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Political Leadership in NATO

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118 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

The revelation of this book is the crucial importance of having a dedicated organization that can integrate information from all sources to ferret out enemy capabilities and intentions. While the breaking of the German "Enigma" code provided important information, the success of Dr. Jones and his compatriots should be attributed to their exhaustive examination of the myriad complex clues not only from intercepted enemy communications, but from electronic emissions, from statements of agents and prisoners, and from exploitation of captured equipment. Guiding the juggling of this information was Jones' predilection for "sticking to basic principles."

The reliance upon multiple sources of supporting evidence and the testing of conclusions against basic principles had an important side benefit. It built the confidence that encouraged Jones to articulate forcefully his findings and recommendations to the highest councils of government. It was Jones who convinced Churchill to employ Window (now called chaff) to blind German radar. His arguments prevailed over the objections of other highly placed advisors who feared that the Germans would quickly develop and employ the countermeasures against allied radars.

Jones' account also addresses the issue of security—preventing disclosure of own capabilities and intentions to the enemy. The Germans' awareness of the need for security, in fact, made the mission of British intelligence a difficult one. Jones laments that his community was unable to identify new weapons systems in the research phase; it was the testing of systems during development and production that provided exploitable clues.

The debate over the use of Window also was an example of security carried to the extreme. Both the British and the Germans were aware of the effects of Window and delayed its employment

fearing the other would develop and employ it with even greater effectiveness. The Germans, on the order of Goering, destroyed all relevant reports and discontinued research and development. The British were "squeamish" but finally employed it in July 1943 after a year of debate. The Germans soon developed countermeasures and began to employ chaff against British radars in January 1944. And so the account goes: weapon, countermeasure, then counter-countermeasure.

In short, *The Wizard War* is a fascinating account of dedicated efforts to counter the new technology of German weapon systems. While reminding the military professional of the need for security, it emphasizes the importance of focusing on the objective and organizing one's efforts towards that end. To stray from that direction is to be misled, to waste energy and talent, and to forfeit the initiative.

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Jordan, Robert S. with Bloome, Michael W. *Political Leadership in NATO. A Study in Multinational Diplomacy.* Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979. 316pp.

This study is an analysis of the political-diplomatic roles of the first four Secretaries General of NATO—General Lord Ismay, Paul-Henri Spaak, Dirk Stikker, and Manlio Brosio. As the author indicates, the focus is on personality rather than structure and events although in the end he concludes that the latter factors decisively shape the performance of the Secretary General. The political conceptions, ambitions, and styles of the men examined might have facilitated or hindered political agreement within the alliance, but it was forces outside the office itself that defined both the agenda of concerns and the substance of political outcomes. Given such an

PROFESSIONAL READING 119

unexceptional conclusion, it should perhaps be no surprise that the reader's main interest in the book probably will be the principal issues and trends in NATO from 1952 to 1971. Ironically, in view of the author's intent, the events overshadow the personalities.

The conceptual plan of the book virtually posits the neutrality of the role of the Secretary General. In a sense, then, the fact that the personality of the occupants of that office is overwhelmed by events may lie not simply in the perversity of the outside world but in the inadequacy of the conceptual framework or point of view itself. This can be illustrated by reference to two closely related perspectives of the author—his view of the nature of the North Atlantic alliance and the influence of decisionmaking and integration studies on his analysis.

In his introduction the author discusses the differences between an alliance and a collective security association. This is indeed an important distinction to establish in order to determine the "logical" role of the Secretary General. Oddly, the initial definitions are not very helpful as the differences between alliance and collective security appear to be grounded on the commitment to peaceful resolution of disputes *among* the member states and on the specificity of the *outside* threat. The former requirement has been as realized in alliances as in collective security arrangements, and the latter requirement virtually contradicts or ignores the real distinguishing characteristics of collective security—e.g., normative agreements on the indivisibility of peace, the primacy of the world community in matters of war and peace, and the impartial determination of friends and enemies according to an agreed notion of aggression, plus a number of structural conditions that favor the dispersion, limitation, and interdependence of power. One must

suspect that the author, if pushed to the point of clarity, would accept these distinctions. In any case it is clear, as the author states, that NATO is "best viewed as an alliance."

Having reached this unsurprising conclusion, the author might have more explicitly noted that many Americans were quite reluctant to accept the idea that NATO was indeed an alliance with all the balance of power connotations implied. Multilateralism and institutionalization might obscure that fact but they would not in themselves alter it. If the alliance character of NATO is kept firmly in view, then one would examine political leadership primarily in terms of U.S. Secretaries of State and permanent representatives or perhaps by reference to SACEUR. One simply would not expect the personality or vision of the Secretary General to be of critical importance. Despite his initial conclusion concerning the alliance character of NATO, the author moves in a direction opposite to that he should have taken, and asserts, "Within NATO, the secretary general stands as the most likely individual to assume the role of leader of the alliance." Had the author remained true to his original light, he would not have had to explain why this never came to pass inasmuch as he never would have expected it in the first place!

To the extent that one views NATO as an exercise in community building, then it is perfectly possible to view the Secretary General and the administrative body to which he is attached as catalysts or expeditors of the process of integration. There is no question that at least one Secretary General, Paul-Henri Spaak, so interpreted the institution and his role. It is equally clear that a number of Americans in a rather vague and general sense also saw the organization in this light. This perspective was reinforced in the fifties and sixties by the fad among social scientists of

120 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

assuming integration—economic, political, and social—to be a kind of natural norm and to focus their attention on the behavioral processes that either reinforced or detracted from this norm. As a result there was always an element of suspenseful drama and surprise in their studies owing to perverse individuals, intractable situations, and untoward events that always seemed to intrude into the natural process. Given a different set of assumptions—ones that placed greater emphasis on power and conflict—there would have been fewer surprises but also less contrived drama in their analyses.

As the author says, to the degree that he *was* influenced by former studies, he owes much of his point of view to analyses on integration behavior and decisionmaking processes. There is no doubt that this approach reinforced the logic of defining political leadership in NATO in terms of the Secretary General and of then testing this "natural" hypothesis against the "accidents" of time, place, and events.

Quite aside from the intellectual frame of the author's analysis, however, he does in fact elucidate with skill the critical issues and trends that have shaped the development of NATO over nearly two decades. Moreover, either because of or despite his hypotheses and expectations concerning the Secretary General of NATO, he has provided additional material on the problems and range of functions open to international civil servants in contemporary international associations.

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Kilmarx, Robert A., ed. *America's Maritime Legacy: A History of the U.S. Merchant Marine and Shipbuilding Industry Since Colonial Times*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979. 264pp.

Whenever maritime historians gather, the conversation turns to the

need for a textbook in American maritime history. Two books were published last year with similar titles: *Our Maritime Heritage*, by James M. Morris (Washington: University Press of America, 1979), and the subject of this review, *America's Maritime Legacy*, edited by Robert A. Kilmarx. But while Morris' book is fairly successful at filling the need for a general maritime history of the United States, *America's Maritime Legacy* by Kilmarx is a very different type of book with a misleading title.

The actual aim of the book is to study government's role in the rise and decline of America's maritime industry in the hope of shedding some light on today's maritime problems and policies. While the work is objective and well documented, it is hardly impartial. Like all the narrative histories of the merchant marine that were published generations ago, *America's Maritime Legacy* clearly advocates a government policy of protection and subsidy to maintain a strong American-flag merchant fleet in peacetime.

The book is composed of seven essays by eleven authors, many of them distinguished maritime historians. It suffers from extreme differences in scope, sources and style among the various chapters. One wishes that more of the chapters were as comprehensive and readable as Jack Bauer's "The Golden Age" (1783-1860) or, alternatively, that each essay presented a distinct thesis, as Jeffrey Safford's chapter on World War I does by demonstrating that Wilson used the merchant marine as a bargaining chip in his diplomatic struggles with the Allies.

John J. McCusker's chapter on the colonial period deals mainly with mercantilism. He shows that government promotion of the economy was the norm, even in colonial times. The American colonies learned mercantilism from the mother country, and colonial governments adopted many