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Traite sur l'Art la Guerre

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122 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

unscrupulousness of the international defenders and detractors both to this day represents a low point in the history of ideology.

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Stuart, Bérault, Seigneur d'Aubigny, *Traité sur l'Art de la Guerre*. Edited by Elie de Comminges. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976. 77pp. (*International Archives of the History of Ideas*, v. 85.)

This treatise on the art of war was written in the early 16th century by a Frenchman of Scottish descent. He was a man who had had a great deal of experience in war and diplomacy during the period of the first series of wars that France fought in her attempt to dominate Italy. It was a complicated period in diplomatic and military history, but it is one that reveals the beginnings of the modern pattern in international relations.

Bérault accompanied King Charles VIII of France on the 1494 invasion of Italy and was sent on diplomatic missions to Florence, Milan, Naples, Mantua, Ferrara and Rome in an effort to secure a free hand for France in his ambitions. However, the epaliton of opposing princes in the Holy League forced France to retreat. At the high point in the first invasion, just following the French capture of Naples, Bérault was appointed commander of French forces in Calabria and later fought the army of Gonzaga de Cordoba and Ferdinand II of Spain. When Naples was lost to Spain, Bérault and his army were withdrawn, but the dream of French conquest in Italy was not forgotten. In 1500, Louis XII launched another attempt. This time, Bérault was named Governor of Milan and later, envoy to Naples and Calabria. As a lieutenant general, Bérault commanded a victorious French Army at Terranova. In the end, however, the French were defeated

and Bérault, himself, surrendered at Rocca Angistola after a long siege. The final outcome of the war proved Spain's ability to defend her position as a Mediterranean power by controlling Italy as well as Sardinia and Sicily. Following the end of the war, Bérault was returned from imprisonment and resumed his service to France. He died in Edinburgh in 1508 while on a mission that combined an official embassy to England and Scotland with a personal pilgrimage to the Shrine of St. Ninian at Whithorn, the first Christian church in Scotland.

This edition of the *Traité sur l'Art de la Guerre* is a collation of six known manuscripts and one early 16th-century printed version. The scholarly apparatus, introduction, notes, and appendices are longer than Bérault's 24-page work, but they do provide fascinating and useful information with which to understand it. Elie de Comminges has edited the document with great care and erudition. All of the material presented in this edition adds something to our knowledge of Bérault and to the history of the Italian wars. The document, itself, is written in 16th century French which requires some expertise to read. However, that task is eased for us by the editor's contribution.

Bérault's study is an important example of that large body of military writing influenced by Vegetius's *Epitoma Rei Militaris*. While Bérault is certainly part of that tradition, his work is also notably different. He appears to be the first modern soldier-diplomat to cite examples of his own time and experience rather than to limit himself to the events of classical history. Bérault's work has five chapters: how to conquer a country, how to besiege a city, what to do when a country is invaded, how to defend strong places, and the order of battle for war. In addition to drawing upon classical history, he effectively illustrates his points from his own knowledge and experience in all of these areas. The result is a series of maxims

that are concise, full of sound advice for a contemporary soldier, and strictly practical. Undoubtedly they were intended to be published as a guide for future leaders.

The general views Bérault expressed were not new but the unique aspect of them lies in the personal element that he added to a work on the art of warfare. As such it is substantially different, but far overshadowed by Fourquevaux' *Instructions sur le Facit de la Guerre*, the most famous and widely quoted 16th-century military work. Élie de Comminges has made a substantial contribution to the study of military writing by making Bérault's work more widely available.

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van Creveld, Martin. *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. 284pp.

General works on the history of logistics are few and far between, and even studies of logistics in particular campaigns are far outnumbered by tactical and strategic studies. *Supplying War* attempts to give a broad outline of the development of logistics between the Thirty Years' War and World War II. In a subsequent article ("Supplying an Army: An Historian's View," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies*, June 1978, pp. 56-63), van Creveld summarizes his argument and carries it on to the present day.

In approaching his subject, van Creveld asks some of the basic questions appropriate to a study of the influence of logistics on strategy: what were the logistics factors limiting an army's operations? What arrangements were made to move it and keep it supplied while moving? How did these arrangements affect the course of the campaign, both as planned and as carried out? These are extremely important questions, and the task of finding

answers to them is an important and useful one. However, the title of the book misleads the reader into assuming that the author's subject is much broader than it is. It is not a book about supplying war, but a study of army logistics. The broader aspects of war logistics that must surely include some reference to national finance, the inter-relationship of land, sea, and later, air forces, the structure of coalitions when they are used, the "friction" of bureaucracy, are not considered in any great extent. The subtitle defines the topic of supplying war as logistics from Wallenstein to Patton. The names of the men give us a clue that this is a book about armies, yet when we look into it, we discover that the subject covers only half of those 300 years. In fact, the book is about the period from Napoleon to Patton.

It is unfortunate that Dr. van Creveld has dismissed the 17th and 18th centuries summarily, for there would seem to be much more there for his subject than he allows. In terms of the British Army, for example, there are further points to be made about the operation of armies on distant stations. The operations of the army in Spain during the War of the Spanish Succession, across the Atlantic in the War for America, or in Spain during the Napoleonic wars offer additional perspectives. Some of these have already been studied by other scholars in terms of logistics. There is much more to be said about the Blenheim campaign of 1704, and these matters may be gleaned from the works of such German and Austrian historians as E. Ritter, Braubach and Mathis.

Van Creveld begins his study in earnest with the Ulm campaign of 1805 that he uses to illustrate an army living off the country. Then he begins to jump to a number of other campaigns in the following century and a half that illustrate other points. He uses the campaign of 1812 to show the inadequacy of