FOREWORD

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Cover design by Tony Sarro.
Resistance to the tyranny of King George III took many forms in the beleaguered American colonies in November 1775. One of the more intriguing accounts, which I came across recently, concerned the individual act of defiance of a good citizen of Newport by the name of Coggeshall. As reported in the *Newport Mercury* of 6 November 1775:

**Early last Saturday morning** (November 4) one Coggeshall, being somewhat drunk or crazy, went on the Long-Wharf, and turn'd up his backsides toward the bomb brig in this harbour, using some insulting words; upon which the brig fired two 4 pound shot at him; one of which went through the roof of Mr. Hammond's store on the said wharf, and lodged in Mr. Samuel Johnston's distillery, at the N.E. part of the cove, within the Long Wharf. The man was soon after taken up, and sent out of town.

The British retaliation to this singular (if unusual) act of patriotism could hardly be termed a measured response; indeed it might even be termed overkill. Certainly, hitting the Newporters' source of liquid refreshment might have evoked an unwanted response by fanning the flames of rebellion.

Fortunately for the future of the United States—and without impugning citizen Coggeshall's show of independence—an event of much greater and lasting moment took place in Philadelphia that very week of 1775.

The Continental Congress, on 10 November 1775, ordered the creation of two battalions of Marines, thereby establishing the United States Marine Corps. One of the mandates of the Continental Congress in this resolution was that "...particular care be taken, that no persons be appointed to office, or enlisted [sic] into said battalions, but such are good seamen, or so acquainted with maritime affairs so as to be able to serve to advantage by sea when required...."

The Marine Corps has served with distinction in maritime affairs since its birth in 1775. Here at the Naval War College, Marine officers are an important part of our faculty and student body. At present, 26 are enrolled in the College of Naval Warfare, 20 are in the College of Naval Command and Staff and 10 serve in key positions on the faculty.

Marines were present at the beginnings of the Naval War College and have played an important role in its evolutionary development as the highest professional-level educational institution in the Navy. The first
Marine students were members of the Class of 1886, the college's second class, and, with few exceptions, Marines have been in every succeeding class. Marine Corps muster roles and officer registers reveal that Capt. Richard Wallach reported to the staff of the college on 10 May 1894 following correspondence between BGEn Commandant George Elliott and Admiral Luce.

Beginning in 1902, assignments to the staff were filled on a more regular basis, often by notable Marines. Lewis C. Lucas, who served on the Navy General Board from 1918 to 1932, Dion Williams, John H. Russell, Robert H. Dunlap, Earl H. Ellis, and Ben H. Fuller were all in this group.

There was close contact between Quantico and the War College in the early thirties. Col. E.B. Miller of the college staff corresponded extensively with officers drafting the Tentative Manual for Landing Operations and visited Quantico frequently.

Many Marine students and staff members went on to achieve particular prominence, distinguishing themselves in combat and rising to general officer rank. Several became Marine Corps Commandants. There were those, too, who made significant contributions to the college's corpus of knowledge on naval warfare and related fields. The much-heralded military planning process, the Navy's Plan Orange for war in the central Pacific, and the place of amphibious operations in comprehensive tactical and strategic war plans were championed by Marines.

Academically, each class of Marines has been impressive, frequently winning the Stephen B. Luce Award (CNW students) and the William Snowden Sims Award (CNC&S students) for academic excellence. They have captured the Luce award for the past 3 years and ended academic year 1978-1979 on a particularly high note by winning both the Luce and Sims Awards.

At the Center for War Gaming, the college and the Marine Corps Development and Education Command have embarked on a joint gaming venture that uses the Navy's WARS (Warfare Analysis and Research System) and the Marine Corps' TWSEAS (Tactical Warfare Simulation, Evaluation, and Analysis System). Such a capability to game all aspects of amphibious operations will enhance the college's ability to deal with every major element of naval warfare: ASW, AAW, MCM, carrier strike warfare, complex surface and helicopter-borne ship to shore movements, close air support, NGFS, and sea to land O. TWSEAS formed an integral part of a recent CINCLANTFLT game played at the college and was most successful in integrating the Navy-Marine Corps team. Specifications for the new Naval War Gaming System (NWGS) are being revised to incorporate the TWSEAS capability and will allow a single system approach to both the at-sea and ashore phases of amphibious operations. This will ensure that our future gaming capability matches the increasing sophistication and can deal with the complexity of such operations.

Marines have always spearheaded the college's research efforts and have contributed to many important studies done at the Center for Advanced Research. Some recent topics have included USMC VSTOL operations aboard merchant ships, an examination of desert operations, a study of Soviet logistics, F/A-18 two-place variant study, and an examination of strategic mobility to include the air and sealift alternatives. Marines are involved throughout the college's mission 'to conduct research leading to the development of advanced strategic and tactical concepts for the future employment of naval forces.'

Marines directly influence the direction of the college and its emphasis, the creation of new
programs, and the fine tuning of existing programs and issues. LTGEN John McLaughlin, USMC (Ret.) has just been appointed to the college's Board of Advisors, replacing LTGEN William Jones, USMC (Ret.) whose advice and counsel were of great benefit to my predecessors and to me in assessing the course of instruction and in providing a fresh, and studied viewpoint for decisionmaking.

At the present time, 27 of the 77 Marine Corps General officers are graduates of the Naval War College. On the last selection list for Brigadier General, five out of seven were Naval War College graduates. The college is proud of its Marines—they've been an integral part of our faculty, staff, and student body since the college's founding—and I am confident of their continued effect on its direction and relevancy.

EDWARD F. WELCH, JR.
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
NATO's 30-year existence has given it almost the character of a familiar statue—we seldom ask how it came to be. This paper looks at the founding of NATO, the treaty, the organizational structure, and the military forces—what conditions required and fostered NATO and why what resulted, rather than something else, did result. It also invites a consideration of two not opposite questions—whether the defense of Europe should be more "Europeanized"; whether NATO should be geographically and functionally broadened.

THE CREATION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, 1948-1952

by

Alan K. Henrikson

And the earth was without form, and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep. And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters. Genesis 1:2.

On 4 April 1949, at a ceremony in the ornate Departmental Auditorium in Washington, D.C., the North Atlantic Treaty was signed. For all of the 12 parties, European no less than North American, the pact—a peacetime military coalition transoceanic in scope—was unprecedented. Not since the breakup in 1822 of the Quadruple Alliance against a Bonapartist resurgence in France had Europe known such a strong grouping of Great Powers in peace. In 1947 the United States had signed the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro to protect the Western Hemisphere, but it had not been formally linked with any European power since its 1778 Revolutionary War alliance with France dissolved by mutual agreement in 1800.

Probably more than any other international arrangement in history, even the League of Nations and the United Nations, the North Atlantic Alliance has set—not to say in a deeper sense caused—the pattern of international relations that we in the Atlantic world today tend to take for granted. It has been regarded—rightly—as a major core of international stability. "To protect this area against war," declared President Truman at the signing ceremony, "will be a long step toward permanent peace in the whole world."

Nonetheless, there is a growing apprehension that the Atlantic Alliance, confined as it is in membership, geography, and function, may be...
too narrow. President Carter, speaking in May 1977 at Notre Dame University, suggested that Americans’ belief in the importance of “an almost exclusive alliance among non-Communist nations on both sides of the Atlantic” is no longer tenable. There is “a new world”—a world in which the Soviet Union has achieved nuclear parity, of economic strains in the United States, and, perhaps most important, of nearly 100 new nations, some of them influential, on the continents of Latin America, Africa, and Asia. “We can no longer have a policy solely for the industrial nations as the foundation of global stability, but we must respond to the new reality of a politically awakening world,” he declared.

The fluidity of present-day global relations and the difficulty of seeing the best way to recrystallize them suggests that the international situation of the late 1940s—apparently so simple and clear—may have been no less amorphous and confusing than the present era.

It is in order to recover some sense of the uncertainty of international relations during the years in which NATO was formed, and of the possible alternatives to that organization, that I should like to attempt to reconstruct the early history of the North Atlantic Alliance, 1948 to 1952. In undertaking such a task, the historian must try to put himself back into the mentality of a period and to look at the world developments as contemporaries did, “remembering” what they remembered and “foreseeing” what they foresaw. At the same time, he must preserve his perspective and critical detachment so as to spot influential ideas and formative events of which those who were “present at the creation” may not have been fully aware.

I shall feel rewarded if, by the end of my account, I have done two things: first, to have given a comprehensive if brief historical explanation of the genesis of NATO—not merely the Treaty itself but NATO’s organizational structure and military forces; and, second, to have established a broader basis for considering how the North Atlantic Alliance might perhaps today be reconceived and reconstituted in light of new international circumstances.

There is a certain tension between these two purposes. In order to give a satisfactory explanation of an event like the founding of NATO, one must identify the necessary and sufficient conditions of it—that is, find the factors that permitted and required it, and it in particular. This is not entirely compatible with a search for alternatives—institutional patterns that history might have formed (and that still might be formed today). The historian’s tendency is to assume that if something happened there were ample causes and good reasons for its happening—that it could not have been otherwise. Nonetheless, he is also impressed by the irregular course that history often seems to take and by the evidence that those who were involved in setting policy directions have subsequently been convinced that the path to the present might have been much straighter and smoother.

The North Atlantic Alliance is an excellent case in point. There was probably no statesman on either side of the Atlantic in 1948 who foresaw the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as it came to be established by late 1952. “At the time of the signing of the Pact, April 4, 1949,” later recalled one State Department official, “I do not believe that anyone envisaged the kind of military setup that NATO evolved into and from which de Gaulle withdrew French forces in 1966.” Similarly, a Congressional staff member of the period comments: “I often say that none of the senators who voted for the Treaty could possibly have foreseen—even in their wildest dreams—the develop-
ments that turned a simple defensive alliance into the NATO of today with its complex command structure, its communication system, its infrastructure, and so forth."

The main divergence from the original concept was the stationing in 1951 of additional U.S. ground divisions in Germany, augmenting those still there on occupation duty. This development, coupled with the establishment of an integrated command structure under an American Supreme Commander, made the United States a factor in the very system—the European balance of power—whose independence and self-sufficiency had in times past been America’s best security guarantee.6 Henceforward the United States could not withdraw from the balance in Europe without seeming to upset it. This was not what had been intended. Nor, except perhaps by some Europeans and a few Americans, worried about Europe’s basic political and psychological stability, had it been desired. Today, U.S. military strategists, while proud of their country’s achievement in helping to assure Europe 30 years of security, sometimes wonder aloud about the wisdom of the original American troop and command commitment, which severely limits their ability to deploy their supplies of manpower and equipment to other critical zones. One Air Force officer, for instance, bluntly speaks of "the NATO trap" into which the United States somehow got itself.

The impetus. The story of NATO, properly conceived, begins in the aftermath of the London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in December 1947. At that session it had become unmistakably plain, from Molotov’s intransigence, that cooperative Four Power supervision of Germany as a single entity in accord with the 1945 Postdam Agreement was impossible. Thus the American Secretary of State, General George Marshall, "broke up" the conference, as one member of the U.S. delegation recalls Marshall’s gesture. Before leaving London, Marshall had a last conversation with Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, who sounded him out on an idea he had. "There is no chance," Bevin said, "that the Soviet Union will deal with the west on any reasonable terms in the foreseeable future. The salvation of the west depends on the formation of some form of union, formal or informal in character, in western Europe backed by the United States and the Dominions—such a mobilization of moral and material force as will inspire confidence and energy within and respect elsewhere."

Marshall considered this statement of sufficient importance to send an assistant, John D. Hickerson, to the Foreign Office to find out precisely what Bevin had in mind. A Foreign Office official explained that Bevin contemplated, more specifically, two security arrangements: one, "a small tight circle including a treaty engagement between the U.K., the Benelux countries and France," and, surrounding that, "a larger circle with somewhat lesser commitments but still commitments in treaty form bringing in the U.S. and Canada also." Note that the "union" (the "small tight circle") was to be entirely, and presumably exclusively, European. The role projected for the United States and Canada, and perhaps other Dominions, was that of backing up a European effort, a strictly external relationship.

This suggestion of Bevin, followed by his historic speech in the House of Commons on 22 January 1948, appears to have been largely his own initiative. His thinking was probably influenced, however, by various comparable ideas for dealing with the Soviet Union that had earlier been floated.9 One was the proposal by Winston Churchill in March 1946 at Fulton, Missouri—part
of the famous Iron Curtain speech—of a "fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples." Such a grouping, a de facto Anglo-American alliance, would have involved "joint use of all naval and air force bases" and, eventually, "common citizenship." Another precedent, less dramatically presented but perhaps more achievable, was the recommendation by the Canadian Minister of External Affairs, Louis S. St. Laurent, at the United Nations General Assembly in September 1947 that there be "an association of democratic and peace-loving states willing to accept more specific international obligations [than those under the U.N. Charter] in return for a greater measure of national security." This was a proposal to supplement the collective security machinery of the United Nations, whose workings were increasingly blocked by the Soviet Union's abuse of the veto in the Security Council. St. Laurent, like many internationalists in the United States, was not ready to surrender the hope that the United Nations would become the principal instrument of world pacification. The provisions of the Charter, St. Laurent reminded his audience, are "a floor under" rather than "a ceiling over," the responsibilities of its member states. The firmest support seemed to be Article 51, which declared in part: "Nothing in the present chapter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."

Bevin's concept differed from these earlier ideas in important ways. Churchill's advocacy of a seemingly exclusive alliance between the United States and the British Empire had produced a backlash, not only within the heterogeneous American public but also among the world's non-English speaking peoples. St. Laurent's U.N. Charter-based scheme, though less ethnically invidious, was too universalist and lacked flavor.

What Bevin offered was more concrete and arresting than either the Churchill or St. Laurent ideas: the prospect of a permanent British commitment to the Continent of Europe. "For one moment in her political history," later wrote Belgian leader Paul-Henri Spaak, "Britain was enthusiastic and, may I say, lucid, about Europe." In reality, Bevin was clear only about "Western Europe." This was a new entity, a somewhat artificial region defined less by culture or history than by the fact of Soviet military control over the eastern part of Europe. Britain, France, and the Benelux countries would form the nucleus of the grouping. Beyond the "Western Union" core, Bevin mentioned possible inclusion of "the new Italy"—despite the conclusion of an Italian Peace Treaty, still widely viewed with suspicion. More circumspectlystill, Bevin also left the way open for eventual participation by Germany. Its assets he privately considered vital to the future strength of the proposed Union.

The model that Bevin and his Foreign Office associates used initially was the 1947 Anglo-French Treaty of Dunkirk. This, an old-fashioned military alliance, provided for the immediate assistance by Great Britain and France to one another in the event of an attack upon either by Germany. They envisioned a network of such bilateral pacts, progressively tying in France and the Low Countries with other continental countries. By this means, they could acknowledge France's emotionally felt and doctrinaire insecurity vis-a-vis Germany and hope partially to dissipate it. There was no doubt in Bevin's own mind, however, that the principal threat to Europe was not the Soviet one. The Soviet Union had in effect split Europe.
as well as Germany, and Britain had somehow to act to shield its western half. Bevin did not believe this really could be done without substantial outside help—namely, that of the United States. Yet apart from mentioning in his House of Commons speech that the “resources” of America would be needed, he said nothing. He knew, on the basis of dealing with Americans with regard to the Marshall Plan, that the best way to get U.S. aid was to make a show of not needing it.12

Initial U.S. Response. As the above discussion indicates, the impetus for an alliance came from Europe, more particularly from Great Britain. What was the American response to the British suggestions? Secretary Marshall, solid and judicious, was clearly interested but inclined to think a military alliance, beyond practical staff talks, premature.13 His reserve may have been in part because of his unfavorable judgment of Bevin. For reasons his staff never fully understood, Marshall simply did not like the tough, plain-spoken former union leader. “Ambassador Douglas and all of us did everything we could to promote a beautiful friendship between the two, similar to that that had existed between Byrnes and Bevin and later developed between Acheson and Bevin,” recalls one colleague, “but it didn’t work.” (Bevin greatly admired Marshall.)14 The most effective way to restore a balance of power in Europe, Marshall and most other American officials believed, was through economic recovery first—that is, through the Marshall Plan (for which Congress had not yet appropriated the funds). His European Recovery Program (ERP) thus had an indirect military purpose. During the voyage home after the London Conference he had discussed the matter with members of his delegation, including the Republican Party’s “ambassador,” John Foster Dulles. It is possible that Dulles, who had gone to France where he had been shocked by a wave of Communist-inspired strikes against the Marshall Plan, heightened the general’s sense of alarm.15 In any case, Marshall, upon his arrival in the United States, grimly reported over nationwide radio and television that Europe had for practical purposes been separated into an eastern part and a western part and that it was necessary to move ahead with the independent rehabilitation of the latter. “We must do the best we can in the area where our influence can be felt,” he declared. This statement may be taken as the symbolic abandonment by the Truman administration of any realistic hope of early European reunification and, indeed, the end of American “European” policy in the former cosmo-politan sense of that term. Henceforth U.S. official concern was, in Marshall’s words, “the rehabilitation of western European civilization with its freedoms.”16

Marshall’s subordinates in the State Department, though intrigued by Bevin’s proposal (which they likened to Marshall’s initiative at Harvard in June 1947), had reservations about its specific character. The idea of concluding further treaties like the bilateral Dunkirk Treaty, explicitly directed against Germany, was considered by most of them narrow-minded and backward-looking. To the extent that a Western Union would reflect this same purpose, rather than opposition to the threat of Soviet domination in Europe, it would be beside the point. To meet the newer and broader Soviet danger, they believed, a multilateral alliance of European states would be the appropriate form of cooperation. This would have the further advantage of encouraging, as did the Marshall Plan, European interest in forming a United States-like federated Europe. The result would really be something solid and progressive,
something the American people, fascinated with blueprints like the Federal Union scheme, could support with enthusiasm.

The specific model American officials urged upon Western European leaders was the recently concluded Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, the Rio de Janeiro Treaty. As one participant remembers, "The Rio pattern was favored because it: (1) provided for an appropriate collective defense arrangement under the U.N. Charter, and (2) had recently been approved by the U.S. Senate." There was a further technical point that a few officials considered as well. Because threats to the peace of Latin America had historically come not only from outside the hemisphere but from inside it, as in the case of the Paraguayan-Bolivian Chaco War (1932-1935), the text of the Rio Pact had been drafted so as to encompass action against aggression from within the alliance itself. The 21 parties simply stated, without specifying the source, that "an armed attack against one or more of them shall be considered an attack against them all." This became known, somewhat misleadingly, as the "Monroe Doctrine formula"—erroneous because the Monroe Doctrine was not, like the Musketeers' pledge, a reciprocal commitment but rather a unilateral declaration. Its attraction in the context of discussion of the Western Union was that Germany could ultimately be included as an ally without depriving the French of the protection they felt they needed against it. With this theoretical assurance of an internal balance, the Union could in fact be developed as a counterweight against Russia in an external balance. Yet, as an ostensibly self-contained "regional defense system" rather than a formation against the Soviet Union, such a grouping need not be provocative. In other words, the Rio pattern would be used as a "screen." As Hickerson explained to the British Ambassador, Lord Inverchapel, a European defense system conceived in terms of the Inter-American Treaty would not seem specifically directed against the Soviets and might make it easier of acceptance by states whose geographical position rendered them more vulnerable to Soviet pressure, such as Sweden. Conceived in these terms it would be even possible for the Soviet Union to join the arrangement without detracting from the protection which it would give to its other members.  

The Rio Pact example, being an American conception, clearly implied some involvement on the part of the United States. On the nature of this relationship there emerged a split in upper State Department ranks. Certain officials, notably Hickerson, the Director of the Office of European Affairs, and his subordinate in charge of Western European affairs, Theodore C. Achilles, believed that even a multilateralized British-French-Belgian agreement would be inadequate unless the United States formally adhered to it. If such a transatlantic pact were, like the Rio Treaty, "clearly linked up" with the United Nations, Hickerson advised Secretary Marshall, the country could and should go along with it. Arrayed against Hickerson and Achilles were two even higher-ranking Department officers: the cerebral Director of the Policy Planning Staff, George F. Kennan, and the Department's diplomatically experienced Counselor, Charles E. Bohlen. Both men considered America's formal participation in European alliance-making unnecessary and European anxieties, as Kennan later described them, "a little silly." As Kennan and Bohlen, close friends, happened to be the government's top Soviet experts, their assessment that the Soviet menace did not require such involvement by the United States could
not be dismissed lightly. Communist protests in Europe against America's initial success with the Marshall Plan merely seemed evidence to them that "some conciliatory gesture" was needed—a sign making it clear that "our purpose was not to humiliate the Soviet Government." Particularly in Kennan's case it was not primarily a judgment about Russia but rather a belief about Europe that governed his response to Bevin's proposal. Kennan's personal European policy was embodied in the Marshall Plan, which, because Congress had not yet made the main authorization for it, was still his preoccupation. The European Recovery Program was built on the principles of economic restoration first and European self-help. "Military union should not be the starting point. It should flow from the political, economic, and spiritual union—not vice versa," he argued in a memorandum to Marshall. To introduce "the note of military defense" right at the outset might frighten some of the outlying countries, notably the Scandinavian states. Bevin's subordinates, he feared, were thinking of "just another framework of military alliances." This would be of little value. "If there is to be union, it must have some reality in economic and technical administrative arrangements; and there must be some real federal authority." American participation in these European deliberations, Kennan believed, would not be appropriate. He did not rule out, however, some reassurance to the Europeans to continue what they were doing by way of organizing themselves.

People in Europe should not bother their heads too much in the initial stage about our relationship to this concept; if they develop it and make it work, there will be no real question as to our long-term relationship to it, even with respect to the military guarantee.

This will flow logically from the circumstances.22 Leaders in Western Europe were not so complacent. Their dilemma, as expressed by Lord Inverchapel, was this: If the United States did not give an actual pledge of support to Bevin's Western Union project, Bevin might not be able to make it "a going concern," for it would be perceived as having too little substance behind it. Unless and until the Western Union were successfully established, however, the U.S. Government did not seem to feel it could not discuss participation in it. Bevin feared "getting into a vicious circle."22

The March Crises. This circle was broken in early 1948 by a series of events as alarming as any that had occurred since the end of the war. These, and similar occurrences later, accelerated processes that would otherwise have taken months to develop, if they would have developed at all. On 25 February the Soviet-backed Communist Party in Czechoslovakia overturned the government there and installed a puppet regime. Shortly thereafter, the Foreign Minister, the beloved Jan Masaryk, jumped—or was thrown—from a window in the Foreign Office to his death on the cement courtyard below. The effect of the Prague coup was, as Bevin's assistant, Gladwyn Jebb, recollected the widespread feelings, "electrical." If the Russians could do this to one European democracy, nearly 3 years after the war was over, what was to stop them from doing it to others? Certainly little in the way of armed strength, it seemed.23

One should realize that Czechoslovakia itself had been at the mercy of Soviet military power ever since the liberation of that country by Soviet troops in 1945. Western forces in Germany consisted of fewer than 200,000 poorly organized troops: in the north, two British divisions, equipped
with wartime Churchill tanks; in the center, three very weak French divisions, armed with old Sherman tanks bought from Belgian junk dealers; and, in the south, the equivalent of two American divisions, deployed and trained to police Germans rather than fight Russians. Ground troop reserves and tactical air support units added little to the total. Opposite the Western forces, distributed for occupation purposes as well as for defensive purposes, there were nearly 30 Soviet divisions, amounting to well over half a million men. Altogether, Soviet fighting mass in Europe outweighed that of the West by more than three to one. “All the Russians need to get to the Channel,” quipped Under Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett, “is shoes.” The takeover of Czechoslovakia seemed to mark a new phase in Soviet-Western relations in which this military balance would be directly relevant. It suggests that Stalin had decided to sacrifice what little comity was left in the wartime alliance and to use all means necessary, including subversion backed by physical force, to secure the Soviet sphere.

At about the same time there occurred another incident which, though less dramatic (and, in a sense, artificial), had an important effect on American military policy and preparations. Gen. Lucius D. Clay, the U.S. Military Governor in Germany, on 5 March sent a cable to Washington in which he ominously stated: “For many months, based on logical analysis, I have felt and held that war was unlikely for at least ten years. Within the last few weeks, I have felt a subtle change in Soviet attitude which I cannot define but which now gives me a feeling that it may come with dramatic suddenness.” Although the chief purpose of this telegram (not sent through normal command channels) may have been to help the military chiefs scare Congress into funding the defense programs they urgently wanted, the content of the message was such as to make any reader doubt that it could have been sent irresponsibly. Secretary of Defense James Forrestal was impressed enough to copy the top-secret message in his diary. He no doubt also saw that it was brought to the attention of President Truman. This telegram may have played a role in getting the Senate Armed Services Committee to proceed with hearings on Universal Military Training (UMT). Gen. Douglas MacArthur in Japan, like Clay himself in Germany, received an order “to survey carefully your emergency plans.” Perhaps the best indication of the fear that was felt is that the Central Intelligence Agency felt called upon to give its estimate (16 March) that war was “not probable within sixty days.” George Kennan, who was sent Clay’s message while on a tour of the Far East, believes that it had an even deeper effect upon American official opinion than word of the Czech coup, and that the combined influence in Washington of these reports was a “real war scare.”

Later in March there was a further disturbing episode in (real or imagined) East-West relations that, though not widely discussed then and almost completely forgotten today, was of even greater importance than the Czech coup or sensed threat in Germany in promoting the formation of an Atlantic, as distinct from a mere Western European or narrowly focused United States-Western European, military coalition. This was the stir in diplomatic circles caused by an anticipated Soviet note to Norway demanding Norway’s signature of a Soviet-Norwegian nonaggression pact, possibly involving Soviet right of access under certain circumstances to Norway’s long coastline. A signatory of the Treaty of Sèvres, the Soviet Union already had a stake in Spitzbergen. Simultaneously, the Russians were concluding a one-sided security arrangement with Finland. A letter from Stalin to
President Paasikivi had produced a crisis. The Norwegian Foreign Minister, Halvard Lange, asked his Ambassador in Moscow to find out if the Russians would approach Norway next. The Soviet Union had always wanted a nonaggression pact with Norway, came the possibly misunderstood reply. To the British Government, Soviet pressure on Norway had special significance. Britain could not (as the Second World War had proved) hold a position in Norway; and, if it did not do so, any Western Union alliance might form could be outflanked. The “defection” of Norway, Bevin warned Washington and Ottawa, “would involve the appearance of Russia on the Atlantic and the collapse of the whole Scandinavian system. This would in turn prejudice the chance of calling any halt to the relentless advance of Russia into Western Europe.” In light of this danger, Bevin proposed very early steps by Britain, the United States, and Canada “before Norway goes under” to conclude a regional “Atlantic Approaches Pact of Mutual Assistance.” Within the scope of such an “Atlantic security system” would be included all the countries directly threatened by a Soviet breakout into the Atlantic. Besides Norway itself and Britain (together with the United States and Canada), potential members might include Denmark, Iceland, Eire, France, Portugal, and, “when it has a democratic regime,” Spain.

At the same time as North Sea-North Atlantic waters were being ruffled, the Mediterranean—a special area of concern for the United States after the Greek and Turkish troubles and the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine—threatened to grow agitated again. For officials in Washington the separate developments on the European central front and the northern and southern flanks were interrelated, psychologically if not geographically. Their apprehensions focused on the forthcoming Italian elections scheduled for 18 April. Hickerson advised Marshall: The easy success of the Communists in Czechoslovakia and the probable outcome of the Finnish crisis, while opening some eyes to the dangers of any dealings with the Communists, have created widespread fear and a certain bandwagon psychology, particularly in the crucial non-Communist left. Italy, with its impending elections, is the critical spot at the moment, but French stability is far from assured and the country is now in a highly nervous state. The same is true of Austria. A general stiffening of morale in free Europe is needed, and it can only come from action by this country. George Kennan, who had been disturbed by Clay’s telegram and out of touch with current intelligence or reassuring Department advice, was surprisingly even more interventionist. If the Communists were to win through intimidation in Italy, he cabled Marshall from Manila, “our whole position in the Mediterranean, and possibly in western Europe as well, would probably be undermined.” He frankly wondered whether it would not be “better that elections not take place at all than that the Communists win in these circumstances.” His practical suggestion was that the Italian Government “outlaw” the Communist Party and “take strong action” against it before any elections could be held. This was followed by an (even by the hard-boiled standards of the time) astonishing scenario:

Communists would presumably reply with civil war, which would give us grounds for reoccupation [of] Foggia fields or any other facilities we might wish. This would admittedly result in much violence and probably a military division of Italy; but we are getting close to the deadline and I think it might well be preferable to a
bloodless election victory, unopposed by ourselves, which would give the Communists the entire peninsula at one coup and send waves of panic to all surrounding areas.  

Kennan’s attitude, seemingly at variance with the political and economic emphasis of his Marshall Plan work, sheds interesting light on the meaning of his “containment” concept. He and other American officials in 1948 retained vivid impressions of the geopolitical pattern of the Second World War and were still strongly in the grip of the ethic of that conflict. The barrier behind which Soviet power must be kept was, in his view, not some abstract line but “the high-water mark” of the Soviet military advance at the end of the war. What lay within the Soviet sphere would not be interfered with; but the Soviet Union must not interfere in the Western sphere. Italy was a country in which the Americans and British, not the Russians, had “taken the surrender,” and it was not Kennan’s view that they had liberated the country from the Nazis only to turn it over within 3 years to another tyranny no less hostile to them than the Hitlers.

The larger solution to the Italian problem that was most often recommended was a formal system of security for the whole Mediterranean. This, a favorite British notion that was urged upon Washington by Bevin, was conceived of as separate from but complementary to the United Kingdom-France-Belgium system and an Atlantic Approaches Pact. One had to start somewhere. The Western Union concept was the furthest along and received the most emphasis.

Treaty of Brussels. The multiple Crisis of March—Czechoslovakia, Germany, Norway, Italy, and tension in some other spots—convinced Bevin to complete his Western Union project. He took the “gamble” that the United States, though not prepared to lead, would eventually follow along. Shortly after the Prague coup, discussions toward that end opened in Brussels. The French Government was so affected by the grande peur that seized Europe that it indicated its readiness to consider a multilateral treaty, rather than a set of bilateral pacts, and to fight against any aggressor, not only Germany. The result was the 50-year Treaty of Brussels signed on 17 March 1948. It was an amalgam of the Dunkirk and Rio Treaties, referring as it did both to the possibility of renewed German aggression and to “individual and collective self-defense” under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. Thus it could be used against the Soviet Union.

The negotiations in Brussels were followed by American officials with great attention. Having advised the participants on the merits of the Rio Treaty, they were interested to see what would happen. The very day the Brussels Treaty was signed (St. Patrick’s Day), President Truman spoke to a joint session of Congress on the menace of communism to Europe. His practical interests were authorizations for the European Recovery Program, the adoption of UMT, and the restoration of Selective Service. He also strongly implied a prospective American stake in the Western Union. Referring to the new agreement simultaneously being concluded in Brussels, he said: “It is a notable step in the direction of unity in Europe for protection and preservation of its civilization. This development deserves our full support. I am confident that the United States will, by appropriate means, extend to the free nations the support which the situation requires.”

What American “support” did Truman have in mind? At a minimum, it would seem, he meant shipments of military equipment and, at the maximum, perhaps some form of actual U.S. association with the European
effort. His and others' controlling concern, however, was the feeling that the U.S. Government should wait to see whether the Brussels powers could effectively implement their agreement.16

Gaining American Commitment. Association by the United States with Europe was less likely to develop through the Brussels Union, however, than through the secret tripartite British-American-Canadian talks that began in Washington 5 days later. The reason was that these discussions, an outgrowth of Bevin's "larger circle" suggestion, were specifically aimed at a problem of direct concern to the United States: the security of the North Atlantic.

It should be noted that the participants in the Washington intergovernmental talks—the principal representatives being U.S. Under Secretary of State Lovett, assisted (significantly) by Hickerson and Achilles, British Under Secretary Gladwyn Jebb, and Canadian External Affairs Deputy Minister Lester B. Pearson—were not thinking only in Atlantic terms. Some hoped that a treaty arrangement among them would be the first in a series of security arrangements, regional in character, that might ultimately be fused into a worldwide "regional" pact. Bevin cabled from London:

A real defence system worked out by the United States of America, Canada, the United Kingdom and the Western European States would affect the whole approach of the world to the peace problem and be the first great step towards what could ultimately become a real world collective Security System, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations.18

The immediate requirement, however, was construction of a North Atlantic defense system. How should the system be organized? The simplest answer was for the United States and Canada to adhere formally to the Brussels Pact. There seemed compelling reasons against doing so, however. The obligations under the Brussels Treaty (Article IV) were "automatic" ones. If any of the high contracting parties were attacked, the others were obliged to afford it "all the military and other aid and assistance in their power." By contrast, the U.S. Senate, seeking to preserve America's freedom of action, had insisted during the Rio Treaty negotiations upon a provision respecting "constitutional processes." It presumably would do so again. Another objection to joining the Brussels Union, stressed by Hickerson (who apparently did not appreciate the extent to which it might count against an Atlantic-wide pact as well) was that any American participation in European institutions would weaken them as instruments of European unification—a declared American policy goal. As he expressed the point: "the U.S. hopes to see the eventual development of a United States of Western Europe (possibly later of all Europe) and the Brussels Pact offers the hard core for such a development. It would lose its utility for this purpose were the U.S. to join."19

A second deceptively simple solution to the problem of America's transatlantic commitment, favored by believers in European autonomy (like Kennan) as well as by some American sovereignty-conscious thinkers (like Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio), was a unilateral Presidential, or Presidential-Congressional, declaration. This would be akin to the 1823 Monroe Doctrine and the 1947 Truman Doctrine. Such a declaration or resolution would be to the effect that the United States of America would regard any threat to the free countries of Europe (or some broader area) as a threat to its own national security, and act accordingly. While a unilaterally given guarantee might
satisfy in the short run, it was objected, it could not be a long-term solution. This was not simply because a future American President might disregard a predecessor's commitment—a distinct possibility, feared the European negotiators. It was rather that, given the nature of American public opinion, a one-sided or asymmetrical arrangement might become politically untenable. It was said that “sooner or later the U.S. would have to require reciprocal guarantees from others. Were reciprocal guarantees offered, the result would, in effect, be a mutual defense agreement.”

The recipients of free security might become as unhappy as the donors. A unilateral guarantee by the United States might accentuate the European countries' “satellite” character—a charge already being leveled against them by the political Left for depending so heavily on Marshall Plan aid. Moreover, as the Canadian Government emphasized, an American declaration would be only a pledge of military support, whereas a general multilateral accord—in which Canada would not just be the North American junior partner—could contain significant provisions for political, economic, and cultural cooperation. Within a “community,” all would be equal.

For American officials, perhaps the most important consideration against both the Brussels Union and a unilateral declaration was the Pentagon's desire for overseas naval and airbases. One must remember how fresh soldiers' memories of the Second World War were. In a sense, the U.S. military, and Congressmen too, simply wanted the right again to use the bases American Seabees had built and American taxpayers had already paid for. On a more rational strategic level, Defense planners were calculating that war against the Russians should be fought in much the same way as the Germans, Italians, and Japanese had been fought: as far away from the continental United States as possible.

The British, who themselves still had military problems abroad (e.g., Malaya and Palestine), well understood American sentimental and global strategic requirements. They themselves had many of the desirable basing facilities. They could not simply give these to the Americans, however. There would need to be, at a minimum, a formal exchange or bargain of some kind—of more lasting advantage to Britain than the 1940 destroyer bases deal now seemed to have been. A mere statement by the President, especially if not endorsed by the Senate, Bevin explained in a cable, would make people in Britain very doubtful as to whether they had incurred any reciprocal obligation. We should certainly be under a moral obligation not to leave the United States in the lurch. We should be constantly challenged as to whether we were in any way bound by a presidential declaration, and we should have to say that there was no commitment. That would leave us in a very unsatisfactory position and might arouse resentment in America.

A Transatlantic Treaty. Given the force of the arguments against American membership in the Brussels Union and an unreciprocated pledge of support for Western Europe, the conference in the intergovernmental talks reached the common conclusion that a formal Atlantic-wide treaty relationship of some sort would be necessary. But how, in a Presidential election year, could a Republican-controlled Congress and a domestically minded American people be persuaded of this necessity?

Critical support came from the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Arthur H. Vandenberg of Michigan. Though a
Republican with an impeccable isolationist past, he had undergone a "conversion" and had been of immense help to the Truman administration in securing passage of the European Recovery Program, the Inter-American Treaty, and other internationalist measures. The State Department's Loven ("a seasoned financier and a very smooth, capable operator"), in particular, enjoyed almost fraternal relations with him. Vandenberg was also influenced by Republican lawyer John Foster Dulles. Initially cool to the idea of a defense treaty, favoring instead an effort to strengthen the faltering United Nations Organization, the Senator was coaxed into sponsoring a resolution permitting "association" by the United States with Europe. He quickly developed a proprietary interest in the project. "Why should a Democratic President get all the kudos in an election year?" he reasonably asked. "Wouldn't the chances of Senate 'consent' to ratification of such a treaty be greatly increased by Senatorial 'advice' to the President to negotiate it?" His partisanship and statesmanship merged.

The Vandenberg Resolution (S.R. 329) passed the Senate on 11 June 1948 by a bipartisan vote of 64 to 4. Article 3, one of the key provisions of that resolve, envisioned: "Association of the United States, by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements [a Rio Treaty formula] as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid [Marshall Plan language], and as affect its national security."

The carefully, if vaguely, worded S.R. 329 was not by itself a sufficient factor to bring the United States into an alliance with the countries of Western Europe. It was more of a permissive condition than a productive one, although the advice given was a generative impulse. What mainly drove the transatlantic talks forward at this stage was another dramatic world event: the imposition by the Soviet Union on 24 June 1948 of a full blockade on Western land and rail communications with Berlin. A blockade, General Clay assumed, was the dire activity he had sensed in his alarmist 5 March message. He wrote in his memoirs: "I was convinced that this was the action I had anticipated and that military action was not likely. I reported these views promptly to the Department of the Army, even though the instance and events could have created war if they had been permitted to do so."

The West's nonmilitary response was the Berlin airlift. The soul-lifting "bridge of planes" to the imprisoned city had a powerful effect on American thinking, especially. Britain's Prime Minister Clement Attlee later commented that, "although Greece and the Soviet coup in Czechoslovakia opened the eyes of Congress quite a lot, it wasn't, I think, until the Berlin airlift that American public opinion really wakened up to the facts of life. Their own troops were involved in that, you see."

Even this was not enough. When in July the "Washington Exploratory Talks on Security" (now including French, Belgian, and Dutch representatives) resumed, they proceeded at a snail's pace, the cause not merely the inherent complexity of the issues. Achilles explains: "The process was a deliberately leisurely one since the U.S. team made clear the importance it attached to avoiding public controversy until after the Presidential election in early November." The foreign participants were probably not difficult to persuade of the wisdom in this. Most expected a change of government.

Truman's "upset" of Thomas E. Dewey on 2 November 1948 opened a new, more public phase of negotiations. From now on the Senate would be directly involved. Hickerson and Achilles met regularly with members of
the Foreign Relations Committee, and even more often with its chief of staff, Dr. Francis O. Wilcox. The chief negotiator for the Executive Branch, Lovett, now turned over his brief to Dean Acheson, President Truman's choice to succeed General Marshall as Secretary of State. Although a former State Department official, Acheson had been in private law practice and needed to be brought up to date. He was thus not, despite the title of his memoirs, "present at the creation" of NATO—the institution with which his name is historically most closely associated. "He was," a senior Canadian official has quipped, "present only on the sixth, the last day of the creation, but that was a particularly busy day."32

Acheson's was a virtuoso performance. "I was like a circus performer riding two horses," he recalled. His trick was to keep the intergovernmental discussions and the congressional deliberations moving in parallel. He masterfully used the Ambassadors' desire for American engagement to "urge on" the Senators, and used the Senators' fear of European entanglement to "hold back" the Ambassadors.33 The result was steady progress.

The Issues. The main issues before both groups, as Acheson saw them, were three: First, should the treaty deal with more than military security? Second, what nations should become signatories of it? And third, what specific commitments should it contain?

The first issue—whether an Atlantic arrangement should be a military coalition or a total community—was pressed most forcefully by some (not all) Canadian officials. Their submission was Article 2 dealing with international general welfare. Having relatively little to contribute in the way of manpower or equipment, particularly after Europe was rearmed, the Canadian representatives—notably Pearson—urged that any alliance must have political, economic, and social meaning. It should also have a transcendent spiritual character. It must, they argued, be positive and dynamic, not negative and static. While undoubtedly expressing genuine idealism, the Canadian case was based as well on more realistic considerations. Pearson's second in command, Escott Reid, has since declared frankly that "the farther the North Atlantic community moved towards political and economic union the more the power of the United States would be restrained by the influence of the North Atlantic allies, especially Britain and France." A transatlantic alliance would "contain" the United States—as well as the Soviet Union. It would give Canada "a countervailing force" against its large neighbor. Recalling and reversing Canada's dictum, Reid fancied calling in Britain and Western Europe "to restore the balance of North America."34 (This logic explains why the Canadians have never liked the "dumb-bell" idea for organizing transatlantic relations—i.e., the notion of a consolidated North America and Western Europe working as equal partners.)

Lovett, Hickerson, Kennan, and perhaps some other State Department officials had seemed to the Canadians to be responsive to their appeal. Even Senator Vandenberg was evidently enthusiastic. "Unless the Treaty becomes far more than a purely military alliance," he astutely remarked, "it will be at the mercy of the first plausible Soviet peace offensive."35

Secretary Acheson, however, was cold to the Canadian plans. To his incisive mind Pearson's case seemed woolly. Acheson's lack of response may have owed something as well to his Canadian parentage and resultant familiarity with the issues of Canadian politics. He may have perceived in Ottawa's idealism a desire to guarantee an international market for the prairie provinces' wheat.
and to placate anticonscriptionists in Quebec and in the religious communities out west. A relatively conservative Democrat, Acheson may also have disliked the implication in Article 2 of a globalized New Deal. (He had resigned from the Treasury Department in the 1930s because of a difference of principle with President Roosevelt.)

On what appear to be rather slender, personal grounds he became convinced that the Senate would never approve the kind of humanitarian alliance the Canadians wanted. "We had all just been through a punishing experience," he recalls in his memoirs. In trying to persuade the Foreign Relations Committee to accept a set of agreements his predecessor had brought back from a meeting in Bogota, he had taken a "terrible beating." The agreements, as he described them, "announced sweeping alleged human rights to education, the good life, welfare, and so on, reminiscent of a good many U.N. resolutions." "Everyone was going to have a college education." "Women were going to have the same rights as men." There was a further consideration. Senator Walter George (D., Georgia) and others, especially fellow Southern legislators, perceived in the attempts by the United Nations to deal with such matters "serious constitutional complications in federal-state-relationships." In at least some part, for some members, this was a constitutionalist mask for anxiety lest the Truman administration use international commitments to enforce liberal domestic civil rights policies that neither Congress nor many state legislatures would pass. (This argument was carried further in the early 1950s by the Bricker Amendment movement.)

The proposed Article 2 of the Atlantic Treaty next touched the same nerve as these earlier measures. Acheson hardly needed to express any legal reservations he himself may have had, for Senator Tom Connally (D., Texas), who after the election became Foreign Relations Committee Chairman, declared: "The reference to the general welfare in the United States Constitution has caused more litigation than any other provision in it. Get it the hell out of this treaty." 16

Acheson concurred with most of the Senators' judgment that to provide for Atlantic welfare in a military alliance would be to jeopardize it "for no important benefit." 17 The European negotiators agreed as well, especially as the Senate might not go along. Thus Article 2, though too patently well-meaning and too ardently supported by the Canadians to be excised completely, was reduced to an abstract promise to strengthen "free institutions," bring about "better understanding," and promote "conditions of stability and well-being." Only slightly more concretely, it urged "eliminating conflict" in international economic affairs and "encouraging economic collaboration." Nothing specific was said about lowering tariffs within an alliance or coordinating defense production—two areas in which practical action was possible then as later. In Acheson's view, as he expressed it to the Committee, Article 2 was the "ethical essence" of the Treaty. It "does not impose any obligations upon the contracting parties." 18 Although "a reservoir of great potential," as Achilles today rightly stresses, Article 2 has fared most of its life been programatically a dead letter. This may be changing. 19

Acheson's second question—who should sign a treaty—was partially dependent on the answer to the first—that of the alliance's nature. If the alliance were to be strictly a military combination, then geostrategic considerations would largely determine the membership. If it were also to be a political and economic union, then ideological considerations would have a major bearing.
For most American officials, despite the role of the United States as the standard bearer of the "Free World," geostate clearly came first. The military perspective of Americans was now much broader, more panoramic than it ever had been. Guided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the American negotiators took the position that any transatlantic alliance would require access to the major midocean islands. This was the "stepping stones" concept. "In those days of comparatively short-range aircraft," Achilles recalls, "it was considered that U.S. reinforcement of its European allies in the event of war would require refueling facilities in Greenland (i.e., Danish adherence), Iceland, and the Azores. This indicated the importance of Portuguese membership...."60 Norway's participation would help secure the Northern flank. The value of including these outposts also partly lay in denying them to the enemy which could interfere, as during the war, with cross-Atlantic shipping. But now there was an awareness of something new: the vulnerability of North America itself. Because of potential technical developments in aviation, the United States and Canada had "live" frontiers. They had to be concerned not simply with backing up European defenses but with buttressing their own, in the Arctic as well as in the Atlantic. Lovett had bluntly stated early in the intergovernmental talks that "Greenland and Iceland were more important than some nations in Western Europe to the security of the United States and Canada."61

The French, by contrast, wanted to concentrate the focus on the central front in Germany in accord with the new doctrine (not easily reconcilable with their wish to keep the Germans forever disarmed) of "forward defense."62 They were also keenly interested in the Mediterranean, both its northern and southern shores. During the war North Africa had been a vital refuge for them and they feared it might be so again. Taking up an initial American suggestion that Italy—a "Western" if not an "Atlantic" country—be included in a pact, the French argued that if this were done Algeria ("in the same relation to France as Alaska or Florida to the United States"), should be covered as well. At one point France's Ambassador in Washington, Henri Bonnet, infuriated his diplomatic colleagues and Acheson by stating, in a virtual ultimatum, that his government would not approve an invitation to Norway unless one also were sent to Italy. Such linkage, Acheson objected, would be ruinous. "Bonnet's clumsy advocacy came near to defeating his purpose," he later wrote. Nonetheless, the French strategy in the end worked. Other than Hickerson, few administration officials or Congressmen were enthusiastic about Italian membership, which seemed geographically odd to them. Had Acheson not replaced Lovett in the negotiations, Hickerson has speculated, the French gambit would have failed. It was decided to invite both Norway and Italy and also to extend the coverage of the treaty to Algeria. In the Atlantic Ocean itself, the southern boundary of the alliance domain would be the Tropic of Cancer. This had the effect of precluding adherence by African states and American Republics (e.g., Cuba, Mexico).63

Widening the Alliance. These were consequential decisions. Norway's joining the negotiations, in the person of its Atlantic-oriented Lange, meant the defeat of a Swedish plan for a Nordic Defense Pact—a kind of latter-day League of Armed Neutrality. The decision to invite Italy meant that a separate Mediterranean-wide defense system, including Greece, Turkey, perhaps Egypt and possibly Iran, would be unlikely. Although Italy's inclusion in the transatlantic orbit seemed at first...
glance to violate the ‘natural’ geographic basis of a North Atlantic Pact, it had the subtle effect of extending the Atlantic concept itself, transforming at least the western part of the Mediterranean into an “arm” of the Atlantic. For Americans, who preferred to contribute naval power rather than ground troops to Europe’s defense, this was important. “I don’t know what we would do with the Sixth Fleet if Italy hadn’t been included,” Hickerson later admitted.44

The geographical stretching of the Atlantic Alliance had important ideological implications. Scandinavian socialism was mixed by Norway’s, Denmark’s, and Iceland’s dependence upon free-enterprise America for future military supplies and protection. It was made clear that such aid would not be forthcoming if the Scandinavian states remained neutral. Italy, though still regarded by some as a former enemy state, received supplies and firm “democratic” backing (though not in the extreme form Kennan had proposed) in order to prevent it from going communist. In the event, Alcide de Gasperi’s Christian Democratic-led coalition had been returned to power easily. The adherence of Italy to the Alliance hastened the liquidation of the Second World War, but it also further crystallized the pattern of the cold war. Portugal, with its authoritarian Salazar regime, gave the alliance a slight fascist tinge. (This would have been even blacker if, as some American military planners urged, Franco Spain had been included.) The incorporation of non-Western, quasi-colonial Algeria reminded the world that many of the North Atlantic partners, despite the inevitability of decolonization, were still “empires.” Éire’s refusal to join as long as the problem of Northern Ireland remained unsettled made a similar point.

Partly in order to preserve the ideological purity of the Alliance while securing wide geostrategic advantages, some U.S. officials, one of them Kennan, had reasoned that there might be “gradations in membership.” This led to the suggestion, never taken very seriously, of three membership categories—“resident members, non-resident members, and summer privileges,” Lovett wryly commented. That is, apart from the original Allies, having fully mutual obligations, there would be a second group of “associate” members linked to the core partners by limited, asymmetrical, and probably only military relations. This would have well suited the case of Portugal, for only base rights were really sought from it. Neurasthenic Sweden might also have been extended one-way aid and protection in return for its partial cooperation. The third, more peripheral category would have reached far out onto the globe, perhaps allowing some protection even for Europe’s colonies as they progressively became independent. American anticolonial sentiment was a heavy brake on such thinking, of course. The Dutch Government, for example, was once warned that it would not get any military aid under the North Atlantic Treaty unless it had resolved its relationship with Indonesia. Such threats were not realistic enough to be entirely credible, for the United States would do what it had to do in order to defend its friends. The decisive argument against a classification system may have been, as voiced by Lester Pearson, “Why should anyone take on the commitments when they can get all the benefits?”65 Surely an equally powerful consideration was the amour propre of the smaller countries themselves. One British diplomat, who does not recall any discussion of three classes of membership, judges the idea a “non-starter” (“it was hard enough to get the smaller countries to accept the tripartite Standing Group”—a body dissolved in 1966). Nonetheless, had such concentric rings of decision and
liability been deemed possible, the present-day, somewhat artificial separation of NATO members' Atlantic and non-Atlantic roles and the absence of Alliance ties with much of the Third World might to a degree have been avoided. In strictly and narrowly conceiving their membership—in the interest of speed, unity, and secrecy of action—the partners may have lost a future chance for a flexible, worldwide security grouping having a North-South dimension.

Strength of Commitment. Acheson's third issue—the exact commitment under a treaty—was at the time the most difficult if not, in the long run, perhaps the most significant. This was the issue of "the pledge" (the Americans disliked the European word, "garantie"). A formula had to be found that would do two things: on the one hand, appear to satisfy Europeans that the United States would promptly come to their aid, and, on the other hand, seem to assure Congress and the American public that the United States would not be dragged, willy-nilly, into war. I use the words "appear" and "seem" because officials' private conceptions of what really was likely to happen in the event of a military showdown over, say, Berlin made any verbal pledge almost superfluous. They prided themselves on being able to say that the treaty would oblige them to do nothing more than what was already clearly in the American national self-interest. European suggestions that the United States was unreliable filled American officials with indignation. "Did they suppose we had labored to free Europe from the clutches of Hitler merely to abandon it to those of Stalin?" George Kennan wondered.65

Why then, the assumption that there had to be a formal, multilateral treaty? The answer can be found partly in the emerging theory of peace through "deterrence." As Dean Acheson notes in his memoirs, "All joined in the doubtful dogma that in two world wars Germany had picked off her victims one by one and that if her rulers had known from the start that such conduct would have brought in Britain and America (presumably at the start) neither war would have occurred." The difficulty in devising a treaty according to this theory was that, "when one took pencil to draft, one was immediately reminded that 'clear as day' must not mean 'automatic commitment.'"66

Of all the prospective allies, it was the French who were the most insistent on a legal commitment—one as close to the wording of the "automatic" Dunkirk and Brussels Treaties as possible. In 1919 Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Wilson had signed a tripartite defensive alliance that would have given France immediate military assistance in the event of another onslaught by Germany. The U.S. Senate had never acted upon the pact. In 1946 Secretary of State James F. Byrnes had proposed a comparable Four-Power Draft Treaty on the Disarmament and Demilitarization of Germany. When the Soviet attitude made cooperation on German matters impossible, the United States had dropped the scheme (which the French liked), refusing even to consider a truncated, three-power version of it. The objection was that only the western part of Germany would thereby be bound, the eastern zone being left for the Russians freely to rearm.68 Not surprisingly, the French wanted, at last, an irrevocable American engagement.

The idea of formalizing the transatlantic relationship also had appeal for some Americans. It is important in considering the genesis of the NATO alliance to understand why. Apart from allegedly being given to "arid legalism" in their statesmanship
(a characteristic Kennan has often decried), many American leaders appear to have believed, perhaps without fully admitting it to themselves, that the more "resonant and rotund" the pledge, the less likely it would ever be that the United States would need to act upon it. That is, promise would become a substitute for performance, "deterrence" for "defense."

This tendency of thought became evident during the deliberations over Article 3 of the draft treaty. The chief purpose of this provision, for the American side, was to spur Europe's own common defense efforts, particularly organizational efforts. "In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty," it stated, "the Parties separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack." Did this mean that the United States could get by with a verbal pledge, or that it would be obliged to provide actual military assistance to Europeans—a costly "military ERP"? Senator Vandenberge was emphatic in the negative:

I think a man can vote for this treaty and not vote for a nickel to implement it, because so far as I am concerned, the opening sentence of the treaty is a notification to Mr. Stalin which puts him in exactly the contrary position to that which Mr. Hitler was in, because Mr. Hitler saw us with a Neutrality Act. Mr. Stalin now sees us with a pact of cooperative action.

For Vandenberge the treaty, because of its presumed deterrent value, would be "an insurance policy"—one that could cost, and would perhaps pay out, nothing. Another evidence of the reliance upon the new psychologic of deterrence was the seeming amorphousness of American military strategy. Defense Department planners did not want to be pinned down to actual steps the United States would take in the event of war. This was particularly so with regard to the European continent. Given the possibility of having to meet the Soviet Union in northern Norway or at the Turkish Straits, not to mention North America or the Far East, they scrupulously guarded their liberty to use their scarce resources in accord with their own priorities—to select among fronts. Maj. Gen. Alfred M. Greuter, the able and articulate representative of the Joint Chiefs in the intergovernmental talks, stressed the "necessity for being entirely clear that no commitment to aid a state, victim of attack, should require that aid should be delivered totally. We should retain freedom to carry out action against the aggressor in accordance with strategic concepts."

Officials in the Pentagon were well aware of how militarily weak Western Europe was. Nominally, its defense was the responsibility of a new Western Union Commanders in Chief Committee (UNIFORCE), headed by Britain's Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery. As one Dutch official remembered, "Our great generals, such as Montgomery and de Lattre de Tassigny, were very nearly our only concrete assets. We had neither manpower, the equipment, nor the economic resources to enable them to build up our forces." A probably apocryphal slogan about the European nations' short-term emergency plan was, "On to Lamballe,"—an obscure Brittany village on one of the evacuation routes. Because of this the Brussels partners wanted a large and continuous American presence on the continent. They did not want a repetition of the World War II experience, with the Americans arriving only in the last year of a 6-year war. Not did they want atomic deliverance. If American armies landed in Europe only after world war III began, they would, in the stark phrase of
French leader Henri Queuille, be "liberating a corpse."

U.S. Congressional Opposition. Article 3 appeared, to some European statesmen especially, to be capable of providing U.S. military assistance in advance. The Foreign Affairs Committee of the French National Assembly, for example, reported that American aid was one of the "elements indispensables" for the effectiveness of the Treaty. Thus the Truman administration itself welcomed the North Atlantic Treaty, once it cleared the Senate, as a policy for a large-scale Military Assistance Program (MAP). This had for some time quietly been preparing in collaboration with European defense officials. It was afraid that major military expenditures by European nations would draw resources away from their recovery efforts.

Whether this military aid program might have won congressional approval without the political justification of the Treaty is difficult to say. The precedents of military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey and, of course, the European Recovery Program itself, suggest that it could have done. Nonetheless, some of the opponents of further American largess were formidable.

Chief among them was "Mr. Republican," Senator Robert A. Taft. To Taft, Article 3 with its implied promise of military aid was more dangerous than any other part of the text, even the "pledge." He saw in it "a peacetime renewal of the old, open-ended lend-lease formula." The Rio Treaty, the presumed model of the North Atlantic Pact, contained no comparable feature. All kinds of circumstances could arise, he warned, in which the obligation to give military aid could prove inconvenient. A recipient government might be taken over by a communist party. Fascist-type governments—Salazar's, and perhaps eventually France's—too would be in a position to demand American support. "Obvious, any help we give one of these nations today may be used later for aggressive purposes, against Russia or its satellites, or neutrals, or members of the pact, or it may even be used against us when we try to fulfill our obligation to other members of the pact." Thus a North Atlantic Treaty, of which he deemed the Military Assistance Program an integral part, could lead to an arms race, and war.

Acheson, to his considerable credit, did not shirk the economic-military implications of the draft treaty. While a vote for the alliance would not strictly oblige a vote for the MAP, he told the Senators, it did require their "honest judgment" about the matter. His statement of this concept is well worth quoting:

The judgment of the executive branch of this Government is that the United States can and should provide military assistance to assist other countries in the pact to maintain their collective security. The pact does not bind the Congress to reach that same conclusion, for it does not dictate the conclusion of honest judgment. It does preclude repudiation of the principle of the obligation of making that honest judgment. Thus, if you ratify the pact, it cannot be said that there is no obligation to help. There is an obligation to help, but the extent, the manner, and the timing is up to the honest judgment of the parties.

Acheson, later justly proud of the stance he took, commented, "So far as I could prevent it, I would oppose attempting to win votes for the treaty by denigrating its commitments."

The Secretary did, however, gloss over the not-so-hypothetical question of future U.S. direct military involvement in Europe under the Treaty. In a memorable exchange with
Consultation and the "Pledge." Closely related to the problems of America's military contribution under the North Atlantic Treaty was that of interallied "consultation." Two articles of the draft dealt with this. Article 4 required consultation whenever any party felt its "territorial integrity, political independence, or security" threatened. An informal "agreed interpretation" made clear that the Article 4 consultation requirement applied to threats "in any part of the world," including threats to the signatories' "overseas territories." Thus, though the defense zone of the treaty was limited to "the North Atlantic area" (defined by Article 6), and there was no provision for aid for the purpose of maintaining colonies, the worldwide scope of the Atlantic powers' interests was recognized. Such farflung places as British Kenya, French Indochina, Dutch Indonesia, or Belgian Congo could under imaginable circumstances be discussed in North Atlantic consultations. So could any remote superpower confrontation that in any way affected the security of the North Atlantic community. Even collective planning, maneuvers, or operations beyond the treaty area were in theory permissible.

Article 9 sketched an organizational framework for consultation. A "Council" would be formed that could "meet promptly at any time." This central body was empowered to create such "subsidiary bodies" as were necessary. In particular, it should "establish immediately a defense committee." Knowing that the United States would probably soon be involved in the work of the Council and as NAT defense body as well, Acheson could hardly have expected that American troops in Germany would remain mere occupation forces or that Montgomery's UNIFORCE would remain in sole military charge in Europe.
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The "heart" of the North Atlantic Treaty, to use the standard metaphor, was Article 5. This contained the "pledge." The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

In its strategic implications Article 5 was closer to the Rio Treaty language than to the Brussels formula, which required immediate military help. The independence of military decision was carefully reserved. This was safeguarded by Article 11, which embodied the Senate's requirement that the Treaty's obligations be carried out in accord with the signatories' "constitutionalized processes." The "assistance" mentioned in Article 5 might include the dispatch of "armed force," but it also could mean less, perhaps not even military help. The parties, it should be noted, were committed to "restore" the security of "the North Atlantic area"—not protect the territory of individual countries in advance from invasion. Thus Article 5, if conservatively analyzed, was not itself a promise of a common, solid forward-defense posture.

In my own view, the main significance of Article 5, apart from its basic legal import, is intellectual and psychological: the recognition, expressed in the phrase taken from the Rio Pact, that "an armed attack against one of the parties in either Europe or North America would be "an attack against them all." This proposition—whose truth seemed to have been proven by the occurrence of two recent transatlantic wars—was a direct assault on the historic distinction between the Old World and the New World—the idea that, as expressed in Washington's Farewell Address, "Europe has a set of primary interests which no us have none or very remote relation." To be sure, some Treaty advocates tried to portray this novel American commitment to Europe as simply an eastward extension of the sphere of the Monroe Doctrine—that is, the pressing outward of the boundary of the New World (fused with the Free World) past the vague mid-Atlantic line to the Iron Curtain. Nonetheless, this semantic identification of the Rio Treaty area and the North Atlantic Treaty area did not suppress the widespread feeling of new geographical and political consciousness. The change in the American attitude toward Europe associated with the North Atlantic Treaty has often been called a "revolution." This is justified.

The revolution was an incomplete one, however. Two centuries of tradition could not be so easily overturned. "The illusion that we could live alone behind a barrier of oceans was at last being shed," wrote columnist Marquis Childs. "Yet at the same time the nostalgia for a past that had seemed safe and secure was still strong." In part because of this the Treaty was made collectively reviewable after 10 years (Article 12) and capable of being denounced by any party after 20 years (Article 13). The Senate's approval of the final text on 21 July 1949 by a vote of 82 to 13, with Taft in the minority, was probably a fair measure of this mixture of dominant forward-thinking and recessive backward-thinking.

Implementation. When President Truman, only a few hours after the
Treaty’s ratification on 25 July 1949, presented to Congress a request for a $1.4 billion foreign military aid authorization, he quickly learned how incomplete this “revolution” was. Even earlier objections had been voiced when on 5 April, merely 1 day after the NATO signing ceremony in Washington, the State Department revealed that it had received requests for military assistance from the five Brussels Powers and Italy, Denmark, and Norway. Senator Connolly had earlier bluntly warned Assistant Secretary of State Ernest A. Gross, “You can’t get an arms program until you get this treaty ratified.” The abrupt European request threw the North Atlantic Treaty “almost wholly into the climate and atmosphere of arms lend-lease,” objected Senator Vandenberg. A large part of the Senators’ opposition was simply fiscal conservatism: The European Recovery Program was supposedly already taking care of Europe’s needs, enabling governments there to set aside their own funds for military defense. (Congress and executive branch could never seem to agree on what Europeans were supposed to be doing first with their money.) There was also a “constitutional” concern. This arose from the powers assigned the President in the bill to transfer arms. Vandenberg, who had never believed the Treaty as a political alliance required much implementation, asserted with hyperbole unusual even for him that the bill made Truman “the personal umpire of this whole earth.”

In order to delay and perhaps to defeat further American involvement in Europe, Vandenberg and others insisted that, before all this military aid was given, the provisions in the North Atlantic Treaty for establishment of a Council and a Defense Committee should be carried out—that is, as with the European Recovery Program, the recipients should coordinate their demands and concert their strategies. After all, the U.S. commitment was to the European nations jointly, not to each nation separately. A common “strategic plan” would therefore have to be presented to Congress for appraisal. In effect, Vandenberg was making Article 3 dependent upon the execution of Article 9, dealing with organization. Vandenberg was joined in his “revolt” by another lapsing bipartisan, John Foster Dulles, who was now an appointive Senator from New York. Dulles’ chief worry was Germany. If France received extensive American military equipment, he feared Germany might be entirely lost, “possibly going into a military alliance even with the Soviet Union.”

As a result of these arguments, the Military Assistance Program bill was redrafted to defer the bulk of the aid until an alliance organizational structure (into which Germany could be integrated) was drawn up. The MAP was made still more attractive when some members, especially Republicans on the west coast, insisted on the addition of some $75 million for expenditure “in the general area” of China. The bill did not finally pass both Houses of Congress, however, until another stunning world event: the announcement on 23 September that the Soviet Union had exploded an atomic bomb. This development, long dreaded, had not been anticipated for another several years. With the United States no longer able to rely on its strategic trump card, it needed to look to its, and others’, strength in conventional military suits. “Once again,” Acheson later wrote, “the Russians had come to the aid of an imperiled nonpartisan foreign policy, binding its wounds and rallying the divided Congress into accepting the Senate version of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program.” The bill was signed into law on 6 October 1949.

Now that the money was made available, the “O”—organization—was
put into the NAT Alliance. A Working Group had already prepared detailed recommendations. These were considered at the first meeting of the "North Atlantic Council" in Washington on 17 September 1949. Secretary Acheson accepted the Chairmanship of the body, thereafter to rotate. Besides instituting the Council itself, the conference generated a Defense Committee, a Military Committee, a Standing Group, and five Regional Planning Groups. The latter, of particular interest as evidence of the participants' strategic images, were: (1) the Northern European Group—Denmark, Norway, and the United Kingdom; (2) the Western European Group—Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom; (3) the Southern European-Western Mediterranean Group—France, Italy, and the United Kingdom; (4) the Canada-United States Group; and (5) the North Atlantic Group (all the members except Italy and Luxembourg). Note that the United States accepted full membership only on the Canada-United States and North Atlantic Groups. On the three geographically European planning bodies, it was only a "consulting member." 87

The "Strategic Concept" worked out by the new NATO also showed the limitation of America's involvement in European defense. Approved by President Truman on 27 January 1950, this plan required each NATO member only to undertake the task for which it, given its location and capabilities, was "best suited." The primary responsibility of the United States would be strategic bombing ("with all types of weapons") and cooperation with Britain in securing sea and air lanes. "Initially, the hard core of ground forces will come from European nations," it was stipulated. "Other nations will give aid with the least possible delay and in accordance with over-all plans." 88 On the strength of this conceptual division of labor, admittedly vague, Truman was able to release the final payments to Europe under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program.

German Participation. American officials hoped at this point that the defenders of Europe would become able to arm themselves. Their confidence depended, however, on their European Allies' willingness to rely upon their recent enemy: Germany. The "equipment deficiencies" of the European members, the State Department suggested, might be met by the use of "available industrial capacity" in West Germany—now the Federal Republic of Germany under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer—"without violating existing security prohibitions." 89 What Washington really wanted was for the Federal Republic of Germany soon to be brought into NATO—in part as a surrogate for the United States.

This American line of argument, as yet tentative and oblique, made the French shudder. To have Germany reenter Europe through an organization whose primary character was military would be disastrous, they believed. The next steps would be a German defense industry, a German General Staff, a German High Command. Yet they did not wish to oppose Washington frontally. In order to broaden the whole discussion of Europe's problems and to make doubly sure that the United States would be in Europe at France's side in solving them, Premier Georges Bidault on 16 April 1950 proposed a "High Atlantic Council For Peace." He envisaged this as "a small group of select men"—"civilians general staff for total diplomacy"—who would address themselves continuously to the larger problem of developing Western capacities "to win a cold war." 95 Bidault's shapeless proposal helped make Americans realize that if NATO were to be used as a mechanism for
integrating Germany into the West, it would have to perform more than military tasks. It would have to assume political and economic responsibilities as well.

Here, however, NATO competed with other postwar institutions, notably the new parliamentary Council of Europe and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. Its most potent rival in the nonmilitary field, however, emerged on 9 May 1950, when French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman announced a plan to place all French and German coal and steel production under a common High Authority in an organization that would be open to other countries of Europe. This sharing of Franco-German bases of industrial production would be "the first step toward European Federation." The principal author of this scheme, which came to include Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, was the imaginative Jean Monnet, who served as the first President of the High Authority. Perhaps not wholly without intention, the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) had an indirect effect of deflating interest in developing NATO as an engine of social and economic progress in Europe. Henceforth, it seemed, the function of NATO was to be primarily that of providing a security "umbrella" for Europe, with the United States holding the handle from afar.

**Effect of Korean War.** This restricted conception of America's future role in Europe, even the defense field, was abruptly changed following sensational news from the other side of the globe: on 25 June (Asia time) North Korean troops invaded South Korea. This seemed to mean, as the prevailing view was expressed by Gen. Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that "communism is willing to use arms to gain its end." The presumably Soviet-backed move highlighted, as had an earlier National Security Council Study (NSC 68) following Russia's breaking of the American atomic monopoly, the military imbalance on the European front. Reports from Europe supplied details. Acheson recalled that "the Germans and the French, looking with apprehension at the sixty thousand East German military police and twenty-seven Russian divisions also in East Germany, with more behind them, found little comfort in NATO's twelve ill-equipped and uncoordinated divisions with little air support." Perhaps unconsciously, the pattern of Northeast Asia was projected upon that of Central Europe: divided Germany seemed analogous to divided Korea, the Elbe comparable to the 38th Parallel. The only way to restore an equilibrium in Europe and thus to preserve peace worldwide, it seemed to most officials (notably excepting George Kennan and Charles Bohlen, who believed that American and European statesmen were making a major interpretive error in reading the North Korean aggression as evidence of a global Soviet military offensive), was the rapid assignment of American ground troops to Europe. "The idea became prevalent," observed Bohlen, "that only armies actually in existence along the edge of danger could provide protection." Acheson gave classic expression to the new doctrine when he urged that, in the future, the United States deal from concrete "situations of strength.""
armed German units (division-sized). In order to integrate the whole transatlantic effort, a "unified command" should be formed. Moreover, all of these things should be done simultaneously. This—known as the "One Package" proposal—was a direct challenge to France.95

The French responded with their own scheme for harnessing Germany's potential military might. Known as the Pleven Plan, after the new Premier, René Pleven, it had the stated object of creating a true European Army ("a complete fusion of all human and material elements"). In this, the German units were to be kept so small they would scarcely realize they were German! Moreover, the Federal Republic would not actually be rearmed until a whole set of centralized (French-designed) European institutions was set in place. One of these would be a European Defense Ministry. Hence considerable delay could be anticipated.

Although inspired by fear and not well thought out, the Pleven Plan was consistent with the purposes of the North Atlantic Alliance. Germany would be allowed to contribute. The Plan promised that the European forces would be "placed at the disposal of the unified Atlantic force" and would "operate in accordance with the contractual obligations of the Atlantic Pact."96 It was thus a worthy answer to Washington.

The contest between the American and French designs for defense of the West was partially resolved by the so-called Spofford Compromise, skillfully engineered by Charles M. Spofford, American chairman of a new NATO Council Deputies Committee. This accord committed the American and European parties to German rearmament "in principle," the details to be worked out during "a transitional period." A meeting of the NATO Council in Brussels in December 1950 endorsed the Compromise, thereby clearing the way for the establishment of a real Atlantic defense system.

Military Integration. The first, and perhaps historically the most critical, step toward a unified NATO defense force was the appointment of a Supreme Commander. Whatever the military justification for this, it was considered almost a political and psychological necessity. "Europe does not respond to committees," Acheson observed.97 For the title one name was preeminent: Dwight D Eisenhower. Of the former SHAPE commander, Winston Churchill had written, "In General Eisenhower we have a man who sets the unity of the Allied Armies above all nationalistic thoughts. In his Headquarters unity and strategy were the only reigning spirits."98 The fact that Eisenhower was an American general was perhaps the decisive consideration. His appointment would embody the full commitment of the United States to Europe's defense. Moreover, European governments did not appear able to agree on one of their own for the job. If there was any European candidate at all it was probably Montgomery, as prickly as Eisenhower was genial. No French general, given France's wartime record, had comparable distinction. The general officers of the smaller countries of Western Europe had never conducted large-scale military operations. A German supreme Commander was unthinkable. Montgomery himself, well aware of the controversy that moved with him, had taken his position as Western Union Commanders in Chief Chairman only on the condition that, should another world war break out, he would be free to step down. The "top post," he felt constrained to say, should go to an American.99 His reluctance, insofar as it was based on an assumption that other European countries and the United States would never in the future
allow their troops to fight under anyone but an American, was notably unwarranted. The image of American military dominance at the end of World War II—the OVERLORD image—was still so powerful, however, that alternative patterns of leadership could scarcely be conceived.

The announcement of President Truman’s designation of Eisenhower as Supreme Commander and decision to increase the number of American troops in Europe touched off the so-called Great Debate. Senator Kenneth Wherry ("the Nebraska undertaker," as Acheson viewed him) introduced a resolution to prohibit the assignment of any ground forces to the European area “for the purposes of” the North Atlantic Treaty. He feared that the troops’ subordination to a “unified command”—even, or perhaps especially, one under an American commander—would permanently entangle the United States in European affairs. Senator Taft, who had to be taken seriously, acknowledged the need for a buildup of military manpower in Western Europe but did not approve the assignment of American troops to an integrated NATO command structure. The President, by committing American forces to “an international army,” he argued, would be limiting his own prerogatives as Commander in Chief—and, more importantly, United States sovereignty.98

The legislative upshot of the Great Debate was Senate Resolution 99. This measure approved the appointment of Eisenhower. It also accepted the principle of the United States doing its own defense in Europe to defend the North Atlantic area. It went on, however, to register the Senate’s view that “the major contribution” of ground forces would have to come from the Western European countries themselves and that no more than four additional American divisions (requested by the Pentagon) should be sent in implementation of Article 3 "without further congressional approval."

The final vote on S.R. 99 was 69-21, Taft finally voting for it. In a sense, this vote marked the completion of the postwar American diplomatic revolution. Coming on 4 April 1951, precisely 2 years after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Resolution occasioned reflections on how far the nation had changed its attitude toward involvement in Europe and the world. As Senator Connally said at the end of the debate, "Certainly if there ever was any doubt on the part of our friends or potential enemies that the United States would be willing to implement the North Atlantic Treaty with ground troops, that doubt has now been dispelled." It is perhaps significant that when Secretary Acheson attributed to President Truman the bringing about of "a complete revolution" in American foreign policy, he cited not the North Atlantic Treaty itself—the formal commitment—but among other things, the "absolutely unprecedented" steps of placing "substantial forces" in Europe, putting them into "an integrated force," and agreeing to "a command structure" with "a supreme commander."99

**How Lasting?** How certain was it that American forces would stay in Europe, however? To the extent that the forces were then conceived as a counterbalance to the Soviet military presence in Europe, the answer to this question must depend on how Soviet policy was interpreted. It was at least imaginable to some knowledgeable officials in the West that the Soviet Union, whose penetration so far westward was historically abnormal, could one day be induced to withdraw. America could then disengage. To the extent, however, that the U.S. forces were understood as a contribution to a new, complex, self-contained Atlantic-European security "system," the answer could be "indefinitely." The very value
of NATO conceived in this way lay in its continuity of existence and generality of purpose—its responsiveness at any time to any threat, internal no less than external, nonmilitary as well as military. As already shown, some of the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty considered the Alliance a way of holding down Germany and influencing the United States. To have American power engaged on the European continent was, from the Canadian and European points of view, to gain some positive control over it. The vagueness and looseness of the North Atlantic Treaty made such actual military integration, especially for the French, then seem imperative.  

The one way by which an indefinite American troop involvement in Europe might have been precluded at this time, it seems in retrospect, would have been via the creation of a strong European defense organization. When NATO was established, however, the one existing European military institution, the Brussels Force, was, in the later words of Lord Gladwyn, "reduced to a sort of vermiform appendix."  

"It is not inconceivable, however, that if Great Britain, particularly, had not been so eager to fold the Brussels Force into NATO, that body might have developed into an effective core for European defense.  

The other possible European alternative to NATO was the French Government's plan for a European Army—the basis of the ill-fated European Defense Community Treaty of May 1952. Officials of the Truman administration finally decided that the best, and perhaps only, way to bring about German participation in Western defense was to give strong American support to the EDC project. Many American officials plainly did not like it. An important one who did, however, was SACEUR—General Eisenhower—who quickly became, in one characterization, "the gospel European Union man." Eisenhower's judgment appears to have been that, as long as political unity developed pari passu with a European Army, and as long as German troops were incorporated in the force in truly national units rather than mere regimental combat teams, the EDC could work. Although the evidence regarding his thinking is not conclusive, he gave at least some Europeans at the time including Dutch Foreign Minister Dirk Stikker, "the feeling that in the back of [his] mind was the idea that the creation of the EDC would allow him to send American boys home." Bevin's successor, Anthony Eden, received much the same impression. "As the European Army developed," Eden remembered, "it was his thought that maybe we and the Americans could be drawn into reserve. We should be there and available if needed, but it might be no bad thing if the Europeans could stand on their own." In short, Eisenhower seems to have believed, "We should help from without rather than from within."  

Conclusion. We are now in a position to reflect upon the genesis of NATO and to try to identify the main factors involved in the creation of that organization. In addition, we may briefly consider, in light of a more detailed knowledge of the concepts and circumstances that gave NATO birth, whether that body is well adapted to the present international environment. If it is not, do any of the alternative security schemes that were conceived in the late 1940s and early 1950s have possible relevance to the present? Does history, when its complexity and variety are appreciated, suggest forms for the future? Any political institution that lasts more than a generation is sustained by forces greater than the energies of those who founded it. This is surely true of NATO, which has become an international fixture. The unprecedented
formation of a peacetime political-military alliance bridging the Atlantic Ocean is basically attributable to the inexorable pressures of the Second World War and the cold war, as well as powerful economic and social developments—notably the temporary collapse of Europe’s economy and the permanent loss of its overseas empires. All of these factors tended to focus attention on the North American-Western European core area.

Nonetheless, without the conscious exertions by individual statesmen and governments, the North Atlantic Alliance—the treaty, the structure, the troops—would never have been organized. Particular major roles can retrospectively be assigned. The impetus came from Foreign Secretary Bevin, without whose initiative nothing might have happened. There is considerable merit in the opinion, held by Prime Minister Attlee, that the Atlantic Pact, like the Brussels Union, is “the work of Bevin.”

Bevin’s concept of a Western Union and of complementary regional associations nearby might never have been reshaped into an Atlantic-wide alliance, however, had it not been for the activity of other states—Norway, Canada, and, especially, the United States of America. The positive response of the Truman administration—Marshall, Lovett, Hickerson, Achilles, and others—was crucial. The involvement of Dean Acheson, though it came later, was also of vital importance. President Truman, perhaps in the best position to judge the relative contributions of everyone involved, later wrote, “There would have been no NATO without Dean Acheson.” He specifically credits Acheson with driving home the point that NATO would have no meaning at all unless a really joint effort was made at common defense and mutual aid.

Here it is important to recognize the participation of Congress. Without its approval and support NATO would never have had either the popular endorsement or the economic withal necessary to proceed. Secretary Acheson and Under Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett were...the chief architects for the United States in building the treaty structure,” Senator Connally rightly observed. “But I think it safe to say that the Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate furnished some of the stone and mixed some of the mortar to complete its symmetry and strength.”

Nor should the contributions of military statesmen be forgotten. One should cite at least the pathbreaking work of Montgomery and his UNIFORME at Fontainebleau, the lucid expositions of Gruenther during the Washington talks and afterward, and, above all, the dynamic personification of NATO by its first Supreme Commander. “Once NATO came into existence,” writes one of his successors in that role, “its success was determined, in large measure, by the enthusiasm of General Eisenhower.”

There was another, hostile dominant personality of the era. A number of Western statesmen have been dubbed “father of the Atlantic Alliance,” Paul-Henri Spaak (himself a claimant) has written. “Not one of them deserves the title. Without Stalin and his aggressive policies, without the threat with which he confronted the free world, the Atlantic Alliance would never have been born.” At times, it seems when the evidence is today examined, Western officials exaggerated the peril from the East. The warnings of an imminent Soviet-Norwegian non-aggression pact, a communist victory in the Italian elections, and a Red army thrust into the western zones of Germany are cases in point. Rumors of war were even, we must admit, sometimes deliberately manipulated—General Clay’s telegram and its handling being an example. Nonetheless, the pervasive insecurity that was
felt throughout Europe and the Western Hemisphere was genuine, and it was not for the most part, falsely grounded. In the circumstances of the time, as even Charles Bohlen later acknowledged, "NATO was simply a necessity. The developing situation with the Soviet Union demanded the participation of the United States in the defense of Western Europe. Any other solution would have opened the area to Soviet domination, contrary to the interests of the United States and contrary to any decent world order."108

By 1953 NATO was a clear success. A few saw limits in it. "Today," correspondent Theodore H. White wrote at the time, "NATO is frozen about the decisions of 1948 and 1950. These decisions rightly saw the Atlantic Basin as the centerpiece in world strategy and moved to secure it; since then, the Atlantic Community has rigidly dedicated itself to the creation and equipment of military divisions in Western Europe."109 There were new dangers to be faced in Asia and elsewhere, and not all of them were military in nature.

Nonetheless, the creation of NATO was, and remains, a considerable achievement. One participant interestingly assesses this as follows:

Thirty years have now gone by and at least we have not had a war in Western Europe. Moreover it is quite possible that a good many difficulties between members of the Alliance may have been averted because of the cohesion brought about by NATO. Without NATO, the Marshall Plan could not have succeeded and Europe could not have moved into the most productive and peaceful period in its history.

The historian is nonetheless tempted to ask: Might not some of the alternative schemes floating about in the late 1940s and the early 1950s for the defense of Europe and the West have accomplished much the same result? In particular, could not an enlarged Brussels Union or even the bolder European Defense Community scheme, if supported by the United States with massive military equipment aid, an offer of coordinated strategical planning, and even American participation in periodic joint maneuvers in Europe, have performed a similar stabilizing role? The central lesson of the NATO experience has often been taken to be, as Dean Acheson expressed it in 1957: "The North Atlantic Treaty, its organization, and its military forces are recognition of the truth that no balance of power in Europe, or elsewhere, adequate to restrain Soviet power is possible unless the weight of the United States is put into the scales."110 But, one must ask, does "the weight of the United States" necessarily mean the permanent stationing of large number of American troops abroad in a highly integrated, U.S.-dominated command structure?

It probably did not then but, given the existence of NATO, it perhaps does today. Nonetheless, one cannot help but note that America's "weight," in relative terms, is not nearly so great as it once was. Europe, once economically prostrate, has been again on her feet for some time. In other regions of the world, too, there are potentially strong nations and international groupings. It is thus now perhaps time again to consider, more seriously than in the past, whether the defense of the Atlantic Community in Europe ought to be "Europeized," enabling some portion of the U.S. forces there to be (as General Eisenhower and other founders of NATO anticipated) "drawn into reserve"—i.e., made available for use elsewhere.

It may further be time, given the world changes that President Carter remarked upon, to consider whether the scope of NATO, especially in geographical terms but also functionally,
ought to be broadened. "It is worth recalling today," writes one of the makers of the Alliance, that the treaty area, as defined in Article 6, is simply that in which an armed attack would constitute a casus belli; there was never the slightest thought in the mind of the drafters that it should present collective planning, maneuvers or operations south of the Tropic of Cancer in the Atlantic Ocean, or in any other area important to the security of the Parties. 11

Article 4 allows for consultation about any problem anywhere that a member nation considers relevant to its own security. The conventional wisdom, however, has been—especially following the 1956 Suez fiasco—that the North Atlantic Alliance works well only so long as it confines its concern to its own area. This tradition is unduly restrictive. So, in truth, is the very idea of a "NATO area." The zones and issues of the international security arena are much more interrelated than they were. NATO members—acting individually or severally as Allies if not collectively as an Alliance—might well seek closer working ties of all kinds—informal "reliances" rather than formal "alliances"—with well-placed nations (e.g., Egypt) and multilateral organizations (e.g., ASEAN) elsewhere to form a global network of security, in the very broadest sense of that term. Given the economic disparities between the North Atlantic partners and many of the countries upon which they may increasingly rely, Article 2 may gain new importance.

Ideally, global security should be guaranteed by cooperation in the United Nations. It should not be forgotten that NATO—an Article 51 association—was formed under the aegis of the United Nations for the avowed purpose of strengthening that organization. For most participants, this was not cynical. If neither organization proves effective, however, it may become necessary, in President Truman's words of 1949, to take yet another "long step toward permanent peace in the whole world."

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Alan K. Henrickson was educated at Balliol College, Oxford, and Harvard University, receiving the Ph.D. degree from the latter. He is Associate Professor of Diplomatic History at The Fletcher School, Tufts University. He is also Associate and a member of the Canada-United States Study Group at Harvard's Center for International Affairs. During academic year 1978-79 he was a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington. His most recent publication is "America's Changing Place in the World: From Periphery to Centre?", a chapter in Jean Gottman, ed., Centre and Periphery: Spatial Variations in Politics.

NOTES

1. Address by President, Harry S. Truman, 4 April 1949, The Department of State Bulletin [hereinafter DOSB]. 17 April 1949, pp. 481-482.


3. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: Norton, 1969). Acheson's title is taken from a quotation on his frontpiece by Alphonso X, the Learned, King of Spain (1252-1284): "Had I been present at the creation I would have given some useful hints for the better ordering of the universe."


5. This and subsequent unattributed quotations (unfootnoted) are from written or oral statements published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1980.
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17. This point is well developed by Timothy P. Ireland. He argues that, implausible as it may seem, many Europeans (particularly the French) considered the long-term danger to the European balance to be that of German, not Soviet, domination. See Timothy Patrick Ireland, "Germany, the North Atlantic Treaty, and the Entangling Alliance," Ph.D. Dissertation, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Cambridge, Mass., 1978. "As the French Government sees it," Ambassador Jefferson Caffery, cabled from Paris, "the Western democracies are faced with (1) an eventual threat, which is Germany; (2) an actual threat, which is the Soviet Union; (3) an immediate threat which is Soviet action in Germany." Caffery to Marshall, 29 June 1948, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States [hereinafter FRUS], 1948, v. III, pp. 142-143. This is a typical formulation.


20. Kennan, pp. 346, 399. The Canadian Government viewed Kennan and Bohlen as the two main bureaucratic opponents of a transatlantic treaty in the Truman administration. Whenever there was a pull in the intergovernmental discussions, it seemed from Ottawa, they could be depended upon to "counterattack." Reid, p. 50.


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31. Kennan to Marshall, 13 March 1948, FRUS, 1948, v. III, pp. 841-849. In a handwritten notation on Kennan's cable, Hickerson advised that, because of its action against the Communist Party, Germany should be "certain to cause civil war" and because the anti-Communist Parties in Italy had "a good chance of winning" without such drastic steps, the "action recommended by GFE seems unwise." Kennan does not mention his proposal in his memoirs. He does discuss it, however, in a letter to the editor of Foreign Affairs, April 1958, pp. 643-645.

32. In his famous July 1947 statement of the containment idea in Foreign Affairs magazine, Kennan had recommended, ambiguously, "the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy." George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (New York: Mentor, 1952), p. 98.


34. Gladwyn, p. 214.


37. The Soviet Government, due to involvement in the talks of British Embassy First Secretary (and Soviet spy) Donald Maclean, was, presumably, fully informed of the three powers' secret deliberations. Given the ultimate success of the alliance talks, this, ironically, may have been a "good thing." A deterrent influence was perhaps conveyed through espionage that would not yet have been projected publicly.

38. Paraphrase of Bevin telegram, FRUS, 1948, v. III, pp. 79-80. The scope of a security arrangement depended in part on which U.N. principles were relied upon. Article 41 of the Charter (on "individual and collective self-defense") implies no geographical limitation. By contrast, the articles of Chapter VIII, "Regional arrangements," are more restrictive not only geographically but in that enforcement action is not permitted without the Security Council's authorization.


41. Ibid.

42. Reid, p. 105.


44. Washington and London agreed on 2 September 1940 that, in return for the transfer of 50 "average" destroyers and certain other (unspecified) weapons from the United States, Britain would lease without charge for 99 years 6 naval and air station sites in the Caribbean, and also grant the right to develop similar facilities in Newfoundland and Bermuda.


46. Acheson, Sketches, chap. VI; Kennan, Memoirs, pp. 494-496; Achilles, p. 12; Daryl J. Hudson, "Vandenberg Reconsidered: Senate Resolution 249 and American Foreign Policy," Diplomatic History, Winter 1977, pp. 46-63, which emphasizes Vandenberg's own substantive contributions. It is noteworthy that, in presenting the resolution text that he and Lovett had worked out to the Foreign Relations Committee, Vandenberg argued that "the whole purpose is to avoid any direct alliance, or the whole purpose is to retain complete freedom of action on our part with respect to the evolution of events, but it is to underscore the fact that there are in the United Nations Charter, regardless of the veto, certain devices which likeminded peace-loving members of the United Nations can embrace as we have done in a spectacular example in the Rio Treaty, for the purpose of protecting national security." U.S. Congress, Senate, The Vandenberg Resolution and the North Atlantic Treaty, Hearings (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1953), pp. 1-5.

47. The other provisions dealing with defense arrangements are Articles 2 and 4. The rest deal with peacemaking and peacekeeping under the United Nations.


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51. ibid., pp. 13-14.
52. Reid, p. 63.
53. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 277. One European participant recalls of Acheson, “He was a very good chairman of the negotiating body although perhaps not quite so easy-going as Lovett, and it was a great advantage to have the Secretary of State in the chair. And, of course, all the time he was having to struggle with Congress—very successfully too.”
54. Reid, p. 139.
56. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 277; Reid, pp. 172, 173.
58. Heindel et al., p. 653.
59. Achilles suggests that the Canadians in February 1952 had an opportunity to invoke Article 2 in order to lift a minor U.S. restriction on the importation of woodpulp, but they “got cold feet.” Achilles, Part 2, p. 17n. For a discussion of recent nonmilitary activities related to NATO, see Joseph M. A. H. Lams, “Thirty Years Later—Aims of the Alliance Still Valid,” *NATO Review*, April 1979, pp. 3-8.
60. Achilles, Part 2, p. 16.
63. Reid, pp. 201-211, 213-218; Minutes of the Tenth Meeting of Washington Exploratory Talks, 22 December 1948, *FRUS, 1948*, v. III, pp. 323-332; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 279; Achilles, Part 2, p. 17. The Algerian departments of France were to be defended against “armed attacks” but not against internal rebellion. Some of the signatories probably had no intention of defending Algeria against external attack by Arab countries. They could argue that “the security of the North Atlantic area” was not threatened. Thus the French diplomatic victory was rather a hollow one.
64. Reid, p. 201. When Senator Vandenberg voiced reservations about including Italy in an “Atlantic” alliance, Ernest Gross of the State Department took Maj. Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther (Director of the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) to see Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, upon whom Vandenberg relied heavily for military advice. Gruenther “most cheerfully” explained to Lodge the strategic importance of the Mediterranean, going all the way back to Hannibal. Vandenberg’s doubts thereafter appeared resolved. Conversation with Ernest A. Gross, 26 November 1979.
69. Kennan, *Memoirs*, p. 409; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 280. Acheson, no legal formalist, also recognized “the weakness of words to bind, especially when the juice of continued purpose is squeezed out of them and their husks analyzed to a dryly logical extreme.”
70. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, p. 159.
72. Sütter, p. 285, Bell, p. 42.
73. Heindel et al., p. 642.
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79. On the differing strategic implications of the Rio, Brussels, and North Atlantic Treaties, see Reid, pp. 146-147.
81. Acheson, quoted in Truman, pp. 254-256.
85. Ibid., pp. 123-124.
86. Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 315.
87. Report of Working Group in Organization to North Atlantic Council, FRUS, 1949, v. IV, pp. 330-357, and Ismay, pp. 25, 26. Canada was a consulting member in only one European group, that pertaining to Western Europe.
93. Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 437.
94. Ismay, p. 33.
96. Ismay, p. 35.
98. Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 364, 494-495.
100. Beaure, p. 28. Beaure finds it "amusing to recall that the idea of integration to which we now object was of French origin," p. 26.
102. White, Fire in the Ashes, p. 274.
107. Speak, p. 141.
Glavnoe komandovanie, the Soviet equivalent of the Western concept of theater command, was usually used in World War II in those critical operations requiring coordination and direction of two or more fronts and involving the several services. Soviet military literature is evincing increased interest in the concept and there have been hints that such a command has already been established in the Far East.

GLAVNOE KOMANDOVANIE: THE SOVIET THEATER COMMAND

by Gregory C. Baird

Introduction. The command and control of a Soviet front, the highest strategic ground formation, is typically understood as a direct Moscow-to-front scheme, devoid of intermediary command entities. In fact, the command and control of Soviet fronts throughout World War II included a number of such intermediaries. Of these, one equates to our conception of a theater command. The theater of military operations (Teatr voennykh deystvij or TVD) had become accepted by many Western analysts as the Soviet equivalent of a theater command. However, the TVD is, simply, "that place where military operations will be carried out." It roughly equates to the European military-geographic term, theater of operations. The actual Soviet equivalent to a theater command is the Glavnoe komandovanie or high command. This article will briefly describe the high command, the Soviet use of this command echelon during World War II, and its modern applicability as evidenced in Soviet literature.

The High Commands of 1941-1942. The formation of the high command echelon was a direct result of the failure of Soviet prewar defense plans following the German attack on 22 June 1941. The Soviets had envisioned a forward defense of their European border by three fronts—the Northwestern, Western and Southwestern—each charged with the defense of a strategic sector (i.e., the approaches to Leningrad, Minsk and Kiev). The front, as it had been in both WW I and the Civil War, was virtually a theater command in this scheme. Consequently, the necessity for multifront coordinated operations had not been envisioned prior to the war.

Overall strategic direction of these fronts was the responsibility of the Central Military Council headed by the Commissar for Defense. Centralized
strategic planning and execution control were the responsibilities of "branches" of the General Staff's Operations Directorate. Each branch was responsible for a single strategic sector or theater of operations. The system failed miserably owing in part to the incompetence of the Soviet field commanders, the lack of preparation prior to the attack, the mistaken estimate of the primary direction of the German attack, and continued communications disruptions resulting from German attacks. Most importantly, from the Soviet perspective, the General Staff proved unable to manage the course of the war. As one Soviet author put it, the formation of the high commands was an attempt to rectify "imperfections in the system of command and control and to simplify... the leadership of military actions..." The Soviet Stavka on 10 July 1941, in order to bring "strategic leadership closer to the troops," created three high commands.

According to the Soviet Military Encyclopedia, a high command is an agency of control, constituted to direct armed forces in a strategic axis or within a theater of military operations. It is headed by a commander-in-chief [glavnokomanduyushchij] under whom is a staff, commanding the unified operations of ground forces, air forces and naval forces. The three high commands created in 1941 represented the first use of this command echelon. The Northwestern, Western and Southwestern High Commands had in subordination the ground, naval and aviation forces (other than strategic reserves) deployed within their areas of operations. Each was responsible for an area that constituted a strategic sector after which the command was named. However, these first high commands departed from the current definition in one significant respect—they did little or no directing.

Instead, these high commands "fulfilled basically the functions of coordination of the efforts of the operational units subordinate to them..." In 1941 the high commands "carried out... an extremely limited scope of missions of operational-strategic leadership of the troops..." They were, as General Shemenko characterized them, "a superfluous intermediate stage between GHQ and the fronts." The almost universally negative assessment by Soviet authors of the high commands of 1941 no doubt stems from the failures of those commands. There were numerous reasons for their failure. A significant one, pointed out by Marshal Kulikov, was that they "lacked the necessary reserves of forces, means, and material resources." For example, a 19 August 1941 Stavka order to the Southwestern High Command assigned only seven divisions of the sector's total of 67 divisions to the high command; the remaining were assigned directly to the fronts. With a frontline stretching some 1,300 kms, this high command was obviously not a significant operational entity.

Lastly, the failure of these high commands resulted from a "duplication in leadership" between the Stavka/General Staff and the high commands. The Operations Directorate "branches" responsible for the western Soviet Union had been abolished in the fall of 1941. In their stead, operations officers were organized under a "chief of sector" and made responsible for a single front. The strategic sectors of the Soviet-German front as the formal geographic planning units were abandoned. The change resulted in improved centralized planning and direction. The new system proved more flexible, and simplified strategic command and control. As Kulikov observed, "within the boundaries of a single theater of military operations the presence of an intermediate strategic level [the high commands] complicated the progress of
leadership and did not ensure sufficient troop command efficiency." By September 1941 the high commands were being bypassed and ignored as the Stavka/General Staff dealt directly with the fronts. Not surprisingly, the last of these initial high commands was abolished by the end of September.

In 1942, three other high commands (Western, Southwestern and North Caucasian) were formed, also responsible for operations within a single strategic sector. These commands had considerably reduced authority. Their Commanders in Chief were concurrently front commanders and no separate high command staff was formed. The CINC, supported by his front staff, was primarily responsible for ensuring "the most suitable unity of effort" of the fronts in multifront operations. Little data are available on these commands and thus it is not possible to assess their utility. However, it is unlikely that they were any more successful than their predecessors as by June 1942 the last of these high commands was abolished. The commands were not used again on the Soviet-German Front.

The High Command of 1945. The high command was resurrected in 1945 for the Soviet Manchurian campaign. Several factors dictated this decision. Primary among them was the remonstrance of the Far East TVD and the paucity of communications linking the theater to Moscow. Secondly, the planned operations in the theater, involving three fronts on three strategic sectors, were considerably more complex than was typical of operations on the Soviet-German Front. As Shremenko, then Chief of the Operations Directorate, observed:

In the West the neighboring fronts had as a rule advanced in parallel, in close contact with one another. In the Far East, owing to the enemy's unusual position, they would have to launch converging attacks from three different directions with the active assistance of the Navy. Combined, these factors made an independent, powerful command a necessity. Consequently, the High Command of Soviet Forces in the Far East was "invested with broad authority for direction of combat operations" and had "a relatively autonomous character." The high command directed the operations of the 1st Far Eastern, the 2nd Far Eastern and the Transbaikal Fronts; the Pacific Fleet and Amur Fleets; and the 9th, 10th and 12th Air Armies. To provide execution direction, the Commander in Chief, Marshal Vasilevsky, had the services of a deputy CINC and commanders for aviation, navy, artillery and armored troops plus chiefs of engineering, medical and rear services. Staff support to the Commander in Chief, under Chief of Staff Colonel General Ivanov, probably included the same staff directorates as the earlier high commands: operations, intelligence, military transportation and communications.

The Soviets spared little in staffing the high command with quality personnel. Besides Marshal Vasilevsky, longtime representative of the Supreme High Command and former Chief of the General Staff, the high command included the commanders of the Soviet Air Force and Navy, the Deputy Chief of Soviet Signal Troops, the Deputy Commander of Artillery and the Deputy Chief of Rear Services. The High Command of Soviet Forces in the Far East represented one of the most impressive concentrations of Soviet military luminaries of the entire war.

This high command best exemplifies the authority granted this command echelon. Like its predecessors the high command of 1945 was not a planning echelon. The plan for the Manchurian
campaign was developed in Moscow by
the Operations Directorate of the
General Staff with the participation of
the commanders who would implement
it. The plan was later modified in part,
primarily by the fronts, with some
participation of the high command.
However, these modifications consisted
primarily of reductions of the length of
certain operational phases in light of
the Japanese dispositions and the
placing of an armored army in the first
echelon of one front as had been earlier
recommended by the General Staff.

The high command primarily
directed the execution of operations
planned by the General Staff and served
as an onsite executive inspector. The
isolation of the Far East from Moscow
coupled with the absence of adequate
communications precluded the type of
centralized direction by Moscow
characteristic of the war in Europe. In
effect, the high command of 1945 acted
as a field-deployed surrogate of
Moscow. For example, Vasilevskiy was
authorized to determine independently
the date and time of attack for one front.

Functionally, the high command
might appear to have been of marginal
significance. However, from the Soviet
perspective the functions of execution
control and coordination plus the
inspection of proper compliance with
Moscow directives were of continued
concern to Moscow throughout the war.
The centralized nature of Soviet
strategic command and control was
dependent upon accurate reporting,
precise execution, and the coordinated
efforts of the fronts/branches of armed
services. Shemenko noted that
commanders "assess the situation and
position of the troops from their own
more or less narrow, or let us say local,
positions." Further, "inasmuch as the
commander bears responsibility for the
actions of his unit or large unit, of course
he strives to ensure that these actions
look good. Therefore, intentionally or
unintentionally, he is inclined to
embrace reality." To ensure that
none of these human propensities
hampered the success of the Moscow-
planned operations required the
presence throughout the war of onsite
intermediary command and control
elements. The high command was the
most formal and powerful of these.
Particularly in 1945, it assumed
significant execution control responsi-
bilities that the remoteness of the
theater from Moscow necessitated.
From the Soviet perspective the high
command was a critical element to
effective strategic command and control.

One cannot escape the impression
that to a great extent the popularity of
the 1945 high command among modern
Soviet military commentators is also a
reflection of the lack of interference
from the Stavka and General Staff that
the high command enjoyed. The high
command in 1945 had the requisite
authority and autonomy from Moscow
actually to direct the operations of the
forces within the TVD. The attractiv-
eness of this high command as a model
can only be enhanced by the success of
the Manchurian campaign. In addition
to successful amphibious operations in
North Korea, Sakhalin Island and the
Kuriles, the ground forces in 12 days
achieved advances of 600-800 kms and
killed or captured nearly 700,000
Japanese soldiers by the end of the
operation in September.

The operations of the Amur Flotilla
and Pacific Fleet during the Manchurian
campaign are of particular interest. As
one Soviet author observed, "One of the
characteristic features of Soviet military
art in the Far East campaign in 1945 was
the close interaction between the
Ground Forces and the Navy and the
Amur Military Flotilla." It was for this
very reason that the Commander in
Chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral
Kuznetsov, was sent to the Far East
where, under Marshak Vasilevskiy's
overall command, he was "delegated
direct command of the naval forces in the Far East...."21

By the beginning of the operation, the Soviet Navy in the Far East deployed some 296 combat vessels, including 78 submarines, and 1,356 aircraft.22 In contrast with the ground and aviation forces participating in the campaign, the Soviet Navy did not enjoy a quantitative superiority over the Japanese Navy, particularly in large surface combatants. The Pacific Fleet deployed only two cruisers, ten destroyers and two destroyer escorts. Further, its delineated area of operations based on the agreed U.S.-Soviet demarcation of zones of naval responsibility was quite restricted. These factors resulted in limited initial missions; the Pacific Fleet was to disrupt the enemy’s shipping and lines of communication in the Sea of Japan, to assist the advance of the troops of the First Far-Eastern Front on the Korean coastal axis, and, in coordination with the forces of the Second Far-Eastern Front, to defend the Soviet coast.23

Based on the 7 August Stavka order to the High Command, the disruption of shipping apparently constituted primarily minelaying and submarine attacks.24 Except for such limited operations, the Pacific Fleet maintained a predominately defensive posture until 11 August.

In contrast, the Amur Flotilla began active combat the evening of 9 August when the 2nd Far Eastern Front began its offensive. The Flotilla’s activities "had a crucial influence on operations of the... 2nd Far Eastern Front."25 It initially supported the crossing of the Amur and Ussuri rivers, providing fire support and transport to the ground troops. Once the bridgeheads had been secured, the Flotilla became a "sort of advance guard" for the 15th Army.26 With rifle units aboard, it entered the Sungari River and led the 15th Army’s advance on the city of Harbin. Along the way it put ashore several landing teams and provided fire support both to these teams and other lead elements of the 15th Army. In 10 days, the Flotilla "covered more than 900 kilometers along the Amur and Sungari."27

On 11 August the Pacific Fleet switched to offensive operations, supporting amphibious operations in Korea, southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles. The purpose of these operations was to establish the Soviet occupation zone in North Korea and reestablish Soviet sovereignty over southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles.

The operations in North Korea met an unusual difficulty. Prior to the start of the Manchurian campaign on 9 August, the United States had sown 587 mines on the approaches to the Korean ports of Selsen and Rasin.28 As a result, during the landings the Soviets lost several ships including the cargo ships Nogi and Dalstroy.29

The Sakhalin and Kurile amphibious operations took place between 11 and 25 August, and 18 August and 1 September, respectively. These operations were carried out with the troops of the 2nd Far Eastern Front and apparently met with few difficulties. However, the absence of suitable landing craft and the consequent necessity of employing combat ships in a landing role has been noted by at least one Soviet author.30 Still the operations met with success, netting over 60,000 Japanese prisoners.

In addition to these amphibious operations and the fire support provided the ground troops by surface combatants, Pacific Fleet aviation was also active. During the campaign naval aviation flew over 4,000 sorties including over 1,000 bombing sorties against troops, fortified areas and rail facilities. Additionally over 800 reconnaissance flights were conducted in support of ground and naval operations.31
The intricacy and length of interaction between ground and naval forces are unique characteristics of operations during the Manchurian campaign. The scope of coordinated ground and naval operations, encompassing Manchuria, North Korea, Sakhalin and the Kuriles, vastly exceeded previous Soviet experience obtained in Europe. It was this "necessity of utilizing the Pacific Fleet in the most expedient and prompt manner in support of all three fronts" that provided a major impetus for the formation of the High Command of Soviet Forces in the Far East. The success of these coordinate ground and naval operations undoubtedly proved the correctness of this decision.

The Modern Applicability. What relevance does this WW II Soviet experience with a theater command echelon have beyond mere historical interest? In part the answer to this question derives from the unique Soviet attitude toward their WW II military experience:

In spite of radical changes in military matters, which have taken place in the post-war period, not one question in the area of armed combat can be completely studied and mastered without a deep knowledge of the experience of World War II. At a minimum this historical experience provides a successful precedent for "strategic leadership of troops in an independent TVD remote from the center," or, implicitly, what worked in the Manchuria of 1945 should work today.

However, not all Soviet authors assess the modern applicability of the high command so narrowly. Colonel Shindo observed as early as 1970 that because of the exigencies of a nuclear war, it may be necessary to create high commands for leadership of armed struggle in the separate theaters.

This will be required by the enormous spatial scope of a nuclear missile war and the unprecedented complexity of leadership in combat operations. Even the Chief of the Soviet General Staff (Kulikov) in 1975 admitted that in a future war the high commands might have "some application." This is not a minor admission inasmuch as the use of high commands would reduce the responsibilities of the General Staff.

The most recent and substantive endorsement of the high command is found in Colonel Vyrodov's April 1979 Military Historical Journal article. Vyrodov, a specialist in strategic command and control, emphasized the use of the high commands not only by the Soviets but also by the Germans, Japanese, British and Americans in a review of WW II strategic command and control. He concluded this review by categorically stating that WW II experience demonstrated "that it became practically impossible for a supreme high command to exercise direction of military operations of major groupings of armed forces without an intermediate echelon." Vyrodov argued that in contrast to WW II the entire strategic C2 system and "its echelons must be set up ahead of time, before the beginning of a war...." Implicitly, Vyrodov would also argue that the structure must be exercised during peacetime as well.

While the above certainly demonstrate the possibility of the Soviet use of a modern high command, this is far from a certainty. And unfortunately the additional evidence is no more specific. The Chinese have asserted that a new Soviet command was established in the "Far East theatre" in 1979. It is tempting to conclude from this that the Soviets have established a high command modeled on their 1945 experience. However, until more evidence becomes available such a conclusion is unwarranted.
Similarly, Rumanian President Ceausescu's speeches following the November 1978 Warsaw Pact heads-of-state meeting appear to indicate a Soviet attempt to expand operational control over Warsaw Pact national forces. Certainly rumors of such an attempt were so prevalent that Ceausescu was moved to state categorically in public that "...I have not signed any other commitment and any other document aside from the declaration published..." The Rumanian Army will only take orders from the supreme Party and State bodies and at the call of the people, and it will never receive orders from outside..." Again this is only suggestive. If the Soviets had decided to establish one or more functioning high commands in Europe, an increase in operational control over Warsaw Pact national forces would be a prerequisite. However numerous other interpretations are admittedly possible.

Conclusion. The Soviets do have a concept equivalent to the theater command, the Glavnoe komandovanie, or high command. The high command is not a major planning entity. Rather, its principal responsibility is to provide coordination and executive direction of fronts implementing a General Staff-developed plan. It is not employed in every TVD or strategic sector but only in the most critical. The high command might be employed in critical strategic operations involving more than two fronts for which closely coordinated multiront/multiservice operations are required.

The contemporary Soviet assessment of their WW II experience suggests that if deployed strategic-level command and control is deemed required in a future conflict, the high command probably will be the preferred choice. In the Far East where a future conflict would likely require coordinated airborne and amphibious operations on South Korea and Hokkaido in addition to ground operations in China and ASW/ACW naval engagements, a high command appears a strong possibility. If the complexities of planned operations and the necessity for coordinated ground, air and naval operations in the Far East of 1945 necessitated the formation of a high command, it is highly unlikely that this experience has been ignored with the vastly more complex situation in the Far East of 1980. The increased interest in the high commands, evidenced in the Soviet military literature, may well portend the revival of the command.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Gregory C. Baird is a Command and Control Analyst with the Foreign Force Operations Analysis Directorate of the BDM Corporation, specializing in Soviet operational-strategic command and control. He joined BDM following service in the U.S. Army during which he held assignments with the Army Special Security Group and the Army Security Agency.

NOTES
4. During WW II the Soviets fought in at least four theaters of military operations: the Northern (Soviet-Finnish border), the Soviet-German Front, the Caucasus and the Far East. The key distinction between a theater of military operations (TVD) and a strategic sector is the degree of autonomy of the Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1980.
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operations within them. TVDs are geographically discrete, as, for example, the Allied WWII North African, Mediterranean and Western European TVDs. Consequently, the operations within them are relatively independent of operations in other TVDs. The strategic sector, a subdivision of the TVD, is not necessarily geographically discrete and operations within them require more coordination with and consideration for operations in other strategic sectors within the same TVD. Unfortunately, Soviet authors tend to colloquially substitute “sector” for strategic sector when the context is the operations within a single strategic sector. This can create confusion.

10. Ibid.
12. V. Kulikov, “Strategic Leadership of the Armed Forces,” Voyennaya Istoricheskaya Zhurnal, June 1973, trans. JPRS 65107, 8 July 1973, p. 44. This article was written when Kulikov was still an Army general and Chief of the General Staff. He currently is a Marshal and Commander in Chief of the Warsaw Pact combined command.
15. Kulikov, p. 44.
25. Kripchenko, p. 84.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid., p. 78.
29. “Route of the Kwantung Army,” Voyennaya-Istoricheskaya Zhurnal, August 1975, trans. JPRS 69226, 14 October 1975, p. 54. Dal’shaya may have been the same vessel that transported prisoners of the Arctic Kolya camps both before and after the war. If it is the same vessel then it wasn’t completely destroyed in 1941; it was reported sabotaged by Latvian and Lithuanian nationalists in 1946. See Robert Conquest, Kolya: The Arctic Death Camps (New York: Viking Press, 1978), pp. 25-26.
32. “Route of the Kwantung Army,” p. 51.
34. Vyrolov, p. 22.
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The translation is edited to substitute "high command" for "main command" to avoid confusion. Both translations are used by the Soviets themselves.


37. Ibid.


War Plan ORANGE assumed that America alone would face Japan in a Pacific war after Germany had been defeated, that there would be no threat in the Atlantic and Caribbean areas. As late as October 1940 it remained the only well-developed plan— even after Europe was overrun and England was bracing for invasion. Little wonder that critics of that time and since have faulted the plan and the Navy’s unmov ing support of it. Another view can be taken, however; a wider view that considers naval officers’ analysis of strategy and diplomatic questions regarding the pre-1941 Pacific.

THE U.S. NAVY AND WAR PLAN ORANGE, 1933-1940: MAKING NECESSITY A VIRTUE

by

Michael K. Doyle

In October 1940 Capt. A.W. Clarke, R.N., the British Government’s personal liaison with President Franklin Roosevelt, received an invitation to visit the Navy Department’s War Plans Division. Once there, Clarke’s host, Capt. Richmond “Kelley” Turner, ushered him into a room, unlocked a safe, and presented him with a document that proved to be the U.S. Navy’s operational plans for war with Japan. Left alone and encouraged to read, the British captain was astonished at the amount of detail the plans contained. What he was seeing was the culmination of almost two decades of efforts by U.S. Navy strategists to prepare for a conflict they had believed almost unavoidable since the end of World War One.

What is remarkable is that the Navy’s Basic War Plan ORANGE, the document Clarke perused, was little more than a literary artifact in October 1940. Events in Europe had radically transformed the conditions under which any Pacific war would be fought. Hitler’s armies had overrun the Low Countries and France, the German air force was systematically devastating English cities, and conceivably the British Isles would face invasion in the near future. The growing danger to the security of the Atlantic and Caribbean had already been publicly expressed, first in the Act of Havana in July and followed by the destroyers-for-bases deal with Britain in September 1940. Yet the fleet remained at Pearl Harbor, symbol of traditional American preoccupation with the Pacific.

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Moreover, RAINBOW contingency planning, begun in 1938 to meet the changed international situation, continued to be plagued by a lack of Presidential direction and by interservice disputes. War Plan ORANGE, outmoded though it was, remained the only well-developed war plan available to both the Navy and the Army.

Adm. James O. Richardson, the Commander of the United States Fleet, alluded to this predicament that same October when he outspokenly challenged the soundness of policy based on Plan ORANGE. Such straightforwardness cost Admiral Richardson his command within a few months. Reduced to its essential point, his argument was that a Pacific naval offensive, the heart of the ORANGE plan, was sure to fail. In a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Harold Stark, Admiral Richardson pointed to the lack of enough fleet bases, men, and ships to support the required operations. He added that any move west of Hawaii would expose the vital regions of the Atlantic and Caribbean to attack. The authors of Plan ORANGE had never considered this last possibility in their scenario, developed for a world in which Germany was a defeated, disarmed power, Europe at peace, and America, untrammeled by commitments elsewhere, faced Japan alone.

There was nothing new about the charges Admiral Richardson leveled against policy based on War Plan ORANGE. The Army members of the Joint Army-Navy Board, the agency responsible for coordinating strategic planning, had been saying much the same thing since the early 1930s. Despite Army opposition, Joint Board naval strategists had remained unmoved in their support for the traditional ORANGE plan.

For the most part, historians have accepted the crisis view of Plan ORANGE. Louis Morton has acknowledged that strategic planners in the 1930s faced a growing disparity between American commitments in the Far East and the ability to defend those commitments, a situation for which he held American diplomats largely responsible. Morton clearly sympathized with the plight of naval strategists. Nevertheless, the impression left by his work and by more recent scholars is that the consequent disarray in strategic planning was largely because of naval officers' intransigent support for a Pacific strategy grown increasingly irrelevant. In its most extreme form the case against Navy strategists in the 1930s is that their unreceptiveness to criticism and their tenacious adherence to an obviously flawed and outmoded conception of a Pacific war was at best self-serving, at worst a manifestation of an inflexible cast of mind.

This paper offers another interpretation of naval planners' behavior, based upon material not previously considered in accounts of ORANGE war planning. The object here is not to dispute the view that Plan ORANGE was a fighting plan mainly in the sense that it could be employed as a justification for more money in the battle of the budget. Nor is it to deny that dogma too often intruded into the thinking of some naval officers. Undoubtedly both self-interest and dogma played some part in shaping naval officers' strategic estimates of the requirements for a Pacific war. However, the archives of the Naval War College in Newport reveal another aspect of naval officers' analysis of strategy and diplomatic questions affecting the Pacific prior to 1941.

The following discussion seeks to show that the Navy's support for offensive operations in the Pacific was dictated in part by diplomatic considerations, namely, the desire to ensure American security through an
indefinite entente with Great Britain on naval policy and Pacific Strategy.\textsuperscript{12} Ironically, then, support for Plan ORANGE can be seen not as an indication of inflexibility, but rather the reverse; an attempt to preserve as many options as possible in a world grown increasingly complex and dangerous for American interests.

The argument that follows rests on a few broad observations that illustrate why naval officers in the 1930s would have approached strategic questions from a perspective fundamentally different from their Army colleagues. First, the experiences of the interwar years deepened, if anything, the traditional parochialism and continentalism of Army strategists in particular, while that service generally languished like a poor relation, barely maintaining its dignity on the grudging charity of Congress.\textsuperscript{13}

These same years reinforced the Navy's traditional sense of separation from the mainstream of American society.\textsuperscript{14} Unlike their Army colleagues, Navy officers possessed in the writing of Alfred Thayer Mahan and his successors a literature that sustained an expansive view of America's responsibilities and interests in world affairs, to which was added a fairly sizable annual appropriation, albeit not everything the Navy desired.\textsuperscript{15}

Moreover, the Navy was involved in all the arms limitations conferences that were a hallmark of the interwar years. These conferences not only brought high-ranking naval officers directly into contact with major diplomatic and political decisions, but also provided the opportunity for informal collaboration between naval officers and diplomats on mutually important subjects. Years of working together had an educative effect on both parties. Just as certain State Department officials became increasingly receptive to the Navy's analysis of America's defense needs, so naval officers learned to appreciate the need to work indirectly for ends otherwise unattainable in the isolationist political conditions of the 1930s.\textsuperscript{16}

With these considerations in mind, and before moving on to an account of the Naval War College's work on Pacific strategy and related policy issues, it is necessary first to describe the general features of War Plan ORANGE as it emerged in the 1930s. According to the Joint Board the cause of hostilities would be Japan's refusal to accept restraints on her political and economic ambitions in Asia, especially in China. Following this logic the authors believed Japan was liable to attack American interests in the Far East rather than conform to America's interpretation of the Open Door policy of equal economic opportunity. As envisioned in Plan ORANGE the conflict would be limited to the armed forces of Japan and the United States.\textsuperscript{17}

Finally, there was the tacit assumption that the Atlantic and Caribbean would remain secure. Only the implicit predicates of a common British-American interest in those regions and the protection afforded by the Royal Navy could provide this security in a Japanese-American war, thereby releasing American forces for the Pacific.

Joint Board Navy strategists consistently maintained that success in a Pacific war demanded offensive operations west of Hawaii at the war's outset. There is no evidence that either Army or Navy planners believed the Japanese high command would try to invade the Eastern Pacific. The consensus was that the high command might send strike forces into eastern waters, but would concentrate the bulk of Japanese naval and military strength in a defensive perimeter anchored on the island chains of the Central and Western Pacific. Taking Pacific geography and the enemy's likely intentions into consideration, estimates
of the situation in an ORANGE war provided for an almost exclusively naval conflict to be fought out on what would be a Japanese lake.\textsuperscript{18}

Only at the Naval War College was there a sustained effort to test these ideas systematically. Among the educational duties of the College staff was preparation of a series of yearly strategic exercises or war games, operations problems in college terminology. These operations problems, usually four or five in a year, had a dual function: to teach student officers a prescribed method for solving strategic problems and to examine various solutions under simulated combat conditions. Echoing the prevailing service wisdom, the college staff gave only nominal attention to the possibility of a British-American conflict in the Atlantic and Caribbean, emphasizing instead the more likely Japanese war.\textsuperscript{19} Concentration on the Pacific had had a long history by the 1930s. As Adm. Ernest J. King noted in his autobiography: "Ever since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the United States, the Naval War College had been pondering...problems that might arise in the Pacific Ocean because of their possession." The "annual strategic maneuver," King continued, "concerned...the means of moving the fleet from Hawaii to the Philippines in the event of any hostile move toward those islands by ORANGE."\textsuperscript{20}

Notwithstanding the yearly absorption in strategy of a Pacific war, the staff insisted that students not mistake these efforts for an "official rest of an actual War Plan." One pamphlet simply described the operations problems as "mental exercise."\textsuperscript{21} Strictly speaking, these remarks were accurate; the Naval War College had long since ceased to have any direct role in formulating war plans.\textsuperscript{22} However, there can be no doubt that in practice, both staff and students understood the results of the problems as a fair indication of what would occur in combat. The playing of Operations Problem IV-1933 confirmed this. More importantly, that game provided invaluable insight into naval strategists' conceptions of how Pacific strategy related to larger problems of American foreign and defense policy. This is so not because of any unique characteristic of Operations Problem IV-1933; on the contrary, its basic outlines were no different from other hypothetical Pacific war dramas of the period. What makes this particular problem significant is that the staff and Adm. Luke McNamee, president of the college between 1933 and 1935, made it the focus of a special study of strategy, arms limitation policy, and their relevance for the diplomacy of Asia.\textsuperscript{23}

One does not have to search far for reasons why in 1933 the college was even more concerned than usual with Pacific strategy and related diplomatic problems. First, the Geneva Arms Limitation Conference was in its second year, already mired in the difficulties that would overwhelm discussion by 1934. Not the least of these difficulties was President Hoover's initiative for an across-the-board cut in defense establishments.\textsuperscript{24} Second, there was a major naval conference pending. Indications were that Japan would either demand extensive revisions of or abrogate the Five Power Naval Treaty which had governed naval building since the 1921-1922 Washington Conference.\textsuperscript{25} Given this estimate of Japan's intentions, Congress' recent votes to grant Philippine independence was of tremendous import for the Navy because of the doubtful future of America's naval bases in the islands.\textsuperscript{26} Third, Army officers had recently raised a number of strong objections to current Pacific strategy, which were soon to come before the Joint Board.\textsuperscript{27} Fourth, the new Democratic administration was an unknown quantity, though naval
officers believed President Franklin Roosevelt to be personally sympathetic to their interests.38

Against a background shaded by these considerations, the staff and students at the Naval War College executed their annual strategic maneuver, Operations Problem IV-1933. In this version of a hypothetical Pacific war, Japan had instigated the conflict as part of a drive to control China's (YELLOW's) economic resources. According to the scenario, the Japanese had launched an attack designed to make Manila's naval facilities untenable for the U.S. Fleet (BLUE). BLUE's first major objective was to regain a naval base in the Philippines, whence it could wear down ORANGE resistance through control of the sea.39 Members of the senior class, made up mostly of captains and flag officers, first attempted individual solutions to the problem of moving the fleet westward from Hawaii to achieve this objective. When their individual projects were done, the student officers divided into ORANGE and BLUE high commands to test one solution under carefully controlled conditions laid down by the staff. Although the game was artificial and the rules governing it controversial, the staff made every effort to achieve a semblance of what a campaign would be like under combat conditions.40

In the play that followed, the staff decided to use a southern route to the Philippines. They rejected the solution proposed by Admiral (then Captain) King, commander of BLUE, because it "did not fit well to make an interesting game."31 The significance of this decision was that King's plan, to send the fleet north of potential Japanese naval and air bases in the Marshalls and Carolines, would not have provided the information the staff sought: the relative logistical difficulties ORANGE and BLUE might face in the southern Philippines. Moreover, the staff had seen efforts similar to King's in years past and knew that his route promised no better or worse results than the other alternatives. King, however, privately fumed at what he believed was unnecessary exposure to flanking attacks in the narrow waters off New Guinea. Hence he felt no regrets when the Navy detached him from the college before the exercise was complete. In his opinion the nearly disastrous outcome had been "sadly obvious" from the first.32 Even though the staff had disagreed with his strategic reasoning, they would have concurred in his estimate of the results of the problem. The fleet managed to fight its way across the Pacific but lost many auxiliary craft and airplanes. A base of sorts was established at Dumanquillas Bay in the southern Philippines but it was problematical at the end of the game whether the fleet would be able to defend the base against a counterattack, or operate from it for any length of time.33

The ORANGE plan of campaign that year had called for a minimal effort against the Philippines and attrition tactics to begin with BLUE's approach to mid-Pacific.44 The staff always assumed that the Japanese high command would base its strategy and tactics on the same doctrine as did the United States. Hence the ORANGE commander's objective would be the reduction of American battleship strength as the means of attaining strategic superiority. It was this goal that determined the use of attrition tactics, no matter what other plans the ORANGE commander made. Furthermore, Operations Problem IV-1933 was predicated on the ships actually built or under construction in both navies. Since America had failed to maintain its Navy at the strength permitted under the 1922 and 1930 naval treaties, this constraint worked in Japan's favor, giving ORANGE a large edge in cruisers and destroyers.35 Even so, the staff thought attrition was
unlikely to provide ORANGE with an overwhelming tactical success. Although ORANGE would undoubtedly take a high toll of BLUE auxiliary craft during the early stages of the offensive, a conjecture based on many war game results, this in itself would not decide the conflict. Attrition alone would not encourage the Japanese high command to stake its capital ships, and with them the outcome of the war itself, on a major fleet action off the Philippines.  

Instead, ORANGE as well as BLUE could be expected to conserve capital ship strength; in the staff's view these behemoths would ultimately determine the victor, even if a decisive fleet action never took place. College doctrine stated that control of the sea would go to the nation maintaining a concentrated fleet with a superior battleline in the area of operations, a conviction that attained the status of holy writ in the interwar Navy. However, as one staff member observed, it made little difference if the fleet held Dumanquitas Bay or some other southern base. Japan would still be able to import crucial strategic materials from Manchuria and might thus easily continue the war indefinitely. The U.S. Fleet would be in no position to provoke a decisive encounter and Japan would have no reason to seek one. Even with a successful return of the fleet to the Philippines, the conclusion was inescapable that final victory would cost enormously in time, manpower, and money.

In the critique following Operations Problem IV-1933, Capt. S.C. Rowan, chief of the Operations Department, and Capt. Forde A. Todd, head of the Strategy Section of Operations, led the discussion. Both men made abundantly clear their grave reservations about the feasibility of offensive operations in the Pacific. Rowan was fatalistic, convinced as he was that "something like this advance may be forced upon us." While higher authority was hedged on the war's larger objectives, "with due regard to political and economic considerations," the BLUE commander would have to conduct operations with whatever forces were available. At the outset these forces were unlikely to be sufficient. Nevertheless, Rowan warned, BLUE's commander "will have to take what he can get and do the best he can."  

Following this counsel of near despair, Capt. Harold Train, lately student commander of ORANGE, asked "if it is a good thing for us to give so much thought to this crossing... when it is pretty well established that it could not be done." Train had put the staff in a predicament not so very different from the good burghers confronted by a young boy's announcement that the king was wearing no clothes. The college Chief of Staff, Capt. Adolphus Andrews, avoided Train's remark, merely noting that "the War College is in no way a War Plans Section" and could provide "no canned solution" to an ORANGE war. Privately, however, both Andrews and Capt. Wilbur Van Auken, director of the Research Department, shared Train's opinion of the Pacific offensive. A short time after the critique Andrews received a request from Capt. J.D. Wainwright, USN, then at the Army War College, for data on an ORANGE war to assist in joint planning. Andrews complied, adding that any naval officer arguing optimistically about a Pacific offensive would be guilty of "giving a very false impression of what we could actually do."  

A similar pessimism infused Captain Van Auken's report on Operations Problem IV-1933. In his evaluation for Admiral McNamee, Van Auken emphasized the difficulties of amassing enough ships at Hawaii and defending a slow fleet train from repeated air and submarine attacks during the Pacific crossing. Once in the Philippines, the fleet would also lack a secure base and
facilities for repairing underwater damage. Van Auken further noted that under these staggering handicaps the fleet was expected to seize and then defend an advanced base. Manila's defenders could not be expected to hold out longer than 2 weeks, an insufficient amount of time for the fleet to cross the Pacific. With the collapse of resistance Manila would be lost and with it any hope of operating out of the Manila Bay facilities. Given the risks of the campaign, Van Auken doubted that the public would support a war in the Far East that entailed such a high probability of immediate defeats.\textsuperscript{42}

With Van Auken's report before him, Admiral McNamee took the unusual step of sending an unsolicited letter on 27 February 1934 to Adm. William Standley, the Chief of Naval Operations. Generally the college did not initiate studies except in response to a specific request. Just the day before, however, Admiral McNamee had written a similar letter to the General Board in compliance with the Board's desire for an evaluation of issues relevant to the naval limitation talks soon to be held in London. Apparently McNamee thought the unsettling results of the college's investigation warranted the additional letter to Standley. This letter to Admiral Standley briefly surveyed the knowledge yielded by recent war games. Given the evidence, Admiral McNamee wrote, it was "highly questionable" whether the United States, with its "Treaty Navy," could accomplish its strategic mission "against determined ORANGE opposition." It was impossible to mistake McNamee's meaning: to fling American naval units across the Pacific in one dramatic charge would only invite disaster.\textsuperscript{43}

The letter to Admiral Standley quoted above merely summarized the naval and strategic aspects of the Pacific problem. However, the staff had also developed the policy implications in a massive document titled "Limitation of Naval Armaments, 1935: Report of the Staff."\textsuperscript{44} Admiral McNamee relied on this study for his reply to the General Board on 26 February and his letter to Standley the next day. The study itself remained at the college. Nevertheless, it deserves a close examination as one of the most candid analyses of foreign and defense policy done anywhere within the 1930s Navy Department. Most strikingly, the study reveals a consensus among the college staff that an informal agreement with the British on Pacific naval policy would provide a way out of the strategic dilemmas presented by the Far Eastern situation.

To begin with, the majority of the staff was dubious about the fate of America's interests in China and the Philippines if the current trend of Far Eastern policy continued. With public opinion opposed to enlarging American defense capabilities in Asia, the rational policy would obviously have appeared to be retrenchment from vulnerable outposts in the Philippines.\textsuperscript{45}

The staff advanced a number of reasons to support the retrenchment thesis. First of all, the Navy could not be assured of public support for a long war to retake the Philippines. Secondly, the Philippines were presently an economic as well as a strategic liability. Thus Congress appeared determined to give them independence, making unlikely the appropriation of sufficient funds for developing an adequate naval base at Manila or elsewhere in the Pacific. Thirdly, it was problematic whether or not the American people would ever approve a war solely to maintain Washington's interpretation of the Far Eastern Open Door. Judged by the actions of Congress on questions of naval policy, there was little support for building the kind of Navy capable of fighting such a war. In short, the consensus was that defending the nation's political and economic stake in any part of Asia was a game evidently
not worth the candle in the eyes of the public. Rather than permitting this situation to continue, the staff suggested it might be advisable to cut loose from the Far East altogether before the nation found itself in a war it was unprepared materially or psychologically to fight. 66

These radical conclusions were muted but not completely absent from Admiral McNamee’s report to the General Board. There was an unmistakable mood of foreboding in his assertion that a “war between Japan and the United States alone under present conditions would involve us in losses entirely out of proportion to any possible gain.” Taken at face value, this statement could have been understood as an argument against maintaining a naval presence in Asia. But this was devil’s advocacy. Actually, Admiral McNamee was intimating there was a third alternative either to withdrawing altogether from Asia or continuing to tolerate the imbalance of diplomatic and strategic forces currently existing. 67

The staff’s studies had argued that Japanese-American relations would remain potentially explosive as long as Washington opposed Tokyo’s aims but lacked the wherewithal to support its diplomacy with force. Clearly retrenchment was preterable to a continuation of this predicament. But then various staff papers cautiously explored another possibility: rather than playing a lone hand, the United States could establish closer ties with Great Britain, the other major Far Eastern naval power. The majority of the staff felt that British rivalry with the United States was more apparent than real in any event. As one writer, Capt. R.B. Coffey, put it, the differences between the two powers were “technicalities” based on “honest” divergences of opinion, merely reflecting “unchangeable peculiarities and conditions.” 68 Indeed, a common interest already existed between Washington and London in matters relating to the Atlantic and Caribbean. Moreover, since 1931 the college had been arguing for some sort of informal arrangement whereby the two governments could face Japan with a united front on naval questions. Such an informal coalition might salvage the existing naval and diplomatic arrangements in the Far East. 69

Awareness of weakness in American defenses, the dangers inherent in a policy of drift, and a desire to promote entente with Britain as a solution to these difficulties all found their way into Admiral McNamee’s answer to the General Board. Thus his observations regarding the forthcoming London discussions were a mixed bag. Two of his central points underscored America’s vulnerability in Asia. The first laid down the standard formula of an overseas naval base and a Navy capable of fighting Japan in its own waters as the absolute minimum acceptable for a sound Asian policy. McNamee’s second point emphasized that the Navy presently was so handicapped that it could “no longer exercise decisive influence” in curtailing Japanese aggression. But then in his third point he flatly asserted that the “British and U.S. navies combined could enforce any reasonable restrictions on Japanese policies.” Even though an alliance was out of the question, Admiral McNamee reasoned that if the two greatest naval powers joined forces to thwart Japan’s naval pretensions, other difficulties would virtually solve themselves, including the strategic dilemmas of a Pacific war. 70

Much of the argument advanced by the War College president was either understated or elliptical. Nevertheless, read in the context of a decade of General Board studies of the Pacific naval problem and against a background of college war gaming, its implications were clear enough to those familiar with the issues. It is possible to reformulate...
the argument in a manner that clarifies the implications lying imbedded in McNamara's recommendations to the General Board and the Chief of Naval Operations, recommendations clearly designed by the college to influence not only the Navy, but also the diplomats of the Roosevelt administration.

First, there would continue to be uncertainty about the public mood on Far Eastern questions. Public opinion might very well fluctuate, whereas American interests in the Pacific were of long standing, and not likely to alter markedly in the future. Given the geography of the Pacific, the Navy would remain primarily responsible for defense of those interests. Second, for the reasons enumerated above, American naval power alone was not a persuasive deterrent to Japan. Third, the sobering effects of naval limitations and Japanese expansion in recent years had tended to quell the remaining vestiges of Anglophobia lingering from the rivalries of the 1920s. Fourth, isolationism ruled out the possibility of an Anglo-American Pacific alliance, although the British were expressing interest in such an agreement. Still, the best hope for American security lay in encouraging the kind of cooperation between the two governments that could result in a common Far Eastern naval policy. The conclusion that emerges inescapably from this reasoning is that for an Anglo-American entente to develop into a viable possibility, perhaps extending to an informal naval agreement, the United States would have to remain actively committed to the defense of its Pacific interests.

To return to the original question of the Navy's attachment to Plan ORANGE, Navy planners were unlikely to accept the offensive simply because the campaign conformed to doctrine or because it promised material rewards in the annual battle of the budget. No naval officer in Washington aware of the work done at the Naval War College could have had any illusions about the terrible risks such a strategy involved. Put simply, a major consideration in support for Plan ORANGE after 1933 was preservation of some flexibility in the choices open to American policymakers. With these observations in mind, it remains to examine the debate between Army and Navy members of the Joint Board over Pacific strategy as it evolved after 1933.

Between 1933 and 1935 the Joint Board heard increasing criticism of Plan ORANGE from both Army and Navy officers stationed in the Philippines. The gist of their objections, remarkably similar to Admiral Richardson's criticism of October 1940, was that the offensive was infeasible because the Manila garrison could never hold out. While the Joint Board took these objections under consideration, the Navy members recommended substituting a step-by-step offensive through the island chains of the Pacific. This revision was designed to secure an advanced base of operations along the route from Pearl Harbor to Manila, thereby abandoning the steamroller advance and fundamentally altering the timing and character of the entire operation. In May 1935 the Army members accepted the Navy revision for reasons that can only be conjectured. Apparently the desire for interservice harmony in Washington prevailed over the Army-led chorus of opponents. In Louis Morton's view, the result was "a plan even more unrealistic than before."

From the Army's standpoint, charged as it was with Philippine defense, Morton's judgment is correct. To be sure, advancing step-by-step avoided the hazards of a headlong rush, which the Naval War College had already thoroughly documented. Nevertheless, this revision only made other problems worse. An island-hopping campaign such as this virtually guaranteed the
destruction of the Luzon defenders and loss of the Manila and Subic Bay naval facilities. If Manila could not have held out long enough with the fleet rushing across the Pacific, this substitution was a tacit admission by the Navy that Pacific victory would be a slow and costly affair. Furthermore, the nation would simply have to absorb some tremendous defeats at the outset.

In retrospect, the step-by-step advance seems obtuse if a major goal of Plan ORANGE were Philippines defense and preservation of a base of operations at Manila. So it seemed to the Army after 1935. Continually minded in the best of circumstances, Army planners such as Brig. Gen. Walter Kreuger now found offensive operations in the Pacific totally unacceptable. Not only would the Philippines fall in any event, but an offensive would also strip the Western Hemisphere of defense forces. Thus Kreuger and his Army colleagues dug in their heels after 1935. They argued that offensive operations ought to be scrapped; in their place the Army wanted to substitute a “position of readiness.” This was in fact a strategic defensive along a perimeter running from Alaska, through Hawaii, down to Panama. Planning based on such a defensive posture would sacrifice everything west of Hawaii indefinitely while ensuring the immediate security of the continental United States.

A number of considerations prompted Army planners’ advocacy of such a cautious strategy, among them the familiar fear that the country might not support a long war. Most important of all, the pessimistic views of Brig. Gen. Stanley Embick, head of Army war planning in 1935, had come to dominate Army thinking on the Pacific. General Embick had been one of those officers in the Philippines who originally had voiced strong objections to Plan ORANGE. His tour as commander of the Corregidor garrison in 1935 had convinced him that the operations in Plan ORANGE were dangerous beyond all reason; that an offensive particularly would be “literally an act of madness.” Under his leadership Army planners came to advocate what they believed was a safe, realistic approach to matters of strategy and defense, given the contemporary isolationism of the American public. The Navy, for its part, refused to concede to General Embick’s analysis of current political and diplomatic attitudes, or to his views of Pacific strategy. Eventually disagreement, latent in joint planning since 1933, emerged openly between 1936 and 1938. For months the Joint Board was deadlocked, unable to devise a commonly acceptable revision of the ORANGE plan.

In early 1938, sitting as a special committee of the Joint Board, General Embick, now Deputy Chief of Staff, and Adm. James O. Richardson, serving as Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, managed a compromise. As in the 1935 step-by-step revision, the resulting agreement produced superficial harmony rather than satisfying Army objections. The 1938 ORANGE plan incorporated the Army’s preference for a defensive posture together with the Navy’s insistence that any meaningful plan had to include provision for offensive operations.

From 1935 on, Army analysts remained unalterably convinced that the military and diplomatic balance in the Far East would continue to favor Japan; that an isolationist America might thus be forced into a war against an adversary enjoying local strategic superiority; that such a war would sacrifice a vital security in the Atlantic and Caribbean; and that for the armed services to plan for offensive operations under these conditions would be suicidal. Seen in the light of 1940, these arguments evidently acquired a cogency for Admiral Richardson that had been lacking in the late 1930s. At
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further remove, seen in the light cast by the events at Pearl Harbor in 1941, the Navy planners' support of PLAN ORANGE offensive operations appears wildly optimistic at best.

But the Navy planners' continuing support did not emerge from misplaced optimism or something worse. On the contrary, the Naval War College had documented both the flaws in the offensive strategy and the equivocal nature of America's commitment to the Far East, confirming the observations of other Navy agencies, particularly the General Board. Once convinced that the Navy had no hope of reaching the Philippines defenders in time, the Army was willing to abandon Asia as a lost cause. Naval officers were not so cavalier. Though they acknowledged the difficulties, for a host of reasons they opposed abandoning America's interests in Asia. Not the least of the considerations affecting their judgment was growing confidence in cooperation with the British on naval matters.

Unlike their Army colleagues, naval officers such as Adm. Richard Leigh of the General Board and Adm. William Standley, Chief of Naval Operations during the crucial mid-1930s, were actively involved in shaping American policy prior to and during the Second London Naval Conference of 1935-1936. Conversations with their counterparts in the British Admiralty had led to a common understanding on strategic and policy problems. Although the emerging British-American front failed to induce Japan to sign the Second London Naval Treaty, this informal understanding was no small achievement when isolationist sentiment in Congress was at its zenith. Furthermore the signatories of the Second London Treaty were to consult on future naval policies; for practical purposes such consultations would almost solely concern the Far East and Japan. Indeed, when Sino-Japanese hostilities commenced in the summer of 1937 President Roosevelt and Adm. William Leahy, Standley's replacement as Chief of Naval Operations, employed this provision as an excuse to send an American naval officer to England. Significantly they chose the director of war plans, Capt. Royal Ingersoll. In early 1938 Ingersoll engaged in highly secret, informal conversations with the Admiralty in London on possible naval cooperation in the Far East. From these conversations emerged the first tentative fruit of the British-American naval entente.

To recur briefly to the related issue of ORANGE war planning, the Navy's substitution of a step-by-step advance in place of the impossible all-out offensive clearly made sense given the Navy's views of emerging policy. First of all, the island-hopping campaign adjusted strategy to the realities of a Pacific campaign as the Navy perceived them. Secondly, the cautious advance into the Pacific kept alive the possibility of coordinating naval policy with Britain in the region, albeit this new operation created insoluble problems for Manila's defenders. Thirdly, the Navy was bereft of clear directives on national policy in these years. Given domestic political conditions and the Navy planners' understanding of America's ineluctable role in Asia, the planners were preparing for a protracted war to retake the Philippines, which according to War College estimates could take as long as 2 years, to say nothing of the time required to defeat Japan. Moreover, a Pacific war would be the ultima ratio, only the last resort of American policymakers.

Even as late as 1941 it remained as unclear that Japan would actually fight as it was uncertain that the American public would support an Asian war. Unlike their Army counterparts in the 1930s, Navy planners perceived American interests in Asia as sufficiently important that no American
government could abandon them in the near future, and surely not in the face of Japanese threats. On this score, eventual Philippine independence was a plaguesome nuisance, complicating rather than signaling an end to the dilemmas of Pacific strategy. Until the situation clarified, Navy planners insisted that the better part of wisdom was to be prepared for any eventuality. These considerations, when added to a growing common interest with Britain on naval questions, undoubtedly contributed heavily to the refusal to junk the ORANGE plan.

Put simply, War Plan ORANGE provided an important opportunity to keep alive a crucial debate on matters of defense policy. To charge that the plan itself was saddled with contradictions or that it served the Navy’s special interests may be accurate, but such charges can also be misleading; they ignore and thereby obscure the broader concerns underlying the Navy’s position. In Admiral Richardson’s letter of October 1940 referred to at the beginning of this paper, the admiral charged that Plan ORANGE “had its inception primarily in the desirability of having a guiding directive for the development of the Naval Establishment to meet any international situation that might be thrust upon it.” In the context in which he wrote, Richardson intended this as a damning criticism. While his judgment was undoubtedly accurate on the narrow ground of the plan’s feasibility under the conditions of 1940, his characterization of the Navy’s objective in supporting the plan sustains the interpretation advanced here, namely, what Navy planners and strategists at the War College and on the Joint Board had in mind was a device to preserve as many alternatives as possible in an uncertain world, not a document rigidly prescribing behavior in a given situation. Under the less than optimal circumstances confronting Army and Navy planners in the 1930s, such precision could have been achieved only at the expense of flexibility. That the only detailed war plan available in October 1940 was the outmoded ORANGE merely testifies to the inadequacy of the RAINBOW war planning effort, under way since the spring of 1938. Ultimately it was Adm. Harold Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, who led the way in redirecting American strategic thinking to an Atlantic First commitment in November 1940. Given the opportunity, the Navy quite willingly jettisoned a preference for the Pacific sustained so long by necessity rather than conviction.

**BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY**

Michael Doyle was educated at Reed College and the University of Washington, receiving the Ph.D. degree in history from the latter. He has taught at the University of Washington and at Pacific Lutheran University. He is now Director of Research for R.F. Crow Associates, engaged in analysis of the U.S. Navy’s role in supporting oceanic nuclear weapons tests between 1946-1962.
# PLAN ORANGE

## NOTES

List of abbreviations used in the notes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GBR</td>
<td>General Board Records</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JBR</td>
<td>Joint Board Records</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMD</td>
<td>Library of Congress Manuscripts Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>National Archives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHC</td>
<td>Naval Historical Collection, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHID</td>
<td>Naval History Division, Old Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMR</td>
<td>New Military records</td>
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<tr>
<td>OA</td>
<td>Operational Archives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMR</td>
<td>Okin Military Records</td>
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<tr>
<td>WPDNF</td>
<td>Army War Plans Division Numerical Files</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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2. War plans were related in an hierarchic fashion: first, *Joint Army-Navy Basic War Plan ORANGE*; second, the *overall strategic concept* (from which the Navy derived its *Basic War Plan ORANGE*); in turn the Commander of the U.S. Fleet developed the *Fleet Operating Plan, ORANGE*. James O. Richardson and George C. Dyer, *On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor: The Memoirs of Admiral James O. Richardson* (Washington: Naval History Division, 1973), pp. 255-256.


5. Richardson and Dyer, p. 424.

6. CinCUS (Richardson) to CNO (Stark), 22 October 1940, A16/F1, Naval Operations, Secret and Confidential File, Secret Correspondence, 1927-1940, microfilm reel 4, RG 38, NA.

7. In late 1937, in a draft plan of the Navy's (which the Army rejected), ORANGE had allies, the United States would also have sufficient assistance "to maintain an adequate superiority." Joint Strategic Plan A, Navy members-JPC to JB, 29 November 1937, Serial No. 617, Subject File No. 325, JBR.

8. The development of war plans in the interwar period can be followed in the Records of the Joint Army-Navy Board and Special Committees, RG 225, OMR, NA. The actual drafting of documents was done by a special committee, the Joint Planning Committee (JPC), which drew its staff from the war plans divisions of the two services. Thus it was actually the officers of the JPC who directed the activities of the Joint Board. The best brief account of war planning in these years remains Louis Morton, *"War Plan ORANGE: Evolution of a Strategy."* *World Politics*, January 1959, pp. 221-250.


11. The author would like to thank Professor James King, formerly Director of Advanced Research, Center for Advanced Research, U.S. Naval War College, Mr. Anthony Nicolosi, curator of the Naval Historical Collection at the Naval War College, and Dr. Dean Allard of the Naval History Division, for their assistance in the research for this article.


14. Peter Karsten, *The Naval Antitrust* (New York: Free Press, 1972) discusses the development of a new sense of professional expertise and self-consciousness among the officer corps of the "new" Navy of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Although Karsten offers some speculative conclusions about professional naval attitudes for later years, much work remains to be done in this area. For an interesting
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discussion of attitudes among young officers in the interest Navy, see Thomas B. Buel, The Quiet Warrior: A Biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974).
17. BLUE-ORANGE Joint Estimate of the Situation, 9 January 1929, Serial No. 280, Subject File No. 325, JBR.
18. Joint Army-Navy Basic War Plan ORANGE, Subject File No. 325, Serial No. 280, JBR.
19. Ironically, in light of the BLUE-ORANGE situation in the Pacific, the U.S. Navy would assume the strategic offensive in the Western Atlantic, while the Royal Navy would face a strategic offensive not so very different from that contemplated in an ORANGE war.
21. Remarks of President of Naval War College Preliminary to solving Operations Problem III-Sr., 20 February 1953, RG 4, NHC. Dept. of Intelligence, Prospectus of the Naval War College Courses, Senior and Junior, 1939-1939, RG 19, NHC.
23. Operations Problem IV-1933 originated and was played under the presidency of Harris Laning, whose term ended in May 1933. McNamee's term began in June, and he instigated the study.
24. Chmn Gen Bd to Sec Nav, 18 June 1933, Serial No. 1584 (1521-AA), Subject File No. 438-2, GBA, OA, NHC.
25. Report Nos. 76, 89, 119, C-10-e/21201, Office of Naval Intelligence, RG 38, OMR, NA.
27. S.D. Embick, memorandum for CG Phil Dept, 19 April 1933, 3251-15, WPDNF 1920-1942, XG 163, OMR, NA.
28. See for example Leahy Diary, 12 November 1932, William H. Leahy papers, LCMD.
29. Operations Problem IV-1933, 2261-AA, RG 4, NHC.
33. Research Dept (Van Auker) to PNWC (McNamee), 6 December 1933, 2261-AA.
35. Rowan, 2261-AA-o.
37. PNWC (Laning) to Gen Bd, 23 October 1931, XTYG(1931-107), RG 8, NHC. T.S. Wilkinson to Norman Davis, memorandum, Battleships—Their Continuance and Their Size, 28 October 1933, Subject File No. 438-1, GBR.
41. Adolphus Andrews to J.D. Wainwright, 21 March 1933, XSTP (1919-1940), RG 8, NHC.
42. Research Dept (Van Auker) to PNWC (McNamee), 6 December 1933.
43. PNWC (McNamee) to CNO (Standley), 28 February 1934, UNT (1934-29), RG 8, NHC.
44. Limitation of Naval Armaments, 1933: Report of the Staff; individual papers filed in XPOD(1934-34), RG 8, NHC.
45. Paper by W. Van Auker, Limitation of Naval Armaments.
47. PNWC (McNamee) to Gen Bd, 27 February 1934, XPOD(1934-34), RG 8, NHC.
48. Papers by R.B. Coffey, Limitation of Naval Armaments.
49. PNWC (Laning) to Gen Bd, 25 October 1931.
50. PNWC (McNamee) to Gen Bd, 27 February 1934.
51. F.P. Conger, memorandum for Director, War Plans Division, 20 July 1935, Strategic Plans Division, Miscellaneous Subject File, Series III, Philippines Island Naval Base Studies, OA, NHD.
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53. G.W. Dugger, memorandum, Notes on Talk of Norman Davis Before the General Board on 15 November 1939, Subject File No. 438-1, GBR, OA, NHD.

54. Chief Gen Bld Sec Nav and CNO, 30 July 1934, and Enc(A, Enc(C) of same, Subject File No. 438-1, GBR, OA, NHD.

55. See material filed in Serial No. 533, Subject File No. 325, JBR. Also Embick, memorandum for CG Phil Dept, 19 April 1933.

56. JBR to Sec Nav, 8 May 1935, Serial No. 546, Subject File No. 325, JBR.

57. Morton, p. 241.

58. Walter Kreuger, memorandum for COS, 28 October 1937, 2720-14, WPDNF 1920-1940, RG 165, OMR, NA.

59. Walter Kreuger, memorandum for COS, 18 October 1937, 2720-14, WPDNF 1920-1940, RG 165, OMR, NA.

60. Stanley Embick, memorandum for COS. Drafts of this memorandum with appendices A and B were completed in May and November 1935, filed in 3380-29, WPDNF 1920-1940, RG 165, OMR, NA. Another copy dated 2 December 1935 is filed in Serial No. 573.


62. W.E. Pye, memorandum for CNO, 22 April 1936, Strategic Plans Division, Miscellaneous Subject file, Series III, OA, NHD. See also material filed in Serial No. 573, Subject File No. 305, JBR.

63. Joint Army-Navy War Plan ORANGE, 21 February 1938, Serial No. 518, Subject File No. 325.

64. Weigley, Walter Kreuger, memorandum for COS, 28 October 1937, COS, memorandum for CNO, 7 December 1937 (not sent), 2720-104, WPDNF 1920-1940, RG 165, OMR, NA.

65. Richard Leigh, chairman of the General Board in 1934, attended preliminary negotiations in London along with Norman Davis in the early summer of 1934. William Stanisly, CNO 1933-1937, attended the London Naval Conference as a delegate. For their views of cooperating with the British, see respectively Chief Bld to Sec Nav and CNO, 30 July 1934, and the correspondence between Stanisly and J.K. Tassige, acting CNO while Stanisly was in London during late 1933 and early 1934, William H. Stanisly papers, USC Library.

66. Berg, Gibbs; Doyle, chaps. V-VIII.


68. Record of Conversations, 13 January 1938 and Royal Ingersoll memorandum for CNO, 31 January 1938, Strategic Plans Division, Series VII, Records Relating to Anglo-American Cooperation, 1930-1944, OA, NHD.


72. CinCUS (Richardson) to CNO (Stark), 22 Oct 1940, A16/F1.

Terrorism, a term in common use, has little common meaning among its users. Individual experience, background, prejudice, and intention may flavor any attempt at definition but efforts toward increased clarity should continue. This article is such an endeavor.

TERRORISM IS . . .?

by


When one speaks of terrorism it is not always clear just what one has in mind. The term has no precise and completely accepted definition. Some countries label those who engage in violent acts against them as "terrorists." Freedom fighters rarely label themselves in such a way, but they often claim they are subjected to governmental terror. "In short, the definition of terrorism seems to depend on point of view—it is what the 'bad guys' do."

Terrorism is frequently described as mindless, senseless and irrational violence. However, none of these terms is appropriate. It is not mindless and there is a theory of terrorism that frequently works. Terrorism should be viewed as a means to an end and not an end unto itself. While terrorist activity may appear random, closer examination reveals that terrorism has objectives. Attacks are often carefully choreographed to attract news media attention. Hostages serve to increase the drama, especially if their being killed is a possibility. Terrorism is aimed at the people watching and, in this sense, "terrorism is theater."

While the term "terrorism" is often indiscriminately used and is difficult to use accurately in a strictly legal context, it raises little doubt in the mind of the man in the street. Though definitional precision is difficult, terrorism is not hard to describe and, for those who have experienced it, is easy to comprehend. "Terrorism is thus an easily recognized activity of a bad character, subjectively determined and shaped by social and political considerations." The term is in flux—like fashion, it is anything we choose it to be. When the question "What is terrorism?" is raised, there always is present some sort of an answer, though it is often colored by the purposes of asking it.

From a "purely physical" perspective, terrorism is not easily isolable from wars, disasters, and the like. And, when combined with the known subjectivity of those who seek to attach a definition to it, greatly complicates any attempt to count and measure terrorist trends. Early attempts to isolate and deal with terrorism (1890s) produced a number of theories. Cranial measures of captured terrorists were taken and a connection between terrorism and lunar phases was detected. Cesare Lombroso, a distinguished criminologist of his day, found both medical and climatological explanations. "Terrorism, like pellagra and some other diseases, was caused by certain vitamin deficiencies, hence its prevalence among maize-eating people.
of Southern Europe." He also found that the farther north one went, the less terrorism there was.6

A serious attempt to define terrorism was made in 1937 when the League of Nations formulated the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism. The convention, signed by 24 states, was ratified by only one and never actually came into force. It was a direct response to the assassination of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia and the President of the Council of the French Republic in 1934 by persons who would now be described as Yugoslav freedom fighters or terrorists, depending upon one’s political stance. The drafters concerned themselves with the problem as they saw it, namely, preparation of a convention to prohibit any form of planning or execution of terrorist outrages upon the life or liberty of persons taking part in the work of “foreign public authorities and services.” The convention was intended to suppress acts of terrorism having an international character only. “Acts of terrorism,” as set forth in Article I, are “criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or the general public.”7

It is interesting to note that the League’s successor, the United Nations, has been unable to agree on a definition of the term and has become diverted by an inclusive discussion of the causes and motives of terrorists.8

With the exception of a number of bilateral agreements for the exchange of intelligence and technical assistance, the international response to terrorism continues to be relatively weak. The United Nations, in the Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States, adopted without vote by the General Assembly on 24 October 1970, asserts at one point that:

Every state has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting, or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another state or acquiescing in organized activity within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts when the acts referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat or use of force.9

However, this same declaration clouds the issue by the greater emphasis on “the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.” The language employed in this regard implies that it is the overriding duty of all states to assist groups struggling for the realization of these rights in every way possible. For example:

Every state has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives people above in the elaboration of the present principles of their right to self-determination and freedom and independence. In their actions against, and resistance to, such forcible action in pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-determination, such peoples are entitled to seek and to receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter.10

Despite these problems, some international conventions that have dealt with one or another aspect of the terrorism problem have been adopted. These conventions are briefly summarized below:

—The Tokyo Convention (Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft): Signed in September 1963, it did not come into force until December 1969. It is a very limited accord that does no more than set a few jurisdictional ground rules and require the contracting states to (1) make every effort to restore control of the aircraft to its lawful commander.
and, (2) arrange for the prompt onward passage or return of the hijacked aircraft together with its passengers, cargo, and crew.

—The Hague Convention (Convention for the Suppression of the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft): Signed in December 1970, it came into force 10 months later. Its principal feature is that it requires (albeit with important discretionary exceptions) contracting parties either to extradite or to prosecute skyjackers.

—The Montreal Convention (Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation): Signed in September 1971, it came into force in January 1973. Covering the sabotage or destruction of aircraft or air navigational facilities, it requires the contracting parties to make such offenses subject to severe penalties and establishes the same extradition or prosecution system for offenders as in The Hague Convention.

—The Organization of American States Convention (Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that are Of International Significance): Signed in February 1971, it entered into force in October 1973 (the United States is a signatory but not a party). With its emphasis on the prevention and punishment of crimes against persons to whom the state owes a special duty of protection under international law, it was a precursor of the U.N. convention concerning the protection of diplomats, cited below. It also employs the Hague Convention extradite-or-prosecute formula.

—The United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons Including Diplomatic Agents: Signed in December 1973, it requires the contracting states to establish certain specified acts against protected persons (or against the official premises, private accommodations, or means of transport of such a person), as crimes under internal law. Once again, the Hague Convention’s extradite-or-prosecute formula applies.11

—European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism: Signed and entered into force 4 August 1978. It is very strong in its wording and states that none of the many acts (hijacking, kidnapping, use of bombs, grenades, letter bombs, etc.) “shall be regarded as a political offence or as an offence connected with a political offence or as an offence inspired by political motives.” While Austria, the Federal Republic of Germany and Sweden readily signed, France, Italy, Norway and Portugal all attached reservations concerning the determination of a “political” offense.12

—Convention Against Taking of Hostages: Drafted by the United Nations during the first week of December 1979, it gives the nations that adhere to it a choice of prosecuting those who seize others with the intention of forcing a government to act or sending them back for prosecution in their native land. The convention will come into force after 22 nations sign it. One article was contested by the Soviet Union and its East European allies. This specifically provides for the prosecution of a person who takes hostages but spares him from being sent home if extradition is requested to punish him for “race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinion.” The Soviets offered a counterproposal but it was defeated by a vote of 103 to 10.13

Although the above conventions reflect some international concern, they do not constitute effective constraints on terrorist activity. Many states, including most of those that have been particularly active in supporting revolutionary or national liberation groups, are not yet parties. Further, the conventions lack teeth in that all make
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the extradition or prosecution of terrorists subject to discretionary escape clauses and none provides for the application of punitive sanctions against states that simply refuse to comply at all.

Another aspect that makes defining terrorism difficult, other than the involvement of varying nationalities and cultures, is that terrorism may be committed for several purposes. First, individual acts of terrorism may aim at wringing specific concessions, such as the payment of ransom or the release of prisoners. Second, terrorism may attempt the gaining of publicity. Third, terrorism may target the causing of widespread disorder, demoralizing society and breaking down social order. Fourth, terrorism may be aimed at deliberately provoking repression in hopes of inducing the government to “self destruct.” Fifth, terrorism may also be used to enforce obedience and cooperation. Sixth, terrorism is frequently meant to punish. Terrorists often declare that the victim of their attack is somehow guilty of something.

One fundamental aspect intimately related to the term terrorism is that it is a “bad” word. No one desires to have the label applied to his activity. The employment of such terms as freedom fighter or liberator are attempts to mitigate what is in fact an ugly profession. If what terrorism stands for were basically “good,” the problem of definition would be easier.

To do unto others what is comprised in terrorism is recognized everywhere as being bad—unless, like war, it can be justified. Terrorism, so defined, is not something that in all conscience can be allowed of as being right and proper, unless there is a massive justification for it—in which case it is not terrorism.

Here we encounter the fine line between terror and terrorism, and the attempts to legalize or justify the former while proscribing the latter. Terror practiced by a government in office appears as law enforcement and is directed against the opposition. Terrorism, on the other hand, implies open defiance of law and is the means whereby an opposition aims to demoralize government authority. While the terrorist group may make no pretense at legality, legitimate government must at least formally adhere (or give the appearance of adhering) to the law. In the absence of directly supporting legislation, governmental terror is made to appear justified by declaring a state of emergency and the issuing of decrees.

From a legal point of view “there is nothing strange or incongruous about the dualism with which the phenomenon of terrorism is viewed.”

Another example worth noting relates to an identical set of physical facts that can be criminal or noncriminal according to its association with “a specific mental element.” Murder and justifiable homicide are good examples. What is good or evil about the matter is not dependent upon the physical aspects of the case itself but rather on the way it is perceived. “The true struggle over definition in the area of terrorism is fundamentally between those who claim an exception at law for certain manifestly harmful conduct and those who will not admit it.” When viewed this way, in terms of individual crimes, these acts, in and of themselves, are not terrorism. Terrorism is more the why of an act than the what.

What about this legal definition of terrorism?

Terrorism involves the intentional use of violence or the threat of violence by the precipitator(s) against an instrumental target in order to communicate to a primary target a threat of future violence. The object is to use intense fear or anxiety to coerce the primary
target to behavior or to mold its attitudes in connection with demanded power (political) outcome. It should be noted that in a specific context the instrumental and primary targets could well be the same person or group.... The crucial factor is that the task of deciding between the permissible and impermissible labels of a particular coercive process should be guided by community expectations and all relevant policies and features of context. Terrorist, like beauty, remains in the eye of the beholder.

These efforts to reach an operational definition of terrorism are put forth not as an exercise in semantics but to illustrate the difficulty that surrounds this particular term. Further, they are an attempt to arrive at a readily workable definition that is more than just one writer's view of the phenomenon. Studies of terrorism must try, when possible, to develop more precise language. Common use of terms is a prerequisite for expanding knowledge. With this as a goal, the following definition is preferred:

Terrorism is a purposeful human political activity directed primarily toward creation of a general climate of fear designed to influence, in ways desired by the perpetrator, other human beings and, through them, some course of events.

Terrorism poses an unacceptable affront to the principles on which an organized society rests. It is expressed through the employment of various criminal acts calculated to harm human life, property or other interests. Terrorists seek to arrogate to themselves and use the powers normally reserved to the state. If this is an acceptable definition, types of terrorism need to be differentiated. The term international terrorism is frequently mentioned in the literature. This should be clearly distinguished from transnational terrorism. International terrorism ought to be employed carefully and applied to groups or individuals controlled by a sovereign state. The term should not imply the existence of a "terrorist international" in the sense of a central body coordinating the activities of terrorists in different countries. No evidence in this regard has been discovered.

Transnational terrorism is carried out by basically autonomous nonstate actors, whether or not they enjoy some degree of support from sympathetic states. The difficulty surrounding an accurate definition of terrorism presents itself again in dealing with typologies.

To find a solution to this dilemma we would best concern ourselves with the nature of the act as opposed to the nature of the group. A transnational terrorist act, then, may be viewed as one:

1. committed or taking effect outside the territory of a state of which the alleged offender is a national; and

2. committed or takes effect:
   a. outside the territory of the state against which the act is directed, or
   b. within the territory of the state against which the act is directed and the alleged offender knows or has reason to know that the instrumental target against whom the act is directed is not a national of the state; or
   c. the instrumental target is a national of the primary target state but is a different nationality from that of the offender; and

3. is intended to damage the interests of a state or an international intergovernmental organization; and

4. is committed neither by nor against a member of the armed forces of a state in the course of military hostilities.
Before ending this definitional attempt, two concepts should be briefly addressed, namely, nonterritorial terrorism and domestic terrorism. The term nonterritorial came about because researchers found other terminology lacked the needed precision to provide effective analysis. Nonterritorial terrorism is defined as "a form of terror not confined to a clearly delineated geographical area." Today's terrorist is seen as having the potential for striking virtually anywhere at will. Brian Jenkins made reference to this when he described terrorism as "...a kind of warfare without territory, waged without armies as we know them. It is warfare that is not limited territorially; sporadic battles may take place worldwide. It is warfare without neutrals, and with few or no civilian bystanders."  

While this effort removes barriers encountered in trying to "squeeze" a group into either the international or transnational definition, it, in a sense, removes too much and is too broad.

Domestic terrorism is activity by a state's nationals attempting to influence that state's behavior. All activity takes place within that state. The activities of the Symbionese Liberation Army are an example of this phenomenon. The George Jackson Brigade, active during the period 1975 through 1978, is another illustration. This particular group grew out of an unsuccessful prison reform movement and focused on the commission of urban operations directed against the "fascist" U.S. Government. Of the 28 actions (bombings and robberies) conducted by the group, 23 were against business, utility and commercial targets and the remainder against government or police facilities. The Puerto Rican Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) have operated both within Puerto Rico and major cities of the United States. The group is the most active of the so-called nationalist groups seeking an independent Puerto Rico. Since its founding in 1974, the FALN has carried out over 60 bombing operations. Within the United States, five persons have died and 75 have been injured. The scope of these attacks could be viewed as limited and it may appear that the United States would not be vulnerable to a serious transnational attack within its boundaries. However, despite the growth of modern weaponry and the increased sophistication of defense planning, highly industrialized nations remain quite fragile. In fact, the highly technological, exposed, and interdependent automated systems so essential in our modern society provide many prime targets for terrorist groups. Commercial aircraft, natural gas pipelines, electric power grids, offshore oil rigs, and computers storing government and corporate records are examples of sabotage-prone targets whose destruction would have more serious effects than their primary losses would suggest. Social fragility is reflected in the blackout that occurred in New York City (13 July 1977). The disproportionately high damage caused by uncontrolled looting and arson, resource shortages, and loss of public confidence, arrests to urban vulnerability. On that day lightning completely disrupted the Consolidated Edison System, immobilizing ten million people. Subways and elevators came to a halt. Airports and television networks were forced to close down. Thousands of looters surged through the streets, resulting in 3,300 arrests and injury to nearly 100 policemen. It was estimated that the cost of the damage would be $150 million. If the blackout lasted 4 or 5 days, it is easy to picture New York almost completely paralyzed with numerous incidents of looting, arson, and panic. The point here is that an "act of nature" with the aid of human inefficiency produced a 2-day siege—a quite small but trained paramilitary force could take the city of
New York or any other large metropolitan area off line for a considerable period of time. A poignant encapsulation of the "decade of dismal terror" has been presented by J. Bowyer Bell in his recent work, *A Time of Terror.*

All now know the long and grotesque litany of massacre. Lod-Munich-Khartoum-Rome-Athens-Vienna. Now millions are familiar with the luminous dreams of the obscure South Moluccans and the strange Japanese Red Army, with the fantasies of the Hanafis and the Symbionese Liberation Army, and with the alphabet of death—PFLP, FLQ, IRA. Carlos-the-Jackal is a media antihero, and Croatia is now found in the headlines instead of in stamp albums. Anyone can be a victim, can ride the wrong airline, take the wrong commuter train or accept the wrong executive position abroad. While opening mail, passing a foreign embassy, standing in an airport boarding line or next to a car, or attending a diplomatic reception, any of us may draw a "winning" lottery ticket in the terrorist game. And everyone is the target of the television terrorists, choreographing massacres for prime time. After each crafted incident, terror still produces intense anguish and indignation, a plea if not for vengeance then at least for effective action. The target audience has not become inured to violence. Repetition has established ritual, not ennui. Sophocles never pales nor, so far, has the murder of innocents, brought to us personal and close-up by the media.

Faced with what has been and recognizing what may well be, an attempt to clarify, through a definitional process, the nature of terrorism has been presented. I hope it will be subjected to scrutiny and criticism as we seek to agree on terminology free of confusion and complexity.

**BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY**

Major William R. Farrell, an Air Force Area Specialist concentrating in Asian affairs, received his Masters Degree in East Asian Studies from Florida State University, has studied Japanese at the Defense Language Institute, and is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Michigan. He attended the College of Naval Command and Staff, Naval War College in 1979-80 where this paper was written as part of a larger study of the U.S. Government's response to transnational terrorism. He is now assigned to the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**NOTES**


2. *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4. To illustrate this, one has only to recall the Symbionese Liberation Army. Through the media everyone became familiar with the seven-headed cobra symbol and heard audio tapes of the group's demands. A significant number of FBI agents and policemen were mobilized to track down the group. Patty Hearst's kidnapping added greatly to the notoriety as the group was viewed nightly by millions on network news. However, it has subsequently been determined that the group had only a dozen or so members at its height of strength. At its demise it had to its credit: one murder, one kidnapping, one bank job and a few stolen cars. The difference between actual violence and the amplified effects of the violence is most notable. See also David Anab, "Coming to Grips with World Terrorism," *Christian Science Monitor*, 19 December 1975, p. 3, where terrorism is described as the "weapon of the
4. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
15. Brian Crenzier, Director of the Institute for the Study of Conflict, London, in testimony before a U.S. Senate subcommittee, indicated that there were two main categories of terrorists: disruptive and coercive. The aims of disruption are: self-publicity, to build up the movement's morale and prestige; to discredit and demoralize the authorities; and to provoke the authorities into taking excessively harsh repressive measures, which will alienate the population and make them feel that they are being used in a crusade against terrorism. The aims of coercive terrorism are: to create fear in the minds of the population, weaken the government's ability to take action, and to make the populace feel that they are under threat.
16. Jenkins makes this point most clearly with an illustration from the massacre at Lod Airport in 1972. He states that "terrorists have used terror for the destruction of guilt and punishment than in other forms of warfare or politics and a narrower definition of innocent bystanders. The victims of the Lod incident, many of whom were Christian pilgrims from Puerto Rico, were killed by the terrorists to be guilty because they had arrived in Israel on Israeli visas and thereby had tacitly recognized the state that was declared by the Palestinians in 1967. By coming to Israel, they had in effect entered a war zone. What was being said was not that the victims were innocent bystanders but that they were caught in a crossfire; neither was it saying it would seek and kill all those holding visas from the state of Israel. The organization was saying that those who happened to get shot—just because they were there—were nonetheless guilty or they would not have been shot. Stated another way, they did not become victims because they were enemies, but rather they became enemies because they happened to be victims. "International Terrorism: A Balance Sheet," p. 186.
18. Ibid., p. 11. The governments of Mexico and Brazil have not frequently used the labels "terrorist" and "political" for the urban terrorists. They use instead "criminal" and "bandit," hoping to deprive the terrorists of any glamour. Such a tactic makes any system of repression easier to justify, should the need arise. Albert Parry, Terrorism from Robespierre to Ayatollah (New York: Vanguard Press, 1976), p. 524.
22. One of the potential dangers that is embodied in the European Convention of 1978 cited above is its potential for not concerning itself with the "why" of a particular act. Blanket prohibition may be an overreaction and exemptly deterrence through "overkill." The several attached reservations tend to endorse this view.


25. This definition closely resembles the one put forth on page 42 of the study by the Joint Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc. One of the major differences is the insertion of the word "political" between the words "human" and "activity." My reason for using this is to avoid admixing terrorism with gangland intimidation or similar acts. Terrorism is directly concerned with the exercise of, or the attempt to exercise, public power or to influence the allocation of values by a ruling body. For those who may be interested in an excellent review of definitional efforts in this regard, see the cited study.


27. This was stated by Brian Crozier as part of his testimony before the Senate subcommittee in 1975 and all indications are that it is equally true today.

28. While a central authority may be lacking, there are many indications of cooperation between groups and open support from governments who support their objectives. A good example of this is the case of the Japanese terrorists who carried out the Lod Airport attack. They had received training from Syria and Lebanon, received money passing through Germany, received arms in Italy, and carried out their act for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

29. Milbank, p. 9. The author makes the following point:

Given the element of governmental patronage that is common to both, the boundary between transnational and international terrorism is often difficult to draw. To the degree that it can be determined, the key distinction lies in who is calling the shots with respect to a given action or campaign. Hence, groups can and do drift back and forth across the line. For example, even a one-time "contract job" undertaken on behalf of a governmental actor by a group that normally acts according to its own lights qualifies as international terrorism.

30. The person or persons against whom the act is directed may be either the primary or instrumental target as indicated previously.

31. Dugard, p. 99. The basis of this definition was taken from Article 1 of the Draft Convention for Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of International Terrorism, submitted by the United States to the U.N. General Assembly, 26 September 1972. For a complete text see Alexander et al., eds., pp. 113-118. If we were to concern ourselves with the particular groups, we would seek to examine not only the site of the act but also such relevant aspects as the nationalities of foreign targets (i.e., training, funding, arms) of the group, sanctuaries, declared ideology and mechanics of the act's resolution. I am grateful for the assistance of Maj. Horst S.C. Edsall III, U.S. Air Force in "fine tuning" this section of this article. His "systems analysis approach" to each definitional attempt disclosed many initial weaknesses.


33. Jenkins, p. 4. The prolonged situation in Iran can be viewed (based upon available evidence) as initially beginning as mob action directed against the United States. However, as the incident progressed and governmental sanction of the activity was given, the act took on the flavor of international terrorism. In this sense the Iranian case can be viewed as evolving into a terrorist act inasmuch as the initial "purposefulness" is a matter of speculation.


In early 1941 the United States and Great Britain agreed that strategic responsibility for the Western Atlantic would rest with the United States when that nation entered the war. The United States did assume such responsibility. It is little remembered, however, that the U.S. Navy contributed only two percent of the escort forces to the subsequent Battle of the Atlantic while Canada contributed 48 percent. With this force disparity and with the U.S. Navy's relative inexperience in antisubmarine warfare (and the charge of its unwillingness to learn), little wonder that Canada was dissatisfied and sought to regain control of her own seapower. She finally succeeded and the revised relationships that were then established are reflected in those of today.

THE ROYAL CANADIAN NAVY'S QUEST FOR AUTONOMY IN THE NORTH WEST ATLANTIC: 1941-43

by Commander W.G.D. Lund, Canadian Forces

On 30 April 1943 the Royal Canadian Navy assumed responsibility for the protection and control of shipping in the North West Atlantic. This event marked the successful conclusion of a campaign by the Royal Canadian Navy to gain control of its rapidly expanding seapower and to assert autonomy in an ocean area that was of primary national interest.

In 1941 the Mackenzie King government had stated that it was "...not prepared to place the strategical direction of the Royal Canadian Navy [in the Western Atlantic] unreservedly under the will of the United States." However, when Great Britain signed the American-British Conversations-1 (ABC-1) Agreement with the United States on behalf of the British Commonwealth, the Royal Canadian Navy was relegated to the position of a subcommand of the U.S. Navy.

Beginnings. On 14 September 1939, after war had been declared, an Order-in-Council was issued that directed Canada's six destroyers "to cooperate to the fullest extent with the forces of the Royal Navy." These six ships, in addition to five minesweepers, were the Royal Canadian Navy and the intent of the order was to avoid placing Canada's small navy completely under the control of the British Admiralty. This reflected Mackenzie King's prewar policy of maintaining the greatest measure of autonomy possible in defense arrangements with Great Britain.

A change that affected command relationships occurred in early 1940 when the Naval Council received approval from the Cabinet War Committee to place all the Canadian destroyers under the operational control, in fact at the disposal, of the
Admiralty. This action, prompted by a request from Britain, was recommended by the Naval Council for two reasons. First, the Admiralty were in a better position to take a worldwide view of naval dispositions and thus ensure that every ship was employed to the best advantage. Second, the dispositions ordered by the Admiralty would probably be greatly to the advantage of Canadian defenses.

As the strategic situation deteriorated in Europe, further changes were made in command relationships. On 23 May 1940 an urgent request was received from the Admiralty for destroyers from the Royal Canadian Navy to assist in the protection of the British Isles against a possible invasion in the near future.

With the Germans ensconced on the Atlantic seaboard after the capitulation of France and with Britain under the threat of invasion there was no question of the Canadian Government standing on any question of autonomy. “To cooperate to the fullest extent” took on a quite different meaning in the dark days of October 1940. Naval Service Headquarters (N.S.H.Q.) and the Canadian Government virtually placed the entire navy at Great Britain’s disposal. The Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast (C.O.A.C.) was allowed to retain only the bare essential number of ships to carry out his functions. The Cabinet War Committee viewed the situation as an “extreme emergency.” It became purely a question of Britain’s survival. There was a strong feeling that if Britain fell Canada would probably be the next target for Nazi aggression. Canada’s first line of defense was now recognized as being the English Channel and the fire-proof-house mentality that had prevailed was swept away by a fear approaching hysteria. It certainly was no time to stand on principle and even Prime Minister King acknowledged this fact. It was through this set of circumstances that Great Britain gained control of Canada’s naval resources as part of her negotiable assets when she later treated with the United States during the ABC-1 conversations.

The acquisition of ports on the Bay of Biscay enabled the Germans to extend their submarine operations further westward. During the latter months of 1940 Germany’s strategy to starve Britain into submission by blockading sea commerce through unlimited submarine warfare became evident and the long struggle by Commonwealth forces to keep open the vital lines of communications began in earnest.

The Royal Canadian Navy eventually dedicated nearly its entire resources to this struggle that came to be known as the Battle of the Atlantic. Rear Adm. L.W. Murray recalled that Prime Minister King had been appalled when *Athenia* was sunk by a U-boat. And subsequently:

...we were able to impress upon him [King] that this type of antishubmarine war was one our small Canadian Navy was best to compete in. We got his approval for anything that could be done and there was never anything to stand in our way.

The government’s favorable attitude toward the policy of concentrating on *Antishubmarine Warfare* (ASW) complemented Rear Adm. P.W. Nelles’ ambition to expand the Royal Canadian Navy. Nelles, Chief of Naval Staff, was intent on building a force of modern destroyers to be kept on cessation of hostilities as a permanent peacetime navy on a much larger scale than before 1939. Therefore, when the Admiralty extended an invitation to Nelles to establish an escort force based on Newfoundland he seized the opportunity. In July 1941 the Newfoundland Escort Force (N.E.F.) was created. Command of the force, based on St. John’s, was given to Commodore L.W. Murray, R.C.N., with the title Commodore Commanding
Newfoundland Forces (C.C.N.F.). The Admiralty returned the destroyers that had been on loan to provide a nucleus for the N.E.F. These were supplemented by a squadron of new Canadian-built corvettes then "working up" in the Halifax area.

The establishment of the N.E.F. enhanced Canada's military presence in Newfoundland, a point that found favor with the Cabinet War Committee, and extended her naval operations to mid-Atlantic. Moreover, the N.E.F. had a distinctive task and this quickly became Canada's most important contribution to the sea war against Germany.

Neither the significance of this undertaking nor the resources required to execute it were fully realized at the time. It was impossible to foresee the developments that were to take place in the Battle of the Atlantic and how vital that theater would become to the war effort. Admiral Nelles' original commitment to the N.E.F. was 48 destroyers and corvettes. Between May 1941 and October 1943 this commitment was more than doubled as Canada built more corvettes and recruited and trained more crews. By the end of 1942 Canada was providing 48 percent of the escorts for convoy protection. Yet with this preponderance of strength the Royal Canadian Navy had virtually no influence in the strategic direction of its resources. This was a direct result of the ABC-1 agreement.

ABC-1. In January 1941 plenary meetings had been held in Washington between the British Chiefs of Staff and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to discuss possible future military cooperation. Canada was neither consulted on her views nor directly represented during these conversations. The conversations resulted in a document, ABC-1, dated 27 March 1941, being submitted to the United States' and Great Britain's Governments for approval. ABC-1 set forth the principles that would guide military collaboration of the United States and the British Commonwealth should the former be compelled to resort to war.

The provisions made for command and staff relationships proved to be unsatisfactory to Canada. Moreover, this was to have a considerable bearing on both the manner of Canada-U.S. cooperation and on Canada's role in the war. Specifically, ABC-1 divided the Atlantic Ocean into eastern and western zones of strategic responsibility. In the event of the United States entering the war "the High Command of the United States and the United Kingdom" would "collaborate continuously in the formulation and execution of strategic policies and plans which shall govern the control of the war." It was also laid down that the United States would take responsibility for the strategic direction of British forces, which would include the Royal Canadian Navy, in the Western Atlantic except for "the waters and territories in which Canada assumes responsibility for the strategic direction of military forces, as may be defined in United States-Canada joint agreements."15

While the discussions were in progress Prime Minister King privately raised objections to Great Britain's High Commissioner on the subject of command relationships. However, these objections were not heard. Consequently, Canada was presented with a fait accompli when the United States assumed strategic control of the Western Atlantic in September 1941. Although Canada was not constitutionally bound to accept this situation, she had a moral obligation to do so as Britain's ally. However, this state of affairs did rattle in the breast of the Royal Canadian Navy's officer corps and later provided some of the motivation to establish a command independent of interference from both the United States and Great Britain.
ABC-22. Concurrently with the ABC-1 conversations, negotiations were carried out by members of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence which had been established to act as the coordinating agency for any Canada-U.S. defense ventures. The task of the Joint Board was to formulate a plan, entitled ABC-22, to complement what eventually became ABC-1, and these negotiations became the scene of hard bargaining.

Canada resisted sustained efforts by the United States to negotiate an agreement that would bring Canadian territory and forces, and Newfoundland, under her control for purposes of ABC-22. The position of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee, concurred in by the Cabinet War Committee, was that the improved strategic situation rendered the invasion of Great Britain unlikely and therefore that the circumstances in which ABC-22 would be brought into effect were "offensive." Under threatening circumstances Canada was willing to accept strategic direction from the United States because of its preponderance of resources. However, now that it appeared that the United States would enter the war for the purpose of assisting in the destruction of the enemy in Europe, Canada was unwilling to give the United States unqualified strategic control of its armed forces.

The Canadian Chiefs of Staff had their way and "command by cooperation" was established as the basis for command relationships. But for some time it was to be a hollow victory. Colonel Dzuiban has suggested that the U.S. War Department blocked continuous efforts by Canada to set up as military mission in Washington as a quid pro quo on the command relationships issue. Through this denial of recognition of Canada as an equal partner in continental defense on the operational level, the Royal Canadian Navy was relegated to the position of a subcommand of the U.S. Navy under the terms of ABC-1 and had to communicate through the British Admiralty Delegation in Washington on all matters of strategic policy.

Unequal Partner. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff pressed the government to have the command relationships in ABC-1 altered when it was submitted to Canada for perusal in May 1941. Having evaded the snare laid by the American proposal in ABC-22, the Chiefs of Staff were concerned that an acceptance of the ABC-1 report as it stood would place the armed forces in the very position they were trying to avoid. The government agreed with the Chiefs of Staff but efforts, mentioned above, by Prime Minister King to have ABC-1 altered had been ignored by Great Britain. Similarly, the Department of External Affairs attempted to lay Canada's case before the U.S. Government through the U.S. Naval Attache in Ottawa. It was pointed out that Canada was not prepared to place the strategical direction of the Royal Canadian Navy unreservedly under the will of the United States. This had not been done with respect to the United Kingdom at the beginning of the war and would not be done now. However, Canada did not press the matter too far for fear of sabotaging the agreement. Consequently, N.S.H.Q. was obliged to accept the reality of American control of its ships in the Atlantic after the Argentia Conference in August 1941, even before the United States entered the war.

During the latter part of the summer the U.S. Navy began to come into the Battle of the Atlantic. On 26 July 1941 the U.S. Navy Western Hemisphere Defense Plan No. 4 (WPL-51) was, with the exception of Task B, brought into effect. Task B, which provided the escorting of ships under the flags of nations other than the United States, was held in abeyance.
Naval War College Review, Vol. 33 [1980], No. 3, Art. 25

U.S. Operational Control. As of 13 September, C.C.N.F. and C.O.A.C. passed under the strategic direction of CINCLANT. This occurred by virtue of N.S.H.Q.'s acceptance of an invitation from Admiral King to put the Royal Canadian Navy's convoy escort forces under one ASW controlling authority.\(^{35}\) This agreement, with regard to strategic control of naval forces, had been tailored to ABC-1.\(^ {35}\) ABC-1 stipulated, as previously mentioned, that in the event of the United States entering the war the U.S. Navy would exercise general strategic control and control of shipping in the Western Atlantic.\(^ {36}\) Although the United States had not declared war when WPL-51 was brought fully into effect, neither the Admiralty nor N.S.H.Q. disputed the U.S. Navy's assumption of control. The assistance of the U.S. Navy was welcome under any terms. It was only after the entry of the United States into the war that first the Admiralty and later N.S.H.Q. raised the question of strategic direction of convoy escort in the Western Atlantic.\(^ {37}\) The reason, as we shall see, was that the demands of the Pacific and other theaters, which were not anticipated in ABC-1, reduced the A/S escorts the United States could contribute to the Battle of the Atlantic to a negligible quantity.

The United States was catapulted into the war by the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor. Up to that moment nothing occurred to test the definition of command relationships as set down in ABC-1 and ABC-22. On 7 December 1941 the Secretary of the Navy ordered both C.O.A.C. and C.C.N.F. to take belligerent action against Japan before Canada had declared war against that country.\(^ {38}\) C.C.N.F. queried N.S.H.Q. on the signal and reported that, 'In the interest of cooperation, and because the particular matter has very little immediate interest for N.E.F., this signal is being relayed to ships of the N.E.F.'\(^ {39}\) Murray asked for direction on
that and any subsequent signals, remarking that he thought such instructions should come from either Canadian or British authorities. Minutes appended to the letter after it was received in N.S.H.Q. indicate an uncertainty about exactly what Commodore Murray's position was. The Naval Secretary under the Direction of the Naval Council replied to Murray's query, "While the N.E.F. is under the strategic direction of the U.S. Navy, this particular signal referred to dealt with policy and was therefore properly outside the scope of strategic direction." The matter was to be forgotten at the insistence of the Naval Council as it would do more harm than good to make an issue of it. What the event did show was that the U.S. Navy considered that both C.O.A.C. and C.C.N.F. were under its direct control in all matters of strategy and that the Royal Canadian Navy, in early 1942, was willing to accept this rather apathetically. The actual performance of the U.S. Navy turned out to be considerably less than had been originally intended and that of the Royal Canadian Navy considerably more. The ships provided under ABC-1 included 3 battleships, 5 cruisers, 48 A/S escorts (all destroyers) and 47 seaplanes. The contribution under WPL-51 was even more impressive and included 3 aircraft carriers. The Canadian contribution under the latter scheme was to be 5 destroyers and 25 corvettes, the policy still being to send as many escorts as possible to European waters. When WPL-51 went into operation U.S. participation was limited to protection of H.X. and O.N. convoys while Canada had increased her forces to 8 destroyers and 25 corvettes. When the United States entered the war there was an immediate withdrawal of all destroyers for other theaters and by February 1942 there were only 2 U.S. Coast Guard cutters available for duty as convoy escorts. Lack of U.S. Contribution. The withdrawal of the U.S. Navy from the organization for the protection of transatlantic shipping once again necessitated close cooperation between the two Commonwealth navies. In fact, it was readily apparent by late January 1942 that Rear Adm. Bristol, USN, whose responsibility it was to direct the control and protection of shipping in the North West Atlantic, was an unnecessary cog in the organization for operational control of escorts as he had no ships of his own. The American's title was Commander Task Force 24 (CTF24) whose Headquarters was established at Argentina, Newfoundland.

A signal from the Admiralty to the Commander in Chief U.S. Fleet (COMINCH) on 29 January 1942 raised the question of strategic direction of transatlantic escorts. It proposed that transatlantic escorts be controlled by C-in-C., W.A. Admiral King, now COMINCH, rejected the proposal stating that the system was working efficiently and that the United States would retain strategic control in the Western Atlantic. The First Sea Lord was not willing to press the matter further at the time, but he felt the scheme of dual control would not work and that he would reopen the question if the operational situation demanded. N.S.H.Q. were content to sit out this battle of the giants and stated to the effect that C.O.A.C. and Flag Officer Newfoundland (F.O.N.F.) would continue to provide the maximum number of ships possible. By August 1942 the main action of the Battle of the Atlantic was concentrated in the mid-North Atlantic. It was there, in the Greenland "air gap," that the Canadian and British escorts bore the full brunt of the battle. By this time many Canadian naval officers, who had either been in the thick of the fight or had held important positions concerned with operations on the staff of C.O.A.C. or F.O.N.F., were
beginning to staff key positions in N.S.H.Q. These officers, and some who had been at N.S.H.Q. for some time, discovered a certain inertia at the higher levels in the form of an unwillingness to assert strongly Canada’s claim for more strategic responsibility in the control of her navy. Therefore wheels were set in motion at lower levels to try and move what had lost momentum above.

Canadian Service Missions. A significant occurrence with regard to the command relationships issue was the establishment in July 1942 of a Canadian service mission in Washington. This mission, called the Canadian Joint Staff, was set up only after 1 year of arduous negotiations with the U.S. State Department. The Americans wanted, among other considerations, to “avoid the establishment of any undesirable precedent” that would encourage other small allies to press for military missions. The Canadian Joint Staff was actually set up using the Permanent Joint Board on Defence as a guise. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff hoped the Canadian Joint Staff would provide a link between the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and themselves on operational policy decisions involving their forces, particularly the Royal Canadian Navy. The Permanent Joint Board on Defence did not, nor had it ever been intended that it would, fulfill this function. The terms of reference, however, of the Canadian Joint Staff were ill-defined and it remained for the individual members to make what they could of their mission.

Rear Adm. V.G. Brodeur, R.C.N., was appointed as the naval member of the Canadian Joint Staff. Brodeur was a French-Canadian, the son of the Minister of Fisheries and Marine in the Laurier government. He possessed a strong personality, was a Canadian nationalist and a proud professional naval officer, and, to a great extent, was anti-British. It does not appear that he was selected for the appointment for any of these reasons but it was for these reasons that he set out to assert Canada’s position in councils between the Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy when the interests of the Royal Canadian Navy were involved. In this respect Admiral Brodeur was a very fortunate choice indeed.

Mixed Command Lines. Because C.O.A.C. and F.O.N.F. were considered subcommands of the U.S. Navy operating under the direct control of CTF 24, N.S.H.Q. and the two commands were normally included in joint negotiations on escort and convoy organization between the Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy. But in many cases N.S.H.Q. were not consulted when major strategic decisions were made concerning the actual employment of ships or other resources. This, to a great extent, was the fault of the British Admiralty Delegation in Washington which was only too ready to keep N.S.H.Q. out of the picture. Consequently, the U.S. Navy found itself dealing sometimes with N.S.H.Q., sometimes with the British Admiralty Delegation, and sometimes with Admiral Brodeur after he was appointed N.M.C.S. This was the situation Brodeur sought to correct. He was determined to establish his office as the one and only link between N.S.H.Q. and the U.S. Joint Chiefs, and the British Admiralty Delegation would no longer speak for the Royal Canadian Navy.

The first reports from the Canadian Joint Staff to the Canadian Chiefs of Staff confirmed that Canada had been left out of important decisions that concerned her forces. Admiral Brodeur’s first personal report to C.N.S. disclosed that Admiral King believed there was collusion between N.S.H.Q. and the British Admiralty Delegation that was an indication that the Royal Canadian Navy did not recognize him as
being in strategic control in certain areas outside the Canadian Coastal Zone. Moreover, Brodeur explained there was a rumor afoot that Canada and Great Britain were trying to cut COMINCH out completely. Brodeur suggested the cause of the complaint was the too frequent use of the "old boy" network between the Royal Navy and the Royal Canadian Navy authorities which the U.S. Navy did not recognize as a bona fide channel of communications. He concluded:

This kind of private arrangement will never obtain for us the confidence nor consideration of the U.S.N. It is most strongly recommended that such personal contact be stopped before we are completely ignored due to this kind of personal intrigue.

Another event significant to the question occurred in September when Rear Adm. R.M. Brainard, USN, succeeded Rear Admiral Bristol as CTF 24. Brainard was another competent officer "with whom," remarked Admiral Murray, "we had nothing but the best and pleasantest relations as well." However, some signals sent during September and October indicate that either Admiral Brainard or some of his staff were intent on asserting themselves. These signals and a letter criticized both the material readiness of Canadian groups and operational procedures. These minor criticisms were helpful and were accepted with good grace. But they were a source of embarrassment to the Royal Canadian Navy as they came from a foreign commander. These criticisms, of course, found their way to N.S.H.Q. They arrived sometime after the Director of Trade received correspondence from the Naval Control Service Officer, Sydney, criticizing the inefficiency of CTF 24's staff in convoy control and the "know it all" attitude of the U.S. Navy with regard to learning from Canadian experience.

By piecing together pieces of evidence one can see that the important Departments at N.S.H.Q., namely Operations, Plans, and Trade, were receiving reports of a series of little annoyances concerning Canada's subordinate position in a theater where her contribution was predominant. Discussions on the subject of establishing an independent command began on an informal basis between Capts. H.N. Lay and H.G. De Wolf who were the Directors of Operations and Plans respectively. This was the beginning of the campaign. Captain Lay wrote to various officers in the operational commands to sound them out on their views. Very shortly strong support was received from all quarters on the project.

By early November a very frustrated Admiral Brodeur was beginning to find his position quite untenable in Washington. On 26 October he had written to C.N.S. that "the U.S.N. is undoubtedly baffled by our present way of dealing with them..." and that the British Admiralty Delegation was making a point of keeping him out of the picture with regard to matters of concern to the Royal Canadian Navy." Brodeur asserted that for this reason, "There is no doubt that the U.S.N. is under the impression that the R.C.N. is partly under the control of the Admiralty...."

Then, during the first few days of November, the British Admiralty Delegation once again bypassed Admiral Brodeur as well as N.S.H.Q. on a matter concerning British strategic and material requirements that included Canadian necessities. It appears that the Secretary of the Navy had posed a query that the British Admiralty Delegation answered without consulting Brodeur. Brodeur found out only when the Americans circulated the British reply to the Canadian Joint Staff. Brodeur wrote a strongly worded Appreciation to C.N.S. which he said "was not meant
to be a criticism" but which outlined all his grievances against the British Admiralty Delegation's policy of ignoring Canada. He cited several important incidents including one concerning operations that could have had serious repercussions. Brodeur concisely summed up the Royal Navy's attitude when he remarked:

This appreciation could go back to 1907 and all its political complications concerning the relations between the R.C.N. and the Admiralty, but as the situation still seems to be very much the same as it was then, only recent facts will be related because they indicate that regardless of all decisions reached at previous Colonial and Imperial Conferences, the Admiralty still looks upon the R.C.N. as the naval child to be seen and heard when no outsider [the U.S.N.] is looking on or listening in.78

This letter put C.N.S. and his staff in the right frame of mind to counter a move by the British Admiralty Delegation and CINCLANT to limit distribution to the Canadian Coastal Zone of information on U-boat positions from N.S.H.Q.'s very effective and highly developed HF/DF system.79 This system located U-boat concentrations by using bearings obtained on U-boat HF radio transmissions by a number of listening stations and a triangulation process. This information was used mainly by Canadian A/S escort groups operating in the Western Atlantic. The British Admiralty Delegation, obviously in collusion with COMINCH's staff, politely raised the question of the promulgation of information in one signal,80 then followed it up with another proposing that N.S.H.Q. greatly curtail their distribution.81 It was also proposed that COMINCH be the sole authority for promulgating such information. N.S.H.Q.'s terse reply to what was considered a challenge stated flatly that the Royal Canadian Navy would not be pushed aside on the matter and that their system was far more efficient than the U.S. Navy's.82 The British Admiralty Delegation's reply pleaded that duplication of effort prompted the proposal and they defended the U.S. Navy's efficiency.83

C.N.S. followed up his signal to the British Admiralty Delegation with a letter to Admiral King that he asked Captain Lay to draft. Lay had approached Nelles on the question of command relationships with the Americans and the latter had asked him "to put it all down on paper and I'll look at it."84 Lay was in the process of drawing up a detailed memorandum when the HF/DF information dispute presented an opportunity to press the matter.

Autonomy Campaign. The letter to Admiral King, which proved to be the opening salvo of a campaign to have the command structure revised, reviewed the entire HF/DF information promulgation issue and suggested that had Admiral Brodeur been consulted the matter could have been cleared up in Washington. It was pointed out that it was the U.S. Navy and the Admiralty who had asked the Royal Canadian Navy to establish the system in the first place. Then the letter went on to review the extent of Canada's contribution to the Battle of the Atlantic and emphasized the fact that her ships made up 48 percent of the escort forces while the Americans provided only two percent. The letter also emphasized the similarity between the Royal Canadian Navy and the Royal Navy which were bearing the brunt of the battle and the dissimilarity of the U.S. Navy to both. Mentioned as well was Canada's contribution in ships to the Torch Operation and the loan of A/S escorts to the U.S. Navy when it found itself hard pressed during June 1942. The
conclusion of the letter opened with the statement:

I hope you will agree that in all matters of common policy the R.C.N. have done their best to cooperate with the two Services [U.S.N. and R.N.] and have placed the general strategic needs of the United Nations ahead of their purely Canadian coastal needs.85

Then it was proposed that a conference be held shortly to discuss "the question of general operational control of all Trade Convoy Escorts."86

The letter was signed by Admiral Nelles but the thoughts and words were Captain Lay's. Lay followed up the letter with a very long memorandum to C.N.S. that reviewed in great detail all the various agreements to which Canada subscribed or had been committed to by the British. He stated to the effect that, regardless of what might have been intended, the Canadian ships on the east coast were, in fact, under the direct control of the U.S. Navy. Lay concluded:

Inspite of the R.C.N.'s efforts to cooperate fully with the U.S. Naval authorities in the general prosecution of the Battle of the Atlantic, the attitude of the C. in C. U.S. Fleet has been considerably difficult. Other U.S. Naval authorities have taken their cue from him. The general attitude appears to be that they consider the R.C.N. as purely a small part of their own fleet and have from time to time issued orders either directly or indirectly to R.C.N. authorities or ships without in any way consulting N.S.H.Q. first.87

Captain Lay's major recommendation was that Canada press for assumption of responsibility of the operational control of all escort forces and convoys in the Western Atlantic. He cited as arguments the unnecessary role CTF 24 played in the escort organization which made effective cooperation between British and Canadian A/S forces difficult. He also cited Canada's major contribution to the Battle of the Atlantic. Lay stated that he thought that considerable resistance would be met in the person of Admiral King and that it would be best to have the matter discussed at a conference on the international level. Although he did not suggest that the Admiralty's help should be solicited, he probably thought that the Royal Navy would support the proposal in a round table conference.

During the rest of December and January 1943, N.S.H.Q. developed their campaign at every opportunity. In this period the hottest action in the U-boat war was in the North-Western Atlantic which emphasized Canada's role and importance. Ammunition was provided for the campaign when Admiral Brodeur intercepted a signal from CTF 24 to COMINCH and C.in.C., W.A. that criticized the operational efficiency of Canadian escort groups.88 Then, without consulting N.S.H.Q., the Admiralty suggested to COMINCH that alterations be made in the type of ships in Canadian escort groups.89 Apparently this had been discussed unofficially at a conference in Ottawa on 20 November 1942, but at Admiral King's request there had been no official agenda. C.N.S. also received a reply from his letter to Admiral King. COMINCH reluctantly agreed to a conference sometime in the future although he thought an additional authority would only complicate the situation.90 Obviously King did not realize it was the Canadians' intention to remove CTF 24 from the scene.

While the situation fermented, Captain Lay worked on Canada's proposals to be tabled at the projected conference.91 He also visited C.O.A.C., who was now Admiral Murray, to sound out his views on the matter. Murray agreed with Lay that it was time for both C.O.A.C. and F.O.N.F. to be removed from U.S. Navy control. Murray's reasons were those of operational
efficiency. He had obviously long considered that CTF 24 was an unnecessary cog in the organization. Moreover, he objected at having to report to an authority that had yet to prove itself any better at A/S warfare than the Canadians.92

In early January Nelles acted quickly upon an incident of an unauthorized transfer of Canadian destroyers by CTF 24 between escort groups.93 C.N.S., by signal, chastised CTF 24 for not requesting N.S.H.Q.'s permission.94 CTF 24 replied he was only following the directions of the Admiralty and COMINCH and stated, "To maintain desired degree of flexibility it is expected that it will be necessary to make further similar changes from time to time without reference to other operational authorities."95 Nelles, of course, realized flexibility was essential but by asserting that only N.S.H.Q. could authorize transfers he wanted to gain purchase on Admiral King that would force the elimination of CTF 24 and replace him with a Royal Canadian Naval authority.96

CTF 24's action was the last bit of ammunition Nelles required, and he moved to the offensive by informing Admiral King that Canadian escorts could not be transferred between groups or commands without N.S.H.Q.'s authority.97 He followed this up with a letter outlining recent grievances and once again pressed for a conference to discuss command relationships.98 Then he wrote to Admirals Murray and Brodeur and Commodore Reid, F.O.N.F., asking for their official opinions on his letter to Admiral King. He also instructed the operational commanders that they were to continue to cooperate with CTF 24, but added "you are responsible only to N.S.H.Q. for the administration of these R.C.N. ships and no change is to be made in their dispositions without N.S.H.Q. concurrence."99 This effectively relieved Murray and Reid of the possibility of having to tilt with Brainard and ensured that the U.S. Navy would have to deal through Ottawa. Nelles had effectively added yet another authority in the play and caught a strong purchase on the U.S. Navy while remaining within the terms of ABC-1 and ABC-22.100 The spirit of those agreements, of course, had never been defined.

Admiral King may have found the altercation with N.S.H.Q. both irritating and tiresome for he left the reply to Nelles' signal and letter to his Chief of Staff, Admiral Edwards.101 Edwards politely asked Nelles to explain N.S.H.Q.'s policy regarding the transfer of destroyers and to outline Canada's objections to the present procedure.102 Nelles, spurred on by yet another attempt at an unauthorized transfer by CTF 24,103 indicated quite clearly that N.S.H.Q. had taken charge of all Royal Canadian Navy ships in the Western Atlantic and would decide in which command they would serve.104 Then C.N.S., hoping to imply that CTF 24 did not understand the operation of the escort cycle, asked the Admiralty to explain it to him.105 This was the first time the Admiralty had been brought into the picture and it was, obviously, to emphasize that the escort organization was really a function of the Commonwealth navies and that CTF 24 was a quite unnecessary authority.

By the end of January Nelles had received replies from his letters to Brodeur, Murray, and Reid. Murray was adamant that Canada should be given responsibility for the protection of sea communications in the North West Atlantic including the organization of both escorts and convoys.106 However, it was his opinion that "the broader Naval strategy must be left to the U.S. Navy because they have the potential force of the U.S. Battle fleet behind them."107 Brodeur's reply was premised on the statement that the U.S. Navy's policy had been for a long time to avoid consulting the Royal Canadian Navy.
representative on important matters affecting the two services. It stated that if the U.S. Navy dealt with him in the same way it did with the British Admiralty Delegation then it would have raised N.S.H.Q. to the same status as the Admiralty. Brodeur believed that the United States and Great Britain were trying to keep policy decisions within their own preserve and only a redefinition of the terms of ABC-1 and other agreements and operating instructions would correct this.

COMINCH Agrees. The point Nelles was trying to make finally came home to Admiral King. On 1 February he ordered CTF 24 not to conduct transfers of either Canadian or British ships between commands without N.S.H.Q.'s authority. King also wrote a letter of conciliatory nature to Nelles. He pointed out, quite correctly, that the issue could have been avoided had N.S.H.Q. raised objection to his initial message authorizing the transfers. Nelles' staff was guilty here and apparently had missed the signal. C.N.S. tried to explain that he did not raise an objection in order "to avoid confusing the issue at a time when it appeared essential to take immediate action to counter the U-boat threat." This was a lame excuse, for his obstructionist tactics during December and January caused the sort of confusion he said he was trying to avoid. However, no harm had been done and Nelles won his point inasmuch as Admiral King agreed to a firm date for a conference on command relationships. King made his intentions known to all concerned in a signal announcing "that at the request of N.S.H.Q." there would be a conference on 1 May 1943.

With concurrence having been wrested from Admiral King, N.S.H.Q. completed details on the Canadian proposals. It was thought that Canada's argument would be stronger if a Commander in Chief for the North Western Atlantic was created prior to the conference. Plans to make C.O.A.C. fit this title were drawn up, but they could not be put into effect in time. Also it was considered essential that all A/S aircraft, which included Canadian, British, and American forces, be brought under Admiral Murray's central control. By the third week in February, Canada's proposals had received the concurrence of the Naval Board.

The Atlantic Convoy Conference opened on 1 March 1943 in Washington as scheduled. Admiral Brodeur headed the Royal Canadian Navy's delegation which included Captains Lay, De Wolf, Brand, and Creery (C.O.S. to C.O.A.C.). Admiral King made an opening statement on behalf of the U.S. Navy that included a remark to the effect that he did not believe in mixed forces which implied that Canada would be given sole responsibility in the North West Atlantic. When King was finished he turned the conference over to Admiral Edwards and did not participate further in it. Admiral Noble, who had recently been appointed to head the British Admiralty Delegation, spoke on behalf of the Royal Navy. Then Admiral Brodeur made his opening statement, declaring that the main Canadian purpose in the conference is to clarify and improve the present complicated chain of Command in existence in the North West Atlantic. He remarked that he was sorry that the subject of operational control was not included in the proposed agenda and that he wanted it included. He then tabled Canada's three main proposals:

1. A North Atlantic area to be established and defined as the area north of 40°N. In this area control of convoys and A/S warfare to be exercised solely by British and Canadian authorities (except within U.S. sea frontiers).
2. The present C.O.A.C. to become Commander in Chief North West
Atlantic and to have general direction of all surface and air forces employed in A/S warfare in the North West Atlantic.

3. Control of convoys, U-boat information, diversion of convoys to be exercised by N.S.H.Q. and Commander-in-Chief North West Atlantic to be similar to that by Admiralty and C in C, W. A. in the North Atlantic.  

Brodeur stated that Canada's strong reasons for asking this were: her large contributions in escorts and escort aircraft and sea and airbases, her 3 years of experience in the very specialized field of A/S operations, and her large program of naval and air development from the beginning of the war. He concluded by intimating that if their proposals were not accepted then N.S.H.Q. would continue to force the issue. Here we see Brodeur's nationalism coming through strongly:

And finally I wish to impress this most important fact about Canada which appears to be little understood, that is, that all Canadian armed forces are under the control of one, only one, higher authority which is the Canadian Government and only by the latter's consent can any armed forces be moved from Canada or from one theatre of war to another and if all sub-committees of the Conference studying the present agenda will remember that important factor, a great deal of time will be saved and many misunderstandings avoided.  

On the completion of Admiral Brodeur's remarks, Admiral Edwards moved quickly to explain that owing to an administrative error the Canadian delegation had not received a revised agenda that had as its first item operational control of escorts in the North West Atlantic. The Conference broke up shortly thereafter into sub-committees to discuss specific subjects assigned to them from the agenda.

The discussions went very well for Canada in the Committee on Command Relationships. The Royal Canadian Navy's proposals were put forward by Captain Lay and the outcome was never really in doubt. On 6 March, Admiral Brodeur was able to report to C.N.S. that unanimous agreement had been reached on Canada's proposals. The committee, Brodeur said in his signal, would recommend that Canada be given control of all surface and air A/S escorts in the area west of 47°W and north of 40°N. In addition, the United Kingdom and Canada would control all convoys between the British Isles and North America, including those originating at New York. Brodeur said the committee was using the term "Commander in Chief, Canadian North West Atlantic" as the new title for C.O.A.C.  

Command Transfer Scheduled. The Conference concluded on 12 March and its recommendations were forwarded to the respective governments for approval. The proposed date for the transfer of command was set as 31 March. Captain Lay wrote to Captain Bidwell (C.O.S. to F.O.N.F.), "The R.C.N. got practically everything which they asked for at the conference, and from that point of view it was extremely satisfactory." Captain Lay had every reason to be satisfied for all the evidence indicates he was the originator and driving force behind N.S.H.Q.'s campaign. It was he who first pressed the matter on Nelles, and once C.N.S. had been persuaded it was then simply a matter of applying constant pressure on the U.S. Navy. Captain Lay drafted all Nelles' correspondence and messages to U.S. naval authorities on the matter and coordinated the drawing up of Canada's proposals within N.S.H.Q. Captain Lay based Canada's whole argument mainly on the Royal Canadian Navy's large contribution to the Battle of the...
Atlantic. He knew he could win on those grounds.  

Admiral Brodeur played an important part in the campaign for it was he who brought it to Nelless attention that Canada's voice was not being heard when naval matters were being discussed by Great Britain and the United States. Brodeur was not the type of person to be bypassed. He and Lay began to press Nelless almost simultaneously. Nelless was of officer who would support a good idea although he produced very few ideas of his own. He was a man of decision who, once committed to a course of action, would see it through to the end. In his contest with King he was like a bulldog and held on tenaciously until the American admiral gave in. With obvious satisfaction Nelless reported his success to the Cabinet War Committee stating, "This new arrangement would place a much heavier responsibility on the Canadian Navy. It was, however, regarded as a satisfactory solution to an important and difficult problem."  

The interesting feature of the results of the conference is that the Royal Canadian Navy had achieved what the Mackenzie King government could not do, that is to assert Canadian autonomy in the military sphere. Moreover, all the evidence points to the fact that the inspiration and motivation behind the campaign developed at the senior level of the officer corps. Throughout the campaign the minister of National Defence for Naval Services, Angus L. MacDonald, remained an interested observer but no more. He and Nelless kept the Cabinet War Committee informed of what had transpired but there is no evidence that suggests the Committee influenced the Naval Board in its course of action.  

While the concurrence of the governments was awaited on the recommendations resulting from the Atlantic Convoy Conference, preparations moved apace in Halifax to set up the new facilities that Admiral Murray would require to direct operations. The Royal Canadian Navy had all the experience required for the job but the facilities, particularly communications systems, were inadequate. The fact was that the change of command was to be effected before Halifax was materially ready to accept it. No mention of this was made outside of Canada as it would, quite obviously, have proved embarrassing after the vigorous and successful agitation to be given responsibility.  

It was decided that the new title for C.O.A.C. would be the Commander in Chief, Canadian North West Atlantic with the short title of C.in.C., C.N.A. Because of Admiral King's extreme reluctance to transfer control to the Royal Canadian Navy, the change of command did not take place until 30 April 1943. Shortly after the Atlantic Convoy Conference, Admiral King proposed that Admiral Murray be appointed as deputy to Admiral Brairnard to learn the ropes, so to speak, and then be suggested that Brairnard be left as permanent adviser to Murray. The latter proposal was passed through Admiral Brodeur who told Nelless he had the impression that, The U.S.N. felt if any serious thinking [sinkings?] took place while we were in command that the world would say [the] U.S.N. passed the command to Canada and took less risky area for [the] U.S.N. knowing heavy sinkings would occur and they certainly did not wish to give that impression in what takes place in the Northern North Atlantic.  

Nelless consulted Murray by teletype on King's two proposals. Murray said that he thought Nelless should turn King down politely by signal on both proposals and also should instruct Brodeur to intimate to the Americans that Canadian authorities are willing to
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accept responsibility for this heavier sinkings] and we could not possibly accuse the U.S. authorities of leaving us in the lurch through removal of their control, any more than we did at any time since they withdrew their escort forces thirteen months ago.135

Nelles replied to King that Murray could be appointed as deputy to Brainard but the latter’s services as an adviser would not be required and that Murray was prepared to take over command as of 31 March 1943.136 These replies were courteous but firm and clearly indicated the Royal Canadian Navy was ready and willing to take on the responsibility. Nelles did not include Murray’s suggestion that the withdrawal of American escort forces in early 1942 had left Canada in the lurch.

King answered Nelles’ signals by a personal letter which he said he hoped C.N.S. would take in the spirit in which it was written—“that of stark realism applied to a situation in which our only wish is to be helpful.”137 King said he viewed with satisfaction that U.S.-U.K. convoys in the North West Atlantic would now be handled by the Canadian Navy. “However, we consider it a fact that your people have as yet little opportunity to conduct the work involved on the scale required.”138 Then he suggested that Admiral Brainard be left in his post until 30 April so that the Canadians could avail themselves of his services and thereafter he could assume an advisory status. It appears that Admiral King was completely out of touch with the realities of the situation in the North West Atlantic and blatantly ignorant of the scope of the Royal Canadian Navy’s participation in escort work since September 1939.

Nelles transmitted King’s letter to Murray whose reaction could have been predicted. Murray suggested a reply on the premise that King had been “very blunt in his statement that they do not think we are capable of handling the job and it may be necessary to be blunt in return.”141 Murray pointed out the 3 1/2 years of experience of the Royal Canadian Navy as compared to the 1 year of the U.S. Navy in convoy escort work. Murray added it was he who taught Bristol, then Brainard, the system for convoy organization and escort protection; moreover, Brainard’s staff had nothing like the experience of his own either at sea or running the escort organization. Murray’s final point was that since the withdrawal of U.S. escort forces from the North Atlantic, the training, operation, administration, and tactics of escorts, with a few minor exceptions, had been under Royal Canadian Navy’s control with “nominal supervision” from CTF 24.138

Had Nelles been as blunt in his reply to King as Murray had suggested he there probably would have been serious repercussions. Nelles also sent a personal signal to the First Sea Lord outlining King’s suggestions and asking for Pound’s view.140 Pound agreed that the proposals resulting from the Atlantic Convoy Conference should be implemented as soon as possible.141 He suggested, not knowing the whole story, that the Americans were probably only trying to be helpful with their offer of Brainard’s services. He observed that “possibly acceptance of their offer would help the R.C.N.1’s future relations with the U.S.N.”142 Nelles decided to accept King’s proposal to leave Brainard in command until 30 April and informed King in a short signal to that effect. Accordingly, King set that date as being official for the change of command.143

If Admiral King had ever felt reluctant to part with command his feelings must have turned to pure chagrin when he received a letter that originated in the office of the Director of Naval Intelligence in N.S.H.Q. The subject of the letter was a news release which was to herald the change of command.145 The release greatness
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exaggerated the Canadian Navy's new responsibility and made no mention at all of U.S. Navy involvement. In fact the release gave the impression that the Americans had disappeared from the scene completely. The release had been sent to the U.S. Navy for approval and expressed an opinion that King wanted to suppress at all costs. He set down what he thought was wrong with the release in no uncertain terms and sent a detailed list of corrections to the Director of Naval Intelligence. Some amendments were made to the release by N.S.H.Q. and the story appeared in papers in Canada and Great Britain, but not the United States, on 1 May 1943.

Autonomy Achieved. On 18 April, Admiral Murray paid an official visit to Admiral Brainard and a formal "turnover" agreement was signed. C.InC., C.N.A.'s signal of acceptance of responsibility was sincere yet filled with meaning:

I accept the torch as from 1200Z April 30th and hope to carry it as successfully as it has been carried since Admiral Bristol received it from my hand in September, 1941. It has been a personal pleasure to serve under your direction and in cooperation with your staff whose excellent understanding of our problems has made our task a simple one.

The key words are "our task." The Royal Canadian Navy had never relinquished the role of the protection of shipping and the U.S. Navy never played more than a token role in the North Western theater of the Battle of the Atlantic. This is the meaning that is implicit in the signal. The Battle of the Atlantic was fought essentially by the British and Canadian navies and air forces although invaluable assistance was received from U.S. A/S aircraft, and "Hunter/Killer" groups during April and May 1943 when the battle was at its peak.

Conclusions. There are a number of conclusions that can be drawn from this study of command relationships between the Royal Canadian Navy and its British and American allies. First, it seems to confirm Clausewitz' suggestion that the pattern of relationships between large and small powers in wartime in regards to political influence is not so much a function of military strength as it is a reflection of the state of military tension within the war. In the early stages of World War II, Canada was willing to suppress national aspirations for the protection of the predominant British and American military force, and for the good of the alliance. It was only when the crisis began to fade that the Royal Canadian Navy was ready to press the more delicate question of command relationships and then it was made a contentious issue.

It can also be concluded that the interaction between the Royal Canadian Navy and the U.S. Navy during the Battle of the Atlantic established the present pattern of command relationships for the maritime defense of North America. Existing defense agreements allocate areas of operational responsibility to Canada. These areas

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Wilf Lund, a Canadian Navy submariner, holds degrees from the University of Victoria and Queen's University at Kingston. He passed the Royal Navy's COQC, "The Perisher," in 1976 and subsequently commanded HMCS ONONDAGA. He served on the staffs of CANCOMSUBRON ONE and COMSUBLANT prior to his appointment as student at the Naval Command College of the Naval War College. His next appointment will be to the staff of the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College at Toronto.
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adjoining the east and west coasts of Canada are of primary national interest and are under the control of the Commanders Maritime Forces Atlantic and Pacific respectively. These officers, however, are under the broad strategic direction of NATO or American authorities on matters of joint defense.

A very interesting facet of this study is that it shows that strong nationalist tendencies existed in the Royal Canadian Navy during the early 1940s. Although the navy reflected a minor image of the Royal Navy in dress, training, and ships, it had a distinctive Canadian personality. In 1942 this personality emerged when the navy came of age. It was ready to cut the apron strings and stand alone on the strength of its demonstrated ability on the field of battle and on its numbers. A strong national pride in the naval service and a dedication to ASW, which is a distinctively Canadian area of specialization, has prevailed to this day.

Possibly the most important conclusion that can be drawn from this study is that it was through its large commitment to ASW that Canada was able to gain some measure of control in the Battle of the Atlantic. No other small power enjoyed such a position. Today there is a strong submarine threat directed against North America from the same strategic area. It follows that if Canada desires to exert some influence in Washington on the direction of the maritime defense of this continent, the historical evidence suggests that the maintenance of a strong ASW force would be most advantageous.

NOTES

Files cited are normally Navy files of the Department of National Defence, Ottawa, deposited at the Directorate of History unless otherwise specified.

1. External Affairs to C.N.S., letter of 30/6/41. N.S.S. 1550-157/1.
3. Cabinet War Committee, Minutes, 17/5/40. (P.A.C., R.G. 2 7c, vol. 1.)
5. The Flag officer commanding Canadian naval forces based on Halifax.
7. See Prime Minister King's remarks in ibid.
8. H.M.S. "Athens" was torpedoed on 4 September 1939 with a loss of 128 lives including many women and children.
12. Cabinet War Committee, Minutes, 27/5/41.
14. This matter was dealt with at length by the Cabinet War Committee during May 1941. For resume see C.P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments (Ottawa: Queen's Printer for Canada, 1971), chap. IV. B. Germain was sent as a "camouflaged observer" for Canada with the British Mission.
15. ABC-1 was forwarded by Britain to the Dominions for comments.
17. See Cabinet War Committee, Minutes, 3/6/41 and especially the Prime Minister's comments.
19. Ibid., p. 1485 and Annex II. Canada was an "Associated Power" under the terms of ABC-1.
20. Cabinet War Committee, Minutes, 5/6/41 and 7/6/41.
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23. PDB 124 in P.J.B.D. Journal included in Cabinet War Committee, Documents. (P.A.C. appended to Minutes.)


25. Lay interview.

26. C.S.C. to Minister, memorandum of 24/5/41, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Minutes. Reply in Minister to C.G.S. in Minutes.

27. Ibid., C.S.C. to Ministers, memorandum of 28/5/41.

28. Cabinet War Committee, Minutes, 3/6/41 and 7/6/41.

29. As early as April 1941, U.S. ships were using St. John, New Brunswick, as a base in accordance with the terms of "The Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defence Plan" (Basic Plan-1) dated 10 October 1940. A copy of this plan is in the Army files in the Directorate of History. All provisions of Basic Plan-1 were embodied in an R.C.N. Operational Plan dated 17 December 1940 in N.S. 1078-13-2.

30. Naval Service Headquarters, History of North Atlantic Convoy Escort Organization and Canadian Participation Therein: September 1939 to April 1945 (August 1945) N.S. 1048-43-3. This manuscript was written by personnel in the Department of Plans. ABC-22 was included as paragraph 12B of WPI-51.


34. C. to C.C.N.F. signal 20/12/41. C.C.N.F. signal 20/12/41.


36. See Cabinet War Committee, Minutes, 9/10/41. The C.A.F. would not accept strategic control by COMINCH of its A/S aircraft based on Newfoundland although the R.C.N. would of its ships.


38. ABC-1, para. 1(b) and Annexes II and V.


41. C.C.N.F. to Naval Secretary, letter of 11/12/41. N.S. 1550-157/1. The Naval Secretary was the executive secretary of the Naval Council and then the Naval Board at N.S.H.Q.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid. See DOD's comments.

44. Naval Secretary to F.O.N.F., letter of 6/1/42. N.S. 1550-157/1. After the United States entered the war, F.O.N.F. and CTF 24 prepared a combined operational plan based on ABC-22 on the authority of the 22nd recommendation of the P.J.B.D. N.S. 1017-10-35. (P.A.C., R.G. 24, vol. 3844).

45. ABC-1, Annex II.

46. WPI-51.

47. Ibid., para. 12d and ABC-22, Annex I.


49. N.S.H.Q., History of Participation.

50. Ibid.

51. Commodore Murray found himself in the peculiar position of having to reach Admiral Bristol and his staff the method of control and protection of shipping and having to turn over his operational responsibilities to a foreign admiral whose country was providing no resources for the job in hand.


53. COMINCH to Admiral signal 2313Z/11/42. N.S. 1048-48-31.


55. Murray was promoted to Rear Admiral in December 1941, to put him on equal terms with Rear Admiral Bristol. Murray was now Flag Officer Newfoundland (F.O.N.F.).


57. The "air gap" was the term for an ocean outside the range of A/S aircraft flying from Canada and Iceland.

58. Lay interview.


60. Chiefs of Staff Committee, "Minutes," 20/6/42.

61. Admiral Brodeur's abbreviated title was N.M.C.S.

62. Lay interview. Admiral Lay explained that Admiral Brodeur had been the butt of jokes by the British through his difficulty with English.

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63. Admiral Brodeur was selected to be Naval Attaché, Washington, from a list of three officers put forward by C.N.S. to the Cabinet War Committee in August 1940. Brodeur had close connections in the Cabinet, in particular Ernest LaPointe. Throughout his tenure as Naval Attaché and then as N.M.C.S., he kept in regular contact with his political acquaintances. Interview with N.D. Brodeur on 16 May 1972.

64. See Brodeur’s remarks in reference 78 below.

65. C.J.S. to C.C.S., memorandum of 11/17/42. N.S.S. 1550-157/1. The memorandum reported on the Portal-Towers (U.K.-U.S.) agreement on long-range aircraft, which was reached without consulting the C.J.S.

66. N.M.C.S. to C.N.S. signal 1508Z/17/17/42. N.S.S. 1550-157/1.

67. Ibid.

68. Admiral Bristol died of a heart attack while duck hunting.

69. Murray interview.

70. CTF 24 to C.O.A.C. and F.O.N.F., letter of 21/9/42. N.S. 1017-10-35. (P.A.C., R.G. 24, vol. 3844.) Also CTF to COMINCH signal 0145Z/10/10/42. N.S.S. 1550-157/1.


72. N.C.S.O. Sydney to Brand, letter of 1/9/42. N.S. 8280B.

73. Lay interview.

74. Lay to Reid (F.O.N.F.), letter of 26/10/42. This is the first mention the author could find on the topic. However, the letter states that Lay had “been thinking for some time” about the question of command relationships.

75. N.M.C.S. to C.N.S. letter of 25/10/42. N.S.S. 1550-157/1.

76. Ibid.

77. The Americans were considerably more helpful than the British. In September 1942, Admiral Leahy appointed officers to effect liaison between JCS and C.J.S.

78. N.M.C.S. to C.N.S., letter of 6/11/42. N.S.S. 1550-157/1.

79. H/F/DF is the abbreviation for High Frequency Direction Finding.

80. B.N.H. (Washington) to N.S.H.Q. signal 2209Z/7/11/42.

81. B.N.H. to N.S.H.Q. signal 1900Z/19/11/42. N.S.S. 1550-157/1.

82. N.S.H.Q. to B.N.H. signal 2043Z/20/11/42. N.S.S. 1550-157/1.


84. Lay interview.

85. Nelles to King, letter of 1/12/42. N.S.S. 1550-157/1.

86. Ibid.

87. DOD to C.N.S., memorandum of 2/12/42. Lay papers.

88. N.M.C.S. to N.S.H.Q. signal 1621Z/22/12/42. N.S.S. 1550-157/1. N.S.H.Q. was not included in CTF 24’s message.


90. King to Nelles, letter of 12/12/42. N.S.S. 1550-157/1.

91. DOD to C.N.S., memorandum of 26/12/42 re projected conference. Lay papers.

92. DOD to C.N.S. and V.C.N.S., memorandum of 28/12/42 re Capt. Lay’s visit to C.O.A.C. N.S. 8280A.

93. CTF 24 to F.O.N.F. signal 2043Z/5/1/43 ordered the transfers of H.M.C.S. Leamington and Columbia. N.S.S. 1550-157/1.

94. N.S.H.Q. to CTF 24 signal 1644Z/7/1/43. N.S.S. 1550-157/1.

95. CTF 24 to N.S.H.Q. signal 2057Z/8/1/43. N.S.S. 1550-157/1.

96. Lay interview.

97. C.N.S. to COMINCH signal 1920Z/12/1/43. N.S.S. 1550-157/1.

98. Nelles to King, letter of 17/1/43. N.S.S. 1550-157/1.

99. Nelles to Brodeur, Murray, Reid, letters all of 19/1/43. N.S.S. 1550-157/1.

100. Authorities directly involved in the command structure numbered eight: COMINCH, QNC-CLANT, CTF 24, N.S.H.Q., C.O.A.C., F.O.N.F., USAF (N/A), and A.O.C., E.A.C.

101. All correspondence of this point has been of a personal nature between COMINCH and C.N.S.

King, however, was very busy directing a “two-ocean war” and might have directed Edwards to write Nelles so as not to delay the reply.

102. Edwards to Nelles, letter of 17/1/43. N.S.S. 1550-157/1.

103. CTF 24 to C.O.A.C. signal 1815Z/20/1/43. N.S.S. 1550-157/1.

104. Nelles to Edwards, letter of 21/1/43. N.S.S. 1550-157/1.

105. N.S.H.Q. to Admiralty signal 1645Z/22/1/43. N.S. 8280B.

106. Murray to Nelles, letter of 24/1/43. N.S.S. 1550-157/1.

107. Ibid.

108. N.M.C.S. to C.N.S., letter of 23/1/43. N.S.S. 1550-157/1.

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109. COMINCH to CTF 24 signal 233/1Z/2/43. N.S.S. 1550-1571/1.
110. King to Nelles, letter of 31/1/43. N.S.S. 1550-1571/1.
111. Nelles to King, letter of 6/2/43. N.S.S. 1550-1571/1.
112. COMINCH signal 201Z/2/2/43. N.S.S. 1550-1571/1.
113. Lay prepared various proposals during February including "Proposed Plan for Organization of Anti-Submarine Forces" (15/2/43) and "Commander-in-Chief N.W. Atlantic" (17/2/43). Lay papers.
114. Lay interview.
116. Noble avoided the issue of command relationships in his remarks. The Royal Navy did, however, work behind the scenes to influence the Canadian Navy's course smoothly.
Interview by author with Brand on 17 May 1972.
117. Atlantic Convoy Conference, Minutes, 1/3/43.
118. Ibid.
119. Ibid.
120. Broder's remark obviously upset Edwards and raised a few feathers in the U.S. Navy. Mears worked behind the scenes to smooth the rough water between the B.C.N. and U.S. Navy. Brand interview.
121. N.M.C.S. to C.N.S. signal 2003Z/6/3/43. N.S.S. 1550-1571/1.
122. Atlantic Convoy Conference, Minutes, "Report of the Sub-Committee of Command Relations."
123. Lay to Bidwell, letter of 19/3/43. Lay papers.
124. Lay interview.
126. Cabinet War Committee, Minutes, 11/3/43.
128. The problem of command relationships and the Nelless/King confrontation was discussed in the Cabinet War Committee although it may have been unofficially. Nelless announced to the Cabinet War Committee on 4/2/43 that there would be a conference on command relationships in Washington.
129. This is indicated by a series of messages during April 1943, between O.C.A.C. and N.S.H.Q. "Canadian North West Atlantic Command" 021 file in N.S.S. 1550-1571/1.
130. Admiralty to N.S.H.Q. signal 2153Z/8/4/43. N.S. 8280A.
131. COMINCH to C.N.S. signal 2123Z/12/3/43. N.S. 1048-48-31. This signal was amplified by N.M.C.S. to C.N.S. 1037Z/15/3/43. Murray papers.
132. Ibid. N.M.C.S. signal. It was at this time that Doenitz had just opened what proved to be his last offensive to smash the convoy system and reports of heavy losses caused alarm in Washington and elsewhere.
133. Murray to Nelless teltype 1508Z/14/3/43. Murray papers.
134. C.N.S. to COMINCH signals 170/2Z/14/3/43 and 2125Z/15/3/43. N.S. 1048-48-31.
135. King to Nelless, letter. A telecopied undated copy of this letter is in the Murray papers. It was obviously sent by C.N.S. to C.O.A.C. presumably on 15/3/43.
136. Ibid.
137. Murray to Nelless teltype undated. Murray papers. This was probably part of a telecopied conversation between C.N.S. and B.C.A.C. with both dictating directly to the operator. This material was considered very sensitive.
138. Ibid.
139. The agitation Murray showed in the reply he suggested be sent to King was quite uncharacteristic of him. King's slight at his professional ability obviously offended Murray deeply.
142. Ibid.
143. C.N.S. to COMINCH signal 1531Z/27/3/43. N.S. 1048-48-31.
144. COMINCH to C.N.S. and Admiralty signal 1251Z/30/3/43. N.S. 1048-48-31.
146. OPNAV to N.S.H.Q. signal 1537Z/24/4/43. N.S.S. 1550-1571/1.
Introduction. The American people first felt the effects of the energy crisis in 1973 when OPEC curtailed oil shipments to the United States and raised the price of a barrel of oil from $2.59 to $11.65. Federal price controls and allocation schemes were put into operation as a temporary measure, and President Ford called on the nation to embark on Project Independence.

In 1979, oil shipments were cut again, this time as a result of the political upheaval in Iran. Long gas lines and odd/even rationing reappeared. Federal controls were still in place. President Carter once again called on the nation to move toward independence.

The total petroleum product supplied to the United States in 1973 was 17.3 million barrels per day of which 6.3 million barrels per day were imported. During 1974 and 1975, imports fell slightly such that U.S. dependence on imported petroleum held at about 37 percent. However, by 1976 imports were again on the rise. In 1978 they reached 8.2 million barrels per day or 44 percent of the daily supply of 18.8 million barrels.

The 7-year long debate over a national energy policy has appeared confused and even chaotic at times. There have been the perennial hunts for scapegoats, an illusive search for quick solutions, and cries for massive government intervention and crash programs reminiscent of the 1960s. Even the very existence of an energy crisis has been questioned. Finally, throughout, there has been an overall sense of national frustration.

It is time that the nation turn back to basics. There are four major factors that must be considered:
- National Security
- Efficiency
- Equity
- Environment

A fundamental shift in the balance among these four factors is required in order to establish a comprehensive energy policy. This shift is occurring, though very slowly. It affects the essence of American values and institutions and that partly explains why the debate has been so long and tortuous. Each of the four factors will be considered in turn.

National Security. The energy shortage is a major threat to the national security of the United States and its allies, and yet, its effect on national security policy and military forces is just beginning to be felt. This is
because of competing influences as well as the long time required from the perception of a threat to the development of a national security policy and the forces to carry out that policy.

President Johnson’s attempt to build simultaneously “The Great Society” and fight the Vietnam war had several serious consequences for national defense that are still being felt today. First, it created expectations for social programs and a corresponding growth in government agencies and budgets. Second, it caused inflation with which every President since has unsuccessfully attempted to deal by holding down government expenditures. These, coupled with antidefense feelings and sense of isolationism after Vietnam, have made defense expenditures the obvious targets for budget cuts.

Initially, defense budget cuts were achieved by reducing active forces from wartime to peacetime levels, realigning support functions and the base structure, and retiring obsolete equipment. The latter was done with full expectation that such equipment would be replaced quickly once inflation was under control. However, by the mid-1970s it was quite clear that the war on inflation had not been won. In addition, the Department of Defense also was experiencing rising costs for both manpower and weapons. Thus, the modernization of the nation’s military forces continued to be postponed.

In contrast, Soviet military expenditures have exceeded those of the United States by an increasing margin since 1971. Although cumulative defense expenditures for the period 1967-1977 were about equal for both countries, the trends of these expenditures were in opposite directions. U.S. outlays declined in real terms while Soviet expenditures averaged a 3 percent growth per year. By 1977 Soviet expenditures exceeded those of the United States by 40 percent when measured in dollars and 25 percent when measured in rubles. This buildup was first rationalized as a need on the part of the Soviets to achieve parity. More recently, policymakers have begun to view these expenditures as exceeding any rational need for self-defense.

Upon taking office, the Carter administration was faced with military forces inadequate to deal with the three defense planning cases: strategic nuclear forces required modernization in all three legs of the triad; general-purpose and tactical nuclear forces for NATO were significantly outnumbered; and forces for the “1½” war suffered from a lack of attention. The Administration’s policy, as articulated early on in Presidential Review Memorandum 10, was to give funding priority to the first two areas. This left little for “other” contingencies, even with the projected 3 percent real growth for defense. This has had its greatest effect on modernization plans for the Navy and Marine Corps. It has taken the holding of hostages in Tehran to push the rapid deployment force beyond the conceptual stage.

In order to maintain a secure source of energy, the United States has relied more on means other than a military presence. The United States has attempted to negotiate peace in the Middle East, has depended on Saudi Arabia with its vast oil reserves to provide pricing discipline over OPEC and, through arms sales, has sought to provide a regional security for the oilfields. Arms sales have had the advantage that energy dollars were at least being recycled through the U.S. economy while also providing security forces for the source of supply.

The events of 1979 clearly have changed the nature of the threat. The breakdown of relations between the United States and Iran means more than troublesome price rises or minor temporary shortages. The United
States should not narrowly view this situation just in terms of the 700,000 barrels per day that the United States no longer imports from Iran or the 3.5 million barrels per day that her allies still rely on from Iran. The more important aspect is the increased political and military instability that has resulted.

Iranian military forces, which at one time could be viewed as a source of security for the oilfields and an added deterrent to Soviet adventurism, are now neutralized at best, and potentially, an added source of concern. At a minimum, there is a major shift in the balance of military power in the region which the Soviet Union could use to its advantage. The Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan adds weight to that shift. Politically the region is now much more unstable than before. The real possibility exists for this political instability to spread over a much larger portion of the oil supply. While the United States does not depend entirely on oil from the Middle East and Persian Gulf, its NATO allies and Japan approach total reliance on these sources. The solidarity and commitment of the NATO alliance will be tested further throughout the 1980s.

Thus, significant pressures are mounting for the United States to provide a greater military presence in the region. Unfortunately, the modernization of strategic nuclear and NATO forces is far from complete and the initial need for this effort has not changed. The old strategy of postponing force planning for “other” contingencies while strategic nuclear and NATO forces are modernized no longer applies. Pressure will continue to mount for an increase in the defense budget beyond the 3 percent increase earmarked for NATO.

At the same time, military forces cannot do it all. There is a real need for the United States to reduce its dependence on foreign oil. This will involve significantly higher energy costs to the nation. The United States in the 1980s will have to fund simultaneously a higher defense budget and the transition to an alternative energy base. There is the real danger that these two needs will be viewed in competition, with one being traded for the other.

Efficiency and Equity. The national debate on energy policy has focused more on issues of efficiency (cost) and equity (who pays). This has involved a thorough and often intense reexamination of the basic economic roles of government, especially the extent to which the government should intervene in the free market.

The U.S. economic system relies on the concept of a free and competitive market. The laws of supply and demand are allowed to operate with prices moving freely in order to bring supply and demand into balance. It is generally agreed that the government will not intervene in the market unless the market deviates significantly from the competitive case such as when there is a monopoly. A monopoly will produce less output, charge a higher price, and earn a larger profit than would occur if an industry were competitive.

The classic means for a government to intervene in the face of a monopoly are antitrust laws and regulation of the industry. Antitrust laws are used to prevent monopolies from coming into existence or to break them up when they do occur. Regulation is used when it makes sense for society to allow a monopoly to exist. This is the rather rare case when a single large firm has significantly lower costs owing to economies of scale. Such claims are made for electric, gas, and telephone utilities because of the high cost of duplicating their distribution systems. Regulation is performed mainly by the government setting the pricing structure for the utility and monitoring...
the quantity and quality of output. If done correctly, prices and profits are lowered, and output is increased, closer to competitive levels.

Unfortunately these classic methods do not apply to the current situation. The simple reason for this is that there does not exist an international body with the legal jurisdiction and power to apply these tools to the OPEC cartel. Initial U.S. reaction to OPEC has emphasized what appeared to be possible; price controls were instituted to hold down the price of oil. However, price ceilings could be imposed only on domestic supplies of oil and gas. While this held down the average price paid by U.S. consumers, it had the unintentional effect of further subsidizing OPEC's monopoly profits by allowing OPEC to charge even higher prices.

Without access to the classic means of controlling a monopoly, consuming nations have only one major defense left. They can only attempt to reduce their demand for imported oil. In the free market system this means that the price of oil and gas must be allowed to rise. This provides the appropriate incentives for conservation and development of alternative sources of supply, both of which are needed to reduce oil imports. It also means that the cost of energy to the nation must inevitably rise. Price ceilings are in direct conflict with this long-term trend.

A case can be made for the temporary imposition of price controls based on equity arguments. This formed a major part of the initial justification for price controls in 1973. It is argued that the consumer's demand for oil is relatively insensitive to price rises in the short run. The same is also claimed to be true for the supply of domestic oil and alternative forms of energy. Thus, allowing the price to rise rapidly would impose severe costs to the consumer, transfer wealth from the consumer to domestic suppliers of oil and gas, and would not significantly reduce the nation's dependence on foreign oil.

Price ceilings are not, however, without their side effects. They have long been recognized as a quick way to instant shortages. Prices held artificially low cause demand to exceed supply. When price is not allowed to allocate the limited supply, some other form of allocation is necessary such as first-come first-served, government imposed rationing schemes, and black markets. Low prices also give a false sense of security. Thus, U.S. consumers have gone through periods when they even questioned the existence of an energy crisis. It took a repeat in 1979 of the long gas lines to remind the nation that availability is also crucial. The nation was paying a hidden but very high price in terms of disruption to the economy.

The decade of the 1970s provides a clear example of what can go wrong with temporary price controls; once installed they are difficult to remove. The deregulation of natural gas, which formed a major part of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, is a prime example. Prior to the act, interstate gas was controlled while intrastate gas was not. This meant that over time the interstate pipelines began to have shortages while a virtual glut occurred within the producing states. These imbalances culminated in the natural gas shortages of 1977 with their disruption to industry.

Although natural gas is now on its way to decontrol, it is clear that this will be a long process. In order to decontrol prices, 17 different categories of natural gas were created, each with its own decontrol schedule. While interstate prices now are allowed to rise slowly, price controls were imposed on intrastate natural gas to avoid an imbalance between the two systems. To some this appears to be a step backward. The law has been described
as confusing, an administrative burden, and extremely slow in implementing decontrol. It is estimated by the Department of Energy that 60 percent of natural gas sales will still be under some form of price control by 1987.

Another major difficulty is that the nation has been caught up in a continuous debate over equity issues. The long congressional debates over the specific form of gasoline rationing to be used in a time of national emergency is one example. Another is the decontrol of oil prices, which has been linked specifically to a “windfall profits” tax. This debate has focused primarily on the transfer of wealth that would occur from consumers to U.S. oil producers when prices are decontrolled. With such large prizes at stake, the intensity of the debate has been understandable. A second aspect of this issue has been whether the oil companies or the government would better channel these profits to the development of alternative sources of energy. Time will tell whether more or less will go to the solving of energy problems as these new “windfall revenues” are recycled through the government.

While the nation has concentrated its attention on equity issues the process of efficiently moving to an alternative energy base has been stalled. Price controls and government allocations are administered through a bureaucratic process that never can be responsive to the dynamic changes of the marketplace. As shortages and inequities inevitably occur, there is a tendency for the bureaucracy to make more and more detailed allocation decisions. This draws the government away from broad policy guidance into the details of the marketplace, where it is least competent to operate. Finally, the uncertainty and risks created by government intervention reinforce a “wait and see” strategy for both consumers and producers. Tax credits for solar equipment were delayed 18 months after they were proposed while Congress worked out the details of the National Energy Act of 1977. This affected the upward sales trend of the solar energy industry as consumers waited to see if the proposals became law.

As the nation enters the 1980s, it is important that greater reliance be placed on the efficiency of the marketplace. Although the decontrol process is slow, it is a major and positive step in the right direction. Equity issues should no longer dominate the debate. There are risks, however, that as the costs of energy increase, a renewed concern over who pays will arise. It is extremely important that the pricing system not be used to resolve these equity issues. The government should use instead the more effective and traditional methods of resolving equity issues based on taxes and transfer payments. As an example, social security and welfare payments can be used to channel assistance to the specific groups most affected and least capable of adjusting to higher energy costs.

Environment. The final factor that must be considered is the environment. It is here that a basic economic rationale exists for government intervention. Economists have long recognized that a breakdown in the free market system occurs when the price of an economic activity does not reflect its total costs to society. Activities that affect the environment give rise to this situation. An example is a power plant that is considering using coal instead of oil for its boiler. As viewed by the plant, the total costs of each alternative would include the costs of the fuel, boiler modification, and maintenance. However, the firm would not consider the pollution costs imposed on its neighbors as it does not incur these costs. Such costs are called external or spillover costs.
THE QUESTION OF DEPLOYING U.S. THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE

by

Lawrence J. Korb*

Although the SALT II agreement was presented to the Senate in 1979, strategic nuclear weapons were not the only nuclear weapons receiving attention during the past year. In fact, there was at least equal time given to the subject of deploying about 600 American-made long-range Theater Nuclear Forces (TNF) or weapons on the European continent. Indeed, many people contended that the TNF issue was more critical than SALT II. As one analyst noted: "At stake are not merely a few hundred extra missiles in Europe...the outcome is going to dramatically affect both the security of the West and the entire future of relations with the Soviet Union."

The issue of stationing long-range American theater nuclear weapons on European soil is not a new one. During the late 1950s, American intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM), Thor and Jupiter, were emplaced in Britain, Turkey, and Italy with the consent of their governments. These weapons had sufficient range to cover many major targets in the Soviet Union. But by the mid-1960s, when the U.S.S.R. was fully targeted by the U.S. strategic triad, those weapons were considered superfluous and withdrawn.

However, it is important to note that even though, since the mid-1960s, no long-range American theater nuclear weapons remained deployed in Europe, the United States has maintained there a stockpile of approximately 7,000 nuclear warheads that could be fired from about 1,000 ground launchers. As indicated in Table 1, these are basically low-yield, short-range weapons, useful only on the battlefield. The Pershing I missile with a range of up to 400 miles and a yield of up to 400 KT is the most capable system. However, the vast majority of the delivery systems have ranges below 10 miles while most of the weapons possess sub-KT yields. In addition, this force was augmented by some 400 nuclear-capable F-4 tactical aircraft deployed to Europe, and A6 and A7s onboard the two aircraft carriers operating in the Mediterranean; 150 P-111s stationed in England and 400 Poseidon warheads assigned to SACEUR for use against Warsaw Pact military installations. Finally, the British had their own force of 56 Vulcan bombers and 4 Polaris submarines with 64 nuclear missiles.

Up through 1977 it was considered that the battlefield nuclear weapons, augmented by the American and British aircraft and submarines, which had the capability to strike some parts of the U.S.S.R., were enough to provide a precarious balance against the tactical nuclear threat posed to Europe by the Warsaw Pact.

As indicated in Table 2, Warsaw Pact ground-launched nuclear systems, up through the mid-1970s, consisted of some 1,500 battlefield weapons with ranges of up to 500 miles and yields of up to 100 KT, and some 600 fixed site SS-4 and SS-5 intermediate-range missiles, that is, theater nuclear weapons, with ranges that exceeded 2,000 miles and yields in the megaronnage range. Like the NATO forces, these ground-launched nuclear systems were augmented by about 750

*Professor of Management, Naval War College
bombers with ranges of up to 400 miles and approximately 1,000 nuclear-armed tactical aircraft with ranges of up to 2,500 miles. What changed the situation in 1977 was the introduction of two new advanced weapon systems, the SS-20 IRBM system and the Backfire bomber. The SS-20 has a range of 4,800 miles, carries three 150 KT weapons, is highly accurate, mobile, and reloadable. It is thus capable of destroying military and civilian targets anywhere in Europe from its staging areas in the Soviet Union and is practically invulnerable to counterattacks by NATO forces. The TU-26 Backfire bomber has a range of 5,500 miles and a top speed of MACH 2.5 and can carry 20,000 lbs. of air-to-surface missiles or free fall bombs. In the view of many European leaders, the introduction of these two systems, coupled with the conventional imbalance in Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and the loss of strategic superiority by the United States created a dangerously destabilizing situation for Western Europe. (The present conventional balance is displayed in Table 3.)

The first European leader to voice his concern publicly about this situation was Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of West Germany. In a lecture delivered in London on 28 October 1977, the West German leader said,

SALT...neutralizes their (Soviet and U.S.) strategic nuclear capabilities. In Europe this magnifies the significance of the disparities between East and West in nuclear tactical and conventional weapons... We must maintain the balance of the full range of deterrence strategy. The alliance must, therefore, be ready to make available the means to support its present strategy... and to prevent any development that could undermine the basis of this strategy. Although cloaked in diplomatic niceties, it was clear that the Chancellor was calling for an increase in Europe’s theater nuclear capabilities. In addition Schmidt was also trying to lay the groundwork for eventually including these weapons in the SALT process.

The Schmidt speech galvanized the Carter administration into action. In June 1978, the President issued Presidential Research Memorandum (PRM) 38 to study the issue. As a result of this study, a Presidential Decision (PD) on the subject was issued in the late spring of 1979. The PD concluded that the United States would produce two new intermediate-range missiles for deployment in Europe.® They would be the Tomahawk ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) and the Pershing II extended-range ballistic missile. The Tomahawk is a small, highly accurate, subsonic weapon with a range of 1,500 miles and a unit cost of $2.6 million. Although it is normally deployed in a hardened shelter, it can be moved around and fired from almost any field. The Pershing II is a supersonic, highly accurate, mobile weapon system with a range of 1,000 miles and a unit cost of about $15 million.

In the fall of 1978 the United States then asked the NATO nations to establish an ad hoc High Level Planning Group to consider the issue. This group, which was composed of civilian and military officials from each NATO nation, was tasked with developing a plan that all parties could agree on before it went to individual governments for approval, thus avoiding a repetition of the “neutron bomb” fiasco.® In October 1979, the group approved a plan to deploy 572 theater nuclear weapons in Europe. Of these, 108 would be Pershing IIs, while the remaining 464 would be GLCMs. The 108 Pershings would all be deployed in West Germany. This would place all of Western Russia up to the Ukrainian city of Kiev within then
1,000 nautical mile range. The GLCMs will be deployed to several countries: 160 will be placed in Britain, 112 in Italy, 96 in West Germany and 48 each in Belgium and Holland. On 12 December 1979 the Foreign and Defense Ministers approved the plan with one exception—the Dutch will not decide whether to accept or reject the proposed stationing of 48 GLCMs until December 1981. The decision of the Netherlands will depend upon progress in arms control negotiations with the U.S.S.R.6

The NATO decision means that the United States can begin deploying these weapons to Europe by 1983, and have complete deployment of all 572 weapons by 1988. The total cost of developing, procuring, and installing these systems will be $6 billion. The United States will contribute about $5.7 billion while the allies will contribute the remaining $300 million. As with all U.S. nuclear weapons assigned to NATO, these weapons will remain in the positive control of the United States, that is, they cannot be fired without the permission of the President of the United States.

Despite the approval of the NATO ministers, several arguments have been advanced against deploying these weapons in Europe. Opponents to long-range TNF usually cite six factors to support their position.7 First, the strategic rationale for the weapons rests on a very thin thread of logic. If theater nuclear warheads placed in Europe, but controlled by the United States, explode inside the U.S.S.R., the Soviets would consider it a strategic attack by the United States and launch a counterattack against the United States. Second, deployment of the SS-20 represents nothing fundamentally new. While it is a more refined weapon than the SS-4 and SS-5, the SS-20 does not change the fact that Europe has been a general target for Soviet missiles for over two decades. In fact, emplacing TNF will make Europe more of a target. Third, strategic parity between the United States and the U.S.S.R. existed long before 1977. According to McGeorge Bundy, the assistant for national security affairs to President Kennedy, both Kennedy and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara recognized that in practice strategic parity existed from the early 1960s, that is, since that time neither side could hope to get a first strike capability.8 Fourth, if the United States refuses to retaliate with its ICBMs against an SS-20 attack on Europe, the British and French could employ their own several hundred nuclear weapons on submarines, aircraft, and IRBMs against the Soviets. Fifth, the 400 Polaris warheads and more than 1,000 nuclear bombs on U.S. aircraft in or near Europe are sufficient to deter attacks by TNF of the U.S.S.R. Sixth, placing the Tomahawk and Pershing on European soil would signal a new level in the arms war between the superpowers. As evidence of this contention, many point to the speech of Soviet President Brezhnev on 6 October 1979. In this speech the Soviet leader warned that European acceptance of TNF would change the strategic situation on the continent and would undermine future arms control negotiations. Brezhnev accompanied his warning with an offer to withdraw 20,000 Soviet troops and several hundred tanks from East Germany and to discuss the possibilities of limiting TNF.9 About 6 weeks later, on 23 November 1979, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko said that stationing the new weapons in Europe would violate SALT II, destroy future arms control negotiations, and start a new spiral in the arms race.10

Proponents of TNF in Europe essentially embrace the rationale put forward by Chancellor Schmidt in October 1977.11 NATO forces must have the capability to deter war at all levels—from the conventional to the
strategic nuclear, linked by TNF. Simultaneously, these forces must be prepared to defend or fight at all levels if deterrence fails. The imbalance in long-range TNF that has existed since the mid-1970s adversely affects both deterrence and defense. Moreover, without the 572 Pershings and GLCMs, the gap will grow wider. As indicated in Table 4, at the present time the Soviets have 900 delivery vehicles deployed within striking range of Western Europe, while the West has only 226 systems capable of reaching the Soviet Union. (Included among the Soviet total are 60 SS-20s and 40 Backfire bombers.) This gives them a 4 to 1 advantage over the NATO nations in warheads and a 3 to 1 lead in EMT. By the middle of the decade, the Soviets will increase the number of delivery vehicles to 1,300 by adding another 250 SS-20s and 100 Backfires. Even with the tactical deployment of Pershing II and Tomahawk, the comparative Soviet advantage in warheads and EMT will increase while the Soviets will gain a 2:1 advantage in hard target kill capability. A decade from now, if all the 572 TNFs are in place, the situation will remain similar to 1985 because the American TNFs will be offset by another 250 SS-20s and Backfires. Without the Pershing and GLCM, the Soviets would have an overwhelming advantage.

Possession of such an advantage could lead the Soviets to believe that they have a sanctuary. They might assume that if they attack Western Europe with their own TNF, the West could respond only by unleashing its strategic nuclear forces and therefore would not respond. Such a belief could be destabilizing.

Proponents of TNF disagree with the Soviet contention that placing Pershing and GLCM will escalate the arms race and undermine future arms control. They point out that the Soviets acted first and that the last thing we need to do is to let the Soviets decide what weapons we deploy in order to deter the threat the Russians created. Moreover, history has shown that negotiations with the Soviets always are more successful when one negotiates from a position of strength. If NATO has not decided to go forward with TNF what would there be to negotiate? Finally, the Soviets unleashed the same propaganda barrage in 1957 when the alliance was considering placing Jupiter and Thor missiles in Europe and in 1977 when the allies were considering giving the neutron bomb (enhanced radiation weapon) to its forces.

Consideration both sides of the issue, the decision of the NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers seems prudent. As indicated in Table 3, the NATO nations have allowed the Soviets substantial advantages in conventional forces. At the present time, the Warsaw Pact has 155,000 or 13 percent more ground troops; 16,200 or 147 percent more tanks; 2,495 or 76 percent more tactical aircraft; and 7,800 or 126 percent more artillery pieces. In an era of strategic parity, or as some have argued Soviet superiority, it would not seem wise to allow the Soviets an overwhelming advantage in TNF as well. Moreover, if the Soviets should agree to meaningful arms negotiations on TNF or MBFR, Pershing and GLCM deployment on the European continent can be slowed or cancelled.
NOTES

2. For a complete analysis of these forces see Justin Golen, "Can NATO Meet Its Toughest Test? Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces for the 1980's," Armed Forces Journal, November 1979, p. 52.
5. In early 1980 the Pentagon launched a new study on the neutron bomb. The study was ordered by Secretary Brown after Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) argued that the Soviets had not shown the restraint demanded by President Carter when he deferred production in 1978.
7. These are summarized succinctly by Kaplan, pp. 50-51. See also Leonard Downie, "Denmark Reevaluating Commitments to NATO Defense," Washington Post, 5 November 1979, p. 20.
11. For an excellent summary of the reasons for TNH, see the interview with Bernard Rogers in U.S. News & World Report, 17 December 1979, p. 53.

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### TABLE 1—U.S. BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR SYSTEMS
*(GROUND-LAUNCHED) IN 1977*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Code Name</th>
<th>Number Deployed</th>
<th>Warhead</th>
<th>Range (Miles)</th>
<th>Guidance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Short-range ballistic</td>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>low KT</td>
<td>2-80</td>
<td>inertial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>missile</td>
<td>Lance</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1-100 KT</td>
<td>2-70</td>
<td>inertial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pershing 1</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>60-400 KT</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>inertial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honest John</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>20 KT or less</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>M-110 203mm</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>low-or sub-KT</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-109 155mm</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>low-or sub-KT</td>
<td>018</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Variable yield warheads are available.


### TABLE 2—SOVIET-WARSAW PACT THEATER NUCLEAR SYSTEMS
*(GROUND- LAUNCHED) IN THE MID-1970’s*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Code Name</th>
<th>Number Deployed</th>
<th>Warhead</th>
<th>Range (Miles)</th>
<th>Guidance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Short-range battlefield</td>
<td>FROG-2-7</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>low-KT nuclear, HE or chemical</td>
<td>4-40</td>
<td>unguided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>missile</td>
<td>Scud-A</td>
<td></td>
<td>low-yield nuclear, possibly sub-KT of HE nuclear, 40-100 KT</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>radio command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short-range ballistic</td>
<td>Scud-B</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>nuclear high-KT variable yield or HE nuclear high-KT</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>simplified inertial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>missile</td>
<td>Scaleboard</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>500</td>
<td>inertial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium-range ballistic</td>
<td>Shaddock</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td>300</td>
<td>simplified inertial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>missile</td>
<td>M/IRBM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-range cruise missile</td>
<td>Sandal (SS-4)</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>nuclear MT</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>inertial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Skear (SS-5)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>nuclear MT</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>inertial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>M-55 203 mm</td>
<td>probably 150</td>
<td>low KT</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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### TABLE 3—BALANCE OF FORCES IN EUROPE IN 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>NATO</th>
<th>Warsaw Pact</th>
<th>Warsaw Pact Advantage AMT</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ground Troop</td>
<td>1,176,000</td>
<td>1,331,000</td>
<td>155,000</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>27,200</td>
<td>16,200</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical</td>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>5,795</td>
<td>2,495</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>6,200</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>7,800</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### TABLE 4—LONG RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR BALANCE FY 1980-90

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1990</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles A</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivery</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>2100</td>
<td>775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warheads</td>
<td>3:1</td>
<td>3:1</td>
<td>4:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMT</td>
<td>1:4</td>
<td>4:1</td>
<td>4:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard Target</td>
<td>1:2</td>
<td>2:1</td>
<td>1:2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kill Potential</td>
<td>1:1</td>
<td>1:1</td>
<td>1:1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes only land-based missiles and aircraft based in Europe.*


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THE BAROMETER

Editor
Naval War College Review
Newport, RI 02840

In the 3 April 1980 issue of Christian Science Monitor I wrote the following:

"One must omit much to get on with something."
—Alfred North Whitehead

* * *

The United States' plan to deploy 200 mobile thermonuclear missiles, each on a special railroad track with 23 hardened shelters covering about 20,000 square miles in Utah and Nevada, is estimated to cost at least 30 billion dollars.

They are designed not to make a preemptive first strike at the Soviet weapons sites, bases, industry or cities but rather to provide the capability to conduct what is known as controlled counterforce nuclear war against Soviet missile sites.

The purpose is to pose such a large number of possible targets for Soviet missiles that the probability of disarming the United States by a "first strike" counterforce missile attack would be so low that the Soviets would have little incentive to attack.

This program is part of the policy of nuclear deterrence and as such its merits and demerits are usually argued in language and logic so esoteric and so speculative that informed, honest, and patriotic men can reach and plausibly support, opposite conclusions. Each makes a personal, intuitive and unquantifiable evaluation of the inherent critical risks. Therefore, we must cut through the confusion of argument to reach the critical issues. These are:

1. What is the nature of national security?
2. Is counterforce nuclear action a valid concept to insure such security?
3. What is the special nature of command decision and control in nuclear action?

Other issues, such as the cost effectiveness of the system, its effect on inflation and on the environment and the feeling that the system is the child of bureaucratic politics rather than sound strategic analysis, while pertinent, are not decisive.

NATIONAL SECURITY: National security is both the security of the state itself as a sovereign political entity and the security of the institutions of the nation. These institutions grow out of and protect the values of the people of the nation. Thus, National Security should be seen as:

EXTERNAL SECURITY: national political sovereignty, territorial integrity, and access to economic resources.

INTERNAL SECURITY: economic sufficiency, freedom of enterprise, of expression, of elections, and of the judiciary.

Each category of security and of freedom has its own constituency of special interest which is in continuing competition with other interests for economic and political preference and power. Because resources are always limited, this complex competition makes it impossible to formulate and carry out a no risk national security policy. There is no way in which the risks can be calculated scientifically. Instead, risk evaluation is a matter of intuitive, political, economic, and military judgment.

FUNDAMENTALS OF NUCLEAR ACTION

In conventional war, a major command error can be overcome by extraordinary effort by that command itself or in another area of the field of action.

Nuclear weapons are so swift and so destructive that their use leaves no room for error in the Commander-in-Chief’s decision process or the operation of the command and control system.

Time and timing are critical: time available to make the decision, time required to carry out the decision, timing of the various phases of the action, particularly the time required to change targets in response to unanticipated developments.

In nuclear warfare, mistakes are irretrievable. Thus, nuclear weapons command and control is a system of absolutes. Once the weapon is loose, the decision cannot be reversed.

The weak link in this vital system is the sense of moral responsibility for making the critical decision to initiate the use of nuclear weapons. This cannot be resolved by scientific analysis. It is the ultimate expression of one’s deepest sense of human values. It must be made in a few critical minutes during which the Commander-in-Chief comes to the shocking recognition that right now, he must decide the life or death of tens of millions of his fellowmen.
108 **NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW**

Any decision to use a nuclear weapon would require the imposition of authoritative control over most of the normal activities of the nation to prepare for the vast physical destruction and social, economic, and political disruption which certainly would follow even a limited nuclear exchange.

Even the imminent threat of such exchange can create panic. No one can foresee the consequences of the news that the President has gone to a sheltered command post while two hundred million of his people are exposed to extinction.

**CONCLUSIONS**

The situation today is:

Repeated studies show that even a relatively small nuclear exchange would produce catastrophic long-range harm as well as immediate damage and casualties.

There is no effective civil defense in the U.S.A. nor is there any evidence that one will be adequately funded and competently managed.

The concept of counterforce nuclear warfare as a means to assure national security is being challenged. Recent events have shown the fallibility of the Presidential decision process. The reliability of the operation of the command and control system under stress is seriously questioned. The cumulative effect of these and of the secondary issues is to diminish rather than enhance both the external and internal elements of national security.

The nature and degree to which the MX system would influence Soviet action is purely conjectural. The present situation with both "strategic" and "theater" weapons is complex and dangerous enough, without spending enormous resources on a project which will further complicate the situation without any assurance of accomplishing its supposed objective.

Therefore, we should abandon the MX missile system program, continue to depend on the present general system of nuclear weaponry to provide deterrence against nuclear attack, make every effort to reduce nuclear weaponry, and accept an acknowledged risk in so doing.

/s/Henry E. Eccles

HENRY E. ECCLES  
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

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NINTH MILITARY HISTORY SYMPOSIUM

1-3 October 1980


Noted scholars taking part in the proceedings include: Akira Iriye, Roger Dingman, Norman Graebner, John Gates, Ron Spector, D. Clayton James, Frank Kierman, C.l. Eugene Kim, Alvin Cox, Theodore Ropp, and from Japan, Sadao Asada and Ikuhiko Hata. Also, several individuals who have both first-hand military experience in the Far East and scholarly credentials, to include General Richard Stilwell, USA (Ret); Captain Paul Schratz, USN (Ret); Colonel Roy Flint, USA; and Colonel John Schlicht, USAF, will deliver papers or comment.

Other noted scholars participating include Frank Vandiver, Philip Crowl, Samuel Wells, Alan Millett, Stanley Falk, William Whitson, and Brigadier General E.H. Simmons, USMC (Ret).

For further information about the symposium write Major Harry R. Borowski, Department of History, USAF Academy, CO 80840.
ADVANCED RESEARCH PROGRAM—MILITARY HISTORY

The US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013, sponsors an "Advanced Research Program in Military History" as one means of stimulating research and study at the Army's major repository for materials in the history of military affairs. Awards will be made only to cover expenses while conducting research and writings at this facility. Recipients will be designated "Advanced Research Project Associates."

Applicants must complete a written form describing the subject, scope, and character of their project; the time estimated for residence at MHI; how MHI facilities, personnel, and materials will aid in their research project; and a careful estimate of expenses to be incurred for which this grant is requested. Forms can be obtained from the Institute.

Careful consideration will be given to each project's usefulness for USAMHI and the professional field of military history, as well as the United States Army. Inter-disciplinary projects are encouraged. Both civilian and military scholars in the field of military history are invited to apply to Director, US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013.

Completed applications must be returned by 1 January 1981.
PROFESSIONAL READING

BOOK REVIEWS


Reviewing a volume that consists of a collection of essays by a number of different authors is always a problem, particularly where, as here, there are many items worthy of specific mention and only a limited amount of space is available for the review. While this reviewer must admit that not every one of the essays engendered in him the enthusiasm displayed by Professor Ruegger in the Preface, there is no question but that, on the whole, this is an excellent collection of studies on an important subject—the new humanitarian law of armed conflict contained in the two Protocols drafted by a Diplomatic Conference consisting of over 100 national delegations over a period of 4 years (1974-1977) and signed in June 1977.

As the Preface discusses each individual essay, this reviewer will not attempt to repeat the information therein contained. Suffice it to say that the articles that were found to be of particular interest and to be particularly well done were those written by Obradovic ("La Protection de la Population Civile dans les Conflits Armés Internationaux"), Cassese ("Means of Warfare: the Traditional and the New Law: A Tentative Appraisal of the Old and the New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict"),Roling ("Aspects of Criminal Responsibility for Violations of the Law of War"), and Bierzanek ("Reprisals as a Means of Enforcing the Laws of Warfare; the Old and the New Law"). In addition, an interesting group of four articles (three in English and one in French), but of varying value, is presented under the rubric "The Attitude of States Toward the Development of Humanitarian Law."

The selection of the foregoing essays on the evolving humanitarian law of armed conflict as being of particular interest should not be construed as indicating concurrence with all of the conclusions reached by the several authors named. For example, this reviewer disagrees with Bierzanek's conclusion that, in drafting the 1977 Protocol I (International Armed Conflicts), the Diplomatic Conference did not go far enough in prohibiting reprisals. On the contrary, there appears to be considerable validity to Roling's observation that it is doubtful whether an absolute prohibition of reprisals contributes to the elimination of misbehavior; and, in fact, in certain circumstances, reprisals may actually serve a useful purpose. (This reviewer also joins in Professor Roling's expression of regret that the Diplomatic Conference elected to reject in its entirety a proposal to include in Protocol I a provision with respect to...
the defense of "superior orders" in war crimes trials.)

The importance that the nations of the world of today place on the need for a far-reaching and enforceable humanitarian law of armed conflict has been vividly demonstrated by the costs they undertook and the talent they contributed to the four sessions of the Diplomatic Conference concerned with that subject. There is an urgent need to supplement the Protocols themselves with published discussions by experts in this field of international law, discussions that will help to clarify and to publicize these documents. This volume is a major contribution to this process.

HOWARD S. LEVIE
Saint Louis University School of Law


Three Before Breakfast recounts a little known story of the sinking of three aged Bacchant-class British cruisers by a single (probably) German U-boat in World War I. What makes this story so unusual is not that the three were sunk, but that all three were sunk in less than an hour's time—just before breakfast. Alan Coles has balanced an incredible amount of scholarly research with a carefully conceived measure of poetic license that makes the personalities on both sides come alive, and it is through their eyes that the morning becomes real. The result is a suspenseful, colorful, romantic, and sometimes sentimental inquiry into one of Britain's darkest days at sea. The incident sparked a great deal of debate on the readiness of Britain's naval forces, the priorities and responsibilities of its senior commanders and the operational plans of the fleet. Additionally, it marked the first action that confirmed the U-boat's value as an effective although ungentlemanly weapon.

In September 1941 Aboakir, Hogue, and Cressy were patrolling the "Broad Fourteens" where the English Channel pushes into the North Sea. At that time and since, some have argued that the three coal-burning cruisers were positioned as unescorted live bait for the German Fleet. Ironically, Churchill had decided to withdraw them from this forward position, to be replaced with a balanced, more modern force. However, his decision was 24 hours too late for a bold U-boat commander named Weddigen had already maneuvered the U-9 for an attack.

Coles' account of the sinkings reads like a novel and he pieces each ship's story together in a skillful manner. None of the ships was ready for the attack—they had fallen into the routine monotony of the patrol. Aboakir was the first ship to be attacked (torpedoed or mined, thought the captain) and shortly afterward was abandoned. Hogue steamed to assist the foundering Aboakir and provided a stationary broadside target for Weddigen. Despite a thick armor belt of Krupp's steel, two torpedoes opened up Hogue's hull and magazine explosions finished the work. While pandemonium reigned on the surface, U-9 stalked Cressy. With her batteries nearly discharged, Weddigen ordered an attack and succeeded in sinking Cressy.

Littered with thousands of men and boys (midshipmen from Dartmouth were assigned to the ships' companies) and an assortment of rafts, launches, and flotillas, the sea became the stage for dramatic heroism and survival. First reaching the survivors were British and Dutch fishing trawlers. The fleeter, having been alerted by Cressy's dispatch "ABOUKIR SUNK, HOUGUE SINKING", arrived on the scene several hours later—just before lunch.

Though not as interesting, the second half of the book deals with the aftermath of the triple sinking, the rescue of survivors, reactions of the
press, the labored and painful official inquiries, some unusually inflated war stories, and the questions that still remain unanswered. Additionally, Coles traces the careers of many of the British officers and midshipmen that were involved in the catastrophe that took 1500 lives. Weddigen's later career is followed as well as that of his second in command, Johannes Spiess, who was one of a handful of German submariners who survived in U-boats until their surrender to the British later in the war.

*Three Before Breakfast* is a classic example of little known naval stories that can be dredged up years later to fascinate, enlighten, and perhaps instruct.

J.P. Morse
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy


Stamp out the facetious beast once and for all in its lair. Use force to break the racial pride of these Germanic women. Take them as your lawful booty. Kill. As you storm onwards, kill, you gallant soldiers of the Red Army.

This injunction by the Soviet war correspondent Ilya Ehrenburg, quoted by the authors of *The Cruellest Night*, states well the reality that the over 7,000 German civilians, Women Naval Auxiliaries, wounded soldiers, and submariners were fleeing in late January 1945 when they boarded the former Nazi Party "Strength Through Joy" passenger liner *Wilhelm Gustloff* in the East Prussian port of Gdynia. Unfortunately, most of these citizens and warriors of the nearly defeated Third Reich did not escape the fury of Soviet revenge, inspired by a half decade of cruel Nazi occupation of Russia. Most of the passengers and crew of the *Wilhelm Gustloff* perished when Soviet submarine captain Alexander Marinetski fired three torpedoes into its hull—causing what the authors claim to be "the biggest sea disaster" in history. Nearly five times the number of people died that night as had died in the *Titanic* sinking.

The sinking of the 23,484-ton *Wilhelm Gustloff* was the most spectacular event in the history of "Germany's Dunkirk," the monumental evacuation of eastern Germany orchestrated personally by Admiral Doenitz and which ultimately saved over two million Germans from Soviet revenge and subjugation. Fortunately, the authors of *The Cruellest Night*, British journalists, refuse to let WW II or cold war politics obscure the essential fact of that drama: that wars are fought by frightened human beings who are capable of great cowardice and great bravery. Consequently, Dobson, Miller, and Payne cram full their narrative with eyewitness accounts from both sides. They tell of the panic to get aboard. "Babies were used as tickets, being carried onboard and then thrown down again to be used as a passport to safety for another family member. Some fell between the ship and the quayside. It seemed not to matter. All that mattered was to get away from the Russians."

The authors also tell of great courage after the liner had been torpedoed. "Then Max Bonnet appeared still apparently wearing his white jacket. With enormous difficulty he carried his tray. 'A final cognac, gentlemen,' he said. They drank and threw down his glasses."

We also see events through Russian eyes as well. We meet Captain Mariesko of Soviet submarine S-13 who, although by sinking the *Wilhelm Gustloff* had scored the largest kill in Soviet submarine history, would later be stripped of his commission, declared an "un-person," and sentenced to the Gulag—all for having returned late once from a shore leave weekend in Turku, Finland (The NKGB accused him of making contact with allied
intelligence). But the Soviets sent him and others like him to the Gulag only after the Nazi menace had been defeated. The captain was reinstated to rank and citizenship in October 1963, but died 3 weeks later of cancer. Such irony is a part of war, and the authors include other such ironic accounts.

On February 6th, as [Marinesko] was running on the surface past the Hela lighthouse while banks of fog rolled across a calm sea, a German U-boat suddenly emerged from the fog and passed by the S-13 only five meters away. Yefremenkov, who was on the conning tower, stared in amazement at the German watch officers as they sailed past with the conning towers almost touching. He heard the sound of a machine gun being cocked. But by the time the gunners had recovered from their surprise, the two submarines had disappeared from each other's sight, slipping into the fog.

Questions about the sinking of the Wilhelm Gustloff remain. How many people actually were on board on 1 January 1945? Was the target a refugee ship with red crosses on the funnels, and thus an illegal target? What about the antiaircraft guns? Had they been removed? All good questions for historians to ponder. What the authors are far more interested in exploring in their dramatic narrative, however, is how "every survivor watched with horror, for the end of the Wilhelm Gustloff seemed to anticipate the end of the Nazi regime itself."

ELWIN F. CUMMINGS, JR.
Captain, U.S. Air Force


The exploits of Agent No. 94 will never rival those of 007, James Bond. Served in Guatemala by the Office of Naval Intelligence in 1917 to search for clandestine radio transmitters and German U-boat bases, he had the misfortune to run afoul of his superiors, apparently for mixing private gain—the purchase of arms for Guatemala—with his primary assignment. His interrogators claimed "he is not all there," placed him in an asylum for the insane, and twice thwarted his attempts to escape incarceration. At war's end, he was promptly released. More than one Director may seriously have contemplated this method of escaping from the problems and frustrations of his office.

Jeffery Dorwart's valuable study of ONI, "America's first intelligence agency," suggests several reasons for this frustration. First, neither the public at large nor the Navy could be convinced that intelligence-gathering had more than limited value at best. Consequently, ONI remained a second-level bureaucracy attached, at various times, to the Bureau of Navigation, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and the Office of Naval Operations. No Director ever remained long enough at the post to stamp ONI with a true sense of mission.

A second problem was the changing nature of ONI's role. In its early years it performed yeoman service in collecting and distributing information of a highly technological and scientific nature to those elements within the service supporting modernization of the American fleet. Increasing international tensions in Europe, combined with the growth of the United States own "military-industrial complex," led to the atrophy of this function. Perhaps, then, ONI could serve as a center for naval strategy and war planning. Despite a promising start in this direction prior to the war with Spain, ONI found its role progressively reduced to supplying raw information to the Naval War College and the General Board. Increasingly insulated and isolated from policymaking within
the Navy and the Government, the Office of Naval Intelligence turned to covert operations.

The success of ONI's covert operations during World War I posed the most serious problem of all. Spying, counterepionage and domestic surveillance proved dangerously attractive to the nation's elite. The needs of the service and the hothouse growth of branch intelligence offices prevented the overburdened Director, Capt. Roger Welles, from combating extralegal tendencies. Dorwart suggests that ONI, convinced of its own importance as interpreter and defender of "American interests," had become—however unintentionally—a threat to civil liberties and the right of dissent.

Dorwart's well-researched monograph makes a distinct contribution to the literature on the new Navy. The struggle for bureaucratic survival, the relationship of intelligence to policy formulation, and the question of means and ends have more than passing relevance to our own time.

RICHARD W. TURK
Allegheny College


The current fad of "things maritime" and the widespread interest in the confusing and complex deliberations of the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) have produced yet another work, this time a collection of papers prepared in 1977 under the auspices of the Institute for Marine and Coastal Studies (IMCS) at the University of Southern California. Managing Ocean Resources: A Primer, edited by Robert L. Friedheim, Associate Director of the IMCS, was intended to provide "... a well-rounded view of the oceans, its [sic] attributes, and the problems of its uses...." Although in many aspects the work is admirable, it unfortunately fails in the rather comprehensive task

Friedheim has set for it. Managing Ocean Resources possibly could have been a primer for understanding the possibilities and problems inherent in man's uses of the bounty of the oceans had its treatment been of sufficient scope and detail to provide a "well-rounded view." Alternatively, the scope of the book could have been pared somewhat, and some of the less relevant papers deleted (thus saving the reader from wondering why a specific topic had been included and where the book was going to take him next). In fact, however, the lack of a coherent framework makes for frustrating reading.

Perhaps the single most glaring shortcoming of Managing Ocean Resources is the absence of a single unifying theme. There appears to be no consistent logic governing what discussions were included or in what order. The "Foreword" attempts to set the tone for what will follow, but from then on the reader must fend for himself in trying to discover what conclusions he should draw from individual papers or, for that matter, from the collection as a whole.

Despite these deficiencies, Managing Ocean Resources does present some specific material that is well-written and well-presented, that is both informative and thought-provoking. Robert F. Hummer's chapter on "Conducting Ocean Science from Space" is a very good and generally understandable discussion of the extremely technical science of remote sensing. Hummer leaves the reader with a good understanding of what remote sensing is, how it is used today, and what its future possibilities are. Similarly, Ross Eckert's discussion of "Ocean Enclosures: A Better Way to Manage Marine Resources," which examines the economic aspects of expanding coastal state jurisdiction over adjacent waters, argues cogently that the present enclosure movement is desirable
because it offers "greater prospect for managing marine resources efficiently than any other alternative decision-making mechanism." Eckert thus provides an answer to Robert Friedheim's own search in his chapter, "The Political, Economic, and Legal Ocean," for a "paradigm" that would explain the reasons behind this movement. Apparently a paradigm that focuses on the actions of individual nation states and their perceptions of sovereignty and self-interest no longer suffices. Friedheim notes inefficiencies that result from the enclosure movement and argues for a more "just" arrangement, with an international authority to assign rights to coastal states so that resources can be allocated sensibly.

Whether this international authority would evolve into a true Leviathan of the oceans, or whether adequate safeguards could be built into the new system, remains unclear. The difficulty of identifying those necessary safeguards and garnering the required international support for them is illuminated in Professor Arvid Pardo's discussion on the "Law of the Sea Conference—What Went Wrong." Pardo's views on the Byzantine politics of UNCLOS III are invaluable, if for no other reason than his widely regarded role as the "father" of the Third Law of the Sea Conference. For it was Pardo, more than any other individual, who sought to structure UNCLOS III around the theme of reserving the living and nonliving resources beyond the area of national jurisdictions for the "common heritage of mankind." Pardo explains what he had hoped would be accomplished under United Nations sponsorship, how the concept of the "common heritage" became diluted in successive draft treaty texts, and what he believes will be the final outcome of the Conference.

Other chapters in Managing Ocean Resources are also noteworthy, among them Ruthann Corwin's "Protecting the Oceanic Environment," which gives a very concise presentation of the problems of marine pollution and the effects of pollution on the marine environment. In the wake of the Argo Merchant and Amoco Cadiz disasters, it should be required reading for every serious student of marine affairs.

The relevance and high quality of individual discussions such as these do help somewhat to alleviate the frustration that the reader feels at the inclusion of many less pertinent papers and at the collection's general lack of focus and direction. If this book is to be recommended, it must certainly be on the strength of its better sections, and very much in spite of its obvious flaws.

SCOTT C. TRUVER
Santa Fe Corporation


Held during the 75th anniversary year of the Wright brothers' first flight, it seems highly appropriate that the Eighth USAF Academy Military History Symposium was centered around the topic "air power and warfare." While the use of the aerial dimension in warfare has progressed amazingly during the intervening three-quarters of a century, the serious historical study of air power has not kept pace. The editors list that lack of serious work on air power as a primary factor in selection of the topic for this symposium.

The papers and speeches brought together a distinguished group of over 25 participants noted for their backgrounds either in the study of air power history or actual participation in its making. Such notables from both military and civilian sectors as Gens. Ike C. Eaker, Noel Parrish, Curtis LeMay,
Michael Collins and O.P. Weyland as well as Drs. Forrest Pogue, Eugene Emme and Theodore Ropp are just a few of those who took part.

The symposium began with the keynote address, "The Influence of Air Power Upon Historians," by Noel Parrish. Parrish laid the basis for the remainder of the sessions as he challenged those present with the potential for the study of air power. His strongest point was that biography holds the key to the understanding of air power's development. Without an understanding of the leaders involved in decisionmaking, no true understanding of the course that events took is possible. He pointed out that serious biographies on several Air Force Chiefs of Staff including Arnold, LeMay, Spaatz, Twining and White remain to be done. In summary, he considers that fact as crippling. A second major speech was presented during an evening session by retired Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, an air pioneer himself, entitled "Some Observations on Air Power."

The succeeding sessions covered air power and warfare for not only the United States but also Japan, Great Britain, Germany and the Soviet Union. The papers were divided among the World War I and interwar years (1903-1941), World War II operations and leadership, the search for maturity in the postwar Air Force (1945-1953), air power and limited warfare (1947-1978) and technology's effect on air warfare throughout the 75-year period.

Editors Hurley and Ehrhart list four major themes that came out of the sessions. (1) The importance of the "human element" in air power. (2) The intricate relationships between technology, doctrine and the actual employment of air power. (3) The unity of the human experience with air power. (4) The study of air power is vital to our national interest and holds the very essence of military history's significance.

The desired quality of this symposium as a watershed in the study of air power history was markedly enhanced by the invitation for each participant to outline the work that remains to be done in his particular area. The lack of good biographical work on air power leaders was joined by the need for studies on the effects of logistics, technology and intelligence, among several. For that delineation of gaps in present scholarship alone, the proceedings are invaluable. The publication of this book is timely and vital in view of the continued evidence of increased interest and appreciation for the importance of military history to the military professional. The study of air power is an integral part of that discipline.

DON RIGHTEMYER
Captain, U.S. Air Force


Dr. Reginald Victor Jones describes *The Wizard Wars* as "a personal memoir in which I hope that general readers may find some entertainment, intelligence officers some working examples of their trade, historians some matters of interest, and scientists some instruction in the value of sticking to basic principles." His hope is realized on all four accounts.

The book, published in Great Britain as *Most Secret War*, is based on declassified World War II reports, transcripts of post-World War II lectures, and personal recollections. It is, then, a personal account of British scientific intelligence activities during World War II. In it Dr. Jones describes his early work in infrared, his heralded success in identifying and countering German guidance beams, the attempts to counter the German air defense radar net, and the intelligence efforts against the V-1, the V-2 and nuclear weapons.
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The revelation of this book is the crucial importance of having a dedicated organization that can integrate information from all sources to ferret out enemy capabilities and intentions. While the breaking of the German "Enigma" code provided important information, the success of Dr. Jones and his compatriots should be attributed to their exhaustive examination of the myriad complex clues not only from intercepted enemy communications, but from electronic emissions, from statements of agents and prisoners, and from exploitation of captured equipment. Guiding the juggling of this information was Jones' predilection for "sticking to basic principles."

The reliance upon multiple sources of supporting evidence and the testing of conclusions against basic principles had an important side benefit. It built the confidence that encouraged Jones to articulate forcefully his findings and recommendations to the highest councils of government. It was Jones who convinced Churchill to employ Window (now called chaff) to blind German radar. His arguments prevailed over the objections of other highly placed advisors who feared that the Germans would quickly develop and employ the countermeasures against allied radars.

Jones' account also addresses the issue of security—preventing disclosure of own capabilities and intentions to the enemy. The Germans' awareness of the need for security, in fact, made the mission of British intelligence a difficult one. Jones laments that his community was unable to identify new weapons systems in the research phase; it was the testing of systems during development and production that provided exploitable clues.

The debate over the use of Window also was an example of security carried to the extreme. Both the British and the Germans were aware of the effects of Window and delayed its employment fearing the other would develop and employ it with even greater effectiveness. The Germans, on the order of Goering, destroyed all relevant reports and discontinued research and development. The British were "squeamish" but finally employed it in July 1943 after a year of debate. The Germans soon developed countermeasures and began to employ chaff against British radars in January 1944. And so the account goes: weapon, countermeasure, then counter-countermeasure.

In short, The Wizard War is a fascinating account of dedicated efforts to counter the new technology of German weapon systems. While reminding the military professional of the need for security, it emphasizes the importance of focusing on the objective and organizing one's efforts towards that end. To stray from that direction is to be misled, to waste energy and talent, and to forfeit the initiative.

WILLIAM T. WILLIAMS IV
Colonel, U.S. Air Force


This study is an analysis of the political-diplomatic roles of the first four Secretaries General of NATO—General Lord Ismay, Paul-Henri Spaak, Dirk Stikker, and Manlio Brosio. As the author indicates, the focus is on personality rather than structure and events although in the end he concludes that the latter factors decisively shape the performance of the Secretary General. The political conceptions, ambitions, and styles of the men examined might have facilitated or hindered political agreement within the alliance, but it was forces outside the office itself that defined both the agenda of concerns and the substance of political outcomes. Given such an
unexceptional conclusion, it should perhaps be no surprise that the reader’s main interest in the book probably will be the principal issues and trends in NATO from 1952 to 1971. Ironically, in view of the author’s intent, the events overshadow the personalities.

The conceptual plan of the book virtually posits the neutrality of the role of the Secretary General. In a sense, then, the fact that the personality of the occupants of that office is overwhelmed by events may lie not simply in the perversity of the outside world but in the inadequacy of the conceptual framework or point of view itself. This can be illustrated by reference to two closely related perspectives of the author—his view of the nature of the North Atlantic alliance and the influence of decisionmaking and integration studies on his analysis.

In his introduction the author discusses the differences between an alliance and a collective security association. This is indeed an important distinction to establish in order to determine the “logical” role of the Secretary General. Oddly, the initial definitions are not very helpful as the differences between alliance and collective security appear to be grounded on the commitment to peaceful resolution of disputes among the member states and on the specificity of the outside threat. The former requirement has been realized in alliances as in collective security arrangements, and the latter requirement virtually contradicts or ignores the real distinguishing characteristics of collective security—e.g., normative agreements on the indivisibility of peace, the primacy of the world community in matters of war and peace, and the impartial determination of friends and enemies according to an agreed notion of aggression, plus a number of structural conditions that favor the dispersion, limitation, and interdependence of power. One must suspect that the author, if pushed to the point of clarity, would accept these distinctions. In any case it is clear, as the author states, that NATO is “best viewed as an alliance.”

Having reached this unsurprising conclusion, the author might have more explicitly noted that many Americans were quite reluctant to accept the idea that NATO was indeed an alliance with all the balance of power connotations implied. Multilateralism and institutionalization might obscure that fact but they would not in themselves alter it. If the alliance character of NATO is kept firmly in view, then one would examine political leadership primarily in terms of U.S. Secretaries of State and permanent representatives or perhaps by reference to SACEUR. One simply would not expect the personality or vision of the Secretary General to be of critical importance. Despite his initial conclusion concerning the alliance character of NATO, the author moves in a direction opposite to that he should have taken, and asserts, “Within NATO, the secretary general stands as the most likely individual to assume the role of leader of the alliance.” Had the author remained true to his original light, he would not have had to explain why this never came to pass inasmuch as he never would have expected it in the first place.

To the extent that one views NATO as an exercise in community building, then it is perfectly possible to view the Secretary General and the administrative body to which he is attached as catalysts or expeditors of the process of integration. There is no question that at least one Secretary General, Paul-Henri Spaak, so interpreted the institution and his role. It is equally clear that a number of Americans in a rather vague and general sense also saw the organization in this light. This perspective was reinforced in the fifties and sixties by the fad among social scientists of
assuming integration—economic, political, and social—to be a kind of natural norm and to focus their attention on the behavioral processes that either reinforced or detracted from this norm. As a result there was always an element of suspenseful drama and surprise in their studies owing to perverse individuals, intractable situations, and untoward events that always seemed to intrude into the natural process. Given a different set of assumptions—one that placed greater emphasis on power and conflict—there would have been fewer surprises but also less contrived drama in their analyses.

As the author says, to the degree that he was influenced by former studies, he owes much of his point of view to analyses on integration behavior and decisionmaking processes. There is no doubt that this approach reinforced the logic of defining political leadership in NATO in terms of the Secretary General and of then testing this “natural” hypothesis against the “accidents” of time, place, and events.

Quite aside from the intellectual frame of the author’s analysis, however, he does in fact elucidate with skill the critical issues and trends that have shaped the development of NATO over nearly two decades. Moreover, either because of or despite his hypotheses and expectations concerning the Secretary General of NATO, he has provided additional material on the problems and range of functions open to international civil servants in contemporary international associations.

ROBERT S. WOOD
University of Virginia


Whenever maritime historians gather, the conversation turns to the need for a textbook in American maritime history. Two books were published last year with similar titles: Our Maritime Heritage, by James M. Morris (Washington: University Press of America, 1979), and the subject of this review, America’s Maritime Legacy, edited by Robert A. Kilmart. While Morris’ work is fully successful and filling the need for a general maritime history of the United States, America’s Maritime Legacy by Kilmart is a very different type of book, with a misleading title.

The actual aim of the book is to study government’s role in the rise and decline of America’s maritime industry in the hope of shedding some light on today’s maritime problems and policies. While the work is objective and well documented, it is hardly impartial. Like all the narrative histories of the merchant marine that were published generations ago, America’s Maritime Legacy clearly advocates a government policy of protection and subsidy to maintain a strong American-flag merchant fleet in peacetime.

The book is composed of seven essays by eleven authors, many of them distinguished maritime historians. It suffers from extreme differences in scope, sources and style among the various chapters. One wishes that more of the chapters were as comprehensive and readable as Jack Bauer’s “The Golden Age” (1783-1860) or, alternatively, that each essay presented a distinct thesis, as Jeffrey Safford’s chapter on World War I does by demonstrating that Wilson used the merchant marine as a bargaining chip in his diplomatic struggles with the Allies.

John J. McCusker’s chapter on the colonial period deals mainly with mercantilism. He shows that government promotion of the economy was the norm, even in colonial times. The American colonies learned mercantilism from the mother country, and colonial governments adopted many
measures to improve their own balance of payments, including preferential duties to favor their own merchant vessels. According to McCusker, Britain's mercantilistic policies were highly beneficial to the colonies, yet he tells us that the British authorities tolerated many colonial violations of the spirit of mercantilism in order not to hurt the thriving colonial economy. But, the chapter is so devoted to economic analysis (the word "promotive" appears three times!) that the slave trade is never mentioned, and captains and sailors are ignored, as are ports. All vessels are "ships," including those trading between the mainland and the West Indies.

In contrast, Bauer's chapter on the Golden Age deals with that period in a thorough and well-balanced manner. We have the growth of ports, the emergence of packets, clippers, steamboats and steamships, canals and railroads; government policies, wars, fishing, whaling, and the gold rush are lucidly explained. Above all, there are human actors on the stage.

Lawrence Allin analyzes the decline of American shipping and shipbuilding from the Civil War to 1913, tracing technological change, and leading us through the maze of legislative proposals that were publicly debated for decades, but accomplished little. The Navy's interest in a strong merchant marine is discussed at length. Unfortunately, this chapter is silent on the question of maritime labor, and the early efforts to organize seamen in the late 19th century. Indeed, one could read the entire book and not learn that brutality was common aboard American ships for almost a century. Allin only says that owners were unhappy with the crimping system which "produced less than able men."

This neglect of the labor picture continues into Jeffrey Safford's otherwise fine chapter on World War I. The La Follette Seaman's Act of 1915 is only mentioned parenthetically as driving up wages on American ships and making them less competitive. In the remaining chapters the unions, which by then were powerful, are paid proper attention.

Two very readable chapters deal skillfully with the period from 1919 to 1945, when the government committed itself to supporting a strong merchant marine and shipbuilding industry. Clark Reynolds then shows that the United States has played a leading role in world maritime affairs in spite of its declining fleet in the years since World War II. The editors conclude with an appeal for wiser—but unspecified—maritime policies to overcome the many contemporary problems that they enumerate.

America's Maritime Legacy has little original material and is of limited scope, but it is an excellent concise history of the relationship between government and the American maritime industry. Anyone involved in maritime affairs who is not already familiar with their history will find this book valuable.

ALLAN A. ARNOLD
U.S. Merchant Marine Academy


There are very few naval aviators remaining on active duty who know the challenge, thrill, and sheer enjoyment of flying a seaplane. Most aviators, familiar with the great power, simplicity, and agility of high flying jets, tend to look with disdain and amusement at the struggling, complicated old flying boats. Let's face it, the flying boats did have many aggravating deficiencies. But flying them, while physically demanding, was often truly rewarding and sometimes even romantic.

The seaplane pilot first had to be a real sailor! Water operation was where
he could easily get into trouble, for his machine was light, of shallow draft, with a lot of windage. In the big boats his thrust was off-center and, in later years, he often had too much power available for water work requiring finesse. He had to know about anchors, sea anchors, fenders, bridles, and beaching gear. He had to keep his airplane docile when mooring in tight, stormy situations so that his crewmembers, puny when measured with the great forces opposing them, would not be hurt. He often had to extend himself, and his engines, to the limit to get a heavily loaded seaplane "on the step"—planning—in order to take off. Those "max gross" takeoffs were something! Even with the latest, improved hull designs.

Once on the step, it could be a different world. How would you like to con the world’s fastest speedboat? Leap over small islands? Chase ducks and geese? And then fly past them, on and up into the other domain of your versatile machine. With what other aircraft could you make 20 consecutive touch-and-go landings—on the same pass, straight ahead? With what other aircraft could you land, light as a feather, so softly that the crew and passengers did not know your flight was over.

With the day’s work done, you could moor, go fishing, and then cook your catch. You could swim, diving off the wing. And after relaxing, doze off in a comfortable bunk to the sound of gently lapping waves. You could do this in some of the beautiful far corners of the earth, in places ordinary aircraft could only fly over, if they could reach that point at all.

Captain Dick Knott, USN, of the seaplane brotherhood, has caught the trials and the triumphs, the risks and the romance of seaplanes in The American Flying Boat. An Illustrated History. It obviously is a labor of love, and the Naval Institute Press has assisted him in the same spirit. The result is a rich and beautiful book. Captain Knott’s readable text is supplemented with rare photographs and drawings. His historic account is fast paced, with a lot of data, and full of exciting vignettes that make American seaplane experience come alive.

Needless to say, the most exciting stories are of Navy pilots and aircrews, for naval aviators led the way in developing and operating seaplanes during their heyday. The stories are of both peace and war, including the first transatlantic flight by the Navy Curtiss (NC)-4, and war patrols by the Americas (also built by Glenn H. Curtiss) in World War I, the Catalinas (Black Cats) and Mariners in World War II, and the Marlins in Vietnam.

Captain Knott says that "the exploits of the flying boats and the men who built them are an everlasting tribute to the searching, soaring spirit of man." Some may not agree, pointing to the poignant demise of Navy seaplanes in the 1950s, when the all-jet Martin Seamaster program was scrapped and dollars diverted to Polaris. If seaplane exploits were so laudable, should we not have kept them in inventory? Though many loved them, seaplanes had become dinosaurs, and it was wise to move on to high technology vehicles.

However, it is enlightening to consider the further activities of seaplane designers and manufacturers. Almost unanimously they became leaders in U.S. space programs. If we have traded off our flying boats for space ships, can we not point to activity that is a continuing tribute to our own searching, soaring spirit?

It is no accident that Captain Kirk flies to the reaches of space in Starship Enterprise.

The seaplane has given way to the spaceship. The exploration of space will be marvelously analogous to the pioneering of air routes on earth by the China Clipper and other famous seaplanes. If you want to understand the
early analog to better understand the future, read *The American Flying Boat*.

W.A. PLATTE*
Captain, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

*Captain Platte may be in the picture on the last page of this book. He once brought a P-51M back to Whidbey Bay from 450 miles offshore with the starboard engine feathered. But his magnifying glass could not verify his presence among those aviators shown atop a crippled "A-boat."


This collection of essays has an importance extending well beyond its modest scale. The editors and authors bring sound credentials, good judgment, and crisp style to their work. Onkar Marwah, formerly an Indian civil servant, works in the Program for Strategic and International Studies of the University of Geneva; Jonathan Pollack, formerly associated with Harvard University, now holds a position in the Social Science Department of the Rand Corporation; Stephen Cohen is associate professor of political science and Asian studies at the University of Illinois; Yasuhisa Nakada is a prominent Japanese journalist specializing in defense and foreign affairs.

The four essays presented here revolve around the premise that a number of the world’s second-rank powers possess security concerns and strategic objectives increasingly independent from the preferences of the major powers. Further, within the next 10 years, some of these second-rank powers, especially China, India, and Japan, will develop military capabilities permitting them wider latitudes of aspiration and action than at any time since World War II. Thus, the authors suggest, “future prospects for stability and peace in Asia will be increasingly determined by the states of the region themselves.”

In an introductory chapter the editors emphasize a 30-year trend of erosion in European power, a trend represented in the anticolonial movement since World War II and, more poignantly for some Americans, in the emergence of global economic interdependence during the 1970s. In this context, they suggest, second-rank powers in the world’s various regions have acquired the ability “to greatly raise the stakes of any external actor seeking to exercise military power with impunity against them; and second, to develop capabilities that address the real needs of national security for these states in the context of their own regional environments.”

Each of the essays in this volume contains information and judgments of considerable interest. Cohen surveys the potential and the inclination of China, India, and Japan to become great powers, or at least greater powers, in the near future. Reminding his readers that for each of these countries “military power and technology became an obsession as a result of contact with the West,” he endorses the view that these secondary powers will exert great influence in the international system. He also analyzes typical flaws in Western assessments of Asian politics. The three principal essays—Pollack’s on Chinese military development, Marwah’s on India’s evolving defense policy and posture, and Nakada’s on the influences for change in Japan’s postwar political and security traditions—provide broad coverage of trends and prospects. Each blends fundamental information and cautious judgment.

This book should have a wide audience. The premise that powers such as China, India, and Japan hold increasing political and military importance is beyond dispute. Few Westerners know as much as they
should—or as much as they think they do—about the attitudes and opportunities shaping the choices of policy elites in these three countries. There is no more economical or painless way to acquire at least a passing familiarity with critical security issues in these three countries than to read this book.

THOMAS H. ETZOLD
Naval War College


Bibliographies generally do not make exciting reading. However, if one is attempting to conduct research into an unknown area or endeavoring to broaden competence in an existing field, the discovery of good bibliography can be a very moving (not to mention timesaving) experience. Norton and Greenberg have compiled an extensive survey of English language works concerning national and international terrorism. While the title indicates that it is an annotated bibliography, only one-third of the approximately 1,000 entries receive comment. The publishers indicate that "this is the only extensive annotated bibliography on the subject." In this respect they are basically—though not exactly—correct. The Central Intelligence Agency in 1976 published an unclassified annotated bibliography on the subject that is also quite helpful to the researcher. However, with the sheer number of books and articles published on the topic in the past 5 years, the CIA work is already dated. If terrorism remains "a growth industry," this book too will suffer the same fate in just a few years.

The work itself is well organized, allowing the reader to survey many aspects of terrorism. The contents are divided topically (tactics, biography, legal perspectives, etc.) and geographically (Asia, North America, Middle East, etc.). A pleasant surprise is the inclusion of over 100 fictional volumes relating to terrorism. As the authors rightfully indicate in their introduction, "Many of these works are especially well-informed and provocative, and may interest not only the pleasure reader but the student of terrorism as well." Seeing how terrorism is portrayed in various fictional accounts adds yet another perspective to this complex phenomenon.

Researchers will be grateful that the authors have taken time to "dissect" the more general works on terrorism. For these books, especially collections, the reader will find multiple listings. The "General Works" section lists the work in its entirety and the appropriate geographical or topical section references individual works contained in the collection.

At the end of the Bibliography two brief appendixes can be found to further aid the researcher. One contains a list of publications and indexes in which relevant data concerning terrorism appears on a regular basis. Two of the listed works, *Air University Index to Military Periodicals* and the *Index of Government Publications* can be extremely helpful. The other is a listing of "essential titles" for anyone seeking to build a library on the subject.

In recent years terrorism has shown itself to be part and parcel of the relationships between peoples and nations. The spectacular nature of terrorist undertakings and the attendant publicity assure knowledge of their activity by a large, if not global audience. Knowledge of an event and understanding of a phenomenon are two very distinct things. For those who wish to journey into the realm of the latter, Norton's and Greenberg's bibliography will provide a sound navigational aid.

WILLIAM R. FABRELL
Major, U.S. Air Force

The very appearance of this volume signifies the recent self-assertion of the Congress in the formulation of national security policies of the United States. The congressional activism of the past decade or so has affected disparate national concerns ranging from foreign military sales, the SALT negotiations, nuclear proliferation and U.S. alliance policies. The President no longer enjoys a relatively unfettered reign in foreign policy decisionmaking, but instead increasingly finds his prerogatives constrained by the legislative branch. Perhaps only in the administration of President Andrew Johnson can we find a period of greater congressional involvement in policymaking. Unfortunately, Congress and Arms Control does not debate the contemporary activism of the Congress; instead it provides a brief for such a role. Not that this should surprise the reader inasmuch as almost all of the contributors share a link to Capitol Hill, and while they differ on specifics, most espouse "a central role [for Congress] in formulating this country's arms control policies."

Of the 11 contributions to Congress and Arms Control, several are noteworthy. Congressman Les Aspin has provided a very lively account of the "power of procedure." Dissenting from the predominant position of the contributors that the Congress needs more information in order to stand on an equal footing with the executive branch, Aspin argues that "...the problem is not information," but the innovative use of procedural tools. Noting that procedural plays allow the legislator to avoid taking a stand that might cost him votes, Aspin asserts that "Congress feels more comfortable dealing with issues this way." A vivid example of the power of procedure is the Walsh Act of 1935. The Congress, suspecting that President Roosevelt was planning to give destroyers to Britain, required the Navy to certify that they were not needed. Thus instead of confronting the President, the Walsh Act played on the predictable reluctance of the Navy to declare that warships were surplus. Such methods allow the Congressman to vote as he pleases and "leave his constituents scratching their heads."

Philip Farley, now with the State Department, provides a very competent exposition of the role of the Congress in regulating arms sales. While he finds that the Congress has done a better job than the Executive in coordinating arms sales with the national interests, he takes a less sanguine view toward congressional activism in this realm than the other contributors. In fact, he finds that "if Congress passed on all arms sales, it is far from certain that the outcome would differ greatly from that of the Executive Branch...." Warren Donnelly of the Congressional Research Service has also provided a commendable survey of congressional activity in the area of nuclear proliferation. He finds that without congressional interest, U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy would not be moving forward as expeditiously as it is.

Another worthwhile treatment is provided by Kurt J. Lauf. Lauf addresses the European perspective on U.S. affairs, and he illuminates the incongruence of congressional activism for the European who is often more accustomed to a parliamentary form of government. To the European observer it is somewhat bewildering to encounter a system in which the legislature not only refuses to support the President, it often also proffers its own alternative policies. At the least, congressional activism has made it very difficult for foreign—and domestic—observers to determine the source(s) of U.S. foreign policy.

Finally, Lawrence D. Weiler's
A review of events of the preceding decade is necessary to an understanding of Anti-personnel Weapons. Sweden, a critic of United States participation in the conflict in Vietnam and of weapons being employed by the United States, pressed for an international conference to ban antipersonnel weapons which (it concluded) caused "an unnecessary suffering." After various meetings of the United Nations, Sweden was successful in obtaining United Nations sponsorship of the present conference. The myriad precedent conferences and events occurring in the interim have served to narrow the issues and tone down the highly politicized rhetoric of the Vietnam war era. For example, Sweden's condemnation of the U.S. M-18 claymore mine as an illegal weapon ceased abruptly in the mid-1970s when its army began development and testing of its version of the claymore, the FFV 013 (which it subsequently adopted). Likewise, Sweden now concedes that none of the weapons under consideration by the U.N. Conference is illegal per se. However, this has not deterred Sweden in its efforts to achieve restrictions on the use of certain antipersonnel weapons against exposed combatants, thereby possibly explaining SIPRI's rationale for publication of Anti-personnel Weapons. Confronted by the substantial armor forces of the Soviet Union, and predominantly an infantry-oriented nation, Sweden has sought unsuccessfully to impose legal restraints on weapons that may be employed against exposed personnel (i.e., infantry forces), while proposing no limits on the attack of armored, or mechanized, forces. (Students of history will recall a similar unsuccessful effort to use international law to overcome a tactical disadvantage in the various endeavors of Great Britain in the post-World War II era to ban the submarine as a weapon of war or, in the Rules of Submarine Warfare of the Treaty of
London of 22 April 1930, to require submarines to conform to the rules of international law to which surface vessels are subject.

A detailed critique of Anti-personnel Weapons would require as many, if not more, pages than the volume itself. Its conclusions are given a false aura of credibility by the subjective selection, truncation and juxtaposition of quotations and data. It is rife with inaccuracies and errors of law. It uses a form of writing and presentation that gives a pretense of authority when in fact there is none. A few examples will serve to illustrate this.

In laying a foundation for a case against flechettes, the book characterizes the bomb-shaped darts (substantially larger than flechettes) dropped from aircraft during World War I as flechettes that could "pierce a man from head to foot," a statement as historically inaccurate as it is physically impossible. In asserting its position against small-caliber, high-velocity projectiles, discussed below, it is suggested that international law allows only bullets that are solid and fired at low velocity. While the third declaration of the 1899 Hague Peace Conference prohibited the employment of so-called "dumdum," or expanding, bullets, the only restrictions on bullet velocity have been those unsuccessfully put forward by Sweden during the 1970s. Indeed, efforts by Sweden to tie superfluous injury to velocity have been rejected as medically and scientifically unsound by an international committee of experts at the Conventional Weapons Conference.

In its condemnation of modern lightweight fragmentation weapons, the book errs in confusing weapons aimed directly at the individual soldier (e.g., bullets) and area weapons (e.g., the M79 40mm high-explosive grenade, and similar fragmentation devices) in implying that the latter violate the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868 prohibiting projectiles of a weight below 400 grams. The history of the conference at St. Petersburg is quite clear in establishing that the limitation was intended to cover only the former.

In fact, the book is rather promiscuous in its use of the term "illegal." In discussing the stalemate of trench warfare in World War I, the book declares that "to break this deadlock, armies used illegal means of warfare, including gas and armed aircraft...." Aircraft never have been considered to be an illegal means of warfare, nor does the attack of combatants with a lawful weapon constitute a violation of the law of war. Agreement on restrictions on first use of poisonous gas was reached in the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol not so much because gas was illegal, but because it was not considered militarily effective. Similarly, Anti-personnel Weapons refers to damage from harassment and interdiction fire as causing "damage to the environment [that] is long-term, widespread and severe." The quoted language, which does not appear within quotation marks in the book, is excerpted from Articles 35(3) and 55 of the 1977 Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which prohibit such damage. However, in reaching consensus on those provisions at the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, the participating parties (including Sweden) were clear in their understanding that battlefield damage incidental to conventional warfare is not proscribed by this provision.

Other misstatements manifest the book's lack of objectivity. Helicopter gunships are referred to as "intended mainly for counterinsurgency operations," apparently in an attempt to gain Third World support. Similarly, one finds a great deal of criticism of modern weapons, but no mention of punji pits and other primitive but equally injurious means of warfare. The book's
not-so-subtle progression from the early use of aircraft by the RAF in Iraq to alleged "indiscriminate area bombing" in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam not only erts in fact and in confusing weapons as such with techniques of weapons employment, but leaves the reader with the conclusion that all bombs dropped from aircraft are dropped indiscriminately over areas.

Perhaps the book's greatest deficiency lies in its discussion of weapons by nationality. U.S. weapons repeatedly are referred to as existing systems, whereas many were either obsolete or discarded as unworkable in the experimental stage, long before the book's publication. For example, reference is made to the development of the XM256E1 (7.62mm) cartridge by the U.S. Army's Frankford Arsenal. The XM256E1 program was terminated and Frankford Arsenal closed more than a year prior to the book's publication. Moreover, discussion focuses on U.S. weapons to the neglect of those of other states; including the Soviet Union. After providing a seven-page list of U.S. cluster bombs, for example, a "comprehensive range" of like Soviet weapons is dismissed with a one-sentence reference even though it is apparent from that reference that sufficient material was available to the author for his elaboration had he elected to do so. There is substantial discussion and condemnation of U.S. fuel-air explosives, but no mention of unsuccessful efforts by the Swedish Government during the period in which this book was written to obtain FAE munitions from the United States for its own research and development. In declaring illegal modern small-caliber, high-velocity rifles, considerable information is provided regarding the U.S. M-16 (5.56mm) rifle, to the neglect of the Swedish FFV 660 (5.56mm) that Sweden had been evaluating for its own army for some time prior to publication of Anti-personnel Weapons. (Since the publication of Anti-personnel Weapons, Sweden has adopted the FFV 660 and the Soviet Union has deployed the AK-74 (5.41mm). Both the FFV 660 and the AK-74 have muzzle velocities equal to or higher than the M-16.)

The misrepresentations regarding small-caliber, high-velocity rifles are manifestation of an apparent lack of objectivity and elementary research contained in Anti-personnel Weapons. The book uses "stopping power" as a measurement of superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, despite the fact that no developer uses immediate incapacitation as an effectiveness criteria for military small arms. Great stock is placed in the premises that the M193 (5.56mm) ammunition for the M-16 rifle tumbles early and breaks up on impact, thereby causing unnecessary suffering. In meetings of government ballistics and medical experts at a preparatory session of the U.N. Conventional Weapons Conference, as well as at similar meetings at the September 1979 Conference, it was concluded that the question of whether a bullet that tumbles early (compared with one that tumbles later) and causes a greater or more severe wound, much less superfluous injury, is highly problematical. Moreover, contrary to the near 100mm variance in tumbling alleged by the author between the M193 and the Soviet 7.62mm round used in the ubiquitous AK-47, actual tests established that the M193, 7.62mm (U.S.S.R.), and 7.62mm (NATO) all tumble on the average of 15mm of one another, a small difference. To the extent that it occurs at all, bullet breakup was found to be a characteristic of all military ammunition, including the Soviet 7.62mm, rather than being unique to the M193. Curiously, the book's argument is based in part on data for the 1965-era M-16 rifle and early 5.56mm ammunition, rather than upon M-16s manufactured or rebuilt after
1967 (at which time the rifling was changed to improve stability and hitting probability) or upon later manufacture, improved versions of the M193 bullet, even though it is clear from the writing that more up-to-date information was at the researcher's disposal. Other theories offered in the book (and at the Conventional Weapons Conference) have been discounted in the meetings of experts at the Conventional Weapons Conference to the point that there is no proposal regarding small-caliber, high-velocity weapons under consideration for the forthcoming conference session.

Anti-personnel Weapons is an extensive but not comprehensive treatment of modern military weaponry. While voluminous, it is so skewed in its intent that it contributes little to the subject. Many of its conclusions, reached through simplistic or convoluted argumentation, have proved to be without foundation when tested in the forum of international negotiations. More galling than its deliberate inaccuracy, however, is that much of the content of Anti-personnel Weapons is based on data provided in the course of the technical exchange of information with U.S. military authorities. That material in turn has been skewed to place the United States in the worst possible light while advancing an opposing cause. If there is any lesson in this book, it is that our oftentimes open exchange of technical information should be viewed as not always working to our advantage.

W. HAYS PARKS


Craig Symonds’ book is one of particular interest to the Naval War College. It is a piece of original research that was inspired by the author’s experience as a professor of strategy at the War College, and it is a direct application of several ideas that are raised in the Strategy and Policy course. This, in itself, is an unusual attribute. As anyone who has taught or taken the course will readily appreciate, there are few books that start and carry forward in the particular areas on which that course focuses. Usually, one must read books written for other purposes in order to view the many aspects in the interrelationship between strategy and policy.

In order to explore the opposing viewpoints that affect the formulation of policy, Professor Symonds focuses on the public debate in Congress during the early years of the Republic, between 1785 and 1827. He dispassionately examines these viewpoints and defines their basic outlook and concerns. In the process he very effectively supersedes the earlier work of Harold and Margaret Sprout in examining these issues. While such earlier historians have scoffed at the Republican opponents of the Navy, Symonds shows that they had very legitimate concerns. The navalists who supported the construction of a large Navy were driven by a vision of the United States holding the balance of power in Europe. To anti navalists, this was an impractical and irresponsible course at a time when the young nation barely had the resources to deal with the Indians on the western frontier. In short, this is the debate between those who see the proper role of the Navy as one of protecting direct and immediate national interests and those who value the role of the Navy in the broad context of international affairs. While the broader viewpoint includes that of defense, the narrower interest does not accept the implications of an international role. Quite clearly, the political debate related here is very much a part of the historical debate between "blue-water" and "continental" strategy. While historians have tended to view
that debate only in the context of British history, we have clear evidence here that it applies not only to a great power, but even to a small republic with very limited resources. It is a political debate that represents a recurring attitude and that has had a continual effect on the policy that controls both the construction and employment of navies.

Symonds' distinction between "Navalists" and "Antinavalists" is an interesting and useful one to make, although it involves a thorough understanding of concepts that are not readily apparent to the nonspecialist. The terms are well defined in the "Introduction." There, the author makes it clear that he is not dealing with a simple pro-Navy-anti-Navy, good guy-bad guy relationship. He starts from the definition that Alfred Vagts made in his History of Militarism (1937) that militarism comprises all the activities, institutions and qualities not actually needed for war. This is what lies behind Symonds' application of the term to those who supported such things for the American Navy. Those who opposed these men were not opposed to the Navy, but they opposed those who wanted to build the Navy beyond the immediate defense needs of the country. In particular, Symonds has identified as navalists those who valued the Navy for its "image, honor, prestige and diplomatic clout." Vagts, himself, focused on the qualities of caste, cult, authority and belief which contrasted with the efficient, rational and humane use of armed force to achieve specific objectives. Symonds' extension of Vagts' definition to include peacetime uses of military force raises some interesting issues. Recent theoretical writing has stressed the role of armed force, short of war, in achieving specific national objectives. In theory, it is a rational use of armed force, not an extraneous factor. Symonds has convincingly demonstrated that those who supported such views in the early days of the Republic had in mind unrealistic aims that were inappropriate to the national interest and, therefore, navalist. Viewing this one example in a broad context, one is left to speculate when the diplomatic uses of a navy are effective and efficient uses of armed force and when they do not serve national interests.

Navalists and Antinavalists is a thorough study of the congressional debate based on a wide range of published documents, and it is a study carefully placed within the context of the historical literature on the period. In this regard, it is particularly unfortunate that the publisher has relegated the footnotes to the end of each chapter. Many of them make substantive corrections and comments on the literature, particularly on the works of Mahan and the Sprouts. Several of these are important enough to have been put into the body of the text.

Symonds has explored and defined an important aspect of the public expression of opinion in regard to the use of the Navy. In doing this, he has shown the two major contending viewpoints and defined the considerations that lie behind them. This is a most useful contribution to political and naval history as well as a case study in understanding one of the forces that affect the determination of policy.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF
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RECENT BOOKS

Selected Accessions of the Naval War College Library

Annotated by

Ann Hardy, with Kathleen Ashook
Doris Baginski and Mary Ann Varoutsos

The effects of perceptions, attitudes, and emotions on Arab decision-making are emphasized in this investigation into the recurring patterns of escalation in Middle Eastern politics, using the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973 as cases in point. Because the 1973 war was marked by a decided change in Arab behavior, detailed attention is given to the Arab decision to attack; the strategic and tactical goals of the Egyptian and Syrian leaders; and Arab conduct and assessment of military operations. In addition, the wider political and military implications of this war are addressed, with specific reference to superpower interests.

Berman uses largely unexplored primary source data to clarify the changes in the nature and operation of the office that was established in 1921 as the Bureau of the Budget, a staunchly impartial agency of great advisory assistance to the President. In the 1950s limitations were imposed on the character of the Bureau, leading to its politicization in the last two decades, when it was reorganized as the Office of Management and Budget; became loaded with noncareer assistant directors; and assumed an institutionalized nonneutral relationship with the White House.

In this slim volume Brezhnev recalls the fierce World War II fighting in which he engaged in the Novorossiisk area, and then retraces his managerial experience in the postwar reconstruction in the Zaporozhye region, where he was in charge of restoring the bombed-out iron and steel works and later of building housing in Dnepropetrovsk. Emphasis is on how the “Soviet political spirit” imbued both military and managerial activity.

The phrase “crisis of power” refers to a collapse of confidence in the U.S. Government’s ability to use the country’s resources in support of its international interests. In this personal assessment of Kissinger’s policy and diplomacy during the years 1969 to 1976, Brown analyzes the Secretary’s efforts to restore confidence both at home and abroad in light of his stated
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objectives as well as the long-range advancement of U.S. interests and the welfare of mankind. Kissinger’s role in helping the country adapt to the growing strategic power of the Soviet Union is seen as his greatest contribution.


In examining crime and deviancy in the armed forces, the author weighs the unique character and mission of military life and its effects on behavior. He has devised a paradigm of three major categories of “khaki-collar” crimes—offenses against property, persons, and performance—which he further subdivides into five loci of occurrence. The examples cited involve armed forces from many lands, many conflicts, and many eras and are drawn from published accounts, war stories of participants, and personal recollections of Professor Bryant when he served as an Army M.P.O. A need for more attentive proofreading is noticeable.

Donaldson, Robert H. The Soviet-Indian Alignment: Quest for Influence. Denver: University of Denver. Graduate School of International Studies, 1979. 70pp. $3.90 (individuals); $4.50 (libraries and institutions)

Coming near the close of a decade marked by dramatic shifts in Asia’s power balance, Prime Minister Kossyn’s visit to India in March 1979 reemphasized the importance of understanding the Soviet-Indian relationship and underscored the need for hard evidence about the nature and scope of Soviet influence in India. To this end, here is an empirically based study of specific instances of Soviet-Indian interaction in the fields of culture, economics, diplomacy, and commerce.


This detailed history chronicles the fate of the German World War II battle cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. Having been preceded by two armored cruisers that provided a rare German naval victory in World War I, these ships were the second-generation namesakes of two legendary generals, Gerhard Johann David von Scharnhorst and Augustus Wilhelm von Gneisenau, who rebuilt Prussia’s military might after her defeat by Napoleon.


Because he is a homosexual, E. Lawrence Gibson was barred from the ship in Gaeta, Italy where he had worked as a civil service instructor in the summer of 1975; and for the same reason Ens. Vernon E. Berg III, a junior officer on the ship, was advised to submit his letter of resignation from the U.S. Navy “for the good of the service.” Written by Gibson and illustrated by Berg, this is a personal, exhaustively documented account of Ensign Berg’s 2-year struggle to refute allegations of misconduct and to obtain an honorable discharge.


The nature of Islam and its effect upon Arab civilization are explored in this political and military history of the Middle East from the birth of Mohammed until the present day.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1980
As the United States and the Soviet Union moved toward détente, various writers and political observers of the early sixties foresaw a world order based on a “condominium” in which the two powers, although engaged in political and economic rivalry, would seek to avoid nuclear war through the joint control of international relations and nuclear armaments. The author demonstrates the limited extent to which any such cooperation was achieved in the resolution of four specific crises, but analyzes the importance of this concept and its applicability to the emerging multipolar international scene.

This British author sees Inchon as the real crux of the military and diplomatic course of the Korean war. MacArthur’s decision upon, and brilliant direction of, the Inchon landing was the last example of the originality of action that was so typical of this world-famous old-school general, uncompromisingly committed to the belief that victory was the only objective in war. Langley terms the Inchon-Seoul offensive “the last great amphibious operation and planned pitched battle the world will probably ever experience.” Yet he considers it worthy of regular study, even in a world where total war seems to have been replaced by the limited war of which, paradoxically, Korea has become the prototype.

During the last decade, the once-dominant influence of the United States in Latin America has steadily diminished, and several Latin American countries have now grown sufficiently to exert a significant voice in world affairs. This essay considers various courses for future U.S. policy to pursue, and suggests that the strengthening of international market structures, rather than attempts at direct aid in the paternalistic and ineffective patterns of the past, would be beneficial to both North and South American countries.

Nine months after the famous battle between those redoubtable Civil War ironclads, the U.S.S. Monitor and C.S.S. Virginia, the victorious Monitor was lost at sea during a storm off Cape Hatteras. The exact location of her resting place was the subject of much speculation for over 100 years, until 1973 her sunken hulk was finally identified by a group of midshipmen from the U.S. Naval Academy. Based on the three-volume study, "Project CHEESEBOX," which resulted from their extensive labors, this well-illustrated book relates not only a detailed history of Monitor, but also the circumstances of the research which led to her discovery.

During the course of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Israeli fighter planes and warships attacked the U.S.S. Liberty, an American intelligence ship in
international waters, leaving 34 dead and 171 wounded. Although the Israeli Government attributed the assault to an innocent mistake, Pearson maintains that it was a deliberate attempt to prevent both friendly and unfriendly nations from using intelligence to intercede in Israel's military drive for additional territory. This somewhat speculative account, intended for the general reader, describes Pearson's personal investigation into the circumstances surrounding the attack on Liberty and its aftermath.


A Canadian journalist presents a scathing indictment of Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau's military program and defense policy as implemented during his terms from 1968-1978. He is accused of "scuttling his own armed forces" both economically and militarily, leaving them too weakened to provide national defense or to assume their NATO role. The measures and priorities that produced such a state of impoverishment are detailed, e.g., sacrifice of military funds to create a new economic order. This work is especially thought-compelling in view of Trudeau's recent reelection.


The Trade Policy Research Centre in London sponsored this examination of the microeconomics of Britain's offshore oil resources and the implications of government policies towards the North Sea oilfields. Using original statistical data collected for this study, the authors analyze probable oil reserves; they review relevant legislation to determine its effect on North Sea oil profitability, the tax system, future oil supplies, and Britain's balance of payments; and, finally, they assess the effects of North Sea oil on the British economy.


The economic, political, and cultural environments that surround the mass media of 18 Arab nations serve as a frame of reference for this analytical study of the Arab news media as institutions. Daily newspapers, radio broadcasts, and television stations are categorized according to the form they have taken in the societies they serve; and the underlying conditions leading to the development or transformation of particular typologies are shown. Special emphasis is given to the relationship between the news media and the governments that control them.


A graduate and assistant commandant of the Naval Academy, Wood was related to both President Zachary Taylor and Confederate President Jefferson Davis. During the Civil War, he supported the Confederacy and became the South's most renowned coastal raider—about the only naval activity possible for the severely limited Confederate Navy against the Federal forces'
blockade. This engrossing book traces Wood's career and his naval influence, follows his exciting days as a fugitive, and recounts his escape to Cuba and later Halifax, Nova Scotia, where he spent the rest of his life.


In this second volume of the Warship Special series, six prominent naval authors discuss the outsized destroyers constructed in the period between the two World Wars. Their design, performance, and cost effectiveness are treated in the cases of six important countries that invested in this class of warship. There are numerous illustrations.

Sweetman, Jack. The U.S. Naval Academy, an Illustrated History. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1979. 289pp. $17.95; de luxe ed. $23.95

Although recommended by John Paul Jones in 1783, and later by other prominent naval leaders, the Naval Academy was not established until 1845. Sweetman, currently a professor at the Academy, has written an interesting history of the development of the school from its founding to the present time, the first such account to appear since 1900. He has made good use of much primary source material and has effectively employed profuse illustrations to enhance the text.


Based on current Navy regulations concerning retirement, this guide provides information on the rights and responsibilities of U.S. Navy personnel who are entitled to retired or retainer pay and discusses in detail a wide range of areas that are also important to the welfare of persons who are considering retirement in the near future.


When the Soviet Union decided to invade Czechoslovakia 17 days after the conclusion of the seemingly successful negotiations with the Dubcek regime at Cernova and Bratislava, many Western observers and Czechoslovak policymakers were caught by surprise. This timely analytic and interpretive essay, intended to aid rational responses to future Soviet foreign policy actions, uses the bureaucratic-politics paradigm to explain the factors that shape such decisions.


This report consists of a concise summary of the objectives, options, and deployment of the superpower navies during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, which marked a turning point in Soviet use of naval forces. The ability to provide an efficient structure and to take quick action are shown to be essential preconditions of successful crisis management. Because these conditions were not fully met by the 6th Fleet during the June war, it is

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suggested that its forward deployment could have been counterproductive in achieving the desired diplomatic goals and that the 6th Fleet might well adopt a more flexible posture in future crises.

*For sale by the National Technical Information Service, U.S. Department of Commerce, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161.


The first group of seven Mercury astronauts and the early years of the space program are observed through the prism of Tom Wolfe's powerful literary style in this wickedly funny, compassionately perceptive, and often admiring view of the "fighter-jock" military pilot and his fiercely competitive world.

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