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## Soviet Military Strategy in Europe

Joseph E. Thach Jr.

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operational commander, but for the American foreign policy decisionmaker, who once knew the value of the non-violent employment of naval power, but whose appreciation of that value seems to have passed to his Soviet counterpart.

FLOYD D. KENNEDY, JR.  
Ketron, Inc.

Douglass, Joseph D., Jr. *Soviet Military Strategy in Europe*. New York: Pergamon Press, 1980. 237pp.

Jones, David R., ed. *Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual: Vol. 4 (1980)*. Gulf Breeze, Fla.: Academic International Press, 1980. 416pp.

This excellent brace of works should prove satisfying to both generalist and specialist readers for their overall coverage of contemporary Soviet military affairs. While the Douglass book eschews actual quantitative Soviet capabilities in favor of an extensive assessment of its current doctrinal perspectives on strategic and theater warfare, *SAFRA-4* more than compensates for this approach with detailed analyses of virtually every component and activity of the Soviet Armed Forces. Consequently, this literary blend of doctrinal and operational coverage combines to furnish an excellent set of reference data to assess Soviet military power over the years ahead.

Based almost entirely on Soviet military writings, especially recently declassified 1960-1970 era issues of the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff journal *Voyennaya Mysl'* (*Military Thought*), Douglass places his main focus on the specific nature and scope of the modern combat doctrine that underlies the sophistication of Soviet/Warsaw Pact force capabilities. Too often, he emphasizes, stated Soviet strategic objectives tend to exceed actual capabilities at any given time and there is a distinct tendency among Western analysts to confuse one with the other. Conversely,

Douglass adds, there is a time gap of about a decade between the time the Soviets first publicly discuss a given operational or technological concept and its full-scale implementation/development within the Soviet Defense Establishment. In that vein, nearly all of the theoretical matters discussed in the three editions (1962, 1963 and 1968) of Marshal V.D. Sokolovskiy's milestone work, *Voyennaya Strategiya* (*Military Strategy*) can be understood as fully integrated into the Soviet Armed Forces during the decade just past.

Following an eight-chapter organizational format, Douglass progressively develops his treatment of the main scope of Soviet military strategy and its effect on the vital European regime. Each chapter easily falls into place for readers and serves as a building block for that which follows. This is particularly evident in the smooth transition between the first three chapters, which afford a comprehensive grasp of modern Soviet military thought, and the next four, which examine more specific operational matters that affect Soviet theater strategy for potential conflict in the vital Central European region.

Discussing such issues as operational and organizational concepts for Soviet/Warsaw Pact ground and tactical air forces and theater command and control among a broad array of contemporary matters that the Soviet high command views as critical to successful combat operations in Europe, Chapters 4-7 represent the "payoff" for his analysis. Taking note of key asymmetries between NATO and Warsaw Pact force doctrines, particularly with regard to Western deterrence concepts *vis-à-vis* Warsaw Pact "war fighting" strategies, Douglass concludes that such qualitative imbalances might prove as fatal to the continued viability of the NATO Alliance as the Soviet/Pact preponderance in trained personnel and combat equipment. Amply supported by extensive source citations and useful

tabular data, this work should stand as a major reference in measuring Soviet doctrinal perceptions concerning potential conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

The 1980 edition of *SAFRA* follows its traditional coverage and offers detailed treatments of the Soviet military machine and related activities of major note during the year 1979. In that respect, *SAFRA-4* has particularly succeeded in solving a lingering problem of time-perishable data inasmuch as earlier volumes were generally 2-3 years behind in their annual surveys. High quality analysis by expert contributors, in contrast, never has been a *SAFRA* shortcoming and the 1980 edition is no exception in that regard. Obviously a much more quantitative reference than the Douglass work, the volume provides a solid statistical summary of current Soviet military power in Part I, and nearly all of the annual reviews of the various Soviet armed forces components and major military-related activities context in Part II include additional tabular and graphic data that provide authoritative estimates of 1979-80 strength level, organizational structures and key command personnel. Besides coverage of the military forces, annual reviews of recent developments in the Soviet defense industry (John McDonnell), space programs (William H. Schauer) and the Far East (Carl G. Jacobsen) help round out Part II. The special surveys in the following section include a solid essay on Soviet military aid to the Third World (Lee Dowdy), while Part IV, which treats Soviet military doctrine and theory, features Michael McCwire's particularly insightful contribution on the evolving strategic role of the Soviet Navy over recent years. In the final section John McDonnell's solid editorial comments accompany the verbatim reprint of the SALT II Agreements.

All told, these two volumes furnish a wealth of useful background data for

anyone seeking to gain or maintain a working familiarity with the modern Soviet Defense Establishment and its politicomilitary elite's perspectives of the U.S.S.R. as a global military power.

JOSEPH E. THACH, JR.  
OASD (PA)

Gansler, Jacques S. *The Defense Industry*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1980. 321 pp.

Most of the debate about the United States' defense program has been concerned with how much should be spent and on what items. Thus, the demand side of the defense market has received much attention. Now that recent world events have produced a consensus on the need for improved military capabilities, it is time to address the supply side. Can U.S. industry develop and manufacture the needed hardware in an efficient, economical, and timely fashion? *The Defense Industry* will be very useful in understanding these issues.

Gansler has excellent credentials to write a study of the defense industry. He has held management positions in several major defense contractors and subcabinet posts in the Office of the Secretary of Defense in the areas of the development and procurement of defense materiel. His education includes degrees in engineering and in economics. This book appears to be an outgrowth of his dissertation for a Ph.D. degree in economics. His background is reflected in the extensive bibliography that covers both academic and government studies.

The tools of economic analysis are combined with detailed knowledge of the defense industry to examine the industry from both "economic and strategic perspectives." The overall assessment of the status of the defense industry in the post-Vietnam War era is not encouraging. Gansler concludes "that the industrial base of defense is