

1979

## Napoleon's Cavalry and its Leaders

Stephen T. Ross

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review>

---

### Recommended Citation

Ross, Stephen T. (1979) "Napoleon's Cavalry and its Leaders," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 32 : No. 2 , Article 24.  
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol32/iss2/24>

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu](mailto:repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu).

## 106 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

world is his view that the state is no longer representative of one sector of the society (the bourgeoisie) but now a much smaller technological elite. It is this elite that manipulates the state rather than an entire class. Carrillo further outlines the religious, social, political, and cultural aspects of the state that are undergoing a series of crises in Spain and Europe. He then proposes to exploit these crises and use them against the dominating elite to achieve a change in the state. Underlying this change is the premise that violence is no longer a productive method of achieving political goals in Europe.

One component of state power that Carrillo writes on in detail is the armed forces. Carrillo recognizes that change is not possible without altering the present role of the military but that it must not be directly confronted. Instead he proposes a series of actions that would tend to neutralize its influence, integrate it further with the rest of society, and attempt to replace traditional values with new ones.

The book is filled with the standard claims of Eurocommunism similar to those found in France and Italy. These include an acceptance of the peaceful road to power, a pluralistic political system, mass parties, decentralism, a reduction in both military blocs in Europe, rejection of the Soviet 1917 model for change, acceptance for long-term private property, and rejection of the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Without this last essential ingredient, a good case can be made for Eurocommunist theory being closer to Social Democracy than to communism.

Carrillo does maintain that the long-range goals of communism have not been abandoned. His writings reflect his acceptance of the Soviet Union as a fraternal leader, the basic class antagonism common to most Communist writings, dialectics, and historical materialism. He further attempts to

present Eurocommunism as another in a series of revisions to the basic ideology.

The book is well organized and appears to have suffered little from the translation. It lacks an index and could be better footnoted. The work has been severely criticized by the Soviets in the journal *New Times*.

JAMES JOHN TRITTEN  
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Duffy, Christopher. *Austerlitz 1805*.  
Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books,  
1977. 194pp.

Austerlitz was one of Napoleon's greatest triumphs. Fought precisely 1 year after his assumption of the Imperial title, it was his first victory of annihilation. His 1796-97 Italian campaign witnessed a series of rapid partial victories. No single engagement was decisive. It was the cumulative effect of numerous battles that forced the Austrians to sue for peace. In the campaign of 1800, the war went on for nearly a year after Marengo. The Battle of Austerlitz lasted one day, and the Austro-Russian Army was completely shattered. Moreover, Austerlitz led directly to the collapse of the Third Coalition. Austria sued for peace and the Russians limped home.

Christopher Duffy provides a clear, concise narrative of the campaign leading up to the battle and of the engagement itself. He also notes that Napoleon did not operate with a fixed plan that ignored the independent will of the enemy. Rather, the Emperor devised a general approach that called for his forces to lure the allies to attack the French right. Napoleon would then deliver a counterstroke with his center and left. During the battle, the left was unable to launch a decisive blow, and Napoleon switched his main thrust to the center. The Emperor's genius then was not a matter of creating and following detailed precise schemes. The essence of Napoleonic strategy was the

ability to take advantage of rapidly shifting circumstances within the framework of a general plan.

Most people interested in military history have some idea of the course of the battle and of the legends surrounding it. Duffy explodes many of these legends. For example, the story that thousands of Russians drowned in the lakes on the southern edge of the battlefield is simply not true. More important, however, is the fact that the author gives a fine analysis of both the battle and Napoleon's generalship.

STEVEN T. ROSS  
Naval War College

Freedman, Lawrence. *U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977. 235pp.

This book is a valuable primer for anyone interested in understanding the issues involved in strategic arms negotiations. Although Freedman's effort leaves quite a bit to be desired, he does succeed in weaving a generally coherent picture of the process of U.S. strategic arms policy development during the last two decades. This is no small feat if one considers, as Freedman does, the long roster of "players" (Secretaries and Under Secretaries, Agency Directors, Representatives and Senators, Academics, Presidential advisors, generals and admirals, and "staffers" of every description) who were, at any given time, likely to be participants in this process. Far from being open to straightforward analysis, the interactions of these people were characterized by a complex interplay of institutional, political, and ideological motivations. Into this tapestry Freedman expertly weaves the story of the CIA and the other intelligence agencies as providers of the information and estimates of Soviet strategic capabilities and programs.

In many ways, this "revised revision" of Freedman's Oxford D.Phil. thesis is a history of the CIA's apparatus for estimating the "strategic" capabilities of the Soviet Union. He traces the rising and falling influence of this apparatus principally embodied in the Office of National Estimates (ONE) through the early years (the fifties), the overestimations known as the "missile gap" (1960), to the underestimations of the mid to late sixties, and the final demise of the ONE in 1973. We see the formation of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in 1961, and then Secretary of Defense McNamara's preference for CIA estimates to hold the military in "check." Later, Freedman describes the ascendance of the National Security Council (NSC) under Kissinger, in which the National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) produced by the ONE were changed from a coordinated effort footnoted by dissenters (DIA, etc.), to one in which competing viewpoints were much less diluted and Kissinger and his NSC staff took over the interpretive role (expressing the conclusions in National Security Study Memoranda or NSSMs). I should note at this point that if the reader is beginning to gag on the acronyms, this is only a sample of what is in the book. Unfortunately, it is unavoidable. From another viewpoint, however, it is part of the story—the amazing regularity with which intelligence boards, panels, and studies have been formed and dissolved in the last 20 years, reflecting dissatisfaction (on the parts of different people at different times for different reasons) with what had previously existed.

The author convincingly describes the problem of the analyst(s) attempting to provide useful information, on a national scale, about an adversary in an environment in which it is assumed "... that the outside world is knowable, that it is the job of the intelligence officer to know it, and that if he fails to provide warning of some