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Die Funkaufklärung und ihre Rolle im Zweiten Weltkrieg

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national liberation through local wars with conventional weapons to widespread or "central" war with limited use of nuclear weapons. Osgood examines each level in considerable detail in this compact book.

In the process he takes a hard look at the Vietnam war, drawing therefrom four reasons for failure:

1. . . . South Vietnam too vulnerable to insurgency to preserve its independence or to be rescued. . . .

2. American military not ready to fight an insurgency; they transformed the conflict into an expanding conventional war that the public was unwilling to sustain. . . .

3. Incremental expansion of the war was inefficient militarily and fatal politically, but it does not necessarily follow that rapid escalation would have been politically feasible or successful. . . .

4. National interests at stake were not sufficiently compelling to Americans to have justified a scale and duration of combat necessary to win the war.

Lessons learned from these reasons for failure should be regarded as "highly contingent," for no future conflict will replicate the conditions of Vietnam:

- National interests must be more faithfully assessed before commitment.

- If indirect assistance is not sufficient to rescue a beleaguered government, direct participation by foreign troops is not likely to succeed. . . .

- The United States must avoid fighting an unconventional war with its own forces. Counterinsurgency remains a task for special forces.

Has the Vietnam experience affected U.S. strategy in the Third World, where limited conventional wars may be required because significant U.S. interests are at stake? Osgood is afraid that it has. ". . . Vietnam has suspended creative thought in this area. Where foreign

policy is most in doubt military strategy is least active." This is unfortunate because in a dynamic world many more nations now are willing and capable of engaging in conventional conflict.

At the central war level, Osgood discusses the mismatch between U.S. concepts of limiting the use of nuclear weapons and Soviet notions of war fighting and winning. Much of this ground has been plowed before, but the treatment in *Limited War Revisited* is more clear and concise. Osgood concludes that the Soviet missile buildup seems destined to provide Moscow with a theoretical advantage (by U.S. logic) in waging controlled strategic war.

All of this means that concepts and strategies of limited war have fallen on hard times in the United States. There is much disillusionment. But as the alternative is even less appealing, limited war theory remains alive.

Limited War Revisited is most perceptive, balanced, and pungently presented. Its rationale and commentary, quickly sketched here, will be widely quoted.

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Rohwer, Jürgen and Jaeckel, Eberhard.
Die Funkaufklärung und ihre Rolle im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Stuttgart: Motorbuchverlag, 1979. 406pp.

This book deals with one of the best kept secrets of World War II: radio intelligence.

In 1974 it became known that British decoding specialists had, throughout the war, been able to decrypt all German messages encoded by the then used cipher machine ENIGMA, a machine in use from the very beginning of the war. Subsequent commentaries in the media gave the impression that the Allies knew all essential operations and operating instructions well in advance and the question then arose: why did it take so long to defeat

Germany? To bring the truth to light about these speculations an international conference was held in November 1978 in Bonn and Stuttgart. Witnesses of and historians concerned with WW II as well as experts on radio intelligence and intelligence personnel from Great Britain, Poland, Finland, Canada, Italy, France, Norway, Greece, the United States and Germany assembled and discussed the subject.

Professor Dr. Rohwer has put together the lectures, reports and discussions of that conference and combined and commented on them in this book.

Besides the very important influence that radio intelligence had on various operations, the history, technology, and development of cipher techniques and cipher machines are discussed in an interesting and understandable manner.

Great Britain and Poland realized first the importance of having an effective decoding organization. This way of gaining information is considered more reliable than spies. If one is able to decode the complete radio traffic of an adversary, one can gain insight into his strategy and tactics. The participants at the conference learned that Germany put less emphasis on decoding than did her opponents because the offensive party is less interested in the enemy's strategy than the defender. Besides, the German specialists were convinced that it was impossible to break their codes. This mental attitude changed as the war progressed.

By using some carefully selected, very interesting examples the book demonstrates the great tactical advantage the Allies had because they knew the German intentions. The air battle of Britain, the battle of Midway, the battle of the Atlantic (perhaps the longest battle in history), and the invasion by the Allies at Normandy were decisively influenced by the fact that the Allies were informed of German intentions by radio intelligence. It would, however, carry the successes of radio intelligence

too far if one said that by this means World War II was won. Still, there is no doubt that the war was shortened and drastically influenced by advantages decoding ENIGMA offered. If Admiral Nimitz had not known the position of the Japanese carriers the U.S. Navy could have sustained a decisive defeat, and that would have influenced the war decisively. And if the Allies had not known the positions of the German U-boats, the battle of the Atlantic would have lasted longer.

In any case, because of radio intelligence the Allies were much better informed about German capabilities and that led to a much better appreciation of the situation.

The book is a rich source for military officers and historians as well as for technicians in the field of radio intelligence. Those who do not read German will be pleased to know that the book will be published in English later this year.

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Ruge, Friedrich. *The Soviets as Naval Opponents 1941-1945*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1979. 210pp.

At first glance this book may seem just the type of inspirational reading necessary for pondering ways that a shrinking U.S. Navy might address the challenge of a burgeoning Soviet Fleet. After all, "track records" are an important element in any evaluation process and what better source than one who has fought both sides. Alas, once again things are not what they seem. Admiral Ruge is neither scout nor oracle. He does appear to fear the results of that fine old practice of punishing the bearer of bad news, however; there is no bad news for Western readers in this book. Instead of the usual concern of asking the warrior-author to be dispassionate when writing of combat is the nagging sense that the tone here is set by the market rather