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Bringing Up The Rear

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essential, but he would do well to digest the entire book for other chapters often touch upon the military implications of primarily civil aspects of the law of the sea. Controversial assertions, such as the belief by Robert L. Friedheim and Robert E. Bowen of the University of Southern California that "use of naval power to defend the interests of the states of the world in the uses of the oceans and its [sic] resources is very little connected to the enclosure movement or to the problems of allocating rights," should be considered for their strength in rebutting conventional doctrine. (In this instance, the argument was successfully countered by Professor Knight and the panelists who contributed to the military issues session.) The reader will broaden and deepen his knowledge by much of the balance of the book, will be amused by some of it, will agree with some conclusions, and be challenged by others.

The judge advocate or lawyer with interests in LOS, admiralty, law of armed conflict, or general public international law issues will find the entire book useful. Some chapters, such as those on ocean shipping, are policy-oriented with little black-letter "hard law," and other parts are interdisciplinary in approach, i.e., John Bardach's essay on "The Relation of Ocean Energy to Ocean Food." There are several traditionally written papers on legal topics, such as Kent Keith's well-done "International Regulation of Ocean Floating Energy Platforms," which should have appeal for positivist spirits in this eclectic field.

Neglected Issues is a valuable addition to the Law of the Sea Institute's annual conference series. Its papers, recorded commentary and speeches should provide new insights into the larger issues facing the LOS conference in its second decade of negotiations.

GEORGE K. WALKER
College of William and Mary

Heinl, Robert D. *Handbook for Marine NCOs*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1979. 595pp.

Truly a believer that "The Marines take care of their own," Colonel Heinl has done just that in this handbook. It is an important and essential aid in dealing with every professional aspect of life as a Marine NCO. He explains in detail what is expected of a noncommissioned officer and describes correct, traditional, and proven methods of leadership. Everything is included from the best way to darn a sock to exhibition drill and mess night procedures. *Handbook* contains practical and professional information of value not only to NCOs and NCOs-to-be but to Marine officers and wives of Marines. It tells of survivor and retired benefits, pay, allowances, travel, and facilities and services at major posts of the Corps. *Handbook* is a valuable reference book with a universal appeal to all Marines. Strongly flavored with historical background, it painstakingly points out the development of the "Marine way" in a manner that fills the reader with a sense of pride in the Corps.

This is a book for the personal library of every officer interested in the professional development of his NCOs. For officers who want to entrust leadership responsibilities in the fullest measure to their noncommissioned officers, *Handbook* will become their bible. For Marine NCOs who seek responsibility and self-improvement, it will provide an education in the profession of arms.

BARRY E. JANKIEWICZ
Major, U.S. Marine Corps

Marshall, S.L.A., *Bringing Up The Rear*. San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1979. 310pp.

From his enlistment in the Army at 17 until his death in 1977, Slam Marshall's first loyalty was to the country he served as a soldier, writer, scholar, tactician, operations analyst and

troubleshooter, recruiter, and confidant of the military and civilian hierarchy of the Army and other Services. *Bringing Up The Rear* is his story and is decidedly out of step with his 26 other works. It is not a product of historical scholarship but an uneven, sometimes disjointed and highly selective account of an extraordinary career that spanned all wars, conflicts, and crises involving the United States (and some not) since WWI. Marshall paints his own life in lively colors, highlighting many inside stories from his career as a soldier and newspaperman, telling stories "which require telling, either to explain myself or because they are significantly related to our history, though as yet untold."

As the youngest commissioned officer in the AEF in Europe, Marshall saw action in the Soissons, St. Mihiel, and Meuse-Argonne campaigns. After the war, he tried his hand at brickmaking and mining before landing a job as a sports reporter for the *El Paso Herald* where his long and distinguished career as a journalist began. Based in part on his coverage of the Spanish Civil War in 1936 and continued study of military affairs, Marshall's byline appeared on a daily column for the *Detroit News* and his short radio commentaries gained a widespread following on the eve of World War II.

After Pearl Harbor, Marshall was called to Washington to serve as a consultant to develop the Army orientation program, an ambitious public affairs and internal relations project, for the Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson. From that success, he was called regularly to handle the sticky problems that were too big, too complex, or too time-consuming for general officers and their staffs. Operationally, his time during WWII was divided between the island-hopping campaigns of the Pacific and on the road to liberating Paris in Europe.

Marshall wrote the Army history of

the Pacific and European campaigns *in situ*. Among other things, his memoirs reveal the unsuccessful attempts of some to influence the writing, and Marshall's firm belief that history was a valid and useful study for the military commander. He liked to work the front-lines, several times getting ahead of friendly fire. By studying a battlefield and interviewing soldiers while the smell of gunpowder was still in the air, Marshall was able to piece together a big blue arrow narration as well as the action of individual units that closed the gap between what was planned and what happened. His accounts were vividly drawn from what actually occurred and because the previous day's history might be crucial to the next day's battle, Marshall often briefed his analysis to the field commander, whether that commander was interested in it or not.

From his separation in May 1946 until 1950, Marshall was called up for active military duty as a reservist 47 times, with tours ranging from 48 hours to 6 months. He had a reputation for directness, military savvy and no-nonsense. His unusual dedication and imagination came through on the battlefield and in his accounts of operations as well as in his staff work that included writing preliminary staff studies on the NATO Alliance and chairing the subcommittee that wrote the Military Code of Conduct. He was promoted to Brigadier General in 1951.

Slam Marshall's influence as a military historian and leader will endure. His books are classic accounts of men in battle, of successes and mistakes. They are guideposts that should be read and studied by officers who may someday lead a group of fighting men or direct a military operation. These memoirs confirm the fact that Slam Marshall was a leader in the finest sense of the word. *Bringing Up The Rear* does not do justice to his life or work; for that, a biographer with Marshall's own sense of

scholarship and a patriot's sensibility is needed.

J.P. MORSE

Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Momyer, William W. *Airpower in Three Wars*. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1978. 358pp.

It is a delight to find that the former commander of Seventh Air Force in Vietnam had at least one thing in common with one of his aircraft commanders (this reviewer) in that we both wondered from time to time just who the heck was in charge of the war, or at least our part of it! In fact, the main theme of *Airpower in Three Wars*, and perhaps even the main theme of William Momyer's professional life, was the endless struggle to establish the principle of unity of command for airpower in any theater of war.

The author of *Airpower* has had a ringside seat to that struggle for 40 years now, and is thus an authority on the subject. He began in 1939, fought as a fighter pilot in the North African campaign of World War II, and has been constantly involved in the tactical fighter side of the USAF until he reached its pinnacle as the Commander of Tactical Air Command in the late sixties. Though the Air War College has not been as productive of airpower theory as was its pre-World War II predecessor, the Air Corps Tactical School, perhaps we can speculate that General Momyer's tour on its faculty not only gave him a firm grasp of doctrine, and a bent for the intellectual approach to war, but also the interest and the ability to write the book at hand.

The organization of *Airpower* could hardly be more conventional yet it is quite effective. At the outset there are two chapters on strategy and command and control. Then each of the roles of tactical airpower, except tactical airlift, is given its own chapter. In fact, they

are presented in the same order as they appear in the basic Air Force doctrinal manuals. The penultimate chapter discusses some case studies: JUNCTION CITY, Khe Sanh, Tet and other battles. The conclusion is direct and to the point--and its main argument is that we have learned the fundamental lesson that the operational control of airpower must be centralized at the theater level too many times, and at the cost of too many lives.

The real heart of the book is the chapter on that subject, command and control. As with the other chapters, the author gives the historical background from World War II and Korea, and discusses the problem in Vietnam in great and fascinating detail. Strike airpower in Southeast Asia was controlled by a multitude of authorities. The helicopter gunships belonged to the Army. Fighters sent against North Vietnam were controlled from PACOM. Fighters (sometimes the same airplanes on different days) employed against targets in South Vietnam were commanded by 7th Air Force. The Ambassador in Thailand had a say about the way that the aircraft based there were used. The same was true in Laos. The B-52s coming in from Guam, in the last analysis, belonged to the JCS. Until 1968 the air resources with the III Marine Amphibious Force were dedicated to the support of their own troops alone--though the excess sorties were volunteered for the support of the units of other services as well. To this reviewer, who wearily raced odd-looking transports from all manner of semi-private air forces for parking spaces, the whole story seems quite credible and tragic, given the fact that it was but a replay of the painful lessons of both North Africa and Korea. In the name of what they used to tell us in the USNA naval history course about unity of command, and at the risk of stinging some of the readers of this journal, I quote Momyer: