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Why South Africa Will Survive: A Historical Analysis

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"Most of today's generals and admirals are men who got there because they were procurement wizards, or adept at punching their tickets, or careful not to make waves. Simply on a human level, I was struck by how little 'edge' most of the generals seemed to have to their characters, how bland most of them seemed . . ." (p. 122) There is no place for such *ad hominem* argument in a work that purports to be a serious study of national defense.

It is regrettable that Fallows' book is so flawed. He does highlight some important issues that must be faced in national defense policy. The quality and effectiveness of the people in the armed forces, as well as their numbers, is a vital concern. There are dangers in developing highly complex weapons systems which cost so much that too few units are procured. If weapons are very expensive to operate, training opportunities can be so constrained by Operating and Maintenance funding that readiness suffers. The fortunate absence of any actual experience with thermonuclear war makes the planning and programming decisions for strategic nuclear forces uniquely full of uncertainty.

Fallows is certainly correct in arguing that the public discussion of national defense needs more coherence, and *National Defense* contains much interesting material pertinent to these national concerns. But the work's omissions and errors prevent it from being an effective means to that end.

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Gann, Lewis H. and Duignan, Peter.
Why South Africa Will Survive: A Historical Analysis. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981. 312pp.

In their preface to *Why South Africa Will Survive*, Drs. Gann and Duignan assert that their " . . . views concerning South Africa are unpopular within the

academic establishment . . ." (p. {xi}), which, in this reviewer's judgment, somewhat overstates the case. Academia is hardly a monolithic entity and, just as survey research has shown that ROTC units are perceived differently by different faculty, depending upon academic discipline, age, sex and previous military service, so one could contend that academics have different perceptions of South Africa. Perhaps their statement might be modified to read black and liberal white American academics, the overwhelming majority of whom seem to view South Africa in a hostile manner. Those familiar with the facile remarks about the "military mind" will readily grasp the point about the heterogeneity of university and college faculties in the United States.

The authors, who have done extensive research in and on Zimbabwe and who are well known for their excellent joint volumes on the colonial services of Germany, Great Britain and Belgium, are historians by training (Gann received his doctorate at Oxford, while Duignan received his at Stanford) and both have had active military duty in the American (Duignan) and British (Gann) armies. From their vantage point in the prestigious Hoover Institution in Stanford, California, the two historians have become disenchanted with the orthodoxies propounded about South Africa by liberal academicians, and their book is a brilliantly conceived and executed counterattack. They are both accurate and fair in recapitulating the bulk of the liberal's position on South Africa, but their recapitulation suffers somewhat from their omission of the names of most of the liberal sinners. Interestingly enough, two of the six persons who read the book in manuscript form and who are thanked in the preface can be so classified. Generally speaking, one needs to hunt among the endnotes to find the villains, as they are not often displayed in the text.

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This book is organized in a manner designed to interest the novice as well as the expert Africanist, and the authors have written a lucid, crisp history of South Africa both in terms of population groups and in terms of institutions and policies. The greatest single strength of the book is the spectacular comparative sweep of the exercise which lifts South Africa out of the *sui generis* category it has often been forced into and places it within the context of the 18th, 19th and 20th-century phenomena throughout the globe. It is this comparative skill that reinforces their underlying premise that far too many American academics, especially the Africanists, have been willing to isolate South Africa in their minds and feelings and to judge it by standards not applicable either to other nations (usually those whose diplomats and citizens are vehement critics) or to the same time period in history, with the end result that South Africa is subjected to a double moral standard (see p. 258). Fortunately, a number of Africanists are sufficiently well balanced emotionally and politically to subject all the states of the African continent to the same moral yardstick.

Another attractive feature is that the authors provide a discerning analysis of the assets and liabilities of South Africa's Military Establishment and take a hard, sober look at the various types of threats and insurgencies that the police and defense units will most probably face. Their estimate, on balance, is favorable to the current regime (chapters 6, 7, and 10), and they are equally willing to draw attention to a number of the repugnant features of the apartheid system (see p. 300). They are rather critical of the high degree of state intervention in the South African economy and come out in favor of a stronger free market system in South Africa (pp. 296-297), along with a system of fragmenting power known as consociationalism (generally linked with sharp

linguistic, ethnic and religious cleavages in the population of some of the nations of Western Europe, such as the Netherlands and Switzerland and Austria) as a counter to straight one-man, one-vote African majority rule (pp. 299-300). The tables of the book are excellent and the maps are adequate, but neither the indexing nor the endnotes are detailed enough to recommend the book as a reference work. A second edition, available in paperback at much lower cost and more rigorously footnoted, would certainly be most welcome and would facilitate the serious debate between the liberals and the moderate conservatives that both authors have carefully tried to foster.

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Hollick, Ann L. *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981. 496pp.

During the past decade, Dr. Hollick has emerged as the best-known and most widely published specialist on the formulation of U.S. ocean policy. Her important new book, *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea*, is rooted in her many articles describing the bureaucratic in-fighting among such actors as the White House, the Congress, the Departments of State, Defense, Interior, Justice, Commerce and Transportation, the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Permanent Mission of the United States to the United Nations. Dr. Hollick's book, like her earlier articles, has the great merit of explaining plainly and intelligently what went on in the tangle of Washington politics to result in those ocean policies with which Washington then negotiated in international politics.

Dr. Hollick's book, however, goes well beyond her articles in at least two ways. First, the book is much more