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The Art of Leadership in War

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address the issues of international interdependence in the defense industry.

A brief chapter discusses how other nations approach their defense industries. This reviewer found this material to be intriguing and a subject worth developing at greater length. One nation cited approvingly is Sweden. Although Sweden has a small defense market, it has developed "one of the best defense industries in the world." Sweden discourages foreign military sales and tries to be self-sufficient. However, it provides stability to its industry through macroeconomic planning with multiyear budgeting and planned phase-in and phaseout of major weapons systems. Similar measures are advocated for the United States.

Gansler also sees a need for closer integration of military and civilian production within U.S. firms and plants as is done in Sweden and in the Soviet Union. Among the benefits of such arrangements are greater surge capability and more employment stability by using redundant defense workers to make civilian products. However, this reviewer would caution that even if the technology, administrative, and marketing requirements of the military and civilian goods make coproduction feasible, there is a risk that the demand for both types of product may peak at the same time. The United States experienced this simultaneous peaking problem in the production of jet engines for both civilian and military aircraft in the mid-1960s and the competition of both naval and merchant vessels for the same production resources in certain shipyards in the early 1970s.

The Defense Industry is a readable work with substantial content. It deserves wide readership by all persons, whether military or civilian, who are involved in the process of military research, development, and acquisition. The analyses and solutions proposed should raise the level of discussion of

policies necessary to achieve greater military power.

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Horsfield, John. *The Art of Leadership in War: The Royal Navy from the Age of Nelson to the End of World War II*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980. 240pp.

Few would deny that leadership is a critical element in military and naval affairs. Its importance is rarely underrated, yet much of the literature on the subject lacks quality. Over the years, writers have found it difficult to produce much more than pious studies of heroes, mosaics of quasi-psychology and precepts of doubtful validity. When faced with a book on leadership readers too often begin to doze. Admiral Rickover has even suggested to a sister journal that it call a 10-year hiatus to publishing such "sophomoric drivel."

John Horsfield's book is an attempt to break out of the old mold and to consider the problem of leadership anew, within a historical perspective. The work has its limitations, but it is an important contribution that points out a sound approach to the subject.

Horsfield has strictly limited his scope by concentrating on "admirals in action." Taking a very selective list of British admirals from a 200-year span of history, he asked a number of important questions. Among other things, he looks at his subjects' relations with others, both junior and senior, attitudes to change, and personal background. After gleaming information on these points from a variety of published and manuscript sources, he goes on to see if there are any common and continuing elements in style and nature of leadership that transcend the various historical periods.

He approaches his task with stress on the sound idea that a man must be seen in relation to his own time, or as he puts

it, "the leader must be seen in relation to the rest of the pack." With this in mind, he looks at the most famous names that we remember today: St Vincent, Nelson, Collingwood, Jellicoe, Keyes, Beatty and Cunningham. The author backs away from compiling any list of principles or qualities of leadership. "In the end," he writes, "the most talented form of leadership, just like the highest form of creative art, can only be encouraged not instructed." While saying that, he also points out what he believes are the main aspects of British naval leadership, stressing their variable, particular and universal qualities.

The variable factors were found in the changing background of political and social life as well as the changing knowledge and assumptions about leaders and education, training, health and materiel. The particular features of British leadership were found in the tradition of the offensive which was consistently maintained since the 18th century and the general practice of broad control that the Admiralty maintained, with strong backing for the particular leader at the scene of action. The universal factors were those that seemed to contribute to successful leadership in many different situations over a long period. Horsfield found three, in particular: past battle experience of individuals, the harmonious working together of the key leaders, and the individual breadth of vision that each leader had developed.

In reaching these conclusions, Horsfield provides a useful antidote to some of the worst features of writing on leadership and he makes important points for anyone who ventures into the field. His work reminds us that there is much fruitful work that can be done in this area if the proper, scholarly approach is taken. While he points the way in this regard, there are lacunae that should be pointed out. No book can serve all purposes well.

Horsfield has done very well to point

out how the 19th century emphasized the Nelson legend incorrectly and how it led to some mistaken notions of leadership. Paradoxically, the author has been unwilling to break entirely free from the tradition and he continues to see Nelson as the best yardstick to measure leadership. Nelson deserves high praise, but Horsfield would have made a more valuable contribution if he had carried on with his initial critique of Nelson rather than falling back into the traditional rut. Nelson still needs to be viewed in terms of dispassionate perspective.

The choice of leaders discussed is a narrow one and the emphasis has been placed on the few names that are most widely remembered today. That emphasis may tell us more about the way history has been written in the past than it does about the problem of leadership in a 200-year period. It suggests a circular argument that is affected by past perceptions. The choice of "fighting admirals" is part of this. Even 200 years ago, there were admirals who performed largely administrative strategic and technical functions. A number of questions along this line must be raised. Certainly, leadership has a broader scope and its effectiveness does not necessarily imply fame, fortune or high rank. What of the others who lead? Is there no difference between junior and senior officers or between leadership in different functions?

Moreover, if one is truly to understand the nature of leadership one must examine carefully the reasons why some have failed. It serves no purpose to mock at failure as Horsfield has done by labeling a portrait of Admiral Sir George Tryon as "the face that launched a disaster." We need to look more carefully at such men to understand why their leadership did not succeed. Captain Bligh serves as valuable a purpose as Nelson in the study of leadership.

Horsfield has fallen into the trap that he sought to avoid. Despite some wise

words along the way, the end result is the impression that there is only one type of naval leader. Horsfield fails to see his subject in the broad light that the naval profession is a varied one that calls for a variety of individuals who, through the nature of their individual personalities, are best suited to provide leadership in particular ways and at particular levels that are most suitable to them. Horsfield is not alone in taking this view, but the point was made effectively by Mahan as long ago as 1901 and it still needs to be followed up by modern scholarship.

There is no doubt that leadership involves esoteric concepts and that an abstract understanding of it most surely will include concepts that even great leaders will not have consciously defined. That is no basis to fault a successful and natural leader, but it suggests that the subject is not entirely the province of those who claim the privilege of age, rank and experience. There is no simple formula to successful leadership: it needs thought and insight. John Horsfield has made some sound points that are useful for the historian; there is much more to be done. Rather than call a hiatus to writing on this subject, let us continue to exchange ideas and to follow new signposts as we examine leadership with greater care and with deeper understanding.

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Hough, Jerry F. *Soviet Leadership in Transition*. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1980. 175pp.

The men who are on the verge of ascending to the leadership of the Soviet Union differ radically from the present helmsmen of the Kremlin. They represent an entirely different generational group with distinctly different political values, educational backgrounds, and wartime experiences. In *Soviet Leadership in Transition*, Jerry Hough

analyzes these generational differences within key Soviet hierarchies such as the central and provincial political structures, the foreign policy establishment, and perhaps most interesting to many of us, the military.

While making little attempt to predict the rise of individual personalities, Hough does present a well-developed assessment of those factors that will most likely play important roles in the forthcoming succession. His examination of generational profiles should be extremely valuable for anyone interested in the Soviet Union for, as Professor Hough correctly points out, "the Soviet system in large part remains an abstraction to us" and their leaders, the men and women who run the country, "remain a great faceless unknown to us." One is reminded of course of Churchill's famous characterization of the Soviet Union as "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma." In fact, asserts Hough, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union seems to have a sound understanding of the political system of the other. This of course complicates relations between the two great powers. Hough's analysis, therefore, has important implications for the future of Soviet-American relations and he concludes by suggesting how the United States might try to improve those relations as the Soviet leadership changes.

Highly critical of recent U.S. policies toward the Soviet Union, Professor Hough argues that future U.S. policymakers, if they are to be effective, must think in rational cost-benefit terms with clear ideas of the priority of national interests—in other words, he advocates the carrot and stick approach in dealing with the new leadership. More specifically the United States should offer incentives for the Soviet Union to pursue "a policy of economic reform, liberalization, and reduction of military expenditures without national humiliation." While traditionalists may view