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Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

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118 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

this key individual in American cold war diplomacy. As De Santis portrays him, Kennan is a kind of tragic hero—a prophet without honor prior to 1946, afterwards hailed as the intellectual savior of American foreign policy. Ironically, Kennan now says that even as he achieved personal recognition, he saw his concept of containment of Soviet power misappropriated and misapplied. As De Santis has told the story, such a fate was virtually inevitable.

MICHAEL K. DOYLE

- Ireland, Timothy P. *Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981. 245pp.

The foundation of post-World War II American foreign policy was constructed between the end of World War II and the start of the Korean War. During that short span, the United States adopted the containment policy and devised instruments to put it into effect: economic assistance in the form of the Truman Doctrine and the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan) and a military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty, with the countries of Western Europe. These policy initiatives both marked a radical change in the nature of American foreign policy and created a policy framework that has endured for over three decades.

The intensity and durability of the cold war have skewed our perspectives on the motives of American policy-makers in the years following World War II. This is particularly the case with NATO, conventionally viewed as an American and European response to the Soviet military threat to Western Europe. Timothy Ireland's thoughtful work, *Creating the Entangling Alliance*, reminds us that there were other reasons for forming NATO and for the direction that that organization has taken. Soviet-American tensions were,

of course, an important consideration in the American view. For our European partners, however, the French in particular, the problem was the threat posed by an economically strong and possibly unified Germany. The dilemma facing American officials, therefore, was "to restore the power of Western Germany in order to create a new balance of power in Europe without also creating an imbalance of power in Western Europe." Initially, American officials saw a European coalition as a means of balancing Soviet power and thereby limiting American involvement in European affairs. With the decision of the Truman administration in 1950 to form an integrated military headquarters and to station American troops in Western Europe, American policy had moved full circle. The United States had become permanently "entangled" in European politics.

In tracing developments leading to the formation of NATO, Ireland gives roughly equal attention to the two main dimensions of the policy process: (1) the discussions between the Department of State and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee over the general nature of American involvement in Europe; and (2) the negotiations between the United States and the major countries of Western Europe. The result is an excellent case study, which illustrates the complexity and potential of parient diplomacy, and a forceful reminder that issues other than the Soviet threat were—and still are—important in NATO organization and policy.

The book has two shortcomings. First, President Truman's role in the policy process is not examined. Truman is mentioned frequently, but only as a background figure. It is difficult to believe that the President played such an insignificant part in a policy issue of this importance. (Ireland did not examine Truman's papers or cite his *Memoirs*.) Second, the analysis would

PROFESSIONAL READING 119

have been easier to follow had a copy of the North Atlantic Treaty (or at least the controversial articles, #3, #5, and #9) been included as an appendix. These deficiencies notwithstanding, *Creating the Entangling Alliance* is a useful and constructive book on the formation of the key security organization of the post-World War II period.

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Keeton, George W. and Schwarzenberger, Georg, eds. *The Year Book of World Affairs, 1981*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981. 288pp.

The purpose of this series of year-books is *not* to comment on the important events of the past year as such. Its "specific object," noted on page 1, is to "make possible analyses in a wider perspective and on the basis of more mature reflection than may be possible in a quarterly or monthly journal." If this caveat is not kept in mind one will be very surprised at this volume's contents. There is, for example, no article directly on the Middle East—and 1980 was an event-packed year for that area. Some of the articles could easily have been printed 2 to 5 years ago (and perhaps 2 or 5 years from now). For example, Kenneth W. Thompson's "Functionalism and Foundations in the United States," is in this category.

But the articles on the whole meet the standard set. Some of the 19 are of better quality than others. They range over a great variety of topics whose center of gravity is obviously the taste and preference of the two editors. The whole collection tends to focus somewhat outside the general politicomilitary framework. They include very specific titles such as "New Zealand and the European Community" and "External Indebtness of Less Developed Countries," to very general essays such as "Catasrophe Theory and International Relations." Among the more

interesting to this reviewer were Colin Legum's "Foreign Intervention in Africa(II)," Miguel Wionczek's external indebtness essay already mentioned (which is filled with well-selected data), C.P. Fitzgerald's "China's View of the World" (which is an excellent "philosophical" look at China), and Alfred P. Rubin's "The Panama Canal Treaties: Locks on the Barn Doors" (which exposes neatly the structural and technical defects in the Canal treaties). Each one of these is first-rate and a reader of this book with limited time could begin there and go on as time permits.

FREDERICK H. HARTMANN
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Murphy, Paul J. *Brezhnev: Soviet Politician*. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1981. 363pp.

More than just another biography of another Soviet political leader, *Brezhnev: Soviet Politician* is an extremely timely study that examines Brezhnev's rise to power in one of the world's most complex and still largely closed political systems. In particular, while Brezhnev's career is in itself interesting, the book is most valuable for the insight it provides into the question of leadership succession in the Kremlin. Murphy takes the position that "conflict" is the principal element of Soviet politics resulting in a continuous process of rivalry, struggle and intrigue. Brezhnev, he contends, is an exemplary example of this process who possesses "the right mixture of tenacious energy, drive, cunning, discipline, ruthlessness, concealment . . . [and] above all . . . ambition."

Acknowledging that political biography, and in particular Soviet political biography, must contain conclusions often based on fragmentary and imprecise evidence, the author does indeed frequently rely on personal opinion and judgment to develop his study. He clearly identifies his own speculation,