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The political requirements for a military victory have been, at times, greater than a military force's ability to fulfill. A military failure, following a military prediction of failure, has been seen as self-fulfilling prophecy. Admiral Du Pont's experience is instructive.

**ADMIRAL SAMUEL F. DU PONT,
THE NAVY DEPARTMENT,
AND THE ATTACK ON CHARLESTON, APRIL 1863**

by
Gerald S. Henig

Gloom overshadowed the Union in the early spring of 1863. The military situation, particularly in the eastern theater, seemed hopeless. In December the Army of the Potomac had suffered a severe defeat at Fredericksburg, and, at least for the immediate future, there were no indications that it was ready to redeem itself. As Allan Nevins has noted in his multivolume study of the war, many in the North believed at this time that the "valor, dash, and tenacity of the South . . . combined with high military leadership, might yet possibly produce a deadlock—which would mean Confederate success."¹ To prevent this, the Lincoln administration, Congress, and northerners in general realized that a decisive blow would have to be leveled against the South. Rather than look to the Army, plagued by a poor combat record and low morale, most now

pinned their hopes upon the Navy—especially upon the man who had given the Union its first major victory, Rear Adm. Samuel F. Du Pont.

Tall, handsome, aristocratic in bearing, Du Pont had a distinguished lineage. His grandfather was the French author and statesman Du Pont de Nemours, a longtime friend of Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson; and Samuel's uncle, Eleuthère Irénée du Pont, was the founder of the gunpowder industry of Wilmington, Delaware. A close family, it came as no surprise and met with the approval of the entire "clan" when Samuel married his first cousin, Sophie Madeleine (the daughter of Eleuthère Irénée), to whom he remained devoted throughout his life. Second only to the love he had for his wife was the deep dedication he had for his profession. In 1817, at the age of 14, he joined the

U.S.S. *Franklin* for his first cruise as a midshipman. This was to be the beginning of a long and illustrious career in which he would serve in European waters, in the Near East, in the Orient, and in Washington. Indeed, at the time the Civil War broke out Du Pont had spent nearly 45 years of his life in the U.S. Navy.²

Impressive as these credentials were, Du Pont was destined to add an even greater achievement to his record. In early November 1861, 8 months after Confederate batteries had opened fire on Fort Sumter, Du Pont delivered to the South its first major defeat. At the head of a vast armada, he successfully attacked the Confederate forts in Port Royal Sound in South Carolina and forced their evacuation. The inland water routes from Charleston to Savannah were thus closed off to the Confederacy, and, most essential, a strategic base of operations was now established for the Union squadron blockading the South Atlantic coast.³

Aside from the tactical advantages secured and the critical boost it gave Union morale, Du Pont's victory had one additional effect: It whetted the North's appetite for an even more magnificent triumph. Now that an important foothold had been obtained off the South Carolina coast, the public as well as the press began to demand an assault on the very symbol of the Confederacy—"the cradle of secession"—Charleston. Although the Navy Department considered such an undertaking unnecessary at the time, preferring instead to continue strengthening its blockade, it soon reversed itself, a result primarily of the enthusiastic prodding by Gustavus Vasa Fox.⁴

A man of boundless energy as well as ambition, Fox had first started his career in the Navy but resigned in the mid-1850s and accepted a position as a business agent for a Massachusetts textile firm. In April 1861, through the efforts of his brother-in-law Mont-

gomery Blair, who served as Lincoln's Postmaster General, Fox played a major role in the attempt to relieve Fort Sumter in Charleston harbor. His talents during that episode did not go unnoticed and he soon rose to the position of Assistant Secretary of the Navy.⁵

"[T]he fall of Charleston is the fall of Satan's kingdom," Fox wrote Du Pont in early June 1862. Having witnessed the historic encounter between *Monitor* and *Virginia* (née *Merrimac*) several months before, the Assistant Secretary was of the opinion that several ironclad monitors were all that were necessary to capture the city. Such a feat, moreover, could be accomplished solely by the Navy. As Fox explained further to Du Pont: "I feel that my duties are twofold; first to beat our southern friends; second to beat the Army. We have done it so far, and the people acknowledge and give us the credit."⁶

While continuing to think highly of the "intelligent and brave" Assistant Secretary, Du Pont was unimpressed with his views on Charleston. What the veteran officer found most disturbing were the intelligence reports he had received detailing the intensive fortifications in the harbor. "For thirteen long months," Du Pont observed, "it has been the remark of our blockading officers that the industry of these rebels in their harbor defenses is beyond all praise; it has been ceaseless day and night." And to make matters worse, unlike the spacious harbor of Port Royal which had been guarded by small forts, Charleston, Du Pont pointed out, was a "cul de sac" with both sides of the entrance protected by a massive network of batteries. In other words, there could be "no bombardment of a week to fatigue and demoralize" the city, nor could a fleet successfully run "the gauntlet, night or day."⁷ Unofficially Du Pont made these views known to Fox, but apparently they were to no avail; the Assistant

70 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Secretary's desire for a naval expedition against "Satan's kingdom" remained unshaken.

Not only was Fox unable or perhaps unwilling to fully appreciate the unique difficulties posed by Charleston harbor, he tended to aggravate the problem further by insisting that the assault be a purely naval one. Once again Du Pont took issue with the Assistant Secretary. Although no greater admirer of the Army,⁶ the Admiral nevertheless wanted a joint expedition, hoping that the land forces would capture some of the forts protecting the approaches to the harbor and thereby reduce the firepower that would be directed against his invading ships. Thinking the matter important enough to warrant a personal interview, Du Pont traveled to Washington in early October 1862 to present his views firsthand.⁹

Soon after arriving in the capital, however, the admiral realized that his mission was in vain. "Fox's navy feelings," Du Pont noted after meeting with him, were "so strong, and his prejudices or dislike of army selfishness so great in their operation with our service, that he listens unwillingly to combined movements. . . ." ¹⁰ Still, Du Pont persisted, telling the Assistant Secretary: "My friend, this is all well, and undivided glory is very pleasant to contemplate, but our country is in a position where certainty of success in such an undertaking is of far more importance than what may accrue to different corps or officers out of the modus of operations." Fox agreed that "success must be paramount," but, he added obstinately, it would be achieved solely by the Navy.¹¹

In meetings with other members of the Administration, Du Pont chose not to raise the issue. With President Lincoln, for example, the admiral dwelt mainly on the importance of maintaining an effective blockade, and with several cabinet members he engaged in conversation generally dealing with

naval appointments, politics, and the overall sorry record of the Army of the Potomac.¹² He even avoided discussion of a combined assault with Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, who in turn chose not to bring up the matter, believing that Fox had the problem under control. Besides, Welles, an old Jacksonian Democrat with a distinct prejudice toward aristocracy, felt somewhat ill at ease with the impressive and courtly admiral.¹³

Welles' reticence is therefore understandable; but how does one account for Du Pont's reluctance to broach the matter of a joint expedition? In a letter to a friend, the admiral revealed at least part of the answer by conceding that it simply was not his nature to press things.¹⁴ As a longtime military man, he was trained to obey and to do his duty, not to question orders. While this certainly sheds light on his behavior, it does not explain it entirely; there were other reasons as well. In the first place, he himself was not confident that the Army could fulfill its part of the assault.¹⁵ Secondly, he feared that any objections to the attack might be interpreted in a bad light, and compromise his reputation as a fighting admiral. And finally, as he readily observed, there was "a morbid appetite for the capture of the place, particularly among the members of the Cabinet . . .," a fact which Secretary Welles confirmed, declaring that they were "like men with tapeworms."¹⁶

Yet the trip to Washington, in Du Pont's opinion, was not a total loss. While he admitted his failure to win favor for a joint expedition, he did have "many points of detail settled at the Dept."¹⁷ But of much greater importance was the overall impression he received concerning the Government's view of the impending assault. At all costs "Charleston must be taken," the admiral confided to his wife in late October. "Six weeks is considered a long time. . . . Officers talk of the 'grand

attack' and all underrate the difficulties."¹⁸

Nor were all of the difficulties foreseen by Du Pont while he was in Washington. Soon after returning to duty at Port Royal, the admiral began to have serious doubts about the ironclad monitors—the vessels that would comprise the main force of the attacking squadron. To be sure, they were formidable defensive weapons, having proven their impregnability in past performances. Yet their offensive abilities left much to be desired. Not only were they plagued by a slowness of speed, but what Du Pont found even more disturbing was their weak potential to launch an assault, as most of the ironclads were equipped with but two guns mounted on a single turret and capable of discharging a round only at 7-minute intervals. "[T]he powers of aggression & even endurance of the ironclads," the admiral declared in early January 1863, "are as much overrated by Mr. Fox & others, as the extent and nature of the defenses of Charleston are underrated."¹⁹

In the latter part of the month, Du Pont decided to put his conviction to the test. On 27 January he ordered John L. Worden, commander of the ironclad *Montauk*, to attack Fort McAllister, a seven-gun fort guarding the Ogeechee River, south of Savannah. During the next few days the *Montauk* launched several assaults on the fort, but failed to inflict any significant damage.²⁰ Rather than relate this information informally to Fox as he had done in the past, Du Pont sent an official and confidential report to Secretary Welles. After explaining that the purpose of Worden's mission was to test the effectiveness of the ironclads, the admiral went directly to the heart of the matter.

My own previous impressions of these vessels, frequently expressed to Assistant Secretary Fox, have been confirmed, viz.: that whatever degree of im-

penetrability they might have, there was no corresponding quality of aggression or destructiveness as against forts, the slowness of fire giving full time for the gunners in the fort to take shelter in the bombproofs.

This experiment also convinces me of another impression, firmly held and often expressed, that in all such operations, to secure success, troops are necessary.²¹

Welles was clearly surprised by the report. Having left much of the Charleston operation in the hands of Fox, he had been unaware of the reservations held by the officer responsible for carrying it out. In any case, after informing Du Pont that he had the right to abandon the project if he deemed it unfeasible (an option, which Welles probably realized, the proud admiral would hardly consider exercising), the Secretary went on to say that the capture of Charleston was "imperative" and that "the Department will share the responsibility imposed upon the commanders who make the attempt."²²

Despite such an assurance Du Pont remained filled with anxiety. Of course there was no question now that the attack would have to be undertaken. But as he saw it there was still one lingering problem: the inadequate size of his invasion fleet (at the time comprising seven vessels). With this in mind, during the next 2 months or so the admiral continued to test his ironclads against Fort McAllister, and on each occasion related the dismal results to the department hoping that it would ultimately respond by increasing the number of monitors at his disposal.²³ Although his efforts met with some success (the department promised at least one and possibly two additional vessels),²⁴ Du Pont was still far from satisfied and decided to exert greater pressure on the Administration. In early March he enlisted the aid of a well-respected naval engineer, Alban Stimers,

72 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

who happened to witness one of the monitor attacks on Fort McAllister. To Du Pont's delight, Stimers agreed with him that more ironclads were necessary before an expedition could be launched against Charleston. What made the engineer's testimony so critical was that he had formerly been a strong representative of the so-called "Monitor Lobby."²⁵ Eager to capitalize on this situation, Du Pont immediately ordered Stimers to Washington to report his views to the department. As the admiral informed his wife: "He [Stimers] will enlighten them more at the Department than fifty letters from me would do, because he belonged to the enthusiasts and, like Fox, thought one [monitor] could take Charleston."²⁶

Rather than enlighten members of the Administration, Stimers' mission served only to disappoint and anger them. Welles, for instance, was outraged, particularly when he heard that Du Pont not only wanted more monitors but still favored a joint Army and Navy assault on Charleston. The admiral, according to Welles, was growing soft and was more anxious to preserve the reputation he had instead of seeking to enhance it.²⁷ Lincoln, who was present at the meeting, came to a similar conclusion. Under severe pressure to deliver a victory to the Union and ill-advised about the combat effectiveness of ironclads when pitted against forts, the President maintained that Du Pont's "long delay . . . his constant call for more ships, more ironclads, was like McClellan calling for more regiments."²⁸ While such a comparison was hardly a fair one, the overall message was unmistakable: the admiral was to launch his attack as soon as possible. Indeed, by the end of March Du Pont concluded that the assault would have to be made in the immediate future. "It seems to be my fate," he wrote,

[to] have the eyes of the nation and the government upon me, when the national heart is

sore and impatient for victory. Politicians, rather than wait a day, prefer to throw the die like gamblers and make or break, as the term is. Statesmen look to results. I sympathize with their impatience very much—[yet] it is true it is the impatience of ignorance.²⁹

A week and a half later, on 7 April 1863, Du Pont's fleet sailed into Charleston harbor.

The squadron, consisting of nine vessels in all (seven of which were the single-turret monitors), was simply no match for the Confederate forts in the channel. Throughout the entire 1-hour-and-40-minute engagement, the guns of the Union ironclads were able to deliver only 139 rounds. In turn, the cannon of the forts rained over 2,000 shots on the invading ships, hitting them no less than 439 times. One vessel was lost and several suffered serious damage. To have pushed the attack further would have resulted no doubt in the loss or capture of most of the squadron.³⁰ Du Pont withdrew, refusing, as he later pointed out, to turn a defeat into a disaster.³¹

Within a week the admiral sent both a preliminary and a detailed analysis of the engagement to the department. In addition to praising the valor of his officers and outlining the damage to his vessels, he included a point by point confirmation of all which he had anticipated.³² Distressing as these facts might have been to Welles and Fox, the report was an accurate appraisal of what had transpired. Yet the Secretary and his assistant, for the moment at least, chose not to respond, hoping to gather testimony which would contradict Du Pont's.³³ In the meantime, the admiral, sensitive, proud, and anxious for approval, grew uneasy with the department's silence—an uneasiness which soon erupted into anger.

On 15 April an extended article on the battle appeared in the *Baltimore*

American. Written by Charles C. Fulton, editor of the paper, the piece was severely critical of the attack, calling it a "disgraceful result" and placing much, if not all, of the responsibility for its outcome on Du Pont's shoulders.³⁴ To add insult to injury, the admiral received information that this "slandereous" article had been fully sanctioned by Fox prior to its publication.³⁵ Although this was not the case, there was considerable evidence suggesting that Fulton had strong ties with the Assistant Secretary, a fact brought to Du Pont's attention by his closest friend and adviser, Henry Winter Davis.³⁶

A former Baltimore Congressman, Davis was a shrewd and colorful figure who retained considerable power in Maryland despite his out-of-office status.³⁷ As leader of the Unconditional Unionists forces, Davis' chief political rival in the state was the conservative (or Conditional Unionist) Montgomery Blair, who happened to be Fox's brother-in-law and a member of Lincoln's Cabinet. In any event, Davis was convinced that it was no mere coincidence that Fulton of the *Baltimore American* had maliciously attacked Du Pont. The *American* was Blair's leading political organ in Maryland, and Davis suspected that Blair was attempting to spite him by assailing his friend Du Pont. In fact, his suspicions were confirmed when word leaked out that Blair had written to Fulton complaining "that he had not 'given it' . . . half hard enough" to Du Pont.³⁸

Beside these political factors, Davis was also of the opinion that Blair had another sinister interest in Du Pont's case. After all, it was common knowledge that Blair supported Fox in his plans for building an ironclad Navy, and that both men were strong enthusiasts of the monitors. For that matter, another member of the family, Francis Preston Blair, Jr., a Missouri politician, occasionally served as an agent to secure government contracts for the con-

struction of these vessels. If Du Pont's position on the Charleston defeat was acknowledged, it would mean that the monitors were not as effective as was generally believed, and it could very well stop further production until their defects were overcome. From Davis' viewpoint, then, the attack upon Du Pont in the *American* and the silence of the department could be explained, at least partially, in terms of "a Blair-Fox conspiracy."³⁹

While there was undoubtedly some truth in Davis' conclusion, it still did not account for Welles' reaction to the abortive attack. The Secretary had promised Du Pont that the department would "share the responsibility" in case of failure,⁴⁰ but it was becoming more and more apparent that he was not about to keep his pledge. Nor did he see any reason to do so, as he now firmly believed that the entire fiasco was Du Pont's fault. The admiral's "vanity and weakness," Welles noted in his diary, had lost them "the opportunity to take Charleston, which a man of more daring energy, and who had not a distinguished name to nurse and take care of would have improved." Furthermore, he wrote, Du Pont was "prejudiced" against the monitors and therefore blamed them for his ill-success, rather than the fact that he had "no taste for rough, close fighting."⁴¹ Convinced of these views, the Secretary sought support for them among officers in Du Pont's fleet. He first contacted John Rodgers, a highly respected and independent-minded officer who commanded *Weehawken*, the ironclad which led the attack. To Welles' chagrin, Rodgers fully supported the admiral, emphasizing that the monitors were deficient in firepower and had serious maneuverability problems—both of which rendered it impossible for Du Pont to capture Charleston. Soon after receiving Rodgers' report, Welles spoke privately with Capt. Percival Drayton, another officer involved in the battle.

74 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Like Rodgers, Drayton backed up the admiral.⁴²

Totally disregarding the testimony of these officers, Welles set about seeking a replacement for Du Pont. In the meantime, the Secretary finally broke the silence of the department by responding to the admiral. With some justification, he explained that he was unwilling at the present time to publish the official reports prepared by Du Pont and his officers concerning the attack, for it would not be in the public interest and would simply "encourage those in rebellion." In a more sarcastic manner, however, Welles went on to point out to Du Pont that "to publish to the world your reports of your failure and your hopelessness of success" would in the end serve no one's interests.⁴³

A sensitive man under normal conditions, Du Pont was enraged by the "offensive" tone of this official department letter. Given the circumstances the admiral's reaction was not unreasonable, even if one takes into consideration his inflated self-esteem. After all, Du Pont was willing to accept a large share—even an "overshare"—of the blame for the repulse; and secondly, he was more than willing to acknowledge the department's reasons for not publishing his dispatches.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, he maintained, by Welles and Fox "not telling a single reporter near them, nor the Associated Press, that my conduct is approved presents an amount of turpitude and deception" which was impossible for him to accept. Confused and hurt, the admiral spoke of his dilemma to his wife: "I want to do what is 'right' and I hardly know myself what is right. I think I am treated *in fact* with positive contempt and so any officer would consider it. . . . Yet what am I to do?"⁴⁵

Of course there was one last resort left: to see the President himself. But the admiral was too steeped in proper naval protocol to consider going over the heads of his immediate superiors in

the department.⁴⁶ Such a consideration, however, did not prove bothersome to the fiery Henry Winter Davis, who, in early May, arranged to see Lincoln in Du Pont's behalf. At the outset of the meeting, Davis, in his usual direct manner, made it clear that he had come for only one reason—to present his friend's side of the dispute. Mincing few words, he stressed that the admiral had always had serious misgivings about the offensive capabilities of the monitors; that he had favored a combined sea and land operation rather than a purely naval one; and that he had all along regarded the attack as "a desperate undertaking, a Balaklava charge, risking more than success justified. . . ." In response, Lincoln claimed that these views had never been conveyed to him by either Du Pont or the Navy Department—a statement which was not entirely truthful as the President had sat in on the Stimers meeting and had been made aware of Du Pont's reservations. At any rate, Davis, unacquainted with these facts, pointed out that Du Pont on countless occasions had expressed his sentiments to Fox, but the latter had kept them secret and had fed everyone "dreamy hopes and visions" instead of the truth, in order "to suit himself and his speculative friends. . . ." Anxious to appease Davis who held considerable influence in radical Republican circles, Lincoln promised to call for and read Du Pont's full report on the expedition. Davis could not have been more pleased with the interview, and believed that once the President learned of the situation he would set the record straight.⁴⁷

But as it turned out, Lincoln did not intercede. While his reasons must remain a matter of conjecture, given the absence of any evidence, it seems likely that in the President's opinion Du Pont was just another military man quick to offer excuses rather than results, a problem Lincoln had confronted time and time again during the past year. In fact, several days after Davis' interview

the Union suffered a disastrous defeat at Chancellorsville, putting the President in no mood to come to the defense of Du Pont or any other defeated officer.

The Navy Department therefore retained full control over the affair, and was now merely biding its time until a proper replacement for Du Pont could be decided upon. In late June word finally arrived; Adm. John A. Dahlgren was ordered to assume Du Pont's command.⁴⁸ "[I]t is hard after forty-seven years of service," Du Pont remarked bitterly, "... to be disposed of in this way by upstarts temporarily in office. But I am going to keep my mouth shut and take all things patiently and, I trust, wisely—[for] I am right on the record."⁴⁹

Returning to his Delaware home in July, the Admiral spent most of the summer weighing the advice of friends and colleagues as to possible courses of action. On the one hand, his fellow officers agreed with his initial decision not to pursue the matter any further, insisting that the record spoke for itself.⁵⁰ On the other hand, the irascible Henry Winter Davis firmly believed that the "insolence and folly" of the department should not go unanswered. Du Pont, who regarded Davis as "the most intelligent" man he had ever known, seriously considered his advice even though it conflicted with his own instincts and those of his naval comrades.⁵¹ But what finally persuaded the admiral to reverse his original stand and to respond to the department was not Davis' influence alone. On 8 September 1863, Admiral Dahlgren unsuccessfully attempted to take Charleston.⁵²

A month and a half later, Du Pont sent a lengthy letter to Welles taking issue with the treatment he had received at the hands of the department, and indicating that the recent operations before Charleston sufficiently vindicated his judgment.⁵³ The Secretary

remained unmoved. After rereading the record, he informed Du Pont that his complaints were nothing more than "wholly imaginary personal grievances," and as far as he was concerned the matter was closed.⁵⁴

Du Pont would never again serve in a combat role. During the final month of the war, however, he was appointed, at the insistence of Adm. David Farragut, to a board assigned to recommend promotions for officers who had compiled outstanding records. While performing these duties, he took ill and died on 23 June 1865.⁵⁵

For Du Pont as well as the Administration the controversy over the Charleston attack was indeed "a regrettable episode."⁵⁶ Perhaps the admiral was remiss in not pressing his views vigorously enough upon those in Washington; and perhaps the President and his Secretaries were blinded to the risks involved because of the public clamor for victory. But once the battle was fought there was much to be learned from the experience. Instead, the Secretary (and the Under Secretary) chose to hide their blunders, break their promises, and make Du Pont the scapegoat for the repulse—actions which in the end did nothing to advance the Union cause.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Gerald Henig is an Associate Professor of History at California State University, Hayward. A graduate of Brooklyn College, he received his Ph.D. degree from the City University of New York. He is author of

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76 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

NOTES

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4. Hayes, ed., v. I, pp. lxxlii, lxxviii.
5. William E. Smith, *The Francis Preston Blair Family in Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1933), v. II, p. 2; John D. Hayes, "Captain Fox—He Is the Navy Department," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1965, pp. 65-66.
6. Gustavus Vasa Fox to Samuel F. Du Pont, 3 June 1862, in Robert M. Thompson and Richard Wainwright, eds., *Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865* (New York: De Vinne Press, 1918-1919), v. 1, pp. 126-128; see also Fox to Du Pont, 12 May 1862, in *ibid.*, v. I, pp. 119-120.
7. Du Pont to Fox, 31 May 1862, in Hayes, ed., v. II, p. 92; see also Du Pont to Mrs. Du Pont, 19 June 1862, in *ibid.*, v. II, p. 129. In the fall of 1862, when General P.G.T. Beauregard assumed command of the Charleston defenses, its fortifications were further strengthened. According to naval historian Bern Anderson, "no other city in the Confederacy was as well defended against attack from the sea." Bern Anderson, *By Sea and By River: The Naval History of the Civil War* (New York: Knopf, 1962), p. 157. For a detailed description of the fortifications, see Milton F. Perry, *Infernal Machines: The Story of Confederate Submarine and Mine Warfare* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965), pp. 49-51.
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9. Davis to Du Pont, 2 September 1862, *ibid.*
10. Du Pont to Davis, 25 October 1862, *ibid.*
11. Du Pont to Mrs. Du Pont, 21 October 1862 in Hayes, ed., v. II, p. 257.
12. Du Pont to Mrs. Du Pont, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21 October 1862 in *ibid.*, v. II, pp. 245-265.
13. John Niven, *Gideon Welles: Lincoln's Secretary of the Navy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 427; see also Howard K. Beale, ed., *Diary of Gideon Welles* (New York: Norton, 1960), v. I, p. 160.
14. Du Pont to Davis, 25 October 1862, Du Pont Papers.
15. *Ibid.*, 19 August 1862; Hayes, ed., v. I, p. lxxx.
16. Du Pont to Davis, 25 October 1862, Du Pont Papers.
17. *Ibid.*
18. Du Pont to Mrs. Du Pont, 18 October 1862, in Hayes, ed., v. II, pp. 248-249.
19. Mrs. Du Pont to Mr. & Mrs. Davis, 7 January 1863, Du Pont Papers; see also Du Pont to Davis, 13 December 1862, 5 March 1863, Davis to Du Pont, 2 January 1863, *ibid.*
20. Jones, v. II, pp. 376-380.
21. Du Pont to Gideon Welles, 28 January 1863, in Hayes, ed., v. II, p. 387.
22. Welles to Du Pont, 31 January 1863, in *ibid.*, v. II, pp. 399-400.
23. See, for example, Du Pont to Fox, 2 March 1863, v. II, pp. 463-464, Du Pont to Welles, 27 February 1863, v. II, pp. 457-458, in *ibid.*
24. Fox to Du Pont, 16, 20 February 1863, in *ibid.*, v. II, pp. 443-445, 450.
25. Niven, pp. 432-433.
26. Du Pont to Mrs. Du Pont, 4 March 1863, in Hayes, ed., v. II, p. 467.
27. Beale, ed., v. II, p. 247.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 259.
29. Du Pont to Mrs. Du Pont, 27 March 1863, in Hayes, ed., v. II, pp. 519-520; see also Du Pont to Davis, 5 March 1863, Mrs. Du Pont to Davis, 5 March 1863, Du Pont Papers.
30. For full details of the battle, see Richard West, Jr., *Mr. Lincoln's Navy* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1957), pp. 234-237; Anderson, pp. 163-165; Shelby Foote, "Du Pont Storms Charleston," *American Heritage*, June 1963, pp. 89-91.
31. Du Pont to Davis, 8, 14 April 1863, in Hayes, ed., v. III, pp. 10-11, 26-30.
32. Du Pont to Welles, 8, 15 April 1863, in *ibid.*, v. III, pp. 5-6, 31-36.
33. Niven, p. 437.
34. *Baltimore American*, 15 April 1863, p. 1.

35. Du Pont to Mrs. Du Pont, 25 April, 10 May 1863, Du Pont to Welles, 22 April 1863, in Hayes, ed., v. III, pp. 57-58, 101, 50-51.

36. *Ibid.*, v. I, p. lxxvvi; v. III, pp. 92-93, n. 3; Mrs. Du Pont to Davis, 25 May [1863], Du Pont Papers.

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39. Davis to Du Pont, 28 May 1863, Davis to Mrs. Du Pont [1863], Du Pont Papers; Smith, v. II, p. 193; Reinhard H. Luthin, "A discordant Chapter in Lincoln's Administration: The Davis-Blair Controversy," *Maryland Historical Magazine*, March 1944, pp. 40-41.

40. See note 22.

41. Beale, ed., v. I, p. 288; see also *ibid.*, pp. 268, 273, 276 and 277.

42. Hayes, ed., v. I, pp. lxxviii-xc; Beale, ed., v. I, p. 296; Niven, p. 437.

43. Welles to Du Pont, 15 May 1863, in Hayes, ed., v. III, pp. 115-118 (*italics are mine*).

44. Du Pont to Davis, 25 April, 27 May 1863, Du Pont Papers; Du Pont to Mrs. Du Pont, 25 April 1863, in Hayes, ed., v. III, p. 58.

45. Du Pont to Mrs. Du Pont, 17 May 1863, in *ibid.*, v. III, pp. 118-120.

46. *Ibid.*, v. I, p. xci.

47. Davis to Du Pont [3 May 1863], in *ibid.*, v. III, pp. 79-84; Davis to Mrs. Du Pont, 4 May 1863, Du Pont Papers; Davis to Abraham Lincoln, 4 May 1863, Robert Todd Lincoln Collection, Library of Congress.

48. Welles had originally ordered Adm. Andrew H. Foote to take over Du Pont's command, but Foote became ill and shortly afterwards died. Beale, ed., v. I, pp. 317, 320-321, 336-337, 345.

49. Du Pont to Mrs. Du Pont, 5 June 1863, in Hayes, ed., v. III, p. 168.

50. *Ibid.*, v. I, p. xci.

51. Davis to Mrs. Du Pont, 30 June 1863, Davis to Du Pont, 4 August 1863, Du Pont Papers; Du Pont to Mrs. Du Pont, 5 June 1863, in Hayes, ed., v. III, p. 163.

52. For full details of the battle, see Anderson, pp. 168-177.

53. Du Pont to Welles, 22 October 1863, in Hayes, ed., v. III, pp. 253-257.

54. Welles to Du Pont, 4 November 1863, in *ibid.*, pp. 257-271.

55. *Ibid.*, v. I, p. xciii.

56. Niven, p. 438.

