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Guernica! Guernica!

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volume is organized more or less chronologically.

As might be expected, there is considerable overlap between the two volumes in the treatment of the Middle East, but this is probably defensible. The only real deficiency appears to be the indexes, which could have been rather more complete. For example, the terrorist incident at the December 1975 meeting of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in Vienna is treated succinctly in *Political Terrorism*, but the reader would never find it in the index (whether he searched under "OPEC," "Vienna," "Austria," or any of the fedayeen organizations, or for that matter "Carlos"—who after all led the raid). This is an important criticism, as the greatest value of books such as these is as reference works. It should also be indicated, as the reader may have already noted, that *Palestinian Impasse* is far broader in scope than its subtitle would indicate.

Those who are interested in the subjects encompassed by these books—whether professionally or avocationally—will find *Palestinian Impasse* and *Political Terrorism* useful sources for the raw data. Neither of the books have great armchair reading potential, but they do deserve consideration for inclusion in private and institutional libraries.

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Southworth, Herbert Rutledge.
Guernica! Guernica! Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977. 537pp.

Herbert Southworth is a certified aficionado of the Spanish Civil War, and this 500-page study is a reflection of this interest. It is without doubt the most heavily researched and documented re-statement of the ex post facto obvious since Will Shakespeare's would-be lover was subjected to literary scrutiny.

Subtitled "A study of journalism, diplomacy, propaganda and history," it is exactly that. The difficulty, if one may express this view, is that it features overkill. The subject is the devastation by Axis/rebel bombing of the Basque center of Guernica in April 1937. It was the first major application of terror bombing of civilians as Europe practiced for the tasks of World War II.

For 500 pages we refight the propaganda event following upon the murderous 3-hour attack. There is no doubt today that Franco forces were responsible, and, for that matter, even on that eventful day, there was no doubt who carried out the bombing. There were, after all, victims, survivors, and eye-witnesses. Yet, surprisingly enough, the intervening years led to a sordid battle between Spanish loyalists and rebels and their international supporters about who really carried out the raid.

The book pursues each and every lead, each and every article, and each and every charge and countercharge, down to the present. It becomes tedious as the propagandists beclouded the issue. Yet, one question remains and eventually Southworth airs it: why Guernica, a small, but historically important Basque symbol?

The answer, something of a shocker, goes back into the ideological history of the era, pitting the Catholics against the "Reds." The reality, it would seem, is to be found in the psychological contradiction, offensive to the nationalists, that Spanish Basque Catholics were largely loyal to the republic, alleged to be Communist. One could not easily mount an international campaign based on the Catholic right, if an important historic enclave of Catholic Spain remained loyal. Thus, the Condor Legion employed its skill to break the Basque morale and support.

I found the book too long, though professionally done. The viciousness of that civil war was amply demonstrated, and to me the cynicism and utter

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unscrupulousness of the international defenders and detractors both to this day represents a low point in the history of ideology.

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Stuart, Bérault, Seigneur d'Aubigny, *Traité sur l'Art de la Guerre*. Edited by Elie de Comminges. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976. 77pp. (*International Archives of the History of Ideas*, v. 85.)

This treatise on the art of war was written in the early 16th century by a Frenchman of Scottish descent. He was a man who had had a great deal of experience in war and diplomacy during the period of the first series of wars that France fought in her attempt to dominate Italy. It was a complicated period in diplomatic and military history, but it is one that reveals the beginnings of the modern pattern in international relations.

Bérault accompanied King Charles VIII of France on the 1494 invasion of Italy and was sent on diplomatic missions to Florence, Milan, Naples, Mantua, Ferrara and Rome in an effort to secure a free hand for France in his ambitions. However, the epaliton of opposing princes in the Holy League forced France to retreat. At the high point in the first invasion, just following the French capture of Naples, Bérault was appointed commander of French forces in Calabria and later fought the army of Gonzaga de Cordoba and Ferdinand II of Spain. When Naples was lost to Spain, Bérault and his army were withdrawn, but the dream of French conquest in Italy was not forgotten. In 1500, Louis XII launched another attempt. This time, Bérault was named Governor of Milan and later, envoy to Naples and Calabria. As a lieutenant general, Bérault commanded a victorious French Army at Terranova. In the end, however, the French were defeated

and Bérault, himself, surrendered at Rocca Angistola after a long siege. The final outcome of the war proved Spain's ability to defend her position as a Mediterranean power by controlling Italy as well as Sardinia and Sicily. Following the end of the war, Bérault was returned from imprisonment and resumed his service to France. He died in Edinburgh in 1508 while on a mission that combined an official embassy to England and Scotland with a personal pilgrimage to the Shrine of St. Ninian at Whithorn, the first Christian church in Scotland.

This edition of the *Traité sur l'Art de la Guerre* is a collation of six known manuscripts and one early 16th-century printed version. The scholarly apparatus, introduction, notes, and appendices are longer than Bérault's 24-page work, but they do provide fascinating and useful information with which to understand it. Elie de Comminges has edited the document with great care and erudition. All of the material presented in this edition adds something to our knowledge of Bérault and to the history of the Italian wars. The document, itself, is written in 16th century French which requires some expertise to read. However, that task is eased for us by the editor's contribution.

Bérault's study is an important example of that large body of military writing influenced by Vegetius's *Epitoma Rei Militaris*. While Bérault is certainly part of that tradition, his work is also notably different. He appears to be the first modern soldier-diplomat to cite examples of his own time and experience rather than to limit himself to the events of classical history. Bérault's work has five chapters: how to conquer a country, how to besiege a city, what to do when a country is invaded, how to defend strong places, and the order of battle for war. In addition to drawing upon classical history, he effectively illustrates his points from his own knowledge and experience in all of these areas. The result is a series of maxims