

1980

Book Reviews


The U.S. Naval War College

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review>

Recommended Citation

War College, The U.S. Naval (1980) "Book Reviews," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 33 : No. 1 , Article 11.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol33/iss1/11>

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.



PROFESSIONAL READING

BOOK REVIEWS

Allen, Scott and Craven, John P., eds. *Alternatives in Deepsea Mining*. Proceedings, University of Hawaii, Workshop, 11-14 December 1978. Honolulu: Law of the Sea Institute, 1979. 110pp.

That extraordinary being, the current edition of the law of the sea negotiations, is now 12 years old. After spending its first 6 years in United Nations Seabed Committees, this adolescent has weathered 6 further years in UNCLOS, the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. For some who kept up with the negotiations in their early days, the recent stages of UNCLOS have often seemed remarkably futile, failing again and again to mature and to yield the new law of the sea treaty that was foreseen as the object of the exercise.

With one important exception, reading *Alternatives in Deepsea Mining* tends to confirm this perception of futility. The book contains the edited proceedings of a workshop held in December 1978 by the Law of the Sea Institute in Honolulu. The list of workshop participants includes some 35 representatives from the diplomatic community, the mining industry, the academic world and the legal profession. Most are American, but there are also participants from Australia, Cameroon, Canada, Japan, Sri Lanka and West Germany. The book also presents four individual papers that were either presented to the workshop or based on its subject matter.

The proceedings of the workshop paint a gloomy picture of at least the seabed aspects of UNCLOS. Often repeated is the fundamental and perhaps irreconcilable division between those that would have the seabed mined by the developed countries who can mine it, but who are already relatively more prosperous, and those that would have the seabed mined by or for the developing countries who are less prosperous, but who cannot, in fact, mine it. The topics of the proceedings are "simplification," the "system of exploitation," the "Assembly," the "Council," "technology transfer," the "review clause," and "dispute settlement," but too often the discussion will not be helpful to anyone not already familiar with these concepts and their context. This is not to say that the editing is at fault; the editing is done intelligently and makes a better whole of the proceedings than, I am sure, the proceedings made of themselves at the time. It is only that the debate begins and proceeds at a sophisticated level and is not for beginners. As for the advanced learner, the value of the proceedings will, I am afraid, diminish rapidly with time. The points raised are usually fine ones and so oriented to current issues that they will lose (and already to a degree have lost) their relevance.

The book's four papers, however, are likely to be of longer-lasting interest. Sri Lanka's Ambassador M.C.W. Pinto offers a "Statement" that makes a clear

96 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

defense of the proposition so alien to American mining interests: "If you touch the nodules at the bottom of the sea, you touch my property. If you take them away, you take away my property." On the other side of things, Robert Krueger of Nossaman, Krueger & Marsh in Los Angeles argues in "A Current View of Deepsea Mining Issue" that the implementation of national systems of deepsea mining can, in fact, surmount a "storm of protest" from developing countries if the national systems are properly coordinated. Rudiger Wolfrum of the University of Bonn discusses the "Transfer of Technology," giving useful background on the development of the issue, as well as outlining present problems and possible resolutions.

Best of all is the paper, "Deep Ocean Mining: Interim Arrangements and Alternative Outcomes," by Douglas Johnston at Dalhousie University. It is the most reflective and the most general part of the book and is likely to be worth reading several years from now when much else of the tome is effectively dead letter. Johnston examines several perceptions of what UNCLOS is meant to be. As a "treaty-making exercise" UNCLOS, he recognizes, is unlikely to be successful: "Especially the unresolved issues in deep ocean mining are too numerous, too important and too deeply divisive—often the result of fundamentally divergent philosophies—to be papered over through a diplomatic miracle of concealment." As an exercise in "law reform," however, UNCLOS might be already viewed as a success, having already contributed to norms for "distributive justice" (i.e., more for the poor nations) and "universal democratic participatory procedures." Those looking at UNCLOS as a process of "legal development" would see a failure to achieve a treaty as a "missed opportunity," but one not necessarily fatal to the development of an ocean order based on customary international law.

Finally, from the standpoint of "ocean development and management" (often the perspective of the industrial and scientific communities), failure to produce a treaty "is a tolerable prospect provided that it does not produce unduly destabilizing consequences around the world." Johnston goes on to present a "case for simplification" that would serve as useful preface to the pages of the workshop's proceedings on that topic and to offer "three scenarios of reluctant consent" that could be interesting to match against law of the sea events as they actually unfold.

MARK W. JANIS

Sullivan & Cromwell, Paris

Booth, Ken. *Strategy and Ethnocentrism*. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979. 191pp.

Ken Booth has a rare clarity of vision and, ironically, that may prove to be a major problem for his readers. We may be so ethnocentrically sealed in that we have difficulty understanding his message. He gently reproves all of us who work in the strategic field or who think about it seriously, which must include nearly everyone. What he says is that much of what is written about strategy is mirror imaging, of which he gives few but very telling examples. If the book achieves its purpose, to raise consciousness, then it will benefit a far larger readership than the "sizable group of strategists" who profess that strategy is multicultural but who behave as if it is not.

What Booth so wisely says is not totally new. We have recognized, certainly since the 19th century, that we were programmed by our culture. But we seldom seem to believe it. Instead, we Americans have frequently depended upon inspired Europeans—Alexis de Tocqueville remains the most remarkable—to describe the patterns of our thought. (Sometimes we reciprocate brilliantly, too, let it be said. Barbara Tuchmann must have done some important consciousness raising for Euro-

pean strategists in *Guns of August*.) As for our own anthropologists we dispersed them to study native minds in the Congo or the Brazilian rain forests but it did not occur to us that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had patterns of thought possibly as unique and definable as those of the Zuni Indians. The trick is to recognize that the best of us is not inevitably logical and rational, that just like those South Sea Islanders for whom East is a big bird, we accept many absurdities as self-evident, and even then contradict ourselves. For instance, no one argues with Sunzi's ancient wisdom, the first law of war is to know the enemy. That maxim is recited in most of our major institutions for the study of war, who nevertheless must be reminded constantly to keep emphasis on their study of the Soviet war machine and its operators.

The term "mirror image" is heard frequently these days. Many strategists are aware of the danger of projecting the "rational man" and extrapolating from "black boxes." But the problem is, as Booth says, multicultural. There are few with the intellectual equipment to break their ethnocentric chains. Take "imminence of hostilities" for example, everyone's nightmare. What chance does one have to understand the Soviet road to nuclear war without knowing something about Russian peasant mentality (because many Soviet leaders are of peasant origin); Soviet concepts of the West (after all, few know more than what they are told); or Soviet attitudes toward death (like Napoleon, do they respect glory but not suffering?). As Booth points out, what we prefer to do is to count warheads, and even that is not always so easy. But it leads us to concentrate on an enemy's capabilities and to disregard the other important, and fiercely multicultural, question: what will make him decide to use them.

The problem is the old one called epistemology in philosophy. How do we

know what we know or, indeed, what do we know? It is the fascination and the despair of the human condition that great advances in knowledge are not always accompanied by increased perception. Our ability to deceive ourselves seems to be eternal. How could the administration that promised man that he would walk on the moon approve the invasion at the Bay of Pigs? How can political leaders dedicated to freeing man not only from all material wants but also from spiritual privations organize the most terrible system of prisons and torture the world has ever known? Ken Booth asks question upon question until the wonder of it is not that we do some things wrong, but that we do anything right.

That, perhaps, is the weakness, or at least the discouragement, of this book. Here is yet another European telling us that we are mucking it up, and for a culture that produced the light bulb and Steve's ice cream, that seems unkind. But how do we break out of the cave of illusion into the sunlight, or even moonlight, of pure knowledge? For once, Booth seems to succumb to the disease he is trying to cure, for his solution, in addition to exhorting us to think better and more broadly, is to turn to academicians who "can try to help by attempting to think of new things (or old things in a relevant way) and by enlarging our understanding of strategy in an environment of constant political, economic, social and technical change." Booth is not, I am sure, arguing that his colleagues do not have their own ethnocentric problems. Who, after all, is it who worked out the language of nuclear war and argued that we were teaching it to the Russians who, it was suggested, did not understand about such sophisticated matters?

Perhaps we could start a new crusade against ethnocentrism. (We Americans do not need a European or even a Margaret Mead to tell us that we like crusades.) But we should not be too

98 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

sanguine; such crusades have been started before. Karl Marx did it in 1848. "Workers of the world unite!", after all, was nothing if not a call for the proletariat to rise above ethnocentrism. Even that movement had its mirror-image problems and seemed to founder on new definitions of original sin. Recently, there was another attempt to break out of the ethnocentric circle through the widespread use of the "Think Red" teams in strategic games. But that was a little like Halloween because underneath the costume was the uniform of Annapolis or West Point. More recently a new crusade has created unexpected possibilities, but it appears that we respond in the old ethnocentric way. As a result of the Jackson Amendment, America is enriched with a wave of emigres who know a great deal about thinking red, but their message does not fit our preconceptions so we have trouble listening.

Some might say, in a scholarly way, that Professor Booth has bitten off too much. And if one thinks only in a scholarly way, that is true. But he did not mean to do our thinking for us. He meant to increase our awareness, and that he succeeded in doing extremely well. His challenge—to learn to think about ourselves thinking—is most difficult and certainly one that does not admit of any narrow limits of standard methodology. We had better partake of Booth's wisdom in this book soon, for if we are not hopeless romantics we must know that Western civilization is in danger. At least that is the shadow that I see.

ROBERT B. BATHURST
Harvard University

Carver, Field Marshal Lord. *The Apostles of Mobility: The Theory and Practice of Armoured Warfare*. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979. 108pp.

A publication in book form of the 1979 series of the Lees Knowles

Lectures, the title of this book is a bit misleading. If the reader hopes to discover a statement of the theory of armored warfare followed by a discussion in any detail of how theory became practice, he will be disappointed. What he will find, in the form of unifying theme rather than thesis, is the notion that the prophets of armored warfare—Fuller and Liddell Hart—and the pioneers in the development of the tank—Hobart, Fuller, Martel, Swinton, and others—had little practical influence upon the great practitioners—Guderian, Rommel, Patton, Dayan, and Rabin. I say unifying theme rather than thesis because even though Liddell Hart and Fuller are going through something of a revival (serious scholarly studies of the lives and works of both have appeared in the last 2 years), few would argue seriously that they were anything more than prolific prophets and occasionally successful lobbyists. There is no controversy here warranting a thesis.

Inevitably the prophet or critic overstates the case; in fact, this is probably his role in the scheme of things. The practitioner is always faced with the dilemma of taking easily stated and greatly oversimplified ideas and bringing them to fruition in the day-to-day world, a process bound to result in compromise (known to philosophers as the "is-ought" problem). On the other hand one ought to be wary of arguing the other extreme, that the successes of a Guderian in applying armored warfare were the result of a purely random mutation—an idea born on the spot with a genius to take advantage of it. While this theory of random mutation is certainly as much a principle of evolution as the notion that things grow in a logical progression into more suitable things, this reader would not accept the random mutation process in this particular instance. In fact I occasionally entertain the notion that *blitzkrieg* was born as much in Clausewitz' discussions of mountain warfare and the Hutier

tactic of World War I as it was in the ideas of Liddell Hart or Fuller—at least insofar as the Germans are concerned.

Given this background, there are good and bad points to this book. Lord Carver's concise statement of the history of the development of the tank in Britain is excellent. His campaign descriptions of World War II are good, though simplified and potentially misleading to a beginning student, in that so much is left out because these discussions are lectures rather than historical analyses or even detailed recollection. In fact, I feel clearly out of place challenging anything here because Lord Carver was a successful participant in these particular frays; in any case, there is no fault here. There is fault, however, in the discussion of the (IDF) Israeli Defense Forces, and in particular the 1967 war. The fault is not so much in the theme—the fact that Liddell Hart's influence on Israeli doctrine or practice has been minimal despite his lionization by the IDF—but in his discussions of the campaigns themselves. The reader would be well-advised to be wary as he absorbs this latter discussion.

This little book is erudite, and to the point, illustrative of what good military writing can be. It is valuable to the military historian for the quick fix it provides for questions regarding British armor development. It is especially valuable for its perspective, provided by one of Great Britain's tank experts. Unfortunately its tone is sometimes disturbing. While the Socratic method at its best champions experience and observation coupled with a finely tuned logic as the best source of knowledge, and while Lord Carver rightly champions this method (he describes himself as a student of Socrates), most of us will not have time to learn from experience in the next war (after all Guderian had Czechoslovakia and Poland to practice on before going against France and Russia). We may have only the prophet to give us a

glimmer; with this glimmer we will have to do it correctly the first time. While the prophet may be incapable of commanding a division, it is his ability to penetrate the potentially deadening inertia of experience that sets the commander of genius off on his new way, not tethered to his past but in control of it.

MICHAEL S. LANCASTER
Major, U.S. Army

Janowitz, Morris. *The Last Half-Century*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978. 557pp.

Whether the reader's interest centers around social change, institutional change, politics, or history, Professor Janowitz provides an encyclopedic study that goes beyond individual disciplines.

Janowitz' temporal framework is that period encompassed by the emergence of the United States as an advanced industrial society, from World War I to the present. Part one charts three basic societal trends: political participation, social stratification, and military participation. Part two looks at social structures. The third part presents an assessment of prospects for "... reasoned direction of societal change" through an examination of "... institution building for social control."

Of the many threads that run through each section of this book, one of the more provocative is social stratification. In *The Last Half-Century*, stratification is seen to be interrelated with many sociopolitical elements including political institutions and electoral behavior, industrialism and trade union membership, racial attitudes and welfare expenditures, and, of particular interest, military institutions and participation.

According to the author, "social stratification and inequality in the United States has been fundamentally conditioned by the structure of its

100 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

military institutions and by the patterns of popular military participation." In support on this theme Janowitz suggests that the period from 1920 to 1975 saw the "perfection" of the mass military institution and, in turn, its transformation by means of the elimination of conscription. It is the author's contention that the military mobilization for World War I and World War II operated to strengthen social equality and promote social integration, while the limited wars of Korea and particularly Vietnam acted to increase social inequality and alienate the veteran from the larger society. The reduction of armed forces after 1945 and their change into an all-volunteer force in 1973 are seen as having the potential for increasing the strain in civil-military relations. A reflection of this strain is a continuing separation of the military from the larger society, with only selective relationships.

In support of this hypothesis, Janowitz presents empirical data and analyses of three topics relevant to the relationship of the military and society: trends in expenditures for the military compared with spending for welfare; differential patterns of military service and of combat casualties by social groupings; and the consequences of military service on veteran status, including the transition back to civilian life.

Of the more thought-provoking conclusions drawn by Janowitz concerning sociomilitary relationships is that "[a] system of conscription which does not rest on widespread and almost universal service of the eligibles loses its validity and legitimacy." He suggests that one result of the substitution of an all-volunteer military for "peacetime conscription" is that "... the significance of military service as a mechanism for defining citizenship has been fundamentally undermined."

This review has given but a brief description of only one of the relationships examined by Janowitz. The

thoroughness of the research and the completeness of subject areas are not open to criticism. It would, however, be impossible for the interested reader to fail to gain some insight into the changes that have occurred during *The Last Half-Century*.

ANDREW E. VAN ESSO
Arizona State University

Jones, David R., ed. *Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual—Volume 3* (1979). Gulf Breeze, Fla.: Academic International Press, 1979. 364pp.

In the not too distant past Western analysts of the Soviet scene were often handicapped by a dearth of reliable public data on the USSR's Military Establishment. Since the early 1970s this situation has reversed itself to such a degree that one is now confronted with a wide variety of publications, nearly all of which are promoted as the absolute "last word" on current trends and events within the Soviet military realm. Consequently the educated reader must seek a reliable, comprehensive reference work that treats this vast and intricate topic. The latest volume of the *Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual* (SAFRA) series fills the bill in admirable fashion.

This is not to say that the series has not experienced growing pains over its first three issues. Unlike the first two volumes, which had a 2-year time lag in their coverage of the Soviet Armed Forces components and related elements of military power, SAFRA-3 covers the previous 2 years' (1977-78) activities and in some cases, e.g., Carl Jacobsen's examination of Soviet actions during the February-March 1979 Sino-Vietnamese border conflict, manages to be as current as yesterday's news reports.

Another attractive feature of the SAFRA series has been its consistency in the selection of its contributors. For example, most of the authors of those annual sections dealing with the Soviet

PROFESSIONAL READING 101

Armed Forces components and other key areas relating to military power, which comprise the vital heart of the SAFRA effort, have contributed to all three volumes published thus far. While some might choose to debate the catholicity of viewpoints expressed, this practice has permitted a good measure of continuity. Because the majority of SAFRA contributors are younger scholars, but with extensive and impressive publishing credentials in the Soviet field, few should have any fears about the high calibre of Western scholarship on Soviet military affairs in future years. If editor Jones has made some adjustment for reasons of timeliness in his yearly review section and has continued his annual bibliographic survey of Soviet military affairs, he has also broadened the scope of the volume's format with some excellent papers dealing with both the crucial present and oft-neglected past of the Soviet military. John McDonnell's treatment of the Soviet weapons acquisition system is a definitive assessment of this vital technological issue, while those by Jacob W. Kipp and Ronald R. Rader on Admiral Gorshkov and pre-WW II Anglo-French estimates of the Red army, respectively, rank as first-class historical scholarship. Most important, the SAFRA effort, unlike some similar scholarly enterprises, is not a "closed shop" affair. Rather, Jones continues to invite inquiries from any scholar who wishes to contribute to future SAFRA volumes.

SAFRA's reference value is further enhanced with the presence of considerable graphic and tabular data that complement the various textual sections, particularly those addressing the current status of the Soviet force components and the high command structure.

SAFRA-3's high-quality analysis includes treatments of those elements of national power (e.g., defense industry, space activities, etc.) that are not always examined in surveys of Soviet military affairs. Such outstanding features might

dispose even the most penurious among Soviet area specialists and interested general readers to invest the required \$35 for this annual investment in superior scholarship on Soviet military affairs.

JOSEPH E. THACH, JR.
Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for
Public Affairs

Keijzer, Nico. *Military Obedience*.
Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1978.
312pp.

This is a well-researched, well-written treatise by a former Dutch naval officer on the subject of military obedience or, more accurately, the defense of superior orders. It is a comprehensive analysis of the application of that defense in military practice.

The subject of superior orders always has had a certain fascination for scholars. There was a spate of writing by academicians during and after the post-World War II war crimes trials. The Vietnam war apparently inspired a resurgence of intellectual pontification, given that this is the third such scholarly contribution on the subject in little more than a decade.

To be sure, there are legalistic nuances regarding the defense as it is stated by various nations. The defense in the United States is a "reasonable man" test, i.e., would a man of ordinary sense and understanding have realized that the order given him (which resulted in the offense with which the accused stands charged) was illegal? If the court answers this question in the negative, the defense serves as a complete defense to the charge. It is a defense seldom attempted and even more rarely achieved. In contrast, the British, while not permitting a claim of superior orders as a complete bar to trial, nevertheless allow it to be heard in mitigation of the offense prior to sentencing. From

102 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

a practical standpoint these are distinctions without a difference, as the general result in U.S. practice conforms to the British handling of the defense.

To be sure, the "reasonable man" test is not black-and-white. Considering subjective standard of the test, there is a substantial gray area, just as there is in other areas of military and civilian law, tactics, leadership, or the principles of war. In that more books have been published on the subject than there have been accused who availed themselves of the defense in the same period suggests that the fascination of academicians with the subject is somewhat in excess of its real import.

There is no question of the superlative quality of *Military Obedience*. Its emphasis is on the defense of superior orders, but there is also a commendable discussion of military obedience in the context of a serviceman's duty to obey lawful orders and his superior's obligation to issue orders that are lawful, concise, and clear. The only issue concerns the book's potential audience. The author indicates that *Military Obedience* was written for the benefit and reading of the average soldier. The depth and complexity of his work suggests that the author may be somewhat optimistic regarding both the spare time reading selections and reading level of today's soldier, sailor, airman, or marine.

Military Obedience is an esoteric analysis of military legal minutiae. Contrary to the author's hopes, the book's value is only as a research source for military lawyers in those rare cases where the defense is asserted.

W. HAYS PARKS

Leebaert, Derek, ed. *European Security: Prospects for the 1980s*. Lexington, Mass.—Toronto: D.C. Heath and Company (Lexington Books), 1979. 302pp.

Published during the 30th anniversary year of the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization, this volume enjoys the dual advantage of historical retrospect and future projection of European security concerns. Edited by the managing editor of the noted journal *International Security* and a faculty member at Harvard and MIT, the volume features 11 contributions prepared by a group of faculty and resident fellows at Harvard's Center for Science and International Affairs. They cover most of these key European security issues in a solid, if not excellent, manner. While some readers might disagree with various analytical findings, few can fault the contributors' treatments for a lack of detailed coverage of the issues at hand.

Part One (Chapters 1-3) provides a reassessment of traditional assumptions about the NATO alliance from its birth in April 1949 to the present day. Editor Leebaert, both in his prefatory remarks and in the first chapter, maintains that NATO must determine whether its current problems "are perpetual or merely transitory" as a firm first step to their resolution. Tracing the post-1949 course of trends and events in NATO, he contends that if many of the problems surrounding NATO interdependence remain unsolved, its basic requirement for regional deterrence against potential Soviet/Warsaw Pact aggression continues to have been met (if not actually invigorated!) over recent years; similarly, the traditional impetus for adequate defense has remained an ongoing and vital element of European economic development. In Chapter 2 Stephen Barrett examines several key political and economic issues that have marred the transatlantic relationship. In the following chapter Stanhope's treatment of the current NATO/Warsaw Pact military balance may raise some eyebrows among military readers. In particular, Stanhope maintains that among the NATO members there is a fundamental difference between "perceptions of the balance" and the realities of the

balance itself. Through a rigorous assessment of force postures, possible conflict scenarios and ongoing defense programs for both military alliances, he concludes that if the East-West regional balance "is not exactly a source of comfort to NATO...it is not as bad as it is sometimes made out to be." He adds that certain "confidence building measures" like those contained in Basket One of the 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) agreement might prove more worthwhile than the ongoing Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) negotiations in order to establish lasting force limitations in the European region.

In the second section (Chapters 4-6), several major issues—alliance security and the energy crisis, collaborative weapons acquisitions programs and politico-military turmoil on NATO's southern flank—come under close scrutiny, and all three papers deserve careful consideration for their major premises and findings. Linda Miller's discussion of the complex energy/security relationship merits special mention for her thorough examination of both achievements and shortcomings in that area over the past decade as well as for her commentary prospectus for the 1980s. On a more immediate issue, Robert Dean treats the political and economic aspects of NATO weapons acquisition programs and concludes that even with improved cooperation these efforts may never totally constitute an alliance-wide integration of either military or defense industrial assets. Likewise, the CSIA Working Group's current assessment of NATO's troubled southern flank indicates that even if a U.S.-sponsored settlement of the longstanding Greco-Turkish enmity over Cyprus could alleviate this major source of regional tension, much more NATO politico-military effort is needed during the coming decade to restore fully its stature in the Mediterranean.

The trio of contributions contained in Part Three (Chapters 7-9) shifts the focus of European security concerns to the Soviet Union and its East European allies. While one might take occasional exception to the precise degree and direction of Coit Dennis Blacker's judgments about Soviet perceptions of European security, he does furnish a rather comprehensive presentation of major Soviet/Warsaw Pact security concerns. In a similar vein, N. Edwina Moreton maintains that the array of political, economic and social developments that have occurred in Eastern Europe over recent years might pose a future destabilizing factor for continued Soviet domination of the region. Steven J. Flanagan discusses the development of the CSCE since the Helsinki Agreement of August 1975 and considers those nonmilitary options that might enhance further progress in East-West relationships during the next decade. Although he notes that inroads have been made since Helsinki, Flanagan also asserts that more can be accomplished in the eighties if both sides will avoid unrealistic expectations and pursue the CSCE program of confidence building measures with a steadily increasing appreciation of common East-West interests.

Current trends in the ongoing phenomenon of Eurocommunism receive analysis by Kevin Devlin; particularly good is his examination of current trends of the French, Spanish and Italian communist parties. Jane Sharp then deals with the qualitative issue of the East-West negotiations process in terms of prospective thrusts and anticipated limitations. She observes that a major lesson of the past decade has been that formal agreements have had "extremely limited utility" and that codified pacts have tended towards protection of the *status quo* rather than any noticeable encouragement of new initiatives. Like Flanagan and Stanhope in previous sections, Sharp contends that

104 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

overall European security might be served much better by use of low-key confidence building measures that curtail the use of force than by formal East-West accords on force levels and arms control.

All in all, the volume has much to offer as a wide-ranging survey of current European security issues. Beyond the highly visible East-West military balance, the volume is also worthwhile reading for its consideration of the complex array of political, social and economic matters that comprise European security from both the NATO and Warsaw Pact perspectives. Although it may be somewhat advanced for many general readers, the book does deserve a much closer look by serious students of international affairs, if only for its projections of European security in the broadest context.

JOSEPH E. THACH, JR.
Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for
Public Affairs

Lefever, Ernest W., ed. *Will Capitalism Survive?* Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center of Georgetown University, 1979. 69pp.

Will Capitalism Survive? consists of an essay, "Has Capitalism a Future?" by Paul Johnson, former editor of the English weekly *The New Statesman*, and the responses to the essay that the editor, Ernest W. Lefever, solicited from a dozen persons in various professions. The respondents consisted of an oil company executive, a political scientist, a labor union leader, two theologians, a journalist, an international lawyer, a futurologist, a former U.S. Senator, and a U.S. Congressman. Lefever regrets that the respondents do not include a "card-carrying economist, historian, or philosopher." Actually his banker, Alan Reynolds, and his journalist, Paul Craig Roberts, are economists, though not of the academic variety.

Johnson's essay, which Lefever calls "the challenger," gives a brief but wide-sweeping account of industrial capitalism's uniqueness among economic systems in its wealth-creating powers. The common people have shown their endorsement of capitalism by flocking to its production centers in the hope of an improved standard of living and freedom of choice.

In spite of its evident accomplishments Johnson sees capitalism threatened by five forces. These threats are the intellectuals' preference for collectivism over capitalism; "ecological panic" impeding economic growth; big government overburdening the private sector with government expenditure, taxation, and regulation; trade union behavior that restricts output and productivity; and an external threat in the military balance shifting in favor of the Soviet Union.

Because Johnson presents his history of capitalism and the present threats to its future in only 14 pages, his essay is more of a call to arms than a systematic analysis of capitalism's past, present, and future. For a deeper treatment of the connection between capitalism and democratic government, readers will need to consult a work like Nobel prize laureate economist Milton Friedman's *Capitalism and Freedom*.

The responses to Johnson's challenge are necessarily overly brief and differ considerably in their quality. The predominant view of the respondents is that Johnson's theses about the merits of capitalism and the threats to capitalism are too broad and exaggerated to be supported by the available evidence.

It is not possible to comment in detail on the essays by each of the respondents. This reviewer found the papers of Schmertz, the businessman, Seabury, the political scientist, and Shanker, the labor leader, to be more moderate and balanced than Johnson in discussing the accomplishments of capitalism, its institutional resiliency,

PROFESSIONAL READING 105

and its connection with democratic societies. Roberts, the journalist-economist, and Novak, the columnist-theologian, provide short but stimulating arguments on why Western intellectuals are so critical of capitalism. Nelson and Cone, the two theologians, provide support for Robert's and Novak's positions by the theologians' dogmatic views that capitalism is an economic system based on exploitation. Herman Kahn, the futurist, sees 15 social limits to capitalism's economic growth, including some of Johnson's forces, but makes an observation worthy of note when he says, "If the public were better informed, it would often choose more economic growth and fewer social limits."

The contributions of the other respondents seemed less valuable to this reviewer. Banker-economist Alan Reynolds gives a libertarian argument that the burdens of the welfare state will lead to tax revolt and a purer form of U.S. capitalism. Congressman Jack Kemp sees the problems of capitalism to be due to the failure of political leaders who have overregulated and overtaxed an otherwise productive system, but in the course of his account he makes egregious errors in explaining Keynesian and monetarist economic theories. Former Senator Eugene McCarthy does no more than wave the populist banner that "corporations have corrupted capitalism"; and international lawyer Rita Hauser raises the perennial cry that capitalism's real problem is that it results in inequality in the distributions of wealth and income.

It cannot be said that Johnson or his respondents have answered the question "Will capitalism survive?" However, these writers do cause the reader to reflect on the nature of capitalism and its relation to freedom and democracy.

JOHN A. WALGREEN
Wheaton College

Osgood, Robert E. *Limited War Revisited*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979. 124pp.

In the early days of the Vietnam war, Vice Admiral (then Commander) Jim Stockdale gathered his air group pilots and bombardier/navigationers together to talk about the war and their part in it. His main point was that although Vietnam was another in a series of "limited wars," their personal commitment to their missions had to be "total."

In North Vietnam, war planners knew their ace in the hole was a United States pledge to a "limited war." They had a chance of winning as long as the United States limited its objectives and methods, for they were totally committed to "total victory."

As Robert Osgood says, "limited war" is a matter of perspective. If you are the most powerful nation on earth, you can wage a "limited war." For your opponent and for your own fighting men, however, that same war may be "total."

This is an introductory truism of Osgood's *Limited War Revisited*. What this recognized scholar of war* examines here is the state of health of the theory of limited war. His premises are that after stalemate in Korea and defeat in Vietnam, limited war strategies have been discredited, and that this is a worrisome development.** Limited war theories come in vogue only after the horrors of a total war. For example, the Napoleonic wars resulted in Clausewitz' writing on limited war, and World War II with nuclear weapons resulted in the proliferation of limited war theories of the '50s. If limited war theory is discarded, the probability of another Armageddon increases.

Modern limited war theories cover the spectrum from guerrilla wars of

*Robert E. Osgood, *Limited War*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957, 309pp.

**Foresadowed in *ibid.*, p. 6.

106 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

national liberation through local wars with conventional weapons to widespread or "central" war with limited use of nuclear weapons. Osgood examines each level in considerable detail in this compact book.

In the process he takes a hard look at the Vietnam war, drawing therefrom four reasons for failure:

1. . . . South Vietnam too vulnerable to insurgency to preserve its independence or to be rescued. . . .

2. American military not ready to fight an insurgency; they transformed the conflict into an expanding conventional war that the public was unwilling to sustain. . . .

3. Incremental expansion of the war was inefficient militarily and fatal politically, but it does not necessarily follow that rapid escalation would have been politically feasible or successful. . . .

4. National interests at stake were not sufficiently compelling to Americans to have justified a scale and duration of combat necessary to win the war.

Lessons learned from these reasons for failure should be regarded as "highly contingent," for no future conflict will replicate the conditions of Vietnam:

- National interests must be more faithfully assessed before commitment.

- If indirect assistance is not sufficient to rescue a beleaguered government, direct participation by foreign troops is not likely to succeed. . . .

- The United States must avoid fighting an unconventional war with its own forces. Counterinsurgency remains a task for special forces.

Has the Vietnam experience affected U.S. strategy in the Third World, where limited conventional wars may be required because significant U.S. interests are at stake? Osgood is afraid that it has. ". . . Vietnam has suspended creative thought in this area. Where foreign

policy is most in doubt military strategy is least active." This is unfortunate because in a dynamic world many more nations now are willing and capable of engaging in conventional conflict.

At the central war level, Osgood discusses the mismatch between U.S. concepts of limiting the use of nuclear weapons and Soviet notions of war fighting and winning. Much of this ground has been plowed before, but the treatment in *Limited War Revisited* is more clear and concise. Osgood concludes that the Soviet missile buildup seems destined to provide Moscow with a theoretical advantage (by U.S. logic) in waging controlled strategic war.

All of this means that concepts and strategies of limited war have fallen on hard times in the United States. There is much disillusionment. But as the alternative is even less appealing, limited war theory remains alive.

Limited War Revisited is most perceptive, balanced, and pungently presented. Its rationale and commentary, quickly sketched here, will be widely quoted.

W.A. PLATTE
Captain, U.S. Navy

Rohwer, Jürgen and Jaeckel, Eberhard. *Die Funkaufklärung und ihre Rolle im Zweiten Weltkrieg*. Stuttgart: Motorbuchverlag, 1979. 406pp.

This book deals with one of the best kept secrets of World War II: radio intelligence.

In 1974 it became known that British decoding specialists had, throughout the war, been able to decrypt all German messages encoded by the then used cipher machine ENIGMA, a machine in use from the very beginning of the war. Subsequent commentaries in the media gave the impression that the Allies knew all essential operations and operating instructions well in advance and the question then arose: why did it take so long to defeat

Germany? To bring the truth to light about these speculations an international conference was held in November 1978 in Bonn and Stuttgart. Witnesses of and historians concerned with WW II as well as experts on radio intelligence and intelligence personnel from Great Britain, Poland, Finland, Canada, Italy, France, Norway, Greece, the United States and Germany assembled and discussed the subject.

Professor Dr. Rohwer has put together the lectures, reports and discussions of that conference and combined and commented on them in this book.

Besides the very important influence that radio intelligence had on various operations, the history, technology, and development of cipher techniques and cipher machines are discussed in an interesting and understandable manner.

Great Britain and Poland realized first the importance of having an effective decoding organization. This way of gaining information is considered more reliable than spies. If one is able to decode the complete radio traffic of an adversary, one can gain insight into his strategy and tactics. The participants at the conference learned that Germany put less emphasis on decoding than did her opponents because the offensive party is less interested in the enemy's strategy than the defender. Besides, the German specialists were convinced that it was impossible to break their codes. This mental attitude changed as the war progressed.

By using some carefully selected, very interesting examples the book demonstrates the great tactical advantage the Allies had because they knew the German intentions. The air battle of Britain, the battle of Midway, the battle of the Atlantic (perhaps the longest battle in history), and the invasion by the Allies at Normandy were decisively influenced by the fact that the Allies were informed of German intentions by radio intelligence. It would, however, carry the successes of radio intelligence

too far if one said that by this means World War II was won. Still, there is no doubt that the war was shortened and drastically influenced by advantages decoding ENIGMA offered. If Admiral Nimitz had not known the position of the Japanese carriers the U.S. Navy could have sustained a decisive defeat, and that would have influenced the war decisively. And if the Allies had not known the positions of the German U-boats, the battle of the Atlantic would have lasted longer.

In any case, because of radio intelligence the Allies were much better informed about German capabilities and that led to a much better appreciation of the situation.

The book is a rich source for military officers and historians as well as for technicians in the field of radio intelligence. Those who do not read German will be pleased to know that the book will be published in English later this year.

HANS J. SCHAEFER

Captain, Federal German Navy

Ruge, Friedrich. *The Soviets as Naval Opponents 1941-1945*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1979. 210pp.

At first glance this book may seem just the type of inspirational reading necessary for pondering ways that a shrinking U.S. Navy might address the challenge of a burgeoning Soviet Fleet. After all, "track records" are an important element in any evaluation process and what better source than one who has fought both sides. Alas, once again things are not what they seem. Admiral Ruge is neither scout nor oracle. He does appear to fear the results of that fine old practice of punishing the bearer of bad news, however; there is no bad news for Western readers in this book. Instead of the usual concern of asking the warrior-author to be dispassionate when writing of combat is the nagging sense that the tone here is set by the market rather

108 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

than passion. The author sums up with, "The German crews fully acknowledged the courage and tenacity of the Russians, but they held their Western opponents in greater respect." This seems too absolute but, regrettably, the partisan tone pervades the book and its analysis. It seems so unnecessary because the book is based on records and reports, not personal experience. Perhaps I just get uneasy when I'm told what I want to hear too often.

Notwithstanding this bias, the combat narrative is intensely alive with accounts of brilliance, blunder, heroism, victory and defeat. One cannot read the accounts of night naval battles off the Eltigen beachhead without stirring the shadows of Guadalcanal and Ironbottom Sound. The vastness here is in the Steppes, not the reaches of the Pacific, but the ebb and flow of battle are the same. And in the end so are some of the lessons—sea control within range of land-based aircraft is costly if not impossible without some sort of air cover or sophisticated air defense system; skillful tactics and high technology only redress numerical imbalances up to a point—then the sheer weight of numbers begins to exact its toll.

At the end I was left with a disquieting sense that the book is less than it could have been, but useful nevertheless. Less than it could have been for reasons mentioned above; useful because of the reminder that numbers do count and because it provides a certain perspective on the Soviet Navy's post-WWII force structure. Too often that force structure has been explained in terms of response to U.S. carrier and amphibious forces. Careful reading of this book suggests that a sound argument might be made that it grew more out of the value of certain types of forces as demonstrated in the war against Germany. That is not an implausible approach. After all, the U.S. Navy's force structure today and for the last 35 years has reflected the capabili-

ties demonstrated by carrier, submarine and amphibious forces in the war against Japan. What is interesting, then, is to contrast how the two navies have integrated new technology to arrive at their current force structures. What begins to emerge is a mosaic of a Soviet Navy that not only understands the importance of numbers but better understands the implications of technological adaptation. Such a picture is at odds with the conventional wisdom but worth serious consideration.

Thus, on balance, I would put the *Soviets as Naval Opponents* on my reading list, but not too near the top.

J.S. HURLBURT
Commander, U.S. Navy

Schaller, Michael. *The U.S. Crusade in China, 1938-1945*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1979. 364pp. Tong Te-kong and Li Tsung-jen. *The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979. 642pp.

Between 1938 and 1945 the United States became deeply engaged in China's wars, that against Japan and that between communist and more conservative factions carrying on China's decades-long modernizing revolution. The first of these involvements became, for the United States, the China-Burma-India theater of World War II; the second became a cold war turning point with consequences in some ways more far-reaching than those of the war against Japan. For Chinese and American policymakers and strategists in the late 1930s and 1940s, these two wars intertwined. Their conjunction forms the topic of Schaller's important book.

Schaller argues that by 1938 top U.S. policymakers had come to believe "that Japanese control of China endangered the security of both the United States and its de facto European allies." For a variety of reasons, both American policymakers and a number of Chinese political and military leaders agreed that

only Chiang Kai-shek possessed the potential to lead a successful war against Japan. Between 1938 and 1941 American leaders tried via economic aid and moral support to make Chiang capable of resisting the Japanese. With this support, American leaders hoped that Chiang could reform his party, the Kuomintang (KMT), and indeed the character of Chinese politics. In the long term China was supposed to become an ally, a political partner in the transformation of Asian politics following the age of European imperial dominance.

By 1941 American policymakers could see that Japanese ambition extended beyond China. This heightened the importance of winning, or at least holding, in China to prevent the Japanese from sweeping on through South and Southeast Asia. From 1941 on American political and military leaders employed military as well as economic and political means to bolster China and, therefore, Chiang. Interestingly, in the military efforts begun in this context, Schaller sees forerunners of the covert operations techniques more often identified as elements of American cold war tactics.

Both in China and in the United States, developments worked against the plans of political leaders. Such a dynamic, of course, is normal rather than exceptional in political-military affairs. In China, Schaller suggests, policy foundered on the contrast between American hopes and Chinese political realities. American technical advisors sent to China failed to alter what they found because

they had little to offer but meddling advice. . . . Their effort to clean up graft on the Burma Road, to suggest tax and economic reform, ignored the fact that the KMT survived through corruption and the bargains it struck with existing elites. Changing any single part of the system risked a collapse of the

entire structure. Chiang did not need outside advice on reform but guns, planes, and money.

On the American side, Schaller notes, blindness to Chinese political realities persisted because of amateurism in diplomatic representation, bureaucratic conflict between political and military agencies, and even competition between covert and overt military organizations and commands. Much of the fault, according to Schaller, belongs to FDR.

Schaller makes a further, extremely important point, one with near-universal application in foreign and military affairs: "American leaders failed to understand how the actual behavior of Americans in China, as distinct from formal U.S. policy, induced the KMT to pursue a military solution and antagonize the CCP [Chinese Communist Party]." His discussion of how the activities of the Naval Group China and the Sino-American Cooperative Organization got out of control is one of the most original and valuable sections of the book.

There is much more in this volume than any brief review can convey. It stands out in the torrent of recent literature on China and Sino-American relations. For students of World War II, as well, it constitutes essential reading. It is pleasant to report in addition that the author is a fine stylist.

The memoirs of Li Tsung-jen overlap significantly with the period and issues treated in Schaller's book. Li was among the first of the modern Chinese generals; that is, one whose military education came in 20th-century Chinese military academies rather than in Japanese schools or through the older Chinese imperial service. Li became one of the most important military figures in China in the campaigns of the 1920s and 1930s. By the end of World War II he had attained a stature sufficient to win election as Vice President of China over the strenuous objections of Chiang Kai-shek, his longtime rival in military if not in political pursuits. Li assumed the

110 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Acting Presidency of China in 1949 when Chiang "withdrew" from office to retreat and consolidate his position on Taiwan.

The memoir contains extensive recollections of the military campaigns of the 1920s and 1930s, especially those for the unification of Guangxi (Kwangsi). Li's early successes there gave him considerable political standing, though not perhaps influence, in KMT circles. The memoir is relatively sparse on World War II and on the closing campaigns of the Chinese Civil War, and contains less than one might expect concerning Chinese political factional struggle even within the KMT, much less as between the KMT and the CCP.

Li's memoirs, in short, display most of the weaknesses—and strengths—of conventional military reminiscences. For military professionals there are interesting insights into military organizations and professionals caught up in chaotic modernization, even revolution. There are recapitulations of battles and campaigns of value to military historians and strategists. As the memoir of one of the more successful and important generals of modern China, this volume will doubtless hold an enduring place in professional military literature.

THOMAS H. ETZOLD
Naval War College

Shulimson, Jack and Johnson, Charles M. *U.S. Marines in Vietnam—1965*. Washington: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1978. 261pp.

U.S. Marines in Vietnam—1965 is a minutely detailed, tightly organized history. It generally follows the chronological sequence of the year 1965 as Marines were initially ordered into Vietnam, increased their strength over a period of time, and then took the fight to the VC and NVA. After presenting a general overview of the war in the first three chapters, the last 100 pages of the book discuss various elements of support (artillery, aviation, and logistics)

and other Marine activities (Special Landing Force, advisors).

The most interesting aspect of the book deals with the chain of command and command relationships. It reaffirms that General Westmoreland not only did not have a free hand to fight the war as he saw it, he also was plagued by the apparent requirement to get clearance from Washington or Hawaii for literally every step he took. The command relationship between MACV, III MAF, FMFPAC, JCS, HQMC, DOD, and the Vietnamese chain of command was complex and muddled, and it had to have hampered the war effort.

Another interesting aspect is developed in the section on logistics. The authors blame the major logistical problems that occurred late in 1965 on the fact that "... for the first time a combat force had been deployed with a computerized supply system." Recent newspaper articles on *Exercise Nifty Nugget—78* stated that a simulated war in Europe resulted in a resounding defeat for U.S./NATO forces because of a myriad of problems, most of which were logistic and many of which sound hauntingly similar to those experienced in Vietnam in 1965. One can't help but wonder whether the lessons so painfully and even tragically learned in Southeast Asia have been ignored or forgotten.

The book is well-documented and a successful effort was made to explain terminology so the uninitiated would not become confused. Prior to publication, the manuscript was sent to nearly 150 key people for their comments, many of which appear as explanatory footnotes. In the appendixes are various organization tables, command chronologies and a glossary of terms. All are helpful and informative. *U.S. Marines in Vietnam—1965* is interesting, accurate, and recommended reading for students of military history.

FRED T. FAGAN, JR.
Major, U.S. Marine Corps

Tiede, Roland V. *On the Analysis of Ground Combat*. Manhattan, Kans.: Military Affairs/Aerospace Publishing, 1978. 280pp.

From camp to camp through foul womb
of night,
The hum of either army stilly sounds,
That the fixed sentinels almost receive
The secret whisper of each other's watch.
Fire answers fire and through their paley
flames
Each battle sees the other's umbered
face.
Steed threatens steed in high and
boastful neighs
Piercing the night's dull ear, and from
the tents
The armorers accomplishing the
knights
With busy hammers closing the rivets
up,
Give dreadful note of preparation.

Shakespeare, *Henry V*, Act IV

Dreadful preparation for war characterizes our own age as much if not so dramatically as the preparation described in *Henry V*. In the combat development community the knights have been replaced by men whose uniforms resemble business suits, while the armorers actually wear business suits. The dreadful hammering is replaced by the nearly silent computer. The "paley flames" of an oily fire have been replaced by antiseptic fluorescent light. Today, knights and armorers nervously cluster about the sickly green cathode ray tube waiting for the numbers to arrive. Numbers portraying "force effectiveness," whatever that is, as well as cost will appear, causing some of these men to slink silently away. Other men will lustily cheer and tote numbers on hand-held computers, numbers that portray their slice of treasure.

Like it or not, cost and effectiveness analysis has replaced mere statements of need as the basis for every decision

affecting force development. Without debating the advantages or disadvantages of this kind of decisionmaking, we should simply recognize it as a fact of life. As military professionals we should be aware of the process called systems analysis and have some apprehension of how it works whether we are directly involved in the process or not. The fact is that key decisions involving doctrines and concepts, as well as material development and procurement, are made using cost and effectiveness analysis for support.

On the Analysis of Ground Combat, is a sufficient entree to this kind of analysis. In fact, Tiede explains that he has spent 25 years of a military career and a decade and one half as a civilian analyst assisting in bridging the gap between analysis for decisionmaking and its practitioners and the military or government decisionmakers. Additionally, Tiede offers that his book serves to both teach a beginning analyst about the military and to expose the professional military man to something of analysis.

I believe that he succeeds in about half of this goal. The attempt to accomplish the first goal will play to mixed reviews at best. In his attempt to "structure the battlefield" as well as describe for the young analyst something of combined arms operations, Tiede flies wide of the mark. He discusses doctrinal and tactical concepts that are obsolete; he has somehow missed the radical revision in tactics and doctrine that has occurred within the U.S. Army under the aegis of the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) since 1973. His discussions of mobile and zone defenses are inappropriate. To compound this problem, he offers a gratuitous discussion of a tactical proposal made by Gen. S.L.A. Marshall in 1954, a proposal which, while interesting, has never been more than a proposal. This aspect of the book is its weakest point.

112 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

On the other hand, his discussion of modeling combat, linked as it is to a discussion of modeling command and control functioning, is very pertinent not only to the Army but to other services. Tiede has some good ideas for getting at this problem, and if we are going to insist upon "micromanagement" of combat, his discussion quickly gets us to both the enormity of the problem and a beginning methodology to address this enormity. While the book ostensibly discusses land combat, the modeling that is the focus of discussion has to do with any service's command and control system with a view toward automating this critical combat function, or at least some portions of it. Herein lies the book's worth.

MICHAEL S. LANCASTER
Major, U.S. Army

Taylor, Gordon. *The Sea Chaplains, A History of the Chaplains of the Royal Navy*. Oxford: B.H. Blackwell Ltd., 1978. 606pp.

In his book, *The Sea Chaplains*, Gordon Taylor has focused attention upon the significant role that religion has played in the development of the Royal Navy. It is worth recalling that it was a religious issue that brought about the revolution of 1688 just as it was a religious motive that inspired Queen Mary to found Greenwich Hospital. In recognizing the influence that religion has had in the history of the Royal Navy, Taylor has written a remarkable history of those men who served in the naval service as chaplains. Their story is not only a chronicle of how these men followed their vocation while they served their country, but it is also a reminder that the "galaxy of heroes" associated with the Royal Navy includes the names of men of the cloth as well as those who took up arms.

Taylor has drawn his material from a wide range of sources. The records of

the Admiralty, diaries, letters, journals and private papers as well as the reminiscences of many serving chaplains have all been used to tell a story of dedicated service that stretches from the first recorded moments of the Navy to the "Cod War." The story illustrates in detail the hardships as well as the romance of life aboard ship. While they served in the ships of the Royal Navy the chaplains were as much a part of the daily routine as were the officers and men. As such they suffered the cramped quarters, the lack of privacy and the unpalatable food that characterized long sea service. Yet in the course of their duties the sea chaplains were in a unique position to bear witness to the unforgettable moments "that are forever enshrined in the annals of the history of the Royal Navy." Many chaplains distinguished themselves in the face of battle with acts of bravery and heroism that remain legend in the history of a service that has known many heroes. In the journals, papers and letters of the chaplains who witnessed or participated in the skirmishes and battles that the Navy fought are preserved articulate accounts of what happened at the great events and turning points in British naval history.

The lure of the glory of battle or the romance of life at sea might have encouraged a few chaplains to seek a life in the Navy. Most, however, as Taylor points out, probably went to their sea parishes because "... they could not find a position at home" or "... when the deprivations implicit in the sea chaplain's vocation were lessened by the patronage of commanders." These men belonged by vocation to a calling in which they might have expected a life that would contain a considerable degree of peace and serenity. Instead, as sea chaplains they were often caught up in the tumult of a ministry in a service that for most of its history was guardian to a great, far-flung naval empire. A peaceful rural parish was not to be their

lot, for many in time of trouble were apt to lose their lives as well as their parishes.

Like the ordinary seamen, the chaplains faced the danger or boredom or loneliness inherent in life at sea. The chaplain, however, faced a greater task for it fell to him to minister to the spiritual and moral needs of his flock, a duty that called for considerable stamina and courage. In 1930, writing to a serving sea chaplain, the Bishop of Salisbury described the difficulty of the chaplain's circumstance: "He is like a single stone-mason quarrying in a huge quarry of granite . . ."

Life at sea was not limited to care for the spiritual needs of the crews. Many chaplains took on additional duties of serving as secretaries to their admirals or performing other tasks aboard ship. Nelson's chaplain, Scott, for example, performed a variety of duties that included acting as ship's purser and assuming responsibility for victualing of the admiral's ships.

The boredom that was a reflection of much of naval life was eased by seamen through an imaginative variety of diversions and entertainments. Many Victorian and Edwardian chaplains

" . . . ensured recognition of their ministry by their secular and athletic attainments." George Leigh Blake, chaplain of the flagship, *Inconstant*, was a man of singular accomplishments. He was not only a swordsman and angler of reknown, but also a musician of note who played the violoncello with distinction. The crew was often entertained by Mr. Blake who was accompanied in the playing of sonatas by a lieutenant in *Inconstant* who was a good pianist, Prince Louis of Battenberg.

It is evident that *The Sea Chaplains* contains a wealth of detail that has been meticulously recorded and skillfully related to the major events of British naval history and will, therefore, prove invaluable as a source for further research and study. In addition, Taylor has been able to capture and reflect the warmth and character of the sea chaplains whose stories are often unusual and sometimes remarkable. In this regard, the volume also will stand as a tribute to those men whose service to the Royal Navy across the centuries has hitherto been neither widely recognized nor sufficiently acknowledged.

K. D. LOGAN
Ottawa, Canada

RECENT BOOKS

Selected Accessions of the Naval War College Library

Annotated by

Ann Hardy, with Kathleen Ashook
Doris Baginski and Mary Ann Varoutsos

Clarke, Douglas L. *The Missing Man: Politics and the MIA*. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. 121pp. \$2.75

A full accounting of Americans missing in action during the Vietnam war remains a point of contention between the United States and Vietnam. Captain Clarke, a naval aviator who flew in Vietnam and conducted this study while a student at the National War College, considers how the political ramifications of the MIA issue have negatively affected both the men's families and the U.S. national interests.