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Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Law of the Sea

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President until the alliance had developed an integrated defense plan is traceable to these three senators and their convictions about Germany. The subsequent influence of the German question on NATO's development (discussed in detail by the author) indicates the centrality of this issue and it is unfortunate that Vandenberg's, Dulles', and George's role in raising it in connection with the Military Assistance Program could not have been highlighted. Although it may be a relatively minor point, it does indicate the limits of an otherwise detailed and well-documented work.

Kaplan's own work in the Pentagon's historical office during the early 1950s is one of the strengths of this book. He brings to this study firsthand knowledge of the issues and personalities that shaped postwar American foreign policy and his conclusions about the long-term effect of decisions made during the 1948-1951 period of American diplomacy are particularly interesting. *A Community of Interests* is a well-written book that makes an important contribution to the scholarship of a critical phase in U.S. diplomatic and military history.

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MacDonald, Charles G. *Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Law of the Sea: Political Interaction and Legal Development in the Persian Gulf*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980. 226pp.

Professor MacDonald of Florida International University describes, in not inconsiderable detail, the contributions of two developing countries to the development of the law of the sea. The work is explicitly "policy-oriented"; law is viewed, not as something unto itself, but as an ordering mechanism in a political context. Accordingly, the first chapter (about one-fifth of the volume) is

devoted to such nonlegal topics as the geography, history, recent politics, and economics of the Persian Gulf. Thereafter, MacDonald integrates legal positions, negotiations and agreements into a surrounding policy environment.

Such a study of the law of the sea contributions of developing countries is especially useful. The very international nature of international law and relations calls for an appreciation of the positions and perspectives of other countries; too much, our own studies look at problems from the United States' point of view. By setting his sights, more or less, from two Persian Gulf states, the author helps us understand how the law of the sea looks to others. He examines interests in the Persian Gulf (transportation, exploitation of offshore resources, coastal state security, preservation of the marine environment, the maintenance of order), claims to authority over and agreements concerning territory and resources in the area, and the positions of Iran and Saudi Arabia in the First (1958), Second (1960) and Third (1973-

) Law of the Sea Conferences. He concludes that the "most significant contribution of the Persian Gulf practice of Iran and Saudi Arabia has been their imaginative and pragmatic application of 'equitable principles' in the delimitation of continental shelf boundaries." This is a way, he argues, that the practice of these two states could contribute to the effective solution of offshore disputes in other regions.

Sometimes, of course, strengths are also weaknesses. The profusion of contextual data (e.g., statistics on crude petroleum production, itemized expenditures under Iran's Fifth Development Plan) while helping us understand the rationale for legal positions, also makes for a hotchpotch and occasionally for difficult reading. Furthermore, the description of positions of developing countries, while especially useful for our better understanding of the world, is

risky if revolutions occur. Here, the research has not been adequately updated for the Iranian Revolution (and perhaps could not be); thus, throughout, whenever Iran is described, we wonder how much is still relevant and how much is history (though of course still interesting). There must also be some doubt concerning the subject-matter orientation of the book. Is it about the policies of Iran and Saudi Arabia or about policies in the Persian Gulf? If the former, then it might have been better to examine just one country intensively. If the latter, then it might have been better to study more Persian Gulf states, e.g., Iraq, whose battle with Iran over the Shatt al Arab has taken on such importance. In any case, as structured, the book swings in focus from Iran to Saudi Arabia to the Persian Gulf generally, adding to the feeling, alluded to above, of sometimes having too much coming at one from different directions.

None of this diminishes Professor MacDonald's real contribution. His is a considerable effort, drawing upon material from many sources, political, historical, and economic, as well as legal. The book is a useful storehouse for anyone concerned with the roles of Iran and Saudi Arabia, specifically, or of developing countries, generally, in the development of the law of the sea.

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Smith, Peter C. *Hit First, Hit Hard: The Story of HMS 'Renown' 1916-48*. London: William Kimber, 1979. 335pp.

This book traces the distinguished career of the British battle cruiser HMS *Renown*. "She hunted the *Graf Spee*," the jacket informs us, "and chased the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* off Norway. As Admiral Somerville's famous flagship she was at the bombardment of Genoa, in the hunt for the *Bismarck* and in the Malta convoy operations, and

served with the Home Fleet in guarding Arctic convoys and the North African landings." That survey suggests a much more stirring account than the facts and Smith's narrative actually provide. Not only did *Renown* actually engage only once with German capital ships, and then indecisively, but, overall, instead of one decisive moment following another, the dominant impression on reading the book is of *Renown* responding to false alarm after false alarm, serving on endless patrol, exercising her crew, taking part in fruitless searches, serving as an escort ship, and transporting British world figures at high speed from place to place. This is not to say that *Renown* wasn't the great ship she was reputed to be, but rather that Smith's narrative tends to emphasize the mundane. Only in the Mediterranean period is there nearly continuous action, and there are many more gripping accounts of the events involving Somerville and Force H than the one to be found in this book. Such a criticism is not really damning, however, for one could argue that by writing such a narrative, Smith has offered a valuable corrective to sea-novel portraits of war in which the tedious and routine is summarized in two short chapters and the rest of the book is filled with drama. Of course naval service isn't often like that—fortunately so, for too much of such drama for capital ships is usually fatal, as it was for the two other British battle cruisers of World War II—*Hood* and *Repulse*.

The battle cruiser type was of necessity far more vulnerable than the standard battleship. Designed to be "armed with the same main armaments as the latest battleships, but with the speed, or better, of the latest cruisers," *Renown* had three twin 15-inch guns and a top speed of 31 knots—but she had to be lightly armored to compensate for these advantages. The author gives us a good account of the original concept of this kind of vessel, as well as an