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America's Maritime Legacy

Allan A. Arnold

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assuming integration—economic, political, and social—to be a kind of natural norm and to focus their attention on the behavioral processes that either reinforced or detracted from this norm. As a result there was always an element of suspenseful drama and surprise in their studies owing to perverse individuals, intractable situations, and untoward events that always seemed to intrude into the natural process. Given a different set of assumptions—ones that placed greater emphasis on power and conflict—there would have been fewer surprises but also less contrived drama in their analyses.

As the author says, to the degree that he *was* influenced by former studies, he owes much of his point of view to analyses on integration behavior and decisionmaking processes. There is no doubt that this approach reinforced the logic of defining political leadership in NATO in terms of the Secretary General and of then testing this "natural" hypothesis against the "accidents" of time, place, and events.

Quite aside from the intellectual frame of the author's analysis, however, he does in fact elucidate with skill the critical issues and trends that have shaped the development of NATO over nearly two decades. Moreover, either because of or despite his hypotheses and expectations concerning the Secretary General of NATO, he has provided additional material on the problems and range of functions open to international civil servants in contemporary international associations.

ROBERT S. WOOD
University of Virginia

Kilmarx, Robert A., ed. *America's Maritime Legacy: A History of the U.S. Merchant Marine and Shipbuilding Industry Since Colonial Times*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979. 264pp.

Whenever maritime historians gather, the conversation turns to the

need for a textbook in American maritime history. Two books were published last year with similar titles: *Our Maritime Heritage*, by James M. Morris (Washington: University Press of America, 1979), and the subject of this review, *America's Maritime Legacy*, edited by Robert A. Kilmarx. But while Morris' book is fairly successful at filling the need for a general maritime history of the United States, *America's Maritime Legacy* by Kilmarx is a very different type of book with a misleading title.

The actual aim of the book is to study government's role in the rise and decline of America's maritime industry in the hope of shedding some light on today's maritime problems and policies. While the work is objective and well documented, it is hardly impartial. Like all the narrative histories of the merchant marine that were published generations ago, *America's Maritime Legacy* clearly advocates a government policy of protection and subsidy to maintain a strong American-flag merchant fleet in peacetime.

The book is composed of seven essays by eleven authors, many of them distinguished maritime historians. It suffers from extreme differences in scope, sources and style among the various chapters. One wishes that more of the chapters were as comprehensive and readable as Jack Bauer's "The Golden Age" (1783-1860) or, alternatively, that each essay presented a distinct thesis, as Jeffrey Safford's chapter on World War I does by demonstrating that Wilson used the merchant marine as a bargaining chip in his diplomatic struggles with the Allies.

John J. McCusker's chapter on the colonial period deals mainly with mercantilism. He shows that government promotion of the economy was the norm, even in colonial times. The American colonies learned mercantilism from the mother country, and colonial governments adopted many

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measures to improve their own balance of payments, including preferential duties to favor their own merchant vessels. According to McCusker, Britain's mercantilistic policies were highly beneficial to the colonies, yet he tells us that the British authorities tolerated many colonial violations of the spirit of mercantilism in order not to hurt the thriving colonial economy. But, the chapter is so devoted to economic analysis (the word "promotive" appears three times!) that the slave trade is never mentioned, and captains and sailors are ignored, as are ports. All vessels are "ships," including those trading between the mainland and the West Indies.

In contrast, Bauer's chapter on the Golden Age deals with that period in a thorough and well-balanced manner. We have the growth of ports, the emergence of packets, clippers, steamboats and steamships, canals and railroads; government policies, wars, fishing, whaling, and the gold rush are lucidly explained. Above all, there are human actors on the stage.

Lawrence Allin analyzes the decline of American shipping and shipbuilding from the Civil War to 1913, tracing technological change, and leading us through the maze of legislative proposals that were publicly debated for decades, but accomplished little. The Navy's interest in a strong merchant marine is discussed at length. Unfortunately, this chapter is silent on the question of maritime labor, and the early efforts to organize seamen in the late 19th century. Indeed, one could read the entire book and not learn that brutality was common aboard American ships for almost a century. Allin only says that owners were unhappy with the crimping system which "produced less than able men."

This neglect of the labor picture continues into Jeffrey Safford's otherwise fine chapter on World War I. The LaFollette Seaman's Act of 1915 is

only mentioned parenthetically as driving up wages on American ships and making them less competitive. In the remaining chapters the unions, which by then were powerful, are paid proper attention.

Two very readable chapters deal skillfully with the period from 1919 to 1945, when the government committed itself to supporting a strong merchant marine and shipbuilding industry. Clark Reynolds then shows that the United States has played a leading role in world maritime affairs in spite of its declining fleet in the years since World War II. The editors conclude with an appeal for wiser—but unspecified—maritime policies to overcome the many contemporary problems that they enumerate.

America's Maritime Legacy has little original material and is of limited scope, but it is an excellent concise history of the relationship between government and the American maritime industry. Anyone involved in maritime affairs who is not already familiar with their history will find this book valuable.

ALLAN A. ARNOLD
U.S. Merchant Marine Academy

Knott, Richard C. *The American Flying Boat. An Illustrated History*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1979. 262pp.

There are very few naval aviators remaining on active duty who know the challenge, thrill, and sheer enjoyment of flying a seaplane. Most aviators, familiar with the great power, simplicity, and agility of high flying jets, tend to look with disdain and amusement at the struggling, complicated old flying boats. Let's face it, the flying boats did have many aggravating deficiencies. But flying them, while physically demanding, was often truly rewarding and sometimes even romantic.

The seaplane pilot first had to be a real sailor! Water operation was where