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Book Reviews


The U.S Naval War College

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BOOK REVIEWS

Cassese, Antonio, ed. *The New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict*. Naples, Italy: Editoriale Scientifica S.r.l. 1979. 501pp. Distribution: Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications.

Reviewing a volume that consists of a collection of essays by a number of different authors is always a problem, particularly where, as here, there are many items worthy of specific mention and only a limited amount of space is available for the review. While this reviewer must admit that not every one of the essays engendered in him the enthusiasm displayed by Professor Ruegger in the Preface, there is no question but that, on the whole, this is an excellent collection of studies on an important subject—the new humanitarian law of armed conflict contained in the two Protocols drafted by a Diplomatic Conference consisting of over 100 national delegations over a period of 4 years (1974-1977) and signed in June 1977.

As the Preface discusses each individual essay, this reviewer will not attempt to repeat the information therein contained. Suffice it to say that the articles that were found to be of particular interest and to be particularly well done were those written by Obradovic ("La Protection de la Population Civile dans les Conflits Armés Internationaux"), Cassese ("Means of Warfare: the Traditional and the New Law") and "A Tentative

Appraisal of the Old and the New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict"), Roling ("Aspects of Criminal Responsibility for Violations of the Law of War"), and Bierzanek ("Reprisals as a Means of Enforcing the Laws of Warfare; the Old and the New Law"). In addition, an interesting group of four articles (three in English and one in French), but of varying value, is presented under the rubric "The Attitude of States Toward the Development of Humanitarian Law."

The selection of the foregoing essays on the evolving humanitarian law of armed conflict as being of particular interest should not be construed as indicating concurrence with all of the conclusions reached by the several authors named. For example, this reviewer disagrees with Bierzanek's conclusion that, in drafting the 1977 Protocol I (International Armed Conflicts), the Diplomatic Conference did not go far enough in prohibiting reprisals. On the contrary, there appears to be considerable validity to Roling's observation that it is doubtful whether an absolute prohibition of reprisals contributes to the elimination of misbehavior; and, in fact, in certain circumstances, reprisals may actually serve a useful purpose. (This reviewer also joins in Professor Roling's expression of regret that the Diplomatic Conference elected to reject in its entirety a proposal to include in Protocol I a provision with respect to

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the defense of "superior orders" in war crimes trials.)

The importance that the nations of the world of today place on the need for a far-reaching and enforceable humanitarian law of armed conflict has been vividly demonstrated by the costs they underwrote and the talent they contributed to the four sessions of the Diplomatic Conference concerned with that subject. There is an urgent need to supplement the Protocols themselves with published discussions by experts in this field of international law, discussions that will help to clarify and to publicize these documents. This volume is a major contribution to this process.

HOWARD S. LEVIE
Saint Louis University School of Law

Coles, Alan. *Three Before Breakfast*.

Homewell, Havant, Hampshire, Eng.: Kenneth Mason, 1979. 192pp.

Three Before Breakfast recounts a little known story of the sinking of three aged *Bacchante*-class British cruisers by a single (probably) German U-boat in World War I. What makes this story so unusual is not that the three were sunk, but that all three were sunk in less than an hour's time—just before breakfast. Alan Coles has balanced an incredible amount of scholarly research with a carefully conceived measure of poetic license that makes the personalities on both sides come alive, and it is through their eyes that the morning becomes real. The result is a suspenseful, colorful, romantic, and sometimes sentimental inquiry into one of Britain's darkest days at sea. The incident sparked a great deal of debate on the readiness of Britain's naval forces, the priorities and responsibilities of its senior commanders and the operational plans of the fleet. Additionally, it marked the first action that confirmed the U-boat's value as an effective although admittedly ungentlemanly

In September 1941 *Aboukir*, *Hogue*, and *Cressy* were patrolling the "Broad Fourteens" where the English Channel pushes into the North Sea. At that time and since, some have argued that the three coal-burning cruisers were positioned as unescorted live bait for the German Fleet. Ironically, Churchill had decided to withdraw them from this forward position, to be replaced with a balanced, more modern force. However, his decision was 24 hours too late for a bold U-boat commander named Weddigen had already maneuvered the U-9 for an attack.

Coles' account of the sinkings reads like a novel and he pieces each ship's story together in a skillful manner. None of the ships was ready for the attack—they had fallen into the routine monotony of the patrol. *Aboukir* was the first ship to be attacked (torpedoed or mined, thought the captain) and shortly afterward was abandoned. *Hogue* steamed to assist the foundering *Aboukir* and provided a stationary broadside target for Weddigen. Despite a thick armor belt of Krupps steel, two torpedoes opened up *Hogue's* hull and magazine explosions finished the work. While pandemonium reigned on the surface, U-9 stalked *Cressy*. With her batteries nearly discharged, Weddigen ordered an attack and succeeded in sinking *Cressy*.

Littered with thousands of men and boys (midshipmen from Dartmouth were assigned to the ships' companies) and an assortment of rafts, launches, and flotsam, the sea became the stage for dramatic heroism and survival. First reaching the survivors were British and Dutch fishing trawlers. The fleet, having been alerted by *Cressy's* dispatch "ABOUKIR SUNK, HOGUE SINKING", arrived on the scene several hours later—just before lunch.

Though not as interesting, the second half of the book deals with the aftermath of the triple sinking, the rescue of survivors, reaction of the

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press, the labored and painful official inquiries, some unusually inflated war stories, and the questions that still remain unanswered. Additionally, Coles traces the careers of many of the British officers and midshipmen that were involved in the catastrophe that took 1500 lives. Weddigen's later career is followed as well as that of his second in command, Johannes Spiess, who was one of a handful of German submariners who survived in U-boats until their surrender to the British later in the war.

Three Before Breakfast is a classic example of little known naval stories that can be dredged up years later to fascinate, enlighten, and perhaps instruct.

J.P. MORSE

Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Dobson, Christopher, et al. *The Cruellest Night*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1979. 223pp.

Stamp out the fascist beast once and for all in its lair. Use force to break the racial pride of these Germanic women. Take them as your lawful booty. Kill. As you storm onwards, kill, you gallant soldiers of the Red Army.

This injunction by the Soviet war correspondent Ilya Ehrenburg, quoted by the authors of *The Cruellest Night*, states well the reality that the over 7,000 German civilians, Women Naval Auxiliaries, wounded soldiers, and submariners were fleeing in late January 1945 when they boarded the former Nazi Party "Strength Through Joy" passenger liner *Wilhelm Gustloff* in the East Prussian port of Gdynia. Unfortunately, most of these citizens and warriors of the nearly defeated Third Reich did not escape the fury of Soviet revenge, inspired by a half decade of cruel Nazi occupation of Russia. Most of the passengers and crew of the *Wilhelm Gustloff* perished when Soviet submarine captain Alexander Marinesko fired three torpedoes into its

hull—causing what the authors claim to be "the biggest sea disaster" in history. Nearly five times the number of people died that night as had died in the *Titanic* sinking.

The sinking of the 25,484-ton *Wilhelm Gustloff* was the most spectacular event in the history of "Germany's Dunkirk," the monumental evacuation of eastern Germany orchestrated personally by Admiral Doenitz and which ultimately saved over two million Germans from Soviet revenge and subjugation. Fortunately, the authors of *The Cruellest Night*, British journalists, refuse to let WW II or cold war politics obscure the essential fact of that drama: that wars are fought by frightened human beings who are capable of great cowardice and great bravery. Consequently, Dobson, Miller, and Payne cram full their narrative with eyewitness accounts from both sides. They tell of the panic to get aboard. "Babies were used as tickets, being carried on board and then thrown down again to be used as a passport to safety for another family member. Some fell between the ship and the quayside. It seemed not to matter. All that mattered was to get away from the Russians." The authors also tell of great courage after the liner had been torpedoed. "Then Max Bonnet appeared still apparently wearing his white jacket. With enormous difficulty he carried his tray. 'A final cognac, gentlemen,' he said. They drank and threw down his glasses."

We also see events through Russian eyes as well. We meet Captain Marinesko of Soviet submarine S-13 who, although by sinking the *Wilhelm Gustloff* had scored the largest kill in Soviet submarine history, would later be stripped of his commission, declared an "un-person," and sentenced to the Gulag—all for having returned late once from a shore leave weekend in Turku, Finland (The NKGB accused him of making contact with allied

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intelligence). But the Soviets sent him and others like him to the Gulag only after the Nazi menace had been defeated. The captain was reinstated to rank and citizenship in October 1963, but died 3 weeks later of cancer. Such irony is a part of war, and the authors include other such ironic accounts.

On February 6th, as [Marinesko] was running on the surface past the Hela lighthouse while banks of fog rolled across a calm sea, a German U-boat suddenly emerged from the fog and passed by the S-13 only five meters away. Yefremkov, who was on the conning tower, stared in amazement at the German watch officers as they sailed past with the conning towers almost touching. He heard the sound of a machine gun being cocked. But by the time the gunners had recovered from their surprise, the two submarines had disappeared from each other's sight, slipping into the fog.

Questions about the sinking of the *Wilhelm Gustloff* remain. How many people actually were on board on 1 January 1945? Was the target a refugee ship with red crosses on the funnels, and thus an illegal target? What about the anti-aircraft guns? Had they been removed? All good questions for historians to ponder. What the authors are far more interested in exploring in their dramatic narrative, however, is how "every survivor watched with horror, for the end of the *Wilhelm Gustloff* seemed to anticipate the end of the Nazi regime itself."

EDWIN F. CUMMINGS, JR.
Captain, U.S. Air Force

Dorwart, Jeffery M. *The Office of Naval Intelligence: The Birth of America's First Intelligence Agency, 1865-1918*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. 1979. 173pp.

The exploits of Agent No. 94 will never rival those of 007, James Bond. Sent to Guatemala by the Office of

Naval Intelligence in 1917 to search for clandestine radio transmitters and German U-boat bases, he had the misfortune to run afoul of his superiors, apparently for mixing private gain—the purchase of arms for Guatemala—with his primary assignment. His interrogators claimed "he is not all there," placed him in an asylum for the insane, and twice thwarted his attempts to escape incarceration. At war's end, he was promptly released. More than one Director may seriously have contemplated this method of escaping from the problems and frustrations of his office.

Jeffery Dorwart's valuable study of ONI, "America's first intelligence agency," suggests several reasons for this frustration. First, neither the public at large nor the Navy could be convinced that intelligence-gathering had more than limited value at best. Consequently, ONI remained a second-level bureaucracy attached, at various times, to the Bureau of Navigation, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and the Office of Naval Operations. No Director ever remained long enough at the post to stamp ONI with a true sense of mission.

A second problem was the changing nature of ONI's role. In its early years it performed yeoman service in collecting and distributing information of a highly technological and scientific nature to those elements within the service supporting modernization of the American fleet. Increasing international tensions in Europe, combined with the growth of the United States own "military-industrial complex," led to the atrophy of this function. Perhaps, then, ONI could serve as a center for naval strategy and war planning. Despite a promising start in this direction prior to the war with Spain, ONI found its role progressively reduced to supplying raw information to the Naval War College and the General Board. Increasingly insulated and isolated from policymaking within

the Navy and the Government, the Office of Naval Intelligence turned to covert operations.

The success of ONI's covert operations during World War I posed the most serious problem of all. Spying, counterespionage and domestic surveillance proved dangerously attractive to the nation's elite. The needs of the service and the hothouse growth of branch intelligence offices prevented the overburdened Director, Capt. Roger Welles, from combating extralegal tendencies. Dorwart suggests that ONI, convinced of its own importance as interpreter and defender of "American interests," had become—however unintentionally—a threat to civil liberties and the right of dissent.

Dorwart's well-researched monograph makes a distinct contribution to the literature on the new Navy. The struggle for bureaucratic survival, the relationship of intelligence to policy formulation, and the question of means and ends have more than passing relevance to our own time.

RICHARD W. TURK
Allegheny College

Friedheim, Robert L., ed. *Managing Ocean Resources: A Primer*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979. 209pp.

The current fad of "things maritime" and the widespread interest in the confusing and complex deliberations of the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) have produced yet another work, this time a collection of papers prepared in 1977 under the auspices of the Institute for Marine and Coastal Studies (IMCS) at the University of Southern California. *Managing Ocean Resources: A Primer*, edited by Robert L. Friedheim, Associate Director of the IMCS, was intended to provide "...a well-rounded view of the oceans, its [sic] attributes, and the problems of its uses...." Although in many aspects the work is admirable, it unfortunately fails in the rather comprehensive task

Friedheim has set for it. *Managing Ocean Resources* possibly could have been a primer for understanding the possibilities and problems inherent in man's uses of the bounty of the oceans had its treatment been of sufficient scope and detail to provide a "well-rounded view." Alternatively, the scope of the book could have been pared somewhat, and some of the less relevant papers deleted (thus saving the reader from wondering why a specific topic had been included and where the book was going to take him next). In fact, however, the lack of a coherent framework makes for frustrating reading.

Perhaps the single most glaring shortcoming of *Managing Ocean Resources* is the absence of a single unifying theme. There appears to be no consistent logic governing what discussions were included or in what order. The "Foreword" attempts to set the tone for what will follow, but from then on the reader must fend for himself in trying to discover what conclusions he should draw from individual papers or, for that matter, from the collection as a whole.

Despite these deficiencies, *Managing Ocean Resources* does present some specific material that is well-written and well-presented, that is both informative and thought-provoking. Robert F. Hummer's chapter on "Conducting Ocean Science from Space" is a very good and generally understandable discussion of the extremely technical science of remote sensing. Hummer leaves the reader with a good understanding of what remote sensing is, how it is used today, and what its future possibilities are. Similarly, Ross Eckert's discussion of "Ocean Enclosures: A Better Way to Manage Marine Resources," which examines the economic aspects of expanding coastal state jurisdiction over adjacent waters, argues cogently that the present enclosure movement is desirable

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because it offers "greater prospect for managing marine resources efficiently than any other alternative decision-making mechanism." Eckert thus provides an answer to Robert Friedheim's own search in his chapter, "The Political, Economic, and Legal Ocean," for a "paradigm" that would explain the reasons behind this movement. Apparently a paradigm that focuses on the actions of individual nation states and their perceptions of sovereignty and self-interest no longer suffices. Friedheim notes inefficiencies that result from the enclosure movement and argues for a more "just" arrangement, with an international authority to assign rights to coastal states so that resources can be allocated sensibly.

Whether this international authority would evolve into a true Leviathan of the oceans, or whether adequate safeguards could be built into the new system, remains unclear. The difficulty of identifying those necessary safeguards and garnering the required international support for them is illuminated in Professor Arvid Pardo's discussion on the "Law of the Sea Conference—What Went Wrong." Pardo's views on the Byzantine politics of UNCLOS III are invaluable, if for no other reason than his widely regarded role as the "father" of the Third Law of the Sea Conference. For it was Pardo, more than any other individual, who sought to structure UNCLOS III around the theme of reserving the living and nonliving resources beyond the area of national jurisdictions for the "common heritage of mankind." Pardo explains what he had hoped would be accomplished under United Nations sponsorship, how the concept of the "common heritage" became adulterated in successive draft treaty texts, and what he believes will be the final outcome of the Conference.

Other chapters in *Managing Ocean Resources* are also noteworthy, among them Ruthann Corwin's "Protecting

the Oceanic Environment," which gives a very concise presentation of the problems of marine pollution and the effects of pollution on the marine environment. In the wake of the *Argo Merchant* and *Amoco Cadiz* disasters, it should be required reading for every serious student of marine affairs.

The relevance and high quality of individual discussions such as these do help somewhat to alleviate the frustration that the reader feels at the inclusion of many less pertinent papers and at the collection's general lack of focus and direction. If this book is to be recommended, it must certainly be on the strength of its better sections, and very much in spite of its obvious flaws.

SCOTT C. TRUVER
Santa Fe Corporation

Hurley, Alfred F. and Ehrhart, Robert C., eds. *Air Power and Warfare—The Proceedings of the Eighth USAF Academy Military History Symposium*. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. 461pp.

Held during the 75th anniversary year of the Wright brothers' first flight, it seems highly appropriate that the Eighth USAF Academy Military History Symposium was centered around the topic "air power and warfare." While the use of the aerial dimension in warfare has progressed amazingly during the intervening three-quarters of a century, the serious historical study of air power has not kept pace. The editors list that lack of serious work on air power as a primary factor in selection of the topic for this symposium.

The papers and speeches brought together a distinguished group of over 25 participants noted for their backgrounds either in the study of air power history or actual participation in its making. Such notables from both military and civilian sectors as Gens. Ira C. Eaker, Noel Parrish, Curtis LeMay,

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Michael Collins and O.P. Weyland as well as Drs. Forrest Pogue, Eugene Emme and Theodore Ropp are just a few of those who took part.

The symposium began with the keynote address, "The Influence of Air Power Upon Historians," by Noel Parrish. Parrish laid the basis for the remainder of the sessions as he challenged those present with the potential for the study of air power. His strongest point was that biography holds the key to the understanding of air power's development. Without an understanding of the leaders involved in decisionmaking, no true understanding of the course that events took is possible. He pointed out that serious biographies on several Air Force Chiefs of Staff including Arnold, LeMay, Spaatz, Twining and White remain to be done. In summary, he considers that fact as crippling. A second major speech was presented during an evening session by retired Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, an air pioneer himself, entitled "Some Observations on Air Power."

The succeeding sessions covered air power and warfare for not only the United States but also Japan, Great Britain, Germany and the Soviet Union. The papers were divided among the World War I and interwar years (1903-1941), World War II operations and leadership, the search for maturity in the postwar Air Force (1945-1953), air power and limited warfare (1947-1978) and technology's effect on air warfare throughout the 75-year period.

Editors Hurley and Ehrhart list four major themes that came out of the sessions. (1) The importance of the "human element" in air power. (2) The intricate relationships between technology, doctrine and the actual employment of air power. (3) The unity of the human experience with air power. (4) The study of air power is vital to our national interest and holds the very essence of military history's significance.

The desired quality of this symposium as a watershed in the study of air power history was markedly enhanced by the invitation for each participant to outline the work that remains to be done in his particular area. The lack of good biographical work on air power leaders was joined by the need for studies on the effects of logistics, technology and intelligence, among several. For that delineation of gaps in present scholarship alone, the proceedings are invaluable. The publication of this book is timely and vital in view of the continued evidence of increased interest and appreciation for the importance of military history to the military professional. The study of air power is an integral part of that discipline.

DON RIGHTMYER
Captain, U.S. Air Force

Jones, R.V. *The Wizard War*. New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1978. 556pp.

Dr. Reginald Victor Jones describes *The Wizard War* as "a personal memoir in which I hope that general readers may find some entertainment, intelligence officers some working examples of their trade, historians some matters of interest, and scientists some instruction in the value of sticking to basic principles." His hope is realized on all four accounts.

The book, published in Great Britain as *Most Secret War*, is based on declassified World War II reports, transcripts of post-World War II lectures, and personal recollections. It is, then, a personal account of British scientific intelligence activities during World War II. In it Dr. Jones describes his early work in infrared, his heralded success in identifying and countering German guidance beams, the attempts to counter the German air defense radar net, and the intelligence efforts against the V-1, the V-2 and nuclear weapons.

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The revelation of this book is the crucial importance of having a dedicated organization that can integrate information from all sources to ferret out enemy capabilities and intentions. While the breaking of the German "Enigma" code provided important information, the success of Dr. Jones and his compatriots should be attributed to their exhaustive examination of the myriad complex clues not only from intercepted enemy communications, but from electronic emissions, from statements of agents and prisoners, and from exploitation of captured equipment. Guiding the juggling of this information was Jones' predilection for "sticking to basic principles."

The reliance upon multiple sources of supporting evidence and the testing of conclusions against basic principles had an important side benefit. It built the confidence that encouraged Jones to articulate forcefully his findings and recommendations to the highest councils of government. It was Jones who convinced Churchill to employ Window (now called chaff) to blind German radar. His arguments prevailed over the objections of other highly placed advisors who feared that the Germans would quickly develop and employ the countermeasures against allied radars.

Jones' account also addresses the issue of security—preventing disclosure of own capabilities and intentions to the enemy. The Germans' awareness of the need for security, in fact, made the mission of British intelligence a difficult one. Jones laments that his community was unable to identify new weapons systems in the research phase; it was the testing of systems during development and production that provided exploitable clues.

The debate over the use of Window also was an example of security carried to the extreme. Both the British and the Germans were aware of the effects of Window and delayed its employment

fearing the other would develop and employ it with even greater effectiveness. The Germans, on the order of Goering, destroyed all relevant reports and discontinued research and development. The British were "squeamish" but finally employed it in July 1943 after a year of debate. The Germans soon developed countermeasures and began to employ chaff against British radars in January 1944. And so the account goes: weapon, countermeasure, then counter-countermeasure.

In short, *The Wizard War* is a fascinating account of dedicated efforts to counter the new technology of German weapon systems. While reminding the military professional of the need for security, it emphasizes the importance of focusing on the objective and organizing one's efforts towards that end. To stray from that direction is to be misled, to waste energy and talent, and to forfeit the initiative.

WILLIAM T. WILLIAMS IV
Colonel, U.S. Air Force

Jordan, Robert S. with Bloome, Michael W. *Political Leadership in NATO. A Study in Multinational Diplomacy.* Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979. 316pp.

This study is an analysis of the political-diplomatic roles of the first four Secretaries General of NATO—General Lord Ismay, Paul-Henri Spaak, Dirk Stikker, and Manlio Brosio. As the author indicates, the focus is on personality rather than structure and events although in the end he concludes that the latter factors decisively shape the performance of the Secretary General. The political conceptions, ambitions, and styles of the men examined might have facilitated or hindered political agreement within the alliance, but it was forces outside the office itself that defined both the agenda of concerns and the substance of political outcomes. Given such an

unexceptional conclusion, it should perhaps be no surprise that the reader's main interest in the book probably will be the principal issues and trends in NATO from 1952 to 1971. Ironically, in view of the author's intent, the events overshadow the personalities.

The conceptual plan of the book virtually posits the neutrality of the role of the Secretary General. In a sense, then, the fact that the personality of the occupants of that office is overwhelmed by events may lie not simply in the perversity of the outside world but in the inadequacy of the conceptual framework or point of view itself. This can be illustrated by reference to two closely related perspectives of the author—his view of the nature of the North Atlantic alliance and the influence of decisionmaking and integration studies on his analysis.

In his introduction the author discusses the differences between an alliance and a collective security association. This is indeed an important distinction to establish in order to determine the "logical" role of the Secretary General. Oddly, the initial definitions are not very helpful as the differences between alliance and collective security appear to be grounded on the commitment to peaceful resolution of disputes *among* the member states and on the specificity of the *outside* threat. The former requirement has been as realized in alliances as in collective security arrangements, and the latter requirement virtually contradicts or ignores the real distinguishing characteristics of collective security—e.g., normative agreements on the indivisibility of peace, the primacy of the world community in matters of war and peace, and the impartial determination of friends and enemies according to an agreed notion of aggression, plus a number of structural conditions that favor the dispersion, limitation, and interdependence of power. One must

suspect that the author, if pushed to the point of clarity, would accept these distinctions. In any case it is clear, as the author states, that NATO is "best viewed as an alliance."

Having reached this unsurprising conclusion, the author might have more explicitly noted that many Americans were quite reluctant to accept the idea that NATO was indeed an alliance with all the balance of power connotations implied. Multilateralism and institutionalization might obscure that fact but they would not in themselves alter it. If the alliance character of NATO is kept firmly in view, then one would examine political leadership primarily in terms of U.S. Secretaries of State and permanent representatives or perhaps by reference to SACEUR. One simply would not expect the personality or vision of the Secretary General to be of critical importance. Despite his initial conclusion concerning the alliance character of NATO, the author moves in a direction opposite to that he should have taken, and asserts, "Within NATO, the secretary general stands as the most likely individual to assume the role of leader of the alliance." Had the author remained true to his original light, he would not have had to explain why this never came to pass inasmuch as he never would have expected it in the first place!

To the extent that one views NATO as an exercise in community building, then it is perfectly possible to view the Secretary General and the administrative body to which he is attached as catalysts or expeditors of the process of integration. There is no question that at least one Secretary General, Paul-Henri Spaak, so interpreted the institution and his role. It is equally clear that a number of Americans in a rather vague and general sense also saw the organization in this light. This perspective was reinforced in the fifties and sixties by the fad among social scientists of

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assuming integration—economic, political, and social—to be a kind of natural norm and to focus their attention on the behavioral processes that either reinforced or detracted from this norm. As a result there was always an element of suspenseful drama and surprise in their studies owing to perverse individuals, intractable situations, and untoward events that always seemed to intrude into the natural process. Given a different set of assumptions—ones that placed greater emphasis on power and conflict—there would have been fewer surprises but also less contrived drama in their analyses.

As the author says, to the degree that he *was* influenced by former studies, he owes much of his point of view to analyses on integration behavior and decisionmaking processes. There is no doubt that this approach reinforced the logic of defining political leadership in NATO in terms of the Secretary General and of then testing this "natural" hypothesis against the "accidents" of time, place, and events.

Quite aside from the intellectual frame of the author's analysis, however, he does in fact elucidate with skill the critical issues and trends that have shaped the development of NATO over nearly two decades. Moreover, either because of or despite his hypotheses and expectations concerning the Secretary General of NATO, he has provided additional material on the problems and range of functions open to international civil servants in contemporary international associations.

ROBERT S. WOOD
University of Virginia

Kilmarx, Robert A., ed. *America's Maritime Legacy: A History of the U.S. Merchant Marine and Shipbuilding Industry Since Colonial Times*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979. 264pp.

Whenever maritime historians gather, the conversation turns to the

need for a textbook in American maritime history. Two books were published last year with similar titles: *Our Maritime Heritage*, by James M. Morris (Washington: University Press of America, 1979), and the subject of this review, *America's Maritime Legacy*, edited by Robert A. Kilmarx. But while Morris' book is fairly successful at filling the need for a general maritime history of the United States, *America's Maritime Legacy* by Kilmarx is a very different type of book with a misleading title.

The actual aim of the book is to study government's role in the rise and decline of America's maritime industry in the hope of shedding some light on today's maritime problems and policies. While the work is objective and well documented, it is hardly impartial. Like all the narrative histories of the merchant marine that were published generations ago, *America's Maritime Legacy* clearly advocates a government policy of protection and subsidy to maintain a strong American-flag merchant fleet in peacetime.

The book is composed of seven essays by eleven authors, many of them distinguished maritime historians. It suffers from extreme differences in scope, sources and style among the various chapters. One wishes that more of the chapters were as comprehensive and readable as Jack Bauer's "The Golden Age" (1783-1860) or, alternatively, that each essay presented a distinct thesis, as Jeffrey Safford's chapter on World War I does by demonstrating that Wilson used the merchant marine as a bargaining chip in his diplomatic struggles with the Allies.

John J. McCusker's chapter on the colonial period deals mainly with mercantilism. He shows that government promotion of the economy was the norm, even in colonial times. The American colonies learned mercantilism from the mother country, and colonial governments adopted many

measures to improve their own balance of payments, including preferential duties to favor their own merchant vessels. According to McCusker, Britain's mercantilistic policies were highly beneficial to the colonies, yet he tells us that the British authorities tolerated many colonial violations of the spirit of mercantilism in order not to hurt the thriving colonial economy. But, the chapter is so devoted to economic analysis (the word "promotive" appears three times!) that the slave trade is never mentioned, and captains and sailors are ignored, as are ports. All vessels are "ships," including those trading between the mainland and the West Indies.

In contrast, Bauer's chapter on the Golden Age deals with that period in a thorough and well-balanced manner. We have the growth of ports, the emergence of packets, clippers, steamboats and steamships, canals and railroads; government policies, wars, fishing, whaling, and the gold rush are lucidly explained. Above all, there are human actors on the stage.

Lawrence Allin analyzes the decline of American shipping and shipbuilding from the Civil War to 1913, tracing technological change, and leading us through the maze of legislative proposals that were publicly debated for decades, but accomplished little. The Navy's interest in a strong merchant marine is discussed at length. Unfortunately, this chapter is silent on the question of maritime labor, and the early efforts to organize seamen in the late 19th century. Indeed, one could read the entire book and not learn that brutality was common aboard American ships for almost a century. Allin only says that owners were unhappy with the crimping system which "produced less than able men."

This neglect of the labor picture continues into Jeffrey Safford's otherwise fine chapter on World War I.

The LaFollette Seaman's Act of 1915 is

only mentioned parenthetically as driving up wages on American ships and making them less competitive. In the remaining chapters the unions, which by then were powerful, are paid proper attention.

Two very readable chapters deal skillfully with the period from 1919 to 1945, when the government committed itself to supporting a strong merchant marine and shipbuilding industry. Clark Reynolds then shows that the United States has played a leading role in world maritime affairs in spite of its declining fleet in the years since World War II. The editors conclude with an appeal for wiser—but unspecified—maritime policies to overcome the many contemporary problems that they enumerate.

America's Maritime Legacy has little original material and is of limited scope, but it is an excellent concise history of the relationship between government and the American maritime industry. Anyone involved in maritime affairs who is not already familiar with their history will find this book valuable.

ALLAN A. ARNOLD
U.S. Merchant Marine Academy

Knott, Richard C. *The American Flying Boat. An Illustrated History*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1979. 262pp.

There are very few naval aviators remaining on active duty who know the challenge, thrill, and sheer enjoyment of flying a seaplane. Most aviators, familiar with the great power, simplicity, and agility of high flying jets, tend to look with disdain and amusement at the struggling, complicated old flying boats. Let's face it, the flying boats did have many aggravating deficiencies. But flying them, while physically demanding, was often truly rewarding and sometimes even romantic.

The seaplane pilot first had to be a real sailor! Water operation was where

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he could easily get into trouble, for his machine was light, of shallow draft, with a lot of windage. In the big boats his thrust was off-center and, in later years, he often had too much power available for water work requiring finesse. He had to know about anchors, sea anchors, fenders, bridles, and beaching gear. He had to keep his airplane docile when mooring in tight, stormy situations so that his crewmembers, puny when measured with the great forces opposing them, would not be hurt. He often had to extend himself, and his engines, to the limit to get a heavily loaded seaplane "on the step"—planing—in order to take off. Those "max gross" takeoffs were something! Even with the latest, improved hull designs.

Once on the step, it could be a different world. How would you like to conn the world's fastest speedboat? Leap over small islands? Chase ducks and geese? And then fly past them, on and up into the other domain of your versatile machine. With what other aircraft could you make 20 consecutive touch-and-go landings—on the same pass, straight ahead? With what other aircraft could you land, light as a feather, so softly that the crew and passengers did not know your flight was over.

With the day's work done, you could moor, go fishing, and then cook your catch. You could swim, diving off the wing. And after relaxing, doze off in a comfortable bunk to the sound of gently lapping waves. You could do this in some of the beautiful far corners of the earth, in places ordinary aircraft could only fly over, if they could reach that point at all.

Captain Dick Knott, USN, of the seaplane brotherhood, has caught the trials and the triumphs, the risks and the romance of seaplanes in *The American Flying Boat. An Illustrated History*. It obviously is a labor of love, and the Naval Institute Press has assisted him in the same spirit. The

result is a rich and beautiful book. Captain Knott's readable text is supplemented with rare photographs and drawings. His historic account is fast paced, with a lot of data, and full of exciting vignettes that make American seaplane experience come alive. Needless to say, the most exciting stories are of Navy pilots and aircrews, for naval aviators led the way in developing and operating seaplanes during their heyday. The stories are of both peace and war, including the first transatlantic flight by the Navy Curtiss (NC)-4, and war patrols by the *Americas* (also built by Glenn H. Curtiss) in World War I, the *Catalinas* (*Black Cats*) and *Mariners* in World War II, and the *Marlins* in Vietnam.

Captain Knott says that "the exploits of the flying boats and the men who built them are an *everlasting* tribute to the searching, soaring spirit of man." Some may not agree, pointing to the poignant demise of Navy seaplanes in the 1950s, when the all-jet Martin *Seamaster* program was scrapped and dollars diverted to *Polaris*. If seaplane exploits were so laudable, should we not have kept them in inventory? Though many loved them, seaplanes had become dinosaurs, and it was wise to move on to high technology vehicles.

However, it is enlightening to consider the further activities of seaplane designers and manufacturers. Almost unanimously they became leaders in U.S. space programs. If we have traded off our *flying boats* for *space ships*, can we not point to activity that is a *continuing* tribute to our own searching, soaring spirit?

It is no accident that Captain Kirk *flies* to the reaches of space in *Starship Enterprise*.

The seaplane has given way to the spaceship. The exploration of space will be marvelously analogous to the pioneering of air routes on earth by the *China Clipper* and other famous seaplanes. If you want to understand the

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early analog to better understand the future, read *The American Flying Boat*.

W.A. PLATTE*
Captain, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

*Captain Platte may be in the picture on the last page of this book. He once brought a P5M back to Willoughby Bay from 450 miles offshore with the starboard engine feathered. But his magnifying glass could not verify his presence among those aviators shown atop a crippled "3-boat."

Marwah, Onkar, and Pollack, Jonathan D., eds. *Military Power and Policy in Asian States: China, India, Japan*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980. 180pp.

This collection of essays has an importance extending well beyond its modest scale. The editors and authors bring sound credentials, good judgment, and crisp style to their work. Onkar Marwah, formerly an Indian civil servant, works in the Program for Strategic and International Studies of the University of Geneva; Jonathan Pollack, formerly associated with Harvard University, now holds a position in the Social Science Department of the Rand Corporation; Stephen Cohen is associate professor of political science and Asian studies at the University of Illinois; Yasuhisa Nakada is a prominent Japanese journalist specializing in defense and foreign affairs.

The four essays presented here revolve around the premise that a number of the world's second-rank powers possess security concerns and strategic objectives increasingly independent from the preferences of the major powers. Further, within the next 10 years, some of these second-rank powers, especially China, India, and Japan, will develop military capabilities permitting them wider latitudes of aspiration and action than at any time since World War II. Thus, the authors suggest, "future prospects for stability and peace in Asia will be

increasingly determined by the states of the region themselves."

In an introductory chapter the editors emphasize a 30-year trend of erosion in European power, a trend represented in the anticolonial movement since World War II and, more poignantly for some Americans, in the emergence of global economic interdependence during the 1970s. In this context, they suggest, second-rank powers in the world's various regions have acquired the ability "to greatly raise the stakes of any external actor seeking to exercise military power with impunity against them; and second, to develop capabilities that address the real needs of national security for these states in the context of their own regional environments."

Each of the essays in this volume contains information and judgments of considerable interest. Cohen surveys the potential and the inclination of China, India, and Japan to become great powers, or at least *greater* powers, in the near future. Reminding his readers that for each of these countries "military power and technology became an obsession as a result of contact with the West," he endorses the view that these secondary powers will exert great influence in the international system. He also analyzes typical flaws in Western assessments of Asian politics. The three principal essays—Pollack's on Chinese military development, Marwah's on India's evolving defense policy and posture, and Nakada's on the influences for change in Japan's postwar political and security traditions—provide broad coverage of trends and prospects. Each blends fundamental information and cautious judgment.

This book should have a wide audience. The premise that powers such as China, India, and Japan hold increasing political and military importance is beyond dispute. Few Westerners know as much as they

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should—or as much as they think they do—about the attitudes and opportunities shaping the choices of policy elites in these three countries. There is no more economical or painless way to acquire at least a passing familiarity with critical security issues in these three countries than to read this book.

THOMAS H. ETZOLD
Naval War College

Norton, Augustus R. and Greenberg, Martin H. *International Terrorism: An Annotated Bibliography and Research Guide*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980. 218pp.

Bibliographies generally do not make exciting reading. However, if one is attempting to conduct research into an unknown area or endeavoring to broaden competence in an existing field, the discovery of good bibliography can be a very moving (not to mention timesaving!) experience. Norton and Greenberg have compiled an extensive survey of English language works concerning national and international terrorism. While the title indicates that it is an annotated bibliography, only one-third of the approximately 1,000 entries receive comment. The publishers indicate that "this is the only extensive annotated bibliography on the subject." In this respect they are basically—though not exactly—correct. The Central Intelligence Agency in 1976 published an unclassified annotated bibliography on the subject that is also quite helpful to the researcher. However, with the sheer number of books and articles published on the topic in the past 5 years, the CIA work is already dated. If terrorism remains "a growth industry," this book too will suffer the same fate in just a few years.

The work itself is well organized, allowing the reader to survey many aspects of terrorism. The contents are divided topically (tactics, biography, legal perspectives, etc.), and geographi-

cally (Asia, North America, Middle East, etc.). A pleasant surprise is the inclusion of over 100 fictional volumes relating to terrorism. As the authors rightfully indicate in their introduction, "Many of these works are especially well-informed and provocative, and may interest not only the pleasure reader but the student of terrorism as well." Seeing how terrorism is portrayed in various fictional accounts adds yet another perspective to this complex phenomenon.

Researchers will be grateful that the authors have taken time to "dissect" the more general works on terrorism. For these books, especially collections, the reader will find multiple listings. The "General Works" section lists the work in its entirety and the appropriate geographical or topical section references individual works contained in the collection.

At the end of the Bibliography two brief appendixes can be found to further aid the researcher. One contains a list of publications and indexes in which relevant data concerning terrorism appears on a regular basis. Two of the listed works, *Air University Index to Military Periodicals* and the *Index of Government Publications* can be extremely helpful. The other is a listing of "essential titles" for anyone seeking to build a library on the subject.

In recent years terrorism has shown itself to be part and parcel of the relationships between peoples and nations. The spectacular nature of terrorist undertakings and the attendant publicity assure knowledge of their activity by a large, if not global audience. Knowledge of an event and understanding of a phenomenon are two very distinct things. For those who wish to journey into the realm of the latter, Norton's and Greenberg's bibliography will provide a sound navigational aid.

WILLIAM R. FARRELL
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Platt, Alan and Weiler, Lawrence D., eds. *Congress and Arms Control*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978. 227pp.

The very appearance of this volume signifies the recent self-assertion of the Congress in the formulation of national security policies of the United States. The congressional activism of the past decade or so has affected disparate national concerns ranging from foreign military sales, the SALT negotiations, nuclear proliferation and U.S. alliance policies. The President no longer enjoys a relatively unfettered reign in foreign policy decisionmaking, but instead increasingly finds his prerogatives constrained by the legislative branch. Perhaps only in the administration of President Andrew Johnson can we find a period of greater congressional involvement in policymaking. Unfortunately, *Congress and Arms Control* does not debate the contemporary activism of the Congress; instead it provides a brief for such a role. Not that this should surprise the reader inasmuch as almost all of the contributors share a link to Capitol Hill, and while they differ on specifics, most espouse "a central role [for Congress] in formulating this country's arms control policies."

Of the 11 contributions to *Congress and Arms Control*, several are noteworthy. Congressman Les Aspin has provided a very lively account of the "power of procedure." Dissenting from the predominant position of the contributors that the Congress needs more information in order to stand on an equal footing with the executive branch, Aspin argues that "... the problem is not information," but the innovative use of procedural tools. Noting that procedural ploys allow the legislator to avoid taking a stand that might cost him votes, Aspin asserts that "Congress feels more comfortable dealing with issues this way." A vivid example of the power of procedure is the Walsh Act of 1935. The Congress,

suspecting that President Roosevelt was planning to give destroyers to Britain, required the Navy to certify that they were not needed. Thus instead of confronting the President, the Walsh Act played on the predictable reluctance of the Navy to declare that warships were surplus. Such methods allow the Congressman to vote as he pleases and "leave his constituents scratching their heads."

Philip Farley, now with the State Department, provides a very competent exposition of the role of the Congress in regulating arms sales. While he finds that the Congress has done a better job than the Executive in coordinating arms sales with the national interests, he takes a less sanguine view toward congressional activism in this realm than the other contributors. In fact, he finds that "if Congress passed on all arms sales, it is far from certain that the outcome would differ greatly from that of the Executive Branch...." Warren Donnelly of the Congressional Research Service has also provided a commendable survey of congressional activity in the area of nuclear proliferation. He finds that without congressional interest, U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy would not be moving forward as expeditiously as it is.

Another worthwhile treatment is provided by Kurt J. Lauk. Lauk addresses the European perspective on U.S. affairs, and he illuminates the incongruence of congressional activism for the European who is often more accustomed to a parliamentary form of government. To the European observer it is somewhat bewildering to encounter a system in which the legislature not only refuses to support the President, it often also proffers its own alternative policies. At the least, congressional activism has made it very difficult for foreign—and domestic—observers to determine the source(s) of U.S. foreign policy.

Finally, Lawrence D. Weiler's

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argument against secrecy in arms control negotiations is without doubt the most provocative chapter in the book. He denigrates the tactical value of secrecy in negotiations with the Soviets, and argues strongly for congressional involvement in all stages of arms control negotiations. The reputation of Capitol Hill as a sieve for classified material is not confronted as directly, by Weiler, as many would believe appropriate. And one suspects that his argument for a broadened congressional role reflects the hidden assumption that such involvement will temper the Military Establishment; whether he holds the same view today, in light of the anti-SALT sentiment in the halls of Congress, and the increasing importance being ascribed to national defense, is at least an interesting question.

To conclude, *Congress and Arms Control* is a readable, interesting book that may be of value to the informed layman, as well as the specialist. However, the reader is not presented with the full story, the book's lack of balance necessitates an antidote on the other side of this most important topic.

AUGUSTUS RICHARD NORTON
Major, U.S. Army

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. *Anti-personnel Weapons*. New York: Crane-Russak, 1978. 299pp.

Aside from its annual yearbook, *Anti-personnel Weapons* is the latest product of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), an "independent" institute financed by the Swedish Parliament. This particular volume was prepared especially for the ongoing United Nations Conventional Weapons Conference, scheduled to hold its second formal session in Geneva in September 1980. Sweden, the principal proponent of that conference, freely distributed copies of *Anti-personnel Weapons* at the first session of the conference in September 1979.

A review of events of the preceding decade is necessary to an understanding of *Anti-personnel Weapons*. Sweden, a critic of United States participation in the conflict in Vietnam and of weapons being employed by the United States, pressed for an international conference to ban antipersonnel weapons which (it concluded) caused "unnecessary suffering." After various meetings of government experts from 1972-1977, Sweden was successful in obtaining United Nations sponsorship of the present conference. The myriad precedent conferences and events occurring in the interim have served to narrow the issues and tone down the highly politicized rhetoric of the Vietnam war era. For example, Sweden's condemnation of the U.S. M-18 claymore mine as an illegal weapon ceased abruptly in the mid-1970s when its army began development and testing of its version of the claymore, the FFV 013 (which it subsequently adopted). Likewise, Sweden now concedes that none of the weapons under consideration by the U.N. Conference is illegal *per se*. However, this has not deterred Sweden in its efforts to achieve restrictions on the use of certain antipersonnel weapons against exposed combatants, thereby possibly explaining SIPRI's rationale for publication of *Anti-personnel Weapons*. Confronted by the substantial armor forces of the Soviet Union, and predominantly an infantry-oriented nation, Sweden has sought unsuccessfully to impose legal restraints on weapons that may be employed against exposed personnel (i.e., infantry forces), while proposing no limits on the attack of armored, or mechanized, forces. (Students of history will recall a similar unsuccessful effort to use international law to overcome a tactical disadvantage in the various endeavors of Great Britain in the post-World War I era to ban the submarine as a weapon of war or, in the Rules of Submarine Warfare of the Treaty of

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London of 22 April 1930, to require submarines to conform to the rules of international law to which surface vessels are subject.)

A detailed critique of *Anti-personnel Weapons* would require as many, if not more, pages than the volume itself. Its conclusions are given a false aura of credibility by the subjective selection, truncation and juxtaposition of quotations and data. It is rife with inaccuracies and errors of law. It uses a form of writing and presentation that gives a pretense of authority when in fact there is none. A few examples will serve to illustrate this.

In laying a foundation for a case against flechettes, the book characterizes the bomb-shaped darts (substantially larger than flechettes) dropped from aircraft during World War I as flechettes that could "pierce a man from head to foot," a statement as historically inaccurate as it is physically impossible. In asserting its position against small-caliber, high-velocity projectiles, discussed below, it is suggested that international law allows only bullets that are solid and fired at low velocity. While the third declaration of the 1899 Hague Peace Conference prohibited the employment of so-called "dumdum," or expanding, bullets, the only restrictions on bullet velocity have been those unsuccessfully put forward by Sweden during the 1970s. Indeed, efforts by Sweden to tie superfluous injury to velocity have been rejected as medically and scientifically unsound by an international committee of experts at the Conventional Weapons Conference. In its condemnation of modern lightweight fragmentation weapons, the book errs in confusing weapons aimed directly at the individual soldier (e.g., bullets) and area weapons (e.g., the M79 40mm high-explosive grenade, and similar fragmentation devices) in implying that the latter violate the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868 prohibiting projectiles of a weight

below 400 grams. The history of the conference at St. Petersburg is quite clear in establishing that the limitation was intended to cover only the former.

In fact, the book is rather promiscuous in its use of the term "illegal." In discussing the stalemate of trench warfare in World War I, the book declares that "to break this deadlock, armies used illegal means of warfare, including gas and armed aircraft...." Aircraft never have been considered to be an illegal means of warfare, nor does the attack of combatants with a lawful weapon constitute a violation of the law of war. Agreement on restrictions on first use of poisonous gas was reached in the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol not so much because gas was illegal, but because it was not considered militarily effective. Similarly, *Anti-personnel Weapons* refers to damage from harassment and interdiction fire as causing "damage to the environment [that] is long-term, widespread and severe." The quoted language, which does not appear within quotation marks in the book, is excerpted from Articles 35(3) and 55 of the 1977 Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which prohibit such damage. However, in reaching consensus on those provisions at the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, the participating parties (including Sweden) were clear in their understanding that battlefield damage incidental to conventional warfare is not proscribed by this provision.

Other misstatements manifest the book's lack of objectivity. Helicopter gunships are referred to as "intended mainly for counterinsurgency operations," apparently in an attempt to gain Third World support. Similarly, one finds a great deal of criticism of modern weapons, but no mention of punji pits and other primitive but equally injurious means of warfare. The book's

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not-so-subtle progression from the early use of aircraft by the RAF in Iraq to alleged "indiscriminate area bombing" in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam not only errs in fact and in confusing weapons as such with techniques of weapons employment, but leaves the reader with the conclusion that all bombs dropped from aircraft are dropped indiscriminately over areas.

Perhaps the book's greatest deficiency lies in its discussion of weapons by nationality. U.S. weapons repeatedly are referred to as existing systems, whereas many were either obsolete or discarded as unworkable in the experimental stage, long before the book's publication. For example, reference is made to the development of the XM256E1 (7.62mm) cartridge by the U.S. Army's Frankford Arsenal. The XM256E1 program was terminated and Frankford Arsenal closed more than a year prior to the book's publication. Moreover, discussion focuses on U.S. weapons to the neglect of those of other states; including the Soviet Union. After providing a seven-page list of U.S. cluster bombs, for example, a "comprehensive range" of like Soviet weapons is dismissed with a one-sentence reference even though it is apparent from that reference that sufficient material was available to the author for his elaboration had he elected to do so. There is substantial discussion and condemnation of U.S. fuel-air explosives, but no mention of unsuccessful efforts by the Swedish Government during the period in which this book was written to obtain FAE munitions from the United States for its own research and development. In declaring illegal modern small-caliber, high-velocity rifles, considerable information is provided regarding the U.S. M-16 (5.56mm) rifle, to the neglect of the Swedish FFV 660 (5.56mm) that Sweden had been evaluating for its own army for some time prior to publication

of *Anti-personnel Weapons*. (Since the publication of *Anti-personnel Weapons*, Sweden has adopted the FFV 660 and the Soviet Union has deployed the AK-74 (5.41mm). Both the FFV 660 and the AK-74 have muzzle velocities equal to or higher than the M-16.)

The misrepresentations regarding small-caliber, high-velocity rifles are manifestation of an apparent lack of objectivity and elementary research contained in *Anti-personnel Weapons*. The book uses "stopping power" as a measurement of superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, despite the fact that no developer uses immediate incapacitation as an effectiveness criteria for military small arms. Great stock is placed in the premises that the M193 (5.56mm) ammunition for the M-16 rifle tumbles early and breaks up on impact, thereby causing unnecessary suffering. In meetings of government ballistics and medical experts at a preparatory session of the U.N. Conventional Weapons Conference, as well as at similar meetings at the September 1979 Conference, it was concluded that the question of whether a bullet that tumbles early (compared with one that tumbles later) and causes a greater or more severe wound, much less superfluous injury, is highly problematical. Moreover, contrary to the near 100mm variance in tumbling alleged by the author between the M193 and the Soviet 7.62mm round used in the ubiquitous AK-47, actual tests established that the M193, 7.62mm (U.S.S.R.), and 7.62mm (NATO) all tumble on the average of 15mm of one another, a small difference. To the extent that it occurs at all, bullet breakup was found to be a characteristic of all military ammunition, including the Soviet 7.62mm, rather than being unique to the M193. Curiously, the book's argument is based in part on data for the 1965-era M-16 rifle and early 5.56mm ammunition, rather than upon M-16s manufactured or rebuilt after

1967 (at which time the rifling was changed to improve stability and hitting probability) or upon later manufacture, improved versions of the M193 bullet, even though it is clear from the writing that more up-to-date information was at the researcher's disposal. Other theories offered in the book (and at the Conventional Weapons Conference) have been discounted in the meetings of experts at the Conventional Weapons Conference to the point that there is no proposal regarding small-caliber, high-velocity weapons under consideration for the forthcoming conference session.

Anti-personnel Weapons is an extensive but not comprehensive treatment of modern military weaponry. While voluminous, it is so skewed in its intent that it contributes little to the subject. Many of its conclusions, reached through simplistic or convoluted argumentation, have proved to be without foundation when tested in the forum of international negotiations. More galling than its deliberate inaccuracy, however, is that much of the content of *Anti-personnel Weapons* is based on data provided in the course of the technical exchange of information with U.S. military authorities. That material in turn has been skewed to place the United States in the worst possible light while advancing an opposing cause. If there is any lesson in this book, it is that our oft-times open exchange of technical information should be viewed as not always working to our advantage.

W. HAYS PARKS

Symonds, Craig L. *Navalists and Anti-navalists: the Naval Policy Debate in the United States, 1785-1827*. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1980. 252pp.

Craig Symonds' book is one of particular interest to the Naval War College. It is a piece of original research that was inspired by the author's

experience as a professor of strategy at the War College, and it is a direct application of several ideas that are raised in the Strategy and Policy course. This, in itself, is an unusual attribute. As anyone who has taught or taken the course will readily appreciate, there are few books that start and carry forward in the particular areas on which that course focuses. Usually, one must read books written for other purposes in order to view the many aspects in the interrelationship between strategy and policy.

In order to explore the opposing viewpoints that affect the formulation of policy, Professor Symonds focuses on the public debate in Congress during the early years of the Republic, between 1785 and 1827. He dispassionately examines these viewpoints and defines their basic outlook and concerns. In the process he very effectively supersedes the earlier work of Harold and Margaret Sprout in examining these issues. While such earlier historians have scoffed at the Republican opponents of the Navy, Symonds shows that they had very legitimate concerns. The navalists who supported the construction of a large Navy were driven by a vision of the United States holding the balance of power in Europe. To antinavalists, this was an impractical and irresponsible course at a time when the young nation barely had the resources to deal with the Indians on the western frontier. In short, this is the debate between those who see the proper role of the Navy as one of protecting direct and immediate national interests and those who value the role of the Navy in the broad context of international affairs. While the broader viewpoint includes that of defense, the narrower interest does not accept the implications of an international role. Quite clearly, the political debate related here is very much a part of the historical debate between "blue-water" and "continental" strategy. While historians have tended to view

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that debate only in the context of British history, we have clear evidence here that it applies not only to a great power, but even to a small republic with very limited resources. It is a political debate that represents a recurring attitude and that has had a continual effect on the policy that controls both the construction and employment of navies.

Symonds' distinction between "Navalists" and "Antinavalists" is an interesting and useful one to make, although it involves a thorough understanding of concepts that are not readily apparent to the nonspecialist. The terms are well defined in the "Introduction." There, the author makes it clear that he is not dealing with a simple pro-Navy-anti-Navy, good guy-bad guy relationship. He starts from the definition that Alfred Vagts made in his *History of Militarism* (1937) that militarism comprises all the activities, institutions and qualities not actually needed for war. This is what lies behind Symonds' application of the term to those who supported such things for the American Navy. Those who opposed these men were not opposed to the Navy, but they opposed those who wanted to build the Navy beyond the immediate defense needs of the country. In particular, Symonds has identified as navalists those who valued the Navy for its "image, honor, prestige and diplomatic clout." Vagts, himself, focused on the qualities of caste, cult, authority and belief which contrasted with the efficient, rational and humane use of armed force to achieve specific objectives. Symonds' extension of Vagts' definition to include peacetime uses of military force raises some interesting issues. Recent theoretical writing has stressed the role of armed

force, short of war, in achieving specific national objectives. In theory, it is a rational use of armed force, not an extraneous factor. Symonds has convincingly demonstrated that those who supported such views in the early days of the Republic had in mind unrealistic aims that were inappropriate to the national interest and, therefore, navalist. Viewing this one example in a broad context, one is left to speculate when the diplomatic uses of a navy are effective and efficient uses of armed force and when they do not serve national interests.

Navalists and Antinavalists is a thorough study of the congressional debate based on a wide range of published documents, and it is a study carefully placed within the context of the historical literature on the period. In this regard, it is particularly unfortunate that the publisher has relegated the footnotes to the end of each chapter. Many of them make substantive corrections and comments on the literature, particularly on the works of Mahan and the Sprouts. Several of them are important enough to have been put into the body of the text.

Symonds has explored and defined an important aspect of the public expression of opinion in regard to the use of the Navy. In doing this, he has shown the two major contending viewpoints and defined the considerations that lie behind them. This is a most useful contribution to political and naval history as well as a case study in understanding one of the forces that affect the determination of policy.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF
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