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Admiral King was never noted for his smooth press relations but during World War II some two dozen journalists came to know and respect him as few outside the service did—and came to believe that his contributions were too valuable to be forfeited, as some called for, because of mishandled public relations.

ADMIRAL KING'S TOUGHEST BATTLE

by

Lloyd J. Graybar

"In peace time," John Sorrels of the Scripps-Howard chain of newspapers stated in 1943, "the sole responsibility of the newspaper is to inform, to enlighten, to illuminate. In war time, a great part of the responsibility is not to inform, but to suppress, to guard, to screen information of the most interesting sort." Both in and outside the profession of journalism there were many who in the name of patriotism would have agreed with this editor. After all, no loyal American wanted to render aid and comfort to the enemy, the standard which was ubiquitously employed to justify withholding news. But was the decision not to inform so simple to make? Sorrels realized there were circumstances when it was not, but it remained for another newspaperman, Palmer Hoyt, publisher of the *Portland Oregonian*, to state best the case for freedom of expression. "No one wants to violate 'necessary naval and military security,'" Hoyt conceded. "But by the same token," he continued,

> public and press alike wonder whether the naval and military establishments are awake to the fact that there is something greater than naval security, something greater than military security, and that is, American security—faith in ourselves, faith in our leadership, faith in our government! No one wants to help the enemy, but none can endorse a policy of silence if it be utilized to give aid and comfort to men responsible for our military or civil failures.[1]

The delicate balance that Hoyt's discerning standards required of the conscientious journalist was similarly imposed on America's military leaders. No one among them seemed less suited to deal sensitively with the press than the abrasive and hot-tempered leader of the

Navy, Adm. Ernest J. King. Yet his dealings with some of America's leading journalists in the trying fall months of 1942 point out how a mutually satisfying compromise of their differences was arrived at that preserved the military's need for security, the public's right to know, and the press' duty to inform.

Had the war not intervened, King would not have held his service's most coveted post, Chief of Naval Operations. Nearing the close of a successful career, most recently spent in naval aviation, he was passed over when the position was filled by Adm. Harold Stark in 1939. Almost 61, King was little more than 3 years from the peacetime retirement age and would not have had another chance to get the promotion he desired. It may be that Stark was appointed solely because he had the better credentials, but to believe so would be to ignore naval politics and King's formidable personality. He was justly regarded as singularly difficult to get along with, demanding and at times inconsiderate of subordinates, and unwilling to smooth his own path to the top by cultivating the favor of service and civilian superiors. Even after he had become a personality and a sought-after interviewee, he remained blunt: "I may as well say . . . that I do not care at all for the write-up," he upbraided a *Life* writer. "I find it a singular combination of fact, fiction, and fancy." King seemed to pride himself on his stern reputation—"so tough he shaves with a blowtorch," went a much-quoted saying about him—and a leader of his mettle appeared made to order for the dark days following Pearl Harbor. He was promptly summoned to Washington to become Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, a position charged with oversight of all fleet combat operations, and after a few months of sharing command of the wartime Navy with Stark he was given the additional title and duties of Chief of Naval Operations. King now had more authority than any previous leader of the American Navy in the 20th century.[2]

Under his determined leadership conditions gradually improved, but even after the triumph at Midway the Navy remained far from achieving dominance over the still formidable Japanese Fleet. In the Atlantic some of the most vicious battles with German submarine forces were yet to be fought. In August the protracted struggle for Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands began. It was one fought by the ships at sea, by the Marines on Guadalcanal, and by King himself in Washington. This made it King's toughest battle.

Public relations was an essential part of it. Unlike other services, in particular the Air Force, which as a new and still subordinate branch of the profession was image-conscious and anxious to gain friends, the Navy was established, could look back on a tradition that began with John Paul Jones, and in World War II was still led by some men who had entered service as long before as the turn of the century. Long periods at sea kept Navy officers more isolated from the press than their counterparts in the Army and the Army Air Corps. All of this bred an outlook of disdain for the press, and it was one King embodied to a high degree. It was said of him that he hated civilians because they might become reserve officers—or newspapermen. "So far as I am concerned," he insisted, "information given the public is information which will almost certainly reach the enemy. . . . I have no intention of giving the enemy anything from which he can derive a shadow of aid and comfort. That's the way I am, that's the way I always have been, that's the way I always will be." In the same vein was the story that he believed the ideal in public relations would be to wait until the war was over and then make one announcement—"We won."[3]

The Navy of course could not escape the need to issue news releases and maintain contacts with the press, but its

efforts at dealing with the press were considered more formal and less successful than those of the other services. Although Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox was a former newspaper publisher, he contributed to the dissatisfaction with the public relations efforts of the Navy that in a strictly organizational sense he headed. His Pearl Harbor report was generally considered to be informative, but subsequent revelations were that it had not been altogether candid. In the early months of 1942 mistrust arose, directed partly at Knox but increasingly at King whose influence in matters dealing with the handling of combat news was rightly regarded as decisive. Perhaps more than anything else, the Navy's refusal to report war losses promptly coupled with its blatant efforts to manage the news by linking disclosures of losses with announcements of victories contributed to the growing distrust of its word and of its leadership. So mismanaged was the Navy's handling of news releases, both as to timing and candor, that according to one informed source the American public grew to believe that the Japanese version of the Pearl Harbor story was more accurate than our own, making Tokyo's subsequent claims of success all the more plausible. The Navy was certainly not the only service to manipulate the news, and to be criticized for it; inevitably, however, the sinking of a carrier or cruiser created more stir than the loss of a tank or a P-39.[4]

On the surface King appeared unruffled and adamant in his opinions despite the increasing volume of criticism aimed at the Navy. Ironically, an incident that happened in the aftermath of Midway, the Navy's first great victory, only made matters worse. Although Knox was the primary victim, the whole Navy hierarchy suffered. A *Chicago Tribune* reporter, Stanley Johnston, had spent some weeks in *Lexington* prior to her loss in the Coral Sea. From the carrier's executive officer, Johnston had learned one of the war's most closely guarded secrets—that by breaking enemy codes the Navy was able to follow Japanese ship movements in detail. The story he subsequently filed on Midway listed many of the participating enemy ships by name. The Japanese surely would discover that their codes were being decrypted, thought horrified officers. Charges resulting in a federal grand jury investigation were filed against the *Tribune* whose publisher already felt that his paper's prewar isolationism and strident Republicanism had not endeared him to President Roosevelt. Moreover, Knox, prior to entering FDR's cabinet in 1940, had published a rival daily in Chicago. In bold headlines the *Tribune* began crying persecution. Unable to reveal precisely why Johnston's article was viewed with such alarm, the naval leadership could only have been relieved when the grand jury refused to indict and the furor quieted. The secret of the code-breaking remained safe.[5]

Soon King replaced Knox at the center of a new public-relations maelstrom that developed during the Guadalcanal campaign. At King's insistence the Navy undertook its first offensive in August of 1942 with its attempt to seize Guadalcanal and so forestall a possible Japanese threat to key American bases to the south. Ultimately the campaign would lead northward to Rabaul, the bastion of Japanese strength in the South Pacific. The invasion of Guadalcanal quickly bogged down into a battle of attrition that drew in more and more forces from both antagonists. American ground forces wound up in their worst predicament since Bataan and Corregidor had fallen in the spring, while on the seas around Guadalcanal violent naval and carrier-air battles ensued.[6]

The Navy soon suffered a spectacular reversal when one Australian and three U.S. cruisers were sunk in a one-sided night engagement off Savo Island. By the time the news of the defeat was

released, almost 9 weeks after the event, the Navy had a recently achieved victory to report. Charges that the Navy was manipulating the news were again heard.[7]

Even louder was the uproar about the Savo Island disaster itself, the revelation of which helped to precipitate an outburst of angry questions about the reasons for the parlous situation in the South Pacific. The *Tribune* led anti-Administration papers in demanding to know why their special hero, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, was not in command of the Guadalcanal operation rather than being a spectator in his Australian headquarters. Unified command became the rallying cry from those seeking panaceas.[8] The most quoted protesters were two Congressmen, John Costello of California and Melvin J. Maas of Minnesota.

Costello initiated the onslaught in mid-October (only days after the announcement of the debacle off Savo Island) with a blast at the strategists in Washington. In a statement clearly directed at the Navy the worried Costello asked why Army personnel from MacArthur's adjoining Southwest Pacific Area had not been brought into action to assist the hard-pressed Marines on Guadalcanal. They were, he declared, prepared to come to the aid of the Marines, "but they can't get there by walking across water." The situation "cries to heaven for an answer."[9]

Hardly had Costello's accusations ceased to be newsworthy when his House colleague, Mel Maas, made the first of several critical statements about the conduct of the war in the Pacific. A Marine reserve officer, Maas was the ranking Republican on the House Naval Affairs Committee and had wangled himself a 4-month tour of duty in the Pacific. On his return to Washington in October he had surprisingly little to say to the press, trying first to swing President Roosevelt and other leading members of the Administration to his views.[10] Apparently unable to win acceptance for his more extreme opinions, Maas finally spoke out in a provocative address heard on the CBS radio network. In it Maas first dwelled on the unfortunate consequences of the Navy's mishandling of war news. He then turned to what he considered the crux of the difficulties in the Pacific: lack of unified command. Not only was the war in the Pacific being lost for want of a supreme command—it should go to the Navy—but because of the shortsighted policy being followed in Washington, where there was no unifying agency to give proper coordination to the war effort as a whole, the Pacific was going without the requisite men and materiel. Instead, these resources were unwisely being diverted to Europe and to sundry secondary theaters. "What is taking place in Europe," Maas argued, "is a terrible European war with dire consequences to us all, but what is taking place in the Pacific is not war at all, but the first mighty explosion of a truly worldwide revolution against the white man's civilization. If we lose this revolution, the white man's day is over."[11]

Perhaps Maas only meant to stir things up enough to get higher priority on supplies for his fellow Marines. At any rate, that was how he explained things to his friend, Adm. William Halsey. Yet designed as they seemingly were to inflame interservice rivalries and to prolong the debate about leadership in the Pacific, Maas' charges could hardly have been welcome news to King. To place them in perspective, however, they were only the most recent in a month-long series of headline-grabbing controversies about the stalemate in the Solomons. The debate about the Navy's lack of leadership and its mishandling of war news had begun to rage some weeks before. It inexorably led to speculation that King's position was in danger, for, as Palmer Hoyt has argued, reluctance to divulge

information about military defeat can easily be construed as a cover-up for incompetence. The conclusion was drawn that the Navy had something to hide. Rumors of disasters even worse than that of Savo Island circulated widely, at a time, ironically, when measures to strengthen American forces in the Solomons had begun to be taken.[12]

The public-relations dimension of the fight for Guadalcanal now assumed unprecedented importance. Since its inception in June 1942 the Office of War Information, a federal agency established to coordinate the handling of military and other news pertaining to the war, had been feuding with the Navy about its reluctance to cooperate in the prompt dissemination of news. "Never have so few withheld so much from so many," fumed Elmer Davis, a veteran newsman who was now director of the OWI. If persisted in, the Navy's misguided attempts to manage the news would certainly undermine King's credibility and more than likely his career as well, felt Davis. Despite a heated argument he had with King about the release of information, Davis was reluctant to use the Savo Island crisis if it meant making things worse for the admiral. Yet he also felt something had to be done to halt the loss of confidence in King. He defended the admiral in a well-publicized speech in which he pleaded for recognition of the fact that for King and other naval leaders public relations was a subsidiary field. Their business was to fight and to win the war. Meanwhile, behind the scenes he sought to make King realize the gravity of the situation. Rather than go over King to the President, Davis turned to Hanson Baldwin, a Naval Academy graduate who had resigned his commission years before to win acclaim as one of the most knowledgeable analysts of military affairs. Like so many others Baldwin was critical of the Navy's inattention to its public relations, believing that the Navy had failed to clarify its objectives in undertaking the Solomons campaign and that its censorship was contributing to the subsequent confusion and bitterness. With his aid, Davis was able to approach officers close to King but more receptive to criticism.[13]

King's friends were also concerned lest his unbending refusal to level with the press destroy his career. Along with Davis' efforts, a luncheon engagement between King's close friend and attorney, Cornelius Bull, and Glen Perry, Washington correspondent of the *New York Sun*, led to a mending of the rift between King and the press. Bull and Perry inevitably discussed Admiral King's predicament. Perry suggested that King should get to know some of the senior Washington correspondents to see for himself that his doubts about them were unnecessary; the occasional formal conferences he held were unsuitable for this. Bull scoffed at the suggestion. But a few days later he got back to Perry to say that he had had a bright idea—why not arrange a get-together between King and some journalists. Perry shrewdly accepted the suggestion as Bull's own, and the two met to work out details. They decided it would be best to have King and some veteran correspondents, primarily bureau chiefs, see each other socially. Because only a select number of journalists were to be invited, the meeting should not be held in official surroundings but should be in the nature of a private gathering at Bull's Alexandria, Virginia home.[14]

The first meeting on 6 November got off slowly with King appearing ill at ease and the eight other guests (Perry, Roscoe Drummond, and six other reporters whom they had decided to invite) apparently uncertain how to approach the admiral whose reputation they well knew. But the tension eased after some minutes and King commented lucidly about the war. Although his remarks were wide-ranging, he did

take pains to address the two issues about which so much had been said and written in recent weeks: that South Pacific operations were foundering because there was no unity of command and that the Navy manipulated its news releases so as to withhold information and to blanket bad news with the good. He insisted that premature disclosure of the details of the Savo Island defeat could indeed have aided the enemy. The action had taken place at night, attended by a great deal of confusion, and there was every reason to believe the Japanese did not know the extent of their success. Revealing American losses at the time of the battle would thus have been improper. The fact that the sinking of the Allied cruisers was finally disclosed at almost the precise moment the Navy had a victory to celebrate was coincidental. The Navy, in fact, had been embarrassed about the timing of the two releases.

King next refuted the charge that there was no unity of command. He declared that it began at the very top where he, Adm. William Leahy who was chief of staff to the President, Army Chief of Staff George Marshall, and Air Force Gen. Henry "Hap" Arnold comprised the Joint Chiefs giving strategic direction to the American war effort and designating the appropriate theaters. The Navy did direct the South Pacific Area just as MacArthur commanded the Southwest Pacific but both did so under the authority of the Joint Chiefs. Forces from both commands were actually cooperating in many ways, "down in the ditch digging together," as another admiral put it.[15]

Suspending his wartime resolve to go on the wagon, King enjoyed a couple of beers amidst a generally cordial atmosphere. While no notes were taken during the admiral's prepared remarks or the question-and-answer session that followed, the reporters were quite pleased with what they had learned in the 4-hour meeting—and with King. His frankness was, in a sense, disarming. "He made a profound impression upon the correspondents," the excited Perry reported to his editor. "They were for him 100 per cent by the time they said good-bye. . . . I had met King once before, and liked him, but this was the first chance I'd had to measure him at all. He's all right." True, the information they received from him was confidential. But as they saw it the purpose of this and the meetings that were to follow was not to allow them to bypass their regular sources of information, a procedure which would probably have exacerbated the tensions between King and the press and done no one any good. By mutual consent they did not then or after approach him about quoting him in their stories. The information they got from King was of course largely about strategy and future operations and would allow the participants and their editors (to whom they were free to send memoranda of the meetings) to be alert for important developments and to place in perspective the news obtained from official releases and from their own sources.[16]

The gratifying results of the initial meeting kept Admiral King and the journalists coming back for more. King, in fact, asked when they would meet again. While the number present at any one time rarely exceeded a dozen, there was some rotation of the guests with representatives of the wire services, periodicals, and the broadcast media joining their newspaper colleagues from the start. King himself scrupulously refused to have anything to say about the composition of the guest list. By the end of the war 16 conferences—or Sunday vesper services as the regulars referred to them—had been held and the number of veterans had climbed to over two dozen. Always in the nature of private gatherings, the meetings continued to take place at Bull's home until his death in 1944 and thereafter at the

home of Phelps Adams, Perry's friend and the *Sun's* bureau chief.[17]

King clearly enjoyed the conferences, but did he profit from them? In initiating them Bull and Perry had hoped to aid in saving King's position, for they believed he was a highly qualified strategist and war leader whose services should not be forfeited because of mishandled public relations. He needed to know some journalists, and they needed to understand where he stood on the great issues of the war. Within weeks after the first session King did get some positive feedback of the type the two had intended. For instance, Ernest Lindley and Raymond Brandt both gave the Navy's war effort writeups that supported King's leadership. There was indeed unified command and it was of the highest caliber, argued Lindley who wrote for both *Newsweek* and the *Washington Post.* In the preceding weeks he had been far from sympathetic to King. Unlike Lindley, Brandt had not attended the inaugural vesper service. However, Marquis Childs, a *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* colleague, had, and it is reasonable to infer word got to Brandt from Childs or from their editor that King had a story worth hearing. The upshot was that Brandt was able to rush into print a front-page interview with King that refuted the charges Maas had just made in his radio address.[18]

Thereafter, the situation changed. Although bureaucratic lethargy still gave Elmer Davis reason to complain, in the most significant ways—completeness and speed of release—the Navy greatly improved its handling of war news. Equally as important, it also began to experience victory, November 1942 bringing an upturn in American fortunes. Therefore, as Davis remarked, there was no reason to complain about the suppression of news when there was no bad news to suppress. Nor was there cause to doubt the quality of King's leadership. In a very real sense Admiral King's press relations were taking care of themselves. On one occasion he did have to rally several of the correspondents (his commandos, as one of the staunchest of them put it) to help stop the rumored transfer of Army Chief of Staff George Marshall to the top European command. King worked well with Marshall and wished to see him remain in Washington as a colleague on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Otherwise, if King gained from continuing the conferences, it was in large measure from the chance to relax with intelligent men outside the service and to use them as a sounding board that might help him to polish the presentation of his ideas.[19]

When the war ended there were thus some two dozen journalists who shared with King one of Washington's best-kept secrets. The informal conferences in which they participated might well seem archaic by contemporary journalistic standards that place the right to know above that of the privilege of confidentiality, a privilege each of the participants respected. There simply were no leaks. However, several of them doubt the off-the-record conference could succeed today, and perhaps should not even be attempted. "One drawback in peacetime," a former *New York Times* correspondent observed,

> is the risk of leaks and the consequent care an official would feel called upon to take. Another, and more serious one, is the damper such associations tend to put on aggressive and independent reporting. . . . God help us if reporters become statesmen and feel persuaded to make judgments on what we should or should not know "in the public interest."[20]

In wartime Washington, however, the confidential briefing—what came to be known as the deep backgrounder—was not uncommon, and all the evidence suggests that the opportunity to meet with the redoubtable Admiral King was welcomed by the participants.[21] For King, in particular, the format Bull and

Perry had worked out was ideal. Extremely able, but not as articulate as some of his highly placed contemporaries nor especially comfortable before large groups, King was able to relax with his new friends and acquaintances from the fourth estate and allow them to see him as few outside the service did. Those who participated—the veterans of the Battle of Virginia—learned that he was not only the master strategist that the war's progress confirmed but a flexible tactician who crossed the Potomac to establish an outpost in Virginia that might help save his position in Washington. The Battle of Virginia did a lot less to still the criticism of King than the successful outcome of the Battle of Guadalcanal, but an understanding of both campaigns is necessary to appreciate the many and varied pressures on Admiral King, or any wartime leader for that matter, and the admiral's surprising deftness in handling them.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Lloyd Graybar received his Ph.D. from Columbia University and is now Professor of History at Eastern Kentucky University. His recent writing includes "Strategy and Policy After Pearl Harbor: The Relief of Wake Island" and "Bikini Revisited." He is presently writing a biography of Admiral Ernest King.

NOTES

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3. Glen Perry to author, 11 July 1974; Hanson W. Baldwin, "Reminiscences of Hanson Weightman Baldwin," U.S. Naval Institute Oral History interview, 1976, pp. 246-248, mss. at Operational Archives, Naval History Division, Washington, D.C.; King and Whitehill, p. 652; Vincent Davis, *The Admirals Lobby* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1967), pp. 266-268; John M. Blum, *V Was for Victory: Politics and American Culture during World War II* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), p. 33; Forrest Davis, "King's Way to Tokyo," *Saturday Evening Post*, 9 December 1944, pp. 9-11, 101-102; King quoted in Robert McCormick, "King of the Navy," *Collier's*, 16 January 1943, p. 20. Although I employ the term *public relations* here and elsewhere in this article, I wish to stress that my emphasis is on dealings between King and the press and on King's feelings about what should go into a press release. Public relations, of course, can also mean the type of image-building pioneered by Ivy Lee. For a valuable book that discusses the military and image-making see Robert Lindsay, *This High Name: Public Relations and the U.S. Marine Corps* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1956).

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5. Clay Blair, Jr., *Silent Victory* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1975), pp. 256-261; transcript, Press Conference of Admiral Ernest J. King, 7 June 1942, p. 7, King Papers; Frank C. Waldrop, *McCormick of Chicago: An Unconventional Portrait of a Controversial Figure* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Greenwood Press, 1966), pp. 260-263; *Chicago Tribune*, 8 August 1942, pp. 1-4; 10 August 1942, pp. 3-4; 11 August 1942, pp. 1 and 4; 14 August 1942, p. 2; 15 August 1942, p. 1; 18 August 1942, pp. 1 and 6; 19 August 1942, p. 1; and 20 August 1942, pp. 1 and 9.

6. *Time*, 26 October 1942, pp. 23, 30; Samuel Eliot Morison, *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II: Vol. V, The Struggle for Guadalcanal* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1949), pp. 3-315 *passim*.

7. *The New York Times*, 15 October 1942, p. 22.

8. *Newsweek*, 2 November 1942, p. 42; *The New York Times*, 15 October 1942, p. 15; 23 October 1942, pp. 1 and 4; *Washington Post*, 18 October 1942, Sec. II, p. 1; 28 October 1942, Sec. II, p. 8; Chicago Tribune, 16 October 1942, p. 4; 25 October 1942, p. 12; 26 October 1942, p. 16; 28 October 1942, p. 1; 30 October 1942, p. 14; and 2 November 1942, pp. 9 and 16; *San Francisco Examiner*, 2 November 1942, p. 8; Forrest Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, 1939-1942* (New York: Viking Press, 1966), pp. 394-395.

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10. Glen Perry to author, 17 August 1974; *Washington Post*, 23 October 1942, p. 4; Melvin J. Maas, "Mistakes I Saw in the Pacific," *American Mercury*, January 1943, pp. 5-14; Maas, "A Unified Service," *Flying*, November 1942, pp. 40-41; Diary of Melvin J. Maas, entries of 9, 10, 22, and 26 October 1942, original in possession of Marianne Catterton.

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12. Maas to William Halsey, 26 November 1942, and Halsey to Maas, 15 December 1942, both in Papers of Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey, Library of Congress; King to David Lawrence, 28 September and 1 October 1942, and Owen Scott to Lawrence, 30 September 1942, all enclosed with King to Harry Hopkins, 1 October 1942, Papers of Harry Hopkins, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library; Harry Byrd to King, 28 October 1942, King Papers; Baldwin, p. 359; *Newswcek*, 2 November 1942, p. 42; *Washington Post*, 28 October 1942, p. 9; Elmer Davis and Byron Price, *War Information and Censorship* (Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1943), pp. 36-39; Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur: Vol. II, 1941-1945* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1975), pp. 219-238.

13. King to Lindley, 4 November 1942, King Papers; Baldwin, pp. 361-363; *The New York Times*, 23 October 1942, pp. 1 and 4; 29 October 1942, p. 1; Davis quoted in Nicholas Roosevelt, *A Front Row Seat* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1953), pp. 259, 264; Roger Burlingame, *Don't Let Them Scare You: The Life and Times of Elmer Davis* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1961), p. 201; Allan M. Winkler, "Politics and Propaganda: The Office of War Information, 1942-1945," unpublished dissertation, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.: 1974, pp. 58-59.

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15. Drummond to King, 14 November 1942, King Papers; memorandum of King conference, 7 November 1942, original in possession of Glen Perry; interview with Perry, 13 May 1975.

16. Richard Wilson to author, 24 June 1974; Perry to Edmond Bartnett, 7 November 1942, in possession of Glen Perry; Benjamin M. McKelway to author, 26 June 1974; Perry to author, 11 July 1974; Adams to author, 13 July 1974; Joseph C. Harsch to author, 11 September 1974; Roy Hoopes, *Americans Remember the Home Front: An Oral Narrative* (New York: Hawthorne Books, 1977), p. 370.

17. Adams to author, 13 July 1974; Catledge to author, 15 July 1974; Adams to King, 19 October 1945, King Papers. The roster of participating journalists and their affiliations is, in the order of appearance: Glen Perry, *New York Sun;* Bert Andrews, *New York Herald-Tribune;* Ray Clapper, *Scripps-Howard;* Ernest Lindley, *Newsweek;* Marquis Childs, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* and

United Features Syndicate; Barnet Nover, *Washington Post;* Roscoe Drummond, *Christian Science Monitor;* Raymond Henle, *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* and *American Broadcasting Company;* Lyle Wilson, *United Press;* Edward Folliard, *Washington Post;* Walter Lippmann, *New York Herald-Tribune Syndicate;* Phelps Adams, *New York Sun;* Paul Miller, *Associated Press;* Lewis Wood, *The New York Times;* Raymond Brandt, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch;* Alexander Jones, *Washington Post;* Mark Foote, *Booth Newspapers;* Felix Belair, *Time;* Joseph Harsch, *Columbia Broadcasting System;* Turner Catledge, *The New York Times;* James Wright, *Buffalo Evening News;* Dewey Fleming, *Baltimore Sun;* Richard Wilson, *Cowles Publications;* Paul Leach, *Chicago Daily News;* Arthur Krock, *The New York Times;* Benjamin McKelway, *Washington Evening Star;* Raymond Swing, *American Broadcasting Company;* William Hillman, *Crowell-Collier Publications.*

18. *Newsweek,* 2, 23 November 1942, p. 34 and 32 respectively; *Washington Post,* 28 October 1942, p. 9; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch,* 15 November 1942, pp. 1 and 10; King to Lindley, 24 August and 4 November 1942; Drummond to King, 14 November 1942; Raymond Brandt to King, 16 November 1942, and King to Brandt, 16 November 1942; Marquis Childs to King, 4 December 1942, all in King Papers.

19. Elmer Davis to King, 8 January and 2 March 1943, both in King Papers; OWI, Report to the President, pp. 20-24, Davis Papers; Adams to author, 30 June 1974; interview with Perry, 13 May 1975; Roscoe Drummond and Glen Perry, "King of the Seven Seas," *Look,* 22 February 1944, pp. 42-49.

20. Paul R. Leach to author, 26 July 1974; Wilson to author, 24 June 1974; quote in Turner Catledge to author, 15 July 1974.

21. Hoopes, p. 370.