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The Office of Naval Intelligence

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intelligence). But the Soviets sent him and others like him to the Gulag only after the Nazi menace had been defeated. The captain was reinstated to rank and citizenship in October 1963, but died 3 weeks later of cancer. Such irony is a part of war, and the authors include other such ironic accounts.

On February 6th, as [Marinesko] was running on the surface past the Hela lighthouse while banks of fog rolled across a calm sea, a German U-boat suddenly emerged from the fog and passed by the S-13 only five meters away. Yefremkov, who was on the conning tower, stared in amazement at the German watch officers as they sailed past with the conning towers almost touching. He heard the sound of a machine gun being cocked. But by the time the gunners had recovered from their surprise, the two submarines had disappeared from each other's sight, slipping into the fog.

Questions about the sinking of the *Wilhelm Gustloff* remain. How many people actually were on board on 1 January 1945? Was the target a refugee ship with red crosses on the funnels, and thus an illegal target? What about the anti-aircraft guns? Had they been removed? All good questions for historians to ponder. What the authors are far more interested in exploring in their dramatic narrative, however, is how "every survivor watched with horror, for the end of the *Wilhelm Gustloff* seemed to anticipate the end of the Nazi regime itself."

EDWIN F. CUMMINGS, JR.
Captain, U.S. Air Force

Dorwart, Jeffery M. *The Office of Naval Intelligence: The Birth of America's First Intelligence Agency, 1865-1918*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. 1979. 173pp.

The exploits of Agent No. 94 will never rival those of 007, James Bond. Sent to Guatemala by the Office of

Naval Intelligence in 1917 to search for clandestine radio transmitters and German U-boat bases, he had the misfortune to run afoul of his superiors, apparently for mixing private gain—the purchase of arms for Guatemala—with his primary assignment. His interrogators claimed "he is not all there," placed him in an asylum for the insane, and twice thwarted his attempts to escape incarceration. At war's end, he was promptly released. More than one Director may seriously have contemplated this method of escaping from the problems and frustrations of his office.

Jeffery Dorwart's valuable study of ONI, "America's first intelligence agency," suggests several reasons for this frustration. First, neither the public at large nor the Navy could be convinced that intelligence-gathering had more than limited value at best. Consequently, ONI remained a second-level bureaucracy attached, at various times, to the Bureau of Navigation, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and the Office of Naval Operations. No Director ever remained long enough at the post to stamp ONI with a true sense of mission.

A second problem was the changing nature of ONI's role. In its early years it performed yeoman service in collecting and distributing information of a highly technological and scientific nature to those elements within the service supporting modernization of the American fleet. Increasing international tensions in Europe, combined with the growth of the United States own "military-industrial complex," led to the atrophy of this function. Perhaps, then, ONI could serve as a center for naval strategy and war planning. Despite a promising start in this direction prior to the war with Spain, ONI found its role progressively reduced to supplying raw information to the Naval War College and the General Board. Increasingly insulated and isolated from policymaking within

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the Navy and the Government, the Office of Naval Intelligence turned to covert operations.

The success of ONI's covert operations during World War I posed the most serious problem of all. Spying, counterespionage and domestic surveillance proved dangerously attractive to the nation's elite. The needs of the service and the hothouse growth of branch intelligence offices prevented the overburdened Director, Capt. Roger Welles, from combating extralegal tendencies. Dorwart suggests that ONI, convinced of its own importance as interpreter and defender of "American interests," had become—however unintentionally—a threat to civil liberties and the right of dissent.

Dorwart's well-researched monograph makes a distinct contribution to the literature on the new Navy. The struggle for bureaucratic survival, the relationship of intelligence to policy formulation, and the question of means and ends have more than passing relevance to our own time.

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Friedheim, Robert L., ed. *Managing Ocean Resources: A Primer*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979. 209pp.

The current fad of "things maritime" and the widespread interest in the confusing and complex deliberations of the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) have produced yet another work, this time a collection of papers prepared in 1977 under the auspices of the Institute for Marine and Coastal Studies (IMCS) at the University of Southern California. *Managing Ocean Resources: A Primer*, edited by Robert L. Friedheim, Associate Director of the IMCS, was intended to provide "...a well-rounded view of the oceans, its [sic] attributes, and the problems of its uses...." Although in many aspects the work is admirable, it unfortunately fails in the rather comprehensive task

Friedheim has set for it. *Managing Ocean Resources* possibly could have been a primer for understanding the possibilities and problems inherent in man's uses of the bounty of the oceans had its treatment been of sufficient scope and detail to provide a "well-rounded view." Alternatively, the scope of the book could have been pared somewhat, and some of the less relevant papers deleted (thus saving the reader from wondering why a specific topic had been included and where the book was going to take him next). In fact, however, the lack of a coherent framework makes for frustrating reading.

Perhaps the single most glaring shortcoming of *Managing Ocean Resources* is the absence of a single unifying theme. There appears to be no consistent logic governing what discussions were included or in what order. The "Foreword" attempts to set the tone for what will follow, but from then on the reader must fend for himself in trying to discover what conclusions he should draw from individual papers or, for that matter, from the collection as a whole.

Despite these deficiencies, *Managing Ocean Resources* does present some specific material that is well-written and well-presented, that is both informative and thought-provoking. Robert F. Hummer's chapter on "Conducting Ocean Science from Space" is a very good and generally understandable discussion of the extremely technical science of remote sensing. Hummer leaves the reader with a good understanding of what remote sensing is, how it is used today, and what its future possibilities are. Similarly, Ross Eckert's discussion of "Ocean Enclosures: A Better Way to Manage Marine Resources," which examines the economic aspects of expanding coastal state jurisdiction over adjacent waters, argues cogently that the present enclosure movement is desirable