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The Shore Establishment of the Navy is managed by a mix of senior military and civilian personnel working closely together. There are many strengths in the system, including the different skills the managers bring to their position. Ideally, the knowledge of the operating forces and the fresh perspectives brought by the military officer are blended with the continuity and procedural and technical competence of the civilian. The relationship is not always smooth, however, and a first look is provided here.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SENIOR NAVY CIVILIAN AND MILITARY EXECUTIVES

by

Laurie A. Broedling, Alan W. Lau, and Arthur Newman

Introduction. The role of career civil service employees in the Department of Defense (DOD) has been surprisingly neglected. Virtually all the systematic attention paid to civilians working in the Defense Establishment has been directed at noncareer civilians. These represent political appointees who serve in the top policymaking positions, usually for a short period of time. They are few in number. On the other hand, civil service personnel in the Military Establishment number almost one million, thus representing almost one-third of all DOD's manpower and almost one-half of the entire federal civil service work force. Moreover, they represent an extremely stable work force with very low turnover. These career civilians are generally concentrated in a variety of areas of military support, particularly weapons maintenance, weapons procurement, and R&D. Moreover, there are senior career

civilians in almost every headquarters function. The only area in which civil servants have little direct involvement is actual military operations. In view of their influence on the Defense Establishment, it is important to make this group an object of academic inquiry.

Any inquiry into the role of career civilians in DOD necessarily includes their relationships with military personnel. In many instances, civilian and military personnel work very closely together. While there is a paucity of systematic research describing this relationship, there is no lack of anecdotal information. Anyone who has worked in an organization with a military-civilian mix knows there is a plethora of generalizations, stereotypes, myths, jokes, and labels applied to each group and to their relationship. Among other things, the civilian group is often characterized as doing just enough to get by, being clockwatchers ("Don't

stand in the hall at 1600 or you'll get trampled in the stampede"), and wedded to an embedded set of bureaucratic procedures. The military group is often characterized as unnecessarily obsequious to their military superiors, primarily interested in doing whatever is necessary to get promoted rather than whatever is best for the organization ("ticket punching"), trying to reinvent the wheel, and only being interested in quick fixes (so improvements are made on "their watch"). In general, there seems to be little doubt that the problem of civilian-military animosity exists and is having detrimental consequences on the U.S. Military Establishment.¹ Moreover, of all the sociological problems confronting the U.S. military, this is the only one that has received almost no institutional or academic attention. This is indeed surprising, given the probable extent of its negative effect.

It should not be surprising that this animosity and stereotyping occurs. The situation has most of the elements that create bias, misunderstanding, and conflict between differing groups of people. The two groups are selected differently, have different expectations, and are administered under vastly different personnel systems.² Because this seems to represent a real source of prejudice, perhaps we even need a label for it to indicate its parallel to other, more familiar biases such as racism and sexism; and because there seems to be no preexisting label that is appropriate, we will take the liberty of coining a term, *milicisim*, to describe the phenomenon.

While some of the stereotyping mentioned above seems to occur wherever there is a military-civilian mix, the exact nature of the stereotyping varies with the organizational unit and the type of people involved.³ In the Navy, for example, units doing maintenance (e.g., shipyards, public works centers) differ from R&D field units in that relatively more of the technical decisionmaking is

done by the military in the maintenance units than in the R&D units. The keyword here is "relatively"; both types of units are almost entirely manned by civilians except for a handful of the top positions. Also, in maintenance units there is, on the average, more demographic disparity between the military and civilians, with the former having more formal education, representing less of an ethnic mix. In the R&D units military and civilian personnel tend to be more similar to one another in terms of socioeconomic characteristics. This relationship also differs between field and headquarters activities. In the field, the structural relationships are quite clearly defined and in the same pattern across similar types of field units. In headquarters units, there is no predominant structural pattern; military personnel work for civilians or vice versa; a few military personnel work with many civilians or vice versa. In headquarters units, the socioeconomic status and demographic characteristics of most civilian and military personnel who work together tend to be fairly similar. In summary, while general patterns of attitudes and stereotyping exist across DOD, there also seem to be differences in their exact nature depending upon the specific type of organization involved. Empirical research would help to better define and describe the phenomenon of *milicisim*.

Relationship Between Navy Civilian and Military Executives.

Given the general lack of documented research on this topic, a major purpose of this paper is to present research findings on the relationship between career civilian and military executives in the Navy. These findings are drawn from a job analysis of senior career civilians in the Navy. The details of the full study design and all the findings are documented elsewhere.⁴

80 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Study Method. The two sets of participants in the study were a representative sample of (1) career civilian executives, i.e., those in GS-16, 17, 18 or equivalent Public Law positions and (2) military executives who supervise civilian executives or influence policy regarding their employment. Sixty percent of the civilian executives are in headquarters and 40 percent in the field. The majority of them work in areas related to weapons system research, development, or procurement. Three-quarters of them work in organizations that deal primarily in the physical sciences or engineering. Data were collected in a variety of ways, including personal interviews, work diaries kept by executives of their daily activities (civilian executives only), observations of the work activities of executives, and structured questionnaires.⁵ The information was collected between July 1977 and March 1978.

Study Findings. The civilian-military executive relationship has at least three aspects, structural, functional, and attitudinal. The first relates to the administrative systems that govern civilian and military positions; the second to how military and civilian executives function in their jobs; and the third to the opinions and perceptions that civilian and military executives hold toward one another based on their group membership. These three aspects are interrelated, with structure, function and attitudes all influencing one another.

ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS. A number of important issues were identified in this regard. One pertains to the general differences between the military and civilian personnel systems. Another to that specific part of the civilian personnel system regulating the executive ranks. The last pertains to the changes that have occurred in the civilian per-

sonnel system and its relationship to the military system.

The military and civilian personnel systems are, in general, very different, with civilians being administered under the civil service system applicable to almost all federal employees. This difference may in fact be the single most influential factor that distinguishes the two groups. The military personnel system is administratively centralized, with promotions and reassignments being performed by a headquarters group. The civilian personnel system is, on the other hand, much more decentralized, with most decisions made at the local level within individual Navy organizations. The military system is based primarily on a rank-in-the-person concept while the civilian one is based primarily on a rank-in-the-job concept. Among other things, this means that one's military rank is dependent primarily on one's demonstrated abilities and qualifications relative to all other similar people in the Navy. It means that one's civilian rank is dependent on the characteristics of the job one is filling. Therefore, the official characteristics of the job are considerably more important to civilians than to military. Also, competition for most civilian jobs tends to be relatively restricted.

Another area of major difference is the performance evaluation systems for the two groups. Distinguishing characteristics include: (1) military promotions are based on the number allowed in each rank while civilian promotions are based on specific jobs to be filled; (2) military promotions are based primarily on periodic "fitness reports" while civilian promotions are based primarily on evaluations made at the time of the promotion decision rather than on the periodic performance review; (3) the official forms and ratings to be given differ.⁶ All these differences relate to yet another crucial distinction: The military system is essentially a rotational one in which people are

SENIOR EXECUTIVES 81

periodically transferred and promotions are usually to new assignments in different organizations; the civilian system is essentially a stable one in which many people spend large portions of their career (or even their full career) in the same organizational segment, progressing within a given career ladder. Another related aspect is that the civil service system, far more so than the military system, encourages specialization. Last but not least, the systems differ in terms of job security.

While the preceding discussion describes the civilian personnel system in general, it should be noted that, at the time of this study, there was a special system for administering executive level positions. The Navy's Civilian Executive Management Board and its subpanels had responsibility for allocating executive billets, filling executive positions, and providing for executive development. Consequently, there was some centralization of administration introduced at the executive ranks. In actuality, however, there was still a fair amount of decentralized control exercised in this process. Also, while executive development was part of the Board's official charter, this part of the charter was not acted upon.

In October 1978 two very important structural changes were made affecting Navy civilians in general and Navy civilian executives in particular.⁷ These were the Navy's Total Force reorganization and the Civil Service Reform Act. Since 1966 the Navy's Office of Civilian Personnel, which was responsible for implementing and executing civilian personnel policy, reported directly to the Navy's Secretariat rather than via the military chain of command. In other words, no one in the military structure, including the Chief of Naval Operations, had formal authority for implementing civilian personnel policy. Since 1966 this organizational arrangement had been continually questioned and, sometimes bitterly, disputed. The

feeling on the part of the majority of both civilian and military executives interviewed in this study was that the arrangement was a definite problem because the Military Establishment had responsibility but not sufficient authority for managing the civilian work force. On the average, military interviewees felt more strongly in this regard than did civilian interviewees. Additional fuel to the reorganization fire was added by growing criticism from Congress regarding the inadequacy of the Navy's manpower planning system. One of the primary cited failures was the lack of integration between the systems for planning civilian and military manpower. Questionnaire responses in our study given in the spring of 1978 regarding the effects of integrating civilian and military manpower planning, indicated that both civilian and military executives believed the effects would be generally positive. The average responses are shown in Table 1. These responses also indicate the military executives, in general, to have been somewhat more positive toward the idea than civilians.

As a result, in October 1978 the Navy was officially reorganized in accordance with what was called the "Total Force" concept. This meant that planning and policy development is to be done with an eye to the Force as a whole—including active-duty military, reserve military, civil servants, and those defense contractor employees who constitute a permanent arm of the Defense Establishment. It also meant that the civilian personnel administration function was moved under the Chief of Naval Operations, leaving only the highest level civilian policy formulation function within the Secretariat. The effect of moving the civilian personnel function under the military chain of command is profound. As with any major organizational change, it will probably take many years for these effects to be fully felt. In addition to

82 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

TABLE 1—PERCEPTIONS OF EFFECT OF INTEGRATION OF CIVILIAN AND MILITARY MANPOWER PLANNING

Item ^a	Civilian Executives (N = 106)		Military Executives (N = 66)		Significance
	Mean ^b	S.D.	Mean ^b	S.D.	
Personnel use	0.5	2.2	1.8	1.7	*
Personnel costs	0.6	1.6	-0.5	1.6	*
Training and development of civilians	0.2	1.8	0.9	1.4	*
Training and development of military	0.5	1.6	0.7	1.5	--
Forecasting requirements for civilian management and executive billets	0.0	1.7	1.4	1.5	*
Forecasting requirements for officer billets	0.4	1.6	0.9	1.7	--

^aApproximately 25 percent of both military and civilian did not respond to these items.

^bBased on a 7-point scale where 3 = Positive effect, 0 = No impact, and -3 = Negative effect.

*p < 05.

integrated manpower planning, there should be at least two results. One is the integration, or at least coordination, of many civilian and military personnel programs that heretofore have been developed completely independently, such as Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO), and management development. The second is that military line managers will assume more responsibility for the civilians who work for them.

It is quite extraordinary that a second change of equally major import also occurred in October 1978—the passage of the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA). CSRA mandates a number of major changes in civilian personnel administration, including the use of performance standards, the streamlining of procedures to remove employees for poor performance, pay for performance at the managerial and executive levels, and executive and management development. For the executive ranks, the changes have been embodied in the Senior Executive Service (SES), which

now encompasses most of those formerly in the supergrade ranks and the political appointees. One of the concepts underlying SES is that people at these levels should function more as general managers and should rotate across various jobs rather than remain in one organizational subunit. There are strong accompanying initiatives for management and executive development to insure the SES members have the skills to fulfill this new, less parochial, role. While administration of the SES is still delegated to each agency (i.e., mobility across agencies is encouraged but not required), SES administration in the Navy seems to be more centralized than the previous Navy system. While it is too early to be certain, it seems as if the mobility concept for executives will be acted on in the Navy. As with the Total Force reorganization, it will be many years before the full effects of the CSRA will become apparent.

FUNCTIONS. Civilian executives interact closely with military executives.

Many civilian executives are supervised by, share their jobs with, or supervise military officers. For example, 97 percent of the military executives in the sample reported work-related interactions with civilian executives at least once a day. With respect to job sharing, it was frequently pointed out in the interviews, that executive jobs are shared by two or more people. For example, a laboratory is often run by a commanding officer and a technical director. In response to the civilian questionnaires, 60 percent reported that they share the responsibilities of running their organizational unit with others, excluding their own department or branch heads (37 percent with military personnel; 13 percent with both military and civilian personnel; and 10 percent with civilian personnel). Finally, 76 percent of respondents to the military questionnaire reported that they share job responsibilities (21 percent with other military personnel; 24 percent with both military and civilian personnel; and 31 percent with civilian personnel).

At the outset of the study, it was assumed that civilian executives were in staff rather than line positions, providing advice to military and noncareer civilians having line authority. Questionnaire responses, however, showed that 66 percent of civilian executives describe their job as line; 20 percent as staff; and 14 percent as half line, half staff.

All of the interviewees, both military and civilian, stated that the relationship between military and civil service personnel was important to the effective functioning of the Navy. Several noted that the intent of the civilian-military mix is to have civilians provide the continuity and corporate memory; and the rotating military, new suggestions as well as knowledge about fleet needs. When this relationship works properly, the civilians prevent the military from "reinventing the wheel" and provide

them with technical and procedural knowledge about how to get things done in the system; and the military prevent the civilians from becoming too ingrained in the same way of doing things and from losing touch with fleet needs. Thus, the relationship between military and civilian executives is intended to be complementary. All civilian interviewees felt that the fact that their job is imbedded in a military system has far-reaching implications for what they do, how they do it, and what is expected of them. They believe that there is a definite difference between DOD and non-DOD federal executive jobs.

Because most Navy civilian executives "came up through the ranks" of the Navy civil service hierarchy, rather than coming in from the private sector or even other government agencies, the civilian personnel system has had a definite effect on them. The decentralized system did encourage specialization and discouraged mobility. Therefore most civilian executives have a considerably narrower set of organizational experiences than their military counterparts. Most military executives felt that this fact works to the disadvantage of civilian executives by the time they reach the executive level. This is because, most civilians at the executive level were found to be functioning almost exclusively as managers rather than as bench scientists or technical experts. This is true even though most came up the ranks from a technical career field and never received any systematic training or development in management. Even many civilian executives saw their lack of preparation for the managerial role as a disadvantage. With regard to mobility, however, they felt that for developmental purposes, it would be better to rotate earlier in one's career, prior to becoming an executive.

ATTITUDES. Given the close working relationships among civilian and military executives in the Navy's Shore

84 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Establishment, the attitudes they hold toward one another rake on great importance. This is particularly true in those instances in which a job is shared between civilians and military. In our study we found the mutual attitudes of military and civilian executives to vary a great deal. Where attitudes were positive, all the benefits of such a complementary relationship accrued. Numerous instances of genuine teamwork and a high degree of mutual respect were discovered. On the other hand, however, some intensely negative attitudes and relationships were also discovered. While not large in number, the dysfunctional consequences for the organizations in which these occurred seemed to be profound. The majority of cases of extreme negative attitude were held by military toward civilians rather than vice versa. Moreover, the few military executives who expressed vehemently negative feelings either toward civilian employees in general or toward civilian executives as a group were for the most part in very influential positions—heads of organizations manned predominantly by civilians or responsible for civilian personnel policy administration in such organizations.

In the midrange between these extremes were many civilian and military executives who respected one another as individuals but did have negative attitudes toward each other's system and attributed perceived faults to the system rather than to individuals. From the military point of view, for example, there was concern voiced over not being able to reassign civilian executives easily, thus making the military reluctant to place civilians in key, decision-making slots. In the military system if such a placement is made and does not work out, a transfer can be effected almost immediately. From the civilian point of view, for example, resentment exists over some military officers' propensity to make decisions based on little prior knowledge but on the "can do"

attitude fostered by the military system. This is seen as a consequence of the very frequent rotation of military personnel. In general, the mutual attitudes held at the executive level were reasonably positive, probably owing to the fact that both groups are highly selected and because people at that level could distinguish between personal attributes and effects of the "system." All those who spoke to the general topic agreed, however, that there are definite problems with negative civilian-military attitudes and relationships at lower levels in their organizations and that this problem warrants attention.

Many military and civilian executives expressed frustration and resentment over the lack of flexibility in the civil service system for rewarding good civilian employees, punishing bad ones, and reassigning them as work demands shift. The depth of this resentment was greater on the part of military than civilian executives, however. In discussing these issues with staff specialists in civilian personnel administration, an interesting perceptual discrepancy emerged. The personnel administrators for the most part felt that the current system had sufficient flexibility to meet line management's goals—that one could in fact reward, punish and reassign, all within the rules and regulations. They felt that line management, particularly military line management, often could not take such actions because of insufficient knowledge about civilian personnel procedures, unwarranted preconceived notions that such actions were impossible, or simply not being willing to take the time.

To determine the specific components of the negative attitudes identified during the interviews, in the questionnaire civilian and military respondents were asked to indicate how much they agreed with a variety of statements about the military-civilian relationship. As shown in Table 2, for 9 out of the 12 items included in both questionnaires,

SENIOR EXECUTIVES 85

civilian and military responses differed significantly ($p < .05$). This indicates a fairly high discrepancy between their attitudes toward each other and their relationship. Specifically, both groups on the average felt positive about the military-civilian partnership and said that military executives solicit the advice of civilian executives. However, military executives felt that this was much more so the case than did civilian executives. Moreover, there was a slight feeling among civilian executives that they were treated as second-class citizens by military executives, while the average military executive felt that this was not the case. Military executives showed modest agreement with the idea that they know more about what is best for the Navy than do civilian executives, a point over which the average civilian executive disagreed. There was strong difference of opinion over whether civilian executives are "clockwatchers" and put in fewer working hours than do military executives. There was additional information in the questionnaire related to this issue of working hours. Respondents were asked how many hours per week they worked in the office and at home. Civilian executives reported working an average of 52 hours per week at the office and 8 hours at home. Military executives reported an average of 55 hours at the office and 6 hours at home. Lastly, there was considerable difference of opinion over the comparability of military and civilian executive compensation, with the military executives feeling it is not comparable. Information gathered from the interviews indicated that many military executives feel undercompensated relative to their civilian counterparts.

During the interviews in this study it was found that many of the interviewees favored the newer concepts embodied in SES although as with all of CSRA, the pay aspects were the most controversial. Military executives, more than civilians, saw executive mobility as a

good thing, both for developmental purposes and because it gives senior executives the opportunity to transfer easily a civilian executive who is not performing well in a given job to another job. In essence, the military interviewees saw the SES as being similar and having the same advantages as the military system.

Discussion and Conclusions. The Navy's Shore Establishment is managed by a mix of military and civilian personnel working closely together. This arrangement has many potential strengths. The underlying intent is to maximize the complementary nature of two groups of people, each of whom brings a somewhat different set of skills to the job. The military personnel provide knowledge of the operating forces and a fresh perspective, while civilians provide continuity and procedural and technical competence.

While in theory this complementary relationship seems well conceived, there are a number of factors that act to diminish its quality. One factor is associated with the great difference in the administrative and compensation systems governing the two groups. With the advent of CSRA and particularly SES, the differences are lessened considerably and therefore should serve to ease some of the tension. There is a danger, however, that the SES will make the two groups too much alike at executive levels, thus losing the advantage of having two different groups of people. For example, if both civilian and military executives are rotated with equal frequency, who will provide the corporate memory and procedural knowledge? Given the intense procedural complexity of the headquarters world, this could become a problem. Another factor is the social dynamics that occur between any two groups of people who are different. The biases and stereotyping that we have labeled "militarism" seem to be representative of the processes that

86 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW**TABLE 2—PERCEPTIONS OF MILITARY-CIVILIAN RELATIONSHIPS**

Item ^a	Civilian Executives (N = 210)		Military Executives (N = 66)		Significance
	Mean ^b	S.D.	Mean ^b	S.D.	
Military personnel evaluate the job performance of other military using different criteria from those they use to evaluate civilians.	5.4	1.5	4.9	1.8	*
How civilian executives carry out their jobs varies a great deal and depends upon their relationship with particular military personnel.	5.6	1.4	5.5	1.4	--
There is a productive partnership between military and civilian executives in commands where they work together.	5.3	1.3	6.3	1.0	*
Military more so than civilian executives resent the job protection afforded civilians by the civil service system.	4.7	2.0	4.4	1.6	--
Military and civilian executives in comparable positions get comparable compensation, all benefits considered.	4.4	1.8	2.4	1.7	*
High-ranking military personnel in the Shore Establishment solicit advice from civilian executives on most important matters.	4.7	1.5	5.8	1.1	*
Civilian executives in the Shore Establishment are often treated as "second-class citizens" by the high-ranking military.	4.3	1.9	2.8	1.5	*
Civilian executives have a sufficiently accurate perception of fleet requirements.	4.2	1.5	3.5	1.4	*
The primary function of civilian managers and executives in Navy headquarters organizations is to supply the "corporate memory" of each command.	3.8	1.7	4.0	1.5	--
High-ranking military personnel in my command make most of the important decisions by themselves.	3.7	1.9	3.0	1.8	*

Item ^a	Civilian Executives (N = 210)		Military Executives (N = 66)		Significance
	Mean ^b	S.D.	Mean ^b	S.D.	
Military executives generally know more about what is best for the Navy than civilian executives.	3.4	1.6	4.3	1.6	*
Civilian executives are more often "clockwatchers" and put in fewer working hours than do military executives.	2.3	1.8	4.1	1.8	*
Military personnel in the Shore Establishment are not sufficiently informed, given their level of authority.	4.5	1.8	--	--	N/A
Civilian executives should not desire to make final policy; their role is strictly a staff one.	1.7	1.2	--	--	N/A
Civilian executives would be more fully used and trusted by military personnel if they had a broader range of job and organizational experience.	4.0	2.2	--	--	N/A

^aThe last three items were not included in the military questionnaire.

^bBased on a 7-point scale, where 1 = Not at all true and 7 = Very true.

*p < .05.

occur in the more familiar ethnic and sexual "isms" of our society.

A third and closely related factor is the exposure patterns of the two groups. Many military executives have not worked directly with civilians until well into their careers. We found some military executives in our sample who had had no such experience until they attained flag rank and then were given direct responsibility for large numbers of civilians. Many military officers spend years in the fleet hearing the popular stereotypes and jokes about civilians without ever having had the opportunity to be exposed to any disconfirming evidence in the form of hard-working, dedicated, competent civil servants. While this problem is less

severe on the civilian side, it does exist. Even though most civilians are indirectly exposed to military personnel early in their careers, it is not until they reach mid or upper management that they generally work closely with military personnel.

A fourth factor is that there is very little systematic knowledge or education given each group about the other. This fact is particularly serious with respect to lack of military knowledge of the civilian personnel administration system, especially the civil service rules and regulations. While such knowledge may increase understanding and general acceptance of civilians and their system by the military, there is a far more important reason to impart this knowledge. Many

88 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

of these military have direct line management responsibility for civilians and execute civilian personnel policy for their commands. It is virtually impossible to perform these functions without a working knowledge of the civilian personnel system.

There are a variety of ways of dealing with the civilian-military relationship problem. One way is through imparting knowledge to each group about the other. The Navy has taken one step in this direction in its course for Prospective Commanding Officers and Executive Officers of shore stations, which includes material on the civilian personnel system. Another solution is to modify Navy officer career patterns to provide for special development of officers who will ultimately command shore stations. Kay has argued for such a change because of his strong feeling that experience or even command at sea is insufficient to prepare one for command ashore.⁸ He suggests that at the career midpoint, preferably upon completion of command at sea as a commander, officers who so request would be diverted into the field of Shore Establishment management. These officers would be offered training in labor relations, financial management, budget planning, nonappropriated fund administration, civilian personnel management, and public relations.

While increased training and mutual knowledge will certainly help, the first basic step is to confront openly the problem as it presently exists. This requires getting past the stage of anecdotal information to a systematic qualitative and quantitative description of the problem and its effect on military organizations. The information in the study described here is one step in that direction. We found a wide variation in the quality of relationships, many contributing factors, and dysfunctional consequences where the relationship was poor. Additional information collected during this study and during research

projects in field units of the Shore Establishment suggests much more serious problems exist below the executive level. The military-civilian relationship is an interesting and complex institutional problem awaiting institutional attention.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Laurie A. Broedling was educated at Brown and George Washington Universities, earning the Ph.D. degree in organizational psychology from the latter. She is a Supervisory Research Psychologist at the Navy Personnel

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BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Alan W. Lau received the Ph.D. degree in applied psychology from the University of Utah. He is a personnel research psychologist at the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center, San Diego. His research is

centered on job redesign, leadership effectiveness, organizational behavior, and personnel selection and measurement. Dr Lau is the author of several journal articles.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Arthur R. Newman was educated at Harvey Mudd College and San Diego State University. He is an operations researcher at the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center, San Diego. His research interests include incentive award systems, work motivation, productivity, and organizational behavior and he has co-written several articles and technical reports in these areas.

NOTES

1. Anthony L. Wermuth, "Civil-military Relations in the Department of Defense: Perspectives, Perceptions, and Proposals," *The Bureaucracy*, Spring 1980, pp. 26-34; M.J. Korbol, *Praise, Punishment and Promotion: A Handbook of AF Civilian Employees for the AF Military Manager*, 1315-78 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College, May 1978); John J. Baker, *A Study of Comparative Research on Organizational and Behavioral Factors Affecting the Integrated Military-Civil Service Workforce*, AD-B040 8111 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College, May 1977).

2. J.F. Landolt, Jr., *The Air Force Civilian and Military Personnel Systems—A Synopsis of Their Similarities and Differences*, 1410-78 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College, May 1978).

3. There are also differences between the Navy, Army, and the Air Force that are at least partially a function of structure. For example, the Navy has almost twice as many civilian executives as do the Army and Air Force. One reason is that the Navy has a large, in-house R&D capability, and most of the top R&D management structure is civilian.

4. Alan W. Lau, et al., *The Nature of the Navy Civilian Executive Job: Behavior and Development*, NPRDC TR 79-27 (San Diego: Navy Personnel Research and Development Center, July 1979). Also summarized in Laurie A. Broedling and Alan W. Lau, *Executive Summary: Navy Civilian Executive Study*, SR 79-10 (San Diego: Navy Personnel Research and Development Center, January 1979).

5. With respect to the structured questionnaires, one version was sent to the full population of career civilian executives and a second, shorter, version was sent to all military executives who supervise civilian executives or make policy in their regard. The return rates for the questionnaires were 58 percent for the civilian sample and 67 percent for the military sample.

6. W.H. Githens and Richard S. Elster, "Comparison of Navy Officer and Civilian Performance Evaluations," *Proceedings, Psychology in the Department of Defense, Sixth Symposium*, April 1978, pp. 265-266.

7. While the study's information was collected prior to the official institution of these major changes in the civilian personnel system, the proposed changes were being discussed and debated during the time of the study. Consequently, the authors received a great deal of information relating to these changes.

8. Howard N. Kay, "Managing the Shore Establishment," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, December 1977, pp. 19-25.

