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## The United States and Six Atlantic Outposts: The Military and Economic Considerations

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10. See pp. 1092-1094; 1125-1128; "The existence of the atomic bomb in our hands is a deterrent in fact, to aggression in the world. We cannot at this time limit our capability to produce or use this weapon," p. 1127; pp. 1125-1127; Barton B. Bernstein, "The Quest for Security: American Foreign Policy and International Control of Atomic Energy, 1924, 1946," *Journal of American History*, March 1974, pp. 1003-1044; Margaret Gowing, *Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-1952* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974). Finally, see p. 1856: "This statement [J.C.S. 1764] is probably correct in the sense that it is distrust of the Soviets which has, by its impact on American public opinion and Congress, formed the resolve of the United States to insist upon adequate controls and safeguards in the control of atomic energy. However, even without regard to the present Soviet posture, it does not appear to me that the United States could, in the interest of its own security, agree to share its atomic resources and knowledge internationally without adequate controls and safeguards. A statement capable of interpretation to the contrary might prove unfortunate.

11. In addition to the numerous documents in the Eisenhower papers, see Michael S. Sherry, *Preparing for the Next War: American Plans for Postwar Defense 1941-45* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977).

12. See pp. 2020-2022 and pp. 2084-2086. However, Eisenhower maintained a clear head to the very end:

Although we must never lose sight of the constant threat implicit in Soviet political, economic and military aggression, we must remember also that Russia has a healthy respect for the power this nation can generate. Unless they had such a respect they would go right ahead and do as they please in Europe and wouldn't spend their time in piling hysterical charge upon hysterical charge and, in general, showing their own doubts and fears by lying when they know that we know they are lying. p. 2085.

13. A first and most interesting discussion of the possibility of a Soviet threat is in a top secret memorandum to Patterson, 29 March 1946, pp. 962-964.

14. Ernest H. van der Beugel, *From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership: European Integration as a Concern of American Foreign Policy* (Amsterdam, N.Y.: Elsevier, 1966).

15. For a similar argument see Herbert Franz Schurmann, *The Logic of World Power; An Inquiry into the Origins, Currents, and Contradictions of World Politics* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974).

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## BOOK REVIEWS

Chester, Edward W. *The United States and Six Atlantic Outposts: The Military and Economic Considerations*. Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1980. 260pp.

In this book the author sets out to assess the military and economic relations that the United States has had with the Bahamas, Jamaica, Bermuda, Iceland, Greenland, and the Azores. With a separate chapter on each of these islands, the author traces the history of U.S. relations with each of them from the 18th century through the present.

One of the weaknesses of the book is that while much attention is focused on the history of American relations with each of these islands, little attempt is made to assess their importance to American foreign policy as a whole.

Further, while their bilateral relations with the United States are looked at closely, the author neglected the present domestic political situations in these islands and how they have affected relations with the United States. In particular, no mention was made of Communist participation in Iceland's government nor of how this has affected Iceland's role in NATO.

While the author appears to conclude that each of these islands is important to the United States militarily, he, unfortunately, does not explain why. Are they important because they might provide bases for U.S. forces? If so, for what missions would bases on these islands be important? Or are these islands militarily important not so much for what they contribute to

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American capability but because the United States would not want them to be controlled by a hostile power? What sort of threat would such a contingency pose for the United States? The author does not examine any of these questions.

While the book is useful for its summary of America's bilateral relations with each of the six islands covered, discussion of how each of them fits into America's broader relations with NATO (for Greenland, Iceland, and the Azores) and the Caribbean (for Bermuda, Jamaica, and the Bahamas) would have been useful. Thus, the overall impression is that the book is incomplete and that further research should have been done.

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Colton, Timothy J. *Commissars, Commanders and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics* (Harvard University Russian Research Center Study No. 79). Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1979. 365pp.

Even a very superficial appraisal of Soviet military power as it has developed over the past two decades would indicate that a strong and harmonious community of interests is shared by the Soviet political elite and its officer corps. The dominant analytical perception among Western specialists on Soviet affairs, however, holds that this interinstitutional relationship is essentially conflict-prone with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) maintaining firm control over the Military Establishment in "carrot and stick" fashion by means of a vast network of military party organs down to the lowest unit levels. For this reason, the work at hand has considerable value in providing an interesting and authoritative reappraisal of Soviet

those areas of confluence and conflict in a balanced and objective manner.

Organized in a three-part, twelve-chapter format, Professor Colton's assessment literally goes back to "square one" in retracing the historical development of Soviet party-military relations from the Bolshevik Revolution to the present day. In fact, his attention to historical detail and use of a vast array of Russian-language source materials adds considerable weight to his basic argument that the Soviet military, organized from the outset as a communist armed force, has made key institutional gains by virtue of its longstanding cooperation with the CPSU political elite rather than from any notable instance or distinct pattern of party-army conflict. In developing the key features of Soviet military politics and reevaluating the relative stability of party-military relations, Colton places major focus on *how* the military and CPSU have interacted and *why* their relationship has persisted without any basic change over the six-decade history of the Soviet state.

Roughly two-thirds of the book deals with the military party organs controlled and directed by the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Fleet, which has separate channels of communication to both the Minister of Defense and the CPSU Central Committee. Part I examines the structure, roles, administrative functions and political monitoring capabilities of the military party organs since the creation of the Red Army and offers some lively insights into that MPA-directed apparatus. Colton makes special emphasis that the organs' party-political work within their assigned units or ships' crews is hardly at odds with professional military activities and goals; rather, its scope of effort has been fully integrated within the mainstream of normal military training and organizational endeavors to enhance the achievement of maximum combat