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## Asia's Nuclear Future

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afforded ample reinforcement. Wilkes writes that his lieutenants (many of whom later signed a testimonial against him) were "scum . . . mean and cowardly." But Wilkes' accounts of his own action provide more than sufficient grounds for their protests.

As for the Trent affair, which so nearly brought England into the American Civil War on behalf of the Confederacy, Wilkes has relatively little to say except that he believed "I had done nothing more than my duty and should do it again if placed under similar circumstances." As for the courts-martial that followed both incidents, Wilkes claims that Secretaries of the Navy Upshur and Welles were both incompetent scoundrels who drummed up charges against him out of jealousy and political partisanship. Though the courts were packed against him, he writes, he was able to overcome their prejudice because of the manifest virtue of his actions.

Much of the volume is filled with trivial travelogues of Wilkes' summer trips and family life, but the active duty portions provide an interesting view of this 19th century Captain Queeg.

CRAIG SYMONDS  
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Overholt, William H., ed. *Asia's Nuclear Future*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977. 285pp.

In a world of perplexing problems, nuclear proliferation stands as one of the most perplexing. Replete with ethnocentric pitfalls, technical complexities and substantial dangers for global stability, the prospect of nuclear spread has challenged the thoughtful and the thoughtless alike. Perhaps even more distressing than the specter of "living in a nuclear-armed crowd," has been the proliferation of books and articles on the subject, many with only the saving grace that they evidence short half-lives. Fortunately, this is not the

case with *Asia's Nuclear Future*, which proves to be a thoughtful book that enhances our understanding of this important issue, rather than merely adding to the din.

Edited by William Overholt of the Hudson Institute, *Asia's Nuclear Future* consists of seven chapters, two of which previously appeared as journal articles. The thematic thread for the volume is provided in the opening chapter by Lewis Dunn (also of Hudson) and Overholt. Eschewing the country-by-country study and the action-reaction dyad as appropriate frameworks for the study of proliferation, they proffer a new metaphor, the "nuclear proliferation chain." Dunn and Overholt argue: "the decision by the initial country to go nuclear triggers a proliferation chain encompassing anywhere from two to ten additional proliferation decisions." Thus, one chain includes India, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Israel, Brazil and Argentina.

While the "chain" metaphor offers great promise for briefing charts, it is hard to concede that an analytical breakthrough has occurred; the "discovery" seems to be that a state's decisions in the nuclear realm are unlikely to be ignored in the international milieu. Nonetheless, the explication of interrelationships is a useful and commendable enterprise that the interested reader will find informative. In a later chapter Dunn develops the "India, Pakistan, Iran . . ." chain; however, one would have hoped that the frugal contribution (15 pages) had been considerably expanded, given the enormity of the subject matter. Overholt's subsequent chapter on Eastern Asia is somewhat meatier, and he does provide interesting discussion of both the Korean and the Taiwanese cases. In both cases he concludes that nuclear weapons would be a rather poor second to the preferred "weapon"—continuing security ties with the United States. Overholt's analysis can only remind us that a precipitous

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diminution of security assistance and troop deployment may be more painful in the long run than the maintenance of such support.

Two Harvard-based contributors, Jonathan D. Pollack, a China expert, and Onwar Marwah, an authority on the Indian nuclear program, provide competent contributions on the Chinese and Indian programs respectively. Pollack demonstrates to this reviewer's satisfaction that the principled Chinese doctrine that nuclear weapons are only instruments of defense is both supported by known deployments and the product of a carefully thought out—even plodding—policy. Marwah's somewhat sympathetic account of the Indian program from 1950-1976 is a useful overview of the Indian case (which perhaps should even be traced to the establishment of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission in 1948).

In a frankly exciting 55-page chapter (that alone is worth the price of this book), Herbert Passin, a Columbia University authority on Japan, attacks and demolishes a number of preconceptions that often cloud any effort to understand the prospect of Japanese development of nuclear weapons. Using relatively recent and varied public opinion survey data, Passin argues that contrary to the common wisdom: younger Japanese are more, rather than less, opposed to higher levels of armament; that the Japanese public is more concerned about raw material, energy and market problems than foreign military threats (although he does seem to depreciate security concerns, thus contradicting the very data he provides); that South Korea is not deemed vital to Japanese security; that in fact, Japan is most likely to remain neutral in the event of a renewed Korean conflict; and, that the ruling Liberal Democratic Party is neither of one voice on nuclear weapons, nor the only significant force in military policy. Passin describes the broad public consensus as follows:

The mainstream of Japanese opinion is today against the adoption of nuclear weapons. Although some conservatives may be willing to contemplate their necessity some time in the future, there is virtually complete agreement that they are not for Japan today.

Passin then concludes with an informed consideration of those factors that may lead to the nuclear decision. Notably, the loss of U.S. credibility leads the list, only to be closely followed by the not farfetched possibility of a sharp break with the United States. Seventeen thought-provoking scenarios for Japanese development of nuclear weapons are provided by Passin, several of which deserve careful contemplation. In sum, Passin's chapter is an important contribution to the literature and will no doubt be widely recognized as such.

*Asia's Nuclear Future* concludes with a splendid chapter by William Overholt in which he treats the U.S. nuclear posture in Asia. His keen and provocative comments on U.S. nuclear deployments in Korea are especially important. He extensively discusses the dilemma of forward-based nuclear weapons that offer only three unattractive options in the event of a serious attack: early use, capture or ignominious retreat. To correct this unsavory situation, he proposes rear-basing (outside of Korea), which while adding geographical separation would still allow delivery without delay (given the timelag for Executive approval regardless of locale). Such proposals are particularly appropriate, given the geography of Korea which is rather well disposed to a nonnuclear defense.

In conclusion, *Asia's Nuclear Future*, while somewhat uneven (this seems to be *de rigueur* for any edited work) offers a timely and informed discussion of a most important question. An index and bibliography would have considerably improved the usefulness of the book. While the book tends to be rather

more speculative and less technically informed than many readers would prefer, it is still a solid contribution to the literature.

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Smith, Charles E. *From the Deep of the Sea*. Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1977. 288pp.

Little has remained the same in the century and a half since Cunningham wrote:

The hollow oak our palace is,  
Our heritage the sea.

What one hopes has not changed is the spirit of the men who can claim that heritage and can include in it the experiences of a surgeon in a 355-ton whaling ship that sailed from Hull on 19 February 1866 and returned 14 months later with what was left of a ragged, scurvy-ridden, starving crew.

The whaling done by *Diana* and indeed all of the ships of Hull was not the 2 or 3-year voyages as the Americans made to the South Seas but was a seasonal trek to the Greenland Seas, the first weeks devoted to sealing and then up through Davis Strait and into Baffin Bay for the whales. Stores were taken for a voyage of about 8 months.

Ship's Surgeon Smith, whose diary this book is, was making his first trip to sea and he recorded everything that interested him—the ship, the sea, the sailors, fish, seals, flowers, birds, literally everything, even sea stories that seemed pertinent to his activities.

By mid-July *Diana* had caught two whales, no seals, and was near the mouth of Ponds Bay in Baffin Bay's upper reaches. Where fishing should have been best, *Diana* (and other ships in the area) found nothing but gales and ice. Toward the first of August the season, such as it was, was obviously over and it was time for "haim to my ain countrie." August was spent trying to find a way out through the rapidly

increasing ice. Baffin Land to the West, ice to the south, and contrary winds forced the ship to make her way north and east to Melville Bay on the north-west coast of Greenland and to try to make her southing from there. But conditions were worse so she returned to the west water. Several times *Diana* was pinched in the ice and only by putting sailors with hawsers on the ice (and overfiring the boiler of her 30hp engine) did she warp herself free and often that was into a hole of water from which there was no exit. Another whaler, *Intrepid*, fell in with *Diana* and for a few days they searched together for a way out. *Intrepid*, with 60hp and 90 tons of coal, promised not to forsake *Diana* but on 1 September *Intrepid* managed to force her way into clear water and, perhaps thinking *Diana* would be able to follow, sailed out of sight.

For three weeks *Diana* sailed among the gathering floes, seeking the open ocean, but on 21 September the captain determined that his only course was to drive the ship into the icepack, from which it might be liberated in April, and drift with it into the Atlantic. The ship had already been on short rations for a month, could continue that rate of consumption for 2 months, but could expect to be in the ice for 6 months with no hope of adding fish, fowl, or animal to the larder.

The impressionable reader should read the rest of the diary in the heat of August when well fed and well rested. Fuel ran out and pieces of the ship not necessary for shelter or for ultimate safe navigation were burned. Finally, only a small fire to boil tea and thaw food was allowable. Ice formed on the cabin bulkheads, in the men's clothing and bedding; the whale-oil lamps had to be warmed before they would light; the clock refused to operate; and pumps that had to be operated continually to keep the ship afloat (ice pressure had opened many of her seams) had to be