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
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SET AND DRIFT

STRATEGIC BALANCE CONSIDERATIONS: POLICY, DOCTRINE, FORCE STRUCTURE, AND SALT

by

Lieutenant Colonel Warren H. Milberg, U.S. Air Force

What in the name of God is strategic superiority? What is the significance of it politically, militarily, operationally, at these levels of numbers? What do you do with it?

Statement of Henry A.
Kissinger in Moscow,
3 July 1974

The subject of the strategic nuclear relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union was hotly debated long before Henry Kissinger's remark in Moscow 6 years ago—and will continue to be the focus of domestic and international discussion in the near future. Although the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have temporarily obscured the debate about this crucial relationship in the United States, it seems likely that it will once again assume its central role when these current "minicrises" abate. This prediction is based on the fact that few issues rival the strategic balance in

terms of importance to the continued security of the United States—and the U.S.S.R. Moreover, the long-negotiated SALT II treaty has become something of a baseline planning document for U.S. force planners even though the chances of it receiving Senate ratification appear dim at best. Then, too, a very real possibility exists that a "peace offensive" could occur between the United States and the U.S.S.R. that would again focus attention on the strategic balance.

Just as various factions within the United States have become polarized over the perceived pros and cons of the strategic balance, so too must we assume that pressures similar to the Malenkov-Khrushchev force structure controversy, in the wake of Stalin's death, must exist for the current leadership in the Soviet Union. Like Henry Kissinger, few people agree on the exact meaning of strategic superiority; yet a number of discernible shifts and trends in the strategic nuclear relationship have occurred. This paper examines the shift from absolute nuclear monopoly in the

United States to parity—or perhaps worse—with the Soviet Union today. Emphasis is placed on the SALT agreements and the differing strategic doctrines that underpin them in order to highlight the thesis that while SALT has been a significant political activity used to improve the overall U.S.-U.S.S.R. relationship, the agreements have not caused either nation to pursue or abandon strategic programs that their respective nuclear doctrines continue to demand.

Although it has been cogently and correctly stated that "there is no consensus on how to measure the strategic balance," the shift in U.S.-U.S.S.R. strategic force levels between 1966 and 1978 is perhaps one of the most dramatic static indicators of the fact that something very real has occurred.¹ In his Annual Report for FY 1980, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown compared strategic force level changes as follows:

	ICBMs	
	1966	1978
U.S.	900	1,054
U.S.S.R.	300	1,400
	SLBMs	
	1966	1978
U.S.	590	656
U.S.S.R.	0	950
	Bombers	
	1966	1978
U.S.	750	348
U.S.S.R.	160	150

The above numbers certainly portray the fact that Soviet strategic force levels have increased tremendously during the period in question but numbers, at least in this case, do not speak for themselves. The numbers of ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers now in the Soviet strategic inventory seem to lend some measure of credence to the beliefs of those observers who subscribe to the theory that the U.S.S.R. is on the path to strategic superiority over the United

States, and may have already achieved it. And perhaps it was this group that Henry Kissinger had in mind when he questioned the pragmatic meaning of "strategic superiority."

Inasmuch as the continuing dialogue concerning the strategic nuclear relationship between the United States and U.S.S.R. will undoubtedly include the use of various indexes that purport to measure one aspect or another of the strategic balance, the most common index is perhaps the comparison of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs).

While some concede the numerical advantages to the Soviets, comparing numbers of SNDVs, on the one hand, tells us nothing about such factors as weapon quality and accuracy, but also that there are real problems in defining what is "strategic" and what is a "delivery vehicle." Comparing U.S. and Soviet megatonnage, another favorite index often used to "prove" Soviet superiority, we again find that the Soviets are in the lead. But megatons measure, *inter alia*, radiation, not blast damage "which is considered the most important effect for almost all strategic nuclear weapons."² In order to measure the destructive power of nuclear weapons, equivalent megatons (EMT) is the index to be employed.

In comparing U.S. and Soviet EMTs, we once again find those rascally Russians now being able to expose nearly twice the number of square miles to overpressures that would be needed to destroy unreinforced brick and frame homes located therein. While the housing industry may find this fact alarming, higher EMTs say little about such considerations as tailoring forces to specific targets, accuracy, and critical military or political targets that are "hardened to resist a nuclear attack."³

Throw-weight, or payload, is yet another index of the strategic balance where the overwhelming lead is in Soviet hands.⁴ Although throw-weight

is related to the EMT of nuclear weapons, just exactly what this index does to clarify the strategic balance is surrounded by controversy. Importantly, it appears that whatever advantages the Soviets see in huge throw-weights, the United States has voluntarily decided that our superior technology allows more efficient use of the available throw-weight in the U.S. strategic arsenal.⁵

Turning to the number of nuclear warheads, we finally come to an index in which the United States clearly leads the Soviet Union. Like the number of SNDVs, numbers of warheads allow simplistic judgments about the balance of forces and this index has been called the most significant indicator of strategic power. Yet the warhead inventory only suggests the number of soft point targets that are subject to attack, not the number of such targets that could be destroyed.⁶

The capability of a weapon and its delivery system to destroy hard targets is said to be its lethality—and the advantage in this area is probably enjoyed by the United States. But this index is also subject to numerous errors that make the U.S. advantage difficult to quantify.⁷

A final word must be said about the most controversial index of them all: comparing U.S. and Soviet defense expenditures. Notwithstanding the obvious problems of open versus closed societies, dollar-ruble comparisons, and the various efficiencies and inefficiencies extant in the military and civil sectors of the United States and U.S.S.R., the United States has chosen to measure Soviet defense spending in terms of what it would cost the United States to duplicate Soviet forces. Using this method, the CIA has estimated that Soviet expenditures for *strategic* forces was about double that of the United States between 1966 and 1971, and increased even more rapidly by 1976.⁸

Yet among other failings of this index,

permitting U.S. inflationary trends to "raise" the cost of Soviet hardware in our estimates does not seem rational. Thomas Brown sums up the problem of budgetary comparisons and other strategic indicators as follows: "... it is uncertain whether we are ahead or behind, but the Soviets are clearly moving forward faster than we."⁹

Considering that semantic games, obscure phraseology and esoteric indexes have been, and will continue to be, a part of the language of international relations, it seems more useful to describe the apparent growth of Soviet strategic forces in the understandable words of Adm. Thomas B. Hayward:

General Jones has graphically described the major shifts which have occurred in the strategic balance, and which will continue to occur for the next few years—with or without this (SALT II) treaty. *Within the limits of the deployments of SALT I*, the Soviet Union has achieved an alarming momentum and *dramatically changed the strategic relationship* between our two countries.¹⁰ (emphasis added)

It is important to note that both Admiral Hayward and others feel that the strategic balance has shifted, absolutely and relatively, in favor of the Soviet Union and they are "disturbed" by the prospect of a continuation of this perceived trend.¹¹ Admiral Hayward further states that "these developments form a part of a larger pattern reflecting the great value which the Soviets place on the accumulation of military *power* as a means—and some would say the primary means—of achieving a number of important objectives of the Soviet state."¹²

John Spanier, in *Games Nations Play*, recognizes that power is an "obvious" element in international politics; so obvious, in fact, that we all take it for granted. He almost casually states that the terms "more powerful" and "stronger" refer primarily to the

military capacities of nations.¹³ However, he does go on to elaborate two very crucial points about power in the state systems that seem particularly germane to a discussion of the strategic nuclear balance:

The first is the popular identification, generally shared by [all] policy-makers, of power with military capacity—regardless of whether the estimate is based on power overtly applied, peacefully demonstrated... or held in the background while adversaries bargain. Because war has historically been the *ultima ratio* of power in interstate politics, this emphasis on military strength is hardly surprising.

The second point... is that *power is what people think it is*. And... it may not only be how foreign statesmen evaluate another nation's power, but how a particular nation's decision-makers think other states will think about its power status that is important. *A reputation for power will confer power, whether that subjective evaluation is correct or mistaken.*¹⁴

The reasons why the Soviet Union has embarked on a course designed to vastly improve the quality and quantity of its strategic forces (and conventional forces as well) can be partly discerned by looking at what they expect these forces to achieve. The same thing also applies to U.S. strategic force levels that have been qualitatively improved, but quantitatively frozen, for some time. The following discussion of the different U.S.-U.S.S.R. strategic doctrines is undertaken to highlight the thesis that doctrine, not SALT agreements, has been the major factor in determining this trend in strategic force levels in both societies.

One needn't venture deeply into Soviet doctrine to stumble upon our old Prussian friend Clausewitz who, according to Richard Pipes, is "buried in the United States [but] seems to be alive and prospering in the Soviet Union."¹⁵ Soviet strategic doctrine, while recognizing the extreme destruction that could result from a superpower nuclear exchange, does not automatically preclude such warfare as a real possibility and their doctrine and force structure is built around this central concept. Without delving too far into the historical and ideological factors that have influenced the development of this doctrine, the Soviet "war fighting," rather than "war averting," force levels also reflect the fact that the Soviets have long sought some modicum of security in pure military weight—in the form of both numbers and pounds. Also, the Soviet Union has more adversaries than does the United States, and its strategic and conventional forces are used in more internal and external capacities than are U.S. forces. But the key factor in Soviet strategic doctrine is how military force can be used to achieve political aims—aims that include the security of the Soviet Union.¹⁶

Although National Security Advisor Brzezinski insightfully notes the difficulty of transforming military power into political gain, he doesn't dismiss the possibility either.¹⁷ This is particularly true in view of power being what people think it is. Soviet leaders apparently believe that the best way to deter attack on the Soviet Union, and to achieve whatever other political goals they may have, is to build and maintain the largest and most powerful military force possible. These force levels have an offensive doctrine that is coupled to a full panoply of defensive measures. Disregarding the particularly American concept of mutual vulnerability of their respective societies as a means of deterring nuclear war, their doctrine

calls for preempting the West should a first strike at the Soviet Union appear imminent.¹⁸ The Soviet idea of strategic balance can then be seen in terms of trying to maintain an imbalance—in their favor. This imbalance includes having strategic forces that are capable of threatening U.S. first and second-strike capacity, a factor that really illuminates the differences in doctrines and strategic force levels.¹⁹

In contrast to the Soviet-Clausewitzian view that weapon technology does not change the meaning and purpose of war, the United States perceives nuclear war as "unthinkable" and has structured its strategic force levels and doctrine accordingly. United States strategic doctrine posits that once we have enough nuclear weapons to "destroy" Soviet society, and they have enough to destroy us, that mutual vulnerability mutually deters each nation. Rather than avoiding nuclear war by having enough offensive and defensive capabilities to insure that one is *not* vulnerable (as in the Soviet Union), the United States believes that "mutual assured destruction" will avoid war. Pipes describes the situation rather succinctly: "... to feel secure the United States actually required the Soviet Union to have the capacity to destroy it."²⁰

So it seems that the relatively static strategic force levels in the United States resulted from the concept of "sufficiency" of nuclear weapons, weapons that would deter a Soviet attack by threatening mutual destruction. To accept this concept makes it easier to understand Kissinger's glib rejection of the concept of nuclear superiority.²¹ Unfortunately, the Soviet Union has a rather different perception of deterrence that includes the idea that mutual vulnerability is not only risky, it is unacceptable.²² It is useful at this point to question why both nations agreed to SALT I and SALT II, considering the doctrinal and strategic

weapon incongruities that now exist between the two nations.

The past and present SALT agreements, like most negotiations and bargains, offered each nation something it wished to achieve. Perhaps the most obvious advantage that SALT has offered the United States and the U.S.S.R. is the opportunity to reduce the costs of a totally unconstrained strategic arms race. Yet one can only wonder whether such a promise is more imagined than real. Considering that there is no absolute answer to the question of how high force levels—and defense expenditures—would rise in the absence of SALT, it would seem that SALT has allowed both participants to channel funds with more confidence into those strategic programs each would have pursued in any event. Cogent arguments have been made that SALT I and II have had minor effect on the aforementioned trends in the strategic nuclear relationship of the superpowers, codifying existing force levels without significantly reducing them.²³

The Soviet Union's goals for SALT have been to limit technical innovation and strategic deployment of U.S. strategic weapons that threaten Soviet society, forces and doctrine. Concurrently, they wanted the freedom to pursue the defense programs that added to their security. The new Soviet ICBMs that have been deployed in recent years, together with limits on ABMs and cruise missiles, are graphic examples. In essence the U.S.S.R. sought, and achieved through SALT, the means to insure or protect the strategic arsenal they now possess. SALT has not constrained the Soviets from changing the strategic nuclear relationship from absolute inferiority to parity; it has allowed it to occur.²⁴

The goals of the United States in SALT have been described by Zbigniew Brzezinski as the same as our overall strategic policy: "to reduce incentives

for either side to *use* nuclear weapons, to limit pressures to *build up* strategic arms, and to *guarantee* the security of our national interests and those of our allies and friends."²⁵ Perhaps Dr. Brzezinski's remarks can be interpreted as something he hopes for in the future, while the remarks of Admiral Hayward seem to be more oriented toward the present: "The failure of SALT II to achieve major reductions is certainly one of its most disappointing aspects.... Of equal importance is the fact that the treaty does little to create a stable strategic relationship between the two sides."²⁶ Admiral Hayward goes on to relate strategic stability to the vulnerability of both sides' weapons—and the fact that SALT permits the Soviet Union to build and deploy such a force for instability. Lest there be any lingering doubts about the relationship of SALT II to the strategic relationship, Admiral Hayward states that the treaty "... provides little comfort to those of us

who had hoped SALT II would see a decisive reversal of the trend toward strategic force expansion."²⁷

The United States clings to the concept of mutual deterrence that requires that both societies be vulnerable and that its second-strike retaliatory capability must be invulnerable. The U.S.S.R. apparently conceives deterrence to be achieved quite differently: no vulnerability is acceptable to either its society or forces and it is pursuing policies to survive a nuclear attack, should it occur, and to "win" the war. These conflicting doctrines have driven the strategic force level trends that have changed so dramatically over the years. SALT has certainly been a useful device for many political reasons but, as Richard Pipes says, it misses the point in that it is not a comprehensive arms agreement and does not address the question of how each side intends to use its forces.²⁸

NOTES

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3. *Ibid.*, pp. 484-485.
4. David S. Sullivan, "The Legacy of SALT I: Soviet Deception and U.S. Retreat," *Strategic Review*, Winter 1979, p. 28.
5. Brown, p. 486.
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7. *Ibid.*, p. 489.
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12. Hayward, p. 2.
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14. *Ibid.*, pp. 104-105.
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16. John Erickson, "The Chimera of Mutual Deterrence," *Strategic Review*, Spring 1978, p. 13.
17. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Remarks Before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 4 April 1979, as quoted in Dept. of State Current Policy Bulletin No. 2, "SALT II and National Security," April 1979, p. 2.
18. Stanley Sienkiewicz, "SALT and Soviet Nuclear Doctrine," *International Security*, Spring 1978, pp. 91-96.
19. Erickson, p. 13.
20. Pipes, p. 24.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 25.
22. Sienkiewicz, p. 91.
23. Sullivan, p. 31; Lodal, p. 249.
24. Sullivan, p. 28.
25. Brzezinski, p. 3.
26. Hayward, p. 2.
27. *Ibid.*
28. Pipes, p. 34.

POTENTIAL OF INTERNAL CONFLICT IN ISRAEL

by

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Introduction. The past recourse in the Middle East to international armed conflict and the ever present threat that yet another war may break out has diverted attention away from another serious threat to stability in the region—the potential for internal conflict within Israel itself. The purpose of this paper is to investigate selected factors that either impel toward internal conflict in Israel or militate against it. The analytical framework derives primarily from the psychological school of conflict theory that seeks to explain the origins, intensity and limits of violence in society. The focus of the paper is not solely on the Palestinian segment but also includes groups within the Jewish community.

An Analytical Frame.¹ A psychological explanation of violence² argues that such behavior results from a sequence of frustration, anger and aggression. The frustration in turn results from a perception that one is unable to acquire or retain material and psychological positions (value positions) to which one believes oneself entitled. The perceived difference between value positions actually held and those felt to be justified is referred to as relative deprivation (RD). For purposes of this paper, however, it is

not enough to ascribe RD only to individuals, even though intensive RD might well lead to individual acts of violence against Israeli society. The more critical issue is the problem of group violence growing out of collective perceptions of group deprivation. With this point of departure, the following four factors will be addressed as a means to identify Israeli conditions that encourage or inhibit internal conflict:

1. Pluralism and the potential for collective violence.
2. Origins of RD (rising expectations).
3. Normative justifications for political violence.
4. Utilitarian justifications for political violence.

Pluralism and the Potential for Collective Violence. The frustration—anger—aggression (violence) sequence that occurs at the individual level is linked to collective violent behavior in relationship to the number of individuals experiencing deprivation and the intensity of that perceived deprivation. Thus if the number of individuals or intensity of their source of deprivation can be moderated the likelihood of collective violence will be reduced. The intensity can be reduced by providing substitute value positions⁷

(either material or psychological) for the ones in which the perceived deprivation occurs, thus lessening the press towards violence. The existence of pluralism in a society (e.g., multiparty, social mobility, horizontal and vertical interacting groups, concurrent membership in multiple groups with divergent goals) provides the mechanism through which these substitute value positions are made available. Value position substitution reduces the relative importance attached to the loss of any given single value position.

Israeli society, particularly the Jewish sector, is typified by a high degree of pluralism that offers multiple avenues for individuals to seek value positions. Some examples follow:

*A multiparty system with proportional representation and universal suffrage.*³ The price of such a political system in various Western states often has been cabinet instability and major shifts in government programs as coalitions move between left and right extremes. But in Israel, until May 1977, the left of center rule of the Israel Labor Party had been unbroken for nearly half a century. The peaceful transition of power from Labor to Likud is evidence of the strength of Israeli democratic procedures and institutions. Specifically, the transition to and the subsequent ability of the Begin Likud regime to make momentous policy shifts (all the more significant given Begin's reputation as an extreme hawk) *vis-à-vis* Egypt are eloquent demonstrations of individual and collective support of the internal system that allocates scarce values (i.e., makes distribution of valued positions to Israeli groups and individuals). The Israeli system of proportional representation, while exacting a cost of inefficiency in legislative procedure, assures even to minor groups (parties) the deprivation alleviating perception of at least being heard. The multiparty system reflects, and gives a sense of worth, to groups of

diverse origins in the largely immigrant population. One can shift from a particular political grouping to another party without thereby endangering all of the value positions associated with the original group.⁴ This is assured by the certainty that the new group (unless very small) will have some representation or influence on national policy affecting the individual. Further the parties provide social, economic and educational services for their respective followings.⁵

It is to be noted, however, that Arab membership in Jewish parties is small. This results from the integrative nature of the parties that seek to inculcate their members with their unique and often emotionally espoused Zionist, religious, socialist or other non-Arabic *gestalt*, and from the noncongruity of mass hierarchical structures with the personality based, atomistic associations typical of Arab society. The result is effective exclusion—not necessarily by design—of most Arabs from the salutary effects of value substitutions offered by the political parties.⁶

An organized labor movement and government social services. Because material well-being is a central value position sought by virtually all in Israel, and resources are limited, the likelihood that relative economic deprivation will be encountered is very great. It is true that Israeli economic health is marginal, given huge defense expenditures, reluctance of foreign capital to invest owing to regional instability and very high inflation rates. It is also true that these conditions are erosive of support of that part of the public that is relatively unprotected from loss of economic value positions. Why has this phalanx of grim economic conditions not led to widespread frustration and internal conflict?

The explanation is largely to be found in the Histadrut,⁷ Israel's powerful trade union movement. The Histadrut offers social mobility vertically through

76 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

demonstrated abilities and laterally (industry, public services, construction, transportation, commerce, etc.) as personal interest dictates. Perhaps even more importantly, it blunts the effects of economic failures on the individual Israeli worker. Growing out of the broad commitment of Zionist socialism to state responsibility for the economic welfare of the citizen, the Histadrut (and even the Likud government) have, as a cardinal social policy, refused to solve economic problems of inflation, low productivity and bureaucratic waste at the expense of the value position (economic) of the Israeli worker. There are, of course, costs to be paid for full employment via state subsidizing of unprofitable enterprises and for indexed wage rates that both outstrip and add to inflation. The cost is being paid by those that underwrite the Israeli state budget—essentially the U.S. and Jewish people outside Israel.⁸ Still, from the narrower viewpoint, the social welfare policies of the Histadrut and government do in fact not only soften the adjustment of new immigrants but also cushion the broader citizenry against the economic shocks of defense outlays. This serves to lessen perceived deprivation and its accompanying frustration, which in turn reduces the potential for internal conflict. The danger is that it merely postpones the time of reckoning and adds greatly to the psychological pressures accompanying the realization that one's economic position is dependent upon those over whom Israel has at best an eroding degree of influence.

Even a cursory review of indicators of economic well-being reveals that the Arab populations of Israel do not receive the same protection of their economic value positions as that afforded to the Jewish segment. Thus unemployment rates during economic downturns (1961, 1967, 1974) are higher for Arab than Jew; *per capita* income for Arab is just over half that of

the Jew; and spending and consumption patterns of Arabs tend much more toward necessities of food and shelter. Education patterns, standards of housing, health and ownership of durable goods (cars, telephones, TVs, etc.) all reflect a consistent picture of an economically depressed group.⁹ There are of course various reasons for these conditions, many of which are to be found as much in Arab failings as in Israeli. But, when perceptions are governing, as is the case in relative deprivation, the cold rationality of logic will lose to the intuitive sense that value positions are not as they should be. A wise leadership would seek to reduce the divergence between actual and desired economic status of the Arab community and indeed, considerable effort has been expended to this end; not a few Arabs enjoy economic value positions within Israel far above those experienced by their brethren outside its borders.¹⁰ To such Arabs economic well-being serves as a value substitute for lost or weakened psychological value positions based on such factors as Arab nationalism, Islamic cultural norms and prior interpersonal relationships.

Communications. The effectiveness of pluralism as a moderator of collective violence is dependent upon intra and intercultural communication. Israel has a communications structure unmatched in the Middle East. The high literacy rate, wide distribution of press materials (24 daily newspapers), freedom from press censorship and nationwide radio, TV and telephone systems all aid in exchange of divergent views. This in turn increases understanding (if not always acceptance) of other groups' objectives and perceptions. To an outsider, it may appear an undisciplined scene, in which internal squabbles run concurrently and in blissful disregard of security threats to Israel's very existence. Yet it could not be otherwise without dictatorial rule and the ultimate explosion of a society,

of such diverse groups. To most Israelis the loss of freedom (a highly esteemed value position) entailed in a suppression of pluralism would be almost as profound as would be the extinction of the state. Thus even the Marxist spokesman Yitzhak Ben-Aharon defends the pluralist form of economic enterprise and social forms with the argument that Israel simply "could not act in this way (dictatorial)."¹¹

Origins of Relative Deprivation (Rising Expectations?). Conflict theory suggests that RD occurs when the value positions attainable (welfare, power, status) remain constant while the value expectations rise. This situation is typical in developing societies in which peoples are exposed to new modes of life and new ideologies. It would appear intuitively that the Arab and Sabra Jews would experience this type of RD (normally identified as aspirational deprivation) as the waves of immigration opened to them expanded economic and social horizons.¹²

Exposure to new modes of life. The implantation of an essentially European, modern, industrial-oriented society upon a Sabra/Arab base certainly exposed the latter to new modes of life in which new values and norms were alien. Each new *aliya* (wave) brought a new mode, from the agricultural society (first), socialist *Kibbutzim* (second), proletarian socialism (fourth) to the professional and middle class (fifth).¹³ The syndrome of attraction and rejection was evident in the erratically rising tempo of Arab-Jewish conflict in Palestine during the Mandate period as the Arab grappled with the generally more effective organizational, economic and political methods of the new settlers.

As could be anticipated, the higher welfare and power value positions of the new Jewish populations led to Arab

RD. It is important to note that the RD was not solely of the aspirational variety. That is, it was not solely (or often even primarily) because of anticipated betterment (rising expectations) after seeing the Jewish example. Thus the demonstration effect underlying the theory of rising expectations had little influence on the interpersonal value category as the Arab largely rejected Jewish cultural norms. It was only when the threat to core Islamic values (removal or total submersion of an Islamic people) was perceived in the ever increasing Jewish immigration that frustration—anger—aggression routinely moved to the collective use of violence. Or put another way, the intensity with which the Arab holds the value of cultural self-worth and identity finally coalesced into a Palestinian nationalism as a means of protecting collective value positions (economic, social and territorial).¹⁴

For the majority of Arabs in Palestine the arrival of increasing numbers of Jewish immigrants did not provide an attractive picture of social and economic achievement to be actively copied. Not that the Arab desired less, but he did not anticipate that it would be given, and thus was not subject to rising expectations. He may well have experienced RD but it was not because of failure to achieve new and expected increases in his value positions. Rather he saw the means for even the retention of the currently held position being lost to the growing power of the Jewish community and state.¹⁵

It is of course not surprising that a displaced people would not forever acquiesce in its displacement. But the Jewish leaders had another and perhaps as difficult a problem in assimilation of very divergent Jewish peoples who shared in many cases little more than one concept—the Holy Land. To the immigrants the central problem became one of rising expectations; of aspirations to be met. As new citizens arrived

78 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

they expected to share in the rewards that had been held out as encouragement for immigration.

Yet there is no question that the rewards have not been and are not equally shared. The principal finding of virtually every sociological study is that the single factor that separates the Jewish population of Israel is the gap between Eastern (oriental and Asian-African) and Western (Ashkenazi) Jews. In each case the difference is to the detriment of the former. Those indexes that are routinely used to measure social class mobility, economic equality and cultural absorption show that the Western Jew occupies the favored position (i.e., his value position is higher). Representative research shows for example that occupational prestige (teacher, soldier, banker, engineer, etc.) of Western Jews is greater, anticipated occupational satisfaction by young Western Jews is higher and family incomes of Western Jews are higher.¹⁶ Why have not these clear inequalities within the Jewish community led to collective violence? Three basic reasons can be identified. First, the existence of overriding collective national commitments have served to mute internal cleavages. The two great national commitments are security and the Israeli state (nation) concept.¹⁷ Second, considerable progress toward achieving the aspired-to value positions has been collectively made. Disadvantaged immigrant groups (e.g., oriental Jews fleeing Arab lands in the post-1948 war period) do in fact have higher standards of living and are usually more participative in political life than their threatened minority ("foreign") status in their former lands allowed. Progress toward anticipated value positions, even if slow, serves to reduce the salience (intensity) of perceived deprivation.¹⁸ Third, a broad integrative obligation has been accepted by both state and private institutions of Israeli society.

Political parties, labor organizations,

religious groups, language societies (Hebrew), and state programs seek to integrate new immigrants and provide at least minimum value positions. The result is a reduction of cultural diversity through acculturation and social mixing. The longer term hazard of this "success" is the intensification of group tensions if (or when) this acculturation is not accompanied by adequate reduction in inequality.¹⁹

Exposure to new ideologies. Both individuals and groups are highly susceptible to the influence of new ideologies (a set of assumptions about reality that posit action) during periods of great stress, particularly if the stress results from the patent inability of previously held ideologies to explain or defend against a loss of collective value positions. A shifting mix of often incompatible ideologies have been at work in Israel, leading to conflicting sets of value expectations and increasing the potential for internal conflict. The more important ideologies have been modernization, Westernization, nationalism and pan-Arabism.

Modernization and its attendant trend toward secularization have been particularly pronounced among the oriental Jews. The orientals (especially the newer generation) have not only become less religious (i.e., in retention of oriental religious traditions) but they tend to acquire the more dominant (and more secularized) Ashkenazi practices such as family planning and preference for situational interpretations of the *halakha* (e.g., watching TV on Sunday).²⁰ The ideology of modernization has been carried to Israel by the Ashkenazi Jew who was much more influenced by the reform and liberal forces of the enlightenment.²¹

Closely tied to the concept of modernization is that of Westernization, a term that describes the general expectations of the Ashkenazi community that Israel will become a modern,

industrial, democratic state based upon secularism, economic progress and the values of individualism. The general pattern of oriental-Ashkenazi relations in connection with the ideology of Westernization has been one of paternalistic co-optation in which the Eastern Jew is to be integrated upon his adjustment to and acceptance of the Western character of the state. This condition resulted in considerable disenchantment among oriental elites and masses and subsequent shifts toward a less paternalistic approach by the Ashkenazi and the beginnings of a competitive pattern. It is by no means yet clear if the forces for integration will predominate over the very real Ashkenazi vested interests in the existing system that gives them greater power, welfare and interpersonal value positions.²²

The ideology of nationalism is paramount to both Zionist Jews and Palestinian Arabs. This ideology produces rising expectations that are certain to go unmet inasmuch as both groups see nationalism in terms of the same territory.

A principal pillar of Israeli integration of the immigrant stream has been the commitment of each citizen to the nation state. Nationalism, in the outward tangible form of a geographical entity, is a *sine qua non* of the Zionist cause. It is backed by the full range of economic, political and military capabilities of world Jewry and ultimately by U.S. commitment to its perpetuation.²³ It is instructive to note that this value position (nationalism) is so deeply held that virtually all other value positions can be eroded to preserve it. Or put another way, security (preservation of the national identity) is the summation of Israel's *weltanschauung*. The danger of such single-mindedness is perhaps obvious; it tends toward a garrison state mentality, short-term solutions and increased alienation of opponents.

The Palestinian Arabs, it is generally conceded, are not uniformly motivated by nationalism as an ideology. Commitments to a Palestinian state vary from the more extremist factions of the Palestinian liberation movement to groups that have accepted integration in other Arab (or European/U.S.) nationalities. It is, for example, by no means certain that the highly skilled, educated and well-paid Palestinian middle manager in Kuwait, London or Chicago would choose the harsh life of building a Palestinian nation were one to be established in the West Bank and Gaza—or that the comparatively well-off West Bank Arab would welcome a mass influx of Palestinians and the threat to his value positions that such a development might well entail. Nor, in fairness it must be added, are all Jews likely to give up their value positions to share the dangers of immigrant status in Israel.

Pan-Arabism, as an ideology, is viewed by Israeli Jews as a threat to their value positions, and so they react negatively to evidence of cooperative endeavors between Palestinians and Arab states. For example, Tel Aviv routinely justifies reprisal raids in terms that fault Arab governments for failing (intentionally?) to control Palestinian terrorist activities.²⁴ From the Palestinian side, there is little evidence to suggest that Pan-Arabism will be thought capable of actually producing concrete results. Rather, Pan-Arabism is used to keep the Palestinian cause in the minds of Arab populations throughout the Middle East.

Normative Justifications for Collective Violence. This topic requires an analysis of socialization patterns within the major groups of Israel's society to determine the existence of cultural traditions, mores, and norms that tend to legitimize the use of violence in political intercourse.

80 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

While recognizing that there is significant subgroup divergence, it is still useful to identify the general cultural norms that justify or reject violence as a means for value position acquisition and retention in the Arab and Jewish communities.

The Arab Community. Normative justifications for violence can be found in the Koranic injunctions of *jihad* (holy war) in defense (or propagation) of the faith and the fixation on the historical experience of Islam's precipitous rise following the Revelation to the Prophet in the seventh century. To be sure, the calls of the Palestinian movement have not been for an Islamic *jihad* so much as for violence in the name of Palestinian secularism, but the linkage between the two remains imbedded in a historical/religious experience that saw the Arab Islamic peoples overcome Western waves of incursion, whether Aristotelian or Crusader. There is great attraction in the call for a return to the pure faith and its struggle (*jihad*) against the current Western wave that is personified to many by the state of Israel. To use violence against it is not only normatively justifiable, it is to many imperative. Although more difficult to trace, the nomadic norms of semianarchy that ennoble violence and success in war can be seen in the propaganda (especially the early stages) of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).

Counterbalancing these normative tendencies toward violence is the trend toward adjusting to and living within existing Israeli political conditions. Thus many Arabs have formed their own parties and/or associated with the ruling coalitions (e.g., Ben Gurion's government in 1959-1965, and the Eshkol and Meir governments in 1966-1969). Those Palestinians more normatively oriented toward violence tend to gravitate to the PLO and its various associated groupings, which in

especially those in the occupied territories.²⁵

The Jewish Community. A major analytical problem exists here inasmuch as Jewish populations come from widely disparate cultural backgrounds, each having its own peculiar attitudes towards the use of violence. With this caveat, the following are the general Jewish normative attitudes towards the use of violence for political ends.

The common determination to survive is an underlying value that justifies violence if required. It often takes the form of "no more holocaust" and is strengthened by a mutual realization of shared danger, memories of past heroic episodes, and the perception that there is no alternative to the state of Israel. Still the population at large shows a strong desire for peace and a settlement with the Arab states.

Other normative blocks to political violence are wide respect for habits of law and the rights of man. The Prophets of Israel are seen to have preached equality, dignity, freedom and obedience. The operationalization of these concepts are, of course, partly incompatible with the Jewish state of Israel and cause considerable anguish to many. The growth of (or rather persistence of) the "peace movement", which seeks a return of selected Arab lands and more equitable dealings with Arab minorities in Israel, can be viewed as the institutional expression of this clash of normative forces.²⁶

Utilitarian Justification of Collective Violence. This topic requires an analysis of past uses of violence in order to discern if normative urges to collective violence have been rewarded with success. The postulate is that if violence has proven its utility its future use is more probable.

The Arab Community. Many Palestinian Arabs fled in 1948 after ineffectual use of violence. This was followed by other formal military

SET AND DRIFT 81

clashes with Jordanian forces in 1970 which also resulted in clear defeat. The defense policies of all Arab states include tight restrictions on the organization and use of Palestinian military forces per se, lest such forces evoke an unwanted Israeli attack on the harboring Arab nation.

The lack of utility of formal Palestinian Armed Forces against Israel has not, however, precluded subconventional war tactics. Lower-level violence has proven of considerable value in keeping the issue of Palestine before the world. Further, the training and recruitment of guerrilla groups have value in maintaining a high level of socialization of Palestinian refugees, thus blocking their assimilation into surrounding Arab societies.

As the al Fatah has moved toward becoming the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, its use of violence has markedly dropped.²⁷ But the tool of terror has been taken up by other more extremist groups that argue that violence has the continued utility of pressuring Israel to meet demands for a Palestinian homeland.²⁸

Jewish Community. The state of Israel grew out of successful use of both collective "informal" (terrorist) and state violence. The wearing down of British colonial will, expulsion and intimidation of Arabs, and repeated conventional war victories with Arab states is a classical case of proven utility of collective violence. Past successes serve to justify reversion to violent means in future crises, external or internal. Evidence of this proclivity can be seen in the all-but-automatic recourse to violent reprisals against Arab guerrilla locations in neighboring Arab states, and even at greater distances such as the Entebbe raid.²⁹ Palestinian critics of Israeli uses of violence for political ends have sought to "expose" excesses and infringements on human rights in the occupied lands.³⁰

The costly "victory" of 1973 has resulted in growing questions about the utility of state-to-state violence and a reduction in perceived utility of such violence as a means of protecting collective value positions. This reduction in the intensity of utilitarian justification for violence results from a pragmatic analysis of such factors as growing Arab military and psychological strength, vulnerability of Israel to advanced weapons, questioning and unsettled attitudes of European states (and the United States)³¹ and domestic cleavages on the issues of peace and war.

The use of collective violence by Jewish subgroups against the state has no normative or utilitarian justification per se; but given the experience of its successful use against non-Jewish targets, it is not unlikely that it would be employed against Jewish ones were the integrative forces to fail in maintaining nationalist cohesion.

Conclusions. This analysis has identified two major factors that suggest that a considerable potential for internal conflicts exists within Israel. The first and perhaps more obvious is the relative deprivation being experienced by the Arab minorities which resent past erosion of their value positions and fear further loss. Often unwilling, or culturally unable, to conform to the modes of the Jewish society, they choose to deny themselves welfare and power value positions rather than be co-opted at the expense of their Arabness.

Less obvious and therefore perhaps more serious a potential for conflict is the very real dichotomy within the Jewish community itself between oriental and Western Jews in which the primacy in value positions clearly belongs to the latter. So long as external threats serve to reinforce the primary cohesive forces of national commitment to a Jewish state, there is little likelihood of widespread internal conflict

82 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

involving collective violence. Still the Jewish society is influenced by the normative and utilitarian justifications for the use of violence and contains deep-rooted social and cultural cleavages. Such a combination carries the potential for internal conflict, both in times of domestic crises and in times of international peace. A pressing need is to narrow further the gaps among the divergent peoples who make up Israel

and to substitute nonsecurity motivations as the source of support to the political community. Much has been done (perhaps more than anyone could have reasonably expected) to tie together so diverse a people in such a short time and under such adverse conditions. Still, as an Israeli Minister of Education and Culture wrote after praising the nation's efforts, "... much remains to be done."³²

NOTES

1. The theoretical construct used in this paper is derived from Ted Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970) and Ivo Feierabend, et al., "Social Change and Political Violence: Cross-National Patterns," in Feierabend and Gurr, eds., *Anger, Violence and Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972), pp. 107-124.

2. An alternative sociological explanation is convincingly argued by Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966).

3. The electoral system is described in "Government and Politics" of Richard F. Nyrop, *Israel: A Country Study* (Washington: The American University Press, 1979), pp. 117-174. See especially pp. 144-162.

4. Suggestive of this flexibility is the emergence of the split-ticket voting behavior and merged party lists (of office seekers) at local levels. See Alan Arian, *The Choosing People: Voting Behavior in Israel* (London: The Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1973), pp. 177-199.

5. The social and economic role of parties is explained in detail in Peter Y. Medding's work on the Mapai (forerunner of the Labor Party) *Mapai in Israel: Political Organization and Government in a New Society* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1972). See especially pp. 8-9 and 231-236.

6. Some political and social consequences of the atomistic view of reality together with an examination of Arab (Islamic) adjustments to Western contact are given in Jay C. Mumford, "Islamic Response Modes to Western Contact," Report No. FAOC 1-79, U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance, Fort Bragg, N.C. (typewritten).

7. A scholarly work that examines the Histadrut's effect on Israel's economic life is Nadav Halevi and Ruth Klinov-Malul, *The Economic Development of Israel* (New York: Praeger, 1968). Chapter 11 deals with Histadrut effect on wage policy.

8. Ann Crittenden, "Israel's Economic Plight," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1979, p. 1010.

9. See "The Transformation of Arab Class Structure in Israel" of Elia T. Zureik, *The Palestinians in Israel* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), pp. 122-130.

10. An anthropological study of such a case is Abner Cohen, *Arab Border-Villages in Israel: A Study of Continuity and Change in Social Organization* (Manchester, U.K.: The University Press, 1965).

11. Irzhak Ben-Aharon, "The Just Society in Israel," in Israel T. Naamani, ed., *Israel, Its Politics and Philosophy* (New York: Behrman House, 1974), p. 431.

12. Aristotle had aspirational deprivation in mind when he observed that "... it is the aspiration after inequality... which provokes... to sedition, when they imagine... their share to be smaller." Aristotle, *The Politics*, translated by Wellton, pp. 343-344, quoted in Gurr, p. 52.

13. S.N. Eisenstadt, *Israeli Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1967), pp. 11-33.

14. Some observers, even overtly pro-Arab, argue that fragmentation of the Palestinian movement is evidence that the Palestinians have not even yet (1972) evolved a nationalism capable of a unified response to the Jewish threat to their basic values. See Abid A. Al-Marayati, "Psychocultural Factors in the Arab-Israeli Conflict," *Middle East Institute: 1972 Panel Series* (Washington: The Middle East Institute, 1972), p. 2.

15. Gurr calls this decremental deprivation, a condition in which value expectations remain relatively constant but value capabilities decrease.

16. Leonard Weller, *Sociology in Israel* (London: Greenwood Press, 1974). See especially the chapter on social class and mobility, pp. 78-120.

17. Eva Etzioni-Halevy, *Political Culture in Israel: Cleavage and Integration among Israeli Jews* (New York: Praeger, 1973), pp. 159-168. While the difference is not great, national commitment to the

state of Israel was higher among Eastern Jews (p. 167). This would further mute frustration associated with unrealized value aspirations of this disadvantaged group.

18. However, the danger of violence increases if, once on the path to better value positions, the progress is stopped or reversed. This characteristic is analyzed in Ted Gurr and Charles Ruttenger, *Cross-National Studies of Civil Violence* (Washington: The American University Press, 1969), pp. 63-66.

19. Sammy Smooha, *Israel: Pluralism and Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 148-150.

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 112-113.

21. The effect on the Ashkenazi Jewry of modern European culture during the 18th century is detailed in Raphael Patai, *The Jewish Mind* (New York: Scribner, 1977), pp. 222-274.

22. Raphael Patai identifies the basic Ashkenazi character of "all important public institutions in Israel" in *Israel Between East and West* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1970), pp. 159-164.

23. The latest restatement of this commitment is in Jimmy Carter, "State of the Union Message," *The New York Times*, 23 January 1980, p. A-3.

24. For example see Juan de Onis, "Lebanon Says 5 Are Killed in Border Raids by Israel," *The New York Times*, 3 January 1975, p. 2-1.

25. Of the many works explaining PLO organization, motives and tactics, among the best is Paul A. Jureidini and William E. Hazen, *The Palestinian Movement in Politics* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1976). See especially pp. 19-40 for the divergent Palestinian views on strategies and tactics.

26. The dichotomy is traced via the Land of Israel Movement and the peace movement in Rael Jean Isaac, *Israel Divided: Ideological Politics in the Jewish State* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), pp. 103-137.

27. Jureidini and Hazen, pp. 95-96.

28. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and Arab Liberation Front (ALF) constitute the core of the so-called rejectionist front that insists on continued use of violence and rejects any peaceful settlement.

29. The success of this raid served to markedly increase the perceived utilitarian justification for violence *even* in other nations as far away in ideology as Egypt and in distance as the United States. In both cases strike forces were established and trained.

30. Typical is George Dib and Fuad Jabber, *Israel's Violation of Human Rights in the Occupied Territories: A Documented Report* (Beirut, Lebanon: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1970).

31. An analysis of the reassessment of the utilitarian justification for state-to-state violence with specific emphasis on changing U.S. attitudes is given in Nadav Safran, *Israel, The Embattled Ally* (London: Belknap Press, 1978), chap. 26.

32. Uri Thon, "Coexistence thru Education: The Israeli Approach," *New Middle East*, April 1973, pp. 30-32.

84 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

STRATEGIC WARFARE: CONSIDERING THE FUTURE NUCLEAR DETERRENT FORCE

by

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Elements of Deterrence. Before embarking on a detailed discussion of strategic nuclear missile basing modes, it may help to examine our deterrent strategy. Since the late 1950s, this nation's strategy has been to pursue the principle of "assured destruction," an effort to show our potential enemy that in a nuclear conflict the harm he would suffer in an exchange of strategic nuclear weapons would be unacceptable to him.¹ As the Soviet arsenal grew, and the assured destruction capability became "mutual," most planners and strategists came to believe firmly in the principle of the "balance of terror," which seemed to reflect a condition in which neither side would resort to the use of strategic nuclear weapons.²

As the "balance of terror" idea caught hold, some began to look at the use of nuclear weapons of limited range and yield—"tactical nuclear weapons"—as feasible, in the belief that they could substitute for conventional forces in Europe. This thinking was driven by the fact that Europe seemed held hostage by the Soviet Union's superior conventional strength, and that we needed an intermediate level of deterrence of a Soviet attack there. The first major treatise on the subject of tactical nuclear warfare was published³ just as many influential military and civilian analysts were beginning to realize that there was no clearly distinguishable boundary between the two sorts of nuclear weapons (and that the Soviets were clearly achieving a credible ICBM capability), and the escalation theory they proposed became virtual doctrine

by the early 1960s.⁴ Contained in this doctrine was the idea that war should be fought with conventional weapons only, and that so long as each side's populations were threatened at the "unacceptability level" by the other side's strategic nuclear weapons, nuclear general war would not occur. This is the essence of the "countervalue" strategy.

The countervalue strategy requires *a priori* a condition in which each side has a sufficient second-strike capability to insure that, after absorbing the first strike, sufficient nuclear assets remain to conclude promptly the exchange at a level that the initiator will find unacceptable. This is a tenuous idea, containing considerable uncertainty, but during the past two decades, even as the balance of nuclear power has changed in both strictly numerical terms and in terms of throw-weight potentials, it was a somewhat viable one, given the low countermilitary potential (CMP) of each side's weapons.⁵ Although Secretary McNamara and other influential policymakers began publicly discussing the merits of a CMP-based, or counterforce, strategy in 1963-1964, it was James Schlesinger, as Secretary of Defense, who firmly placed our strategy on the counterforce course in the early 1970s.⁶

Herman Kahn, writing in 1963, defined the six broad strategic objectives sought by U.S. military policy:⁷

1. *Type I Deterrence*—to deter a large attack on the military forces, population, or wealth of the United States, by threatening a

high level of damage to the attacker in retaliation;

2. *Type II Deterrence*—to deter extremely provocative actions short of large attack on the United States (for example, a nuclear or even all-out conventional strike against Western Europe) by the threat of an “all-out” United States nuclear reprisal against the Soviet Union;

3. *Improved War Outcome*—to limit damage to United States (and allied) population and wealth, and improve the military outcome for the United States should a war occur;

4. *Stability*—to reduce the likelihood of an inadvertent thermonuclear war;

5. *Comprehensive Arms Control*—to control and limit both the arms race and the use of force in settling disputes;

6. *Type III Deterrence*—to deter provocations not covered by Type II Deterrence and provide support for the achievement of “peaceful” political objectives and for tactics such as Controlled Reprisal, other limited wars, mobilizations, negotiations, and so forth.⁸

These objectives are still operative in their essential aspects though, as we shall see, there is room for doubt that we any longer adequately achieve them all, or will be able to through the decade ahead. No attempt will be made here, however, to enter into a critique of the theory and calculus of deterrence.⁹ Kahn's six categories of strategic objectives are sufficient for a discussion of weapon-basing modes, as they seem to define the long-term National Command Authority (NCA) view.

Defining the Strategic Deterrent.

General. Having seen that the intended purpose of strategic nuclear weapons is to deter their use by either side, it is necessary to examine the essential

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criteria that must be met by a given strategic system or combination of systems if deterrence is to be served.

Essential Deterrent Criteria. In order for a strategic weapon system to deter, it must meet five general criteria. While these criteria apply to both nuclear and nonnuclear conventional systems, the discussion here is in nuclear terms.

Survivability. In Henry Young's words, the system must “deny a coercive post-attack military superiority.”¹⁰ That is to say, if it is targetable, it must be able to absorb the effects of the enemy's weapons and still be able to function. This criterion has two bidimensional components: own system's targetability and hardness, and enemy system's accuracy and yield. Survivability is enhanced by proliferating a given system or its launchers to the extent that exceeds the number of warheads in the enemy's arsenal, or by reducing targetability, either of which reduce the requirement to harden.¹¹

Prompt Employment. A strategic weapon system must be capable of responding quickly to a first strike. For highly targetable systems this capability enhances survivability to the extent that the nuclear release authority has the willingness and C³ capability to “launch on warning” (LOW) or “launch through attack” (LTA). As targetability decreases, some response time can be traded for survivability.

Credibility. A strategic weapon system must be designed so that, in the view of the potential nuclear opponent, we would be willing and ready to use it, should the need arise. One of the most important considerations is that the weapon's war potential must be such that, should deterrence fail, our ability to deny him his objective in initiating the exchange is enhanced. An equally important component of a system's credibility is the extent to which resort to its use would run counter to our

86 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

values and norms. For example, one could ask, "Is this system's yield so large, and its accuracy so poor, that its use, even on purely military targets, would cause the inhumane suffering of large numbers of innocent civilians?" To the extent the answer to that question is yes, and assuming that the Soviets have not laid down nuclear strikes on *our* population centers, the credibility of the threat posed by our system is low.

Countermilitary Potential. As we have seen, weapon systems of high CMP are more useful deterrents than weapons with lower CMPs, especially under a counterforce strategy. This is a big subject to which no brief discussion can do justice, and its operating components are among the major factors in the current debate with respect to basing modes.¹² Suffice it to say that the Soviet Union's silo-based strategic nuclear missile systems have achieved high CMPs much sooner than we had originally expected, and that factor alone is quickly placing our like systems under the gun.

War Potential. Many would argue that this is not an essential criteria that must be met by a strategic deterrent weapon system. There is a belief, fairly widely held, that once deterrence at the strategic nuclear level fails, there can be no winners, only losers. This view fails to take into account the apparent Soviet view, on the one hand, and the technological state of the art with respect to specific systems, on the other.¹³ Again, we are faced with a credibility problem: if deterrence *does* fail, can we use the systems in quantity and tactics of our choosing, when we wish, to make it impossible for the enemy to win? If it seems to him that we cannot, then to the extent that we cannot, we degrade deterrence. The corollary is apparent.

The Triad Concept. Having established the interrelated criteria for

deterrence through latent threat, it is interesting to note that until recently our strategic nuclear Triad,¹⁴ taken in the aggregate, has met these criteria. The Triad is a fortuitous historical accident. That is, as we worked to retain an operational deterrent in the face of our opponent's improving threat, we created new systems, and when the current Soviet capability emerged, it happened that the legs of the Triad we possessed worked effectively in concert to deter.

There are two ways deterrence has benefited from the existence of a Triad. Firstly, the legs have a synergistic effect on each other. For example, the fact that the flight time of the most accurate Soviet missiles—silo-based ICBMs, which must be targeted on *our* silos to disarm us—is sufficient to allow our bomber force to launch on warning while depressed-trajectory SLBMs targeted on our bomber bases have short flight times but would enable us to I.T.A. an undegraded ICBM disarming strike, creates a serious attack timing problem for the initiators of a coordinated strike. Secondly, the weaknesses of each leg tend to be offset by the strengths of the others. To the extent that bombers have great potential for attacking with precision but low survivability in the escape and penetration phases of the attack, SLBMs have great survivability but considerably less precision (as currently deployed). This synergistic and complementary nature of the Triad's components must be kept in mind during any discussion of the future nature of the force.

It is essential, when thinking about the future, to reflect on the decision to deploy the current silo-based ICBM force. When the Kennedy administration came into office in January 1961, authorization already existed for 450 Minuteman ICBM.¹⁵ We knew *then* that those silos might eventually become vulnerable, but the time within which

that might occur (which we are now entering) seemed then to be far in the future. The question must be asked, would another strategy, embarked upon at that time, have changed the current situation? If so, we can ill-afford to make the same mistake again.¹⁶

A counter to that argument, of course, is that *any* system presumably can become vulnerable at some future point, and the accelerated rate of technological achievement on both sides makes that point difficult to predict. As a consequence, the counterargument goes, maintenance of a multifaceted capability enhances deterrence, at equal or less cost and risk, by dissipating the technological defensive effort of the other side into many areas, as he deals with many sorts of threat. We thus hedge against the uncertainty of future technological achievement.

The crux of the problem is that we are severely resource-constrained when planning the future force, at a time when one leg of the Triad—the silo-based ICBM—is about to become the victim of block obsolescence brought on by our opponent's technological activity. We should allocate our resources to systems that seem to have the highest potential for postponing the onset of block obsolescence in the future.

Measures of Effectiveness. In studying strategic nuclear weapon systems, and especially when comparing them, it is helpful to have at hand some fairly clear measures of effectiveness by which alternative systems can be evaluated. Having already established the general criteria to be met by any strategic system, it seems fairly easy to derive specific characteristics that nuclear systems must possess. Theoretically, then, and assuming the rational decision process, we should be able to determine what is the "best" system.

This method of comparison is, of course, simplistic in the extreme, providing only one element in the

decision calculus. Nevertheless, this analysis proceeds on the assumption that the rational model should precede all others.

For the purposes of this study, six key characteristics for strategic nuclear weapon systems have been derived. Others may postulate greater or fewer numbers of characteristics of interest but, as was the case with criteria of interest noted earlier, the interrelationships between the characteristics are such that it is necessary for each analyst to subdivide them only to the point of greatest use to him.

Accuracy. Measured as CEP (Circular Error Probable or Circle of Equal Probability)—the radius of a circle into which 50 percent of a system's warheads will fall and detonate. CEP is far the most important factor in computing counterforce lethality, or CMP, and is currently largely a function of delivery system accuracy. The exception is MARV (maneuvering reentry vehicle), but MARV can be adapted to any missile-basing mode.

Penetration. The capability of a system's warheads to penetrate enemy defenses. For missiles, governed in significant degree by trajectory and time of flight.

Promptness. Rapidity of response. A function of mechanical and physical properties of the launcher; characteristics of the vehicle (which may also be the launcher); and C³ capability, survivability, and postattack reconstitution potential.

Survivability. A function mainly of targetability, hardness, and enemy CMP.

C³—Command, Control, and Communications System. Measured in terms of its survivability, reliability, and capacity. The characteristic to

88 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

which total system effectiveness is most sensitive. For example, a C^3 system that is highly survivable and totally reliable, but cannot communicate retargeting data quickly, reduces promptness of the system. A C^3 system with great reliability and capacity, but which is highly vulnerable, makes the total system vulnerable to the same degree.

Flexibility. A system's responsiveness to changing targets, attack criteria, and timing. Governed in large part by C^3 effectiveness, this is a critical characteristic if the posited system is to meet the war criteria earlier discussed.

Before proceeding to a discussion of silo-based ICBM vs. submarine-based SLBM, it will be helpful to analyze today's force, the Triad, in terms of the above six characteristics, using two countervailing forces—the Soviet strategic nuclear forces of 1980 and as we estimate they will be in 1985—to illustrate the nature of the counterforce dilemma we face. The analysis, in matrix form at Tables 1 and 2, ranks each leg of the Triad from first to third in effectiveness against each measure. While based on judgment, the rankings do tend to reflect the majority view among most influential policymakers and strategists.

TABLE 1—TRIAD COUNTERVAILED BY 1980 SOVIET FORCE

	Bomber	ICBM	SLBM
Accuracy	1	2	3
Penetration	3	2	1
Promptness	3	1	2
Survivability	3	2	1
C^3	2	1	3
Flexibility	1	2	3
Raw Total	13	10	13
Total Firsts	2	2	2
RANKING	2	1	2

As seen in Table 1, the 1980 analysis shows the ICBM clearly in first place within the Triad, with the manned

bomber and SLBM tied for second. The synergistic and complementary nature of the Triad's components make them very nearly equal when taken together.

TABLE 2—TRIAD COUNTERVAILED BY 1985 SOVIET FORCE

	Bomber	ICBM	SLBM
Accuracy	1	2	3
Penetration	3	2	1
Promptness	3	1	2
Survivability	2	3	1
C^3	2	3	1
Flexibility	1	3	2
Raw Total	12	14	10
Total Firsts	2	1	3
RANKING	2	3	1

In 1985, however, as shown in Table 2, the situation changes markedly. The SLBM, here assuming that no major changes are made to the current program, emerges clearly in first place, followed by the bomber, with the silo-based ICBM as currently deployed clearly in last place. This is the source of the current debate, and of plans to embark in earnest on the MX program in some one of several possible basing options. Critical to the argument to follow is the fact that the entire net change in ranking can be traced to changing survivability factors in the face of improving Soviet CMP figures. The improving Soviet CMP makes the silos vulnerable, degrades the survivability of C^3 systems, and thus makes quick retargeting potential doubtful.

Force Structure Changes. It is apparent that a key benefit of the Triad is that it tends to force the Soviets to allocate their strategic offensive and defensive resources into several areas simultaneously. This, in turn, dissipates their technological effort.

Unfortunately, continued pursuit of the Triad as currently envisioned dissipates our own effort as well. There is no reason to believe that what has, up

to this point, been our strongest attribute in defense matters—technological superiority—will cease being so in the future, if we make the correct decisions now. It thus seems safe to say that whether we field one or twenty strategic systems, we will be able to maintain a technological edge in each of them. Many, not all of them defeatists, will argue otherwise, of course.

Nevertheless, taking that idea as an axiom, it becomes our task to decide what the future effort should have as its goal. For the purposes of this discussion, the manned bomber, which fulfills many purposes beyond strategic nuclear deterrence, is assumed to be a viable and ongoing system for the future. The choice here will be between silo-based ICBMs and submarine-based SLBMs. The discussion has several key dimensions.

If we were tomorrow to dismantle all our silo-based ICBMs and fill the holes with asphalt, simultaneously cancelling the MX program, the Soviets would find that they had expended a great deal of effort and treasure on weapons that suddenly had no targets. The whole object of improving the CMP of their silo-based force was to place our key counterforce system—the silo-based ICBM—under the gun. Weapons of such accuracy and yield are vastly overdesigned and overdeveloped for use on soft targets, and their use or threatened use for such targets leaves the Soviets the problem that we have a system—SLBM—optimized for just that purpose. To zero out our ICBM capability, of course, would introduce other problems, such as the loss of our entire disarming, prompt, retaliatory capability, but the idea serves to illustrate that there *are* simple solutions to the emerging ICBM vulnerability problem. The question, of course, is whether they accomplish the strategic deterrent objectives of the nation.

The Soviets have undertaken a known program to harden their silos to

psi resistance values of at least 2,000. The P_k of a 170KT MK12 reentry vehicle, ejected from a Minuteman III bus, against such a silo is approximately 25 percent, based on a MK12 CEP on the order of 0.15nm. Two such warheads (the optimum level, beyond which fratricidal effects are a problem) raises the P_k to 44 percent.¹⁷ The MX, with its much higher throw-weight, yields much higher confidence of hard-target kill. It can be (and is) thus argued that if for no other reason, the MX is a good idea.

Beyond the throw-weight improvement, however, one of the key arguments for MX is that it tends to ameliorate the vulnerability problem by offering many targets to the Soviet ICBM force. This, it is hoped, will make it virtually impossible to target all our hard target-killing capability, and that constitutes a clear signal to the Soviets that we will not tolerate their growing counterforce capability.

We can gain these same benefits with the strategic submarine, within the same time period, at the same or less cost. MX is currently scheduled for Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in 1985-86, assuming that the not-inconsiderable environmental and local socioeconomic barriers can be quickly overcome. It is currently estimated that it will cost at least \$43 billion in acquisition. There is little question that \$43 billion applied to the Trident II and follow-on programs would yield an equally capable system in terms of total CMP, the vulnerability problem would be solved to the same extent or better, and there are virtually no environmental factors that have not already been addressed.¹⁸

One important component of war potential as a deterrent criterion is the ability to reload a system for follow-on attacks. This is based on the principle of reserve capability, which the Soviets respect as a "main factor" in determining the outcome of a war. The basing of

90 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

our prompt counterforce weapons in SSBNs greatly improves our ability to reload when compared with land-based systems, inasmuch as disruption of the terrain around land launch points will surely prevent operation of large land vehicles; the Soviets would certainly target SLBM storage sites for the first strike but we would retain the *potential* for reloads in the SSBN system.

The decision to move to an all-SLBM force would have to be based on the assumption that the C³ problems currently encountered in the system could be solved adequately. The flexibility advantage currently found in land ICBM systems results from the relative ease with which retargeting can be accomplished. This requires high data rates, and all current high-rate SSBN communications systems use easily disrupted bands of the frequency spectrum. On the other hand, the range of the Trident II missile will be such that the submarines can launch from havens very close to CONUS, which can be expected to ease the communications challenge considerably.

Of considerable concern is the fact that the Soviets seem to be approaching the desired state of the art in improving the CMP of their land-based force, and are thus now able to expend far more R&D effort on ASW. It is thus conceivable that at some future time the SLBM force could encounter block obsolescence, leaving our entire prompt retaliatory force vulnerable. While this must remain a valid concern, and is certainly a strong argument in favor of continuing the Triad and pressing on with MX, there are also strong counterarguments.

In the first place, if the Soviets are currently in a position to maximize their ASW effort, and have already achieved a significant counterforce

capability against our land force, there seems to be little we can do to lessen that effort. For the *foreseeable* future, SLBM remains essentially invulnerable, and with or without SALT II, the MX will not be. SALT II, of course, strengthens the MX case, in both counterforce and arms limitation terms.¹⁹ In the second place, the range and accuracy of Trident II will be such that the launchers can patrol in some of the worst ASW wares in the world, and still threaten the Soviets with a disarming second strike.

The Soviets are thus forced either to place their land-based system in a mobile or multiple launch-point mode (as they can no longer count on disarming us with a surprise first strike), or to stand it down entirely and go to a dyad. Should they choose the latter, they are embarking on a technological race in which we start with most of the good cards. Should they choose the former, resources must again be diverted away from ASW.

There is no one best argument. As we have seen, designing the future force is far more difficult than it was in the past owing to both technical and perceptual complexities. We can ill afford to hope that another "fortuitous historical accident" will provide us the correct mix of strategic nuclear systems. But we must, in spite of the uncertainties of the future, make the decision soon, because the delays of the recent past have already cost us dearly in terms of our technological edge. The final choice is fundamentally between dissipating our effort and our resources in three directions at once, or capitalizing on our technological superiority in submarine systems to yield solutions to the remaining problems there, while returning us to a highly stable strategic nuclear stance. The latter seems the proper choice.

NOTES

1. Paul H. Nitze, "Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Détente," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1976, pp. 214-215. Nitze points out that *mutually* assured destruction was an *objective*, the fulfillment of which would follow.

2. Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," *Commentary*, July 1977, p. 25. Pipes quotes Benjamin S. Lambeth (*Selective Nuclear Options in American and Strategic Policy*, Rand R-2034-DDRE, December 1976, p. 14), "It [the assured destruction strategy] posited that the principal mission of the U.S. military under conditions of ongoing nuclear operations against [the continental United States] was to shut its eyes, grit its teeth, and reflexively unleash an indiscriminate and simultaneous reprisal against all Soviet aim points on a preestablished target list... it had the simple goal of inflicting punishment for the Soviet transgression."

3. Henry Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1957).

4. It was in 1963 that the Kennedy-McNamara "flexible response" doctrine was first officially articulated.

5. Countermilitary Potential (CMP) is a common measure of the hard target-killing potential of a nuclear weapon system, taking into account the individual warhead's yield and accuracy. It is defined by the equation:

$$K = Y^{2/3} / CEP^2,$$

K = CMP,

Y = Yield, and

CEP = Circular Error Probable.

This equation is also known as the counterforce formula, because it is weapons of high CMP that make counterforce strategies possible. As is apparent from the equation, the improvement of CEP is more important in raising CMP than the increasing of yield. This point is often ignored in discussions of the Soviet throw-weight advantage. The danger in our throw-weight disadvantage is not so much that the Soviet weapons have much higher yields (which they do), but that greater fractionalization of their force is possible as they improve the CEP of each MIRV.

6. Michael Nacht and Ted Greenwood, "The New Nuclear Debate: Sense or Nonsense?" *Foreign Affairs*, July 1974, p. 762.

7. Herman Kahn, "Strategy, Foreign Policy, and Nuclear War," in Robert A. Goldwin, ed., *America Armed. Essays on United States Military Policy* (Chicago, Rand McNally, 1963), pp. 43-70.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 50-51.

9. The best treatment of the subject is found in Kosta Tsipis, "The Calculus of Nuclear Counterforce," *Technology Review*, October/November 1974, pp. 34-47.

10. Henry Young, "Nuclear Deterrence: The Evolving Role of Naval Forces," Unpublished Student Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I.: 1978, p. viii.

11. Ongoing reductions in CEP are making it extremely difficult and incredibly expensive to harden silos sufficiently to make an appreciable improvement in survivability. See Colin S. Gray, *The Future of Land-Based Missile Forces* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979), pp. 17-18.

12. Tsipis covers most of the technical aspects of the discussion.

13. Pipes supports my position. It also bears noting that in the Soviet view, strategic nuclear weapons constitute the new "main factor" in war. It is now possible to achieve strategic ends without resorting to protracted war.

14. The strategic Triad has three "legs": land-based intercontinental-range bombers, silo-based ICBMs, and submarine-based SLBMs with strategic range.

15. Gray, p. 2.

16. Lawrence J. Korb, *The FY 1980-1984 Defense Program: Issues and Trends* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1979), p. 39. Korb, using figures derived from the *FY 1980 Defense Report*, p. 117, gives the following figures for surviving U.S. silos after a Soviet disarming first strike:

	1978	1980	1984	1986	1988
Best case	700	540	460	160	60
Best estimate	390	220	190	80	20
Worst case	210	100	80	20	0

17. Gray, p. 12.

18. U.S. Congress, Congressional Budget Office, *Planning U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces for the 1980s: Budget Issue Paper for Fiscal Year 1979* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., June 1978), Tables 3,

92 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

19. Without SALT II, the Soviets would be free to proliferate launchers, missiles, and warheads of sufficient number and CMP to threaten any conceivable number of MX launch points. The SALT II limit on missiles, to be in effect at the beginning of 1982 if the treaty is ratified, is 1,200 MIRVed ICBM launchers, MIRVed SLBM launchers, and MIRVed ASBM (Air-to-Surface Ballistic Missiles), of which no more than 820 launchers can be for MIRVed ICBMs.

