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Do Gorshkov's writings establish or reflect Soviet naval doctrine? Is he the author of Soviet naval policy? Can the authoritativeness of those writings be determined, as some have attempted, by an examination of "key" words and phrases in those writings?

THE DOCTRINAL LEGITIMACY OF GORSHKOV'S WRITINGS: MEASURING THE MEASURES

by
Renita Fry

The appearance in 1976 of Admiral Gorshkov's book *Sea Power of the State* revived the question of whether the views of the Soviet Commander in Chief were a statement of doctrine or not. At the time of the publication of the Gorshkov series of articles in 1972-3, many Western commentators, relying heavily on their "feel" for the authoritativeness with which Gorshkov wrote, concluded that the series was part of a factional debate. Later, these same commentators argued that the book was a doctrinal confirmation of the views expressed in the series. The issue is not merely semantic. In Soviet military literature, doctrine holds a unique place. Military doctrine is at the apex of all military thinking and writing. It forms the base on which policy is formulated and executed. Military doctrine provides both the officially approved views on the conduct of war and the outline for keeping the country and its armed

forces prepared for war. Doctrine is a fundamental law of the state, which makes it unchallengeable. All other categories of military thinking contribute to doctrine but are subordinate to it.¹ Classification of Gorshkov's works as doctrine would mean that the opinions attributed to Gorshkov were the driving force of Soviet naval policy. A denial of doctrinal status would indicate lack of agreement concerning naval policy.

One commentator, James McConnell, has consistently argued that Gorshkov's writings, both series and book, are more than a line of argument in a factional debate. In a paper for the Center for Naval Analyses, McConnell proposed that a more systematic measure of authoritativeness than the "feel" used by his colleagues would support his contention.² The method of evaluation proposed by McConnell is interesting because it applies to Gorshkov's writings. The analysis of words and phrases often

used to interpret nonmilitary Soviet writings. In greatly simplified terms, the method draws on keywords or phrases that have consistently been used as signals in Soviet writings. The pattern of words/phrases can provide the reader with information or directives that are not stated overtly. In the case of McConnell's analysis, the keywords are those that signal doctrinal legitimacy.

The texts of both of Gorshkov's major works can be interpreted as fitting the doctrinal pattern outlined by McConnell. Gorshkov's own words can be read as a claim of legitimacy. However, what an author claims for his work and the actual status of his views are not necessarily identical. The author's words are but one piece of evidence. A further test of doctrinal authority (one that McConnell did not have the space to include) is to extend the examination of keywords to the texts of Soviet commentaries on Gorshkov's works. Theoretically, the use of keywords in these commentaries should match their use by Gorshkov. If the commentaries contradict Gorshkov's use of the keywords, then it would be possible to argue either that Gorshkov lacks doctrinal legitimacy or that McConnell's framework is not adequate. The purpose of extending the application of McConnell's framework is not to prove either argument, but to demonstrate that no single measure of legitimacy is conclusive.

Essentially, McConnell stated that there is a series of keywords that distinguish military doctrine from other areas of military thought, particularly from its closest cousin, military science. The keywords, or doctrinal indicators, are used as signals that the material in question is doctrine rather than part of the other fields of military writing. The distinctions between the signals of military doctrine and military science can be summarized as:

1. The term "unity of views" is consistently associated with

doctrine. Doctrine can "establish" unity, "promote" unity, or "reflect" unity. The central element is that unity prohibits the expression of differing views. In the field of military science, however, clashes of opinion are expected and promoted.

2. Doctrine limits itself to the period of the present and the immediate future, the latter covering the period of only 3-5 years beyond the present. References to the prospects of the future development of the navy fall into the category of military science. Examinations extending beyond three to five years are part of military science. Similarly, works devoted primarily to the past cannot be doctrinal.

3. Military doctrine deals with a wider range of subjects than military science. Doctrine covers the armed struggle, the political aspects of war, and peace. Military science is consistently limited to the means of the armed struggle or to the theory of the art of war.

4. Doctrinal statements emphasize the unity of the various branches of the armed forces. In doctrine, no branch of the service is unique. Practical statements concerning the employment of one branch or another (those that recognize uniqueness) are part of military science or military art. The frequently repeated Soviet assertion that all branches must act in concert to achieve victory is a reflection of the "singleness" of doctrine.

These four doctrinal indicators are clearly evident in the Gorshkov series. In a single introductory paragraph, Gorshkov tied in each of the signals of

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doctrine. He spoke of the "development of a unity of views." In the next sentence, he denied any intention of producing a military history or of predicting the development of the navy.³ He stated that he was interested in the employment of navies "in peacetime as an instrument of state policy," along with their use in wartime. Finally, Gorshkov denied that the navy holds a unique position. In light of Gorshkov's emphasis on the special qualities of naval firepower, mobility and concealment, the denial can be interpreted (as McConnell proposed) as a bow to the doctrinal requirement of concert among the branches of the armed forces.

Unfortunately, the same paragraph does not appear in the introduction to *Sea Power of the State*. However, in the foreword, there are several phrases that fit the doctrinal criteria. Gorshkov (or the collective of authors who prepared the book) states that the book will concentrate on the correct subject matter for doctrine: "the dialectical relationship between the development of naval forces and the goals of that policy of the States which they were designed to serve" and the role of the army and navy "which in peacetime have also continued to serve as an instrument of state policy." The book, then, covers the three areas of legitimate concern to doctrine—the armed struggle, the political aspects of war and the peacetime use of naval forces. With respect to time period, Gorshkov denies any intent to produce a military historical analysis; rather, historical material would only be part of the examination of the "conformity to laws in the changes in their [various branches of the armed forces] roles and positions in wartime and peacetime." Use of the term "peacetime" suggests that historical analysis is offered as the basis of doctrinal principles, not as a subject itself. A later paragraph reinforces this interpretation by using the required terminology of the present and the

"near future" as the period covered by the book.

The introduction to *Sea Power of the State* does not contain the specific denial of naval uniqueness that was used in the series. However, the integration of all military branches is strongly emphasized before reference is made to the operational uniqueness of the navy. In fact, arguing that victory can come only through the coordinated efforts of all forces, the foreword states that "there have been almost no purely land or purely naval wars." The foreword even bows to the ground forces as the only element that can consolidate and confirm a victory. One could consider this statement to be a more forceful declaration of unity than that contained in the series as it is a positive affirmation of unity rather than a denial of uniqueness.

The only one of McConnell's indicators that does not appear in the introduction to *Sea Power of the State* is that stipulating the presentation of a unity of views. Instead the two paragraphs that summarize the content and purpose of the book cite the "author's" goal and the expression of "several thoughts." This phraseology can be interpreted in several ways. First, if the book is regarded as an expression of the unity of views, i.e., as the approved solution in a debate, it would be superfluous to include a statement of unity. The audience towards whom the book is directed would not require such a statement. Second, the last paragraph of the introduction acknowledges the assistance of those who cooperated in preparing the book. Among those singled out are the head of the naval academy and other top-ranking naval personnel. If the acknowledgment can be taken as an indication that the book was a collective effort, then the paragraph is a statement that the book's contents represent a unity of views. Finally, of course, one might consider that the absence of this one doctrinal indicator

questions the authoritativeness of the book.

Citations from both the series and book fit comfortably with the indicators noted by McConnell. At some points, the question of unity of views, for example, there is room for differing interpretations of the meaning of phrases. Nevertheless, the texts do match the doctrinal pattern. Both the series and book were the subject of conferences and reviews following their publication. Other articles relevant to the formulation or publication of military thought appeared simultaneously. Each of these can be examined in light of the doctrinal indicators. Throughout such a presentation, two points should be kept in mind. First, there is non-textual evidence that may not be included in the following sections. Second, there is room for other interpretations of the textual evidence than those given here because interpretation is inherently an individual exercise.

Textual evidence surrounding the 1972-3 series comes from three articles carried by *Morskoy Sbornik* in 1973.⁴ The first article appeared in March, the first issue after the conclusion of the series. Written by Admiral Sergeyev, then Chief of Staff of the Navy, the article commemorated the 125th anniversary of *Morskoy Sbornik*.⁵ Sergeyev's article described the chief function of the naval digest as providing information on combat readiness, the tactical employment of naval forces, etc. The article made no reference to *Morskoy Sbornik* as a legitimate forum for the presentation of doctrine. Nor were there any references to *Morskoy Sbornik's* role in promoting unity of views, examining the present/immediate future, discussing the peacetime or political role of the navy, or any of the other phrases that would place *Morskoy Sbornik* as a journal of doctrine. Instead, Sergeyev wrote of the journal's role in the discussion of controversial topics, a label clearly excluding

doctrine. Further, Sergeyev did not mention the series specifically despite the fact that Gorshkov's articles had been the lead items in *Morskoy Sbornik* for over a year. The omission is unusual because Sergeyev's views on the employment of naval forces have been fairly close to Gorshkov's.⁶ One might have expected him to promote the legitimacy of Gorshkov's writings, however indirectly, in his description of the functions of the naval digest. If the series had been a final statement, it seems likely that Sergeyev would have defined a role for *Morskoy Sbornik* in the expression of doctrine.

A second article relevant to the legitimacy of the series appeared 3 months after the last installment. In a brief item, *Morskoy Sbornik* noted that the series had been the subject of conferences at the Dzershinskiy Higher Naval Engineering Order of Lenin School and at the Frunze Higher Naval School.⁷ Three aspects of the conferences bear on the legitimacy of the series. First, the schools at which the conferences were held are not the top level of Soviet naval academies. That spot is apparently reserved for the Leningrad Naval Academy.⁸ That the first recorded conferences took place below that level could well have been a signal of lack of weight to be accorded the series. Second, the conferences reportedly concentrated on the "practical" impact of the series on the work of officers. "Practical" issues are the concern of military art, not of military doctrine. While the practical side of Gorshkov's views would be extremely important for the naval officer corps, if the series were a statement of doctrine, establishment of its legitimacy would be a logical prerequisite to widespread adoption of the "practical" consequences. Finally, the item reporting the conferences was not placed as a separate entry, but was included in the monthly section of fleet news. This section is not always reserved for stories on the

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performance of individual sailors; it can include personnel and policy changes. However, the prominence initially given the series was hardly matched by burying the first specific evaluation of the articles in the middle of fleet briefs.

A more prestigious report on the series appeared 3 months later when *Morskoy Sbornik* recorded a conference at the naval academy (presumably the Leningrad Naval Academy, as it is the only one referred to without its identifying "orders of").⁹ This item did appear as a separate entry, a tribute to either the academy or to the series. However, the participants at the conference discussed the series in terms of its contributions to "the theory of naval art," personnel training, shipbuilding, mastering the ocean and international law. None of these are legitimate subjects of doctrine. Use of the term "naval art" was particularly revealing in placing the series outside the context of doctrine. Further, although the conference noted widespread attention devoted to the series, it should be remembered that 5 months had elapsed between the conclusion of the series and this recording of a conference reviewing it at the nation's highest institution of naval education. The absence of doctrinal keywords in the report of the conference and the timing suggest that there was controversy surrounding Gorshkov's writings. Controversy, naturally, is unacceptable when dealing with works of doctrine because of doctrine's nature as part of the fundamental law of the state.

These three articles do not fit the pattern of McConnell's doctrinal indicators. One fails to accept *Morskoy Sbornik* as the correct forum for the presentation of doctrine. The other two describe conferences on the series that emphasize those aspects of Gorshkov's views that are not the legitimate subject matter of doctrine. In no case is there a clear signal that the Gorshkov series is to be considered more than a significant

contribution to military science. As a result, these three articles cast doubt on Gorshkov's claim for doctrinal recognition.¹⁰

Commentaries that bear on the status of *Sea Power of the State* were more numerous than specific references to the Gorshkov series. The book appeared on 9 February 1976, well ahead of schedule.¹¹ It was reviewed by *Tass*, *Izvestia* and *Soviet Military Review*. In addition, it was the subject of several items in *Morskoy Sbornik*. If all of these sources are examined for keywords, a number of contradictions become apparent.

Before looking at these contradictions, one article by Gorshkov, concurrent with the book, deserves mention because it expresses Gorshkov's opinion of the contribution of military writers. The article, "Greeting the 25th Congress of the CPSU," appeared in the February 1976 issue of *Morskoy Sbornik*. In the article, Gorshkov defined the function of works by naval researchers, specialists and officers as providing "further insights into the basic questions of operational strategic use of the navy during a war," or trying to "justify its role in future," or revealing "the optimum paths to developing the Navy's power."¹² These phrases, particularly the emphasized portions, are not applicable to military doctrine according to McConnell's criteria. Further, Gorshkov specifically stated that admirals and officers are purveyors of military scientific thought. In short, at the very time that his book was published, Gorshkov denied its doctrinal weight in theory.

Four conferences on *Sea Power of the State* were recorded by *Morskoy Sbornik*. The first was held at the Leningrad Naval Academy. The briefing on the book was given by Admiral Syosev, the head of the Academy. He classed the book as "fundamental military theoretical research." Syosev stated that "For the first time,¹³ the work synthesizes historical, economic, and

military political aspects of the problems of sea power. It reveals its importance for defense of the country's interests. And it substantiates the role of the Fleet in attaining military and political goals."¹⁴ Syosev's briefing does contain some elements of the doctrinal indicators. For example, reference to the use of the navy for military and political goals signals the correct subject matter for doctrine. The wording also denies that the book is a history; history is but one element of the synthesis, so that the time period is legitimate for doctrine. On the other hand, there is a contradiction between the references to military-political goals and the Russian term for defense (*zashchita*) used in the briefing. McConnell has argued that there is a clear distinction between *zashchita*, which is associated with "'combat' readiness, capabilities and strength or might 'of the armed forces,'" and *oborona*, which deals with the "aggregate of 'military political' measures."¹⁵ Both words mean defense, but in different contexts. Gorshkov was the first to apply *oborona* and readiness together, as part of his effort to upgrade the role of the navy from chiefly military to military-political tasks. Syosev's selection of the word *zashchita* marks a retreat from the more wide-ranging phraseology of Gorshkov and implies a limitation on the doctrinal legitimacy of *Sea Power of the State*.

Another conference on *Sea Power of the State* was held in the Pacific Fleet. The writeup in *Morskoy Sbornik* stated that the book "examines thoroughly the Leninist principles of military organization and development of strengthening the Navy's might. It shows its role in defending (again, *zashchita*) the state interests of the Motherland."¹⁶ The report also stated that the speakers at the conference dealt with the development of "naval forces and means, and naval art in the postwar period." As is evident from these citations, the report

did not use McConnell's keywords to define the book as a doctrinal statement.

A similar conference was held at sea on the *Oktyabr'skaya Revoliutsiya*. Speakers noted the great significance of the book on the "practical activities of naval personnel"—which is quite far removed from examining the book as doctrinal literature."¹⁷ Of course, one could well argue that the purpose of such a conference would not be to disseminate military doctrine, but to discuss naval art. Ship personnel are more likely to be concerned with operational directives. In that case the holding of conferences in the fleets could be a signal of the widespread circulation of the book and hence of its importance.¹⁸ In line with this argument, it might be significant that the shipboard conference did receive special editing; information about the cruise of the *Oktyabr'skaya Revoliutsiya* appeared as usual in the news from the fleets, but the conference report was published as a separate entry.

A fourth conference on the Gorshkov book was held at the Military Political Academy.¹⁹ This conference was a gathering of professors, representatives of the main staff and central directorates of the navy, the navy political directorate, the naval academy and other educational institutions, and members of the military press. It was the first conference to include such a high-level cast. The opening briefing placed the book in the category of "theoretical works by Soviet military leaders for developing military science." The deputy head of the academy, LTC Yurpolskiy, who gave the briefing, described the book as a "noteworthy phenomenon in military literature, and an interesting and deeply scientific investigation." A second briefer spoke of the book's elaboration of the "role, place, and significance of the Soviet Navy in the defense (*zashchita*) of the achievements of socialism." This

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speaker stressed the "practical" use of the book for discussing the "theoretical issues of further development of the Navy." Other speakers whose comments were recorded were R.A. Stalbo and V.A. Solovyev. The former, who was mentioned in Gorshkov's acknowledgments, made no statements using the doctrinal indicators. The latter repeated the classification of the book as military scientific literature and praised the book's exposition of the "theory of balancing the forces of the Navy at the present stage of its development." In all of these comments, the keywords are contradictory. There is no reference to a unity of views, although the second briefer did recommend the book as a text, which could signify unified acceptance of the ideas presented by Gorshkov. One speaker referred to the present stage of development (doctrine) and one of the future (science). None referred to the unity of all armed forces, while one mentioned a special role for the navy. None referred to the book's coverage of the use of the navy in peacetime; and the use of the term *zashchita* in connection with state interests precludes interpreting "defense of state interests" as a peacetime task. As a result, the content of the report does not point clearly towards accepting or denying doctrinal status for *Sea Power of the State*. There is also evidence outside the content of the speeches at the conference that should be taken into account: (1) that the conference was at the Military Political Academy, an institution concerned with both military and political subjects, i.e., with doctrine, and (2) that the conference, following the lead of the naval academy, did nominate the book for the Frunze Prize. The endorsement of the book by an institution closely associated with the formulation of military doctrine could be viewed as more significant than the lack of doctrinal signals in the speeches of conference participants.

Gorshkov's writings outside the framework of conferences, two appear most relevant. First, in April 1976, *Morskoy Sbornik* carried an article by Admiral Syosev, in which the head of the naval academy discussed the value of continued study of the combat experience of World War II.²⁰ In Syosev's view, such a study is valuable for educating the new generation of officers and to illustrate the continuing validity of such principles as mass and surprise. The major function of a review of World War II is, according to Syosev, not the substantiation of doctrine proposed by Gorshkov, but the development of military art. Syosev supported his judgment by citing Gorshkov's own words that the past is the key to further naval development (the subject of science) and to improvement of the naval art. Syosev's article does not refer specifically to Gorshkov's new book nor does it credit historical studies that deny their historical orientation. With Syosev's definitions, *Sea Power of the State* would be considered a scientific, not doctrinal, work. (The function of the article might be compared to the Sergeyev article that followed the series. Both are relevant to a particular contribution by Gorshkov, but neither discusses the specifics of the work.)

The second article to be considered appeared in *Morskoy Sbornik* in January 1977 as part of a series on the functions of the naval academy. Most of the individual articles in the series described the academy as a center for the development of naval art and science, a categorization that should be considered in connection with the academy's endorsement of the Gorshkov book for the Frunze Prize. More specifically, one article in the series defined the "basic works by Commander Chief Navy, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Gorshkov" as the "development and modern interpretation of the basic categories of naval art."²¹ This classification is even

further removed from military doctrine than the one used by Syosev. The article was written by Admiral Solov'yev, the deputy head of the academy, also a participant in the conference at the Military Political Academy. The appearance of Solov'yev's lukewarm evaluation of the relationship between Gorshkov's writings and military doctrine may indicate that conflicting opinions were not harmonized by the convening of that high-level conference.

A final area of evidence concerning *Sea Power of the State* is the content of reviews of the book. In April 1976, a review by Admiral Lobov (Navy Rep.—General Staff) was published in *Morskoy Sbornik*.²² Lobov gave a highly complimentary summary of the contents of the book. He concluded that Gorshkov's work was an "excellent example of a creative path to the solution to cardinal questions of the development of naval science" and a "serious contribution to military science." In addition, Lobov presented the book as the basis for discussion by military and naval leaders that would lead to an "accurate understanding of the role and place of the Fleet under modern conditions." The first two references—to the book as a work of science—oppose categorizing the book as a doctrinal statement. Further, one specifically isolates the book's contribution to naval, not military, science by emphasizing the uniquely naval aspects of Gorshkov's ideas. Lobov's statement concerning discussion of the book could be interpreted as either a reference to the clash of opinions that forms part of military science or to a declaration of units of views. One's interpretation depends on whether "accurate" is equated with "unified." In either case, Lobov left his readers without a clear statement on the significance of the Gorshkov book.

A second review of *Sea Power of the State* appeared in the August 1976 issue of *Soviet Military Review*.²³ The review

summarized the contents of the book for two full pages. Yet there were almost no references that could be measured against McConnell's framework. Only two statements might be considered relevant as measures of the book's authoritativeness. First, the review stated that the modern navy can "stand up to aggression from the seas and can accomplish strategic missions in the world ocean." But the article did not go on to mention naval protection of state interests or performance of nonstrategic state tasks—roles that fall under the discussion of doctrine and are definitely included in the book. Second, the section of the review that dealt with Gorshkov's description of the use of fleets in local wars or for demonstrative purposes (peacetime tasks) was placed as part of naval art. By using this terminology, the review placed a subject that McConnell's framework would include as doctrine in the subordinate field of military art. If the contradiction was intentional, then the *Soviet Military Review* article would oppose doctrinal status for Gorshkov's book.

An interesting contrast to *Soviet Military Review's* consideration of *Sea Power of the State* is the treatment given to a book written by Admiral Kuznetsov in 1975. Kuznetsov, Gorshkov's predecessor, published his memoirs under the title *Heading for Victory*. The book dealt largely with naval operations during World War II, a subject that was extensively covered by Gorshkov. *Soviet Military Review* serialized the book in 1976, the last installment appearing in the same issue as the review of Gorshkov's book. One might question whether the decision to publicize Kuznetsov's book more heavily than Gorshkov's was a comment on the relative merit of the two or merely a reflection of publication schedules.²⁴

The final review of *Sea Power of the State* appeared in *Izvestia*, the government press organ, on 22 May 1976. The

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review was written by Marshal I. Bagramyan, one of the few nonnaval leaders to comment on the book.²⁵ The selection of Bagramyan as a reviewer can be viewed in two ways. His name carries a great deal of prestige, as he was for many years the head of Soviet rear services. His review might therefore be considered officially dictated. In addition, Bagramyan's prestige was upgraded in late 1977 when he was honored on the occasion of his 80th birthday. The biography accompanying the article that marked his birthday noted that he was still a member of the Central Committee and the Supreme Soviet and was doing "extensive Public work."²⁶ The article further pointed out that Bagramyan had on occasion differed with the opinion of other prominent military leaders, such as Sokolovsky, and had been proven correct. On the other hand, some Western sources consider the marshal a waning figure in Soviet military leadership. In their view the selection of a more prominent figure to review Gorshkov's book would have represented greater prestige for the book.²⁷

Bagramyan's remarks can be divided into three sections.²⁸ In the first section, he outlined the qualities of "major global works of scientific thought," the category in which he placed *Sea Power of the State*. In this section, there are a number of "signal" phrases, as well as consistent reference to the book as representative of military science. For example, the type of analysis used by Gorshkov was said to have as its aim "to correctly determine the prospects of military development in the future." In the next paragraph, the review referred to the book as a monograph "in which history and the past serve as a springboard for probing the present and the future." In neither case is the terminology that which McConnell describes as doctrinal. In McConnell's criteria, history "substantiates" doctrine; it does not "serve as a springboard for probing." Further, the inclusion of the past

present and future clearly defines military science, not military doctrine. A second key phrase is that theoretical research "is intended to contribute to a correct definition of the role and place of various categories of troops and branches of the forces in the overall system of armed forces." One might interpret "contributing to a correct definition" as meaning the creation of a unity of views. However, a "contribution" seems a little less substantial than the words that are generally coupled with a unity of views (reflects, constitutes, determines, establishes or ensures). To "contribute" seems more in line with the presentation of an argument than with a statement of doctrine. In the same phrase, Bagramyan draws attention to two other signals. First, theoretical research is defined as concerned with one branch of the unified armed forces, i.e., to its unique role. Bagramyan does not include the disclaimer of uniqueness that McConnell says is customary with doctrine. Second, the phrase deals with the overall system of armed forces, which concerns the tasks and preparedness of the armed forces, not the military political field, the sphere of doctrine. Bagramyan's terminology places peace and the political aspects of war outside the legitimate area of theoretical research. Thus, Bagramyan's words limit *Sea Power of the State* to coverage of the role of navies in war. Such an interpretation is supported in the first paragraph of the review, in which are listed the topics that should be kept in mind by theoretical researchers—new weapons, the model of future war, methods of repelling aggression. All of these topics are combat oriented. The only reference to military and political factors in the first section is with respect to imperialist states. In short, the first two paragraphs of Bagramyan's review do use the doctrinal indicators outlined by McConnell. But

the indicators are not used to confer doctrinal authority on Gorshkov's writings.

The second section of the review deals with the content of *Sea Power of the State*. In this section, the signals contradict those of the first section. For example, the review does indicate that Gorshkov's book represents a unity of views. Bagramyan wrote that the book "reveals the basic law governed patterns," "expounds on orderly system of views," and "conclusively formulates the concept of sea power." Further, Bagramyan recommended the book to the "wide reading public," which suggests approval of the formulas contained in the work. Second, in time period, Bagramyan wrote only of the book's coverage of naval development to the present (the correct limit for doctrine). He made no reference to predictions of future development. With respect to subject matter, Bagramyan made two references to the book's coverage of the peacetime use of naval forces and the naval role in implementing state policy (again the correct subject for doctrine). Finally, the review placed Gorshkov's writing as a direct outgrowth of the "Marxist-Leninist teachings on war and the army and Soviet military doctrine," a description that fits the criterion of the unified nature of doctrine. Clearly, the second section of the review touched on each of the categories set up by McConnell. In each case, the book was described as fitting the definition of doctrine.

In contrast to the second section, the last lines of Bagramyan's review retreat from the definition of the book as a doctrinal statement. In the last paragraph, Bagramyan criticized the book's uneven treatment of issues. If doctrine is a fundamental law of the state, one suspects that it is not generally criticized in this fashion. Finally, the review closed with a restatement that "on the whole" the book is a "valuable contribution to our military science and

especially, to naval art." Neither classification should be expected as part of a solid definition of the book as a statement of doctrine.

A close reading of Bagramyan's review leaves one with as many questions as answers. The review merely reinforces the contradictions found in other commentaries on Gorshkov's writings. The conferences and reviews cited in connection with the Gorshkov series were equivocal at best on the question of the significance of Gorshkov's views. The material surrounding the book is even less clear-cut. Applying McConnell's doctrinal indicators, one finds that some discussions of the book refer to it as military science or art. Some mention its value for predicting the future development of the navy. Several refer only to its coverage of the navy's wartime role or combat tasks. Some speak of its contribution in uniquely naval matters. All are nondoctrinal signals. On the other hand, some reviews do refer to the "correct" formulations in the book, to its explanation of the present development of the navy, to the political role of the navy in war and peace or to the foundations of Marxist-Leninist science on which the book is based. Each of these is a signal that the book is of doctrinal weight. The contradiction between these positions is most obvious in the Bagramyan review, half of which fits McConnell's categories and half of which does not.

Whether the Gorshkov book/series are doctrine continues to be debated by Western analysts on a variety of levels of evidence. McConnell tried to provide a consistent framework to measure the authoritativeness of Gorshkov's writings. The text of the series/book fit within that framework, but examination of authors other than Gorshkov poses a series of contradictions within the framework. McConnell would escape the dilemma thus created by placing Gorshkov's writings in yet another category of military writing, that of

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concrete expressions of doctrine. These are a synthesis of science and doctrine with the central function of substantiating doctrine. This interpretation would neatly sidestep the dilemma of the contradictions described above except that concrete expressions of doctrine are theoretically as immune from controversy as is doctrine itself. Both carry the force of state law and deal with unified views. The controversy suggested by the reviews of Gorshkov's work would not mesh with concrete expressions of doctrine any better than with doctrine *per se*. Further, the synthesis of concrete expressions is supposed to take place under the determining influence of doctrine; doctrinal signals should therefore outweigh scientific signals. In the case of commentaries on the Gorshkov book, it is clear that this is not always the case. In addition, McConnell's explanation of the categorization of Gorshkov's works devotes itself to doctrinal indicators, rather than to those suggesting a separate category of writings. The field of concrete expression of doctrine appears belatedly and is used as almost equal with doctrine. The indicators are presumed to be the same. Thus, if the Soviet commentaries do not reflect the doctrinal indicators uniformly, neither can they reflect the indicators of a concrete expression of doctrine. We must return therefore to the question of what contradictions between Gorshkov's own use of doctrinal indicators and their use in commentaries on the book/series mean.

Was Gorshkov too generous in claiming doctrinal legitimacy? Are there hold-outs who do not recognize the authoritativeness of Gorshkov's words? Is the

West incorrect in assuming that Gorshkov is the architect of Soviet naval policy? Or are we perhaps asking too much of "keywords" as a measure of legitimacy? Any of the first three questions could be answered affirmatively on the basis of the reviews cited in this article. That such answers are possible indicates that the last question, too, could be answered yes. Analysis of word patterns in Soviet literature is a valuable tool, but it is only one tool. As the literature surrounding Gorshkov's writings demonstrates, it cannot stand alone or be accepted unequivocally. There are too many instances in which interpretation of keywords is subjective—almost as subjective as the "feel" method that McConnell sought to avoid. This judgment does not invalidate McConnell's framework. Rather the inadequacies of a framework of doctrinal indicators as a rigid determinant of authoritativeness merely reinforce recognition that the definition of Soviet naval policy cannot come from any single Soviet or Western source.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



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NOTES

1. For definitions of the various categories of military writing, see Sidorov, "Foundations of Soviet Military Writing," *Soviet Military Review*, September 1972, pp. 14-15; or *Dictionary of Basic Military Terms* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1965), USAF Military Thought Series.

2. James McConnell, *The Gorshkov Articles, the New Gorshkov Book and Their Relations to Policy* (Arlington, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 1976). Also available as a chapter in Michael McGwire, *Soviet Naval Influence: Domestic and Foreign Dimensions* (New York: Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1975)

Praeger, 1977). McConnell's analysis is also presented in his contribution to the congressional study U.S. Congress, Senate, Commerce Committee, *Soviet Oceans Development* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976).

3. The relevance of the fact that the majority of both the book and the series deal with the history of the Navy has been debated at great length by McConnell and McGwire. For a presentation of their arguments, see U.S. Congress, pp. 169, 188-192.

4. Nontextual evidence also has been widely debated. For example, a number of commentators have differed over the series. The series was interrupted after the fifth article and thereafter may have been late in being released for publication. The article that replaced the continuation of the series was also by Gorshkov and concerned a topic that had been discussed in a number of other articles in the naval digest. The same article appeared in *Soviet Military Review* after the conclusion of the series. For a discussion of the arguments surrounding the publication delays, see McConnell, p. 168.

5. Sergeyev, "Friend and Advisor of the Naval Officer," *Morskoy Sbornik*, March 1973, pp. 17-32. It should be noted that the "controversial topics" mentioned by Sergeyev were removed from both military science and doctrine. They included the role of the wardroom, training of junior officers, nautical culture. It follows that the Sergeyev article does not place the series as part of a debate, as has been argued by some commentators.

6. For a presentation of the positions of various Soviet naval personalities, see McGwire, pp. 116-117.

7. "With the Ships, Units and Forces of the Fleet," *Morskoy Sbornik*, May 1973, p. 8.

8. A history of the Leningrad Naval Academy is given in the June 1968 issue of *Morskoy Sbornik*.

9. "After the Appearance of *Morskoy Sbornik*," *Morskoy Sbornik*, August 1973, p. 53.

10. Here the reader should be warned that it is necessary to read entire passages from the articles used in evidence lest parts of evidence escape notice. Even then, differing interpretations are certainly possible. For example, McConnell cites as a doctrinal signal a phrase from an article by Admiral Gontayev that describes the Gorshkov series as providing "a scientifically substantiated system of views . . ." However, Gontayev's sentence goes on to say that these "views" related to the development of the navy and to the naval role in armed combat. These phrases are a qualification of the doctrinal signal. Whether one chooses to weight them more heavily than the signal itself is a matter of interpretation. The point is that commentaries on Gorshkov's writing should be read in full before making judgments. See Gontayev, "The Navy at War: Experience and Lessons," *Morskoy Sbornik*, April 1975, pp. 104-109.

11. The book was due to appear in the second half of 1976 and went to press in November 1975.

12. Gorshkov, "Greeting the 25th Congress of the CPSU," *Morskoy Sbornik*, February 1976, pp. 8-13.

13. The phrase "for the first time," which also appears in a later review, could be given as evidence that the series was not considered a doctrinal statement.

14. "Fundamental Research on the Fleet," *Morskoy Sbornik*, August 1976, p. 20.

15. See U.S. Congress, p. 198.

16. "News from the Fleets," *Morskoy Sbornik*, September 1976, pp. 17-22.

17. "Readers Conference at Sea," *Morskoy Sbornik*, June 1976, p. 76.

18. The book was published in 60,000 copies, a large number for military literature.

19. "Conference on Book by CINC Navy," *Morskoy Sbornik*, September 1976, p. 22.

20. Syosev, "The Experience of the War and the Present," *Morskoy Sbornik*, April 1976, pp. 19-22.

21. Solov'yev, "Center of Naval Science," *Morskoy Sbornik*, January 1977, pp. 20-23.

22. Lobov, "Sea Power of the State and Its Defensive Capability," *Morskoy Sbornik*, April 1976, pp. 99-105.

23. Drozdov, "Sea Might of a State," *Soviet Military Review*, August 1976, pp. 60-61.

24. It should be noted in passing that several articles by Kuznetsov have questioned Gorshkov's description of the role played by the Navy during the war. For example, Kuznetsov has described serious deficiencies in the joint command structure that, he claims, limited the effectiveness of the navy during the early part of the war. Gorshkov, on the other hand, usually highly praises the joint command and the Navy's ability to fight effectively from the very first days of the war.

25. John Hibbits, *Admiral Gorshkov's Writings: Twenty Years of Naval Thought*, CANKUS Maritime Intelligence Conference, 15 May 1977, p. 8.

26. "Marshal Bagramyan," *Soviet Military Review*, November 1977, pp. 60-61.

27. Hibbits, p. 8.

28. Bagramyan, "Might for the Sake of Peace," *Izvestia*, 22 May 1976, p. 5.