

1981

Book Review


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Recommended Citation

War College, The U.S. Naval (1981) "Book Review," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 34 : No. 3 , Article 10.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol34/iss3/10>

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PROFESSIONAL READING

BOOK REVIEWS

Ashworth, Tony. *Trench Warfare—The Live and Let Live System*. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1980. 266pp.

What we know of an age or historical event is fashioned for us by the historians. In time a kind of consensus is found, derived from which facts are highlighted, where the emphasis is placed, and how the analysis is drawn and the conclusions reached. Such is certainly the case with WW I. We all know the story of that incredible "war to end all wars" when the great powers of Europe, after 20 years of duplicitous diplomacy and a stubborn refusal to recognize the changing world around them, literally stumbled into 5 years of carnage and unprecedented horror in 300 miles of parallel trenches stretching from Switzerland to the English Channel. Famous too are the heroes of the French on the Marne and at Verdun, and of the British date with destiny in the marshes of Flanders.

But for Professor Ashworth it is quite another story. His interest and hence his emphasis lies less in the usual story of the more famous heroes, battles and generals, and more with the fate of the common soldier. What was his lot? How did he endure the disaster and the horror of the trenches? Is the story in fact one of unending artillery and mortar bombardment, of gas warfare and pitched hand-to-hand combat in "no man's land," and finally one of frontal assault "over the top" into a solid wall of machinegun bullets? Nor

so, according to Ashworth, or at least not to the degree we may think. Instead, what he calls the "Live and Let Live System" prevailed throughout the war. Thus, facing each other across as little as 100 yards of no man's land the enemies could choose either to harass, bombard, snipe and attack each other, or they could choose to practice a kind of laissez-faire truce.

Professor Ashworth maintains that both sides chose these undeclared but fully recognized truces, that they were a kind of sympathetic understanding between soldiers for their mutual protection and safety, and that they were prevalent throughout the war. Citing hundreds of examples and quoting numerous sources from both sides, he builds a solid case for his interpretation of this little-known side of the Great War. This tendency for the war continuously to "deteriorate into peace" created a problem for the generals. Thus commanding officers on both sides were forced to deal with lethargy in the trenches and the problem of motivating men to fight. For the French the Live and Let Live System became a problem of major proportion near the war's end when large portions of their army simply refused to fight. The British answer to the tendency was a tactic called the Raid, which was a small-scale attack across no man's land by small units designed to demoralize the enemy and "enhance the [British] fighting spirit." Ashworth maintains, however,

that the raids not only jeopardized the Live and Let Live System, because they necessarily invited counterattack by the enemy, but that they were even more detrimental to morale and the fighting spirit as no man could withstand constant harassment in the trenches for long.

Ashworth's study is unique, and interesting because it focuses on such a little-known side of the history of WW I. In part it reminded this reviewer of personal experiences with the River Patrol Force in the Republic of Vietnam in the late 1960s when we had our rivers and the Vietcong had theirs. To choose to enter "their" rivers was to invite retaliation. Whether we did or did not was remarkably like the Live and Let Live System.

MICHAEL B. EDWARDS
Commander, U.S. Navy

Bryant, Ralph C. *Money and Monetary Policy in Interdependent Nations*. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1980. 606pp.

Economic instability is not the least of the threats facing the Western World, and the last 10 years have been marked by particularly baffling problems posed by rising prices and fluctuating exchange rates. In such a situation the importance of economists, with their claims to be able to diagnose, and prescribe for, the ills of economies, has naturally increased. Yet much economic theory, for all its sophistication, is inappropriate for a world of increasingly interdependent economies, for economists have traditionally divided their discipline into its domestic and international aspects, all too often with inadequate regard for the interactions between these aspects.

The disadvantages of habits of thought that keep domestic and international economics apart become apparent as soon as one attempts to define the quantity of money in any one country, for to what nation's money supply would one allocate, say, a West

German firm's call deposit, denominated in U.S. dollars, in a London bank, when the firm's business is trade with Argentina? Conventions can be developed to deal with such cases but, as Bryant points out, national governments do not, as a matter of fact, all employ the same concepts or statistical practices. Moreover, the most appropriate concept of money supply may vary according to whether one wishes to stress the causal effect of various forms of financial assets on the economy, or the monetary authorities' power to control something called "the money supply."

Bryant has set himself an integrationalist role in presenting a common-sense analytical framework within which policymakers may work out options. He eschews unnecessary theoretical controversies among economists, and refuses to place himself either in the Keynesian or monetarist camp. He admits that academics in the social sciences have tended to isolate themselves from policymakers and laymen as a result of increasing use of "technical languages" (less politely called jargon), and he has attempted to write for both policymaking and academic communities. Nonetheless, while his prose is unusually lucid for an economist he cannot avoid extensive use of mathematics, and one can only say that a nation all of whose policymakers (as opposed to specialists in its central bank) could follow his arguments would be indeed fortunate.

The policymaker who comes to Bryant seeking some simple monetary rule-of-thumb will (rightly) be disappointed. Nevertheless the book does suggest some basic guidelines to which those responsible for national monetary policy would do well to pay heed. He stresses that monetary policy should not be conducted in isolation but should be integrated with fiscal and other policies (this seems to argue against the independence of central banks). He urges that

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policy instruments should not become ends in themselves and that, in particular, policymakers should not specify targets for some definition of the money supply, and then use the instruments of monetary policy with the object of minimizing deviations of the money supply from these targets. These are not views that will endear him to the more dogmatic (or simplistic) monetarists.

His main message, however, is the integration of domestic and international economics in a way that makes clear that a nation's policymakers can only secure autonomy in monetary policy at the expense of sacrificing the benefits of the interdependence of nations—that is, the more efficient allocation of resources through trade and international capital movements. Attempts to insulate a national economy from the world economy, for example, by exchange-rate flexibility are likely, in the case of major economies, to have an influence on the world economy that will have inevitable feedback effects on the national economy. The case of collective action by national governments, and for the promotion of supranational institutions that can assist that collective action, is strengthened by this book. The world is too complex for major nations to be able to act profitably in isolation from their partners in economic policy, as in other matters relating to national security.

G.C. PEDEN
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"Cincinnatus." *Self-Destruction: The Disintegration and Decay of the United States Army during the Vietnam Era*. New York: Norron, 1981. 288pp.

As this issue goes to press (4 May), news accounts have identified "Cincinnatus" as Cecil B. Currey, a professor at the University of South Florida, who was commissioned as lieutenant in the Nebraska National Guard in 1965. He remains in the Army Reserve, attached to the Office of the Chief of Chaplains.

A pseudonymous author self-styled as "Cincinnatus" has written a book about the Army entitled *Self-Destruction*. The author's thesis is in the title. It is his

or her view (the author claims to be a professional Army officer, about which more later) that the numerous problems afflicting the Army during and since the Vietnam era are of its own making, and that they persist to the present day.

There is not much new here. Most of the author's criticisms have long since been put forth with greater force, credibility and immediacy by others, most notably the Army's own general officers, as reported years ago in Douglas Kinnard's book *The War Managers*, which this author quotes extensively, and by others of the officer corps in such landmark works as the 1970 Army War College *Study on Military Professionalism*. Whatever original research underpins the present work seems to consist largely of some interviews the author says he has conducted with people, also anonymous, that he asserts know something about the matters under discussion. He does not identify his sources, nor give even a statistical profile of their qualifications or demographics, thus diminishing the force and credibility of whatever new material he may have been able to uncover. The result is a very slender volume (some 170 pages of text, fleshed out with a series of appendixes including such diverse and dubiously relevant material as the text of the Declaration of Independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the dates on which major Army units arrived in Vietnam, and a two and a half page quotation from an unnamed lieutenant colonel) that adds little to the body of scholarship on the Army in Vietnam and since.

The text itself reads like a student research paper recycled (far too late to be pertinent) as a book. In seeking to make his own case the author grabs various published sources seemingly at random, certainly without any apparent discrimination, to establish one point or another. The government is criticized, for example, for having failed to heed the advice of a writer named Robert

Taber who published a book in 1965 asserting that extermination of all insurgents and turning the territory that harbors them into a desert is the only effective means of winning such a conflict. The Army is also criticized for having "generally ignored" ideas for alternative approaches to revolutionary warfare put forth by Geroge Patton in an Army War College student paper, an effort this author then goes on to call in the same sentence "a not very incisive analysis." There is a great deal more of the same kind of thing.

Equally uninspiring is the snide tone of much of the material. People become "captivated by" concepts, rather than adopting them rationally, as they work in "magnificent edifices." Security classifications are invariably "slapped" on documents, never objectively assigned to them. Senior officers are patronizingly characterized to no point: Lt. Gen. DeWitt Smith is, the author tells us, a "small-stature general," while Brig. Gen. James L. Collins, Jr. he gratuitously dubs "a pleasant man who walks with the aid of a cane."

In an unlucky bit of timing the author completed the manuscript in July 1979 although publication did not take place until early 1981. Such lengthy processes are not uncommon in the publishing business, although they can be radically compressed when commercial considerations dictate. In this case the delay is particularly unfortunate, for the author misses out entirely on the views and initiatives of the reformist administration that has been guiding the Army since Gen. Edward C. Meyer became Chief of Staff in June 1979. Thus a double misfortune: publication comes too late for the author to be given any credit for stimulating the present reform movement, while completion of the manuscript occurred too early for him to take it into account.

While it is too soon to reach conclusions about the likely long-term effect of the moves to increase unit cohesion,

improve morale, and enhance training and readiness that General Meyer has put in train, it is even at this stage highly significant that the Army's top leader has gone on record as recognizing the problems and taking them as his own, attributed many of them to deficiencies in the professionalism of the officer corps, and charted a course for reform and rebuilding. Any analysis that appears some year and a half after this all began and that takes no note of it whatever is hopelessly dated to begin with.

What is needed now is some explication of the reasons behind the now widely recognized failures of professionalism within the Army, which became painfully obvious during the era of Vietnam but surely did not originate solely in that troubled decade, and some actionable proposals for reform. *Self-Destruction* provides no such insights or prescriptions. The few vague suggestions offered by this author are notable primarily for being patently inadequate to the resolution of problems of the nature and magnitude he has asserted now exist. The author does not even attempt to explain why such widespread degradation of professional behavior occurred, and without an understanding of the underlying causes of what he deplores there is little hope that effective remedies can be devised.

Any reviewer of this work is forced to make at least some mention of the author's decision to publish under a pseudonym. One's first reaction is that the author chose a particularly inappropriate pen name in signing himself "Cincinnatus," inasmuch as the original Cincinnatus, a Roman statesman and general, has come to be viewed as symbolic of the citizen soldier who takes up arms when his country is in danger and returns to his civil pursuits when the conflict is resolved—in other words, the antithesis of the professional soldier who serves in peace and war alike. Because this author claims to have spent

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a lifetime moving through the ranks from private to "senior field-grade officer," it appears he has misunderstood the import of his chosen pseudonym.

Reading of the text, however, leaves one wondering whether the claimed military background of the author may not be overstated, even a hoax, for there are numerous blunders of terminology and the like that could lead experienced soldiers to question whether this author is really one of their company as claimed. The Army's Corps of Engineers, for example, is referred to as the "Corps of Engineering," while the Chaplain's Corps is called the "Chaplain Corps." The author reveals in a glossary entry that he does not understand the meaning of the term "cover," as used in the familiar phrase "cover and concealment," and he talks of camouflage suits of a "spotted-tiger" variety (a contradiction in terms to begin with). He advises his readers that a battalion S2 is responsible for advising "the commandant" on intelligence matters and, in a revelation that will surely come as a surprise to battalion executive officers everywhere, states that the battalion S3 "runs the battalion during the commander's absence." In a single sentence referring to the 173d Airborne [Brigade] the author first calls it a battalion, then cites one officer as its deputy brigade commander, and finally speaks of another officer as the unit's "division commander." The Americal Division he gets nearly right as the "American Division."

Perhaps most puzzling of all, the author quotes approvingly an assertion that appeared in an earlier work to the effect that in 1960 it took an average of thirty-three years and two months for an officer to be promoted through the ranks from second lieutenant to full colonel. Because, with the exception of general officers and a very few other special cases, Army officers are required to retire upon completion of 30 years'

service, the assertion appears ridiculous on the face of it; all those lieutenant colonels completing thirty years would retire, not be kept around for some 3 years and 2 months more to make colonel. The thought appears never to have crossed our author's mind.

None of this makes any particular substantive difference, but the cumulative effect is to cast doubt on the anonymous author's assertion of his credentials as an experienced professional officer. It is also not reassuring that, according to an account that appeared in *The New York Times*, the publisher claims never to have seen the author in person, but only to have "spoken to him many times," presumably by telephone.

Whatever its validity, *Self-Destruction* has been reviewed in a number of newspapers and general readership magazines, indicating that there is substantial interest in the topic of the Army as an institution and its present and prospective states of well-being. The field is still wide open for someone to provide an insightful and useful analysis that delves into the reasons for the many real problems, seeks to formulate some reforms that are genuinely responsive to these causal factors and feasible of implementation, and analyzes current Army initiatives in terms of their likely effect on the problem. The author of *Self-Destruction* credits himself with "a lively curiosity, mastery of certain research skills, twenty-two years of military service, many friends," and other attributes. On his own evidence he should have done a better job.

LEWIS SORLEY

Deane, Michael J. *Strategic Defense in Soviet Strategy*. Coral Gables, Fla.: AISI and Current Affairs Press, 1980. 119pp.

One of the Advanced International Studies Institute's "Monographs in International Affairs" series, this study by

Michael Deane examines the role of Soviet programs in strategic defense, and is intended to complement two earlier AISI monographs on Soviet military strategy, *The Role of Nuclear Forces in Current Soviet Strategy* by Leon Gouré, Foy Kohler and Mose Harvey (1974), and *War Survival in Soviet Strategy* by Leon Gouré (1976).

As do the two earlier AISI studies, Deane's monograph relies heavily on published Soviet sources in an attempt to present a Soviet perspective on nuclear strategy in general and on strategic defense in particular. These uniquely Soviet views, Deane asserts, differ markedly from traditional U.S. concepts that have moved away from "fighting" a nuclear war to "detering" nuclear war. The Soviets in fact, if one is to take at face value their many public pronouncements on the subject (as indeed the author clearly does), "appear to subscribe to the long time basic rule of war *fighting* which mandates superiority in terms of both offense and defense." (emphasis added) U.S. preoccupation with deterrence and concepts of unacceptable damage, mutual vulnerability, and in particular assured destruction, asserts Deane, result in a strategic posture void of civil defense and an antiballistic missile capability and is, in short, a military posture lacking in credibility. Citing Soviet military manuals, Deane attempts to show that Soviet doctrine, on the other hand, emphasizes the need to destroy the enemy's nuclear arsenal, smash important groupings of his troops, undermine his economy and to disorganize his state and military control. What's more, adds Deane, Soviet authorities clearly prefer that these attacks be carried out preemptively. Here he cites in particular Col. M.P. Skirdo in *The People, the Army, the Commander* (*Narod, armiya, polkovodets*). This reviewer drew no such conclusion from the cited remarks of Skirdo when read in context.

Deane's conclusion is that we are witnessing a growing U.S.-Soviet strategic asymmetry that if permitted to continue "virtually guarantees that in case of a nuclear war the U.S. will suffer defeat and probably annihilation as a functioning society while the USSR and its system will survive and with sufficient power intact to establish the world hegemony that its leadership has always considered its ultimate due." Surely one must look far and wide to find an equally bleak assessment of our future national security! To support his thesis, the author employs an analysis of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, contrasting Soviet and American views. In fact, more of the monograph is devoted to the ABM issue than to any other.

The solution to this problem of impending doom? According to the author, the United States should upgrade its offensive systems to ensure more effective penetration of Soviet defensive systems, and perhaps more germane to the book's basic thesis, should also "fully develop and deploy a comprehensive strategic defensive system, supplemented by a reasonably effective civil defense preparation," for as one regularly hears from AISI, the Russians are coming.

DALLACE L. MEEHAN, LTCOL, USAF
Air Command and Staff College

d'Encausse, Helene Carrere. *Decline of an Empire: The Soviet Socialist Republics in Revolt*. New York: Newsweek Books, 1979. 304pp.

This very dispassionate and timely book provides a starting point for those who must think beyond the first battles and on to the final campaigns that will probably seek to overthrow the predatory Soviet State—the U.S.S.R. Far too many people continue to think of the Soviet Union as being one vast, monolithic, integrated state impervious to outside influence. It is not, and this book highlights important aspects of the

conglomeration of almost 100 distinct nations and peoples making up the U.S.S.R. Often speaking diverse languages, this half of the Soviet controlled population (Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Kazakhs, Ukrainians, Belorussians, etc.) actively retain diverse aspirations and rising expectations. The motivation for this undying nationalistic spirit is rooted in the fundamental desire of these peoples to achieve some degree of independence and self determination or, in short, to live their own lives with minimal interference from a central authority (Moscow). The author analyzes aspects of the national consciousness of each major ethnic group in terms of language, economic situation, religion, culture, and heritage and tradition. Her information reinforces what such Russian dissidents as Andrei Sakharov and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and others have been saying during this past decade: that the fires of nationalism have yet to be extinguished and that the dream of independence still lingers on among a majority of the Soviet-dominated peoples (as well, perhaps, among the Warsaw Pact satellite nations).

The Bolsheviks with Lenin and Trotsky cleverly exploited this spirit through the use of lies and false propaganda to overthrow the czarist government and consolidate the October Revolution of 1917. Roughly a quarter-century later in 1941, invading German armies were initially greeted enthusiastically throughout the western and southwestern U.S.S.R. as liberators by a totally disillusioned peoples. Unfortunately for the German Army, Hitler's demonic mind and intoxication with military success caused him to abandon the then brilliant opportunity to use the highly motivated anti-Stalinist ethnic groups against the Soviet apparatus. Confronted with the false alternative of German domination, these same people later waged a particularly vicious and highly successful guerrilla campaign

against the Germans that proved to be a contributing factor to the latter's ultimate defeat in Russia.

Today this indomitable spirit continues to be a real vulnerability that the Soviet State has never been able to totally repress or hide despite deportations, genocide, and force of terror. Established here is the potential climate that the astute psychological campaigner and military strategist can exploit. Any military-political campaign against the U.S.S.R. can be greatly enhanced by exploiting the subtle, indirect approach that recognizes each nationality within the U.S.S.R. and fosters each nation's independence.

As the author correctly intimates, the motivation for initiating an *open* revolt will very likely only take place when the physical presence of a liberating force is firmly established and felt on territory previously controlled by the U.S.S.R. The psychological bomb of oppressed and disillusioned peoples, which the Berlin Wall so well serves as an appropriate symbol, is ready and waiting to blow the Soviet apparatus apart. This potential should not be underrated. Helene Carrere d'Encausse, Professor and Director of the U.S.S.R. Studies Section at the Institute of Political Sciences in Paris, has provided some very useful light by which a future victory may be seen.

SEWALL H. MENZEL
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army

Dismukes, Bradford and McConnell, James M., eds. *Soviet Naval Diplomacy*. New York: Pergamon Press, 1979. 426pp.

In 1980 the Soviets commissioned a new nuclear-powered battle cruiser and launched a huge cruise missile submarine and an even larger ballistic missile submarine. The Soviet Navy is developing and deploying a massive fleet which, by sheer mass of hardware, cries out for close examination. Unfortunately, with some notable exceptions such as Robert

Hettick's *Soviet Naval Strategy*, the great volume of published analysis on the Soviet Navy (*Voyenno-morskoy Flot*) has been distinctly hardware-oriented. The small remaining volume of doctrinal analysis has been directed to wartime operations. However, the Soviet Fleet has not seen actual combat since the end of the "Great Patriotic War" (1941-45), and the *Voyenno-morskoy Flot* of today is distinctly different from that of World War II years. Because this new fleet has never been used in wartime, its primary influence has been during peacetime; to the dismay of Western leaders, the Soviets are each day growing more and more adept at deriving maximum "peacetime" advantage from their fleet. Dismukes and McConnell's *Soviet Naval Diplomacy* is the first available study of the new phenomenon of Soviet gunboat diplomacy; as such, it may be the most important book to be published on the Soviet Navy in over 10 years.

The book is generally well-structured, leading off with an explanation of Soviet doctrine by McConnell, one of the few analysts devoted to the explication of every nuance of the Soviet naval psyche. However, his rather weighty, informed writing styles does not easily flow into the crisp informative style of Charles Petersen, who follows with a comprehensive look at Soviet naval operations and port visits. This difficulty in smoothly transitioning from chapter to chapter is shared by most edited collections of articles by different authors, but is accentuated in *Soviet Naval Doctrine* by the widely divergent writing styles of the contributors. Occasionally, as a result, one is left with the impression that some chapters were written as independent exercises and not as elements of a study on Soviet naval diplomacy.

Petersen's two chapters are succeeded by a series of examples of Soviet "coercive diplomacy" in the Third

World, then instances of direct superpower naval confrontations: the June 1967 war, the 1970 Jordanian crisis, the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, and the Yom Kippur war. The breadth of this book is illustrated by Dismukes' chapter on the Soviet intervention in Egypt during the 1969-70 War of Attrition with Israel. By no stretch of the imagination, an example of *naval* diplomacy, this was the only instance in which land-based Soviet forces were inserted into a warring country to accomplish specific, limited, diplomatic goals, and Dismukes integrates it nicely into the overall context of coercive diplomacy. By virtue of this and the succeeding chapters and appendixes that encompass media in addition to the maritime, the title of the book is somewhat misleading. "Soviet Diplomacy of Force" would perhaps be a more appropriate title, for this volume quite adeptly places the extraterritorial role of the entire Soviet military in the perspective of the peacetime competition and confrontation between the two superpowers.

From the evidence presented, McConnell attempts to structure some "rules of the game" for superpowers practicing naval diplomacy. The majority of his categories are perhaps too rigid and specific, but his concluding point emphasizing *status quo* as the key variable guiding the "rules" seems quite valid to this reader. Even those who may contest his findings must feel challenged and stimulated by his arguments.

Soviet Naval Diplomacy is not a dissertation; to judge it on that basis would be to ignore its essence. It is the portrayal of an evolving Soviet appreciation of the practicality and utility of a naval and military presence around the globe. Dismukes and McConnell have documented how the Soviets have grown to appreciate the effect that their fleet has on the perceptions of world leaders and the influence it can "peacefully" exert on world events. Their book should serve as a text, not for the naval

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operational commander, but for the American foreign policy decisionmaker, who once knew the value of the non-violent employment of naval power, but whose appreciation of that value seems to have passed to his Soviet counterpart.

FLOYD D. KENNEDY, JR.
Ketron, Inc.

Douglass, Joseph D., Jr. *Soviet Military Strategy in Europe*. New York: Pergamon Press, 1980. 237pp.

Jones, David R., ed. *Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual: Vol. 4 (1980)*. Gulf Breeze, Fla.: Academic International Press, 1980. 416pp.

This excellent brace of works should prove satisfying to both generalist and specialist readers for their overall coverage of contemporary Soviet military affairs. While the Douglass book eschews actual quantitative Soviet capabilities in favor of an extensive assessment of its current doctrinal perspectives on strategic and theater warfare, *SAFRA-4* more than compensates for this approach with detailed analyses of virtually every component and activity of the Soviet Armed Forces. Consequently, this literary blend of doctrinal and operational coverage combines to furnish an excellent set of reference data to assess Soviet military power over the years ahead.

Based almost entirely on Soviet military writings, especially recently declassified 1960-1970 era issues of the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff journal *Voyennaya Mysl'* (*Military Thought*), Douglass places his main focus on the specific nature and scope of the modern combat doctrine that underlies the sophistication of Soviet/Warsaw Pact force capabilities. Too often, he emphasizes, stated Soviet strategic objectives tend to exceed actual capabilities at any given time and there is a distinct tendency among Western analysts to confuse one with the other. Conversely,

Douglass adds, there is a time gap of about a decade between the time the Soviets first publicly discuss a given operational or technological concept and its full-scale implementation/development within the Soviet Defense Establishment. In that vein, nearly all of the theoretical matters discussed in the three editions (1962, 1963 and 1968) of Marshal V.D. Sokolovskiy's milestone work, *Voyennaya Strategiya* (*Military Strategy*) can be understood as fully integrated into the Soviet Armed Forces during the decade just past.

Following an eight-chapter organizational format, Douglass progressively develops his treatment of the main scope of Soviet military strategy and its effect on the vital European regime. Each chapter easily falls into place for readers and serves as a building block for that which follows. This is particularly evident in the smooth transition between the first three chapters, which afford a comprehensive grasp of modern Soviet military thought, and the next four, which examine more specific operational matters that affect Soviet theater strategy for potential conflict in the vital Central European region.

Discussing such issues as operational and organizational concepts for Soviet/Warsaw Pact ground and tactical air forces and theater command and control among a broad array of contemporary matters that the Soviet high command views as critical to successful combat operations in Europe, Chapters 4-7 represent the "payoff" for his analysis. Taking note of key asymmetries between NATO and Warsaw Pact force doctrines, particularly with regard to Western deterrence concepts *vis-à-vis* Warsaw Pact "war fighting" strategies, Douglass concludes that such qualitative imbalances might prove as fatal to the continued viability of the NATO Alliance as the Soviet/Pact preponderance in trained personnel and combat equipment. Amply supported by extensive source citations and useful

tabular data, this work should stand as a major reference in measuring Soviet doctrinal perceptions concerning potential conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

The 1980 edition of *SAFRA* follows its traditional coverage and offers detailed treatments of the Soviet military machine and related activities of major note during the year 1979. In that respect, *SAFRA-4* has particularly succeeded in solving a lingering problem of time-perishable data inasmuch as earlier volumes were generally 2-3 years behind in their annual surveys. High quality analysis by expert contributors, in contrast, never has been a *SAFRA* shortcoming and the 1980 edition is no exception in that regard. Obviously a much more quantitative reference than the Douglass work, the volume provides a solid statistical summary of current Soviet military power in Part I, and nearly all of the annual reviews of the various Soviet armed forces components and major military-related activities context in Part II include additional tabular and graphic data that provide authoritative estimates of 1979-80 strength level, organizational structures and key command personnel. Besides coverage of the military forces, annual reviews of recent developments in the Soviet defense industry (John McDonnell), space programs (William H. Schauer) and the Far East (Carl G. Jacobsen) help round out Part II. The special surveys in the following section include a solid essay on Soviet military aid to the Third World (Lee Dowdy), while Part IV, which treats Soviet military doctrine and theory, features Michael McCwire's particularly insightful contribution on the evolving strategic role of the Soviet Navy over recent years. In the final section John McDonnell's solid editorial comments accompany the verbatim reprint of the SALT II Agreements.

All told, these two volumes furnish a wealth of useful background data for

anyone seeking to gain or maintain a working familiarity with the modern Soviet Defense Establishment and its politicomilitary elite's perspectives of the U.S.S.R. as a global military power.

JOSEPH E. THACH, JR.
OASD (PA)

Gansler, Jacques S. *The Defense Industry*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1980. 321 pp.

Most of the debate about the United States' defense program has been concerned with how much should be spent and on what items. Thus, the demand side of the defense market has received much attention. Now that recent world events have produced a consensus on the need for improved military capabilities, it is time to address the supply side. Can U.S. industry develop and manufacture the needed hardware in an efficient, economical, and timely fashion? *The Defense Industry* will be very useful in understanding these issues.

Gansler has excellent credentials to write a study of the defense industry. He has held management positions in several major defense contractors and subcabinet posts in the Office of the Secretary of Defense in the areas of the development and procurement of defense materiel. His education includes degrees in engineering and in economics. This book appears to be an outgrowth of his dissertation for a Ph.D. degree in economics. His background is reflected in the extensive bibliography that covers both academic and government studies.

The tools of economic analysis are combined with detailed knowledge of the defense industry to examine the industry from both "economic and strategic perspectives." The overall assessment of the status of the defense industry in the post-Vietnam War era is not encouraging. Gansler concludes "that the industrial base of defense is

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becoming economically inefficient and unresponsive to a potential strategic emergency."

This state of affairs is correctable, and Gansler proposes a number of policy changes that he estimates would enable the Defense Department to purchase an additional \$3 billion of equipment without any increase in the budget.

Before arriving at these conclusions and policy proposals, there is discussion of the relationship of the defense industry to the U.S. economy and the industry's structural, behavioral, and performance characteristics. Various models and concepts of economics are used, but Gansler's greatest strength is his depth of institutional knowledge.

The author argues that a "free-market economy" does not exist in the buyer-seller relationship in the defense industry because of the single buyer and relatively few sellers. While it is true that the defense industry has these structural characteristics, Gansler seems to be using the term "free market" as identical to the market structure that economists call "perfect competition," a large number of buyers and sellers. Many nondefense industries have few sellers and high levels of concentration, but would still be characterized as "free markets," albeit imperfect ones. In fact the author, himself, makes the point that imperfect competition is still competition when he says, "Because of the unusual nature of oligopoly rivalry, two subcontractors is often a sufficient number for real competition."

The discussion of prime contractor-subcontractor relationships highlights the importance of subcontractors and parts suppliers to the nation's industrial mobilization capability and the developments at this level that have reduced production surge potential. DOD's tendency to focus on the prime contractors has caused it either to overlook or to give inadequate attention to the lower

tiers of the production process. Fortunately, this situation has been identified in other studies of the industrial mobilization base, but Gansler's analysis should give added impetus to the effort to take corrective actions. He provides a number of proposals that, while not completely original, would strengthen vertical production relationships and industrial preparedness planning.

Although the book frequently discusses the defense industry in general terms, it makes a major effort to point out that the industry has significant sectoral differences and to be effective, policies must be shaped to the conditions prevailing in particular sectors. The chapter on sectoral differences goes on to describe the aircraft and shipbuilding industries and proposes some corrective actions that could alleviate problems that affect each of these sectors, e.g., excess capacity in the aircraft industry and very high labor turnover in shipbuilding.

One of the post-Vietnam period developments that is of special concern to Gansler is the internationalization of the U.S. defense industry. Shrinking U.S. markets and high R&D costs have made foreign markets increasingly important to U.S. arms manufacturers. But unlike previous military sales programs when the United States was selling older equipment, the foreign military sales programs of the 1970s have involved advanced technologies. These sales are often in competition with contemporaneous procurement of the same equipment by U.S. forces and entail long-term training and logistical support commitments. At the same time, U.S. defense production is becoming more dependent on components that are produced abroad. The author believes that these multinational considerations have tended to be either ignored or treated on an *ad hoc*, short-term basis in a simplistic fashion. While he notes that questions are easier to provide than answers, there is a need to

address the issues of international interdependence in the defense industry.

A brief chapter discusses how other nations approach their defense industries. This reviewer found this material to be intriguing and a subject worth developing at greater length. One nation cited approvingly is Sweden. Although Sweden has a small defense market, it has developed "one of the best defense industries in the world." Sweden discourages foreign military sales and tries to be self-sufficient. However, it provides stability to its industry through macroeconomic planning with multiyear budgeting and planned phase-in and phaseout of major weapons systems. Similar measures are advocated for the United States.

Gansler also sees a need for closer integration of military and civilian production within U.S. firms and plants as is done in Sweden and in the Soviet Union. Among the benefits of such arrangements are greater surge capability and more employment stability by using redundant defense workers to make civilian products. However, this reviewer would caution that even if the technology, administrative, and marketing requirements of the military and civilian goods make coproduction feasible, there is a risk that the demand for both types of product may peak at the same time. The United States experienced this simultaneous peaking problem in the production of jet engines for both civilian and military aircraft in the mid-1960s and the competition of both naval and merchant vessels for the same production resources in certain shipyards in the early 1970s.

The Defense Industry is a readable work with substantial content. It deserves wide readership by all persons, whether military or civilian, who are involved in the process of military research, development, and acquisition. The analyses and solutions proposed should raise the level of discussion of

policies necessary to achieve greater military power.

JOHN A. WALGREEN
Wheaton College

Horsfield, John. *The Art of Leadership in War: The Royal Navy from the Age of Nelson to the End of World War II*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980. 240pp.

Few would deny that leadership is a critical element in military and naval affairs. Its importance is rarely underrated, yet much of the literature on the subject lacks quality. Over the years, writers have found it difficult to produce much more than pious studies of heroes, mosaics of quasi-psychology and precepts of doubtful validity. When faced with a book on leadership readers too often begin to doze. Admiral Rickover has even suggested to a sister journal that it call a 10-year hiatus to publishing such "sophomoric drivel."

John Horsfield's book is an attempt to break out of the old mold and to consider the problem of leadership anew, within a historical perspective. The work has its limitations, but it is an important contribution that points out a sound approach to the subject.

Horsfield has strictly limited his scope by concentrating on "admirals in action." Taking a very selective list of British admirals from a 200-year span of history, he asked a number of important questions. Among other things, he looks at his subjects' relations with others, both junior and senior, attitudes to change, and personal background. After gleaming information on these points from a variety of published and manuscript sources, he goes on to see if there are any common and continuing elements in style and nature of leadership that transcend the various historical periods.

He approaches his task with stress on the sound idea that a man must be seen in relation to his own time, or as he puts

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it, "the leader must be seen in relation to the rest of the pack." With this in mind, he looks at the most famous names that we remember today: St Vincent, Nelson, Collingwood, Jellicoe, Keyes, Beatty and Cunningham. The author backs away from compiling any list of principles or qualities of leadership. "In the end," he writes, "the most talented form of leadership, just like the highest form of creative art, can only be encouraged not instructed." While saying that, he also points out what he believes are the main aspects of British naval leadership, stressing their variable, particular and universal qualities.

The variable factors were found in the changing background of political and social life as well as the changing knowledge and assumptions about leaders and education, training, health and materiel. The particular features of British leadership were found in the tradition of the offensive which was consistently maintained since the 18th century and the general practice of broad control that the Admiralty maintained, with strong backing for the particular leader at the scene of action. The universal factors were those that seemed to contribute to successful leadership in many different situations over a long period. Horsfield found three, in particular: past battle experience of individuals, the harmonious working together of the key leaders, and the individual breadth of vision that each leader had developed.

In reaching these conclusions, Horsfield provides a useful antidote to some of the worst features of writing on leadership and he makes important points for anyone who ventures into the field. His work reminds us that there is much fruitful work that can be done in this area if the proper, scholarly approach is taken. While he points the way in this regard, there are lacunae that should be pointed out. No book can serve all purposes well.

Horsfield has done very well to point

out how the 19th century emphasized the Nelson legend incorrectly and how it led to some mistaken notions of leadership. Paradoxically, the author has been unwilling to break entirely free from the tradition and he continues to see Nelson as the best yardstick to measure leadership. Nelson deserves high praise, but Horsfield would have made a more valuable contribution if he had carried on with his initial critique of Nelson rather than falling back into the traditional rut. Nelson still needs to be viewed in terms of dispassionate perspective.

The choice of leaders discussed is a narrow one and the emphasis has been placed on the few names that are most widely remembered today. That emphasis may tell us more about the way history has been written in the past than it does about the problem of leadership in a 200-year period. It suggests a circular argument that is affected by past perceptions. The choice of "fighting admirals" is part of this. Even 200 years ago, there were admirals who performed largely administrative strategic and technical functions. A number of questions along this line must be raised. Certainly, leadership has a broader scope and its effectiveness does not necessarily imply fame, fortune or high rank. What of the others who lead? Is there no difference between junior and senior officers or between leadership in different functions?

Moreover, if one is truly to understand the nature of leadership one must examine carefully the reasons why some have failed. It serves no purpose to mock at failure as Horsfield has done by labeling a portrait of Admiral Sir George Tryon as "the face that launched a disaster." We need to look more carefully at such men to understand why their leadership did not succeed. Captain Bligh serves as valuable a purpose as Nelson in the study of leadership.

Horsfield has fallen into the trap that he sought to avoid. Despite some wise

words along the way, the end result is the impression that there is only one type of naval leader. Horsfield fails to see his subject in the broad light that the naval profession is a varied one that calls for a variety of individuals who, through the nature of their individual personalities, are best suited to provide leadership in particular ways and at particular levels that are most suitable to them. Horsfield is not alone in taking this view, but the point was made effectively by Mahan as long ago as 1901 and it still needs to be followed up by modern scholarship.

There is no doubt that leadership involves esoteric concepts and that an abstract understanding of it most surely will include concepts that even great leaders will not have consciously defined. That is no basis to fault a successful and natural leader, but it suggests that the subject is not entirely the province of those who claim the privilege of age, rank and experience. There is no simple formula to successful leadership: it needs thought and insight. John Horsfield has made some sound points that are useful for the historian; there is much more to be done. Rather than call a hiatus to writing on this subject, let us continue to exchange ideas and to follow new signposts as we examine leadership with greater care and with deeper understanding.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF
Naval War College

Hough, Jerry F. *Soviet Leadership in Transition*. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1980. 175pp.

The men who are on the verge of ascending to the leadership of the Soviet Union differ radically from the present helmsmen of the Kremlin. They represent an entirely different generational group with distinctly different political values, educational backgrounds, and wartime experiences. In *Soviet Leadership in Transition*, Jerry Hough

analyzes these generational differences within key Soviet hierarchies such as the central and provincial political structures, the foreign policy establishment, and perhaps most interesting to many of us, the military.

While making little attempt to predict the rise of individual personalities, Hough does present a well-developed assessment of those factors that will most likely play important roles in the forthcoming succession. His examination of generational profiles should be extremely valuable for anyone interested in the Soviet Union for, as Professor Hough correctly points out, "the Soviet system in large part remains an abstraction to us" and their leaders, the men and women who run the country, "remain a great faceless unknown to us." One is reminded of course of Churchill's famous characterization of the Soviet Union as "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma." In fact, asserts Hough, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union seems to have a sound understanding of the political system of the other. This of course complicates relations between the two great powers. Hough's analysis, therefore, has important implications for the future of Soviet-American relations and he concludes by suggesting how the United States might try to improve those relations as the Soviet leadership changes.

Highly critical of recent U.S. policies toward the Soviet Union, Professor Hough argues that future U.S. policymakers, if they are to be effective, must think in rational cost-benefit terms with clear ideas of the priority of national interests—in other words, he advocates the carrot and stick approach in dealing with the new leadership. More specifically the United States should offer incentives for the Soviet Union to pursue "a policy of economic reform, liberalization, and reduction of military expenditures without national humiliation." While traditionalists may view

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this as a highly whimsical piece of wishful thinking, Hough points out that the generational change about to occur within the Kremlin is likely to result in a more innovative foreign policy whose architects are likely to be more self-confident and more willing to engage in quiet diplomacy as long as they are treated with dignity as mature, responsible equals in international affairs.

Nicely complementing the author's much larger book, *How the Soviet Union is Governed* (a revision of Merle Fainsod's classic, *How Russia is Ruled*), *Soviet Leadership in Transition* is a well-researched and engrossing study of the Soviet political system.

DALLACE L. MEEHAN, Lt Col, USAF
Air Command and Staff College

Kaplan, Lawrence S. *A Community of Interests: NATO and the Military Assistance Program, 1948-1951*. Washington: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Historical Office, 1980. 251pp.

The Military Assistance Program (officially the Military Defense Assistance Program—MDAP), was approved in the fall of 1949 and contained provisions authorizing the President to extend \$1 billion in military aid to America's allies in Western Europe. This was, in the context of the early cold war, a substantial commitment on the part of the United States, and the Truman administration's proposals generated considerable controversy within the United States and between the United States and its European allies. Moreover, the implementation of the arms aid program played an important role in shaping the structure of the Atlantic Alliance.

However, the Military Assistance Program has the misfortune (from a historiographic point of view) of being sandwiched between more revolutionary or enduring projects such as the European Recovery Program, the

North Atlantic Treaty, and the assignment of American ground forces to NATO. As a result, the Military Assistance Program's influence on the Atlantic Alliance has never been the subject of careful study and analysis. Fortunately, Lawrence Kaplan's *A Community of Interests: NATO and the Military Assistance Program, 1948-1951* fills this important gap for students and scholars of the early postwar period. In addition, by detailing the Pentagon's part in the formulation and implementation of the MAP, the author highlights the significant political and diplomatic role played by the fledgling Defense Department in shaping U.S. foreign policy during the early years of the cold war.

The author views the early history of the Military Assistance Program as a troubled one: its purpose was blurred by including aid for the NATO allies in a larger, globally oriented, assistance package; its relationship to other postwar programs was not adequately coordinated; and the preparation of the MDAP was subject to bureaucratic politics, interdepartmental rivalries and heavy congressional criticism. Moreover, because the military aid program was a part of an evolving alliance relationship where the roles of the European and American partners remained unclear, its development was further hampered by transatlantic strains and stresses. The United States, eager to avoid entangling overseas commitments, hoped that arms aid from the United States would spur the Europeans to greater defense efforts, help restore the military balance on the continent, and ultimately reduce the need for a long-term American commitment. On the other hand, the Europeans—beset with the problems of economic recovery, political instability, overseas commitments, the Soviet menace and latent fears of Germany—hoped that U.S. assistance would be a substitute for increased defense spending on their

part and would involve the United States more closely in European security.

As a result of these problems the Military Assistance Program had an awkward, stumbling beginning. Indeed, it was not until after the shock of the Korean war in June 1950 that U.S. military aid to Europe began to have a salutary effect on the improvement of European defense capabilities. The Mutual Security Act of 1951 created the Mutual Security Agency and a Director of Mutual Security within the executive branch. These moves consolidated economic assistance and arms aid into a single package, led to greater coordination within the U.S. Government, provided a clearer definition of purpose, and spurred greater efforts by the Europeans. However, the aftermath of Korea also witnessed an American troop commitment to NATO, the opening of the German rearmament question, and proposals for a European Defense Community. These other events overshadowed the work of the Mutual Security Agency and have been the subject of most scholarly works on the period.

Yet despite its relative obscurity and shaky beginnings, the Military Assistance Program played an important role in shaping the Atlantic Alliance and aiding European rearmament. It must be remembered that when the North Atlantic Treaty was approved by the U.S. Senate in July 1949 it was a paper pledge that contained no content or form. In fact, the MAP was the first tangible evidence of the United States' commitment to European security and implementation of the arms aid program was closely linked to the development of NATO's organizational structure and the first defense strategy for the North Atlantic area. The effect of military assistance on European economic recovery was also significant: American arms aid allowed the Europeans to undertake a considerable

rearmament effort without undermining their economic recovery. In fact, Kaplan argues with some force that the Military Assistance Program had a more lasting effect on the strengthening of the European economies than did the Marshall Plan.

A Community of Interests is the third of a multivolume history of the Defense Department. Professor Kaplan's analysis of DOD's rivalry with the State Department for influence within the Government, of the military's fears that aid for Europe would sap America's own armaments, and the diplomatic role played by the Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs) provides fresh insight into the development of the Pentagon as an important force in foreign policy decisionmaking.

But if its narrow focus is one of the major strengths of this book, it is also its chief flaw. The author's treatment of senatorial objections to the original draft of the military aid bill is a case in point. While Kaplan correctly maintains that senators led by Arthur Vandenberg, John Foster Dulles, and Walter George opposed the Truman administration's arms aid plan on constitutional and fiscal grounds, their opposition actually went much deeper and embraced substantive strategic issues. As Vandenberg explained in the Foreign Relations Executive Session hearings on the MDAP, his chief objection was to the Administration's belief that France would be the bulwark of the continental defense system and that the French should receive the lion's share of U.S. assistance. Vandenberg, Dulles, and George countered the executive branch's view by pressing for the inclusion of Western Germany into NATO's rearmament program and the reinvigoration of German industrial might as the key element in European defense. The MDAP's requirement that overall assistance for Europe be limited to \$1 billion and that 80 percent of the monies appropriated be withheld by the

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President until the alliance had developed an integrated defense plan is traceable to these three senators and their convictions about Germany. The subsequent influence of the German question on NATO's development (discussed in detail by the author) indicates the centrality of this issue and it is unfortunate that Vandenberg's, Dulles', and George's role in raising it in connection with the Military Assistance Program could not have been highlighted. Although it may be a relatively minor point, it does indicate the limits of an otherwise detailed and well-documented work.

Kaplan's own work in the Pentagon's historical office during the early 1950s is one of the strengths of this book. He brings to this study firsthand knowledge of the issues and personalities that shaped postwar American foreign policy and his conclusions about the long-term effect of decisions made during the 1948-1951 period of American diplomacy are particularly interesting. *A Community of Interests* is a well-written book that makes an important contribution to the scholarship of a critical phase in U.S. diplomatic and military history.

TIMOTHY P. IRELAND
Tufts University

MacDonald, Charles G. *Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Law of the Sea: Political Interaction and Legal Development in the Persian Gulf*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980. 226pp.

Professor MacDonald of Florida International University describes, in not inconsiderable detail, the contributions of two developing countries to the development of the law of the sea. The work is explicitly "policy-oriented"; law is viewed, not as something unto itself, but as an ordering mechanism in a political context. Accordingly, the first chapter (about one-fifth of the volume) is

devoted to such nonlegal topics as the geography, history, recent politics, and economics of the Persian Gulf. Thereafter, MacDonald integrates legal positions, negotiations and agreements into a surrounding policy environment.

Such a study of the law of the sea contributions of developing countries is especially useful. The very international nature of international law and relations calls for an appreciation of the positions and perspectives of other countries; too much, our own studies look at problems from the United States' point of view. By setting his sights, more or less, from two Persian Gulf states, the author helps us understand how the law of the sea looks to others. He examines interests in the Persian Gulf (transportation, exploitation of offshore resources, coastal state security, preservation of the marine environment, the maintenance of order), claims to authority over and agreements concerning territory and resources in the area, and the positions of Iran and Saudi Arabia in the First (1958), Second (1960) and Third (1973-

) Law of the Sea Conferences. He concludes that the "most significant contribution of the Persian Gulf practice of Iran and Saudi Arabia has been their imaginative and pragmatic application of 'equitable principles' in the delimitation of continental shelf boundaries." This is a way, he argues, that the practice of these two states could contribute to the effective solution of offshore disputes in other regions.

Sometimes, of course, strengths are also weaknesses. The profusion of contextual data (e.g., statistics on crude petroleum production, itemized expenditures under Iran's Fifth Development Plan) while helping us understand the rationale for legal positions, also makes for a hotchpotch and occasionally for difficult reading. Furthermore, the description of positions of developing countries, while especially useful for our better understanding of the world, is

risky if revolutions occur. Here, the research has not been adequately updated for the Iranian Revolution (and perhaps could not be); thus, throughout, whenever Iran is described, we wonder how much is still relevant and how much is history (though of course still interesting). There must also be some doubt concerning the subject-matter orientation of the book. Is it about the policies of Iran and Saudi Arabia or about policies in the Persian Gulf? If the former, then it might have been better to examine just one country intensively. If the latter, then it might have been better to study more Persian Gulf states, e.g., Iraq, whose battle with Iran over the Shatt al Arab has taken on such importance. In any case, as structured, the book swings in focus from Iran to Saudi Arabia to the Persian Gulf generally, adding to the feeling, alluded to above, of sometimes having too much coming at one from different directions.

None of this diminishes Professor MacDonald's real contribution. His is a considerable effort, drawing upon material from many sources, political, historical, and economic, as well as legal. The book is a useful storehouse for anyone concerned with the roles of Iran and Saudi Arabia, specifically, or of developing countries, generally, in the development of the law of the sea.

MARK W. JANIS

University of Connecticut School of Law

Smith, Peter C. *Hit First, Hit Hard: The Story of HMS 'Renown' 1916-48*. London: William Kimber, 1979. 335pp.

This book traces the distinguished career of the British battle cruiser HMS *Renown*. "She hunted the *Graf Spee*," the jacket informs us, "and chased the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* off Norway. As Admiral Somerville's famous flagship she was at the bombardment of Genoa, in the hunt for the *Bismarck* and in the Malta convoy operations, and

served with the Home Fleet in guarding Arctic convoys and the North African landings." That survey suggests a much more stirring account than the facts and Smith's narrative actually provide. Not only did *Renown* actually engage only once with German capital ships, and then indecisively, but, overall, instead of one decisive moment following another, the dominant impression on reading the book is of *Renown* responding to false alarm after false alarm, serving on endless patrol, exercising her crew, taking part in fruitless searches, serving as an escort ship, and transporting British world figures at high speed from place to place. This is not to say that *Renown* wasn't the great ship she was reputed to be, but rather that Smith's narrative tends to emphasize the mundane. Only in the Mediterranean period is there nearly continuous action, and there are many more gripping accounts of the events involving Somerville and Force H than the one to be found in this book. Such a criticism is not really damning, however, for one could argue that by writing such a narrative, Smith has offered a valuable corrective to sea-novel portraits of war in which the tedious and routine is summarized in two short chapters and the rest of the book is filled with drama. Of course naval service isn't often like that—fortunately so, for too much of such drama for capital ships is usually fatal, as it was for the two other British battle cruisers of World War II—*Hood* and *Repulse*.

The battle cruiser type was of necessity far more vulnerable than the standard battleship. Designed to be "armed with the same main armaments as the latest battleships, but with the speed, or better, of the latest cruisers," *Renown* had three twin 15-inch guns and a top speed of 31 knots—but she had to be lightly armored to compensate for these advantages. The author gives us a good account of the original concept of this kind of vessel, as well as an

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exhaustive account of the various modifications that *Renown*, in particular, went through. Unfortunately he does not stretch his narrative to give us an in-depth evaluation of the overall success of the type. Neither does he account for the fact that throughout her 30-year career *Renown* was a notoriously happy and high-spirited ship; one might have wished to know what part tradition and leadership played in *Renown's* high morale, or whether it was merely a product of chance. But while the author works into his book much personal recollection of captains and crew, on evaluation of the human affairs of the ship he is weak. In fact, overall, the book is a thoroughgoing chronology rather than a perceptive history. But chronology has its uses, and for those with a special interest in the ship or in the period *Hit First, Hit Hard* is recommended.

ROBERT SHENK
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Solomon, Richard H., ed. *Asian Security in the 1980s: Problems and Policies for a Time of Transition*. Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1980. 324pp.

This book contains several revised papers that were originally presented at a RAND Corporation conference on East Asian security held in 1979. Among them are several highly impressive ones that analyze in great detail the security relationships that exist in this region and how they are affected both by external, great power influences and by internal influences. For almost all countries in East Asia, the foreign policy of the Soviet Union is presenting an increased threat. Crucial to how these countries face this threat will be the policies of the United States. The Soviet Union, though, is not the only challenge to security in this region: both Vietnam and North Korea pose a threat to stability as does internal turmoil within noncommunist countries.

The essays in this volume are extremely good in discussing how the U.S.S.R., Vietnam, and North Korea may threaten stability and what the foreign policy options of the United States, People's Republic of China, and other East Asian nations might be. These essays are less insightful, however, in discussing the threat of domestic turmoil within certain noncommunist countries. The authors criticize the Carter administration for its human rights policies, which they see as potentially causing a danger of destabilization within certain U.S. allies that would increase their vulnerability to external attack as well as decrease their ability to counter it. While such a question is a valid one, the authors, unfortunately, did not examine the question of to what extent does continued dictatorship in South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and elsewhere affect the ability of these nations to defend themselves. Can dictatorships that refuse to leave office despite their unpopularity expect to command the same loyalty from their citizens as democratically elected governments? Indeed, is not the very existence of these dictatorships a cause of domestic unrest that the authors wish to see avoided? These questions are vital to the security of East Asian nations and thus deserve serious consideration.

In addition to security issues, several essays in this book examined economic ones affecting East Asia. Particularly interesting was that by Dr. Soedjatmoko that noted that there is a link between security and economics. Unfortunately, many Americans tend to regard these nations that it wishes to be allies for security purposes as enemies when it comes to trade. Paul Langer, for instance, seemed to feel that the solution of trade disputes between the United States and Japan that might block a more harmonious security relationship was for "further Japanese concessions and compromises in the economic

sphere." The Japanese might be expected to hold a different opinion on this matter. Considering the increasing economic competitiveness of Japan and declining competitiveness in the United States it might be salutary for both nations if the United States were more amenable to making certain compromises and concessions itself that would allow the United States greater access to the fruits of Japanese productivity and provide the United States greater incentive to increase its own.

The two criticisms raised here, though, are not ones that apply only to this book, but to American thinking about East Asia generally. In other respects, this book is a fine one, particularly with regard to possible American options in dealing with the different foreign policy problems that will be faced in East Asia during the 1980s.

MARK N. KATZ
The Brookings Institution

Thorne, Christopher. *Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War Against Japan, 1941-1945*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978. 772pp.

Christopher Thorne, a professor of international relations at the University of Sussex and a leading British scholar of Western diplomacy in Asia, has written an account of allied policy in the Pacific phase of World War II that is likely to remain unsurpassed for many years. *Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War Against Japan, 1941-1945* is an awesome book, encyclopedic in research and scope. Indicative of its qualities, the book received the prestigious Bancroft Prize in American History in 1978.

According to Thorne, *Allies of a Kind* "is in many respects a sequel" to his earlier book, *The Limits of Foreign Policy*, that explores the response of the Western Powers to Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931. Thorne offers no

simple explanation for the failure of collective security in the ensuing debacle of Western diplomacy during 1931-1933. One essential point does emerge from his analysis of the intricately shifting patterns of action surrounding the Manchurian Incident: none of the principal actors in this drama possessed an adequate conception of the domestic and international forces that shaped and reshaped the choice of policies available to statesmen. In this respect, collective security could be said to have failed because of the inability of the Western Powers to comprehend one another's points of view, not to mention the views of the Asian states that were also involved.

With *Allies of a Kind*, Thorne continues his dual inquiry into Western diplomacy in Asia and the conditions for collective action among states. In this new work he is concerned with two questions. First, he seeks to answer how the Anglo-American alliance endured successfully, given the profound differences that separated London and Washington over the conduct and resolution of the Pacific phase of World War II. Second, he attempts to explain what the reconquest of Asia by the European colonial powers, in league with American arms, meant for Asian peoples. Many Asians had welcomed the collapse of colonialism in 1941-1942, even if they had opposed Japanese occupation.

The result is not a book meant for the casual student of international relations. As in his previous work, Thorne employs an immense amount of archival and secondary material, including both published and unpublished documents, official correspondence, personal papers, autobiographies, and biographies. To these he adds interviews and his own correspondence with a large number of participants. Where *Allies of a Kind* suffers by comparison with *The Limits of Foreign Policy* is in the lack of a tightly written narrative. Thorne

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apparently felt that he could leave nothing out. Instead, he attempts a reconstruction in minute detail of the interplay of diverse historical and contemporary trends—intellectual, cultural, political, economic, and strategic—that composed the milieu in which statesmen and military leaders confronted events and made their decisions between 1941 and 1945. Commendably, Thorne believes one must first understand the complexity and confusion amid which policy is made before judging its results. However, in this case the elaborate detail he provides often leaves the reader as befuddled as some of the hapless military and civil servants whose actions and misdeeds Thorne so eloquently pillories. Thorne could have relieved some of the confusion by supplying graphic summaries of the more important bureaucracies and commands. More maps would also assist the reader in understanding the changing military situation.

Whatever its flaws, *Allies of a Kind* will endure as a compelling account of a successful military and political alliance that achieved its objectives in the face of frequent antagonisms and recriminations. It is easy to forget that Britain and America fought the war in Asia and the Pacific in a political environment fundamentally different from the conflict in Europe. As Walter Lippmann characterized the American view in a letter to John Maynard Keynes in early 1942: "There is a strong feeling . . . that the war in Europe is a war of liberation and the war in Asia is for the defense of archaic privilege."

Ultimately, of course, bonds of shared cultural and political values withstood the often irrational animosities and the very real differences of national interest that could have split the Anglo-American alliance. As Thorne demonstrates so tellingly, the divisiveness that might have threatened to poison relations between the two countries was quickly neutralized by good sense and

wisdom on both sides, combined with the dramatic reversal of roles within the alliance. After 1943 Britain was so obviously on the decline, America so obviously on the ascendant as a major world power, that those Britons remaining unreconstructed imperialists could only wage a rear guard action. Between 1943 and 1945 both British and American officials became increasingly aware that American views, not British desires, would predominate in shaping the postwar order in Asia.

Here the other side of Thorne's inquiry comes into play. Even before the end of the Pacific phase of World War II, he argues, the forces of Asian nationalism unleashed by the defeat of white European colonialism became a major factor in determining the postwar character of Asia. Neither the British nor the Americans, says Thorne, were intellectually or psychologically prepared to deal with the phenomena of Asian nationalism. In this respect, Thorne's argument and his approach closely resemble that of Akira Iriye and other recent scholars of Western diplomacy in Asia. What Thorne has shown in this portion of his analysis is the degree to which images and stereotypes often dominated policymaking, affecting not only American policymakers and their European counterparts, but also Asian nationalist leaders. To cite but one example, he argues that racism within the United States was one source of the conceptual inadequacies of Roosevelt, State Department diplomats, and military representatives as they drew up policies for postwar Asia.

Thorne's effort to get at the psychological and cultural constituents of foreign policy, what almost could be termed the anthropology of grand strategy and diplomacy, is both his most controversial and his most important contribution to World War II scholarship. Were Thorne to elaborate some of these themes and issues more explicitly than he has in the past, such a work

would be well worth reading. Unfortunately, he is unlikely to do so, in that he has frequently expressed his distaste for discussions of methodology. Nevertheless, because *Allies of a Kind* raises so many important questions, and because its conclusions are likely to provoke so many controversies, other scholars will, no doubt, rush to fill the gap.

MICHAEL K. DOYLE

Tillman, Barrett. *MiG Master: The Story of the F-8 Crusader*. Annapolis: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Co., 1980. 224pp.

To many, a military airplane is only an expensive collection of metal, nuts and bolts. To others, it may bring to mind poignant memories of past experiences. To all, it should represent a valuable tool for deterrence and, if necessary, military action. Books about air weapon systems can approach the subject from each viewpoint but the latter serves the military professional best. When the story of an aircraft's development and performance is juxtaposed with its actual use, the result is greater than the individual parts. This story of the F-8 *Crusader* fills that bill.

Barrett Tillman, author of several books on World War II aircraft including the F4U *Corsair*, ventures into the jet age with this volume. Tracing the story from the early days of jet warfare in Korea, the author performs an excellent job in unfolding the *Crusader's* development into an operational fleet fighter. Where many aviation writers lose the reader on technical details, Tillman fleshes out the rest phase with numerous personal interviews and insights.

The early years of the F-8 witnessed its unsuccessful bid for the first level supersonic flight by the achievement of several world speed records. Marine Maj. John H. Glenn achieved a transcontinental speed record during Project

Bullet in the late sixties that still stands. The peacetime years of the fighter also saw its use in low-level reconnaissance missions over Cuba during the missile crisis. The author errs here by his scope of the photo recon missions. While Tillman presents Operation *Blue Moon* as solely an F-8 effort, the Air Force flew at least an equal number of low-level sorties across the island.

The F-8's true grit became apparent during the Vietnam air war. Three chapters cover the period in superb detail including a discussion of the airplane's armaments. The first narrative chapter, "The Vietnam Years," is much more than just an accounting of F-8 participation. It is a well-written coverage and analysis of the entire air conflict over North Vietnam. While Tillman's asides against national leaders of the period are occasionally volatile, this is one of the better postwar treatments of the 1965-1973 campaign. The followup chapter, "MiG Encounters," pits the *Crusader* against its arch enemy, the North Vietnamese MiG. Numerous actual air battles are capably described and placed in the context of the war around them. The F-8 was seemingly designed just for Southeast Asia and it served its purpose well.

This book is rounded out with a look at the international applications of the F-8 by France and the Philippines plus several excellent appendices. Those provided include aircraft specifications, Vietnam cruises by F-8 squadrons, MiG kills and an excellent glossary of aircraft and Vietnam era terminology. The book is also well illustrated and documented.

While *MiG Master* is, at face value, the mere story of an airplane, it is much more than that as it unravels the story of those who flew and fought in it. This work is one of the best thus far in the volumes written about the air war over Vietnam.

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