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The Barometer

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
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THE BAROMETER

Get the War College Back in the Navy

Sir:

The composition and organization of the Naval War College faculty and staff shown by your listing in the September-October 1981 issue are frightening! Two of the three War College departments are headed by civilians, the "Advisors" do not include a naval officer and your "Board of Advisors" includes only one naval officer.

The operative words in the name of your institution are "naval" and "war." Haven't you forgotten this in taking on the trappings of academia? Why all the emphasis on degrees, civilian professors and academic titles? For example, why list Frank M. Snyder as Professor when to most of us in the military the facts that he is Captain Frank M. Snyder, USN (Ret.) and is an experienced communicator are much more telling qualifications for someone on your faculty.

Isn't the Naval War College supposed to be developing men who in peacetime have the wisdom and moral courage to develop and create a Navy which can accomplish its missions and who in wartime, have the presence of mind and physical courage to lead it to victory in combat? Look at the weakened state of today's Navy. When have Naval War College graduates spoken out to prevent it? Where are they speaking out today to reverse it?

Let us get the Naval War College back in the Navy. Let us recreate the challenging pre World War II environment which helped develop the Kings, Nimitzes and Spruances.

Cdr. Paul H. Backus, USN (Ret.)

Sir:

In his very interesting letter, Paul H. Backus, Commander, USN (Ret.), has asked a valid and timely question. This is, indeed, a good time to debate and to reconsider the missions of the Naval War College, to ask what it is that the Navy needs most and should most endeavor to obtain from senior service education. The men who go down to the sea in ships are too few; those who conduct the Navy's affairs ashore in many cases do so at 71% manning—all

this on the verge of one of the biggest increases in capital expenditures in the Navy's history.

What the Navy needs from its War College cannot be supplied wholly by those in uniform. The War College does not need the trappings of academia nearly as much as the substance. The Frank Snyders of the faculty are important not only for specific technical experience and expertise but for a grasp of the way in which grand tactics—and grand tactical theory—bridge the gap between strategy and operations. Wisdom and moral courage can be learned but not taught; and in any case, they are rarely the product of adult education of any sort. One must ask as well about the likely results of re-creating—if that were even possible—a pre-World War II environment, for we no longer inhabit a pre-World War II world.

The ability of the Navy to contribute to national well-being depends, to a great extent, on the ability of the Navy's senior officers to link naval missions and doctrine with national-level political and strategic thinking on national interests, intentions, and force development. Senior service education is the key to this and, for the Navy, a strengthened War College seems a simple necessity for the 1980s—to educate the Navy's future leaders; to help shape the Navy of the future by contributing to the long-range thinking and planning that always gets overwhelmed by the immediate in Washington; and by improving the Navy's combined arms and joint service doctrine, planning, coordination, and operations. The Naval War College has never left the Navy, but in doing these things well it could do much to make the Navy and its leaders more effectual in the 1980s.

Thomas H. Etzold
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Editor's Note: The President of the Naval War College is a naval officer. So are many members of the faculty. Because of the additional knowledge and breadth of thought they provide, officers from other Services are appointed as advisors. For the same reasons scholars, lawyers, and people in business are appointed to the Board of Advisors. Without them all the War College would be no more naval than it is. What it would be is poorer than it is.

MacArthur, the Navy, and the Orange Plan

Sir:

I enjoyed your article on the Orange Plan [see the *Review*, Jul-Aug 1980, pp. 23-41] very much. I had the plan in my keeping for two weeks before the war began. I was a Second Lieutenant then. It wasn't every Second Lieutenant, First Lieutenant, Captain, Major or Lieutenant Colonel that even saw it.

96 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

General MacArthur had not had anything to do with the formation of the plan, so he decided that he would make a plan of his own. He had Colonel Daugherty, Artillery Brigade Commander; Colonel Pierce, 26th Cavalry Commander; Colonel Horan, Baguio Commander; and the Commander of Ft. McKinley coming into Manila every Wednesday to form a new plan.

The Orange Plan was very complete. It even gave the amount of dynamite to use on bridges.

But MacArthur threw it out. This resulted in Philippine scout units being anywhere except where they were supposed to be. "E" Battery, 24th Field Artillery, would have been on Batangas Bay, but they were on the west coast of Bataan.

The brunt of the attack fell on Philippine army troops who were green troops. They had six weeks' training before the war began.

It seems the Navy had the Japanese attack figured out long before it took place.

Colonel Daugherty was the best informed officer in the Philippines. It was his fourth tour of duty there. He had stated in July that the Japanese would attack at the end of the rainy season and that was December. He was right.

Why the Army and MacArthur didn't listen to the Navy I don't know.

Lt. Col. George A. Reed, AUS (Ret.)

Israel and American Base Privileges

Sir:

In his article, "Clientism Unbound: America and the Tactics of Third World Security," [see the *Review*, May-June 1981, pp. 75-82] Ensign Robert King Morris wrote that "Our Arab contacts frequently question the fairness of our special relationship with Israel, although they refuse us the same naval air cover and privileges at bases with which the Israelis repay us."

If the above statement is true, what specifically are the naval air cover and base privileges we enjoy in Israel? Where does the United States post AWACS in the Middle East? Where did the United States recently hold air maneuvers and from what air bases? What is the military relationship between the United States and the Government of Oman?

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