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Soviet Naval Diplomacy

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conglomeration of almost 100 distinct nations and peoples making up the U.S.S.R. Often speaking diverse languages, this half of the Soviet controlled population (Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Kazakhs, Ukrainians, Belorussians, etc.) actively retain diverse aspirations and rising expectations. The motivation for this undying nationalistic spirit is rooted in the fundamental desire of these peoples to achieve some degree of independence and self determination or, in short, to live their own lives with minimal interference from a central authority (Moscow). The author analyzes aspects of the national consciousness of each major ethnic group in terms of language, economic situation, religion, culture, and heritage and tradition. Her information reinforces what such Russian dissidents as Andrei Sakharov and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and others have been saying during this past decade: that the fires of nationalism have yet to be extinguished and that the dream of independence still lingers on among a majority of the Soviet-dominated peoples (as well, perhaps, among the Warsaw Pact satellite nations).

The Bolsheviks with Lenin and Trotsky cleverly exploited this spirit through the use of lies and false propaganda to overthrow the czarist government and consolidate the October Revolution of 1917. Roughly a quarter-century later in 1941, invading German armies were initially greeted enthusiastically throughout the western and southwestern U.S.S.R. as liberators by a totally disillusioned peoples. Unfortunately for the German Army, Hitler's demonic mind and intoxication with military success caused him to abandon the then brilliant opportunity to use the highly motivated anti-Stalinist ethnic groups against the Soviet apparatus. Confronted with the false alternative of German domination, these same people later waged a particularly vicious and highly successful guerrilla campaign

against the Germans that proved to be a contributing factor to the latter's ultimate defeat in Russia.

Today this indomitable spirit continues to be a real vulnerability that the Soviet State has never been able to totally repress or hide despite deportations, genocide, and force of terror. Established here is the potential climate that the astute psychological campaigner and military strategist can exploit. Any military-political campaign against the U.S.S.R. can be greatly enhanced by exploiting the subtle, indirect approach that recognizes each nationality within the U.S.S.R. and fosters each nation's independence.

As the author correctly intimates, the motivation for initiating an *open* revolt will very likely only take place when the physical presence of a liberating force is firmly established and felt on territory previously controlled by the U.S.S.R. The psychological bomb of oppressed and disillusioned peoples, which the Berlin Wall so well serves as an appropriate symbol, is ready and waiting to blow the Soviet apparatus apart. This potential should not be underrated. Helene Carrere d'Encausse, Professor and Director of the U.S.S.R. Studies Section at the Institute of Political Sciences in Paris, has provided some very useful light by which a future victory may be seen.

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Dismukes, Bradford and McConnell, James M., eds. *Soviet Naval Diplomacy*. New York: Pergamon Press, 1979. 426pp.

In 1980 the Soviets commissioned a new nuclear-powered battle cruiser and launched a huge cruise missile submarine and an even larger ballistic missile submarine. The Soviet Navy is developing and deploying a massive fleet which, by sheer mass of hardware, cries out for close examination. Unfortunately, with some notable exceptions such as Robert

Hettick's *Soviet Naval Strategy*, the great volume of published analysis on the Soviet Navy (*Voyenno-morskoy Flot*) has been distinctly hardware-oriented. The small remaining volume of doctrinal analysis has been directed to wartime operations. However, the Soviet Fleet has not seen actual combat since the end of the "Great Patriotic War" (1941-45), and the *Voyenno-morskoy Flot* of today is distinctly different from that of World War II years. Because this new fleet has never been used in wartime, its primary influence has been during peacetime; to the dismay of Western leaders, the Soviets are each day growing more and more adept at deriving maximum "peacetime" advantage from their fleet. Dismukes and McConnell's *Soviet Naval Diplomacy* is the first available study of the new phenomenon of Soviet gunboat diplomacy; as such, it may be the most important book to be published on the Soviet Navy in over 10 years.

The book is generally well-structured, leading off with an explanation of Soviet doctrine by McConnell, one of the few analysts devoted to the explication of every nuance of the Soviet naval psyche. However, his rather weighty, informed writing styles does not easily flow into the crisp informative style of Charles Petersen, who follows with a comprehensive look at Soviet naval operations and port visits. This difficulty in smoothly transitioning from chapter to chapter is shared by most edited collections of articles by different authors, but is accentuated in *Soviet Naval Doctrine* by the widely divergent writing styles of the contributors. Occasionally, as a result, one is left with the impression that some chapters were written as independent exercises and not as elements of a study on Soviet naval diplomacy.

Petersen's two chapters are succeeded by a series of examples of Soviet "coercive diplomacy" in the Third

World, then instances of direct superpower naval confrontations: the June 1967 war, the 1970 Jordanian crisis, the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, and the Yom Kippur war. The breadth of this book is illustrated by Dismukes' chapter on the Soviet intervention in Egypt during the 1969-70 War of Attrition with Israel. By no stretch of the imagination, an example of *naval* diplomacy, this was the only instance in which land-based Soviet forces were inserted into a warring country to accomplish specific, limited, diplomatic goals, and Dismukes integrates it nicely into the overall context of coercive diplomacy. By virtue of this and the succeeding chapters and appendixes that encompass media in addition to the maritime, the title of the book is somewhat misleading. "Soviet Diplomacy of Force" would perhaps be a more appropriate title, for this volume quite adeptly places the extraterritorial role of the entire Soviet military in the perspective of the peacetime competition and confrontation between the two superpowers.

From the evidence presented, McConnell attempts to structure some "rules of the game" for superpowers practicing naval diplomacy. The majority of his categories are perhaps too rigid and specific, but his concluding point emphasizing *status quo* as the key variable guiding the "rules" seems quite valid to this reader. Even those who may contest his findings must feel challenged and stimulated by his arguments.

Soviet Naval Diplomacy is not a dissertation; to judge it on that basis would be to ignore its essence. It is the portrayal of an evolving Soviet appreciation of the practicality and utility of a naval and military presence around the globe. Dismukes and McConnell have documented how the Soviets have grown to appreciate the effect that their fleet has on the perceptions of world leaders and the influence it can "peacefully" exert on world events. Their book should serve as a text, not for the naval

operational commander, but for the American foreign policy decisionmaker, who once knew the value of the non-violent employment of naval power, but whose appreciation of that value seems to have passed to his Soviet counterpart.

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Douglass, Joseph D., Jr. *Soviet Military Strategy in Europe*. New York: Pergamon Press, 1980. 237pp.

Jones, David R., ed. *Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual: Vol. 4 (1980)*. Gulf Breeze, Fla.: Academic International Press, 1980. 416pp.

This excellent brace of works should prove satisfying to both generalist and specialist readers for their overall coverage of contemporary Soviet military affairs. While the Douglass book eschews actual quantitative Soviet capabilities in favor of an extensive assessment of its current doctrinal perspectives on strategic and theater warfare, *SAFRA-4* more than compensates for this approach with detailed analyses of virtually every component and activity of the Soviet Armed Forces. Consequently, this literary blend of doctrinal and operational coverage combines to furnish an excellent set of reference data to assess Soviet military power over the years ahead.

Based almost entirely on Soviet military writings, especially recently declassified 1960-1970 era issues of the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff journal *Voyennaya Mysl'* (*Military Thought*), Douglass places his main focus on the specific nature and scope of the modern combat doctrine that underlies the sophistication of Soviet/Warsaw Pact force capabilities. Too often, he emphasizes, stated Soviet strategic objectives tend to exceed actual capabilities at any given time and there is a distinct tendency among Western analysts to confuse one with the other. Conversely,

Douglass adds, there is a time gap of about a decade between the time the Soviets first publicly discuss a given operational or technological concept and its full-scale implementation/development within the Soviet Defense Establishment. In that vein, nearly all of the theoretical matters discussed in the three editions (1962, 1963 and 1968) of Marshal V.D. Sokolovskiy's milestone work, *Voyennaya Strategiya* (*Military Strategy*) can be understood as fully integrated into the Soviet Armed Forces during the decade just past.

Following an eight-chapter organizational format, Douglass progressively develops his treatment of the main scope of Soviet military strategy and its effect on the vital European regime. Each chapter easily falls into place for readers and serves as a building block for that which follows. This is particularly evident in the smooth transition between the first three chapters, which afford a comprehensive grasp of modern Soviet military thought, and the next four, which examine more specific operational matters that affect Soviet theater strategy for potential conflict in the vital Central European region.

Discussing such issues as operational and organizational concepts for Soviet/Warsaw Pact ground and tactical air forces and theater command and control among a broad array of contemporary matters that the Soviet high command views as critical to successful combat operations in Europe, Chapters 4-7 represent the "payoff" for his analysis. Taking note of key asymmetries between NATO and Warsaw Pact force doctrines, particularly with regard to Western deterrence concepts *vis-à-vis* Warsaw Pact "war fighting" strategies, Douglass concludes that such qualitative imbalances might prove as fatal to the continued viability of the NATO Alliance as the Soviet/Pact preponderance in trained personnel and combat equipment. Amply supported by extensive source citations and useful