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Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty. The Last Naval Hero: An Intimate Biography

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could be eliminated for a \$55 billion saving with no noticeable reduction in national security will also be questioned. And Kaufman's skepticism about the value of the B-1 strategic bomber and the need for additional Navy carrier battle groups to press the attack to Russian home waters will not please advocates of these programs.

Readers of this year's Brookings analysis of the federal budget will, as in the past, find plenty of material that is informative, enlightening, or provocative.

JOHN A. WALGREEN
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Rood, Harold W., *Kingdoms of the Blind*. Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 1980. 294pp.

Professor Rood has written a book which should provide interesting reading to naval officers and other serious students of strategy. His two central themes are to document the "dangerous inclination democratic people have of discounting the likelihood of war" and call attention to the repeated Soviet preparations for war.

Without adhering to the principle that history repeats itself ("It is only the behavior of democracies that seems repetitious"), Professor Rood quickly repeats the lessons of the 1930s and then provides keen insights into the strategic nature of Soviet foreign policy since 1945. His analysis of submarine warfare is extremely well thought out and documented. Professor Rood does not dwell on the past and argues a good case for the current international situation being far worse than anything experienced by Great Britain in the prewar years.

The book presents a number of detailed case studies of the geopolitical implications of events in Cuba, Czechoslovakia and of the strategic importance of central Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Caribbean. Professor Rood develops

an interesting and revealing scenario with regard to the magnitude of any operations which would be undertaken to neutralize Cuba. He adroitly ties this to his thesis that strategy is essentially "to force one's enemy to defend that which he has no choice to defend and in areas away from the principal theater of war, while one's own forces concentrate to achieve a decision in that theater of war where the outcome of battle will decide the outcome of war."

Europe remains the center of what Professor Rood views as the most likely area of future East-West confrontation. The book documents numerous examples of Soviet maneuvers that have significantly altered their options to the detriment of NATO. Soviet successes in arms control negotiations, while continuing to openly prepare for a winnable war, have been met with American optimism and adoption of the classic role of any peacetime democracy. Rood argues that the shift in favor of the East has already started to occur. He states that, "If the West prepares for war and no war comes, we may enjoy the freedom of criticizing ourselves for our foolishness. If war comes and the West is unprepared . . . Our freedom will have died, killed by our blindness."

Kingdoms of the Blind is indexed and extremely well footnoted.

JAMES JOHN TRITTEN
Commander, U.S. Navy

Roskill, Stephen. *Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty. The Last Naval Hero: An Intimate Biography*. New York: Atheneum, 1981. 430pp.

The claim on the dust jacket notwithstanding, Captain Roskill's biography of Admiral Beatty is not the first biography of this distinguished British naval officer of the World War I era. Thirty years ago, Rear Adm. W.S. Chalmers recorded Beatty's naval achievements without delving into the more delicate features of Beatty's personal life or

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bringing into full light some of the more deplorable practices in the Royal Navy. Sensitivities having eased with him, Roskill has secured access to the private papers of the Beattys, of Beatty's lover and her husband, and of the royal family at Windsor so that he can now provide a full portrait of the whole man.

None can dispute Roskill's assertion that the handsome and brave Beatty possessed "a very high degree of charisma" that won for him devotion in the Royal Navy from the lower decks up. His cap at jaunty angle, his especially cut jacket, his rich and beautiful American wife, and his spectacular rise to become the youngest British admiral since Nelson all attest to the panache that adorned the public image of David Beatty. Behind the panache, however, Roskill has found the terrible trials that Beatty suffered from his unbalanced wife, his affair with a woman who both loved him and sought to help him with his wife, his antisemitism, his disastrous approval of the recommendation by the Smuts Committee in 1917 that Britain establish a separate air arm, and much more.

Predictably, Roskill's biography of Beatty also includes numerous comments on Professor Marder's treatment of the Royal Navy in *From Dreadnought to Scapa Flow*, especially Marder's assessments of the British at the battle of Jutland. Neither Roskill nor Marder have been drawn into the partisan debate over the conduct of Admirals Jellicoe and Beatty at Jutland. What Marder saw as caution in Jellicoe, however, is timidity to Roskill, and Roskill finds Beatty a good deal more decisive and flexible than did Marder. Whereas Marder attributed heavy losses of the British at Jutland to careless handling of cordite, Roskill would still stress the weakness of British armor. Roskill blames poor British shooting on the Admiralty's adoption of the Dreyer fire control system, rather than the superior system developed by Arthur

Hungerford Pollen. Although Roskill claims that Beatty sought to reverse the overcentralization that stifled initiative in the Royal Navy, he also conceded that there was too much wrong with Beatty's staff work for later generations to conclude that the admiral should be counted among the great handlers of fleets. American historians familiar with the debates between line and staff officers in the U.S. Navy should note Roskill's conclusion that excessive domination by line officers over specialists and scientists may have cost the Royal Navy technological leadership over the German Navy.

While Roskill does not sit as judge over the Jutland controversy, he deplors as extremely unwise Beatty's underhanded efforts to tamper with history. Why Beatty was so anxious to cover up the circular movement of his flagship at Jutland remains one of the fascinating mysteries of battle history.

As in his earlier work, Roskill has written of Beatty and the Royal Navy from the point of view of an insider who can draw from his own rich personal experience and background to find meaning in his materials. It is one of the tragedies of American naval history that no American naval officer shall ever write on the U.S. Navy during the early 20th century as has Captain Roskill on the Royal Navy.

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Sarkesian, Sam C. and Scully, William L., eds. *U.S. Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict: Potentials for Military Struggles in the 1980s*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1981. 221pp.

The essays in this book represent a serious discussion of how the United States can protect its foreign policy interests in the many localized conflicts that are likely to occur in the Third World. The authors recognize that there