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## Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War College Against Japan, 1941-45

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sphere." The Japanese might be expected to hold a different opinion on this matter. Considering the increasing economic competitiveness of Japan and declining competitiveness in the United States it might be salutary for both nations if the United States were more amenable to making certain compromises and concessions itself that would allow the United States greater access to the fruits of Japanese productivity and provide the United States greater incentive to increase its own.

The two criticisms raised here, though, are not ones that apply only to this book, but to American thinking about East Asia generally. In other respects, this book is a fine one, particularly with regard to possible American options in dealing with the different foreign policy problems that will be faced in East Asia during the 1980s.

MARK N. KATZ  
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Thorne, Christopher. *Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War Against Japan, 1941-1945*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978. 772pp.

Christopher Thorne, a professor of international relations at the University of Sussex and a leading British scholar of Western diplomacy in Asia, has written an account of allied policy in the Pacific phase of World War II that is likely to remain unsurpassed for many years. *Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War Against Japan, 1941-1945* is an awesome book, encyclopedic in research and scope. Indicative of its qualities, the book received the prestigious Bancroft Prize in American History in 1978.

According to Thorne, *Allies of a Kind* "is in many respects a sequel" to his earlier book, *The Limits of Foreign Policy*, that explores the response of the Western Powers to Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931. Thorne offers no

simple explanation for the failure of collective security in the ensuing debacle of Western diplomacy during 1931-1933. One essential point does emerge from his analysis of the intricately shifting patterns of action surrounding the Manchurian Incident: none of the principal actors in this drama possessed an adequate conception of the domestic and international forces that shaped and reshaped the choice of policies available to statesmen. In this respect, collective security could be said to have failed because of the inability of the Western Powers to comprehend one another's points of view, not to mention the views of the Asian states that were also involved.

With *Allies of a Kind*, Thorne continues his dual inquiry into Western diplomacy in Asia and the conditions for collective action among states. In this new work he is concerned with two questions. First, he seeks to answer how the Anglo-American alliance endured successfully, given the profound differences that separated London and Washington over the conduct and resolution of the Pacific phase of World War II. Second, he attempts to explain what the reconquest of Asia by the European colonial powers, in league with American arms, meant for Asian peoples. Many Asians had welcomed the collapse of colonialism in 1941-1942, even if they had opposed Japanese occupation.

The result is not a book meant for the casual student of international relations. As in his previous work, Thorne employs an immense amount of archival and secondary material, including both published and unpublished documents, official correspondence, personal papers, autobiographies, and biographies. To these he adds interviews and his own correspondence with a large number of participants. Where *Allies of a Kind* suffers by comparison with *The Limits of Foreign Policy* is in the lack of a tightly written narrative. Thorne

apparently felt that he could leave nothing out. Instead, he attempts a reconstruction in minute detail of the interplay of diverse historical and contemporary trends—intellectual, cultural, political, economic, and strategic—that composed the milieu in which statesmen and military leaders confronted events and made their decisions between 1941 and 1945. Commendably, Thorne believes one must first understand the complexity and confusion amid which policy is made before judging its results. However, in this case the elaborate detail he provides often leaves the reader as befuddled as some of the hapless military and civil servants whose actions and misdeeds Thorne so eloquently pillories. Thorne could have relieved some of the confusion by supplying graphic summaries of the more important bureaucracies and commands. More maps would also assist the reader in understanding the changing military situation.

Whatever its flaws, *Allies of a Kind* will endure as a compelling account of a successful military and political alliance that achieved its objectives in the face of frequent antagonisms and recriminations. It is easy to forget that Britain and America fought the war in Asia and the Pacific in a political environment fundamentally different from the conflict in Europe. As Walter Lippmann characterized the American view in a letter to John Maynard Keynes in early 1942: "There is a strong feeling . . . that the war in Europe is a war of liberation and the war in Asia is for the defense of archaic privilege."

Ultimately, of course, bonds of shared cultural and political values withstood the often irrational animosities and the very real differences of national interest that could have split the Anglo-American alliance. As Thorne demonstrates so tellingly, the divisiveness that might have threatened to poison relations between the two countries was quickly neutralized by good sense and

wisdom on both sides, combined with the dramatic reversal of roles within the alliance. After 1943 Britain was so obviously on the decline, America so obviously on the ascendant as a major world power, that those Britons remaining unreconstructed imperialists could only wage a rear guard action. Between 1943 and 1945 both British and American officials became increasingly aware that American views, not British desires, would predominate in shaping the postwar order in Asia.

Here the other side of Thorne's inquiry comes into play. Even before the end of the Pacific phase of World War II, he argues, the forces of Asian nationalism unleashed by the defeat of white European colonialism became a major factor in determining the postwar character of Asia. Neither the British nor the Americans, says Thorne, were intellectually or psychologically prepared to deal with the phenomena of Asian nationalism. In this respect, Thorne's argument and his approach closely resemble that of Akira Iriye and other recent scholars of Western diplomacy in Asia. What Thorne has shown in this portion of his analysis is the degree to which images and stereotypes often dominated policymaking, affecting not only American policymakers and their European counterparts, but also Asian nationalist leaders. To cite but one example, he argues that racism within the United States was one source of the conceptual inadequacies of Roosevelt, State Department diplomats, and military representatives as they drew up policies for postwar Asia.

Thorne's effort to get at the psychological and cultural constituents of foreign policy, what almost could be termed the anthropology of grand strategy and diplomacy, is both his most controversial and his most important contribution to World War II scholarship. Were Thorne to elaborate some of these themes and issues more explicitly than he has in the past, such a work

would be well worth reading. Unfortunately, he is unlikely to do so, in that he has frequently expressed his distaste for discussions of methodology. Nevertheless, because *Allies of a Kind* raises so many important questions, and because its conclusions are likely to provoke so many controversies, other scholars will, no doubt, rush to fill the gap.

MICHAEL K. DOYLE

Tillman, Barrett. *MiG Master: The Story of the F-8 Crusader*. Annapolis: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Co., 1980. 224pp.

To many, a military airplane is only an expensive collection of metal, nuts and bolts. To others, it may bring to mind poignant memories of past experiences. To all, it should represent a valuable tool for deterrence and, if necessary, military action. Books about air weapon systems can approach the subject from each viewpoint but the latter serves the military professional best. When the story of an aircraft's development and performance is juxtaposed with its actual use, the result is greater than the individual parts. This story of the F-8 *Crusader* fills that bill.

Barrett Tillman, author of several books on World War II aircraft including the F4U *Corsair*, ventures into the jet age with this volume. Tracing the story from the early days of jet warfare in Korea, the author performs an excellent job in unfolding the *Crusader's* development into an operational fleet fighter. Where many aviation writers lose the reader on technical details, Tillman fleshes out the rest phase with numerous personal interviews and insights.

The early years of the F-8 witnessed its unsuccessful bid for the first level supersonic flight by the achievement of several world speed records. Marine Maj. John H. Glenn achieved a transcontinental speed record during Project

*Bullet* in the late sixties that still stands. The peacetime years of the fighter also saw its use in low-level reconnaissance missions over Cuba during the missile crisis. The author errs here by his scope of the photo recon missions. While Tillman presents Operation *Blue Moon* as solely an F-8 effort, the Air Force flew at least an equal number of low-level sorties across the island.

The F-8's true grit became apparent during the Vietnam air war. Three chapters cover the period in superb detail including a discussion of the airplane's armaments. The first narrative chapter, "The Vietnam Years," is much more than just an accounting of F-8 participation. It is a well-written coverage and analysis of the entire air conflict over North Vietnam. While Tillman's asides against national leaders of the period are occasionally volatile, this is one of the better postwar treatments of the 1965-1973 campaign. The followup chapter, "MiG Encounters," pits the *Crusader* against its arch enemy, the North Vietnamese MiG. Numerous actual air battles are capably described and placed in the context of the war around them. The F-8 was seemingly designed just for Southeast Asia and it served its purpose well.

This book is rounded out with a look at the international applications of the F-8 by France and the Philippines plus several excellent appendices. Those provided include aircraft specifications, Vietnam cruises by F-8 squadrons, MiG kills and an excellent glossary of aircraft and Vietnam era terminology. The book is also well illustrated and documented.

While *MiG Master* is, at face value, the mere story of an airplane, it is much more than that as it unravels the story of those who flew and fought in it. This work is one of the best thus far in the volumes written about the air war over Vietnam.

DON RIGHTMYER  
Captain, U.S. Air Force