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Battleship: Pearl Harbor, 1941

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for example, factors influencing Soviet behavior, is applicable in a wider context, the purposes of the book would have been better served by an essay on Soviet arms policy in general.

The chapter on Germany is perhaps the most interesting of the country-specific chapters because there is so little literature on German arms transfer policy. The author emphasizes the deliberately low profile of German policy, but concludes that given the emergence of a significant defense industrial base, and NATO emphasis on standardization and interoperability, Germany is increasingly subject to "the same political, economic, technical and security pressures that other Western arms suppliers have had to accommodate in the last fifteen years." (p. 125)

In the final chapter the editor distinguishes among reduction, restraint, and regulation of arms transfers. Reduction, meaning significant reductions in numbers of weapons and/or dollar volume transferred, and restraint, meaning gradual reduction and/or certain qualitative or geographical constraints, are regarded by the author as impossible given the present international context. Regulation, which she defines as administrative control, accepting the status quo and seeking to "regularize, rationalize, and bureaucratize the process multilaterally" is viewed as the least controversial of the three approaches, but its prospects are also seen as dim. Further, "Even if these . . . regulations could be negotiated into a supplier's agreement, the viper's pit at the arms bazaar would not be turned into a nest of garter snakes." (p. 195) In short, the editor views prospects for control pessimistically.

Although somewhat dated, *The Gun Merchants* is a useful contribution to arms transfer literature. It provides some interesting insights into individual country arms transfer policies. Written by, and mostly for, professional political scientists, it is not recommended for the casual reader but is of most benefit to readers having considerable familiarity with the arms control literature.

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Exum, Wallace Louis. *Battleship: Pearl Harbor, 1941*. Virginia Beach, Va.: The Donning Company, 1981. 136pp.

Want a firsthand look at the "old" Navy of fancy work, wooden decks, slush funds, foo foo juice, Academy martinets, mail call, bosun pipes, black oil, seabags, pogey bait, shining brass, and 14-inch guns? Then *Battleship* may be the book for you. As an unvarnished view from the deckplates of the routine and tradition of seagoing life, the book is tough to match. First published in 1974, colorful and spare and not too serious, the story portrays no dashing, larger-than-life heroes or leaders of classic dimension, but rather focuses on the quite ordinary bluejackets assigned to the battleship *Nevada*. In this respect, the book is unusual. Most people who have been associated with the Navy past or present will appreciate this somewhat sentimental voyage and will feel some emotional kinship with the story's central, very human characters. Fast-moving and straightforward, *Battleship* could have been written only by someone who was there.

The actual events of 7 December 1941 take only a few pages and are entwined in a very believable fictional framework that begins when Quartermaster Chief Toland reports for duty aboard *Nevada* the month before. With much of the action set in the familiar surroundings of CPO Quarters, the Wheelhouse, and the Charr Room, the story unfolds easily from Toland's steady, experienced, no-nonsense perspective. Within the clipped, entertaining and very realistic dialogue, the author makes two points that are as sobering today as they were 40 years

ago: first, our overconfidence in knowing and assessing the enemy's intentions and second, the utility of ships as large, expensive, and vulnerable as battleships. In this respect, the book is unquestionably current. While the serious thread that runs through the story does not dominate it, the author's points are well-founded even if somewhat simplistically presented. Included at the book's end is an afterword that continues a brief history of the battleships that survived the Japanese attack, plus a well-known letter written by Nimitz in 1965 that addresses the totally devastating effect that the attack would have had *if* the fleet had been at sea and *if* Yamamoto had followed up the tactical advantage gained on the initial attack.

Whether the decision to republish was made following the announcement of the battleships' return to service or not is uncertain. However, casual historians, ex-Navy men (and women), and prospective *New Jersey* crewmembers will certainly find this novel's brief excursion into the past a worthwhile experience.

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Fallows, James. *National Defense*. New York: Random House, 1981. 221pp.

This book is a readable discussion of selected national defense issues. Fallows is writing for the general reader rather than for military affairs professionals. Unfortunately, his readers will receive an unbalanced and frequently biased picture of national defense.

Fallows is a journalist, not a military analyst. He notes his background in the Introduction and discloses that he has had no military service. Although Fallows says that he has been conscious of possible bias and has done his best to avoid it, this reviewer believes that he has been unsuccessful in the attempt.

A major problem with *National Defense* is the lack of balance in its treatment of topics. Fallows draws his arguments primarily from dissidents and critics of the current defense establishment and rarely gives the other side of an argument. For example, 15 pages are devoted to a stimulating, essentially sociological examination of "the civilianized service" of the volunteer army and the various problems that it has created for the armed services. But Fallows gives only one page, and that includes his rebuttal, to what he considers the "three respectable arguments against the draft." Although he uses a variety of military and academic sources to show the pernicious effects that the volunteer army has had, no real attempt is made to examine the social costs of a peacetime draft. He does not let proponents of a volunteer army develop their case and accuses economists who favor relying on market forces to obtain military personnel of making "wooden pronouncements." (Fallows appears to be weak in his understanding of economics, and he is opposed to applying economic analysis to national defense decisions.)

While Fallows quotes liberally from interviews with critics of various aspects of contemporary national defense and from a variety of publications (mostly secondary sources) to make his points, he often quotes anonymous officers and civilian defense experts. Some of these critics of the way national defense is conducted are respected, serious analysts like Pierre Sprey and Stephen Canby. But Fallows also makes heavy use of "authorities" such as the pseudonymous "Cincinnatus." Use of such material does not inspire reader confidence in the objectivity of the author.

Fallows makes some unsubstantiated accusations that are very offensive. In discussing military careerism, he states,