-61 and Dalrymple testimony, p. 67. Wellesley concurred with Cotton's response and wrote to him, "I consider it most fortunate that by your interference that article [7] in it has been struck out . . . We
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ought not to allow the French to interfere in any manner between us and the Russians." See *Wellington's Supplementary Despatches*, Wellesley to Cotton, 27 August 1808, v. IV, pp. 125-26.

72. *Proceedings*, Dalrymple to Junot, 25 August 1808, p. 177.

73. *Ibid.*, Junot to Dalrymple, 26 August 1808, pp. 177-78; *Papers* (Part II), Dalrymple to Murray, 25 August 1808, p. 3. It is noteworthy that Dalrymple did not incorporate this blunt language into his letter to Junot.

74. *Papers* (Part II), Cotton to Dalrymple, 25 August 1808; Cotton to Murray, 26 August 1808, p. 4.

75. *Wellington's Supplementary Despatches*, A Memorandum respecting the Convention of Sintra, 28 August 1808, v. XIII, pp. 303-04.

76. *Papers* (Part II), Cotton to Dalrymple, 27 August 1808; Dalrymple to Cotton, 28 August 1808, pp. 5-6.

77. *Ibid.*, Cotton to Dalrymple, 28 August 1808, p. 6; Dalrymple to Cotton, 28 August 1808, p. 6; *Proceedings*, Suspension d'armes . . . , 22 August 1808, pp. 6-7; Definitive Convention . . . , 30 August 1808, pp. 7-10, 245-48.

78. P.R.O., Adm., 1/340. Siniavin to Cotton, 29/17 August 1808; Soriano, pp. 451-52n; *Proceedings*, Siniavin to Dalrymple 31/19 August 1808, p. 236; Dalrymple to Siniavin, 1 September 1808, p. 236. Dalrymple had already told Murray, "Whatever regards the enemy's ship, or any ships, the admiral must answer." See *Wellington's Supplementary Despatches*, v. XIII, pp. 305-06.

79. *Proceedings*, Dalrymple testimony, pp. 45-46.

80. *Papers* (Part II) Siniavin to Cotton, 2 September/21 August 1808, pp. 9-10; Soriano, pp. 452-53.

81. *Ibid.*, Siniavin to Cotton, 2 September 1808, pp. 10-11. Kellermann personally appealed to Siniavin on 27 August to relieve his troops in the Tagus forts but he refused. There was an inaccurate claim by French Hanoverian deserters that 150 men from each Russian vessel were sent ashore to relieve the French. See *Proceedings*, Spencer to Wellesley, 21 June 1808, pp. 149-50.

82. *Ibid.*, Dalrymple to Cotton, 4 September 1808, p. 11; Cotton to Dalrymple, 4 [?] September 1808, p. 11; Soriano, p. 454; *Proceedings*, Dalrymple testimony, p. 47.

83. Ajuda, Articles of a Convention entered into between Vice Admiral Siniavin . . . and Admiral Sir Charles Cotton, 3 September 1808, Cod. 54, VI, 14; See *Papers* (Part I), p. 14 for minor variations.

84. P.R.O., Adm., 1/340, Siniavin to Cotton, 4 September/23 August 1808; *Papers* (Part II), Cotton to Siniavin, 4, 6 September 1808, pp. 11-13.

85. *Papers* (Part I) Cotton to Pole, 4, 7 September 1808, pp. 13-14. Cotton sent his master carpenter, Trounsell, to examine the two Russian vessels and he reported that it was "imprudent to risk the passage to England, particularly at this season of the year." Consequently, the skeleton crew of 76 Russian sailors was sent on to England for their return to Russia. Work continued on the ships through the rest of the year. See *Papers* (Part I), Cotton to Pole, 12 October 1808, pp. 18-20; P.R.O., Adm., 1/340, Cotton to Pole, 19 November, 20, 27 December, 1808.

86. *Proceedings*, Murray to Dalrymple, 26 August 1808, p. 178. The seaworthy vessels included: *Vasco da Gama* (74), *Carlota* (54), *Fênix* (48), *Andorinha* (9), *Gaivoia* (20), *Benjamin* (6), *Cariorg* (6), *Laure* (6), and *Bombardor* (6). Those vessels still uncompleted included: *Maria I* (74), *São Sebastião* (64), *Amazona* (44), *Pêrola* (44), *Triunfo* (40), *Venus* (36), *Princesa da Beira* (64) [22], *Neptune* (18), *Princesa Real* (18), *Magnanims* (22), one large vessel in the stocks, and three floating batteries. See P.R.O., Adm., 1/340, Cotton to Pole, 7 September 1808; Sepúlveda, v. X, pp. 48-49, XI; José Accursio das Neves, *Historia geral da invasão dos francezes em Portugal* . . . (Lisbon: Oficina da Simas Ferreira, 1810-11), v. I, p. 179.

87. P.R.O., Adm., 1/340, Cotton to Tyler, 7 September 1808. The British escort fleet included *Barfleur*, *Hercule*, *Conqueror*, *Elizabeth*, *Donegal*, *Alfred*, *Ruby*, and *Crocodile* while the Russian Fleet was composed of *Twerdoi*, *Skoroy*, *St. Helene*, *Salafael*, *Ratvizan*, *Silnoy*, *Motchnoy*, and the frigate *Kildeyn*. See *Papers* (Part I), Tyler to Pole, 7 October 1808, p. 17.

88. *Papers* (Part I), Pole to Cotton, 17 September 1808, p. 16; P.R.O., Adm., 1/340, Pole to Cotton, 27 September 1808.

89. P.R.O., Adm., 1/340, Cotton to Pole, 28 September 1808.

90. *Papers* (Part I), Pole to Cotton, 30 September 1808, p. 17; Pole to Tyler, 30 September 1808, p. 16.

91. P.R.O., Adm., 1/340, Cotton to Pole, 5 November, 10 December 1808.

92. *Posoljstvo grafa P.A. Tolstago*, Rumiantsev to Tolstoy, 27 November 1807; Tolstoy to Kurakin, 19 February 1808, v. LXXXIX, pp. 256, 430.

93. *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier*, Nos. 14355, 14386, Napoleon to Clarke, 2 October 1808, v. XVII, pp. 618-19; Napoleon to Junot, 19 October 1808, v. XVIII, pp. 2-3.

94. France, Archives Nationales, MSS, AF IV, 1697, Caulaincourt to Napoleon, 26 August, 7 September 1808, Dossier 2, Rapports 50, 52; Caulaincourt to Napoleon, 20 December 1808, Dossier 4, Rapport 4.

95. *Proceedings*, Castlereagh to His Royal Highness, 29 October 1808, p. 5; J.A. Pulteney to Richard Ryder, 1 November 1810, pp. 6-11; *Inquiry*, pp. 12-121.