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American Security Policy and Policy-Making

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Honor at the Navy Yard rather than the White House was another effort to keep the matter low key.

The author develops a strong case with many examples to support his contention of a coverup. This portion of the book makes interesting reading and provides many insights into how the government responds to complex crisis situations.

The account and photographs of the attack and its aftermath are chilling and filled with examples of individual heroism. As a witness to the damage 18 hours later, I can attest to the accuracy of the descriptions, but even this fine effort does not do justice to the brutality inflicted by the attackers on the almost defenseless ship.

The only noticeable flaw in the book is an overstatement of the organizational effectiveness of the *Liberty* crew. As individuals many of these brave men distinguished themselves by their heroism, but the thorough and effective teamwork that comes from intensive training and discipline was lacking. The condition of the ship and the crew on the morning of 8 June did not suggest *Liberty*'s unorthodox management policies contributed to the ship's survival. Competence and assistance from other units were needed and played a larger role than Mr. Ennes describes.

A sticking point in this reviewer's mind (and evident in the review of the book by CDR L.M. Bucher in the *Washington Post*) was the failure of U.S. forces to respond promptly. As Bucher ironically points out, there were many similarities in this incident and the *Pueblo* incident, but in this case, help was much nearer at hand. Ennes covers this area well, and the wisdom of the decision to call off a retaliatory strike is debatable, but the decision not at least to fly over the stricken ship is inexplicable. This lapse contributed to the state of shock the *Liberty* crew was in after the attack. With apparent low risk, a flyover operation would have rallied the brave and exhausted crew who were well aware of how close the carriers were.

Assault on the Liberty, like many recent books on the failure of government, is a painful but instructive reading experience. Although there are some cases of personal speculation, the author has assembled a compelling case that a great deal of information has been withheld from the public. I am not convinced that we yet have all the facts, but the doors opened by Ennes' book should lead to further study. As naval officers, government professionals and as citizens, it is in our best interest to know the full story.

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Hatkavy, Robert and Kolodziej, Edward A., eds. *American Security Policy and Policy-Making*. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1980. 268pp.

The dilemmas of using and controlling force have confounded and confused American policymakers and students of security policy alike—especially since World War II. This collection of essays attempts to clarify some of the complexities inherent in the role that force and its control must play in protecting national security interests. Based on a symposium sponsored by the Policy Studies Organization, the book contains 15 individual contributions arranged into three parts dealing with historical and contemporary conditions for the role of force, selected problems in American security policymaking, and theoretical approaches to the use and control of force.

Two of the three sections that make up part I, essays by George Modelski and Edward Kolodziej, examine the historical cycles that appear to characterize changes and alternations of power in international relations. While

Modelski draws several other important conclusions in his analysis, both authors seem to agree that the predominance of the United States has begun its decline in an increasingly complex (and dangerous) glohal system. The final selection in part I appears to be a bone thrown to the "number-cruncher" school of political analysis. While Ms. Critchley admits to developing only a "highly simplified exposition," her attempt to define strategic value (in this case using oil as an example) in terms of worth qualified into a 64-cell matrix, ultimately demonstrates that "In terms of oil, Saudi Arabia is much more important to the United States than Iran or China." This selection adds little to the book.

Part II, which makes up nearly half the book, deals with a wide range of selected issues in contemporary American security policy. Joseph Coffey leads off the section with a brief discussion of the cruise missile, cleverly showing the distinction between the military capabilities of the weapon itself and its psychological effects on the NATO alliance. Similarly, Steve Canby develops a strong case for his interesting thesis that the main problem besetting NATO's military capabilities is *not* one of resources, but rather of conception and organization. Canby's thesis is certainly controversial, if not downright iconoclastic, but deserves consideration. Larry Korb discusses some of the problems of bureaucratic politics and the budgetary process at the macro level, while Judith Reppy focuses a little more sharply on the budget as it affects military research and development. Together they illustrate important relationships of budgetary politics, force modernization, and arms control.

Part III is reserved for four selections that deal with "approaches" to the use and control of force. Here the book shifts to a much mote theoretical plane of discussion that ranges from psychological considerations to the use of game theory in the analysis and explanation of arms control situations. It is in two of the articles in part III, by authors George Quester and Patrick Morgan, that this reviewer reaped the rewards of patience and persistence. Quester, in a lesson on "how to avoid isometric exercises," cautions against posing strategic issues in ways that mislead decisionmakets into reacting to their own concerns tathet than to the hehavior of likely advetsaties—a condition of "fearing feat itself." Using the issue of missile accuracy as an example, he shatters the myth and conventional wisdom concerning the effects of decreasing circular error probable (CEP), and even makes an interesting case for the proposition that missile accuracy (and reliability) might indeed be *decreasing*! Morgan contends that despite our intense interest in arms control, we have little or no theoretical grasp of the subject. He does an excellent joh of providing a conceptual framework for evaluating the prospects for arms control today, and stipulates a set of preconditions for future arms control agreements.

The individual theses, contentions and conclusions contained in the selections that make up *American Security Policy and Policy-Making* will certainly not appeal to all readets. Yet in the aggregate they provide useful insight into a much-muddled subject. The editors' purpose was to produce a book that contributes "to the lowering, if not the dismantling, of ... conceptual and institutional barriers" to the understanding of the American security policy process. They succeeded.

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Homewood, Harty. *Final Harbor*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980. 371pp.

Only rarely, for reasons of predictable professional military officer interest,