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

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

February 1979

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FOREWORD

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Cover: USCGS *Eagle*. Photograph by Major Thomas V. Burns, U.S. Marine Corps.

TAKING STOCK

In my frantic rush to catch up on the eight years of American history that I missed, I am often appalled by the studied, analytic approach to warfare taken by so many of the educated, well-intentioned individuals who directed our war in Vietnam. If my understanding of their reasoning is to remain lacking, so much the better. For he who supports the position that warfare and warriors are just other things to which the rational concepts of business and economics apply is missing the mark. Lewis Sorley reviews *Crisis in Command* in the Professional Reading section of this *Review* and I think his opening assessment of the book is accurate: the book is flawed. Gabriel and Savage's little volume has been condemned by many as an exaggerated indictment of American performance in Vietnam; many say it is hung on a questionable historic framework, and almost all its readers agree that its suggested reforms are reminiscent of the Dark Ages. Though acknowledging all of that, Sorley again hits the nail on the head when he adds: to dismiss this book for the above reasons, however, is to ignore the tremendous power of the authors' central thesis. That thesis is that American victory was impossible because our traditional fighting man's gladiatorial ethic had been programmed out of style and supplanted by an entrepreneurial ethic whose tools were based on the rational corporate model, systems analysis and utils. This new fad assumed that management and leadership were synonymous. Natural outgrowths of that concept were officers' ticket punching, organizational "efficiency" at the expense of honor, and ultimately a breakdown of small fighting unit cohesion, spirit and integrity.

Wars cannot be fought the same way bureaucrats haggle over apportionments. The toll of human life in battle does not lend itself to cost/benefit analysis. One's plan of action on the international chess board cannot be built on compromise businesslike decisions among factions. To design a country's strategy along a middle course for bureaucratic reasons is to aim at what Winston Churchill has called the bull's eye of disaster. That our country was steady on course for that bull's eye of disaster, even before I was shot down in September 1965, is evident from a reading of Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp's recent book *Strategy for Defeat*. By that time, the bureaucracy was already sending him, CINCPAC, waffled directives (consensus documents with "all factions inside the paper") that were not consistent with the stated military objectives of that same bureaucracy. The managerial authors of the war policy spoke self-assuredly in the language of war but their mind set continued to be that of faddish entrepreneurial gamesmen; by the time

they realized that the enemy was ignoring their finesses, it had long been clear to those in the field that these gamesmen had no belly for a fight. With forces already committed, there was no place to go but down.

The style, ethics and language of business are peculiar to that vocation. So too does war have its own style, ethics and language. Adapting the business approach to the military profession has serious shortcomings; too many in uniform caught the habit of asking, "What's in it for me?" This type of self-centered careerism may be *de rigueur* on Wall Street but is the antithesis of *service* in the military. War *is* a unique human enterprise that cannot be managed on the margin. Clausewitz wrote: "War is a special profession, however general its relation may be and even if all the male population of a country capable of bearing arms were able to practice it, war would still continue to be different and separate from any other activity which occupies the life of man." Contrast this with a paragraph from a study done in 1974 entitled *U.S. Tactical Air Power:* "Waging war is no different in principle from any other resource transformation process and should be just as eligible for the improvements in proficiency that have accrued elsewhere from technological substitution." This is simply not true. There are men who in battle can realize proficiency that would be labeled "impossible" by any systems analyst, men who can make 2+2=5 time after time on the basis of their personal courage, leadership, strength, loyalty and comradeship. When the chips are down, and you're facing real uncertainty instead of that on a projected Profit and Loss sheet, you need something more than rationalist stuffing. The first step is to acknowledge that fighting men resent being manipulated by carrot and stick enticements; they find no solace in being part of some systematic resource transformation process when they're told to go in harm's way. In short, you can't program men to their deaths; they have to be led, and, as *Crisis in Command* points out, high risks and high casualty rates for senior officers are common elements of victory.

Thus, though I take issue with some of the assertions in *Crisis in Command,* I think it carries a strong message for leadership. Whether we're driving ships around the ocean or navigating a desk ashore, all of us in the military should continually contemplate that "different and separate activity which occupies the life of man." As we follow the peacetime horde down the prescribed track, let us not adopt the false sense of security that combat philosophies will be issued by "the system" when the need arises. The twists and turns of the fortunes of war have a way of throwing military men into new decision making territory where all previous bets are off and no philosophic survival kits are available. Have you thought it through? When the whistle blows, are you ready to step out of your business suit with both the philosophy and the belly for a fight?

J.B. STOCKDALE
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College

P.S. The growing rate of submission of professionally written articles and the prospect of receipt of more War College student papers of publishable quality prompts the immediate increase in our printing frequency from quarterly to bimonthly. Look for your next *Review* in May.

JBS

Naval power continues to offer flexibility, mobility, universality, and public acceptance to policymakers but the ordering function of military force has become less certain, perhaps less appropriate, as international conditions grow more complex. Some factors affecting the future use of naval power are discussed herein.

THE CHANGING CONTEXT OF AMERICAN SEAPOWER

by

James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver

The "Expansion of Force." Among the more important of the new complexities confronting both analysis and policy are those surrounding the use of force. For almost 300 years prior to the end of World War II, the pursuit of "security" by nation-states has been the central dynamic of international politics. The correlative of this condition has been an expansion of the capacity of the nation-state to deploy and use military power. During the last 150 years of this "expansionist phase"[1] of the role of military power in international politics an important paradox emerged: the use of military power could result in enormous disorder but, under certain circumstances, order as well. Maximizing the potentialities for order became the preoccupation of that essential prescription for prudential behavior in an international politics based on the inevitability of war—the balance of power. As one of the most careful students of the balance of power notes: it "...is not a formula for perfect peace, but rather for reasonable stability and order with no more than moderate use of violent techniques by the states involved in the system."[2]

The 20th century seems to many to have demonstrated the futility of power. Three decades of international disorder culminated in the skies over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in what many regarded as the ultimate expansion of force. How, it might be asked, could this most immoderate of military instrumentalities be "used" to foster order in an international system characterized by deep Soviet-American hostility and conflict?

To post-World War II American realists, the period of expanding force in international relations has been seen as coming to a conclusion. It was, they believed, replaced by what Robert Osgood termed a "regulatory" phase in

world politics. In this new period, the threat of war replaced the use of military power as an ordering process.[3] At the same time, however, realists argued that the national interests of the United States in a bipolar world required the threat and under some circumstances, the use of force including nuclear weapons–if Soviet power was to be contained. "[W]ith as much conjecture as hope" as Osgood put it,[4] American policymakers sought to reconstruct world order and manage the security dilemma through the "uses of military power short of war"[5]–or, at a minimum, short of nuclear war.

Some Policy Implications . . . and Consequences. A great testing of these doctrines of controlled threat and violence came in the waters off Cuba and in the inhospitable terrain of Vietnam. The Cuban Missile Crisis suggested the realist contention that the threat of nuclear war could be manipulated so as to achieve American ends and, in time, to stimulate the superpowers to pursue a more regulated strategy. Vietnam, however, now stands with more ambiguous portent. It revealed that the application of enormous amounts of conventional force was not in itself adequate or appropriate to that war. Moreover, among the consequences of the effort was a serious erosion of popular support not only for the immediate conflict but the larger policy of containment if it was dependent upon the controlled use of conventional violence.

Simultaneously, the many "new forces"[6] of international political economics moved to the top of American policymakers agendas. Food, energy, oceans policy, environmental concerns, "neomercantilism," international monetary stability, the multinational corporation and the many other manifestations of what had been traditionally regarded as "low politics," were now viewed as central issues. Indeed, the whole notion of interdependence challenged the relevance of the realist's balance of power images and metaphors. Complicating matters further, of course, was the fact that the older concerns were clearly not irrelevant. Today's crises of political economic interdependence had not displaced such "traditional" concerns as strategic arms control, proliferation, the NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation in central Europe, or the multiple crises that pervaded the Mediterranean basin. Rather, both "tracks" of American postwar foreign policy now vied for attention.[7] They were no longer separable into distinct bureaucratic niches and, most frustrating of all, the policy instruments developed since the 1940s–"liberal capitalist" international economics and institutions on the one hand and the modalities of strategic deterrence, limited war, and the threat of force on the other–no longer seemed comprehensively applicable. And, when these approaches were applied, policymakers could no longer assume that the limits of public permissibility were sufficiently broad and pliant to allow for what Henry Kissinger referred to as "the modicum of ambiguity" necessary for the conduct of foreign relations.[8]

Policy Change and Naval Power. We now stand somewhere beyond, but nearer the beginning than the end of, the effort to develop concepts and fashion policy instruments appropriate to new international conditions. By the early 1970s naval power seemed to have emerged somewhat better thought of than other instruments of military power. Whereas the portions of the defense budget claimed by the Army and the Air Force had declined or at best remained constant, the Navy's had grown.[9] Undoubtedly much of this budgetary growth can be related to the challenge posed by expanding Soviet naval power as well as the modernization program launched by the Navy in the wake of its decision to retire the obsolete portion of the fleet. Neverthe-

less, the commitment of substantial resources to the Navy also represents an important part of the Nixon-Kissinger response to the new international and domestic political realities of the 1970s. Part of the Nixon-Kissinger response to a changing international reality was a marginal reduction of the American Military Establishment outside Europe and the Mediterranean. Significantly, however, the Nixon Doctrine did not involve elimination of an American presence in these areas. Indeed, to the extent that the Nixon Doctrine required continued American access in support of regional surrogates responsible for the maintenance of local balances of power, responsive global American military assets remained essential. However, domestic political constraints were such that the deployment and use of these military forces had to minimize the risks of involvement in sustained, intense conventional ground combat while maximizing American combat support capacity and symbolic presence. Given these circumstances and the persistence of support assumptions concerning the European contingency, a "renaissance" of naval power took place during the early 1970s.

Because of the insistence of Nixon and Carter that the global range of our interests remains undiminished and because a European war seems relatively unlikely, the most pervasive mission for the Navy under present and likely future international and domestic conditions is that of presence.[10] To be sure, the last two Chiefs of Naval Operations have defined sea control and projection of power as the fundamental missions of the surface fleet of the U.S. Navy. And force structure and individual ship design remain predicated on the carrying out of "nonpeaceful" missions. Nonetheless, international political, economic, and strategic conditions in which the appearance and display of potential strategic and conventional power is at least as important as the use of that power, make the mission of presence or peacetime deterrence crucial. Then too, if, owing to the fear of domestic political consequences or the fear of escalation to nuclear war, the use of naval power must be restricted to low-risk and low-cost operations, the likelihood of "nonpeaceful" use diminishes and the capacity or limitations of naval power as an instrument of political influence assumes greater importance.

The Utility of Naval Force in an Era of Discounted Forces. Naval power would certainly seem to have a number of attributes that make it an appropriate military instrument in a world in which the availability and even forward positioning of potential military power is deemed necessary, but domestic as well as international political circumstances complicate and constrain its ultimate use. As Hedley Bull has noted:

> As an instrument of diplomacy, sea power has long been thought to possess certain classical advantages *vis-a-vis* land power and, more recently, air power. The first of these advantages is flexibility: a naval force can be sent and withdrawn, and its size and activities varied, with a higher expectation that it will remain subject to control than is possible when ground forces are committed. The second is visibility: by being seen on the high seas or in foreign ports a navy can convey threats, provide reassurances or earn prestige in a way that troops or aircraft in their home bases cannot do. The third is its universality or pervasiveness: the fact that the seas, by contrast with the land and the air, are an international medium allows naval vessels to reach distant countries independently or nearby bases . . . .[11]

Bull might also have added that modern navies are technology intensive, which is not without its domestic political benefits in a society that prides itself on and takes much of its identity from its technological prowess. Moreover, and perhaps most important, the political and economic appeal of such forces is all but irresistable for a people and their politicians who have recently experienced for a second time in less than 20 years the agony of tens of thousands of their sons dying and being maimed on unpronounceable battlefields on the other side of the world.

None of this was lost on the framers of the Nixon Doctrine or, one suspects, their successors either. Thus, apart from what the Soviets might have done, it seems likely that naval power would have assumed its current salience in post-Vietnam American national security policy. Of course any expansion of the Soviet Fleet would complicate the task of a military force that now finds itself the primary "forward" presence throughout much of the world and, in addition, responsible for the support of American interests in the Mediterranean and the maintenance of sea lines of communication to and protecting the flanks of NATO in the event of war in Europe. A larger Soviet naval presence raises fears of declining or neutralized credibility for the American naval presence and, to the extent that the expanded Soviet Navy can carry out sea denial, dangerous complications for the Navy to carry out its sea control and power projection missions. Predictably, therefore, the missions and role of naval power have assumed, along with the ongoing problems of strategic stability, the central position in current discussions and analysis of American defense policy.

Yet analysis focused on the use of naval power is regarded by many observers as underdeveloped. Adm. Stansfield Turner, among others, has lamented: "Despite the Navy's increasingly important role in peacetime deterrence, there is no body of doctrine or writing on how to accomplish this deterrent mission."[12] More recently, Admiral Turner, then serving as Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe observed:

> I believe that the essence of the deterrent peacetime function is to have many different types of ships, capable of orchestrating the right kind of action in many different places. But do we know enough about orchestrating? . . . Further, I think that we who exercise naval presence do not know enough about how to fit the action to the situation: how to be sure that the force we bring to bear when told to help in some situation is in fact the one most appropriate to the circumstances. I would also suggest that in an era of detente we are likely to see much more competition between the Soviet and free-world navies in the field of presence.[13]

To the extent that there is a body of literature and doctrine directed at the problem outlined by Admiral Turner, it concludes that the combination of the international environment and the attributes of naval power are such as to, in Professor Luttwak's words, ". . . render it [naval power] peculiarly useful as an instrument of policy even in the absence of hostilities."[14] A central question, of course, is whether future international politics will be so benign or permissive. In addition, there is the question, seldom if ever discussed, of whether domestic political conditions will impinge significantly on the efficacy of naval power in the future.

Constraints in the Future Environment of U.S. Naval Power. Apart from the question of the general structure and dynamics of future international society to which we return in our

conclusion, there are at least four sets of more specific factors that seem likely to affect perceptions of and the actual efficacy of American naval force in the future:

1. the transformation of the international legal regime of the oceans;
2. changes in military technology that seem, on balance, to enhance the capacity of the defense;
3. the Soviet Navy; and
4. perhaps the most indeterminant of factors, American domestic politics. If the attributes of mobility, political and military flexibility, and the universality of geographic reach, as well as its domestic political acceptability are all characteristics of naval power that have moved it to the forefront of American national security policy, then clearly environmental factors constraining these attributes deserve close scrutiny.

Closure of the "Great Commons." A crucial assumption of claims for the uniqueness of naval power is the idea that naval force operates in an "international" and "free" medium. The legal regime applicable to the oceans has been for the most part quite permissive; indeed, it has been based on the legitimacy of minimal constraints on the high seas. It is likely, however, that we are now moving away from these doctrines of *mare liberum* towards an uneven and incrementally established legal regime of modified *mare clausum*. Important elements of this system will include 12-mile territorial seas and some form of fairly extensive—probably 200 mile—economic zones in which coastal states exercise some measure of sovereign control beyond that now commonly in force, and, perhaps "demilitarized" oceans as well.

Complicating this situation even further is that the process whereby this extension of coastal state sovereignty occurs is unlikely to have the neatness of a judicial or even legislative proceeding. The present lumbering Law of the Sea Conference aside, the effect and working of the legal regime is likely to take quite some time to emerge as coastal states develop the technological or economic bases for exploiting and managing their extended maritime sovereignty. In addition, it is likely that much of this activity will be undertaken through commercial arrangements with private entrepeneurs who will require, indeed, demand, a degree of policing to secure their operations. In the absence of the provision of such services by the coastal states, it is possible that the coming decades will witness the development of "private" maritime policing capability.

We are not positing exotic scenarios of "private navies" interfering with the projection of American naval power. Nevertheless, the extension of coastal state economic activity scores and perhaps hundreds of miles offshore will probably introduce greater complexity into a formerly simple and permissive maritime environment. Indeed, the unilateral extension of offshore sovereignty is already well underway. Moreover, the process of extension has thus far not proceeded strictly within the confines of international negotiation. Hence, more diffuse and uneven mechanisms of "normal" politics are likely to define ocean space—at least in the short run. The net effect is, therefore, likely to be even greater ambiguity and uncertainty where formerly there was confidence in the benign nature of the medium in which naval power operated. Elizabeth Young summarizes the problem:

> The great navies will find their traditional roaming of the open seas, "showing the flag" in their interest, constrained, psychologically where not physically, by the multitude of new jurisdictional boundaries. The rights of foreign naval vessels within boundaries of quite unfamiliar texture . . . will need establishing not only by

> theoretical definition, in terms of international convention, but also by subjection to all the normative pressures of practise and experience.[15]

The openness of the "great common" is of course the basis of the purported uniqueness of naval power; for it is now one of the necessary conditions for conceiving and undertaking all naval missions. If, however, a naval force no longer operates in an "international" medium and needs to be very concerned with transgressing often ill-defined "sovereign" territory, or international or commercial arrangements, is not one of the elements that makes naval force so appropriate to the conditions of contemporary world politics radically handicapped, if not eliminated?

In addition, the fact that the United States has now joined the movement towards the establishment of a 200-mile economic zone will probably complicate the domestic budgetary and bureaucratic politics of the U.S. Navy. Insofar as policing this expanded zone leads to increased requests for U.S. Coast Guard assets, one might speculate that some potentially nasty budgetary confrontations might result if these two seagoing forces confront one another in Congress. One can expect an increase in the Coast Guard's budget as offshore commercial operations by American companies increase. Moreover, as some traditional coastal security questions seem to move to greater significance, e.g., problems of immigration and drug control, the occasions for competition for resources and definition of mission responsibility will be exacerbated. With constrained budgets it is not unreasonable to expect that some of this increase might come at the expense of the Navy.* Alternatively, of course, the Navy might be asked to assume a portion of the coastal policing role—a new mission for a force structured around global policing.

Changes in Military Technology. If the new international legal regime exists only on paper, it is unlikely to inhibit significantly the use of American naval power. Coastal states must be able to enforce their claims; otherwise very little will have changed. Under present conditions naval missions would seem, therefore, to maintain their viability. But the proliferation of new military technology could in time change decisively this situation and thereby compromise the use of naval force both in and short of war. Laurence Martin, for example, has recently predicted a possible increase in military conflict at sea as jurisdictional claims and disputes proliferate and as coastal states increase their capacity to enforce their claims to this newest dimension of their sovereignty, through the acquisition of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and modern patrol craft. It is likely that these conflicts will remain regionally contained, confined to the level of conventional weapons, and directed by coastal states at each other. It is unlikely, however, that the U.S. Navy can escape the broader implications of this situation if American policy requires that it intervene in these disputes.

Though most analysis and speculation on the effect of PGMs have concentrated on land warfare, the potential proliferation of precision-guided weapons to "lesser" powers does not seem to favor the expressive use of naval power, especially if that use presupposes the classic, vastly asymmetric circumstances wherein a powerful state attempts to coerce a state with a relatively primitive military establishment.

*Yet another possibility for "rationalizing" this potential bureaucratic tangle would be absorption of the Coast Guard into the U.S. Navy. One suspects, however, that "rationalization" of this sort would involve a bureaucratic struggle of some magnitude.

The problem presented is a good deal more complex than a question of tactics to be employed by the U.S. Navy in dealing with a coastal state possessing a modest arsenal of PGMs. It is reasonable to expect that American technological superiority should be such that an American naval force could overwhelm whatever defensive measures could be arrayed against it. The more problematic issue concerns the cost of such a "successful" projection of American naval power. Recent analysis and events suggest that the costs would not necessarily be minor.[16] Not all or even most coastal states will be able to employ PGMs at the extremity of their coastal zones but "... the advent of the surface-to-surface missiles has given the coastal states the ability to inflict serious damage on destroyer or cruiser-size ships within twenty miles or so of the coast."[17] Moreover, a proliferation of PGM-armed patrol craft implies a seaward extension of this potential defensive perimeter. Similarly, the projection of tactical airpower, though devastating for the target, is unlikely to be cost free if the Vietnam experience is indicative. Likewise, the military valor and technological superiority of the U.S. Marine Corps might lead ultimately to a successful opposed landing, but not without cost.

Nor is it sufficient to count such costs as militarily "acceptable," for the ultimate accounting must be political. That is to say, the most important calculations in the future may be those undertaken by a political leadership concerned by the political costs represented by scores or perhaps hundreds of marines dead, missing, or wounded; pilots captured, or major warships damaged. The decision may indeed be to pay the price; but with PGMs involved the "price" may prove higher and more politically potent than heretofore reckoned. Thus, if what Luttwak has termed "active suasion" becomes fraught with higher risk even the activities associated with "latent suasion" or "peacetime deterrence" must be undertaken with a degree of preparation and care that cannot be counted as "routine." And if the purported "flexibility" of naval power is thereby constrained, then its political use is in some measure reduced, the ultimate capacity of American naval power to prevail in a test of arms notwithstanding.

Precision-guided munitions seem, therefore, likely to erode and complicate the potential for a diplomacy predicated on the easy deployment of naval power. On land, PGMs may place a premium on dispersion and concealment. But on sea, dispersion and concealment are the very antithesis of the traditional presence and show of force missions. The ships that loom so awesome and impressive in their traditional role—carriers or cruisers in the case of the United States and Kara-class cruisers in that of the Soviet Union—may find it difficult to operate in a PGM threat area. The advent of PGMs makes unopposed landings less plausible and therefore less credible as a deterrent. Furthermore, PGMs may also escalate the level or intensity of combat activity—a blurring of the distinction between low and high intensity operations.[18] Thus the advent of PGMs may, in short, attenuate the theoretical and practical attempt to marry force and diplomacy.[19]

Finally, PGM induced changes may also vitiate another centerpiece of naval strategy—sea control—which in Admiral Holloway's view is "... the fundamental mission of the U.S. Navy" and "... is a prerequisite of all other naval tasks and most sustained overseas operations by the general purpose forces of the other services."[20] However, "sustained overseas operations by the general purpose forces of the other services" seems to be a diminishing probability apart from the European Mediterranean contingencies. Moreover, the increasingly common prognosti-

cation that future conflict in Europe is most likely to be brief and intense does not augur well for a sea control mission.

Even if one grants the necessity for some sea control capacity in support of a resupply effort, however, the problem remains of what kind of force structure would be most appropriate against attack submarines or PGM-armed enemy surface ships and aircraft. One answer may be a sea control force structure built around some combination of submersible and large numbers of conventionally powered surface patrol craft, and perhaps a much more modest aircraft carrier. Such concepts are not new, of course, but significantly they have encountered a good deal of opposition within the Navy and in Congress. Moreover, a sea control capacity of the sort described here does not bristle with awesome power projection capacity and is, therefore, less useful for the latter mission and the closely related task of global presence.

Thus, technological change will not make any easier the Navy's adaptation to the future. In fact, technological change may be bringing submerged inconsistent foreign policy assumptions to the fore, assumptions that must now be resolved. As long as the U.S. Navy remained superior to almost any combination of forces that could be brought to bear against it, it was perhaps possible to maintain that it could carry out virtually any set of missions with a force structure built around the large aircraft carrier. Now, however, impending changes in technology underscore important intrinsic incompatibilities within a comprehensive set of missions in the service of worldwide interests. In the absence of external pressures, it has been easy for the U.S. Navy and the American foreign policy community that it has served to assume that it could do virtually anything. Thus, at crucial moments over the last 30 years naval power has been called on and it has always "worked." But in most instances U.S. naval superiority could be assumed. Now, however, technological change—long the servant of American supremacy—makes that superiority situationally problematic.

The Soviet Navy. There seems little benefit in recapitulating in great detail the current debate concerning the growth of the Soviet Navy. An outline of the contending positions should suffice.[21] On the one hand, a substantial body of official and academic opinion holds that the expansion of the Soviet Navy during the last 10 to 15 years has brought the Soviet Navy to parity and in some respects, superiority over the U.S. Navy. The upshot of this situation, it is held, is that the Soviet Union is now in a position to establish overall supremacy over the United States in the near future. In contrast, other observers discount the alarm and pessimism of the first group. While not denying Soviet expansion, this latter group would suggest that the new Soviet naval presence is best understood as a logical extension of its historic preoccupation with the defensive uses of naval power. Thus from an essentially coastal defense navy, the Soviets have moved to establish a surface navy capable of contesting and if possible denying sea control to the U.S. Navy in those areas deemed most vital to Soviet defense, e.g., the eastern Mediterranean, the northern Atlantic and perhaps the northwestern portion of the Pacific. Of course, any Soviet Fleet expansion extends its capacity to engage in some forward deployment of its own. Nevertheless, it is argued, the lack of Soviet capacity for sustained resupply, lack of significant air cover once away from coastal areas, and at best, replacement levels of surface ship construction, all suggest the conclusion reached by Barry Blechman: "... Generally, and with the exception of strategic submarines, the Soviet Navy does not appear to be designed to project the Soviet Union's power into distant oceans."[22]

Perhaps more important than detailed and ultimately inconclusive comparisons of force structure are the asymmetries in the mission profiles of the two superpower navies. The U.S. surface navy has been, is now, and will continue to be (given current construction projections) a navy built around the missions of sea control and projection on a sustained forward deployed basis, all of which has given the U.S. Navy substantial presence capability. In contrast, the Soviet Union has built and seems likely to maintain a surface and subsurface navy, the primary mission of which will be close-to-home sea denial mission. A power projection or presence mission will be, at best, a residual capacity. The Soviet surface navy is designed for high intensity, perhaps preemptive, but not sustained, war at sea* against a U.S. Navy designed for a much broader range of contingencies. Thus force structure comparisons that do not account in some way for these mission asymmetries are almost invariably inconclusive. But those that have tried to compare the two navies generally agree with former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger's assessment:

> . . . once one removes the mission asymmetry and measures the balance, it becomes clear that the naval forces of the Soviet Union and its allies are not generally superior to those of the United States and its allies, and that this should be perceived by well-informed observers. . . . [23]

Yet if the Soviet Union has not achieved naval superiority it may have achieved something of nearly equal importance. All observers, no matter which side of the debate on Soviet expansion they may stand, agree that the Soviet Union has probably achieved the capacity to inflict significant losses on American naval task forces wherever they might come into contact. Moreover, it seems unlikely that Soviet-American naval combat could be isolated at sea. The apparently limited Soviet reload capacity[24] and the lack of seaborne air cover for their fleet increase the likelihood that any naval combat between the United States and the Soviet Union could quickly escalate encompassing not only contending naval forces but shore installations as well.

In short, the Soviets have probably achieved the capacity to carry virtually any naval contact with the United States beyond the threshold of limited or conventional war. In developing the capacity to take any naval contact to the level of strategic confrontation the Soviet Union has achieved at sea what it accomplished in the realm of strategic weapons in the mid and late 1960s: at least as much as and probably a good deal more than "finite deterrence." American policymakers will likely find it as difficult to "use" or even plan for the use of American naval power when confronted with Soviet naval forces as their predecessors did in the 1960s when they were compelled by the inevitable growth of Soviet strategic power to downgrade planning for limited nuclear war.

Leaving aside, therefore, the question of whether the Soviet Navy has or will achieve superiority over the U.S. Navy, a very important circumstance remains. The Soviet Navy now has the capacity to enlarge any contact with the U.S. Navy to at least the level of strategic confrontation or at worst, nuclear war. That capacity may have existed in theory or marginally in the past, but now it would appear to be an ongoing reality of contemporary world politics. In this respect, the loss of unequivocal superiority and adjustment of the naval

*Soviet attack submarines undoubtedly have as their missions interdiction of allied shipping as well as a strike role against the American surface fleet. But most analysts agree with the conclusion of former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger that such an effort would ultimately fail.

balance of forces to one of what might be termed "challenged American superiority," implies a decline of American policy initiative when it concerns the use of naval power. In other words, American policymakers can no longer be sure that they can manage the tempo of politicomilitary engagement when the Soviet Navy is involved. Control over and the flexibility of the naval instrumentalities are not thereby completely surrendered. But new rigidities are present. Hence, the efficacy of naval power may decline simply because its use can no longer remain at the same level of relatively low risk.

Domestic Constraints. The effect of perceptions on American policymakers is even more pronounced with respect to the last of the factors to be considered. Public opinion and the interaction of American domestic political institutions have passed through a period of considerable stress. How the American public and political institutions respond will be of considerable importance for future users of naval power. Indeed, to the extent that American domestic politics have proven to be even more dangerous than international issues for American policymakers, at least passing attention to the nature of these factors seems in order.

Two sets of factors have attracted the most attention in recent years: the dynamics of American public opinion within internationalist to neoisolationist policy limits and the effects of Vietnam and Watergate on the balance of institutional power within the executive-legislative relationship. The two are, of course, closely related in that the executive-legislative policymaking nexus is invariably conditioned by the perceptions held by those who operate within it concerning the limits of permissibility roughly defined by American public opinion. Policy initiative remains, therefore, within the executive-legislative interaction and nothing that has happened in the past decade has changed the *ex post facto* nature of public rewards and deprivations. What may have changed, however, is the content and hence the potential effect of public and elite expectations concerning America's global involvement.

It seems fairly clear, based on the considerable volume of public opinion polling conducted within the last few years, that the American public is in general less internationalist/interventionist in its propensities than a decade or two decades ago. However, it is important to recognize that American belief systems concerning foreign policy can no longer easily be circumscribed by internationalist-isolationist indexes. Such characterizations of American public opinion are, in the light of the latest Potomac Associates poll and recent testimony of the nation's leading public opinion experts,[25] gross oversimplifications of the state of the American people's thinking about American foreign policy.

What seems to be emerging is ambivalence towards but resigned acceptance of American activism in the international system. At the same time, however, there is a rejection of activism if this is translated by policymakers to mean military intervention. Herein lies perhaps the most important legacy of the Vietnam war that, despite all the exhortations of American policymakers, apparently remains the central element of people's perceptions of America's future world role. Despite crosscutting judgments concerning the extent to which Vietnam was a "special case" from which no valid generalizations can be drawn, Watts and Free report: "the closest thing to a consensus that emerges is a warning to avoid commitments, and potentially bloody involvements, where the security interests are not clear."[26]

Furthermore, there is evidence that the American people have moved toward greater sophistication con-

cerning the degree of success being experienced by American policy as well as lower expectations concerning the responsiveness of international problems to American remedies. Simultaneously, there has been a decline in the importance placed on foreign policy questions *vis-à-vis* other issue areas and at best a marginal restoration of confidence in how well American political institutions work in the foreign policy area. In short, Americans are concerned about the international image of the United States and its security as it relates to the other major international powers, but they are not prepared to accept policies for the advancement of American interests that entail a price to be paid in blood.

Perhaps most important, however, this general mood of ambivalence concerning America's international affairs becomes more clearly skeptical and even less accepting of traditional internationalist/interventionist policies among those normally associated with political elites in American society. Hence, the most recent poll data on higher income, college educated, professionals supports earlier analyses that found a rejection of American dominance in the world and dependence upon military instruments of policy.[27] That is to say, those groups from which the American foreign policy elite traditionally has been drawn now appear more skeptical concerning the past course of American foreign policy than any other group in American society. Four years ago, William P. Bundy told an American college audience:

> The makers of American policy from 1950 right through the present time were members of a generation of Americans—men ranging from their mid-eighties to their fifties—who had lived through a period of extreme rejection of force . . . . And those policies of rejecting force and rejecting American involvement in the world seemed . . . to contribute . . . to . . . the most ghastly human phenomena . . . of history. To the men who made the Vietnam decisions . . . all the men . . . Kennedy, Johnson, Rusk, my brother, myself, McNamara—all of us had participated . . . in the greatest debate over American entry in World War II on the side of intervention. We were interventionists at a time when you could assemble an interventionist meeting . . . and get 25 people . . . and in the end, after the intervention succeeded, it had universal support. . . . The interventionist point of view was vindicated . . . . It could prevent vast evil and open the way to progress. . . . War was viewed . . . not as "Catch 22" or "M.A.S.H." or even "Patton" . . . but as the only way to deal with world order.[28]

The last decade may represent for the political elites of today and tomorrow a learning experience no less dramatic than that which the decade of Munich represented for their parents.

Institutionally, the evidence concerning this generationally based policy change remains quite mixed. Thus generational turnover in the House of Representatives during the last decade seems to have contributed to some increased liberalism in that body. At the same time, however, a combination of ambivalence and caution on the part of newer members and the persistence in positions of institutional power of men of an older generation, has worked to soften somewhat the effects of Congress stirring from its 35-year slumber. In the Senate, for example, opponents of an anticipated shift in American policy away from its pre-Vietnam and pre-détente essentials are still able to provide a new President with some very bad moments when he seeks to place in the official foreign policy community, men who have come to doubt the future relevance of the old course. Further-

more, in both Houses recent defense budgets have, if anything, been expanded.

The more specific dangers that this ambivalence within the executive-legislative relationship could hold for the Navy have become manifest in the last 2 years. Whereas throughout most of the 1970s Navy budget requests, particularly for high cost, high capability combat vessels, were treated supportively by most of the Congress and the executive, objections have now been mobilized in both quarters. Skepticism concerning the pace and costs of the Navy's modernization program, especially its nuclear components,[29] has apparently gathered effective support in the White House and the Department of Defense during the last 2 years. Consequently, the future of the aircraft carrier, at least in its nuclear-powered incarnation, and the Navy's desired new class of nuclear-powered cruisers are now in some doubt and with them, the 600-ship fleet proposal of 2 years ago. If a similar lead concerning the *use* of naval power emerges from the new White House, we could see a crystallization of heretofore ambivalent opinion. The precedents are contradictory—e.g., *Mayaguez* and Angola—and offer little basis for confident prediction. Perhaps in the long run this combination of generational change and a general air of indeterminateness will in itself serve as a constraint although initiative would remain in the hands of the White House.

Summary and Conclusions. It is important to emphasize in closing this survey of likely factors that will affect the future use of naval power by the U.S. Government, that we have been talking about constraints and not factors that will preclude its use. As noted in our introductory remarks concerning the transformation now apparently underway in the international system, the role of force as both an instrumentality of international order and of narrower state interests has become increasingly constrained. This is not to say that it has not been used. Indeed, as Robert McNamara used to point out, the post-World War II era is characterized by its extraordinarily high frequency of war.[30] Nevertheless, recent American experience has led to the conclusion among millions of Americans and many within the policy community that its utility as an ordering instrumentality has declined and its future use is increasingly problematic although preparation for its use must continue. In such a complex and difficult policy environment, naval power seems to offer a number of advantages in terms of its flexibility, mobility, universality, and public acceptability. At the same time, however, modern naval power is increasingly susceptible to many of the forces that have impinged on and constrained other forms of military power. Moreover, its very flexibility may undermine the use of naval presence to signal commitment and political will.[31]

The outcome of this interplay of forces is, of course, extremely important for the United States, for it has staked a great deal on the continuing utility and flexibility of naval power. A wager on naval power, however, like a bet on any form of military power ultimately confronts the reality of what Edward L. Morse has called the "great transformation" of foreign policy.[32] The "modernization of international society," Morse and others have pointed out, means that force is a necessarily discounted instrument of policy. The source of our international "problems" is becoming less the zero-sum Soviet-American competition and more diffuse in origin. And as politics thus becomes "systemic" or "globalized," policy remedies become less apparent.

This does not mean that international military conflict or the use of naval power is about to disappear. It does mean that the ordering function of force for those who possess it—naval or

otherwise—is less certain and, perhaps, less relevant. A world plagued by economic stagnation, rising demands on governmental structures, the emergence of fissiparous nationalisms and subnationalisms, and nuclear proliferation will probably not be amenable to much order no matter how flexible the instrument, steadfast the will or great the firepower. And when, in the end, only the quantity of firepower is certain, the future of the regulatory phase of international history and the role of American naval power in it, remains clouded.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARIES

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NOTES

1. The term is Robert Osgood's and this section relies heavily on Osgood's discussion in Robert Osgood and Robert Tucker, *Force, Order and Justice* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967).
2. Inis Claude, *Power and International Relations* (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 88.
3. Osgood and Tucker.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 40.
5. *Ibid.*
6. See Seyom Brown, *New Forces in World Politics* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1974).
7. Richard N. Cooper, "Trade Policy in Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1972-1973, pp. 18-36.
8. Text of a background briefing in New Orleans, 14 August 1970, p. 16, cited by David Landau, *Kissinger: The Uses of Power* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), p. 128.
9. Lawrence J. Korb, "The Defense Budget and Detente: Present Status, Assumptions and Future Possibilities," *Naval War College Review*, Summer 1975, pp. 19-27.
10. See the discussion by Stansfield Turner in "Designing a Modern Navy: A Workshop Discussion," in *Power at Sea: Part II: Super-powers and Navies*, Adelphi Papers, no. 123 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976), p. 28.
11. Hedley Bull, "Sea Power and Political Influence," in *Power at Sea: Part I: The New Environment*, Adelphi Papers, no. 122 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976), p. 6. Any analysis of the future environment of the international system as it relates to the future of the U.S. Navy can profit from this important essay; the present attempt is no exception.
12. Stansfield Turner, "Educational Innovation at the Naval War College, 1972-1974: A Case Study," *Naval War College Second Annual Report of the President*, 9 August 1974, p. 70.
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15. Elizabeth Young, "New Law for Old Navies: Military Implications of the Law of the Sea," *Survival*, November-December 1974, p. 265.
16. See for example, International Institute for Strategic Studies, "New Naval Weapons Technologies," *Strategic Survey 1975* (London: 1976), p. 25.
17. Linton Wells, "Comments" in *Perspective on Ocean Policy*, Report of Conference on Conflict and Order in Ocean Relations, 21-24 October 1974, Airlie, Virginia, prepared for National Science Foundation under Grant No. GI 39643 by Ocean Policy Project, Johns Hopkins University.

18. See James Digby, *Precision-Guided Weapons,* Adelphi Papers, no. 118 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975) and Richard Burt, *New Weapons Technologies: Debate and Directions,* Adelphi Papers, no. 126 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976) for a discussion of these and other issues related to the development of PGMs.

19. An additional consideration related to the likely proliferation of PGMs in the future is the role of terrorism as it relates to the exercise of naval power. This question has received little detailed analysis in the now large literature on terrorism. Perhaps the greatest "potential" would be in the area of terrorist attacks on commercial operations at sea, but one suspects that potential permutations run beyond disruption of commercial shipping.

20. James L. Holloway III, "The U.S. Navy: A Bicentennial Appraisal," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings,* July 1976, p. 19.

21. See Norman Polmar, *Soviet Naval Power: Challenge for the 1970s* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1974) and Michael MccGwire, et al., eds., *Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and Constraints* (New York: Praeger Special Studies, 1975) for a rough approximation of the spectrum of opinion. In addition: MccGwire, ed., *Soviet Naval Developments: Capability and Context* (New York: Praeger, 1973); MccGwire, "Western and Soviet Naval Building Programmes 1965-1976," *Survival,* September/October 1976, pp. 204-209; George E. Hudson, "Soviet Naval Doctrine and Soviet Politics, 1953-1975," *World Politics,* October 1976, pp. 90-113; Barry Blechman, The Changing Soviet Navy (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1973); and Robert W. Herrick, *Soviet Naval Strategy: Fifty Years of Theory and Practice* (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1968).

22. Blechman, p. 36.

23. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, *Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1976,* Hearings (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975), pt. 1, p. 64. Schlesinger did add, however, "Nonetheless, U.S. naval power has suffered a serious decline and must be resuscitated."

24. See John J. Holst, "The Navies of the Super-Powers: Motives, Forces, Prospects," in *Power at Sea: Part II,* pp. 1-14 and in the same collection, MccGwire's, "Maritime Strategy and the Super-Powers," pp. 15-24.

25. William Watts and Lloyd A. Free, "Nationalism, Not Isolationism," *Foreign Policy,* Fall 1976, pp. 3-26 and U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Foreign Policy Choices for the Seventies and Eighties* Hearings (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975-1976), v. 1, pp. 1-130.

26. Watts and Free, p. 9.

27. Bruce M. Russett and Betty C. Hanson, "How Corporate Executives See America's Role in the World," *Fortune,* May 1974, p. 165 and Russett, "America's Retreat from World Power," mimeo, n.d., pp. 4-9.

28. William P. Bundy, Transcript of Remarks, 16 October 1973, University of Delaware, Newark, Delaware.

29. See James K. Oliver, "Congress and the Future of American Seapower: An Analysis of United States Navy Budget Requests in the 1970s," a paper prepared for delivery at the 1976 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, The Palmer House, Chicago, Illinois, 2-5 September 1976. See also, Senator John Stennis' speech before the Senate on "U.S. Naval Power," *Congressional Record,* 19 September 1974, pp. S17132-34.

30. On the frequency and general effectiveness of the use of threat of force by the United States, see Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *The Use of Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington: Advanced Research Projects Agency, 1976).

31. *Ibid.*

32. Edward L. Morse, *Modernization and the Transformation of International Relations* (New York: Free Press, 1976).

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While U.S. leverage in Asia can no longer be taken for granted, American policy is still a critical factor in the stability of the area. Some U.S. initiative leading to coordination of that policy with the East Asian policies of Japan seems necessary to promote mutual objectives and to reconcile differences.

REASSESSING THE SECURITY ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN

by

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The role of the United States in the security of Japan is an issue that has received relatively little official attention, despite significant developments in Northeast Asia over the past decade. These developments, clearly more than isolated or temporary phenomena, are relevant to the U.S.-Japan security alliance in at least three respects. First, the U.S. commitment to Japan has, *in Japan's perception,* lost much of its credibility. Second, improved relations between Japan and the People's Republic of China (PRC) raise the prospect of a shift in the strategic balance of power in Asia. And third, the Soviet Union has significantly increased its use of military forces to exert political pressure on Japan. Each development requires careful examination in terms of its implications for both United States and Japanese interests.

Japan's perception of the American commitment in Asia has been shaken by a series of dramatic events over the past 10 years. Beginning with the 1969 "Nixon Doctrine," which stated that conventional Asian wars would thereafter be fought by Asians, Japan witnessed the evolution of the U.S. policy of withdrawal from Vietnam. Initially, Tokyo's reaction to the U.S. withdrawal was muted, largely because U.S. pronouncements on military policy indicated a shift in emphasis toward clearly identifiable American interests—such as the security of Japan. Then, early in 1977, at the very outset of his administration, President Carter announced that American ground forces would be withdrawn from South Korea. The change in U.S. policy toward Korea caused considerable apprehension in Tokyo despite assurances from Washington that the United States was not deserting any of its Asian allies. Not surprisingly, many Japanese viewed the announcement of withdrawal from Korea as more

indicative of American policy than promises of future support. Even before the U.S. announcement, the Vice Director of the Japanese Defense Agency stated in an annual Defense white paper (June 1969) that, "the United States has been replaced by the Soviet Union as the predominant military power in the Far East." If Japanese officials believe that the United States is second in strength to the Soviet Union in Asia, they would naturally take a skeptical view of American promises: after all, how sincere can the commitment be if the United States is willing to withdraw forces from Korea in the face of Soviet predominance?

More recent events have not been lost on Japanese observers either, such as Washington's apparent preoccupation with the security of Western Europe. In a recently delivered paper, a Japanese professor of international relations began by quoting the following statement by General Brown, Chairman of JCS, to the U.S. Congress:

> At current levels of force structure, war in Europe would require the great preponderance of U.S. general purpose forces. Deployment of a significant portion of the Pacific Command's naval resources to the Atlantic may be required. If this were to occur, control of the seas between the continental United States and Hawaii could be maintained, as could the sea lanes between Alaska and the Lower Forty Eight. However, broad sea control beyond those lanes would be a difficult challenge. Forces of all Services available for other contingencies and crises—for example, war in the Middle East or on the Korean Peninsula—would be seriously reduced.[1]

The effect of such statements by high-level American officials should not be underestimated, especially when made to Congress. Whatever congressional hearings may mean to Americans, they are watched closely by foreign observers for signs of future U.S. policies. For example, it is unlikely that Tokyo failed to notice that Secretary of State Vance, in a February 1978 synopsis of U.S. foreign policy presented to the House International Relations Committee, did not even make reference to Asia.

A second perception evolving in Japan is that the U.S. Congress wants Tokyo to assume a greater share of Japan's defense burden.[2] Undoubtedly, there is some support in Congress for such a move, but the idea will almost certainly not gain momentum without support from the Department of Defense—an unlikely prospect for the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, it is easy to see how Japanese authorities might view discontented Congressmen as harbingers of a reduction in the U.S. contribution to Japan's defense.

Also important in Japan's perception of the U.S. commitment to East Asia is its view of U.S. policies toward the PRC and the Soviet Union. When the United States first made overtures toward Peking in 1971, the Japanese Government was surprised and offended by Washington's failure to consult with Tokyo in advance (the shift in U.S. policy was dubbed by the Japanese press as "Nixon's shock"[3]). The diplomatic wounds have largely healed, partly as a result of improved relations between Tokyo and Peking, but Japan is undoubtedly concerned about the future of America's new Asian policies. For example, a desire for full diplomatic relations with the PRC could cause the United States to abandon its relationship with Taiwan. If that were to occur, Japan's economic links with the Taiwan Government would be jeopardized and, not incidentally, the level of U.S. forces in East Asia would be reduced even further. Moreover, some Japanese analysts may be concerned that U.S.-Soviet détente will cause Washington to reduce

its forces in East Asia as part of an agreement, or to improve relations, with Moscow.

Such possibilities as these must loom large in Japan's perception, if only because the United States acted so unpredictably in 1971. It is therefore likely that Japanese policymakers are particularly sensitive to the prospect of U.S. political objectives that would affect Japan's security interests adversely. Once such suspicions are formed, insignificant acts by the United States are apt to be viewed as index of an unwelcome trend, thereby eroding Japan's belief in the U.S. commitment for reasons Americans would not readily recognize. The problem, then, cannot be understood simply by examining Japan's reaction to observable events; it is also necessary to consider that Tokyo may have unvoiced concerns about possible shifts in U.S. Asian policy that would subvert Japan's interests for other U.S. objectives.

The foregoing discussion of Japan's perception of the U.S. commitment has obviously been oversimplified. Nations do not perceive anything—people do. Undoubtedly, there is within Japan a wide range of opinions, held with varying degrees of certainty, concerning U.S. intentions. The point, however, is that an increasing number of Japanese are forming doubts about the U.S. commitment, and even those with the most faith in the U.S.-Japan alliance are probably less convinced than they once were. As will be discussed later, these doubts can lead to a national policy that undermines U.S. interests, and they should be dealt with accordingly.

The second major development in East Asia has been the improvement in relations between Japan and the PRC. Tokyo officially recognized the PRC in 1972, shortly after President Nixon's initial trip to Peking, although informal discussions between the two countries had begun in the early sixties. Like the United States, Japan welcomed the opportunity to establish a dialogue with an emerging Communist power. Moreover, Japan was, and is, anxious to establish itself as the primary source of technology and capital for an economy with a prodigious growth potential.

The relationship between Japan and the PRC shows signs of developing into a political alignment with very important strategic implications. In August 1978 the two countries signed a symbolic pact called a "peace and friendship treaty" that called for the peaceful settlement of any disputes between them. Significantly, the Japan-PRC treaty also contains a clause opposing "hegemony" in Asia by any nation—an unmistakable reference to the Soviet Union. Initially, Japan would not sign the treaty because the antihegemony clause provoked a very hostile reaction in Moscow. Not only did the Soviets denounce the treaty, but they repeatedly warned of a reassessment of their policy toward Japan if the latter signed a treaty containing the objectionable clause. China refused to remove the antihegemony clause and a 3-year impasse in treaty negotiations ensued. Finally, Japan agreed to accept the antihegemony clause, although it insisted on an additional clause stating that the treaty did not affect either party's relations with third countries. The compromise solution, if it can be called a compromise, was still a diplomatic victory for the PRC, and the Soviets were predictably upset. Statements in the official Soviet press warned of the treaty's "dangerous character," and the Soviet Ambassador to Japan returned to Moscow for an unusually prolonged stay of 4 months.

The Soviet Union is deeply concerned about the prospects of Sino-Japanese accord. Such accord would not only accelerate the PRC's industrial development, but it would also facilitate what the Soviets view as the ultimate PRC goal of replacing the United States as Japan's protection against the Soviet

threat.[4] Soviet fears may be overdrawn, but they are not baseless. As Japan and the PRC strengthen their political and economic ties, the latter will probably become more and more vocal in support of Japan's security interests. This, in turn, could cause Tokyo to view Peking's aggressive anti-Soviet policy as the most effective counterforce against Soviet influence.

The problem for Japan is a delicate one: how to cultivate its relationship with China without unduly antagonizing the Soviet Union. If Moscow perceives that Japan is encouraging China's anti-Soviet objectives, Japan is likely to experience a much greater Soviet threat than it must cope with at present. Needless to say, such an escalation of tensions would put the United States right in the middle of a difficult situation.

Fortunately, the United States need not wait and watch while events unfold in East Asia. American policy is still a critical factor in the stability, or instability, of the area. Particularly important is the U.S. relationship with Japan, because American support can enable Japan to move away from PRC influence if circumstances require it. Furthermore, U.S. attitudes toward the PRC and the Soviet Union can affect Japan's relations with those two countries, assuming that the U.S.-Japan alliance remains essentially unchanged. U.S. leverage in Asian affairs cannot be taken for granted, however. It is essential that the United States coordinate its East Asian policy with that of Japan. Unless Tokyo and Washington undertake to promote mutual objectives, the two Governments may find themselves pursuing Asian policies that are not complementary. To avoid such a situation, the United States should take the initiative now to discuss with Japan the best ways to advance common interests and reconcile those that are in conflict.

The third major development mentioned at the outset has been the increase in Soviet efforts to exert political pressure on Japan through the use of military forces. These Soviet efforts are significant because they affect Japan's perception of the Soviet threat and, hence, Japan's view of the adequacy of American support.

In April 1975, during the worldwide Soviet *Okean II* exercises, four Russian naval task forces were deployed around Japan, two of them on important Japanese trading routes. A year later Soviet warships sailed south through the Sea of Japan while Soviet reconnaissance aircraft flew a parallel course along both sides of Japan's home islands.[5] In 1977, Soviet military aircraft made nearly 200 "abnormal demonstrative flights" near Japan's airspace, including 30 flights that circled Japan.[6] Also in 1977 the Soviets conducted numerous naval maneuvers in the Sea of Japan.[7]

Such displays of Soviet military force are not Japan's only concern. Equally important in terms of political effect is the so-called "Northern Territories" problem. The Northern Territories are the four islands just north of the main Japanese island of Hokkaido that are claimed by both Japan and the Soviet Union (Etorufu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the Habomai group). The islands were occupied by Soviet forces at the end of World War II and the Soviets have been in possession ever since. Japan, which held undisputed title to the islands from 1855 to 1945,[8] claims that the Soviet annexation was illegal under the terms and principles governing boundary settlements after the war. The Soviets have been consistently inflexible in their view: the territorial issue is not negotiable.

The problem of the Northern Territories is significant for political, economic, and military reasons. Mere discussion of the problem arouses strong feelings of Japanese nationalism. In fact, the dispute has been a major obstacle to a peace and friendship treaty between Japan and the U.S.S.R., despite the fact

that the two countries have had diplomatic relations since 1956. Moreover, the issue is becoming more sensitive as competition between Japanese and Soviet fishermen increases. The Northern Territories are surrounded by a very fertile fishery, and Japan has been forced to negotiate for limited fishing rights in what used to be traditional Japanese fishing grounds.[9] Soviet patrol boats do not hesitate to seize Japanese fishing vessels that either enter territorial seas around the disputed islands or violate the terms that regulate Japanese fishing in the area. Since 1945, some 8,000 Japanese fishermen and 1,000 vessels have been seized by Soviet patrols.[10]

Soviet seapower is also evident in the Northern Territories in a different form. A Peking radio broadcast in early 1976, quoting a Japanese fisherman, stated that Soviet planes were based at an airfield on Kunashiri and Soviet warships were anchored at Hittokappu Bay, Etorufu Island.[11] The strategic significance of the Northern Territories is undoubtedly well-known to the Soviets: the islands overlook three straits into the Sea of Okhotsk (or three straits into the Pacific Ocean, depending on one's perspective). Furthermore, the Soviet military presence north of Japan serves as a constant reminder to Tokyo that in the event of a major war the Soviets would almost certainly use the islands to launch an invasion against Japan's northern island of Hokkaido.[12]

It is not likely that the demonstrations of Soviet military strength enumerated above will decrease in the future. Such uses of seapower are consistent with the Soviet philosophy that the peacetime role of the Navy is to display the military might of the Soviet Union and thereby assist in the conduct and support of foreign policy. Japan, with its dependence on seaborne commerce and its strategic location, is particularly vulnerable to the peacetime applications of naval force advocated by the Soviet's influential Admiral Gorshkov:

> Demonstrative actions of the fleet in many cases make it possible to achieve political goals without resorting to armed conflict by just indicating pressure by their potential might and the threat of beginning military actions.[13]

Given the prospect of a growing Soviet presence, the question for Tokyo—and Washington—is how to deal with the external pressure that is clearly designed to influence Japan whenever it makes decisions affecting Soviet interests.

Before discussing the role of the United States, it is important to consider two options that Japan might pursue if it loses faith in American support: rearmament and neutrality. The latter option, with certain qualifications, is the more likely of the two, but neither is so improbable that it can be ignored.

A number of knowledgeable observers have predicted that the rearmament of Japan would be an inevitable reaction to a decline in U.S. support. Notable among these observers is Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security advisor, who, writing as an academic in 1972, expressed the view that a U.S. policy of isolation would compel Japan to develop its own military might, including a nuclear capability.[14] Other writers have taken a similar position, including the belief that rearmament would necessarily mean the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Japan.[15] Reasons offered to support predictions of rearmament have included Japan's need to balance the Soviet threat, a perception by the Japanese that economic success entitles them to a larger voice in world affairs, and a growing sense of nationalism and self-confidence in Japan. While such influences cannot be denied, they are considerably less significant than the factors militating *against* rearmament.

Two frequently cited indexes of antimilitarism in Japan are public opinion polls and the strength of "passivist" political factions. Such statistical indicators, while they may reflect the national mood at a given time, provide an unreliable basis for predicting future trends. They are effects rather than causes. It is more useful to consider the advantages Japan has enjoyed as a result of low defense budgets and to compare the probable consequences of militarization.

The most obvious benefit of Japan's low military profile has been the facilitation of phenomenal economic growth. In the 30-plus years since World War II, Japan has risen from economic impotence to a nation with the world's third largest GNP. While Japan's growth cannot be attributed solely to low defense budgets, a contributing factor has certainly been the allocation of funds for industrial development rather than defense. It is apparent to the Japanese that their economic strength has given them more international prestige and a higher standard of living than would have been the case had they devoted a significantly larger share of their national wealth to military development.

A second factor militating against Japan's rearmament is the political instability it would cause in Asia, particularly if Japan were to acquire nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union would no doubt feel threatened, and it would almost certainly intensify its military buildup around Japan. Additionally, smaller nations with whom Japan has trade relations might be alarmed either by the prospect of alienating the Soviet Union or of becoming Japan's "satellites." This, in turn, could cause the smaller nations of Asia to reconsider their own need for more arms or stronger ties with a superpower. And finally, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Japan would probably alienate the United States, given the latter's commitment to nuclear non-proliferation,[16] possibly leaving the PRC as the only power to which Japan could turn in the event of a crisis where the nuclear threat was inappropriate. Such reliance on the PRC would be dangerous for Japan because of the risk of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement or, more likely, the development of an intense economic rivalry between China and Japan for markets in Asia.

Based on a rough cost/benefit analysis, then, it seems unlikely that Japan would pursue a policy of rearmament, even to compensate for what was perceived as inadequate American support. Instead, Japan would probably seek an independent role in Asia, with a possible bias toward the PRC. The advantage of such a posture, if it succeeded, would be to allay Soviet fears by reducing the *U.S.* presence in East Asia. This, according to the plan, would cause the Soviets to abandon their threatening posture toward Japan, assuming the latter could show that it would not permit its friendship with the PRC to support anti-Soviet objectives.

If Japan were to embark on such an independent course, it would almost certainly proceed slowly, not only because of the uncertainties involved but also to minimize the adverse reaction in the United States. Friendship with the United States would retain a high priority in Tokyo's foreign policy, even while Japan was subordinating U.S. interests to the goal of eliminating the Soviet threat. A gradual movement by Japan away from U.S. influence would probably begin with a reduction in the Japanese Self-Defense Force, which is maintained at least in part to satisfy American preferences,[17] and an announcement that the United States could not use Japanese bases in the event of another Korean war.[18] The latter action may not be as far away as it seems. Article VI of the 1960 "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between United States and Japan," states that the United States

shall have the use of military facilities in Japan to maintain peace and security in the Far East. Significantly, Japan's Foreign Minister Miyazawa asserted in 1975 that North Korea was not included in the "Far East" for purposes of the U.S.-Japan security alliance.[19] While the statement may have been nothing more than a diplomatic gesture designed to improve relations with North Korea, the mere fact that it was made evidences a movement by Tokyo towards a more flexible Asian policy.

It is by no means inevitable that Japan will decide to ease out of its military alliance with the United States. To the contrary, the impetus is still in favor of strong military ties with Washington.[20] The United States, however, cannot afford to be complacent or it may witness a shift in Japan's foreign policy as the latter acts on its own to cope with the growing Soviet threat.

In response to what can accurately be called Japan's dilemma, the United States should take three steps. First, it should develop and communicate an Asian policy that demonstrates concern for Japan's needs and interests. Second, the United States should encourage the development of a more effective Japanese Self-Defense Force. And third, economic tensions between Japan and the United States should be dealt with in the overall context of the alliance between the two countries.

In the past, the United States has seemed content to allow world events to shape Japan's foreign policy. Such inattention to Japan's needs and interests is quite idealistic in that it assumes a great deal about future U.S.-Japan relations. Yet those relations are even now showing signs of strain, and the future is not nearly as predictable as it was just a few years ago. Accordingly, the United States should devote more attention to Japan and communicate that attention by coordinating a comprehensive U.S.-Japan Asian policy that addresses the myriad issues of concern to both countries. Such a mutual undertaking would demonstrate the sincerity of the American commitment to Japan and might alleviate some of the problems that have arisen over the last 10 years.

As an additional means of showing support, the United States should address the growing Soviet threat by improving the capabilities of both the 7th Fleet and the Japanese Self-Defense Force. Of course, political constraints in both the United States and Japan limit the available options, but there is still room for applications of technology that will augment the defense and attack capabilities of military forces in Japan. For example, more antiair and antiship missiles would help compensate for the numerical superiority of Soviet forces, and they would require less reaction time in the event of an unexpected crisis. Similarly, computer technology, laser guidance systems, and sophisticated surveillance techniques can improve military effectiveness without a significant increase in manpower requirements. To be sure, technological advances are already an important component of Japan's defense structure, but the recent increase in Soviet strength suggests that it is necessary to augment Japan's defense with an even more intensive application of the latest U.S. military technology.

Finally, when discussing the U.S.-Japan alliance, it is important to consider economic competition between the two countries. Recent economic trends have not been conducive to harmonious relations, and the chances for improvement are not promising. The United States is presently experiencing a huge trade deficit, largely because of imports from Japan. Moreover, the rising value of the yen in relation to the dollar has increased the cost of maintaining U.S. forces in Japan.

The Japanese also have complaints. Their fishing industry suffered a serious blow in 1977 when the United States put its 200-mile economic zone into

effect. Additionally, the decline of the dollar has made Japanese goods more expensive, and hence less competitive, in America.

Clearly, economic tensions between the United States and Japan are not going to disappear. They can, however, be reduced if both countries are willing to discuss the problems and make concessions in the interest of better overall relations. Given the present state of the U.S. economy, Washington would undoubtedly have to accept greater losses than Tokyo, but such losses should be viewed, in the final analysis, as part of the cost of a strong U.S.-Japan alliance.

In summation, the United States is overdue for a thorough reexamination of its role in the security of Japan. The reexamination should be a high-level, mutual effort with Japan aimed at a better understanding and a coordinated policy. At the very least, a concerted effort to deal with Japan's problems and interests would do much to allay Tokyo's present apprehensions about the sincerity of the U.S. commitment to the security of Japan.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Lieutenant Wiegley majored in English and Philosophy at the State University of New York at Buffalo and after graduation from OCS in 1973 he served as an oceanographic research officer and communications officer at the Naval Facility, Point Sur. He was selected for the Law Education Program in 1975 and received his J.D. magna cum laude from the University of Wisconsin in 1977. He is assigned to the Naval Legal Service Office, Pearl Harbor, and is an International Law of the Sea Scholar at the University of Hawaii.

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18. Elmo Zumwalt and Worth H. Bagley, "Strategic Deterioration in the Pacific: The Dilemma for the U.S. and Japan," *Pacific Community*, January 1978, p. 125.

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Do Gorshkov's writings establish or reflect Soviet naval doctrine? Is he the author of Soviet naval policy? Can the authoritativeness of those writings be determined, as some have attempted, by an examination of "key" words and phrases in those writings?

THE DOCTRINAL LEGITIMACY OF GORSHKOV'S WRITINGS: MEASURING THE MEASURES

by
Renita Fry

The appearance in 1976 of Admiral Gorshkov's book *Sea Power of the State* revived the question of whether the views of the Soviet Commander in Chief were a statement of doctrine or not. At the time of the publication of the Gorshkov series of articles in 1972-3, many Western commentators, relying heavily on their "feel" for the authoritativeness with which Gorshkov wrote, concluded that the series was part of a factional debate. Later, these same commentators argued that the book was a doctrinal confirmation of the views expressed in the series. The issue is not merely semantic. In Soviet military literature, doctrine holds a unique place. Military doctrine is at the apex of all military thinking and writing. It forms the base on which policy is formulated and executed. Military doctrine provides both the officially approved views on the conduct of war and the outline for keeping the country and its armed forces prepared for war. Doctrine is a fundamental law of the state, which makes it unchallengeable. All other categories of military thinking contribute to doctrine but are subordinate to it.[1] Classification of Gorshkov's works as doctrine would mean that the opinions attributed to Gorshkov were the driving force of Soviet naval policy. A denial of doctrinal status would indicate lack of agreement concerning naval policy.

One commentator, James McConnell, has consistently argued that Gorshkov's writings, both series and book, are more than a line of argument in a factional debate. In a paper for the Center for Naval Analyses, McConnell proposed that a more systematic measure of authoritativeness than the "feel" used by his colleagues would support his contention.[2] The method of evaluation proposed by McConnell is interesting because it applies to Gorshkov's writings the analysis of words and phrases often

used to interpret nonmilitary Soviet writings. In greatly simplified terms, the method draws on keywords or phrases that have consistently been used as signals in Soviet writings. The pattern of words/phrases can provide the reader with information or directives that are not stated overtly. In the case of McConnell's analysis, the keywords are those that signal doctrinal legitimacy.

The texts of both of Gorshkov's major works can be interpreted as fitting the doctrinal pattern outlined by McConnell. Gorshkov's own words can be read as a claim of legitimacy. However, what an author claims for his work and the actual status of his views are not necessarily identical. The author's words are but one piece of evidence. A further test of doctrinal authority (one that McConnell did not have the space to include) is to extend the examination of keywords to the texts of Soviet commentaries on Gorshkov's works. Theoretically, the use of keywords in these commentaries should match their use by Gorshkov. If the commentaries contradict Gorshkov's use of the keywords, then it would be possible to argue either that Gorshkov lacks doctrinal legitimacy or that McConnell's framework is not adequate. The purpose of extending the application of McConnell's framework is not to prove either argument, but to demonstrate that no single measure of legitimacy is conclusive.

Essentially, McConnell stated that there is a series of keywords that distinguish military doctrine from other areas of military thought, particularly from its closest cousin, military science. The keywords, or doctrinal indicators, are used as signals that the material in question is doctrine rather than part of the other fields of military writing. The distinctions between the signals of military doctrine and military science can be summarized as:

1. The term "unity of views" is consistently associated with doctrine. Doctrine can "establish" unity, "promote" unity, or "reflect" unity. The central element is that unity prohibits the expression of differing views. In the field of military science, however, clashes of opinion are expected and promoted.

2. Doctrine limits itself to the period of the present and the immediate future, the latter covering the period of only 3-5 years beyond the present. References to the prospects of the future development of the navy fall into the category of military science. Examinations extending beyond three to five years are part of military science. Similarly, works devoted primarily to the past cannot be doctrinal.

3. Military doctrine deals with a wider range of subjects than military science. Doctrine covers the armed struggle, the political aspects of war, and peace. Military science is consistently limited to the means of the armed struggle or to the theory of the art of war.

4. Doctrinal statements emphasize the unity of the various branches of the armed forces. In doctrine, no branch of the service is unique. Practical statements concerning the employment of one branch or another (those that recognize uniqueness) are part of military science or military art. The frequently repeated Soviet assertion that all branches must act in concert to achieve victory is a reflection of the "singleness" of doctrine.

These four doctrinal indicators are clearly evident in the Gorshkov series. In a single introductory paragraph, Gorshkov tied in each of the signals of

doctrine. He spoke of the "development of a unity of views." In the next sentence, he denied any intention of producing a military history or of predicting the development of the navy.[3] He stated that he was interested in the employment of navies "in peacetime as an instrument of state policy," along with their use in wartime. Finally, Gorshkov denied that the navy holds a unique position. In light of Gorshkov's emphasis on the special qualities of naval firepower, mobility and concealment, the denial can be interpreted (as McConnell proposed) as a bow to the doctrinal requirement of concert among the branches of the armed forces.

Unfortunately, the same paragraph does not appear in the introduction to *Sea Power of the State*. However, in the foreword, there are several phrases that fit the doctrinal criteria. Gorshkov (or the collective of authors who prepared the book) states that the book will concentrate on the correct subject matter for doctrine: "the dialectical relationship between the development of naval forces and the goals of that policy of the States which they were designed to serve" and the role of the army and navy "which in peacetime have also continued to serve as an instrument of state policy." The book, then, covers the three areas of legitimate concern to doctrine—the armed struggle, the political aspects of war and the peacetime use of naval forces. With respect to time period, Gorshkov denies any intent to produce a military historical analysis; rather, historical material would only be part of the examination of the "conformity to laws in the changes in their [various branches of the armed forces] roles and positions in wartime and peacetime." Use of the term "peacetime" suggests that historical analysis is offered as the basis of doctrinal principles, not as a subject itself. A later paragraph reinforces this interpretation by using the required terminology of the present and the "near future" as the period covered by the book.

The introduction to *Sea Power of the State* does not contain the specific denial of naval uniqueness that was used in the series. However, the integration of all military branches is strongly emphasized before reference is made to the operational uniqueness of the navy. In fact, arguing that victory can come only through the coordinated efforts of all forces, the foreword states that "there have been almost no purely land or purely naval wars." The foreword even bows to the ground forces as the only element that can consolidate and confirm a victory. One could consider this statement to be a more forceful declaration of unity than that contained in the series as it is a positive affirmation of unity rather than a denial of uniqueness.

The only one of McConnell's indicators that does not appear in the introduction to *Sea Power of the State* is that stipulating the presentation of a unity of views. Instead the two paragraphs that summarize the content and purpose of the book cite the "author's" goal and the expression of "several thoughts." This phraseology can be interpreted in several ways. First, if the book is regarded as an expression of the unity of views, i.e., as the approved solution in a debate, it would be superfluous to include a statement of unity. The audience towards whom the book is directed would not require such a statement. Second, the last paragraph of the introduction acknowledges the assistance of those who cooperated in preparing the book. Among those singled out are the head of the naval academy and other top-ranking naval personnel. If the acknowledgment can be taken as an indication that the book was a collective effort, then the paragraph is a statement that the book's contents represent a unity of views. Finally, of course, one might consider that the absence of this one doctrinal indicator

questions the authoritativeness of the book.

Citations from both the series and book fit comfortably with the indicators noted by McConnell. At some points, the question of unity of views, for example, there is room for differing interpretations of the meaning of phrases. Nevertheless, the texts do match the doctrinal pattern. Both the series and book were the subject of conferences and reviews following their publication. Other articles relevant to the formulation or publication of military thought appeared simultaneously. Each of these can be examined in light of the doctrinal indicators. Throughout such a presentation, two points should be kept in mind. First, there is nontextual evidence that may not be included in the following sections. Second, there is room for other interpretations of the textual evidence than those given here because interpretation is inherently an individual exercise.

Textual evidence surrounding the 1972-3 series comes from three articles carried by *Morskoy Sbornik* in 1973.[4] The first article appeared in March, the first issue after the conclusion of the series. Written by Admiral Sergeyev, then Chief of Staff of the Navy, the article commemorated the 125th anniversary of *Morskoy Sbornik*.[5] Sergeyev's article described the chief function of the naval digest as providing information on combat readiness, the tactical employment of naval forces, etc. The article made no reference to *Morskoy Sbornik* as a legitimate forum for the presentation of doctrine. Nor were there any references to *Morskoy Sbornik's* role in promoting unity of views, examining the present/immediate future, discussing the peacetime or political role of the navy, or any of the other phrases that would place *Morskoy Sbornik* as a journal of doctrine. Instead, Sergeyev wrote of the journal's role in the discussion of controversial topics, a label clearly excluding doctrine. Further, Sergeyev did not mention the series specifically despite the fact that Gorshkov's articles had been the lead items in *Morskoy Sbornik* for over a year. The omission is unusual because Sergeyev's views on the employment of naval forces have been fairly close to Gorshkov's.[6] One might have expected him to promote the legitimacy of Gorshkov's writings, however indirectly, in his description of the functions of the naval digest. If the series had been a final statement, it seems likely that Sergeyev would have defined a role for *Morskoy Sbornik* in the expression of doctrine.

A second article relevant to the legitimacy of the series appeared 3 months after the last installment. In a brief item, *Morskoy Sbornik* noted that the series had been the subject of conferences at the Dzershinskiy Higher Naval Engineering Order of Lenin School and at the Frunze Higher Naval School.[7] Three aspects of the conferences bear on the legitimacy of the series. First, the schools at which the conferences were held are not the top level of Soviet naval academies. That spot is apparently reserved for the Leningrad Naval Academy.[8] That the first recorded conferences took place below that level could well have been a signal of lack of weight to be accorded the series. Second, the conferences reportedly concentrated on the "practical" impact of the series on the work of officers. "Practical" issues are the concern of military art, not of military doctrine. While the practical side of Gorshkov's views would be extremely important for the naval officer corps, if the series were a statement of doctrine, establishment of its legitimacy would be a logical prerequisite to widespread adoption of the "practical" consequences. Finally, the item reporting the conferences was not placed as a separate entry, but was included in the monthly section of fleet news. This section is not always reserved for stories on the

performance of individual sailors; it can include personnel and policy changes. However, the prominence initially given the series was hardly matched by burying the first specific evaluation of the articles in the middle of fleet briefs.

A more prestigious report on the series appeared 3 months later when *Morskoy Sbornik* recorded a conference at the naval academy (presumably the Leningrad Naval Academy, as it is the only one referred to without its identifying "orders of").[9] This item did appear as a separate entry, a tribute to either the academy or to the series. However, the participants at the conference discussed the series in terms of its contributions to "the theory of naval art," personnel training, shipbuilding, mastering the ocean and international law. None of these are legitimate subjects of doctrine. Use of the term "naval art" was particularly revealing in placing the series outside the context of doctrine. Further, although the conference noted widespread attention devoted to the series, it should be remembered that 5 months had elapsed between the conclusion of the series and this recording of a conference reviewing it at the nation's highest institution of naval education. The absence of doctrinal keywords in the report of the conference and the timing suggest that there was controversy surrounding Gorshkov's writings. Controversy, naturally, is unacceptable when dealing with works of doctrine because of doctrine's nature as part of the fundamental law of the state.

These three articles do not fit the pattern of McConnell's doctrinal indicators. One fails to accept *Morskoy Sbornik* as the correct forum for the presentation of doctrine. The other two describe conferences on the series that emphasize those aspects of Gorshkov's views that are not the legitimate subject matter of doctrine. In no case is there a clear signal that the Gorshkov series is to be considered more than a significant contribution to military science. As a result, these three articles cast doubt on Gorshkov's claim for doctrinal recognition.[10]

Commentaries that bear on the status of *Sea Power of the State* were more numerous than specific references to the Gorshkov series. The book appeared on 9 February 1976, well ahead of schedule.[11] It was reviewed by *Tass*, *Izvestia* and *Soviet Military Review*. In addition, it was the subject of several items in *Morskoy Sbornik*. If all of these sources are examined for keywords, a number of contradictions become apparent.

Before looking at these contradictions, one article by Gorshkov, concurrent with the book, deserves mention because it expresses Gorshkov's opinion of the contribution of military writers. The article, "Greeting the 25th Congress of the CPSU," appeared in the February 1976 issue of *Morskoy Sbornik*. In the article, Gorshkov defined the function of works by naval researchers, specialists and officers as providing "further insights into the basic questions of *operational* strategic use of the navy during a *war*," or trying to "justify its role in *future*," or revealing "the optimum paths to *developing* the Navy's power."[12] These phrases, particularly the emphasized portions, are not applicable to military doctrine according to McConnell's criteria. Further, Gorshkov specifically stated that admirals and officers are purveyors of military scientific thought. In short, at the very time that his book was published, Gorshkov denied its doctrinal weight in theory.

Four conferences on *Sea Power of the State* were recorded by *Morskoy Sbornik*. The first was held at the Leningrad Naval Academy. The briefing on the book was given by Admiral Syosev, the head of the Academy. He classed the book as "fundamental military theoretical research." Syosev stated that "For the first time,[13] the work synthesizes historical, economic, and

military political aspects of the problems of sea power. It reveals its importance for defense of the country's interests. And it substantiates the role of the Fleet in attaining military and political goals."[14] Syosev's briefing does contain some elements of the doctrinal indicators. For example, reference to the use of the navy for military and political goals signals the correct subject matter for doctrine. The wording also denies that the book is a history; history is but one element of the synthesis, so that the time period is legitimate for doctrine. On the other hand, there is a contradiction between the references to military-political goals and the Russian term for defense (*zashchita*) used in the briefing. McConnell has argued that there is a clear distinction between *zashchita*, which is associated with "'combat' readiness, capabilities and strength or might 'of the armed forces,'" and *oborona*, which deals with the "aggregate of 'military political' measures."[15] Both words mean defense, but in different contexts. Gorshkov was the first to apply *oborona* and readiness together, as part of his effort to upgrade the role of the navy from chiefly military to military-political tasks. Syosev's selection of the word *zashchita* marks a retreat from the more wide-ranging phraseology of Gorshkov and implies a limitation on the doctrinal legitimacy of *Sea Power of the State*.

Another conference on *Sea Power of the State* was held in the Pacific Fleet. The writeup in *Morskoy Sbornik* stated that the book "examines thoroughly the Leninist principles of military organization and development of strengthening the Navy's might. It shows its role in defending (again, *zashchita*) the state interests of the Motherland."[16] The report also stated that the speakers at the conference dealt with the development of "naval forces and means, and naval art in the postwar period." As is evident from these citations, the report did not use McConnell's keywords to define the book as a doctrinal statement.

A similar conference was held at sea on the *Oktyabr'skaya Revolutsiya*. Speakers noted the great significance of the book on the "practical activities of naval personnel"—which is quite far removed from examining the book as doctrinal literature."[17] Of course, one could well argue that the purpose of such a conference would not be to disseminate military doctrine, but to discuss naval art. Ship personnel are more likely to be concerned with operational directives. In that case the holding of conferences in the fleets could be a signal of the widespread circulation of the book and hence of its importance.[18] In line with this argument, it might be significant that the shipboard conference did receive special editing; information about the cruise of the *Oktyabr'skaya Revolutsiya* appeared as usual in the news from the fleets, but the conference report was published as a separate entry.

A fourth conference on the Gorshkov book was held at the Military Political Academy.[19] This conference was a gathering of professors, representatives of the main staff and central directorates of the navy, the navy political directorate, the naval academy and other educational institutions, and members of the military press. It was the first conference to include such a high-level cast. The opening briefing placed the book in the category of "theoretical works by Soviet military leaders for developing military science." The deputy head of the academy, LTG Yurpolskiy, who gave the briefing, described the book as a "noteworthy phenomenon in military literature, and an interesting and deeply scientific investigation." A second briefer spoke of the book's elaboration of the "role, place, and significance of the Soviet Navy in the defense (*zashchita*) of the achievements of socialism." This

speaker stressed the "practical" use of the book for discussing the "theoretical issues of further development of the Navy." Other speakers whose comments were recorded were R.A. Stalbo and V.A. Solovyev. The former, who was mentioned in Gorshkov's acknowledgments, made no statements using the doctrinal indicators. The latter repeated the classification of the book as military scientific literature and praised the book's exposition of the "theory of balancing the forces of the Navy at the present stage of its development." In all of these comments, the keywords are contradictory. There is no reference to a unity of views, although the second briefer did recommend the book as a text, which could signify unified acceptance of the ideas presented by Gorshkov. One speaker referred to the present stage of development (doctrine) and one of the future (science). None referred to the unity of all armed forces, while one mentioned a special role for the navy. None referred to the book's coverage of the use of the navy in peacetime; and the use of the term *zashchita* in connection with state interests precludes interpreting "defense of state interests" as a peacetime task. As a result, the content of the report does not point clearly towards accepting or denying doctrinal status for *Sea Power of the State*. There is also evidence outside the content of the speeches at the conference that should be taken into account: (1) that the conference was at the Military Political Academy, an institution concerned with both military and political subjects, i.e., with doctrine, and (2) that the conference, following the lead of the naval academy, did nominate the book for the Frunze Prize. The endorsement of the book by an institution closely associated with the formulation of military doctrine could be viewed as more significant than the lack of doctrinal signals in the speeches of conference participants.

Turning to articles that dealt with Gorshkov's writings outside the framework of conferences, two appear most relevant. First, in April 1976, *Morskoy Sbornik* carried an article by Admiral Syosev, in which the head of the naval academy discussed the value of continued study of the combat experience of World War II.[20] In Syosev's view, such a study is valuable for educating the new generation of officers and to illustrate the continuing validity of such principles as mass and surprise. The major function of a review of World War II is, according to Syosev, not the substantiation of doctrine proposed by Gorshkov, but the development of military art. Syosev supported his judgment by citing Gorshkov's own words that the past is the key to further naval development (the subject of science) and to improvement of the naval art. Syosev's article does not refer specifically to Gorshkov's new book nor does it credit historical studies that deny their historical orientation. With Syosev's definitions, *Sea Power of the State* would be considered a scientific, not doctrinal, work. (The function of the article might be compared to the Sergeyev article that followed the series. Both are relevant to a particular contribution by Gorshkov, but neither discusses the specifics of the work.)

The second article to be considered appeared in *Morskoy Sbornik* in January 1977 as part of a series on the functions of the naval academy. Most of the individual articles in the series described the academy as a center for the development of naval art and science, a categorization that should be considered in connection with the academy's endorsement of the Gorshkov book for the Frunze Prize. More specifically, one article in the series defined the "basic works by Commander Chief Navy, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Gorshkov" as the "development and modern interpretation of the basic categories of naval art."[21] This classification is even

further removed from military doctrine than the one used by Syosev. The article was written by Admiral Solov'yev, the deputy head of the academy, also a participant in the conference at the Military Political Academy. The appearance of Solov'yev's lukewarm evaluation of the relationship between Gorshkov's writings and military doctrine may indicate that conflicting opinions were not harmonized by the convening of that high-level conference.

A final area of evidence concerning *Sea Power of the State* is the content of reviews of the book. In April 1976, a review by Admiral Lobov (Navy Rep.–General Staff) was published in *Morskoy Sbornik*.[22] Lobov gave a highly complimentary summary of the contents of the book. He concluded that Gorshkov's work was an "excellent example of a creative path to the solution to cardinal questions of the development of naval science" and a "serious contribution to military science." In addition, Lobov presented the book as the basis for discussion by military and naval leaders that would lead to an "accurate understanding of the role and place of the Fleet under modern conditions." The first two references—to the book as a work of science—oppose categorizing the book as a doctrinal statement. Further, one specifically isolates the book's contribution to naval, not military, science by emphasizing the uniquely naval aspects of Gorshkov's ideas. Lobov's statement concerning discussion of the book could be interpreted as either a reference to the clash of opinions that forms part of military science or to a declaration of units of views. One's interpretation depends on whether "accurate" is equated with "unified." In either case, Lobov left his readers without a clear statement on the significance of the Gorshkov book.

A second review of *Sea Power of the State* appeared in the August 1976 issue of *Soviet Military Review*.[23] The review summarized the contents of the book for two full pages. Yet there were almost no references that could be measured against McConnell's framework. Only two statements might be considered relevant as measures of the book's authoritativeness. First, the review stated that the modern navy can "stand up to aggression from the seas and can accomplish strategic missions in the world ocean." But the article did not go on to mention naval protection of state interests or performance of nonstrategic state tasks—roles that fall under the discussion of doctrine and are definitely included in the book. Second, the section of the review that dealt with Gorshkov's description of the use of fleets in local wars or for demonstrative purposes (peacetime tasks) was placed as part of naval art. By using this terminology, the review placed a subject that McConnell's framework would include as doctrine in the subordinate field of military art. If the contradiction was intentional, then the *Soviet Military Review* article would oppose doctrinal status for Gorshkov's book.

An interesting contrast to *Soviet Military Review's* consideration of *Sea Power of the State* is the treatment given to a book written by Admiral Kuznetsov in 1975. Kuznetsov, Gorshkov's predecessor, published his memoirs under the title *Heading for Victory*. The book dealt largely with naval operations during World War II, a subject that was extensively covered by Gorshkov. *Soviet Military Review* serialized the book in 1976, the last installment appearing in the same issue as the review of Gorshkov's book. One might question whether the decision to publicize Kuznetsov's book more heavily than Gorshkov's was a comment on the relative merit of the two or merely a reflection of publication schedules.[24]

The final review of *Sea Power of the State* appeared in *Izvestia*, the government press organ, on 22 May 1976. The

review was written by Marshal I. Bagramyan, one of the few nonnaval leaders to comment on the book.[25] The selection of Bagramyan as a reviewer can be viewed in two ways. His name carries a great deal of prestige, as he was for many years the head of Soviet rear services. His review might therefore be considered officially dictated. In addition, Bagramyan's prestige was upgraded in late 1977 when he was honored on the occasion of his 80th birthday. The biography accompanying the article that marked his birthday noted that he was still a member of the Central Committee and the Supreme Soviet and was doing "extensive Public work."[26] The article further pointed out that Bagramyan had on occasion differed with the opinion of other prominent military leaders, such as Sokolovsky, and had been proven correct. On the other hand, some Western sources consider the marshal a waning figure in Soviet military leadership. In their view the selection of a more prominent figure to review Gorshkov's book would have represented greater prestige for the book.[27]

Bagramyan's remarks can be divided into three sections.[28] In the first section, he outlined the qualities of "major global works of scientific thought," the category in which he placed *Sea Power of the State*. In this section, there are a number of "signal" phrases, as well as consistent reference to the book as representative of military science. For example, the type of analysis used by Gorshkov was said to have as its aim "to correctly determine the prospects of military development in the future." In the next paragraph, the review referred to the book as a monograph "in which history and the past serve as a springboard for probing the present and the future." In neither case is the terminology that which McConnell describes as doctrinal. In McConnell's criteria, history "substantiates" doctrine; it does not "serve as a springboard for probing." Further, the inclusion of the past, present and future clearly defines military science, not military doctrine. A second key phrase is that theoretical research "is intended to contribute to a correct definition of the role and place of various categories of troops and branches of the forces in the overall system of armed forces." One might interpret "contributing to a correct definition" as meaning the creation of a unity of views. However, a "contribution" seems a little less substantial than the words that are generally coupled with a unity of views (reflects, constitutes, determines, establishes or ensures). To "contribute" seems more in line with the presentation of an argument than with a statement of doctrine. In the same phrase, Bagramyan draws attention to two other signals. First, theoretical research is defined as concerned with one branch of the unified armed forces, i.e., to its unique role. Bagramyan does not include the disclaimer of uniqueness that McConnell says is customary with doctrine. Second, the phrase deals with the overall system of armed forces, which concerns the tasks and preparedness of the armed forces, not the military political field, the sphere of doctrine. Bagramyan's terminology places peace and the political aspects of war outside the legitimate area of theoretical research. Thus, Bagramyan's words limit *Sea Power of the State* to coverage of the role of navies in war. Such an interpretation is supported in the first paragraph of the review, in which are listed the topics that should be kept in mind by theoretical researchers—new weapons, the model of future war, methods of repelling aggression. All of these topics are combat oriented. The only reference to military *and* political factors in the first section is with respect to imperialist states. In short, the first two paragraphs of Bagramyan's review do use the doctrinal indicators outlined by McConnell. But

the indicators are not used to confer doctrinal authority on Gorshkov's writings.

The second section of the review deals with the content of *Sea Power of the State*. In this section, the signals contradict those of the first section. For example, the review does indicate that Gorshkov's book represents a unity of views. Bagramyan wrote that the book "reveals the basic law governed patterns," "expounds on orderly system of views," and "conclusively formulates the concept of sea power." Further, Bagramyan recommended the book to the "wide reading public," which suggests approval of the formulas contained in the work. Second, in time period, Bagramyan wrote only of the book's coverage of naval development to the present (the correct limit for doctrine). He made no reference to predictions of future development. With respect to subject matter, Bagramyan made two references to the book's coverage of the peacetime use of naval forces and the naval role in implementing state policy (again the correct subject for doctrine). Finally, the review placed Gorshkov's writing as a direct outgrowth of the "Marxist-Leninist teachings on war and the army and Soviet military doctrine," a description that fits the criterion of the unified nature of doctrine. Clearly, the second section of the review touched on each of the categories set up by McConnell. In each case, the book was described as fitting the definition of doctrine.

In contrast to the second section, the last lines of Bagramyan's review retreat from the definition of the book as a doctrinal statement. In the last paragraph, Bagramyan criticized the book's uneven treatment of issues. If doctrine is a fundamental law of the state, one suspects that it is not generally criticized in this fashion. Finally, the review closed with a restatement that "on the whole" the book is a "valuable contribution to our military science and especially, to naval art." Neither classification should be expected as part of a solid definition of the book as a statement of doctrine.

A close reading of Bagramyan's review leaves one with as many questions as answers. The review merely reinforces the contradictions found in other commentaries on Gorshkov's writings. The conferences and reviews cited in connection with the Gorshkov series were equivocal at best on the question of the significance of Gorshkov's views. The material surrounding the book is even less clear-cut. Applying McConnell's doctrinal indicators, one finds that some discussions of the book refer to it as military science or art. Some mention its value for predicting the future development of the navy. Several refer only to its coverage of the navy's wartime role or combat tasks. Some speak of its contribution in uniquely naval matters. All are nondoctrinal signals. On the other hand, some reviews do refer to the "correct" formulations in the book, to its explanation of the present development of the navy, to the political role of the navy in war and peace or to the foundations of Marxist-Leninist science on which the book is based. Each of these is a signal that the book is of doctrinal weight. The contradiction between these positions is most obvious in the Bagramyan review, half of which fits McConnell's categories and half of which does not.

Whether the Gorshkov book/series are doctrine continues to be debated by Western analysts on a variety of levels of evidence. McConnell tried to provide a consistent framework to measure the authoritativeness of Gorshkov's writings. The text of the series/book fit within that framework, but examination of authors other than Gorshkov poses a series of contradictions within the framework. McConnell would escape the dilemma thus created by placing Gorshkov's writings in yet another category of military writing, that of

concrete expressions of doctrine. These are a synthesis of science and doctrine with the central function of substantiating doctrine. This interpretation would neatly sidestep the dilemma of the contradictions described above except that concrete expressions of doctrine are theoretically as immune from controversy as is doctrine itself. Both carry the force of state law and deal with unified views. The controversy suggested by the reviews of Gorshkov's work would not mesh with concrete expressions of doctrine any better than with doctrine *per se*. Further, the synthesis of concrete expressions is supposed to take place under the determining influence of doctrine; doctrinal signals should therefore outweigh scientific signals. In the case of commentaries on the Gorshkov book, it is clear that this is not always the case. In addition, McConnell's explanation of the categorization of Gorshkov's works devotes itself to doctrinal indicators, rather than to those suggesting a separate category of writings. The field of concrete expression of doctrine appears belatedly and is used as almost equal with doctrine. The indicators are presumed to be the same. Thus, if the Soviet commentaries do not reflect the doctrinal indicators uniformly, neither can they reflect the indicators of a concrete expression of doctrine. We must return therefore to the question of what contradictions between Gorshkov's own use of doctrinal indicators and their use in commentaries on the book/series mean.

Was Gorshkov too generous in claiming doctrinal legitimacy? Are there holdouts who do not recognize the authoritativeness of Gorshkov's words? Is the West incorrect in assuming that Gorshkov is the architect of Soviet naval policy? Or are we perhaps asking too much of "keywords" as a measure of legitimacy? Any of the first three questions could be answered affirmatively on the basis of the reviews cited in this article. That such answers are possible indicates that the last question, too, could be answered yes. Analysis of word patterns in Soviet literature is a valuable tool, but it is only one tool. As the literature surrounding Gorshkov's writings demonstrates, it cannot stand alone or be accepted unequivocally. There are too many instances in which interpretation of keywords is subjective —almost as subjective as the "feel" method that McConnell sought to avoid. This judgment does not invalidate McConnell's framework. Rather the inadequacies of a framework of doctrinal indicators as a rigid determinant of authoritativeness merely reinforce recognition that the definition of Soviet naval policy cannot come from any single Soviet or Western source.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Renita Fry's undergraduate studies in political science were done at Hollins College. She was awarded a Diplôme from the Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales in Geneva and the Ph.D. degree from The Fletcher School. Mrs. Fry is a Research Scholar of the Center for Advanced Research at the Naval War College and is investigating the role of the Soviet Navy in Eastern Europe.

NOTES

1. For definitions of the various categories of military writing, see Sidorov, "Foundations of Soviet Military Writing," *Soviet Military Review*, September 1972, pp. 14-15; or *Dictionary of Basic Military Terms* (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1965), USAF Military Thought Series.

2. James McConnell, *The Gorshkov Articles, the New Gorshkov Book and Their Relations to Policy* (Arlington, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 1976). Also available as a chapter in Michael MccGwire, *Soviet Naval Influence: Domestic and Foreign Dimensions* (New York:

Praeger, 1977). McConnell's analysis is also presented in his contribution to the congressional study U.S. Congress, Senate, Commerce Committee, *Soviet Oceans Development* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976).

3. The relevance of the fact that the majority of both the book and the series deal with the history of the Navy has been debated at great length by McConnell and MccGwire. For a presentation of their arguments, see U.S. Congress, pp. 169, 188-192.

4. Nontextual evidence also has been widely debated. For example, a number of commentators have differed over the series. The series was interrupted after the fifth article and thereafter may have been late in being released for publication. The article that replaced the continuation of the series was also by Gorshkov and concerned a topic that had been discussed in a number of other articles in the naval digest. The same article appeared in *Soviet Military Review* after the conclusion of the series. For a discussion of the arguments surrounding the publication delays, see McConnell, p. 168.

5. Sergeyev, "Friend and Advisor of the Naval Officer," *Morskoy Sbornik*, March 1973, pp. 17-32. It should be noted that the "controversial topics" mentioned by Sergayev were removed from both military science and doctrine. They included the role of the wardroom, training of junior officers, nautical culture. It follows that the Sergeyev article does not place the series as part of a debate, as has been argued by some commentators.

6. For a presentation of the positions of various Soviet naval personalities, see MccGwire, pp. 116-117.

7. "With the Ships, Units and Forces of the Fleet," *Morskoy Sbornik*, May 1973, p. 8.

8. A history of the Leningrad Naval Academy is given in the June 1968 issue of *Morskoy Sbornik*.

9. "After the Appearance of *Morskoy Sbornik*," *Morskoy Sbornik*, August 1973, p. 53.

10. Here the reader should be warned that it is necessary to read entire passages from the articles used in evidence lest parts of evidence escape notice. Even then, differing interpretations are certainly possible. For example, McConnell cites as a doctrinal signal a phrase from an article by Admiral Gontayev that describes the Gorshkov series as providing "a scientifically substantiated system of views . . . ." However, Gontayev's sentence goes on to say that these "views" related to the development of the navy and to the naval role in armed combat. These phrases are a qualification of the doctrinal signal. Whether one chooses to weight them more heavily than the signal itself is a matter of interpretation. The point is that commentaries on Gorshkov's writing should be read in full before making judgments. See Gontayev, "The Navy at War: Experience and Lessons," *Morskoy Sbornik*, April 1975, pp. 104-109.

11. The book was due to appear in the second half of 1976 and went to press in November 1975.

12. Gorshkov, "Greeting the 25th Congress of the CPSU," *Morskoy Sbornik*, February 1976, pp. 8-13.

13. The phrase "for the first time," which also appears in a later review, could be given as evidence that the series was not considered a doctrinal statement.

14. "Fundamental Research on the Fleet," *Morskoy Sbornik*, August 1976, p. 20.

15. See U.S. Congress, p. 198.

16. "News from the Fleets," *Morskoy Sbornik*, September 1976, pp. 17-22.

17. "Readers Conference at Sea," *Morskoy Sbornik*, June 1976, p. 76.

18. The book was published in 60,000 copies, a large number for military literature.

19. "Conference on Book by CINC Navy," *Morskoy Sbornik*, Septembe- 1976, p. 22.

20. Syosev, "The Experience of the War and the Present," *Morskoy Sbornik*, April 1976, pp. 19-22.

21. Solov'yev, "Center of Naval Science," *Morskoy Sbornik*, January 1977, pp. 20-23.

22. Lobov, "Sea Power of the State and Its Defensive Capability," *Morskoy Sbornik*, April 1976, pp. 99-105.

23. Drozdov, "Sea Might of a State," *Soviet Military Review*, August 1976, pp. 60-61.

24. It should be noted in passing that several articles by Kuznetsov have questioned Gorshkov's description of the role played by the Navy during the war. For example, Kuznetsov has described serious deficiencies in the joint command structure that, he claims, limited the effectiveness of the navy during the early part of the war. Gorshkov, on the other hand, usually highly praises the joint command and the Navy's ability to fight effectively from the very first days of the war.

25. John Hibbits, *Admiral Gorshkov's Writings: Twenty Years of Naval Thought*, CANKUS Maritime Intelligence Conference, 15 May 1977, p. 8.

26. "Marshal Bagramyan," *Soviet Military Review*, November 1977, pp. 60-61.

27. Hibbits, p. 8.

28. Bagramyan, "Might for the Sake of Peace," *Izvestia*, 22 May 1976, p. 5.

Admiral King was never noted for his smooth press relations but during World War II some two dozen journalists came to know and respect him as few outside the service did—and came to believe that his contributions were too valuable to be forfeited, as some called for, because of mishandled public relations.

ADMIRAL KING'S TOUGHEST BATTLE

by

Lloyd J. Graybar

"In peace time," John Sorrels of the Scripps-Howard chain of newspapers stated in 1943, "the sole responsibility of the newspaper is to inform, to enlighten, to illuminate. In war time, a great part of the responsibility is not to inform, but to suppress, to guard, to screen information of the most interesting sort." Both in and outside the profession of journalism there were many who in the name of patriotism would have agreed with this editor. After all, no loyal American wanted to render aid and comfort to the enemy, the standard which was ubiquitously employed to justify withholding news. But was the decision not to inform so simple to make? Sorrels realized there were circumstances when it was not, but it remained for another newspaperman, Palmer Hoyt, publisher of the *Portland Oregonian*, to state best the case for freedom of expression. "No one wants to violate Unnecessary naval and military security,'" Hoyt conceded. "But by the same token," he continued,

> public and press alike wonder whether the naval and military establishments are awake to the fact that there is something greater than naval security, something greater than military security, and that is, American security—faith in ourselves, faith in our leadership, faith in our government! No one wants to help the enemy, but none can endorse a policy of silence if it be utilized to give aid and comfort to men responsible for our military or civil failures.[1]

The delicate balance that Hoyt's discerning standards required of the conscientious journalist was similarly imposed on America's military leaders. No one among them seemed less suited to deal sensitively with the press than the abrasive and hot-tempered leader of the

Navy, Adm. Ernest J. King. Yet his dealings with some of America's leading journalists in the trying fall months of 1942 point out how a mutually satisfying compromise of their differences was arrived at that preserved the military's need for security, the public's right to know, and the press' duty to inform.

Had the war not intervened, King would not have held his service's most coveted post, Chief of Naval Operations. Nearing the close of a successful career, most recently spent in naval aviation, he was passed over when the position was filled by Adm. Harold Stark in 1939. Almost 61, King was little more than 3 years from the peacetime retirement age and would not have had another chance to get the promotion he desired. It may be that Stark was appointed solely because he had the better credentials, but to believe so would be to ignore naval politics and King's formidable personality. He was justly regarded as singularly difficult to get along with, demanding and at times inconsiderate of subordinates, and unwilling to smooth his own path to the top by cultivating the favor of service and civilian superiors. Even after he had become a personality and a sought-after interviewee, he remained blunt: "I may as well say . . . that I do not care at all for the write-up," he upbraided a *Life* writer. "I find it a singular combination of fact, fiction, and fancy." King seemed to pride himself on his stern reputation—"so tough he shaves with a blowtorch," went a much-quoted saying about him—and a leader of his mettle appeared made to order for the dark days following Pearl Harbor. He was promptly summoned to Washington to become Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, a position charged with oversight of all fleet combat operations, and after a few months of sharing command of the wartime Navy with Stark he was given the additional title and duties of Chief of Naval Operations. King now had more authority than any previous leader of the American Navy in the 20th century.[2]

Under his determined leadership conditions gradually improved, but even after the triumph at Midway the Navy remained far from achieving dominance over the still formidable Japanese Fleet. In the Atlantic some of the most vicious battles with German submarine forces were yet to be fought. In August the protracted struggle for Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands began. It was one fought by the ships at sea, by the Marines on Guadalcanal, and by King himself in Washington. This made it King's toughest battle.

Public relations was an essential part of it. Unlike other services, in particular the Air Force, which as a new and still subordinate branch of the profession was image-conscious and anxious to gain friends, the Navy was established, could look back on a tradition that began with John Paul Jones, and in World War II was still led by some men who had entered service as long before as the turn of the century. Long periods at sea kept Navy officers more isolated from the press than their counterparts in the Army and the Army Air Corps. All of this bred an outlook of disdain for the press, and it was one King embodied to a high degree. It was said of him that he hated civilians because they might become reserve officers—or newspapermen. "So far as I am concerned," he insisted, "information given the public is information which will almost certainly reach the enemy. . . . I have no intention of giving the enemy anything from which he can derive a shadow of aid and comfort. That's the way I am, that's the way I always have been, that's the way I always will be." In the same vein was the story that he believed the ideal in public relations would be to wait until the war was over and then make one announcement—"We won."[3]

The Navy of course could not escape the need to issue news releases and maintain contacts with the press, but its

efforts at dealing with the press were considered more formal and less successful than those of the other services. Although Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox was a former newspaper publisher, he contributed to the dissatisfaction with the public relations efforts of the Navy that in a strictly organizational sense he headed. His Pearl Harbor report was generally considered to be informative, but subsequent revelations were that it had not been altogether candid. In the early months of 1942 mistrust arose, directed partly at Knox but increasingly at King whose influence in matters dealing with the handling of combat news was rightly regarded as decisive. Perhaps more than anything else, the Navy's refusal to report war losses promptly coupled with its blatant efforts to manage the news by linking disclosures of losses with announcements of victories contributed to the growing distrust of its word and of its leadership. So mismanaged was the Navy's handling of news releases, both as to timing and candor, that according to one informed source the American public grew to believe that the Japanese version of the Pearl Harbor story was more accurate than our own, making Tokyo's subsequent claims of success all the more plausible. The Navy was certainly not the only service to manipulate the news, and to be criticized for it; inevitably, however, the sinking of a carrier or cruiser created more stir than the loss of a tank or a P-39.[4]

On the surface King appeared unruffled and adamant in his opinions despite the increasing volume of criticism aimed at the Navy. Ironically, an incident that happened in the aftermath of Midway, the Navy's first great victory, only made matters worse. Although Knox was the primary victim, the whole Navy hierarchy suffered. A *Chicago Tribune* reporter, Stanley Johnston, had spent some weeks in *Lexington* prior to her loss in the Coral Sea. From the carrier's executive officer, Johnston had learned one of the war's most closely guarded secrets—that by breaking enemy codes the Navy was able to follow Japanese ship movements in detail. The story he subsequently filed on Midway listed many of the participating enemy ships by name. The Japanese surely would discover that their codes were being decrypted, thought horrified officers. Charges resulting in a federal grand jury investigation were filed against the *Tribune* whose publisher already felt that his paper's prewar isolationism and strident Republicanism had not endeared him to President Roosevelt. Moreover, Knox, prior to entering FDR's cabinet in 1940, had published a rival daily in Chicago. In bold headlines the *Tribune* began crying persecution. Unable to reveal precisely why Johnston's article was viewed with such alarm, the naval leadership could only have been relieved when the grand jury refused to indict and the furor quieted. The secret of the code-breaking remained safe.[5]

Soon King replaced Knox at the center of a new public-relations maelstrom that developed during the Guadalcanal campaign. At King's insistence the Navy undertook its first offensive in August of 1942 with its attempt to seize Guadalcanal and so forestall a possible Japanese threat to key American bases to the south. Ultimately the campaign would lead northward to Rabaul, the bastion of Japanese strength in the South Pacific. The invasion of Guadalcanal quickly bogged down into a battle of attrition that drew in more and more forces from both antagonists. American ground forces wound up in their worst predicament since Bataan and Corregidor had fallen in the spring, while on the seas around Guadalcanal violent naval and carrier-air battles ensued.[6]

The Navy soon suffered a spectacular reversal when one Australian and three U.S. cruisers were sunk in a one-sided night engagement off Savo Island. By the time the news of the defeat was

released, almost 9 weeks after the event, the Navy had a recently achieved victory to report. Charges that the Navy was manipulating the news were again heard.[7]

Even louder was the uproar about the Savo Island disaster itself, the revelation of which helped to precipitate an outburst of angry questions about the reasons for the parlous situation in the South Pacific. The *Tribune* led anti-Administration papers in demanding to know why their special hero, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, was not in command of the Guadalcanal operation rather than being a spectator in his Australian headquarters. Unified command became the rallying cry from those seeking panaceas.[8] The most quoted protesters were two Congressmen, John Costello of California and Melvin J. Maas of Minnesota.

Costello initiated the onslaught in mid-October (only days after the announcement of the debacle off Savo Island) with a blast at the strategists in Washington. In a statement clearly directed at the Navy the worried Costello asked why Army personnel from MacArthur's adjoining Southwest Pacific Area had not been brought into action to assist the hard-pressed Marines on Guadalcanal. They were, he declared, prepared to come to the aid of the Marines, "but they can't get there by walking across water." The situation "cries to heaven for an answer."[9]

Hardly had Costello's accusations ceased to be newsworthy when his House colleague, Mel Maas, made the first of several critical statements about the conduct of the war in the Pacific. A Marine reserve officer, Maas was the ranking Republican on the House Naval Affairs Committee and had wangled himself a 4-month tour of duty in the Pacific. On his return to Washington in October he had surprisingly little to say to the press, trying first to swing President Roosevelt and other leading members of the Administration to his views.[10] Apparently unable to win acceptance for his more extreme opinions, Maas finally spoke out in a provocative address heard on the CBS radio network. In it Maas first dwelled on the unfortunate consequences of the Navy's mishandling of war news. He then turned to what he considered the crux of the difficulties in the Pacific: lack of unified command. Not only was the war in the Pacific being lost for want of a supreme command—it should go to the Navy—but because of the shortsighted policy being followed in Washington, where there was no unifying agency to give proper coordination to the war effort as a whole, the Pacific was going without the requisite men and materiel. Instead, these resources were unwisely being diverted to Europe and to sundry secondary theaters. "What is taking place in Europe," Maas argued, "is a terrible European war with dire consequences to us all, but what is taking place in the Pacific is not war at all, but the first mighty explosion of a truly worldwide revolution against the white man's civilization. If we lose this revolution, the white man's day is over."[11]

Perhaps Maas only meant to stir things up enough to get higher priority on supplies for his fellow Marines. At any rate, that was how he explained things to his friend, Adm. William Halsey. Yet designed as they seemingly were to inflame interservice rivalries and to prolong the debate about leadership in the Pacific, Maas' charges could hardly have been welcome news to King. To place them in perspective, however, they were only the most recent in a month-long series of headline-grabbing controversies about the stalemate in the Solomons. The debate about the Navy's lack of leadership and its mishandling of war news had begun to rage some weeks before. It inexorably led to speculation that King's position was in danger, for, as Palmer Hoyt has argued, reluctance to divulge

information about military defeat can easily be construed as a cover-up for incompetence. The conclusion was drawn that the Navy had something to hide. Rumors of disasters even worse than that of Savo Island circulated widely, at a time, ironically, when measures to strengthen American forces in the Solomons had begun to be taken.[12]

The public-relations dimension of the fight for Guadalcanal now assumed unprecedented importance. Since its inception in June 1942 the Office of War Information, a federal agency established to coordinate the handling of military and other news pertaining to the war, had been feuding with the Navy about its reluctance to cooperate in the prompt dissemination of news. "Never have so few withheld so much from so many," fumed Elmer Davis, a veteran newsman who was now director of the OWI. If persisted in, the Navy's misguided attempts to manage the news would certainly undermine King's credibility and more than likely his career as well, felt Davis. Despite a heated argument he had with King about the release of information, Davis was reluctant to use the Savo Island crisis if it meant making things worse for the admiral. Yet he also felt something had to be done to halt the loss of confidence in King. He defended the admiral in a well-publicized speech in which he pleaded for recognition of the fact that for King and other naval leaders public relations was a subsidiary field. Their business was to fight and to win the war. Meanwhile, behind the scenes he sought to make King realize the gravity of the situation. Rather than go over King to the President, Davis turned to Hanson Baldwin, a Naval Academy graduate who had resigned his commission years before to win acclaim as one of the most knowledgeable analysts of military affairs. Like so many others Baldwin was critical of the Navy's inattention to its public relations, believing that the Navy had failed to clarify its objectives in undertaking the Solomons campaign and that its censorship was contributing to the subsequent confusion and bitterness. With his aid, Davis was able to approach officers close to King but more receptive to criticism.[13]

King's friends were also concerned lest his unbending refusal to level with the press destroy his career. Along with Davis' efforts, a luncheon engagement between King's close friend and attorney, Cornelius Bull, and Glen Perry, Washington correspondent of the *New York Sun*, led to a mending of the rift between King and the press. Bull and Perry inevitably discussed Admiral King's predicament. Perry suggested that King should get to know some of the senior Washington correspondents to see for himself that his doubts about them were unnecessary; the occasional formal conferences he held were unsuitable for this. Bull scoffed at the suggestion. But a few days later he got back to Perry to say that he had had a bright idea—why not arrange a get-together between King and some journalists. Perry shrewdly accepted the suggestion as Bull's own, and the two met to work out details. They decided it would be best to have King and some veteran correspondents, primarily bureau chiefs, see each other socially. Because only a select number of journalists were to be invited, the meeting should not be held in official surroundings but should be in the nature of a private gathering at Bull's Alexandria, Virginia home.[14]

The first meeting on 6 November got off slowly with King appearing ill at ease and the eight other guests (Perry, Roscoe Drummond, and six other reporters whom they had decided to invite) apparently uncertain how to approach the admiral whose reputation they well knew. But the tension eased after some minutes and King commented lucidly about the war. Although his remarks were wide-ranging, he did

take pains to address the two issues about which so much had been said and written in recent weeks: that South Pacific operations were foundering because there was no unity of command and that the Navy manipulated its news releases so as to withhold information and to blanket bad news with the good. He insisted that premature disclosure of the details of the Savo Island defeat could indeed have aided the enemy. The action had taken place at night, attended by a great deal of confusion, and there was every reason to believe the Japanese did not know the extent of their success. Revealing American losses at the time of the battle would thus have been improper. The fact that the sinking of the Allied cruisers was finally disclosed at almost the precise moment the Navy had a victory to celebrate was coincidental. The Navy, in fact, had been embarrassed about the timing of the two releases.

King next refuted the charge that there was no unity of command. He declared that it began at the very top where he, Adm. William Leahy who was chief of staff to the President, Army Chief of Staff George Marshall, and Air Force Gen. Henry "Hap" Arnold comprised the Joint Chiefs giving strategic direction to the American war effort and designating the appropriate theaters. The Navy did direct the South Pacific Area just as MacArthur commanded the Southwest Pacific but both did so under the authority of the Joint Chiefs. Forces from both commands were actually cooperating in many ways, "down in the ditch digging together," as another admiral put it.[15]

Suspending his wartime resolve to go on the wagon, King enjoyed a couple of beers amidst a generally cordial atmosphere. While no notes were taken during the admiral's prepared remarks or the question-and-answer session that followed, the reporters were quite pleased with what they had learned in the 4-hour meeting and with King. His frankness was, in a sense, disarming. "He made a profound impression upon the correspondents," the excited Perry reported to his editor. "They were for him 100 per cent by the time they said good-bye. . . . I had met King once before, and liked him, but this was the first chance I'd had to measure him at all. He's all right." True, the information they received from him was confidential. But as they saw it the purpose of this and the meetings that were to follow was not to allow them to bypass their regular sources of information, a procedure which would probably have exacerbated the tensions between King and the press and done no one any good. By mutual consent they did not then or after approach him about quoting him in their stories. The information they got from King was of course largely about strategy and future operations and would allow the participants and their editors (to whom they were free to send memoranda of the meetings) to be alert for important developments and to place in perspective the news obtained from official releases and from their own sources.[16]

The gratifying results of the initial meeting kept Admiral King and the journalists coming back for more. King, in fact, asked when they would meet again. While the number present at any one time rarely exceeded a dozen, there was some rotation of the guests with representatives of the wire services, periodicals, and the broadcast media joining their newspaper colleagues from the start. King himself scrupulously refused to have anything to say about the composition of the guest list. By the end of the war 16 conferences—or Sunday vesper services as the regulars referred to them—had been held and the number of veterans had climbed to over two dozen. Always in the nature of private gatherings, the meetings continued to take place at Bull's home until his death in 1944 and thereafter at the

home of Phelps Adams, Perry's friend and the *Sun's* bureau chief.[17]

King clearly enjoyed the conferences, but did he profit from them? In initiating them Bull and Perry had hoped to aid in saving King's position, for they believed he was a highly qualified strategist and war leader whose services should not be forfeited because of mishandled public relations. He needed to know some journalists, and they needed to understand where he stood on the great issues of the war. Within weeks after the first session King did get some positive feedback of the type the two had intended. For instance, Ernest Lindley and Raymond Brandt both gave the Navy's war effort writeups that supported King's leadership. There was indeed unified command and it was of the highest caliber, argued Lindley who wrote for both *Newsweek* and the *Washington Post*. In the preceding weeks he had been far from sympathetic to King. Unlike Lindley, Brandt had not attended the inaugural vesper service. However, Marquis Childs, a *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* colleague, had, and it is reasonable to infer word got to Brandt from Childs or from their editor that King had a story worth hearing. The upshot was that Brandt was able to rush into print a front-page interview with King that refuted the charges Maas had just made in his radio address.[18]

Thereafter, the situation changed. Although bureaucratic lethargy still gave Elmer Davis reason to complain, in the most significant ways—completeness and speed of release—the Navy greatly improved its handling of war news. Equally as important, it also began to experience victory, November 1942 bringing an upturn in American fortunes. Therefore, as Davis remarked, there was no reason to complain about the suppression of news when there was no bad news to suppress. Nor was there cause to doubt the quality of King's leadership. In a very real sense Admiral King's press relations were taking care of themselves. On one occasion he did have to rally several of the correspondents (his commandos, as one of the staunchest of them put it) to help stop the rumored transfer of Army Chief of Staff George Marshall to the top European command. King worked well with Marshall and wished to see him remain in Washington as a colleague on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Otherwise, if King gained from continuing the conferences, it was in large measure from the chance to relax with intelligent men outside the service and to use them as a sounding board that might help him to polish the presentation of his ideas.[19]

When the war ended there were thus some two dozen journalists who shared with King one of Washington's best-kept secrets. The informal conferences in which they participated might well seem archaic by contemporary journalistic standards that place the right to know above that of the privilege of confidentiality, a privilege each of the participants respected. There simply were no leaks. However, several of them doubt the off-the-record conference could succeed today, and perhaps should not even be attempted. "One drawback in peacetime," a former *New York Times* correspondent observed,

> is the risk of leaks and the consequent care an official would feel called upon to take. Another, and more serious one, is the damper such associations tend to put on aggressive and independent reporting. . . . God help us if reporters become statesmen and feel persuaded to make judgments on what we should or should not know "in the public interest."[20]

In wartime Washington, however, the confidential briefing—what came to be known as the deep backgrounder—was not uncommon, and all the evidence suggests that the opportunity to meet with the redoubtable Admiral King was welcomed by the participants.[21] For King, in particular, the format Bull and

Perry had worked out was ideal. Extremely able, but not as articulate as some of his highly placed contemporaries nor especially comfortable before large groups, King was able to relax with his new friends and acquaintances from the fourth estate and allow them to see him as few outside the service did. Those who participated—the veterans of the Battle of Virginia—learned that he was not only the master strategist that the war's progress confirmed but a flexible tactician who crossed the Potomac to establish an outpost in Virginia that might help save his position in Washington. The Battle of Virginia did a lot less to still the criticism of King than the successful outcome of the Battle of Guadalcanal, but an understanding of both campaigns is necessary to appreciate the many and varied pressures on Admiral King, or any wartime leader for that matter, and the admiral's surprising deftness in handling them.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Lloyd Graybar received his Ph.D. from Columbia University and is now Professor of History at Eastern Kentucky University. His recent writing includes "Strategy and Policy After Pearl Harbor: The Relief of Wake Island" and "Bikini Revisited." He is presently writing a biography of Admiral Ernest King.

NOTES

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3. Glen Perry to author, 11 July 1974; Hanson W. Baldwin, "Reminiscences of Hanson Weightman Baldwin," U.S. Naval Institute Oral History interview, 1976, pp. 246-248, mss. at Operational Archives, Naval History Division, Washington, D.C.; King and Whitehill, p. 652; Vincent Davis, *The Admirals Lobby* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1967), pp. 266-268; John M. Blum, *V Was for Victory: Politics and American Culture during World War II* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), p. 33; Forrest Davis, "King's Way to Tokyo," *Saturday Evening Post*, 9 December 1944, pp. 9-11, 101-102; King quoted in Robert McCormick, "King of the Navy," *Collier's*, 16 January 1943, p. 20. Although I employ the term *public relations* here and elsewhere in this article, I wish to stress that my emphasis is on dealings between King and the press and on King's feelings about what should go into a press release. Public relations, of course, can also mean the type of image-building pioneered by Ivy Lee. For a valuable book that discusses the military and image-making see Robert Lindsay, *This High Name: Public Relations and the U.S. Marine Corps* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1956).

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6. *Time*, 26 October 1942, pp. 23, 30; Samuel Eliot Morison, *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II: Vol. V, The Struggle for Guadalcanal* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1949), pp. 3-315 *passim*.

7. *The New York Times*, 15 October 1942, p. 22.

8. *Newsweek*, 2 November 1942, p. 42; *The New York Times*, 15 October 1942, p. 15; 23 October 1942, pp. 1 and 4; *Washington Post*, 18 October 1942, Sec. II, p. 1; 28 October 1942, Sec. II, p. 8; Chicago Tribune, 16 October 1942, p. 4; 25 October 1942, p. 12; 26 October 1942, p. 16; 28 October 1942, p. 1; 30 October 1942, p. 14; and 2 November 1942, pp. 9 and 16; *San Francisco Examiner*, 2 November 1942, p. 8; Forrest Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, 1939-1942* (New York: Viking Press, 1966), pp. 394-395.

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10. Glen Perry to author, 17 August 1974; *Washington Post*, 23 October 1942, p. 4; Melvin J. Maas, "Mistakes I Saw in the Pacific," *American Mercury*, January 1943, pp. 5-14; Maas, "A Unified Service," *Flying*, November 1942, pp. 40-41; Diary of Melvin J. Maas, entries of 9, 10, 22, and 26 October 1942, original in possession of Marianne Catterton.

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12. Maas to William Halsey, 26 November 1942, and Halsey to Maas, 15 December 1942, both in Papers of Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey, Library of Congress; King to David Lawrence, 28 September and 1 October 1942, and Owen Scott to Lawrence, 30 September 1942, all enclosed with King to Harry Hopkins, 1 October 1942, Papers of Harry Hopkins, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library; Harry Byrd to King, 28 October 1942, King Papers; Baldwin, p. 359; *Newswcek*, 2 November 1942, p. 42; *Washington Post*, 28 October 1942, p. 9; Elmer Davis and Byron Price, *War Information and Censorship* (Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1943), pp. 36-39; Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur: Vol. II, 1941-1945* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1975), pp. 219-238.

13. King to Lindley, 4 November 1942, King Papers; Baldwin, pp. 361-363; *The New York Times*, 23 October 1942, pp. 1 and 4; 29 October 1942, p. 1; Davis quoted in Nicholas Roosevelt, *A Front Row Seat* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1953), pp. 259, 264; Roger Burlingame, *Don't Let Them Scare You: The Life and Times of Elmer Davis* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1961), p. 201; Allan M. Winkler, "Politics and Propaganda: The Office of War Information, 1942-1945," unpublished dissertation, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.: 1974, pp. 58-59.

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15. Drummond to King, 14 November 1942, King Papers; memorandum of King conference, 7 November 1942, original in possession of Glen Perry; interview with Perry, 13 May 1975.

16. Richard Wilson to author, 24 June 1974; Perry to Edmond Bartnett, 7 November 1942, in possession of Glen Perry; Benjamin M. McKelway to author, 26 June 1974; Perry to author, 11 July 1974; Adams to author, 13 July 1974; Joseph C. Harsch to author, 11 September 1974; Roy Hoopes, *Americans Remember the Home Front: An Oral Narrative* (New York: Hawthorne Books, 1977), p. 370.

17. Adams to author, 13 July 1974; Catledge to author, 15 July 1974; Adams to King, 19 October 1945, King Papers. The roster of participating journalists and their affiliations is, in the order of appearance: Glen Perry, *New York Sun;* Bert Andrews, *New York Herald-Tribune;* Ray Clappen, *Scripps-Howard;* Ernest Lindley, *Newsweek;* Marquis Childs, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* and

United Features Syndicate; Barnet Nover, *Washington Post;* Roscoe Drummond, *Christian Science Monitor;* Raymond Henle, *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* and *American Broadcasting Company;* Lyle Wilson, *United Press;* Edward Folliard, *Washington Post;* Walter Lippmann, *New York Herald-Tribune Syndicate;* Phelps Adams, *New York Sun;* Paul Miller, *Associated Press;* Lewis Wood, *The New York Times;* Raymond Brandt, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch;* Alexander Jones, *Washington Post;* Mark Foote, *Booth Newspapers;* Felix Belair, *Time;* Joseph Harsch, *Columbia Broadcasting System;* Turner Catledge, *The New York Times;* James Wright, *Buffalo Evening News;* Dewey Fleming, *Baltimore Sun;* Richard Wilson, *Cowles Publications;* Paul Leach, *Chicago Daily News;* Arthur Krock, *The New York Times;* Benjamin McKelway, *Washington Evening Star;* Raymond Swing, *American Broadcasting Company;* William Hillman, *Crowell-Collier Publications.*

18. *Newsweek,* 2, 23 November 1942, p. 34 and 32 respectively; *Washington Post,* 28 October 1942, p. 9; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch,* 15 November 1942, pp. 1 and 10; King to Lindley, 24 August and 4 November 1942; Drummond to King, 14 November 1942; Raymond Brandt to King, 16 November 1942, and King to Brandt, 16 November 1942; Marquis Childs to King, 4 December 1942, all in King Papers.

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20. Paul R. Leach to author, 26 July 1974; Wilson to author, 24 June 1974; quote in Turner Catledge to author, 15 July 1974.

21. Hoopes, p. 370.

Kiev's mix of tactical V/STOL fighters and helicopters and an extensive weapons inventory give it capability for a variety of roles but it is here contended that its basic role is to protect the Soviet SSBN force. An earlier version of this paper first appeared in the Naval Intelligence Quarterly.

SOVIET DOCTRINE ON THE ROLE OF THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER

by

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Introduction. At the close of World War II, the combined fleets of the United States and Great Britain included over 115 aircraft carriers with a total capacity of some 6,700 aircraft. Typifying their strength was the U.S. Navy's Task Force 38, operating off Japan from 10 July through 15 August 1945. Because carrier airpower had already contributed greatly to the destruction of the Japanese Fleet, this force was free to operate within 100 miles of the coast. Aircraft from the task force proceeded to devastate Tokyo and ranged across the Japanese countryside attacking targets of opportunity virtually at will.

Like the Japanese, the Soviets had no fleet that could prevent a similar force from approaching their Siberian or European coasts. A 1946 article in *Military Thought*, the Soviet professional military journal, revealed the impact that the Allied employment of carriers had made on Soviet thought:

> The conditions of modern war at sea demand the mandatory participation in the combat operations of navies of powerful carrier forces, using them for striking devastating blows against the naval forces of the enemy as well as the contest with his aviation. Both at sea and near one's bases, these tasks can only be carried out by carrier aviation.[1]

The primary concern of the Soviets in viewing the overwhelming preponderance of Western aircraft carriers was their ability to operate against shore targets. Soviet capabilities to hamper such operations were minimal; there were virtually no Soviet major surface combatants in 1945, and while the Soviets possessed a numerically impressive submarine fleet, individual submarines had displayed a mediocre wartime record. The greatest Soviet naval potential lay in river flotillas that had worked closely with Soviet ground

forces during the "Great Patriotic War," but these, obviously, were of little use in offshore waters.

Following demobilization of Western armies Soviet ground forces quickly became the dominant power in Europe and were quite capable of defending or launching a massive offensive from the line that separated East and West. Soviet writings make clear, however, that the U.S.S.R. derived little sense of security from this advantage on the European landmass. Not only did the United States have exclusive possession of the atomic bomb, it also had developed amphibious warfare to a fine art, thereby threatening the sea flanks of the Soviet Army. These amphibious capabilities, supported by massive carrier airpower, were perceived as a tactical deterrent to Soviet expansion that complemented the strategic deterrent of the atomic bomb. From Moscow's point of view, these capabilities constituted a major threat to the Motherland. Admiral Gorshkov, writing in *Sea Power of the State*, described the West's use of carriers in World War II and, in so doing, revealed the concern they caused to Soviet planners:

> Carrier operations against the shore were most widespread during the conduct of amphibious operations when aircraft were employed to "soften up" and neutralize the anti-landing defense of the enemy and to cooperate with their own troops in accomplishing missions ashore after the landing.

Commenting on the rapid expansion of Western fleets of aircraft carriers during the war, Gorshkov continued:

> It is true that the experience in such operations was limited to the employment of aircraft carriers by only three countries—Great Britain, Japan, and the United States. However, this experience has become proof of the practicality of employing this form of operation, which has led to a considerable expansion in carrier construction.[2]

Early Efforts to Counter the Carrier. The Soviets' apparent inability to counter successfully the carrier and amphibious threats resulted in an accelerated postwar naval building program. This program emphasized modern submarines and cruisers that could intercept Western forces before they reached their lines of attack. But according to a "former Soviet naval officer" in Robert Herrick's *Soviet Naval Strategy*, Stalin also acquiesced to his naval commander in chief's requests for four Soviet aircraft carriers that could extend the U.S.S.R.'s defensive perimeter seaward. Admiral Kusnetsov announced the carriers' pending acquisition in 1951, but Stalin later reneged, according to the same source, and the carriers were never laid down.[3]

This setback notwithstanding, the U.S.S.R.'s postwar shipbuilding program continued to be driven in large part by concern with the threat that the West's carrier forces posed to Soviet territory. This concern increased substantially in the early 1950s when the U.S. Navy acquired a nuclear attack capability. Again quoting Gorshkov:

> The introduction of nuclear weaponry into the navies of great powers considerably expanded the scope of employing naval forces against the shore. Initially, carrier aircraft, and later ballistic missiles launched from submarines, constituted the colossal capabilities of the navy to deliver attacks against enemy territory. Naval operations against the shore have assumed a fundamentally new significance in warfare in general. They make up an important part of warfare in general.[4]

Clearly, the Soviets saw the large U.S. attack aircraft carriers as a threat to their homeland, primarily because of the strategic threat that their heavy

attack aircraft posed to urban/industrial targets and secondarily because of the tactical threat that light attack aircraft and fighters capable of delivering tactical nuclear weapons as well as conventional ordnance posed to ground forces.

Khrushchev's Different Tack. Stalin's massive naval construction program, begun shortly after World War II, was cut back at his death and continued to languish during Khrushchev's consolidation of power (1953-56). Thereafter, Khrushchev adopted a naval construction program that reflected his conviction that submarines and aircraft were an adequate response to the West's carrier threat and that the large blue-water navy that Stalin had approved could be greatly trimmed. All three editions of Marshal V. Sokolovskiy's *Military Strategy* reflect this new approach by reversing the earlier estimate of the aircraft carrier's value. Sokolovskiy contended that the experience of World War II signaled the demise of large ships as the main element of naval combat and instead confirmed the superiority of naval aviation and submarines.

Despite this belittling of large combatants, Sokolovskiy acknowledged that "The most important task of our fleet from the very outset of the war will be to destroy enemy carrier-based units."[5] Therefore, even while denying the importance of aircraft carriers, the Soviets continued to treat them as the primary naval threat.[6]

In *Sea Power of the State*, Gorshkov admits that the emphasis that Khrushchev's policies placed on the development of a large submarine force was dictated by time and necessity:

> Giving the priority to the development of submarine forces made it possible in the shortest possible time to sharply increase the attack capabilities of our navy, to pose a serious threat to the main forces of the enemy navy in the ocean theaters, and, at a cost of fewer resources and less time, to intensify the growth in the maritime might of our country, thus depriving the enemy of those very advantages which he could have had at his disposal in the event of war against the Soviet Union and the countries of the Socialist Community.[7]

Sokolovskiy saw nuclear strikes by Soviet naval aviation and submarines—both at sea and against ports—as the most effective means for accomplishing the Soviet Navy's mission of destroying the West's carrier forces. Once this primary mission had been accomplished the navy could then assume other responsibilities such as the disruption of enemy sealanes, the protection of Soviet shipping and the support of the seaflanks of the ground forces. Sokolovskiy emphasized that the primary mission of the Soviet Navy is the destruction of enemy carrier and missile-carrying submarine forces, done most efficiently by nuclear means.[8] Also briefly mentioned in all three editions of *Military Strategy* is the requirement for surface ships and aircraft to support submarine operations. These support operations would be conducted by reconnaissance and antisubmarine warfare aircraft, special ASW (PLO) and antiairwarfare ships, and radar patrol ships.[9]

In retrospect it is apparent that the Soviet concept of employing the submarine as the primary offensive and defensive weapons system—and supporting it with a combination of surface and air forces—must have included, as early as 1960, some interest in the possibility of developing a new breed of aircraft carrier that could assist in this support role. If this thesis is correct then it is more than likely that Soviet naval planners had a lively interest in a debate that was underway in the United Kingdom at that time.

Britain's Great Carrier Debate. The controversy in Britain centered on the plan to construct a new class of aircraft

carrier to follow the ships laid down during World War II but not completed until after the war. In 1960 the *Times* of London reported that serious planning had begun on the next generation of carriers for the Royal Navy. They would be larger than the then-current generation, would have catapults for conventional naval aircraft and would be powered by oil-fired boilers and turbines, not nuclear reactors.[10] But an alternative plan emerged and in 1962 the *Times* reported that the question of vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) aircraft had been raised by a member of Parliament who advocated that the next generation of carriers be designed around that concept.[11]

The Royal Navy's official response was that VTOL technology was not sufficiently advanced to plan a class of aircraft carriers around it. Conventional aircraft were needed aboard standard aircraft carriers, not as part of a strategic nuclear striking force but as an economical means of deploying aircraft throughout the world. It is evident, however, that the Royal Navy's argument was not universally accepted because in June 1963 the *Times* carried another report revealing official uncertainty about how to proceed:

> What seems to be restraining the Admiralty in coming out firmly in favour of carriers is the undoubted difference of opinion in the Navy itself on the advantages of such ships. Among those who think that airborne platforms are needed at all, some feel that the need could be met by ships similar in size to the French La Resolute, of 10,000 tons. This ship carries a commando of 700 men with their equipment and a war complement of 12 large helicopters. Instead of the commando, so British supporters say, she could be designed to carry additional VTOL fighters and strike aircraft if desired.[12]

Divided opinion continued through that year and the next, and by 1965 the *Times* was still reporting the imminent construction of a new 50,000-ton aircraft carrier. Not until 1966 did the British finally decide to scrap the carrier program as it was then envisioned, and with the carrier program went Britain's presence east of Suez.

It seems from Soviet writings that the *Times'* coverage of Britain's great carrier debate was less than complete. Evidently the Russians had better sources within the British Defense Establishment because a 1972 book by T.M. Korotkin, Z.F. Slepenkov and B.A. Kolyzayev entitled *Aircraft and Helicopter Carriers* reveals that the controversy over what sort of carriers the United Kingdom should have was not confined to the Admiralty and a few M.P.s. Quoting from this book:

> . . . It is interesting to recall the basic ideas of the discussion which occurred in the middle of the 1960's in England on the most rational type of future carriers. The command of the Royal Air Force insisted in that period on building small displacement tonnage carriers designed for basing future VTOL aircraft. The representatives of the RAF based their viewpoint on the fact that, in line with the development of anti-aircraft guided missiles, piloted aircraft could not operate successfully against ships and shore installations. The traditional role of a large carrier, as the main assault force of the navy, would become, in their opinion, a matter of history. The carriers and their aviation would be necessary for carrying out just three missions: the search for and destruction of submarines, moving amphibious troops to the landing region, and aviation support of the amphibious troops. These missions could be carried out also by VTOL

aircraft and for basing them the large, complex and expensive carriers of the present type would not be needed. It would be possible to create small, simply designed inexpensive ships. Ten small carriers built in the place of three large ones could be 200 percent more effective and would be much less vulnerable. The RAF representatives recommended that these carriers be built in antisubmarines and landing variations.

The English Admiralty rejected the viewpoint of the RAF and insisted upon creating large carriers which would be capable of basing the future supersonic bombers, fighters with a speed corresponding to a Mach-2 number, as well as a new type of anti-submarine aircraft. The calculations given by the Admiralty showed that it was wrong to assert the advisability of having a large number of small carriers instead of several large ships of this class. The large carriers would operate aviation under more difficult weather conditions, and would be better from the economic viewpoint, since the expenditures per aircraft based on it would be, according to the Admiralty's calculations, much less than on the small carriers . . . .

In one of the few opinions expressed in the book the authors go on to say:

> As is known, the plans for building the new carriers for the English Navy were not carried out. However, the arguments given in the course of the discussion on the optimum type of future carriers have not lost their significance.[13]

Conceptual Base for a New Soviet Carrier. Although this controversy was almost completely overlooked in the United States (this was the same period when the question of nuclear propulsion for CVA-67 was being argued among the U.S. Navy, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Congress), the Soviets apparently were following it closely. *Aircraft and Helicopter Carriers* was published in the Soviet Union at approximately the same time that large amounts of resources were about to be committed to the construction of at least four relatively "small displacement-tonnage carriers designed for basing future VTOL aircraft," the new *Kiev*-class ships. Consequently, it is possible to view this work as an officially sanctioned effort to communicate and justify a decision recently arrived at by the Soviet leadership. The book's extended treatment of the British debate, however, combines persuasively with the long leadtimes required for such fundamentally new construction to suggest that the Soviets had been thinking about a carrier whose role would be limited to support at least a decade before the book's publication.

This thesis is borne out in subsequent writings in which it is made quite clear that the Soviets—at least since Stalin's time—never intended to build carriers that would emulate those of the West. These texts describe the American attack carrier as an instrument directed primarily at the shore, capable of projecting power well inland and supporting "imperialist" aims. On the other hand, the new *Kiev*-class carrier is always described as an antisubmarine cruiser, part of the surface component in Gorshkov's "balanced Navy." The difference in the two concepts is highlighted by Gorshkov himself:

> The attack carrier forces, which are the main means of attack by the [U.S.] navy in local wars and are a highly trained reserve for the strategic strike forces in an all-out nuclear war, remain now as before the main element of the [Western] general purpose naval forces.[14]

and:

> Today, submarines and [land based] naval aircraft are the main arms of the forces of our navy, and ballistic and cruise missiles with nuclear warheads are the main weapons. Diverse surface ships and aircraft are included in the inventory of our navy in order to give combat stability to the submarine and to comprehensively support them, to battle the enemy's surface and ASW forces, and to prosecute other specific missions.[15]

Thus, in Gorhkov's estimation, American naval forces are built around the aircraft carrier as both a tactical and strategic system, while the Soviet forces are built around submarines and naval aircraft, supported by the surface forces that now include the *Kiev* and *Moskva*-class antisubmarine cruisers. In effect, the two different concepts for building aircraft carriers that were debated by the British in the early 1960s have been realized in two other navies that are rivaled only by one another as the world's greatest—though substantially different—seapowers. The disparity in the results that stem from these two concepts is especially evident in the physical characteristics of the two latest types of carriers built in the United States and the U.S.S.R.

Two Different Carriers. The newest American carrier, the 91,400-ton U.S.S. *Eisenhower* (CVAN-69), is nuclear powered and equipped with steam catapults and arresting gear for launching and recovering long-range, high-performance, conventional aircraft. Of the approximately 100 aircraft embarked in *Eisenhower*, about half are designated as "attack" aircraft. As an element of American theater nuclear forces, *Eisenhower* could use these attack aircraft to deliver nuclear weapons in support of a NATO war. In the event of a conventional war, the fighter and attack aircraft aboard *Eisenhower* are equipped to destroy enemy naval forces, to achieve local air superiority in high-threat areas, such as over an objective area or battlefield, and to provide close air support to friendly ground forces. *Eisenhower* is a vehicle for power projection as well as sea control, relying upon its embarked air group to provide its offensive punch as well as its defense. Its only other weapons system is a Basic Point Defense Missile System to defend against aircraft and missiles that slip through the protective screen provided by its own aircraft and other ships/aircraft. *Eisenhower* is therefore the epitome of the "attack" carrier, the centerpiece for the American surface naval force structure. It is indeed, as the Soviets describe it, a "strike carrier," and the same "large carrier" type advocated by the British Admiralty in the 1960s.

Kiev, on the other hand, displaces approximately 40,000 tons, is conventionally powered, and has no catapults or arresting gear that would permit it to operate long-range, high performance aircraft. The aircraft embarked on her maiden voyage through the Mediterranean were ASW *Hormone* helicopters and short-range VTOL *Forger* fighters. She appears heavily laden with communications gear and has more missile launchers and guns than an American guided-missile cruiser. This weapons suite includes SS-N-12 long-range, surface-to-surface missiles; SA-N-3 medium-range, surface-to-air missiles; SA-N-4 short-range, surface-to-air missiles; 76-mm dual purpose, and 23-mm antiaircraft guns; torpedoes; antisubmarine rocket launchers; and SS-N-14 missiles that deliver torpedoes.[16] The VTOL fighters embarked in *Kiev* are no match for even U.S. Navy attack aircraft, much less the sophisticated F-4 and F-14 fighters embarked in American attack carriers. There is also little likelihood that any V/STOL aircraft the Soviets will develop will have

the capability to counter the F-14 in the foreseeable future. Finally the range of American carrier aircraft is considerably greater than that of the surface-to-surface missiles carried by *Kiev*.

Thus the armament of this new Soviet carrier makes it apparent that *Kiev* is not an effort to challenge American carrier forces on the open seas, but is primarily intended for the ASW and defensive AAW missions similar to those the RAF envisioned for Britain's carrier forces in the mid-1960s. The surface-to-surface missiles of *Kiev*, using midcourse correction provided by an embarked helicopter or YAK-36 *Forger*, could successfully engage any Western non-carrier ships, such as cruisers or destroyers. The ASW suite seems capable of conducting a variety of attacks on submarine contacts, and the AAW missile suite is typical of the self-defense capabilities provided to most Soviet surface ships. The YAK-36, while not a match for modern Western fighters or attack aircraft, is more than a match for maritime patrol, electronics surveillance, communications relay, or other poorly defended aircraft. These capabilities are significant when placed in the proper perspective, that is, of providing support to Soviet submarines. Gorshkov has made the Soviet viewpoint explicit in stating, "Surface ships remain the main and frequently the only weapon supporting the deployment of the main attack forces of the navy, the submarines."[17]

The Carrier as an ASW Coordinator. In *Sea Power of the State*, Gorshkov repeatedly took the Germans to task for not attacking Allied forces so as to relieve the pressure on their submarines and thereby aid them in accomplishing their mission:

> Despite the exceptional threat posed by the antisubmarine forces to submarines, no one operation or any other specially-organized military operations aimed at defeating or destroying the anti-submarine warfare forces was ever conducted[18] . . . and . . . they did not make a single attempt to employ organized counteraction against the Allied antisubmarine forces which were operating with impunity. That, obviously, is the reason 70% of the German submarines were destroyed while proceeding to the combat areas.[19]

Gorshkov has admitted that in World War II close coordination among air, surface and subsurface forces was impossible because of recognition and communications difficulties. In modern times however, "the situation has fundamentally changed, and the possibility has arisen of achieving the close coordination in battle and operations between submarines and surface ships which has greatly improved their combat effectiveness."[20]

By virtue of her demonstrated and estimated capabilities, *Kiev* is probably the latest vehicle for this close coordination. Its mission as one element in a formation of other surface warships, "operational-tactical" nuclear submarines, and ballistic missile submarines would be anti-ASW or, put more directly, protecting the capital ships of the Soviet Navy: the SSBNs. The concern with which the Soviets view the threat to their ballistic missile submarine force is illustrated by an article in *Morskoy Sbornik*, written by Captain First Rank V'yunenko:

> . . . Having been recognized as the main strike force of a modern navy, the nuclear-powered submarines armed with ballistic missiles have also drawn attention to themselves as the objective of the actions of all other naval forces against them. The struggle against missile-armed submarines and the efforts to destroy them before they employ their weapons have become one of the foremost missions of navies.[21]

The Mobile Zone of Supremacy. In 1975 and 1976, articles in *Morskoy Sbornik* and *Aviatsiya I Kosmonavtika* discussed the concept of a formation of surface ships and attack submarines as a means of defending SSBNs against submarine attack:

> . . . The tactic of jointly employing mixed forces (submarines, surface ships and aircraft) is seen by foreign specialists as a practical way of combating the submarine threat.[22]
>
> . . . Combination aircraft carrier attack units established on the foundation of aircraft carriers, can be used for protection of a battle patrol of submarine missile-carriers.[23]
>
> . . . Operational-tactical submarines are more and more frequently being included in the combat disposition of various forces of surface ships . . . and are being employed to support the combat patrolling of strategic submarines.[24]
>
> . . . Submarines can . . . support the ASW defense of formations of friendly surface warships and submarines armed with ballistic missiles.[25]

Recent Soviet writings also reveal an interest in Western doctrine on the protection of its capital ships, the attack aircraft carriers. To quote again from V'yunenko's article:

> . . . The joint employment of aircraft carriers with other surface ships, submarines, and antisubmarine aircraft makes it possible to create effective mobile zones of supremacy on the high seas . . . . Within this space, the assumption is to provide absolute supremacy beneath the water surface, on the sea, and in the air.[26]

Formations consisting only of ASW cruisers and attack submarines would theoretically be able to provide such supremacy beneath the water surface, but the SSNs and SSBNs also must be protected against the ASW aviation threat. Heretofore, this has been a function of both the AAW batteries of noncarrier surface ships and by shore-based aviation within its range limitations.[27] However, these defenses are not available for forward-deployed submarines that also require protection from unescorted long-range patrol aircraft. A requirement therefore exists for sea-based aircraft capable of dealing with this threat, a requirement that the YAK-36 *Forgers* aboard *Kiev* seem capable of fulfilling.

Gorshkov foresees an expanding requirement for sea-based vertical takeoff and landing aircraft like the YAK-36:

> Air-capable ships, and indeed other combatants will to an even greater degree be equipped with VTOL aircraft and other air vehicles like the modern helicopter, but of a more advanced type. To an even greater degree combat operations will move into the subsurface and air environments.[28]

These more advanced varieties of VTOL and perhaps V/STOL (Vertical/Short Takeoff and Landing) aircraft should provide greater capabilities in controlling the air above the "mobile zone of supremacy on the high seas," thereby bolstering the area of primary weakness of Soviet seagoing forces: air cover.[29] In fact, the thrust of recent Soviet writings about the role of their new carriers indicates that *Kiev* could have many of the same missions attributed to the British "Thru-Deck Cruiser," H.M.S. *Invincible*. In an article in the December 1976 issue of *Morskoy Sbornik*, these missions are described as follows: "delivering strikes against surface ships; intercepting air targets and conducting reconnaissance missions with embarked VTOL aircraft; detecting, tracking and attacking submarines using embarked helicopters; supporting the air defense

of the area of combat operations; and controlling mixed naval forces."[30] All that is missing from the British example is the absence of any mention of supporting amphibious operations.

Conclusion. Gorshkov's approach to building his fleet has been unique, and *Kiev* is illustrative of his philosophy:

> . . . In the quest for ways of developing our navy, we avoided simply copying the fleet of the most powerful sea power of the world. The composition of the navy, its weapons, ship designs and organization of forces were determined primarily by the missions which the political leadership of our country assigned to the armed forces, . . . by the country's economic resources, and also, by the conditions under which the navy had to accomplish these missions.[31]

Rather than copying the aircraft carriers of the West and their attack mission, it is evident that the Soviets have added an aircraft-carrying capability to their ASW cruiser concept in order to give better support to the primary attack arm of their fleet: the submarine. Their goal is to protect their ballistic missile submarines just as the West attempts to protect its aircraft carriers. Their decision was to achieve this objective with a combination of surface and submarine escorts that could provide a "mobile zone of supremacy on the high seas." *Kiev*-class carriers now joining the Soviet Fleet should therefore be understood in the West as primarily intended to be protectors of the U.S.S.R.'s submarine force.

Future Soviet development of carrier forces will probably not be limited to this concept, however. As the Soviet Navy develops operational experience with its *Kiev*-class carriers, it (and the Communist Party hierarchy) will probably develop an appreciation for the power projection potential of the American-type "strike carrier." Gorshkov has already laid the political foundation for the naval power projection mission with his ballistic missile submarine force and constant references to operations against the shore being the most important mission of navies.[32] Most recently, the prolific naval writer, Professor-Vice Adm. K. Stalbo, produced two articles in *Morskoy Sbornik* that were uncharacteristically complimentary about the power projection and nuclear capabilities of Western carrier forces.[33] Another article by Capt. First Rank S. Mikhaylov in the December 1978 issue of *Voyennyye Znaniya* discusses, in favorable terms, the multiple capabilities of a 58,000-ton general-purpose carrier with conventional, V/STOL and rotary-wing aircraft embarked.[34] These articles may simply be an effort to make a point by one isolated faction within the navy, or they may portend a new Soviet interest in developing more capable, general-purpose carriers. A third possibility is that they might be the first step in the final phase of a long planned evolution to the same end. If so, the Soviet Navy would then be truly "balanced," with offensive and defensive carrier forces,

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

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offensive and defensive submarine forces, offensive shore-based naval aviation, and a comprehensive infrastructure in support of it all. Party politics and allocations of scarce resources within the Soviet economy will probably determine what kinds of new carriers the Soviets build in the 21st century, but it may be safely said that they will be examining all the options through the framework of their own unique requirements.

NOTES

1. I. Shner, "Aircraft Carriers and Their Roles in the Operations of a Navy," *Military Thought (Voyennaya Mysl')*, No. 6, 1946, p. 82, quoted in Robert W. Herrick, *Soviet Naval Strategy* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1968), p. 58.
2. S.G. Gorshkov, *Morskaya Moshch' Gosudarstva* [Seapower of the State] (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1976), pp. 359-360.
3. Herrick, p. 64.
4. Gorshkov, p. 360.
5. V.D. Sokolovskiy, ed., *Military Strategy* (3rd edition and a comparison with previous editions), translated by Harriet Fast Scott (prepared for the Chief of the Office of Research and Development, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C., Contract DAHC 19-71-C-0001 SR1, Project 8974, Menlo Park, Calif.: Stanford Research Institute, 1971), p. 345.
6. In a 1969 article in *Military Thought (Voyennaya Mysl')*, No. 2, 1969 entitled "The Role of Surface Ships in Combat at Sea," V. Kasatonov discusses the vulnerability of carriers during nuclear war, yet gives them credit for their continually growing striking power against the shore. Kasatonov contends that this power, while tempered in a major conflict by Soviet submarines and shore-based aviation, is not so restricted in a local war and has been preeminent. See *Military Thought*, No. 2, 1969, p. 38.
7. Gorshkov, pp. 309-310.
8. Sokolovskiy, pp. 245-246, 298.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 298.
10. *The London Times*, 26 October 1960, p. 13.
11. *Ibid.*, 22 November 1962, p. 4.
12. *Ibid.*, 11 June 1963, p. 13.
13. I.M. Korotkin, et al., *Aircraft and Helicopter Carriers* (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1972), Selected Translation in JPRS 59415, July 1973, chap. 10.
14. Gorshkov, p. 280. See also R. Tombovskiy, "The Present and Future of Attack Aircraft Carriers," *Morskoy Sbornik*, No. 7, 1974.
15. Gorshkov, pp. 307-308.
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17. Gorshkov, p. 319.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 193.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 197.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 317.
21. N. V'yunenko, "Some Trends in the Development of Naval Tactics," *Morskoy Sbornik*, No. 10, 1975, p. 21.
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23. O. Kozlov and Ye. Sokolovskiy, "Carrier Aviation of the USA," *Aviatsiya i Kosmonavtika*, January 1976, pp. 46-47.
24. V'yunenko, p. 22.
25. S. Shapovalov, "Views of U.S. and NATO Command on Antisubmarine Warfare," *Morskoy Sbornik*, No. 11, 1976, p. 85.
26. V'yunenko, p. 23.
27. I. Lyubimov, "Coordination of National Air Defense Troops with the Navy," *Military Thought (Voyennaya Mysl')*, No. 3, 1969, p. 35.
28. Gorshkov, p. 346.
29. The vulnerabilities of ASW aircraft are discussed in I. Kutsayev's "ASW Aircraft," *Morskoy Sbornik*, No. 12, 1974, p. 72.
30. "The British Anti-Submarine Cruiser INVINCIBLE," *Morskoy Sbornik*, No. 12, 1976.
31. Gorshkov, p. 458.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 449.

33. K. Stalbo, "Aircraft Carriers in the Second World War," *Morskoy Sbornik*, No. 1, 1978, pp. 91-100, and "Aircraft Carriers in the Postwar Period," *Morskoy Sbornik*, No. 6, 1978, pp. 91-100.

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The future program for carrier-based naval aviation has been seen to require a choice between a follow-on Nimitz CVN and a midi-CVV. There is an option better than and no more expensive than the CVV.

THE 1978 CARRIER CONTROVERSY:

WHY NOT THE KENNEDY?

by

Scott C. Truver

Epitomized by President Carter's veto of the FY 1979 Defense Authorization Bill and the subsequent failure of the House of Representatives to override that veto, a serious controversy has continued to engulf the Navy, the Department of Defense, Congress, and White House advisors over the future program for carrier-based naval aviation. The veto focused national attention on the disputed need for spending a total of $2.4 billion (in FY 1979 dollars) for a fourth *Nimitz*-class nuclear-powered carrier that the Navy and Congress believed to be in America's national security interests. However, rather than buy a follow-on *Nimitz*, President Carter promised to include in his FY 1980 request a $1.6 billion, 62,000-ton, conventionally propelled carrier, the "midi" CVV.

Because the veto has resulted in a 1-year extension of the carrier controversy, it would be beneficial to consider all feasible conventionally propelled aircraft carrier alternatives available to ensure the decision that is reached on the next carrier is based on a complete review of all relevant information. Such a review necessarily should consider the costs and capabilities of an updated *John F. Kennedy* (CV-67)-design large-deck carrier. Indeed, even a cursory examination will show that a modernized *Kennedy*—the Navy's most recent conventionally propelled carrier, commissioned in 1968—is to be preferred over the CVV on a mission-effectiveness and cost-effectiveness basis. Even more important from a domestic political perspective, the *Kennedy* alternative is an elegant compromise that President Carter can use to bridge the chasm separating congressional and administration proponents of nuclear-powered large aircraft carriers and those who favor small, less costly, conventionally propelled air-capable platforms. And a follow-on *Kennedy* large-deck CV can be the "transition ship" Navy

Secretary Graham Claytor has argued is needed if the Navy is to pursue meaningful programs for VSTOL (Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing) aircraft expected in the 1990s. However, before turning to a comparison of *Kennedy* and the CVV, it may be worthwhile to consider briefly some of the assumptions that underlay the veto, particularly as they pertain to the future program of Navy air.

The Risks of Conventional Wisdom. The veto of the fourth *Nimitz* CVN can be seen as based on "conventional wisdom" about the Navy.[1] This conventional wisdom, that naval forces in general are becoming increasingly obsolete, in turn is founded on two assumptions: (1) the expected technological developments in threat levels and capabilities will greatly increase surface combatants' vulnerabilities; and (2) that a reliance upon quantitative policy analysis to reach decisions about future force level requirements that are tied to specific scenarios will provide all the necessary guidance for decisionmakers.

The first assumption, the imperatives of future technology, states that because of projected improvements in antiship missiles launched from surface combatants, aircraft, and submarines, and the difficulty of defending against these missiles, surface ships in the near future will be less likely to survive in combat at sea. An extension of this first assumption points to the expansion of force worldwide and the consequences for any navy structured around surface ships. Referring to the widespread sale of modern weapons to many Third World countries, Paul Cohen in an insightful *Foreign Affairs* article warned of the erosion of surface naval power that could result from small power coastal states' possession of the military wherewithal to challenge even the major naval states.[2] Thus, surface combatants of the future, if they are going to remain useful tools of diplomacy and coercion, can be employed only in ocean areas of low to moderate threat levels. One result of these two considerations that was evident in President Carter's action is a growing reluctance to place "all the eggs in one basket," that is, to devote increasingly greater national resources to a single, offensive naval platform, the large-deck aircraft carrier. Rather, proponents of a "new Navy" argue that it would be much better to develop smaller, air-capable platforms that cost much less on a per-ship basis, and thereby disperse airpower throughout the fleet, making it more difficult to destroy in a coordinated attack the Navy's major offensive and defensive assets.

But this belief in the increasing vulnerability of large aircraft carriers ignores the conclusions of a number of recent civilian, DoD, and Navy analyses that point out the greatly enhanced self-defensive capabilities of modern surface warships, particularly the multipurpose aircraft carriers. Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that self-defense features are driven by the same technological imperatives that have resulted in increased threat levels. One such study, the congressionally-mandated Assessment of Sea Based Air Platforms Project of February 1978, clearly showed that large aircraft carriers that have incorporated into their design modern armor and passive protection features as well as modern active self-defense measures are more likely, not less, to survive in the high threat environments of the 1980s and beyond. This, plus the advantages of more propulsion shafts and catapults, larger aviation fuel and ordinance loads, and greater combat endurance will increase the effectiveness of large aircraft carriers *vis-à-vis* small air-capable ships in the years ahead.

More, the future development of VSTOL aircraft, aside from the advantage of making tactical airpower available to a greater number of surface

ships, is likely to improve the combat capabilities of all types of aircraft carriers. The addition of VSTOL aircraft to a large carrier's air wing would make it possible for that ship to carry out its missions even after suffering damage to its propulsion plant, catapults, arresting wires, or deck area. And, given the introduction into the fleet of new defensive technologies—e.g., the *Aegis* integrated air defense system, the *Vulcan-Phalanx* Close-In-Weapon-System, and long-range antiair missiles—and new tactics for their use, the large-deck carriers will become even more capable of achieving mission objectives in regions of the greatest potential threat.

Another aspect of the veto—an overreliance on quantitative policymaking—was evident also in the decision announced by the Secretary of Defense early in 1978 to shift the Navy's basic function from worldwide selective sea control to the defense of the Atlantic sealanes in the context of a NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict. This decision, the cancellation of an aircraft carrier perceived as "too much ship" for expected future roles, and the design of the CVV carrier alternative, apparently were reached on the basis of a "method of decision making that relies heavily, in the military field, on designing forces to cope with very specific scenarios, utilizing complex computer models dependent on numerous detailed assumptions."[3] In certain applications the use of quantitative analysis and the "systems" perspective can lead to balanced force structures within budget constraints established a *priori*. However, this approach to designing a Navy for the future may rely too heavily upon highly detailed scenarios and, thereby, ultimately may be unrealistic.

The ships being designed and constructed in the late 1970s and early 1980s will be operating well into the next century, at a time when the assumptions and expectations under which those ships were designed simply may no longer be valid. Rather than design a ship for a specific set of missions to be carried out within expected scenarios, a more realistic approach would be to arrive at a ship design that is capable of carrying out a wide range of missions. These ships, therefore, must be highly flexible in terms of, first, being able to accept the expected technological changes in weapons and sensors to be carried on board, and, second, being able to be used for a number of different roles. In the post-World War II period, U.S. naval forces, and particularly the highly flexible large aircraft carriers, have been able to accommodate necessary technological alterations and have been used in a wide variety of contingencies, from the demonstration of peacetime political presence to the launch of tactical airstrikes in war. Because of the global nature of future U.S. economic, political, and military interests, the naval forces being constructed today must be both versatile and flexible, capable of quickly and effectively responding to widely separated and multilevel threats to American interests.

In retrospect, then, the conventional wisdom about the Navy fails to recognize that multipurpose large-deck aircraft carriers have been, and will remain, one of the most effective tools to deter conflict and manage international crises. In a larger perspective, rejection of the follow-on *Nimitz* in favor of the CVV may result in less combat capabilities and naval flexibility in the late 1980s and the next century.

The International System and the Uses of Naval Airpower. A 1976 Brookings Institution study, *The Use of the Armed Forces as a Political Instrument*,[4] reported that of the 215 incidents in which the United States employed its armed forces for political purposes—not for actual combat as in Korea or Vietnam—between 1946 and 1975, naval units participated in

177 incidents (82 percent); alone in 100 incidents (47 percent). And, although the Navy participation sometimes varied, the Brookings study found that since the mid-1950s the trend has been toward a greater Navy participation: on the average, the Navy had been involved in over 90 percent of all incidents over that 20-year period. Because of the inherent characteristics of easy mobility, operational and tactical flexibility, and capabilities for a graduated effect upon the target nation, surface combatants can be used more subtly to support U.S. foreign policy objectives and therefore have been relied upon more often in the postwar period than have land-based forces.[5]

More significant for the present discussion, the Brookings study reported that when U.S. naval forces were relied upon, carrier-based airpower was turned to most frequently. U.S. aircraft carriers took part in 60 percent of the incidents involving naval forces and slightly more than half of all the incidents studied. Furthermore, aircraft carriers tended to be used more often in political contexts characterized by international violence and also in those incidents in which the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China was involved. Aircraft carriers, in addition to being the most powerful weapons in America's naval general-purpose arsenal, have been a singularly important diplomatic tool used to communicate intense American interest in the outcome of a crisis.

However, the Brookings study underscored one important point: naval forces, principally because of their operational flexibility and mobility, at times failed to achieve the stated policy objective. Because navies do not necessarily depend upon foreign shore basing and can easily be withdrawn, the insertion into a crisis of purely naval assets in many of the 215 incidents did not signify to the target countries as great a degree of U.S. commitment and resolve as did the insertion of ground troops or land-based airpower. Simply because ground forces or land-based air forces are less easily withdrawn once in country, and because significant base support must accompany their insertion for anything other than very short durations, the introduction of elements of the Army, Air Force, or Marines into a crisis tended to signify a major U.S. commitment and willingness to take larger political and military risks. This decision, in turn, produced a greater effect on the leadership of the target country and, more often than naval forces alone, produced the desired outcome as defined by U.S. objectives.[6]

Nevertheless, if, because of the global dimensions of the potential Soviet and Third World threats facing the United States and the highly varied nature of those threats, Washington must rely upon naval forces simply because they are easier to move about and can respond quickly and at a high level of operational readiness, then the United States must be equipped to insert into a crisis the most capable naval assets available: large-deck aircraft carriers and their escort combatants. There are two reasons for this conclusion.

First, the potential threats the United States is likely to face over the next quarter-century, even at the lowest level of violence, are increasing rapidly in offensive capabilities. In order to have any lasting effect on the outcome of a crisis or naval confrontation, the naval assets the United States employs must possess clearly visible, extensive combat capabilities, both offensive and defensive. Yet, as Third World countries shed their "small power complexes" and their self-perceptions and proclivities to challenge America and the West are emboldened by the acquisition of modern antiship weapons, the symbolic act of "showing the flag" by U.S. warships may be of less effect. Although a single U.S. warship or task force without a carrier deployed could still serve a

symbolic function in the early hours of a crisis (i.e., as a portent of an additional military response by the United States if the target country does not comply with U.S. desires, rather than as the agent for that response), Third World countries may choose to challenge that ship or task force on the assumption that the United States will not become more extensively involved, especially with ground forces. This perception may have been strengthened by America's immediate post-Vietnam war unwillingness to become mired in similar military conflicts. However, if the United States will continue to rely upon naval forces for crisis management roles, these ships must be able to protect themselves from all likely military challenges. And, if so required, these ships must be able to mount an adequate military response to those threats. As currently configured, the large-deck carrier task group possesses significant combat capabilities that make it appropriate for crisis management.

Second, because the inherently psychological nature of the target country's leadership perception of U.S. resolve and commitment has been shown to be dependent upon the type of forces the United States employs, if naval forces are used the ships must be "capital" assets. That is, if a major U.S. commitment and a strong willingness to intervene are to be demonstrated, then major warships must be employed, particularly in crises as opposed to normal peacetime "presence" operations. In such a highly subjective and psychological perception process, carrier task groups will clearly signify strong U.S. resolve and high interest in the favorable resolution of the crisis. This is so because these task groups are structured around the Navy's most capable and costly—in terms of national resources, men, and weapons devoted to a single platform—ships. By committing an aircraft carrier to a high-risk situation, in effect putting all of its eggs in one basket, the United States will unambiguously communicate its perception of the gravity of the crisis and its high interest in an advantageous outcome. Of course, the routine maintenance of "low mix" combatants or even auxiliary vessles in world regions important to America but where serious threats to peace are absent remains a normal peacetime operation.

For these two reasons, one military and the other inherently psychopolitical, the aircraft carrier will continue to be the most appropriate instrument for the management of crises. Furthermore, if carriers are to be the central component of a U.S. naval response to threats against America's global interests, the carrier employed should be the most capable ship the country can buy consistent with existing domestic political and fiscal constraints.

Policy Options for FY 1980. The Navy and the Department of Defense have determined that a 12 active carrier force level is marginally adequate to meet normal peacetime operations. When *Carl Vinson* (CVN-70) is delivered in late 1981, the Navy will have four nuclear-propelled carriers, eight oil-fired carriers of the postwar *Forrestal/Kitty Hawk* classes, and two World War II carriers, a total of 14 ships. However, *Coral Sea* (CV-43), which entered the fleet in 1947, has no air wing assigned and is not considered routinely deployable. Furthermore, beginning in FY 1981, the *Forrestal/Kitty Hawk* carriers built during the 1950s and 1960s will be undergoing an extensive, 28-month Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) that aims to modernize these ships and extend their useful lives from 30 to 45 years. This program plus the nondeployable status of *Coral Sea* will effectively reduce the active carrier force to 12 ships during each SLEP period. (Figure 1 shows projected carrier force levels through the mid-1990s.) Between 1980 and 1990, the Navy will retire or place

	Actual 1978-1980	1981-1985	Projected 1986-1995
Active:	8 *Forrestals* 1 *Enterprise* 2 *Nimitzs* 1 *Midway*	7 *Forrestals* 1 *Enterprise* 3 *Nimitzs* 1 *Midway*[2]	7 *Forrestals* 1 *Enterprise* 3 *Nimitzs* 1 *Kennedy* follow-on
Contingency Reserve:	1 *Coral Sea*	1 *Coral Sea*[3]	1 *Midway*
SLEP Overhaul:		1 *Forrestal*	1 *Forrestal*
New Construction:	1 *Nimitz*[1]	1 *Kennedy*[4]	

[1] CVN-70, *Carl Vinson.*

[2] *Midway* will be available for limited active duty to compensate for SLEP overhauls. Will probably be retired in 1990.

[3] *Coral Sea* will not be deployed on active duty but will be kept in "contingency reserve" status. Will probably be retired in 1985.

[4] CV-71, follow-on *Kennedy,* if funded in FY 1980.

Fig. 1—U.S. Aircraft Carrier Force Levels

in a "contingency reserve" status the remaining World War II carriers, *Coral Sea* and *Midway* (CV-41), although both ships, already over 30 years old in 1979, at times could be required to remain on active status to maintain 12 active decks until the carrier funded in FY 1980 enters the fleet sometime after 1986.

A massive carrier construction program is unwarranted to remedy the expected shortage of active decks in the near future. Rather, based upon the objective need to maintain 12 active carriers in the fleet, most Navy and civilian authorities—including President Carter—agree that only one more carrier must be built in the 1980-1986 period. That being the case, the United States should procure the most capable ship available at a reasonable cost. The Assessment of Sea Based Air Platforms analyses carried out by the Navy showed unequivocally that the *Nimitz*-class nuclear-propelled carrier is the most capable and survivable ship compared to all alternative designs. The *Nimitz* carriers—as well as the nuclear-powered *Enterprise* (CVN-65) and, to a slightly lesser extent, the eight conventionally propelled *Forrestal/Kitty Hawk* carriers in the fleet in 1978—can deal with a much higher level of threat from hostile aircraft, cruise missiles, submarines, and surface ships than the Administration-favored CVV.

However, because of the fourth *Nimitz* carrier's very high cost of approximately $2.4 billion, President Carter was unwilling to buy one more of these highly capable, nuclear-propelled ships, and instead chose to request the "midsized" CVV in FY 1980. The CVV, an "on-paper" ship design estimated to cost at least $1.6 billion in FY 1980, simply cannot carry out the same warfare tasks as the CVNs and the large-deck CVs. These existing ships are designed for ocean strike, ocean area control, theater strike, and tactical interdiction ashore roles, and will be able with a large margin of certainty to defeat most of the threats presented by

the Soviet Union and Third World countries in the years ahead.

If the next carrier must be oil-fired, in an effort to hold down costs, the CVV may not be the most attractive alternative available to the Navy and the United States. Rather than buy a design that was predicated upon a political compromise of capability for lower cost–a compromise in 1978 based upon a comparison of the CVN and the CVV–the Navy should investigate comparisons of cost and capability between an updated *John F. Kennedy* (CV-67) design and the CVV. (Figure 2 shows the principal characteristics of these two ships.) The characteristics of *Kennedy* result in certain operational advantages over the CVV. *Kennedy* has four catapults and four aircraft elevators, compared to two each for the CVV, and therefore would permit a greater operational tempo than that possible by the CVV. Furthermore, *Kennedy* carries twice the aviation ordnance and over twice the aviation fuel as the CVV. And *Kennedy*'s air wing of 85-90 aircraft is about one-third greater and more capable than that of the CVV. (Figure 3 lists some of these advantages, in the form of ratios, with data for the CVV taken as unity.)

Kennedy's larger size and more capable aircraft handling features provide additional advantages over the CVV:

- Better seakeeping ability that permits flight operations to be conducted in higher sea states

	CVV	*Kennedy*
Length overall (feet)	912	1,051
Beam, maximum (feet)	256	252
Full load displacement (tons)	62,400	80,200
Maximum number of aircraft	50-64	85-90
Aircraft elevators	2	4
Aircraft catapults	2	4
Accommodations (ship and air wing)	4,100	5,500
Propulsion plant	oil-steam	oil-steam
Shaft horsepower	140,000	280,000
Propeller shafts	2	4

Fig. 2–Principal Characteristics

	CVV*	*Kennedy*
Aviation ordnance	1	2.0
Aviation fuel	1	2.2
Number of aircraft	1	1.4
Aircraft catapults	1	2
Aircraft elevators	1	2
Propulsion power	1	2
Propeller shafts	1	2
Maximum speed	1	1.1
Endurance, ship's stores (days)	1	1.6
Endurance, nautical miles	1	1.5

*Data for CVV taken as unity

Fig. 3–CVV, *Kennedy* Comparison

- More propulsion shafts, catapults, elevators, and arresting wires providing additional operational safety and survivability in combat
- Greater number of aircraft catapults minimizing launch times and raising task group reaction time and speed of advance
- More space available for stowage of fuel for escorts, thus increasing battle group independence

Kennedy is an improved *Kitty Hawk*-class carrier, a class itself an improvement over the earlier *Forrestals*, the first carriers built in the United States after World War II. A follow-on *Kennedy* design carrier therefore would benefit from the operating experience of eight earlier, similar ships, the first of which, *Forrestal* (CV-59), was commissioned in 1955. Lessons learned from the operation of *Enterprise* and *Nimitz*-class carriers, approximately similar to *Kennedy* in size and aircraft handling capabilities, also would be incorporated into an updated *Kennedy* design, as would the most modern electronics/sensors and active/passive shipboard defensive features. As configured in 1978, *Kennedy* is a mature, highly successful, modern aircraft carrier design, proven by many years of operational experience, several of which were in combat in Vietnam. The CVV, on the other hand, is an entirely new ship design that has not yet progressed to the detailed engineering design stage.

The cost of an updated *Kennedy* has been estimated by the Navy at approximately $1.7 billion in FY 1980 dollars, compared to about $1.6 billion for the CVV. The costs of operating *Kennedy*'s larger air wing and of the additional fuel required for its more powerful engineering plant would raise the life cycle costs above those of the CVV. However, life cycle costs, driven principally by the size of the embarked air wing, could be reduced by operating a smaller air group of CVV size, to be augmented by Marine or Naval Reserve aircraft when the situation so requires. This inherent feature of the larger *Kennedy* design provides for greater operational flexibility than that available in the smaller CVV. Additionally, the costs of building and operating a CVV are likely to be higher than anticipated because it is a new ship design with new requirements for logistics support, repair and maintenance facilities, and personnel training. A follow-on *Kennedy* would be identical in most essential aspects to eight other carriers already in the fleet and would fit smoothly into the existing support and training structures.

Some Recommendations. In light of the probable international political, economic, and military conditions in which the United States will act to protect its interests over the next 30 to 40 years, and the high utility of general-purpose naval forces to preserve those interests, the United States should procure the most capable and flexible aircraft carriers possible consistent with domestic political and fiscal constraints. The country cannot afford an unlimited shipbuilding program that would aim for an all nuclear-propelled carrier force. But neither can the United States afford the false economy and apparent shortsightedness of procuring warships of limited capabilities and usefulness simply because of their lower costs. Taking into account these issues, the stated objective of maintaining a 12-carrier force into the 21st century, and the relative costs and capabilities of the alternative platforms under examination in 1978-1979, two specific recommendations can be offered.

First, the Navy should undertake an extensive review of the available design and cost data for the CVV or a *Kennedy* follow-on to be begun in FY 1980. If the estimates available in 1978 are supported by additional scrutiny, the *Kennedy* design should be used for the CV-71. Aside from the apparent cost and operational advantages of a

Kennedy follow-on relative to the CVV, a *Kennedy* design CV-71 would serve well in quieting the dispute that has embittered pronuclear/large-deck and prosmall carrier factions in the Navy, Congress, and the Administration.

And second, the Navy should proceed carefully with design studies for the other air-capable platform alternatives under discussion in 1978 and 1979. The VSTOL Support Ship (VSS) concept, the air-capable *Spruance*-class destroyer (DD-963 H), and other smaller, specialized air-capable ship designs appear attractive for the limited warfare tasks for which these ships are intended–convoy escort and antisubmarine warfare operations– but only if the future development of VSTOL aircraft is successful. If required before the next generation of VSTOL aircraft is available (expected sometime in the late 1990s), these ships can be configured to operate with existing VSTOL aircraft (AV-8B/B-Plus Harrier) or helicopters to provide the necessary open ocean ASW and antiair protection for convoys or small task forces, and to relieve the CVN/CV force of the requirement to assist in this assignment.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

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Ψ

The political requirements for a military victory have been, at times, greater than a military force's ability to fulfill. A military failure, following a military prediction of failure, has been seen as self-fulfilling prophecy. Admiral Du Pont's experience is instructive.

ADMIRAL SAMUEL F. DU PONT, THE NAVY DEPARTMENT, AND THE ATTACK ON CHARLESTON, APRIL 1863

by

Gerald S. Henig

Gloom overshadowed the Union in the early spring of 1863. The military situation, particularly in the eastern theater, seemed hopeless. In December the Army of the Potomac had suffered a severe defeat at Fredericksburg, and, at least for the immediate future, there were no indications that it was ready to redeem itself. As Allan Nevins has noted in his multivolume study of the war, many in the North believed at this time that the "valor, dash, and tenacity of the South . . . combined with high military leadership, might yet possibly produce a deadlock–which would mean Confederate success."[1] To prevent this, the Lincoln administration, Congress, and northerners in general realized that a decisive blow would have to be leveled against the South. Rather than look to the Army, plagued by a poor combat record and low morale, most now pinned their hopes upon the Navy–especially upon the man who had given the Union its first major victory, Rear Adm. Samuel F. Du Pont.

Tall, handsome, aristocratic in bearing, Du Pont had a distinguished lineage. His grandfather was the French author and statesman Du Pont de Nemours, a longtime friend of Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson; and Samuel's uncle, Eleuthère Irénée du Pont, was the founder of the gunpowder industry of Wilmington, Delaware. A close family, it came as no surprise and met with the approval of the entire "clan" when Samuel married his first cousin, Sophie Madeleine (the daughter of Eleuthère Irénée), to whom he remained devoted throughout his life. Second only to the love he had for his wife was the deep dedication he had for his profession. In 1817, at the age of 14, he joined the

U.S.S. *Franklin* for his first cruise as a midshipman. This was to be the beginning of a long and illustrious career in which he would serve in European waters, in the Near East, in the Orient, and in Washington. Indeed, at the time the Civil War broke out Du Pont had spent nearly 45 years of his life in the U.S. Navy.[2]

Impressive as these credentials were, Du Pont was destined to add an even greater achievement to his record. In early November 1861, 8 months after Confederate batteries had opened fire on Fort Sumter, Du Pont delivered to the South its first major defeat. At the head of a vast armada, he successfully attacked the Confederate forts in Port Royal Sound in South Carolina and forced their evacuation. The inland water routes from Charleston to Savannah were thus closed off to the Confederacy, and, most essential, a strategic base of operations was now established for the Union squadron blockading the South Atlantic coast.[3]

Aside from the tactical advantages secured and the critical boost it gave Union morale, Du Pont's victory had one additional effect: It whetted the North's appetite for an even more magnificent triumph. Now that an important foothold had been obtained off the South Carolina coast, the public as well as the press began to demand an assault on the very symbol of the Confederacy—"the cradle of secession" —Charleston. Although the Navy Department considered such an undertaking unnecessary at the time, preferring instead to continue strengthening its blockade, it soon reversed itself, a result primarily of the enthusiastic prodding by Gustavus Vasa Fox.[4]

A man of boundless energy as well as ambition, Fox had first started his career in the Navy but resigned in the mid-1850s and accepted a position as a business agent for a Massachusetts textile firm. In April 1861, through the efforts of his brother-in-law Montgomery Blair, who served as Lincoln's Postmaster General, Fox played a major role in the attempt to relieve Fort Sumter in Charleston harbor. His talents during that episode did not go unnoticed and he soon rose to the position of Assistant Secretary of the Navy.[5]

"[T]he fall of Charleston is the fall of Satan's kingdom," Fox wrote Du Pont in early June 1862. Having witnessed the historic encounter between *Monitor* and *Virgina* (*née Merrimac*) several months before, the Assistant Secretary was of the opinion that several ironclad monitors were all that were necessary to capture the city. Such a feat, moreover, could be accomplished solely by the Navy. As Fox explained further to Du Pont: "I feel that my duties are twofold; first to beat our southern friends; second to beat the Army. We have done it so far, and the people acknowledge and give us the credit."[6]

While continuing to think highly of the "intelligent and brave" Assistant Secretary, Du Pont was unimpressed with his views on Charleston. What the veteran officer found most disturbing were the intelligence reports he had received detailing the intensive fortifications in the harbor. "For thirteen long months," Du Pont observed, "it has been the remark of our blockading officers that the industry of these rebels in their harbor defenses is beyond all praise; it has been ceaseless day and night." And to make matters worse, unlike the spacious harbor of Port Royal which had been guarded by small forts, Charleston, Du Pont pointed out, was a "cul de sac" with both sides of the entrance protected by a massive network of batteries. In other words, there could be "no bombardment of a week to fatigue and demoralize" the city, nor could a fleet successfully run "the gauntlet, night or day."[7] Unofficially Du Pont made these views known to Fox, but apparently they were to no avail; the Assistant

Secretary's desire for a naval expedition against "Satan's kingdom" remained unshaken.

Not only was Fox unable or perhaps unwilling to fully appreciate the unique difficulties posed by Charleston harbor, he tended to aggravate the problem further by insisting that the assault be a purely naval one. Once again Du Pont took issue with the Assistant Secretary. Although no greater admirer of the Army,[8] the Admiral nevertheless wanted a joint expedition, hoping that the land forces would capture some of the forts protecting the approaches to the harbor and thereby reduce the firepower that would be directed against his invading ships. Thinking the matter important enough to warrant a personal interview, Du Pont traveled to Washington in early October 1862 to present his views firsthand.[9]

Soon after arriving in the capital, however, the admiral realized that his mission was in vain. "Fox's navy feelings," Du Pont noted after meeting with him, were "so strong, and his prejudices or dislike of army selfishness so great in their operation with our service, that he listens unwillingly to combined movements. . . ."[10] Still, Du Pont persisted, telling the Assistant Secretary: "My friend, this is all well, and undivided glory is very pleasant to contemplate, but our country is in a position where *certainty* of success in such an undertaking is of far more importance than what may accrue to different corps or officers out of the modus of operations." Fox agreed that "success must be paramount," but, he added obstinately, it would be achieved solely by the Navy.[11]

In meetings with other members of the Administration, Du Pont chose not to raise the issue. With President Lincoln, for example, the admiral dwelt mainly on the importance of maintaining an effective blockade, and with several cabinet members he engaged in conversation generally dealing with naval appointments, politics, and the overall sorry record of the Army of the Potomac.[12] He even avoided discussion of a combined assault with Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, who in turn chose not to bring up the matter, believing that Fox had the problem under control. Besides, Welles, an old Jacksonian Democrat with a distinct prejudice toward aristocracy, felt somewhat ill at ease with the impressive and courtly admiral.[13]

Welles' reticence is therefore understandable; but how does one account for Du Pont's reluctance to broach the matter of a joint expedition? In a letter to a friend, the admiral revealed at least part of the answer by conceding that it simply was not his nature to press things.[14] As a longtime military man, he was trained to obey and to do his duty, not to question orders. While this certainly sheds light on his behavior, it does not explain it entirely; there were other reasons as well. In the first place, he himself was not confident that the Army could fulfill its part of the assault.[15] Secondly, he feared that any objections to the attack might be interpreted in a bad light, and compromise his reputation as a fighting admiral. And finally, as he readily observed, there was "a morbid appetite for the capture of the place, particularly among the members of the Cabinet . . . ," a fact which Secretary Welles confirmed, declaring that they were "like men with tapeworms."[16]

Yet the trip to Washington, in Du Pont's opinion, was not a total loss. While he admitted his failure to win favor for a joint expedition, he did have "many points of detail settled at the Dept."[17] But of much greater importance was the overall impression he received concerning the Government's view of the impending assault. At all costs "Charleston must be taken," the admiral confided to his wife in late October. "Six weeks is considered a long time. . . . Officers talk of the 'grand

attack' and all underrate the difficulties."[18]

Nor were all of the difficulties foreseen by Du Pont while he was in Washington. Soon after returning to duty at Port Royal, the admiral began to have serious doubts about the ironclad monitors—the vessels that would comprise the main force of the attacking squadron. To be sure, they were formidable defensive weapons, having proven their impregnability in past performances. Yet their offensive abilities left much to be desired. Not only were they plagued by a slowness of speed, but what Du Pont found even more disturbing was their weak potential to launch an assault, as most of the ironclads were equipped with but two guns mounted on a single turret and capable of discharging a round only at 7-minute intervals. "[T]he powers of aggression & even endurance of the ironclads," the admiral declared in early January 1863, "are as much overrated by Mr. Fox & others, as the extent and nature of the defenses of Charleston are underrated."[19]

In the latter part of the month, Du Pont decided to put his conviction to the test. On 27 January he ordered John L. Worden, commander of the ironclad *Montauk*, to attack Fort McAllister, a seven-gun fort guarding the Ogeechee River, south of Savannah. During the next few days the *Montauk* launched several assaults on the fort, but failed to inflict any significant damage.[20] Rather than relate this information informally to Fox as he had done in the past, Du Pont sent an official and confidential report to Secretary Welles. After explaining that the purpose of Worden's mission was to test the effectiveness of the ironclads, the admiral went directly to the heart of the matter.

> My own previous impressions of these vessels, frequently expressed to Assistant Secretary Fox, have been confirmed, viz.: that whatever degree of impenetrability they might have, there was no corresponding quality of aggression or destructiveness as against forts, the slowness of fire giving full time for the gunners in the fort to take shelter in the bombproofs.
>
> This experiment also convinces me of another impression, firmly held and often expressed, that in all such operations, to secure success, troops are necessary.[21]

Welles was clearly surprised by the report. Having left much of the Charleston operation in the hands of Fox, he had been unaware of the reservations held by the officer responsible for carrying it out. In any case, after informing Du Pont that he had the right to abandon the project if he deemed it unfeasible (an option, which Welles probably realized, the proud admiral would hardly consider exercising), the Secretary went on to say that the capture of Charleston was "imperative" and that "the Department will share the responsibility imposed upon the commanders who make the attempt."[22]

Despite such an assurance Du Pont remained filled with anxiety. Of course there was no question now that the attack would have to be undertaken. But as he saw it there was still one lingering problem: the inadequate size of his invasion fleet (at the time comprising seven vessels). With this in mind, during the next 2 months or so the admiral continued to test his ironclads against Fort McAllister, and on each occasion related the dismal results to the department hoping that it would ultimately respond by increasing the number of monitors at his disposal.[23] Although his efforts met with some success (the department promised at least one and possibly two additional vessels),[24] Du Pont was still far from satisfied and decided to exert greater pressure on the Administration. In early March he enlisted the aid of a well-respected naval engineer, Alban Stimers,

who happened to witness one of the monitor attacks on Fort McAllister. To Du Pont's delight, Stimers agreed with him that more ironclads were necessary before an expedition could be launched against Charleston. What made the engineer's testimony so critical was that he had formerly been a strong representative of the so-called "Monitor Lobby."[25] Eager to capitalize on this situation, Du Pont immediately ordered Stimers to Washington to report his views to the department. As the admiral informed his wife: "He [Stimers] will enlighten them more at the Department than fifty letters from me would do, because he belonged to the enthusiasts and, like Fox, thought one [monitor] could take Charleston."[26]

Rather than enlighten members of the Administration, Stimers' mission served only to disappoint and anger them. Welles, for instance, was outraged, particularly when he heard that Du Pont not only wanted more monitors but still favored a joint Army and Navy assault on Charleston. The admiral, according to Welles, was growing soft and was more anxious to preserve the reputation he had instead of seeking to enhance it.[27] Lincoln, who was present at the meeting, came to a similar conclusion. Under severe pressure to deliver a victory to the Union and ill-advised about the combat effectiveness of ironclads when pitted against forts, the President maintained that Du Pont's "long delay . . . his constant call for more ships, more ironclads, was like McClellan calling for more regiments."[28] While such a comparison was hardly a fair one, the overall message was unmistakable: the admiral was to launch his attack as soon as possible. Indeed, by the end of March Du Pont concluded that the assault would have to be made in the immediate future. "It seems to be my fate," he wrote,

> [to] have the eyes of the nation and the government upon me . . . when the national heart is sore and impatient for victory. Politicians, rather than wait a day, prefer to throw the die like gamblers and make or break, as the term is. Statesmen look to results. I sympathize with their impatience very much—[yet] it is true it is the impatience of ignorance.[29]

A week and a half later, on 7 April 1863, Du Pont's fleet sailed into Charleston harbor.

The squadron, consisting of nine vessels in all (seven of which were the single-turret monitors), was simply no match for the Confederate forts in the channel. Throughout the entire 1-hour-and-40-minute engagement, the guns of the Union ironclads were able to deliver only 139 rounds. In turn, the cannon of the forts rained over 2,000 shots on the invading ships, hitting them no less than 439 times. One vessel was lost and several suffered serious damage. To have pushed the attack further would have resulted no doubt in the loss or capture of most of the squadron.[30] Du Pont withdrew, refusing, as he later pointed out, to turn a defeat into a disaster.[31]

Within a week the admiral sent both a preliminary and a detailed analysis of the engagement to the department. In addition to praising the valor of his officers and outlining the damage to his vessels, he included a point by point confirmation of all which he had anticipated.[32] Distressing as these facts might have been to Welles and Fox, the report was an accurate appraisal of what had transpired. Yet the Secretary and his assistant, for the moment at least, chose not to respond, hoping to gather testimony which would contradict Du Pont's.[33] In the meantime, the admiral, sensitive, proud, and anxious for approval, grew uneasy with the department's silence—an uneasiness which soon erupted into anger.

On 15 April an extended article on the battle appeared in the *Baltimore*

American. Written by Charles C. Fulton, editor of the paper, the piece was severely critical of the attack, calling it a "disgraceful result" and placing much, if not all, of the responsibility for its outcome on Du Pont's shoulders.[34] To add insult to injury, the admiral received information that this "slanderous" article had been fully sanctioned by Fox prior to its publication.[35] Although this was not the case, there was considerable evidence suggesting that Fulton had strong ties with the Assistant Secretary, a fact brought to Du Pont's attention by his closest friend and adviser, Henry Winter Davis.[36]

A former Baltimore Congressman, Davis was a shrewd and colorful figure who retained considerable power in Maryland despite his out-of-office status.[37] As leader of the Unconditional Unionists forces, Davis' chief political rival in the state was the conservative (or Conditional Unionist) Montgomery Blair, who happened to be Fox's brother-in-law and a member of Lincoln's Cabinet. In any event, Davis was convinced that it was no mere coincidence that Fulton of the *Baltimore American* had maliciously attacked Du Pont. The *American* was Blair's leading political organ in Maryland, and Davis suspected that Blair was attempting to spite him by assailing his friend Du Pont. In fact, his suspicions were confirmed when word leaked out that Blair had written to Fulton complaining "that he had not 'given it' . . . *half hard enough*" to Du Pont.[38]

Beside these political factors, Davis was also of the opinion that Blair had another sinister interest in Du Pont's case. After all, it was common knowledge that Blair supported Fox in his plans for building an ironclad Navy, and that both men were strong enthusiasts of the monitors. For that matter, another member of the family, Francis Preston Blair, Jr., a Missouri politician, occasionally served as an agent to secure government contracts for the construction of these vessels. If Du Pont's position on the Charleston defeat was acknowledged, it would mean that the monitors were not as effective as was generally believed, and it could very well stop further production until their defects were overcome. From Davis' viewpoint, then, the attack upon Du Pont in the *American* and the silence of the department could be explained, at least partially, in terms of "a *Blair-Fox* conspiracy."[39]

While there was undoubtedly some truth in Davis' conclusion, it still did not account for Welles' reaction to the abortive attack. The Secretary had promised Du Pont that the department would "share the responsibility" in case of failure,[40] but it was becoming more and more apparent that he was not about to keep his pledge. Nor did he see any reason to do so, as he now firmly believed that the entire fiasco was Du Pont's fault. The admiral's "vanity and weakness," Welles noted in his diary, had lost them "the opportunity to take Charleston, which a man of more daring energy, and who had not a distinguished name to nurse and take care of would have improved." Furthermore, he wrote, Du Pont was "prejudiced" against the monitors and therefore blamed them for his ill-success, rather than the fact that he had "no taste for rough, close fighting."[41] Convinced of these views, the Secretary sought support for them among officers in Du Pont's fleet. He first contacted John Rodgers, a highly respected and independent-minded officer who commanded *Weehawken*, the ironclad which led the attack. To Welles' chagrin, Rodgers fully supported the admiral, emphasizing that the monitors were deficient in firepower and had serious maneuverability problems—both of which rendered it impossible for Du Pont to capture Charleston. Soon after receiving Rodgers' report, Welles spoke privately with Capt. Percival Drayton, another officer involved in the battle.

Like Rodgers, Drayton backed up the admiral.[42]

Totally disregarding the testimony of these officers, Welles set about seeking a replacement for Du Pont. In the meantime, the Secretary finally broke the silence of the department by responding to the admiral. With some justification, he explained that he was unwilling at the present time to publish the official reports prepared by Du Pont and his officers concerning the attack, for it would not be in the public interest and would simply "encourage those in rebellion." In a more sarcastic manner, however, Welles went on to point out to Du Pont that "to publish to the world your reports of your failure and your hopelessness of success" would in the end serve no one's interests.[43]

A sensitive man under normal conditions, Du Pont was enraged by the "offensive" tone of this official department letter. Given the circumstances the admiral's reaction was not unreasonable, even if one takes into consideration his inflated self-esteem. After all, Du Pont was willing to accept a large share—even an *"overshare"*—of the blame for the repulse; and secondly, he was more than willing to acknowledge the department's reasons for not publishing his dispatches.[44] Nevertheless, he maintained, by Welles and Fox "not telling a single reporter near them, nor the Associated Press, that my conduct is approved presents an amount of turpitude and deception" which was impossible for him to accept. Confused and hurt, the admiral spoke of his dilemma to his wife: "I want to do what is 'right' and I hardly know myself what is right. I think I am treated *in fact* with positive contempt and so any officer would consider it.... Yet what am I to do?"[45]

Of course there was one last resort left: to see the President himself. But the admiral was too steeped in proper naval protocol to consider going over the heads of his immediate superiors in the department.[46] Such a consideration, however, did not prove bothersome to the fiery Henry Winter Davis, who, in early May, arranged to see Lincoln in Du Pont's behalf. At the outset of the meeting, Davis, in his usual direct manner, made it clear that he had come for only one reason—to present his friend's side of the dispute. Mincing few words, he stressed that the admiral had always had serious misgivings about the offensive capabilities of the monitors; that he had favored a combined sea and land operation rather than a purely naval one; and that he had all along regarded the attack as "a desperate undertaking, a Balaklava charge, risking more than success justified...." In response, Lincoln claimed that these views had never been conveyed to him by either Du Pont or the Navy Department—a statement which was not entirely truthful as the President had sat in on the Stimers meeting and had been made aware of Du Pont's reservations. At any rate, Davis, unacquainted with these facts, pointed out that Du Pont on countless occasions had expressed his sentiments to Fox, but the latter had kept them secret and had fed everyone "dreamy hopes and visions" instead of the truth, in order "to suit himself and his speculative friends...." Anxious to appease Davis who held considerable influence in radical Republican circles, Lincoln promised to call for and read Du Pont's full report on the expedition. Davis could not have been more pleased with the interview, and believed that once the President learned of the situation he would set the record straight.[47]

But as it turned out, Lincoln did not intercede. While his reasons must remain a matter of conjecture, given the absence of any evidence, it seems likely that in the President's opinion Du Pont was just another military man quick to offer excuses rather than results, a problem Lincoln had confronted time and time again during the past year. In fact, several days after Davis' interview

the Union suffered a disastrous defeat at Chancellorsville, putting the President in no mood to come to the defense of Du Pont or any other defeated officer.

The Navy Department therefore retained full control over the affair, and was now merely biding its time until a proper replacement for Du Pont could be decided upon. In late June word finally arrived; Adm. John A. Dahlgren was ordered to assume Du Pont's command.[48] "[I]t is hard after forty-seven years of service," Du Pont remarked bitterly, "... to be disposed of in this way by upstarts temporarily in office. But I am going to keep my mouth shut and take all things patiently and, I trust, wisely—[for] I am right on the record."[49]

Returning to his Delaware home in July, the Admiral spent most of the summer weighing the advice of friends and colleagues as to possible courses of action. On the one hand, his fellow officers agreed with his initial decision not to pursue the matter any further, insisting that the record spoke for itself.[50] On the other hand, the irascible Henry Winter Davis firmly believed that the "insolence and folly" of the department should not go unanswered. Du Pont, who regarded Davis as "the most intelligent" man he had ever known, seriously considered his advice even though it conflicted with his own instincts and those of his naval comrades.[51] But what finally persuaded the admiral to reverse his original stand and to respond to the department was not Davis' influence alone. On 8 September 1863, Admiral Dahlgren unsuccessfully attempted to take Charleston.[52]

A month and a half later, Du Pont sent a lengthy letter to Welles taking issue with the treatment he had received at the hands of the department, and indicating that the recent operations before Charleston sufficiently vindicated his judgment.[53] The Secretary remained unmoved. After rereading the record, he informed Du Pont that his complaints were nothing more than "wholly imaginary personal grievances," and as far as he was concerned the matter was closed.[54]

Du Pont would never again serve in a combat role. During the final month of the war, however, he was appointed, at the insistence of Adm. David Farragut, to a board assigned to recommend promotions for officers who had compiled outstanding records. While performing these duties, he took ill and died on 23 June 1865.[55]

For Du Pont as well as the Administration the controversy over the Charleston attack was indeed "a regrettable episode."[56] Perhaps the admiral was remiss in not pressing his views vigorously enough upon those in Washington; and perhaps the President and his Secretaries were blinded to the risks involved because of the public clamor for victory. But once the battle was fought there was much to be learned from the experience. Instead, the Secretary (and the Under Secretary) chose to hide their blunders, break their promises, and make Du Pont the scapegoat for the repulse—actions which in the end did nothing to advance the Union cause.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

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21. Du Pont to Gideon Welles, 28 January 1863, in Hayes, ed., v. II, p. 387.

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45. Du Pont to Mrs. Du Pont, 17 May 1863, in *ibid.*, v. III, pp. 118-120.

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47. Davis to Du Pont [3 May 1863], in *ibid.*, v. III, pp. 79-84; Davis to Mrs. Du Pont, 4 May 1863, Du Pont Papers; Davis to Abraham Lincoln, 4 Mey 1863, Robert Todd Lincoln Collection, Library of Congress.

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51. Davis to Mrs. Du Pont, 30 June 1863, Davis to Du Pont, 4 August 1863, Du Pont Papers; Du Pont to Mrs. Du Pont, 5 June 1863, in Hayes, ed., v. III, p. 163.

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

SET AND DRIFT

ASSESSING THE CAPABILITY OF NAVAL FORCES

by

Commander Ralph V. Buck, U.S. Navy

Introduction. In assessing military capability, careful judgments by seasoned military and civilian professionals never can be entirely supplanted by mathematical analysis. However, such judgment can be aided and improved through the use of selected quantitative measures and assessments. The degree to which this process is successful depends on how well it meets the needs of a particular assessment problem and the understanding that operators and analysts have of the role of combat modeling.

Historically, analysis of military capabilities has proceeded from the simple to the complex; from the description of physical performance characteristics, to single system encounters, to battle and theater force actions. Many attempts have been made to carry the level of detail from the simple to the complex by a form of building block, or modular, aggregation. Such attempts, while intuitively appealing, are carried out at great monetary cost (development, computer running time, etc.) and understanding (loss of general knowledge of model details, and proliferation of the number of possible combinations of the inputs).

Key difficulties encountered can be grouped as follows:

- Complexity of military activities often exceeds computation capacity and time available to develop the model.
- Level of detail is often aggregated to reduce complexity, thereby biasing the results by the necessary assumptions.[1]
- Physical theory is deficient in uniformly predicting results from initial conditions. Static measures such as firepower indices do not easily decompose to show the time history of each element's contribution.
- The modeling hierarchy is nonlinear in the sense that higher level resource allocation models depend on interaction factors developed in lower level models, which in turn depend on the output of the upper models.

To address these difficulties, some assessments[2] have taken a top-down approach, in which highly aggregated models develop those interaction

processes that are central contributors to the outcome. Additional details are then supplied as the analysis proceeds step-by-step down the hierarchy, tracking through relevant details of the problem. This approach depends on certain heuristic rules, to ensure a reasonable link between physical parameters and aggregate capability measures, and looping methods, involving the exercise of models at several levels in carefully prescribed sequences.

A top-down approach tends to involve military experience and judgment in the early stages of an assessment in which general courses of action are identified. Subsequent elaborations then integrate the knowledge and judgment of specialists in operations, systems, and technology.

This article examines various quantitative assessment measures for military forces, ranging from static comparisons of combat strength to dynamic simulation and gaming models and their aggregated inputs and outputs. The methodology of assessment will be discussed and related to its techniques and applications.

Static Analysis. Because the general objective of assessing military capability is a comparison with some threat, most net assessments of military balance start by comparing numbers of opposing combat forces. Some base the count on like items of similar equipment, such as fighter squadrons, patrol gunboats, or divisions. Such counts are overly simple as opposing forces are seldom symmetrically composed or arrayed but they are easy to present in overview form. Some experienced strategists[3] and naval leaders[4] have argued for basing counts on a comparison of forces whose objectives are opposed, e.g., offensive vs. defensive weapons or sea control vs. sea denial forces. Such counts are not easily presented and run the risk of double counting, as many major systems are multipurpose.

Some assessments attempt to show how technology and manpower are related. The analytical techniques are usually based on a form of production theory, in which unlike inputs are merged and organized in a complex process to produce "levels of defense." The analytical difficulty arises from a need to consider qualitative differences between elements that make up the inputs[5] and to define output measures that are useful in comparing opposing forces.

The most widely used measures for comparing unlike forces have been indices of firepower capability. The crudest of these is a ratio formed from the sums of major equipment items in opposing units,[6] while a more sophisticated approach aggregates unlike systems. Most assessments will use one of two methods: judgmental or laboratory.

Judgmental firepower measures are usually produced by experienced military officers. Relative effectiveness estimates can also be compared with historical data and refined through consensus. This process is the basis for many recent balance assessments, including Presidential Review Memorandum-10.[7] Each weapon is assigned a Weapons Effectiveness Index expressed as some standard such as "tank equivalent" or "air wing equivalent."

Laboratory indices are target specific and are usually derived from engineering design and test data on the lethal area of projectile fragments (or tank kill probability, etc., as appropriate). Summing the indices of all weapons in a unit yields an Index of Combat Effectiveness. Some have argued that as much subjective judgment enters the derivation of these indices as for the judgmental ones.[8]

While firepower indices are satisfactory for some assessments, military experience suggests that numbers and firepower alone may not always determine the outcome. Considerations of relative force quality can enter assess-

ments explicitly in the form of readiness categories and behavioral/historical adjustments,[9] and implicitly in the manner in which firepower scores are generated.

Allied to quality factors are adjustments made to reflect differences arising from attacking or defending strategies.[10] Such adjustments have inconclusive historical basis, derive from traditional military thumb rules, and are meant to apply to limited engagements. Such adjustments can also enter into the calculation of firepower scores and should not be applied repeatedly in the assessment process.

Static analyses go beyond order-of-battle listings and, though limited to a given point in time, provide insights into possible results of conflict. They can even be constructed to show relative capabilities at several times during mobilization or confrontation but they do not portray the actual process of conflict. This is the special domain of dynamic analyses.

Dynamic Analysis. Dynamic analyses encompass a wide range of models, simulations, and games that concentrate on the course of conflict. They are generally based on data similar to those used to produce static measures, but extend the analysis through time-dependent capability estimates. This extension increases the complexity of assumptions, calculations, and interpretation. The increase in assumptions alone provides fertile area for disagreement on the outcomes of such analyses. For this reason they are most useful in assessing fighting potential "on the margin," as inputs are varied to reflect uncertainty in value.

To deal with the complexities in combat modeling, many techniques have evolved. One ranks various models according to the degree of conflict involved and the treatment of reality. Thus, analytical models are carefully bounded treatments with a range of conflict axiomatically incorporated. War games are broader in scope and generally model intense levels of conflict. A number of gaming models have been developed and used for analysis of each level of force engagement. As mentioned earlier, results of each level have been used as inputs for higher and lower levels of analysis. Interactions normally follow this scheme:[11]

- One-on-one engagement;
- Multiple system encounter;
- Battle analysis;
- Campaign or theater analysis;
- Global analysis.

A *one-on-one engagement* is an encounter between two opposing units. Examples are a single ship countering the attack of an antiship cruise missile or a single submarine in an antisubmarine warfare (ASW) barrier station attempting to detect and attack transiting enemy submarines.

One-on-one engagements are routinely examined for all weapon systems. The quantitative techniques that have been used range from hand calculations of simple equations to complex, detailed, computer simulations. This level of analysis treats the threat explicitly and requires estimates of the characteristics, capabilities, employment, and tactics of both U.S. and threat systems. Most of the inputs and assumptions are sufficiently uncertain that the engagements must be analyzed using a range of input values to determine the sensitivity of the analytical results to critical assumptions.

One-on-one analysis is particularly useful because of its simplicity and because a specific threat can be "played" against a weapon system under consideration. This level of analysis can be useful in evaluating complementary or substitute weapon systems in several possible roles (for example, a patrol aircraft in a barrier or area search role). However, one-on-one analysis does not consider the multiple threat or multiple weapon system employment

that characterizes most military engagements, and is therefore of limited use.

The *multiple system engagement* extends the scope of analysis to include a number of similar units of each side. For example, the single, antiship missile attack on a surface combatant can be expanded to a multiple missile attack on a surface ship formation. This analysis permits considering the effects of mutual support and coordination between units, command and control, and degradation because of saturated defenses.

The extension of quantitative analysis to treat multiple unit encounters requires additional inputs, including estimates of the employment and tactics of each side's forces and of the degradation of weapon systems performance caused by multiple threats. The uncertainty in both inputs and outputs of this analysis generally exceeds that which is found in lower level analyses. Sensitivity analysis can be used to set limits on the uncertainty, but the uncertainty remains a fundamental problem that cannot be eliminated.

Multiple system analysis can be applied to the same types of problems for which one-on-one analysis is used. Weapon systems can be compared in multiple-threat encounters and alternative employments of systems can be investigated. In addition, situations beyond the scope of one-on-one analysis, such as antiair warfare (AAW) command and control systems for surface combatants, can be examined.

Battle analysis is the extension of multiple system analysis to examine multiple attackers of several types against multiple defenses that include different type forces. Some models use expected value probability calculations,[12] but most use Monte Carlo (stochastic) simulations programmed for large capacity digital computers. Battle analysis comes close to modeling realistic engagements involving mixes of forces on each side; it examines the contributions of different types of weapon systems; and it can be used to examine trade-offs between additional old systems and the design of new systems to complement existing capabilities. In general, detailed modeling of physical characteristics is replaced by relationships between various lower level indices or measures of effectiveness (MOE). The complexities are reflected more by the modeling process than by these effectiveness indices. Other techniques, such as Lanchester's attrition models,[13] supplement the detailed battle models. In some applications the costs of forces are considered in order to determine the least cost force that would achieve a specified outcome (or effectiveness) in a given encounter.

The uncertainty existing in the inputs is significant and must be considered in interpreting the results of battle analyses. For example, in ASW study the least-cost alternative could change from an airborne system to a submarine system when poor environmental conditions are assumed instead of good environmental conditions. Contingency and sensitivity analyses can be used to identify the assumptions or inputs that have the most significant effects on the study's results, but it is the judgment of relative importance of different sets of conditions that is critical to applying the study results to a particular problem or decision.

Campaign analysis is the application of analytic techniques to examine the quantitative outcome of a large-scale military campaign consisting of a series of battles or engagements extending over a considerable period of time. This level of analysis has been used for most net assessments of relative capability and, the most notable of these applications has been to assess the effectiveness of U.S. and Allied general-purpose naval forces to defend essential sea lines of communications during a conventional war. Land campaign analyses have generally centered on the NATO Central Front.

Models used in campaign analysis require the calculation of the outcome of the campaign on an engagement-by-engagement basis and then an aggregation of the results. Engagements are examined following a specified sequence or schedule. For each engagement the opposing forces are determined, the outcome is derived from supporting analyses, force levels are adjusted to reflect losses, and units are redeployed for the next engagement. Figure 1 outlines the process, typically accompanied by a cost model in force level studies.

Some extensions to campaign analysis address the question of what force mix and level would be the best compromise for two or more tasks. Two force optimization methodologies that have been developed will be described briefly for illustrative purposes.[14]

The first was developed by the Institute for Defense Analyses in its 1970 Navy Force Structure Study. Two opposing forces, Blue and Red, were considered. A campaign model calculated the outcome based on:

- a definition of tasks Blue wished to accomplish,
- a set of tactics to be employed by Red to prevent Blue from accomplishing his tasks, and
- an estimate of the capabilities of each element of the forces of Blue and Red.

The model was then used to determine a table of outcomes when Blue forces were varied systematically while Red forces, the tactics of both sides, and Blue objectives were held constant. Peacetime costs were calculated for each force mix examined and the least-cost force mix to achieve a given level of campaign outcome was determined.

In the Navy's 1968-1969 ASW Force Level Study (unpublished), a campaign model was used to generate a set of results as a function of the force levels of one combatant by solving a zero-sum, two-person game in which the objective



Fig. 1—Campaign Analysis

of one side was to maximize the peacetime cost of ships sunk, while the objective of the other side was to minimize these same costs.

Optimization techniques have been used extensively in the analysis of strategic nuclear warfare in which interactions tend to be tractable to the use of static measures, but have had only limited acceptance in the evaluation of general-purpose force effectiveness in which multiple measures and missions greatly complicate the analysis.

A *global analysis* involves trade-offs among national objectives. Assessments are generally made in terms of national economic, political, and social factors.[15] Some conceptual approaches at this level are based on game theory, but there are vast quantification difficulties for relevant strategy and payoff measures. Complexities are thus represented in the measures, while modeling is relatively straightforward.

Mission Effectiveness Analysis. Prior to 1960 analytic support for defense program decisions consisted of one-on-one engagements, many-on-many engagements and, in some instances, battle analysis. Typically, analysis was used to help decide the characteristics of new weapons, ships, and aircraft.

The appointment of Mr. McNamara as Secretary of Defense in 1960 resulted in increased application of quantitative analysis to the defense decision process. He directed the services to study the effectiveness of their forces in accomplishing specific missions. The results of these studies were then used as the basis for service proposals of force levels and new procurement. Large-scale Navy studies of the capabilities or effectiveness of general-purpose naval forces have included the CYCLOPS series (1963-66), War at Sea series (1966-69), Major Fleet Escort Force Level study (1967), ASW Force Level study (1970), Naval Requirements and Capabilities—General-Purpose Forces study (1971), SEAMIX series (1972-74), and SEA WAR 85 (1979).

Typically, a campaign scenario is based upon available forces and assumed strategies, and analyzed using outputs from lower level analyses of specific engagements or battles. In general, expected value calculations are used to derive an estimate of the average outcome of the campaign being analyzed (forces lost, etc.). Usually no estimate of the statistical uncertainty, (or dispersion) of the predicted results is obtained. To account for the presence of uncertainty, cases are analyzed for a range of input values or with specific assumptions relaxed in order to determine the sensitivity of the results to those inputs and assumptions that significantly affect the output. "Marginal analysis," involving making relatively small additions or reductions to the forces or weapon systems of one side, can be used to support decisions on allocations of resources, or in identifying the likely effects of trends away from expected results.

Mission effectiveness analysis can be divided into three fundamental components: supporting analyses; scenario assumptions and other inputs; and an aggregating methodology. Figure 2 shows a schematic diagram of the relationship of these three components.[16]

A number of combat models and simulations have been developed for analysis of specific warfare areas. Such models draw heavily on the quantitative principles of game theory (goal-oriented conflict behavior), Lanchester's equations (mass, technology, and firepower effects on battle), search and detection theory, network analysis, and dynamic programming (sequential decision models) etc.

The controlling factor in all areas of analysis is the *quality of the inputs.* The analyses examine complicated engagements whose results are functions of many variables, among which complex relationships often exist. Many of these



Fig. 2—Schematic Diagram of Navy Mission Effectiveness Analysis

variables are difficult to quantify and estimate precisely. For example, such factors as false submarine contacts, countermeasures, and command and control are difficult to incorporate in the calculations used to determine the MOE. Other factors, such as enemy force levels and weapon characteristics, may not be precisely known. And some factors, such as enemy objectives, strategy, and tactics, must be assumed in a somewhat arbitrary manner. Finally, most MOE are only indirectly related to the objective being pursued by a party to a conflict.

The objectives of a particular analysis will determine the appropriate role of threat analysis. For instance, it probably would not be necessary to perform a detailed analysis of the entire Soviet submarine force when examining the choice between alternative ASW helicopters. Such an analysis would be appropriate in determining the best ASW force mix, however.

In these days when heated debate over 5-year shipbuilding plans injects uncertainty in the ability to estimate the size and capability of our own future fleet, one is bound to question estimates of the threat. In this regard, campaign analyses have a twofold problem. If the threat estimates vary significantly from reality it is possible to optimize against the wrong threat (one is reminded of the history of antiair warfare systems). On the other hand, detailed, realistic and accurate threat models entail a cost that may be out of proportion to the analytical objectives.

All of the preceding factors introduce uncertainty into the results derived by any analysis and reduce confidence in the absolute value of the results. However, this reduced confidence does not necessarily affect the use of the analysis as many of the questions asked depend upon relative results (i.e., how does the magnitude of the MOE change as different elements are varied).

Because increases in the MOE correspond to improvements in performance (independent of the magnitude of the MOE), these analyses can help evaluate which of several alternative systems, application of forces, allocation of resources, tactics, etc., produces the most effective results.

Still, there is the problem of quality or relevance of the data inputs. Operational test data may be scarce and contain major uncertainties. There is also a great deal of subjectivity in combining the contributions of several types of systems. Uneasiness about the utility of aggregate indices leads to development of more detailed campaign models for which more detailed data must be found. Lacking adequate test data, historical empirical data (attended by problems involving cause and effect) or study outputs (bearing an incestuous connotation) may be sought. The situation argues strongly for greater emphasis on the operationally determined data.

The *aggregating methodology* is the process used to combine the results of individual engagements or battles in order to determine the outcome of a campaign. An aggregating methodology is essentially a bookkeeping system that goes through the scenario events or engagements sequentially. For each event, supporting analysis is used to determine the outcome of the event. The methodology then requires the adjustment of the forces on both sides, making of any necessary changes in the schedule of future events, recording all data of interest, and moving on to the next event. When all events have been examined, a summary of the results of the campaign is produced.

There are two basic types of aggregating methodologies. The first consists of combining manual calculations with computer support so that tactics and force deployments can be adjusted during the campaign. The second consists of an entirely computerized model. Through a series of iterations, the analyst attempts to determine the best tactics for each side. Most comparisons of the results of studies that used the manual calculation methodology with results of computer simulations, using exactly the same inputs and scenario assumptions, indicate that there is little difference in the final results. A significant exception to this general finding is in interactive computer gaming, a technique whereby human decisionmakers actively interact with the computer-based output.[17] Using such techniques, a wide range of alternatives can be accommodated for investigation. A particular "play," however, may involve only a limited set of alternatives being considered by the decisionmaker player.

Almost all mission effectiveness analysis has been campaign-level analysis of conflict. For analyses involving only the threat of conflict, the methodologies do not generally apply. The major difficulties have been selection of appropriate quantitative MOE and interpretation of the results.

Assessing the Assessments. Theorists from many disciplines have contributed the rigor and logic necessary to the detailed investigation of combat. Analysts have painstakingly investigated past events and current systems for the quantitative and qualitative links between policy and outcome. Military and civilian strategists and tacticians have applied the light of their experience and judgment to construction of exercises, identification of cause and effect, and the structure of likely scenarios. Yet, in study after study, not only is there widespread disagreement on the merits of the analysis, but considerable concern that we may not be using the proper scales to measure the balance between national military capabilities.

Estimates of future performance are notoriously optimistic. This state of affairs generally derives from two conditions. First, predictive models necessarily assume logical and complete links

between what is known and what is surmised, and take an axiomatic approach to order the "significant" variables. Such logic rarely is observable in practice, either because it is lacking or is masked by other considerations. The second condition is related to this masking of reality in that factors that are incompletely perceived or understood may be excluded from consideration. Such factors generally relate to degraded performance. Meanwhile, the search for a unifying theory of combat proceeds, however elusively.

Few combat models can be validated in the sense of repeatable scientific experiments. The roots of this limitation lie in the almost limitless combinations of the events that make up a combat interaction, as well as the limitations on measuring the variables with sufficient accuracy. Thus, the "random" nature of combat. Consider, too, that while current events never exactly duplicate past events, the nature of the differences cannot always be determined. This certainly calls into question the relevance of judgment based on military experience as well as the logic of analytical models.

Models stand midway between general theory and practice. They are means to extract specific hypotheses from general considerations. Any attribution of model properties to the "original" can only yield an imperfect analogy. Indeed, the central purpose of combat modeling is to develop hypotheses about those capabilities and strengths that decisively influence battle outcomes and to trace the cause-and-effect relationships.

Military objectives are not related directly to most quantifiable measures of effectiveness. The achievement of objectives is generally a multidimensional problem in relating outputs to inputs of the combat process. The uncertainty involved in combining measures results in an inability to predict definitively the "winner" of a particular battle or campaign. Indeed, most analyses carry the caveat that the results provide useful insights but should not be used to predict "how much is enough" or "who will win." Unfortunately, this provides no insight into the relations between what the model does and does not consider.

Department of the Navy force assessments rest heavily on the methodology described in this paper and it must always be borne in mind that they are derived from:

- Objectives for which reliable and comprehensive measures are difficult to define,
- Patterns of force commitments which rely on sound military judgment,[18]
- Aggregated inputs and the use of adjustments made to reflect unquantified relationships,
- The analysis of low-level engagements from physical or statistical models based on data containing many types of uncertainty.

While sensitivity analysis is the usual means to deal with such difficulties, most campaign analyses produce extreme results when attempts are made to define the upper and lower bounds of uncertain inputs.

Fortunately, with all the limitations described, capability analysis still makes significant contributions to force structure decisions and resource allocation planning. Problems are subjected to logical and structured representations that sort out the alternatives, risks, and interrelationships among key elements. Debate can be focused on critical issues and both analyst and operator can determine, examine, and refine the choices of scenarios, strategies, tactical development and evaluation, data collection requirements, and the design of drills, exercises and rehearsals.

NOTES

1. For example, specific assumptions must be made regarding targeting, weapon mix, ammunition consumption, fire control, etc. These assumptions then remain constant throughout the engagement, though the factors affecting them may not.

2. See, for example, work done in 1974 by John R. Bode for Braddock, Dunn and McDonald Corporation, as reported in the Gaming and Simulation Working Group papers of the 35th MORS, and Henry Young, *Hierarchical Analysis of Naval Operations*, Center for Advanced Research, U.S. Naval War College, 1 January 1975.

3. Robert L. Fischer, *Defending the Central Front: The Balance of Forces* (London: ISSS, Adelphi Paper No. 127, Autumn 1976).

4. Stansfield Turner, "The Naval Balance: Not Just a Numbers Game," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1977, pp. 339-354.

5. Both manpower and weapons are further defined by quality factors (e.g., distribution of weapons among units, as well as the "tooth-to-tail" composition of a combat force, affects the results of engagements).

6. Such ratios lead to statements, for example, that based on missiles carried, the Soviet SLBM forces are 1/3 more powerful than the U.S. SLBM force.

7. Congressional Budget Office, *Assessing the NATO/Warsaw Pact Military Balance*, Budget Issue Paper, December 1977.

8. J.A. Stockfisch, *Models, Data, and War: A Critique of the Study of Conventional Forces* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation Report R-1526-PR: March 1975), pp. 31-33. Stockfisch argues that lethal area depends partly on projectile burst height, angle of fall, and target vulnerability. These are functions of tactics. He gives an example of human incapacitation factors subjectively derived from animal testing.

9. The advantage of Arab manpower or firepower prior to each Arab-Israeli conflict since the 1960s was about 4:1. Most analysts agree that such quality factors as discipline, leadership, and training can compensate for relative deficiencies in other areas. Most military men hold similar views.

10. Generally accepted examples of attacker/defender ratios for several combat modes are:

Breakthrough	(5:1)
Offensive	(3:1)
Prepared defense	(1.7:1)
Hasty defense	(1.4:1)

11. See E.L. Woisard, ed., *Mission Effectiveness Analysis of General Purpose Naval Forces* (U), (Washington: U.S. Office of Chief of Naval Operations, c1974), SECRET, and John R. Bode, "Indices of Effectiveness in General Purpose Force Analysis" (BDM Corporation Technical Report W-74-070: October 1974).

12. See, particularly, Annex 1 to Appendix F of the *Sea Based Air Platform Cost/Benefit Study* (U), (Center for Naval Analyses CNS 1110: January 1978). SECRET

13. An excellent tutorial on the current state of development and application of these models can be found in James G. Taylor, "A Tutorial on Lanchester-Type Models of Warfare," from the *Proceedings of the 35th MORS*, December 1975 (Conference held July 1975).

14. Woisard, p. 7.

15. See Roy S. Cline, *World Power Assessment 1977* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977). Cline uses various ranking, scaling, and weighting schemes to rate "world power" for many nations. Additive and multiplicative linear expressions for five major determinants of power, each composed of several attributes, are derived. Politicomilitary games played within the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization offer other illustrations of global analysis.

16. See Woisard, p. 451, and note the parallel with posture statements of the Chiefs of Naval Operations in the late 1970s. Similar to Figure 1, but with a task emphasis.

17. The Naval War College has employed various forms of interactive gaming over the years; manual games gave way to the machine-assisted NEWS, and the current digital computer-supported WARS. Plans are presently well along for a major update to the system that will permit remote play of several games at once. An interactive ASW resource allocation campaign game was developed by the Applied Physics Lab of Johns Hopkins University and the Navy Strategic Analysis Support Group (now part of Op-604 in the Office of the CNO) in the early 1970s. Results were input to global strategic exchange models.

18. The process of combat presumably derives from sound military judgment which commits forces only when success is indicated. That engagements can then occur between rational commanders illustrates the ultimate illogic of war.

SOLZHENITSYN IN HARVARD YARD: AN OLD BELIEVER SPOKE FROM THE NEW WORLD

by

W.F. Long, Jr.

When Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn appeared as the commencement speaker in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in June 1978, his audience was not the umbrella-sheltered Americans in Harvard Yard. His words were aimed at those in the Kremlin. He was using a podium in the New World to express in a friendly public atmosphere the same ideas that had been received in hostile silence when he wrote them privately in his "Letters to the Soviet Leaders" on 5 September 1973.

Whatever Americans may have anticipated in Solzhenitsyn's appearance, most recorded reactions to his views of the West ignore the intentions of the speaker. They are unquestionably colored by the bias of the Western listener. Those who listened to or read the speech are troubled by the cast it gives to some basic Western institutions and convictions. *Time* magazine asked several members of the "ruling groups and the intellectual elite," who were accused of being particularly noticeable in exhibiting a decline in civil courage, the question, "Is Solzhenitsyn right?" The answers, perforce compressed or distilled to save space, tended toward the respondent's own persuasions and translated parts of his speech into the total message. They heard with Western ears and saw with Western eyes. It is recorded that in 1867 Dostoevsky was exasperated with the expatriate Turgenev's antagonism to Russophils and Slavophils and advised Turgenev that if he was trying to write about Russia he should use a telescope "because Russia is a great distance from here (Baden-Baden)." This was Russian malice and an insult to a Russian. Without malice, it may be good advice to Westerners. In most dealings with the Soviet Union or Russians, Americans reach for the mirror instead of a telescope. We look for a reflection of ourselves, rather than choosing the power of observation to magnify our knowledge of Russia and the Russians.

Solzhenitsyn is not an expatriate. He did not choose the West. He is not another distinguished refugee from a totalitarian government abjectly grateful to embrace American "freedom" and to enjoy the "good life." His 1978 speech to Americans and his 1973 letter to Soviet leaders demonstrate that he may not be able to understand the freedom of Western life and, to the extent that he does, he does not like it. He does not like Marxism, either, considering it a superficial Western economic theory. What he likes—loves—is Russia, real Russia—Russia uncorrupted by the West and what the West conceives as "progress."

Solzhenitsyn is an "Old Believer," a 17th-century Raskolnik, resisting the incursions of unsettling, unorthodox, un-Russian ideas with the same courage and single-mindedness demonstrated historically in the physical exertions of Russian people against military invasions by foreign armies. "Old Believers" were the Russian orthodox Christians who resisted the corrections of the perversions that had crept into Russian orthodoxy even down to correcting the spelling of Jesus' name to Iisus, which had been improperly translated from the Greek as Isus. One monastery (Solovetsk) carried on an organized re-

sistance for 8 years and had to be overcome by an army assault. Through persecution "Old Believers" became stronger morally and, in the larger context, Raskolnik communities became centers for popular discontent.

In speaking over American heads Solzhenitsyn was speaking to the leaders of Russia in continuation and expansion of his 1973 letter—and at the same time maintaining the integrity of his character in exile in Vermont, just as he had in prison in the "Gulag Archipelago." There are two fundamental themes in his 1973 letter: "... the chief dangers facing our country in the next ten to thirty years ... are: war with China, and our destruction, together with Western civilization, in the crush and stench of a befouled earth."

Harvard Yard was not the place to review his fears of Russian ideological war with China; it provided an ideal platform to embellish his estimate of "the West on its knees"—to round out the thought brushed over in 1973 when he wrote:

> The catastrophic weakening of the Western world and the whole of Western civilization is by no means due solely to the success of an irresistible, persistent Soviet foreign policy. It is, rather, the result of an historical, psychological and moral crisis affecting the entire culture and world outlook which were conceived at the time of the Renaissance and attained the peak of their expression with the eighteenth century Enlightenment. *An analysis of that crisis is beyond the scope of this letter.* (emphasis added)

The construction of the speech in general looks at the weakening of the Western World and leads from an allegation of a decline in civil courage through a description of paralyzing legalism to a culminating attack on the free press that would have done credit to Admiral Shishkov (who proposed a statute of censorship to Tsar Nicholas I designed to render printing "harmless"). Nowhere in this speech does Solzhenitsyn reflect his traditional Russianness more profoundly than in his attitude toward the press. As the West understands freedom, it is based upon uninhibited discourse; and, if there is to be true freedom, there must be no restrictions on speech—or writing. This concept is completely foreign to Russian practice—and possibly to Russian imagination—because of the great differences in the religious, social and political experience of the Russians.

The persistent thrust of Western history has been illuminated in the struggle of the individual against all authoritarian restraints. Further, the genius of the West has been displayed in preserving order at the lower levels of authority. In Russia, whenever the autocrat could not impose order, anarchy prevailed and Russia would be riven internally and, in a weakened condition, assailed from without. It is hard for an American to understand the Russian people begging and pleading with the cruel ruler Ivan IV to return to Moscow from his mysterious, self-imposed exile. In so doing they gladly agreed to his terms that no objections were to be made to any executions or humiliations he exacted, and they rejoiced in his return to what can only be regarded as a monstrous indulgence of unmitigated personal power. Yet the Russians knew the alternatives and chose authority. Upon Ivan's death, conditions growing out of the crisis in central authority were so desperate that, even in that country that has suffered so much, the period is known as the "Time of Troubles."

A free, uncontrolled press is the marshalling yard of all enemies of absolute authority, and control of the press has been practiced by all autocrats in Russia. After centuries of arbitrary and whimsical censorship of the most intimidating sort, the one great press reform

in Russia lasted for less than 40 years. This act of 1865 simply replaced preliminary censorship (the presentation of proposed writings to the censor in advance) with punitive censorship, which was not in the hands of the judiciary but was retained by administrative authority. Even this amount of freedom was soon eroded by the restrictions of 1868 (certain papers could be sold only to regular subscribers), 1871 (magazines again subjected to preliminary censorship) and 1873 (the Minister of the Interior could forbid discussion of subjects designated as "matters of state" for 3 months). The position of the Russian revolutionaries of 1917 and that of succeeding Soviet governments with respect to control of the press is well known. The point is that control of the press is traditional in Russia. Although Solzhenitsyn has suffered a fate similar to that of the patriotic Slavophils of the 19th century who had to publish their writings outside Russia and were punished for speaking out, this has not generated in Solzhenitsyn a fervor for freedom of the press. He takes a peculiarly Russian view.

Long before the so-called Press Reform of 1865, Russian autocrats had occasionally considered opinions of distinguished writers submitted in the form of private communications—just like Solzhenitsyn's "Letter to the Soviet Leaders." While the free press acts as the spur and conscience of rulers of the West, "writers" have attempted this role in Russia. It can be expected that the Russian tradition is less strident, more intellectual and (in arrogating to itself clear vision and moral rectitude) authoritarian. When Solzhenitsyn criticizes the Western press, he is, perhaps subconsciously but certainly invidiously, comparing the nobility, consistency and qualities of expression of his integrated views with the messy vacillation and transient poundings of the American press. Solzhenitsyn is authoritarian in his dissidence and this leads to the most curious—and illuminating—juxtaposition of ideas in his speech. He rebukes the West for a lack of civil courage and later accuses American political leaders of being shortsighted and the American intelligentsia of losing its nerve—and the Vietnam war. He has it all wrong. It was exactly a great expression of civil courage that forced the whole nation (including those in authority responsible for it) to justify the Vietnam twilight war; and it was a free press, moving from acceptance of the official estimates to reporting that was not politically controlled (as military reporting is), that led to a change in policy. However, in the context of warning the Soviet leaders in 1973 of the need to reject Marxism and substitute for it patriotism in anticipation of an impending war with China, Solzhenitsyn had already rendered his judgment.

> Beware when the first cannons fire on the Sino-Soviet border lest you find yourselves in a double precarious position because the national consciousness in our country has become stunted and blurred—witness how mighty America lost to tiny North Vietnam, how easily the nerves of American society and American youth gave way, precisely because the United States has a weak and undeveloped national consciousness.

The final curiosity with regard to Solzhenitsyn's view of the Vietnam war is in laying at the door of the U.S. anti-(Vietnam) war movement the betraying of Vietnam and Cambodia into genocide and suffering; but this and his inveighing against Western legalism and naivete regarding Communist world strategy can best be understood by contrasting what he advises Americans regarding foreign involvement and what he wrote in 1973 to the Soviet leaders:

> Give them their ideology. Let the Chinese leaders glory in it for a while. And, for that matter, let

> them shoulder the whole sackful of unfulfillable international obligations, let them grunt and heave and instruct humanity, and foot the bills for their absurd economics (a million a day just to Cuba) and let them support terrorists and guerrillas in the Southern Hemisphere, if they like.

If Americans take his advice, they will, as champions of morality, fight the worldwide evils of communism; and, if Soviet leaders take his advice, they will let China prevail on the international ideological scene and China will be the instrument of worldwide Communist involvement.

Many Americans have likened Solzhenitsyn to an Old Testament prophet. If this is so, he is not for us a Jeremiah exhorting sinners to turn back to God, but rather a Jonah whose desire is less to save an alien Ninevah than to be established as right in his own prophecies—and where it counts, at home in Russia. And it is in Russian history that we must find our bearings on this remarkable man, not in just his courageous deeds—and certainly not in just his words in Harvard Yard.

> I wish all people well, and the closer they are to us and the more dependent upon us, the more fervent is my wish. But it is the fate of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples that preoccupies me above all, for, as the proverb says: It's where you're born that you can be most useful. And there is a deeper reason, too: the incomparable sufferings of our people.
>
> I am writing this letter on the *supposition* that you too are swayed by this primary concern, that you are not alien to your origins, to your fathers, grandfathers and great grandfathers, and that you are conscious of your nationality . . . .

Solzhenitsyn then continues to invoke for the Soviet leaders all the traditional roots of Russian patriotism—Russian earth, Russian Orthodox Christianity, reverence for purely Russian history and heroes. He is rooted in the heartland of Russia and riveted to the conservative mentality of the "Old Believer" and Slavophils who lost the struggle to save Russia from the Westernizers in the 17th century. Nikon, who reformed the Russian Orthodox Church in 1654; Peter I, who opened Russia to the West; Karl Marx, the author of the alien ideology endangering modern Russia—all are enemies and for the same reason. Nikon as Patriarch forced the Russian church into line with its Greek origins, creating a schism in the church, bloodshed in the land, and a resentment that lives on today. Peter I forced a reluctant Russia's face to the West and it is significant that Solzhenitsyn, in writing to his Soviet masters, uses the name Petersburg—not Leningrad nor even the Russianized name Petrograd adopted at the outbreak of World War I. This is deliberate. Petersburg is a Teutonic name—alien. The struggle between the corrupting West, epitomized in St. Petersburg, and Holy Mother Moscow is replete in Russian literature. It is often difficult for Westerners to grasp—sometimes subtle as in Tolstoy's *Anna Karenina* and allusive as in Pushkin's *Bronze Horseman*. In Solzhenitsyn's case, it is also clear where he always stands. In his 1973 letter his heroes are the Slavophils and "Old Believers" and the villains are all Westerners—and the Harvard Yard expression of Solzhenitsyn's low opinion of the West and the institutions of democracy are consistent. He does not admire the election process: "Argue in all sincerity that we are not adherents of that turbulent 'democracy run riot' in which once every four years the politician, and indeed the entire country, nearly kill themselves over an electoral campaign trying to gratify the masses . . . . " Nor

was democratic legalism spared in 1973 any more than in 1978: " . . . in which a judge, flouting his obligatory independence in order to pander to the passions of society, acquits a man who, during an exhausting war, steals and publishes Defense Department documents."

Solzhenitsyn's alternative to Western democracy is presented in this view:

> Should we record as our democratic tradition the Land assemblies of Muscovite Russia, Novgorod, the early Cossacks, the village commune? Or should we console ourselves with the thought that for a thousand years Russia lived with an authoritarian order—and at the beginning of the twentieth century both the physical and spiritual health of her people were still intact?

However, authority must have a strong moral foundation. It is his conception of the moral force that is central:

> Yes, of course, freedom is moral. But only if it keeps within certain bounds, beyond which it degenerates into complacency and licentiousness. And order is not immoral if it means a calm and stable system. But order, too, has its limits, beyond which it degenerates into arbitrariness and tyranny.

It is good for Americans to hear and to learn from a Russian whose character, courage and skill challenged oppression in the Soviet Union and won him world acclaim. It is time that we tried to understand and respect Russians for their great accomplishments under gigantic challenges of climate, location and history. However, much of what Solzhenitsyn says has been said by other Russians whose lives and minds were admirable. Constantine Petrovich Pobedonostsev, a distinguished jurist and Procurator of the Holy Synod under Tsar Alexander III, was characterized as a man with a powerful intellect and unimpeachable honor. He, too, attacked freedom of the press (because it was sometimes misused), trial by jury and parliamentary elections. He did so lucidly and brilliantly. So, much as we admire Solzhenitsyn's character and accomplishments, we cannot accept his judgments about our freedom nor his ideas as fresh, clear insights—and certainly not accept his views or their interpretations as a strategy for achieving democracy's best interests or brightest future.

He is a Russian, a distinguished Russian, but a man first cloistered by fate and now by choice. Out of his imprisonment and exile he periodically emerges and speaks. Our hearts are his because his character has withstood oppression and his spirit is still strong; our minds must be our own, because in the extramural world of the West it requires a different, and perhaps even tougher, mentality to withstand the pressures of freedom as well as the assaults against it.

SOLZHENITSYN AND THE QUEST FOR THE HOLY GRAIL

by

William R.D. Jones

Now that the clamor and emotion over Solzhenitsyn's 1978 Harvard speech have subsided, it seems time for a calm, objective comment. It takes a certain temerity—perhaps even arrogance—to take issue with a man who is truly a giant of his time and who has endured so much. Solzhenitsyn probably knows the real meaning of human suffering and comprehends the limits of the human spirit as much as anyone alive. I dare to take issue, however, because the underlying thread weaving his argument is a direct reflection of the pathos and tragedy that has plagued Russia over the past two millenia, and provides us with much insight into the intellectual heritage of the man himself.

Unlike some who have commented critically on his speech, I find neither ingratitude nor petulance in Solzhenitsyn's indictment of contemporary Western civilization. While his indictment is somewhat harsher than objective facts warrant, there is certainly enough truth in it to give us abundant food for contemplation and action. I am not even dismayed by his failing to find in the West a satisfactory model for sociopolitical emulation. Disturbing, however, is the fact that a man so steeped in the essence of human experience as Solzhenitsyn, like the Russian intelligentsia before him, is still *looking* for such a model. Those editorials that portray him as a zealot blindly pursuing a holy cause miss this point. Solzhenitsyn is passionately searching *for*—but still unable to find—the holy cause to espouse and pursue.

Russia's isolation over the centuries engendered in her intelligentsia two illusions: first, that the Russian experience was somehow *basically* different from that of other societies, and second, that there must somewhere be a formula to be applied to cure Russia's social ills. While the former led to the self-imposed intellectual seclusion so eloquently described in the companion piece to this comment, the latter frequently manifested itself in an intensive—and often violent and extreme—search for social "models," either from abroad or from within Russia itself. The result invariably was nothing less than pathetic, counterproductive acts of violence, more often than not strangling reform and badly needed social development in their very infancy.

The trend toward utopian absolutism was in no way lessened by the historical development of the Russian Orthodox Church. The inseparable linkage between church and state and the consequent role of the czar as infallible head of both institutions led to wide clerical tolerance of government abuse. The concept of original sin, while certainly never abjured by the church, nevertheless went largely ignored, and a certain aura of mystical sanctity attached to the institution of czardom and to the person of the czar. The concept that all men possess in common certain basic human weaknesses thus became somewhat lost, and the absolute insistence on secular as well as religious infallibility by czar after czar left no room in the course of Russian social development for either compromise or gradualism. Would-be reformers thus felt themselves forced to employ radical and violent tolls in their efforts toward reform.

The common tendency of historians writing on the Soviet era to term the advent of Lenin's communism an accidental or aberrant occurrence is,

believe, unfortunate and misleading. Of all places of the world at the time of Lenin's *coup d'etat*, Russia was particularly ripe for just the kind of a model advanced by Karl Marx. It contained all the ingredients historically dear to the hearts of Russian reformers: utopianism, radicalism, violent revolution, and environmentally induced change in man's basic nature. Man, himself, was not "bad"; only *certain* men were "bad," and these could presumably be made "good" with "appropriate" alterations to the socioeconomic structure.

Belief in the possibility of an externally imposed purification of man's soul has universally permeated contemporary ultraliberal and radical sociopolitical thought. There is thus an intellectual linkage between the Karl Marxes and Lewis Mumfords, and the Aleksandr Solzhenitsyns of this world. Indeed, this writer has yet to encounter a single Russian émigré—whether from the pre- or post-Soviet era—fully capable of comprehending the essence of the Western experience and our concomitant reliance on proximate, gradual, incremental change in bringing about political, social and economic reform. A basic syllogism is completely lost on these unfortunates; namely, because *man* is imperfect, and because society by definition is composed solely of humans, society must remain forever imperfect. Absolute solutions simply do not fit the human experience.

The fact that Solzhenitsyn is by profession a writer is both ironic and predictable: predictable in that Russian literature has, of necessity, long served as the principal and sometimes only vehicle for social change as well as a pure art form, and ironic that his quest for the "true model" has been discredited so effectively by two fellow writers. It is probably no accident that one of these, Pasternak, was ethnically a non-Russian, while Tolstoy's long and culturally full life enabled him ultimately to reject the traditional Russian view that such a quest was either desirable or achievable.

In *War and Peace*, Tolstoy lays great stress on his conviction that two components comprise all man's actions and activities: necessity, or externally imposed circumstances, and free will: "Wealth and poverty, health and disease, culture and ignorance, labour and leisure, repletion and hunger, virtue and vice, are all only terms for greater degrees of [individual] freedom."[1] Such a view of man's complexity effectively precludes the application of simplistic models. Pasternak's *Doctor Zhivago* similarly carries a social message in both its title and its plot: that the only meaning of "life" is to be found in the very process of living.[2] Both novels are agonized cries against the imposition of any social model and against the inevitable and unfeeling interference of such models with free choice and individual human happiness. To both authors the "meaning" of life is to be found in man's knowledge of his own mortality, and in his exercise of individual free choice in accommodating to this knowledge as best he can. Put another way, the purpose of life is to exercise free choice in enjoying life in its most fundamental aspect, i.e., in the full, through senses, constrained only by the practical limits of our physical environment and by the moral or ethical limits of our social relationships.

The riddle of life is nowhere more eloquently expressed than in Pierre's musings in *War and Peace* after the war and his return to Moscow:

> And it was just at this time that he attained that peace and content with himself, for which he had always striven in vain before. For long years of his life he had been seeking in various directions for that peace, that harmony within himself, which had struck him so much in the soldiers at Borodino. He had sought for it in philanthropy, in freemasonry, in

> the dissipations of society, in wine, in heroic feats of self-sacrifice, in his romantic love for Natasha; he had sought it by the path of thought; and all his researches and all his efforts had failed him. And now without any thought of his own, he had gained that peace and that harmony with himself simply through the horror of death, through hardships, through what he had seen at Karataev.[3]

And in *Doctor Zhivago:* "Now what is history? It is the centuries of systematic explorations of the riddle of death, with a view to overcoming death."[4] The message that both Tolstoy and Pasternak tried to convey to their Russian readers was eloquent in its simplicity despite the complex nature of man: the essence of life is to live, to enjoy, to love and to be loved through the individual exercise of free choice. And the infinite possibilities of free choice open to a single individual at any one time makes the application of social formulas antithetical to its very exercise.

It is with the deepest respect for the character and monumental achievements of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn that I wish him good health and a long life, with the fervent hope that further exposure to the Western experience will cause him to abandon his search for the Holy Grail of human development. It just doesn't exist!

NOTES

1. Count Lev Tolstoy, *War and Peace* (New York: The Modern Library, 1931), p. 1124.
2. *Zhiv* is the stem of the Russian verb, "to live."
3. Tolstoy, p. 942.
4. Boris Pasternak, *Doctor Zhivago* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1958), p. 10.

THE BAROMETER

28 November 1978

Editor,

I have realized since publication of my article "The 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949" in the Fall 1978 issue of the *Review* that I neglected to recognize Geoffrey Best for providing me with both the reference to and translation of the passage quoted from Pierre Boissier's *L'Epee et la Balance*. I cited Boissier, but also should have credited Mr. Best, whose French is better than mine, for his "Legal Restraints in Warfare," which appeared in the September 1977 *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute*.

Sincerey,

/s/ W. Hays Parks

W. HAYS PARKS



PROFESSIONAL READING

REVIEW ARTICLE

War, Strategy and Maritime Power

by

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What is a navy in the absence of a maritime strategy? The United States has interests overseas in need of naval protection, and it also depends on much commercial traffic that is maritime. The United States has a large, if diminished, inventory of warships and auxiliaries, as well as sundry ancillary air forces and many shore facilities variously related to naval functions. Just over 500,000 people in uniform operate and administer these ships, aircraft and shore facilities, and another 200,000 operate a complete, self-contained armed force historically associated with amphibious operations, and now still administratively associated with the naval force as such. But the one thing that the United States plainly lacks is a maritime strategy.

What is a navy in the absence of a strategy? It is, in effect, a priesthood. Ships, aircraft and facilities are maintained, as temples are kept clean, repaired and repainted. Fleets are rotated from home bases to overseas deployment areas, and then back again, as liturgical services are performed at set hours, in the days set by the priestly calendar. Routine ceremonies alternate with the consecration of new ships, and with the introduction of new devices, much as new temples are from time to time commissioned to replace those beyond repair, or to augment their number when faith is on the rise, and the harvest gods have been kind. In all priesthoods there are degrees: some priests are confined to the supervision of the lesser sanctuaries of rustic gods; others are deemed elevated enough to officiate at the inner altars where the most powerful gods reside; the analogy with the nuclear guardians in our Navy need not be belabored.

The priests of ancient pagan faiths had many complex tasks, but it was no part of their duty to ask why the sacrifices were made and the prayers chanted. Nor could they question the wisdom of rites or suggest better ways of appeasing the gods. As for those outside the priesthood, they were disqualified to ask questions by their lack of knowledge of the secrets of the faith. And so we ourselves continue with the upkeep of the ships, aircraft and facilities and with their ritual movements—year after year—never asking fundamental questions about our purposes and methods.

Sometimes the peasants rebel and refuse to pay the tithes exacted for the

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building of replacement temples; sometimes they react at the cost of some new idol made of exotic materials by expensive craftsmen. Then the members of the priesthood unite in their corporate solidarity to evoke all the sinister dangers that will attend the diminution of the number of temples, or the reduction of their magnificence. Sometimes the peasants are successfully intimidated, and are frightened into paying homage in hard cash; at other times it is the priests who give up, and then they take care not to undermine faith in the temples and idols still in hand, and so they refrain from insisting on the dangers of the gods left unappeased or by temples not built.

What else can a navy do but perform as best it can as a priesthood, if it has no maritime strategy? For only in a strategy may rational ideas be found to inform the choice of sea and air platforms, to provide meaningful guidelines for subsystem design priorities, and to define the pattern of requisite deployments.

A navy in being is a necessary condition of any maritime strategy but is not a substitute for such. Ever since the defeat of the Imperial Japanese Navy the U.S. Navy has had to live without a comprehensive strategy. Now that there is a growing Soviet Navy of already impressive proportions, it may seem that a strategy for the U.S. Navy could be found effortlessly, by summing the requirements of defeating the Soviet Navy. Unfortunately this easy answer is foreclosed: the Soviet Navy itself can find sufficient strategy in the neutralization of American naval power and its alliance adjuncts, but the latter in turn must accomplish positive purposes, and cannot exhaust their function in neutralizing Soviet naval strength.

The United States thus unavoidably needs a positive maritime strategy, i.e., a coherent statement of its own role in the world with a consequent delineation of the maritime requirements of this role. (Maritime rather than merely naval, because to a large extent naval *force* is merely the protective framework for the use of oceans in all its aspects.) The source of the problem is no mystery: we have no maritime strategy because we have no *national* strategy. But this in turn is no excuse for the failure of the U.S. Navy as a corporate body to formulate a coherent strategy. It merely means that the maritime strategy must be defined in terms of a *presumptive* national strategy, in the hope that the nation will indeed accept the logic of the former, even if it does not fully acknowledge the latter. But this most basic of tasks continues to be evaded. Preoccupied with purely managerial problems, absorbed by the narrow thoughts of bureaucratic role-playing, determined to promote these bureaucratic interests through the substrategic devices of systems analysis and all the other numbers games, much more interested in new technology than in the purposeful operation of *all* technologies (and only strategy may confer purpose on mere technicity) our higher naval leadership has not even seriously tried to develop the intellectual structure of a maritime strategy. In some cases there has been the belief that the mere listing of "missions" is a substitute; in others faith has been placed in *posture statements* poised to exploit the latest headlines (e.g., oil in FY 1975 and 1976). It is true that both the internal customs of resource allocation in the Department of Defense, and also our congressional budgetary process demand specifics and are structured to reject rational strategic discourse, as the latter cannot be quantified. The mindless insistence on numbers, even when the absence of a strategic context makes the numbers meaningless is a fact of life. But there is no reason why the Navy cannot develop its own internal strategic discourse and eventually present its own analysis of the nation's maritime needs, even while continuing to feed all

the bookkeepers and slide-rule artists with the deceptively precise numbers that they crave. One must hope that the corrosion of the minds caused by bureaucratic factionalism has not so far developed that the Navy is now in fact incapable of true strategic discourse.

*War, Strategy and Maritime Power** is not a statement of naval strategy, nor is it a strategical treatise such as would serve directly to guide the formulation of an American naval strategy. It is, however, a most valuable source book that could be of much use to inform the strategic discourse now long overdue. The first group of essays by Bernard Knox, Gordon Turner, Basil Liddell Hart and Norman Gibbs makes a good introduction by addressing the broader problem of war and peace; except for Liddell Hart's notoriously ignorant misapprehension of Clausewitz (he deplores the fellow, plainly never having read him) it is all solid stuff, in a historical vein. The next section has pieces by Herbert Rosinski, Henry Eccles, James Field, and William Reitzel; it focuses more directly on the nature and purposes of strategy itself. Rosinski's contribution amounts to a lucid miniessay that offers what I believe to be the best brief definition of strategy itself, in contradistinction to tactics ("strategy is the comprehensive direction of power; tactics is its immediate application"). Eccles pursues at much greater length and to good purpose the definitional route; neither good nor bad, his contribution is simply basic, and reflects a sustained interest in the fundamentals of strategy that is itself a valuable rarity among us.

The essays by Field and Reitzel, not to be summarized here, are concerned more closely with the specifically naval aspect, but their focus is on the history of naval strategy rather than on naval strategy *tout court*. What follows after this in the book is a long series of diverse case studies and essays of reappraisal, including Stephen Ambrose on seapower in the two World Wars, Martin Blumenson on the continuities and contrasts between the two World Wars, and the editor's own essay on the rearmament of Germany, or rather its immediate prelude. Brisk and well-written, it is a useful piece of work even for those who have no interest in the past, because it is now easy to see that the issues of 1950-54 are about to reemerge in full force, one way or the other. Readers will want to explore the remaining rich menu of essays on strategic, military, and politicomilitary issues. Necessarily uneven, the average standard is nevertheless high.

*B. Mitchell Simpson III, ed. *War, Strategy and Maritime Power*, New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1977, 356pp. A collection of articles and essays on strategy and maritime power that have appeared in the *Naval War College Review*, selected and edited by a former editor of the *Review*.

BOOK REVIEWS

Banks, Arthur S., ed. *Political Handbook of the World: 1978.* New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978. 627pp.

This is an extremely useful reference work for anyone who desires a convenient encapsulated description of the governmental structures, the political elites, and the history and demography of the nations of the world, together with a short synopsis of the most pressing issues with which each must deal. Of particular interest is the listing of the major political parties of each nation along with each party's prominent leaders. This work also identifies each party's legislative strength and in those nations that adhere to the parliamentary system of government, the governing party is listed. In those parliamentary nations where no party commands a majority in the legislature, the *Handbook* names those parties that constitute the governing coalition.

The description of the nations is highly readable. The work suffers from drawbacks identical to those of other handbooks of this type. Because the world is changing so rapidly, both in the internal political composition of nations as well as the number of nations, the book becomes outdated almost as soon as it is published. Even publishing a new edition each year does not enable the publisher to remain absolutely current.

I found that a major factor distinguishing this work from the ordinary almanac or political handbook is the inclusion of an introduction of the major problems and issues that affect bilateral and multilateral relationships between and among nations on a regional basis. By following this regional formula, some problems or issues peculiar to a particular area of the world are investigated, whereas if one were to attempt to spotlight only global problems, many of these issues would be overlooked. The division of the world into regions for this purpose also lessens the probability that the ethnocentrism of the editors governed the selection of issues deemed important enough to identify.

Another factor enhancing this work is the description of the composition and operation of a significant number of international organizations. The inclusion of this section enables one to have a ready reference to the multitude of these organizations that play such an important role in the various international relationships throughout the world.

I highly recommend the *Political Handbook of the World: 1978* as a comprehensive reference tool. It is well worth the cost.

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Barnds, William J., ed. *China and America: The Search for a New Relationship.* New York: New York University Press, 1977. 254pp.

This book is a series of professional papers presented at the 1975-76 Council on Foreign Affairs session on the development of Sino-American relations. Dealing with past and present issues, the papers analyze Sino-American relations and propose future direction for American foreign policy.

The introductory chapter, written by the editor, gives a foundation for current political patterns in the normalization of Sino-American relations. The chapter skeptically appraises the possibility of an East-West alliance.

Akira Iriye wrote the second chapter on how the People's Republic of China (PRC) views the United States in Chinese foreign policy. Presenting an historical background by dividing the period between 1930 to the present into six identifiable segments, Iriye defines the contemporary issues. Drawing the conclusion that PRC-U.S. relations his-

torically have been characterized by misunderstandings and wars, Iriye foresees the PRC trying to insure a stable relationship so that it can concentrate on internal developments.

An interesting theory Iriye develops is that the PRC does not recognize the United States in a bilateral relationship but as a major determinant in Asian and worldwide affairs. By rejecting a bilateral relationship, the PRC hopes to promote its own international esteem through increased contacts with the United States, while seeking to prevent U.S. affiliations with powers that are potential enemies of the PRC. Examples cited as a threat to the PRC are potential U.S.-Soviet, or U.S.-Taiwan alliances.

The next two chapters evaluate the tangible agreements between the PRC and the United States for the improvement of economic and cultural exchanges. Alexander Eckstein's chapter on Sino-American economic relations explains the development of trade between these two nations, its potentials and barriers. The major emphasis in this chapter is to develop a policy in which trade could expand at a moderate rate. Currently, though, there are many obstacles hindering bilateral trade. For example, under the conditions of the Jackson-Vanick amendment of the 1974 Trade Act, credit and "most favored nation" treatment is not granted to the PRC. Another area of concern is the narrow U.S. market for goods from the PRC, resulting in a trade deficit for the PRC. The conclusion drawn is that if these and other issues are resolved, economic policy would be the determining factor in future Sino-American relations.

Lucien Pye's chapter on building a relation on cultural exchanges suggests that such exchanges are the most convenient way to build a natural bridge of communication between the PRC and the United States. To date, cultural exchanges have been limited and to increase the exchanges both countries must first recognize their different expectations. Pye concludes that if the United States responds to the PRC's desire for exposure to U.S. technology and the PRC satisfies the U.S. need for intellectual exchanges in the field of the humanities and social science, future exchanges will be encouraged.

In the fifth chapter, Ralph N. Clough discusses the Taiwan issue in Sino-American relations. He argues that the United States will be unable to establish full diplomatic relations with the PRC unless it withdraws all support from Taiwan. On the other hand, Clough implies that if the United States breaks its present security treaty with Taiwan then the United States will lose its credibility among such Asian nations as South Korea and Japan. Clough successfully states the problem, but fails to suggest solutions other than to advocate a policy of making Taiwan independent of the United States while developing diplomatic relations with the PRC.

An interesting argument that Clough presents is the effect of Sino-Soviet relations on the issue of Taiwan. Clough is convinced that as long as tensions exist between the Soviet Union and the PRC, the United States can sustain informal relations with Taiwan, but if Sino-Soviet relations improve, the PRC could pressure U.S. involvement in Taiwan by jeopardizing U.S.-PRC relations. Presently the United States has time to develop a solution, but the question is how much time?

William J. Barnds concludes the book with a final chapter on China in American foreign policy. Taking into consideration that the PRC has both historical and current grievances with the United States, Barnds suggests that the United States should first establish strong credibility among its Asian allies and then gradually establish increased relations with the PRC. If this solution is accepted, I foresee a balance of power struggle in Asia resulting in Sino-

American relations which are more competitive than cooperative.

Using professional papers written by the leading Chinese-American specialists, the editor offers a book that provides both a broad understanding and varied opinions on a widely controversial subject. Thoughtful readers will find *China and America: The Search for a New Relationship* valuable background for examining Sino-American relations and their importance in world affairs.

MARTHA WALLS
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Blechman, Barry M. and Berman, Robert P., eds. *Guide to Far Eastern Navies.* Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1978. 586pp.

Although perhaps better titled, "Guide to East Asian Navies," this regional look at the navies of China, Japan, the two Koreas, the Philippines and Taiwan is a refreshing attempt to provide more than just a compilation of photographs and technical data. To achieve this, the book is divided into two distinct parts. The first, comprising slightly more than half the pages, is a series of essays, each dealing with one of the six subject navies and written by individuals of different naval repute, including Norman Polmar writing on the two Koreas. One could question the inclusion of the Philippine Navy in this work in terms of locale, capability and interaction with the other navies; but the essay is informative. Part II of the book contains the usual photographs, silhouettes and technical data on ships and aircraft. While not quite as detailed as some of its larger counterparts, it is adequate.

The significance of this naval guide then lies in Part I. The editors hope to inform the reader "about the quality of each force, its strengths and weaknesses, the role it plays in peacetime in support of foreign policy and its potential wartime roles, and how it is likely to evolve in the future." That is no mean task, considering the complexity of such countries as China, Japan and Korea, but it is carried off reasonably well. As might be expected, however, there are as many new questions raised as old ones answered. This is not really so much a fault of the authors and editors as it is a reflection of the realities of the region. Only the most intrepid of analysts or futurists would dare to predict which of the various options available to the nations of the area will, in fact, be pursued, how these will affect the selection of options by the others, and how this interaction will influence naval forces. None of the authors appears this intrepid; thus, what is presented is a menu of possibilities for the future that the reader may or may not find reasonable. Yet it may well be that these uncertainties are precisely what makes this work a timely and significant contribution, as suggested by Admiral Zumwalt in his Foreword.

Notwithstanding the uncertainties of the future, the historical perspective and commentary on the present status and roles of these navies is solid. It is here that the naval reader and layman alike will find most items of interest, although this may reflect this operator's penchant for fact over hypothesis. Despite the multiple author approach, two themes suggest themselves throughout the essays. The navies, as they exist today, reflect post-World War II political realities rather than traditional Western naval concepts. For example, if the size of one's navy has traditionally been held to be a reflection of one's maritime interests, then Japan, with worldwide trading interests and significant dependence on the sea as a source of food, should maintain a navy with global reach. Instead, reflecting the political reaction to the experience and results of WW II and her American-imposed Constitution, Japan maintains only a Maritime Self-Defense Force, credible in home waters, but lacking any real open ocean capability. China, with a merchant

marine of some 550 ships and growing continues to rely on a coastal navy more suited to a form of guerrilla war at sea than a traditional sea control role. In this case, fiscal and technological constraints also may play a role, although the implication is that they are not dominant. There are signs of change, but any new direction must await the results of the current internal debate on modernization. What grows on the reader is a perception of East Asian interest in a continued U.S. naval presence in the Western Pacific to guarantee what they are unwilling or unable to protect.

The second thread is a sense of a regional naval balance in which each of the navies, less the Philippines, is evaluated as being effective in defending its own home waters while posing no credible offensive threat against any other. One gets an eerie feeling of 1922 naval ratios achieved by happenstance rather than agreement. What this means, of course, is that the dominant naval forces in the area are those of the U.S. 7th Fleet and the Soviet Pacific Fleet. This issue is handled in a lead essay, written by the editors, that provides a rather gross comparison of the two forces and postulates how they might interact with each other and with the navies of the region. This chapter seems rather shallow with too many caveats. Had it been placed at the end of the section as a wrap-up, rather than a lead-in, it would have proven far more effective. Such statements as "The size of the U.S. Navy will increase in the future, as the growth in U.S. shipbuilding appropriations, initiated in the early 1970s, results in greater numbers of new ships, while the Soviet Navy, facing a worsening obsolescence problem in submarine and major warships, will become smaller," will cause a raising of eyebrows.

On balance, *Guide to Far Eastern Navies* achieves its stated purpose of providing a dynamic view of the navies of East Asia rather than the typical snapshot. It remains to be seen whether it is the forerunner of a series of regional guides and how such volumes may be kept current. For now, this one is worth the readers' attention.

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Buchanan, A. Russell. *Black Americans in World War II.* Santa Barbara: Clio Books, 1977. 148pp.

World War II profoundly affected black Americans. In spite of the racism, segregation, discrimination, and frustration that blacks experienced, the war engendered a racial awareness and brought about great changes in their status. Many of the advances of the Civil Rights revolution began during the war. This story of promise, challenge, and change is the subject of A. Russell Buchanan's short, descriptive volume, *Black Americans in World War II.* Although derived mainly from secondary sources, the book does show the author's research in the papers of the NAACP and National Urban League. Those papers, however, are sometimes used to the exclusion of such other equally important sources as the black press. During the war the black press had an important influence on both black and white America, in spite of Buchanan's contention that it did not reach the masses, and this point demonstrates one of the major problems when an author depends too heavily on too few primary sources.

Black Americans in World War II contains nine topic chapters and a summary but there is little continuity between chapters, and each is without any significant introduction or conclusion. Still, the chapters do relate a rather interesting and exciting history, pointing out the different racial conditions in the north and south, the March on Washington Movement, violence in 1943, black women, the unique situation in the military, and the Double V campaign. The work contains little analysis or interpretation, being pri-

marily a summary of progress which occurred during the war. Perhaps this reviewer's main criticism is the location of the discussion of the Double V, which is the last chapter before the conclusion. To understand fully the essence of black feelings and protest during the war, one must comprehend the concept of the Double V—victory over fascism abroad and racism at home. Blacks understood this idea much better than whites and used it effectively. Thus, any study of blacks during World War II should follow an early analysis of the Double V. (The *Pittsburgh Courier* was the main force behind the Double V but Buchanan does not mention this fact, another indication of the overuse of NAACP papers.)

The three chapters on blacks in the military are good summaries, although the account of World War I is somewhat muddled and there is an overuse of Ulysses Lee's *The Employment of Negro Troops*. Blacks participated in the war effort but had to face difficulties that whites never did. Progress in the services owed much to pressure by the black community and a perseverance by black members of the armed forces. Real progress was slow indeed, but the result by the end of the war was a more receptive military establishment ready to move toward integration.

In spite of many weaknesses and a high price ($14.95), this study is a basic introduction to and summary of the changes which occurred in the black community during World War II. It offers a good concise history for the general reader.

ALAN M. OSUR
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Buckley, Alan D., ed. "International Terrorism," *Journal of International Affairs*. Spring/Summer 1978. 163pp.

It is somewhat unusual for a journal number to be the subject of a book review, but when a journal treats one topic at book-length, it offers the reader the equivalent of an edited book and it probably should be treated as such. "International Terrorism" is a solid, well-edited collection of articles that treats the problem of terrorism from a number of interesting perspectives.

Richard Shultz offers a useful, if not definitive, typology of political terrorism that distinguishes three basic types of the phenomenon—revolutionary, subrevolutionary and establishment—and then proposes that these three types be examined by variation according to cause, environment, goals, strategy, means, organization and the nature of participants. The value of the proposal is that it offers some basis for hope that the study of terrorism can move somewhat beyond the descriptive and journalistic treatments that are currently in vogue.

Bard O'Neill of the National Defense University applies the Schultz typology (with refinements) in a competent and provocative essay treating the Palestinian Resistance Movement. After providing a straightforward reconstruction of the development of Palestinian-Arab nationalism, O'Neill attempts to explain the emergence of fedayeen terrorism. He finds that Palestinian terror has been resultant of long-term causes—ideology and relative deprivation—and a short-term factor that he calls "capacity reduction." Capacity reduction is said to be the product of bad fedayeen strategy, poor physical and human conditions for insurgency, poor organization, effective counterinsurgency, and limited assets. Capacity reduction in turn helps explain terrorism.

There are a few problems with O'Neill's argument that really demand attention. If the article were insignificant, we could ignore these criticisms, but it is a good contribution to the literature and accordingly demands our attention.

First, Schultz offers a typology (i.e., a "systematic ordering and classification of empirical data"). To the extent that

Schultz is successful, his typology will contribute to a coherent comparison between terrorist groups, thus Schultz has offered a static schema. However, O'Neill has taken Schultz' descriptive tools and employed them as if they explained—rather than described—terrorism. Second, and more importantly, O'Neill's "capability reduction" is not a static condition but rather a process in which the terrorism phenomenon is a result. What this argument ignores is the fact that the fedayeen have always had minimal capabilities vis-a-vis Israel, and indeed it may be argued that fedayeen activism through terrorism has resulted in capability *enhancement* (especially if one takes a broad view of capability).

Thirdly, terrorism has frequently been the harbinger of political struggle, or at least symptomatic of the first stages of revolution, especially in circumstances in which there is a gross disparity in relative strengths. Terrorism is the weapon of the weak, and we might say the weapon of those who have suffered "capability reductions" at some point, but that would be tautological. As the reader can guess, O'Neill's article deserves attention, warts and all, for it attempts to address terrorism systematically, a not unimportant example for others specializing in the study of terrorism.

Richard Lebow follows with an interesting article tracing the "origins of sectarian assassination" in Belfast. Lebow's piece is nice as far as it goes, which is to say not earlier than this decade; but in a conflict with deep and aged roots such as that in Belfast, one would hope that Lebow continues his interest in this variant of terrorism and delves rather more deeply than the contemporary period.

The most important contribution in "International Terrorism" is provided by Robert K. Mullen, whose article "Mass Destruction and Terrorism" is no doubt one of the best analyses published to date on the macroterror problem (i.e., nuclear, biological and chemical). Mullen offers an informed—and thus rare—discussion of chemical and biological agents with mass destructive capabilities and proceeds to identify the production and (not inconsiderable) delivery considerations that will confront the prospective macroterrorist. His presentation supports his conclusion that mass destruction threats from terrorists are "vanishingly remote."

Contributions by Paul A. Tharp and Yonah Alexander deserve the reader's attention, and those familiar with Brian Jenkins' important work on terrorism will not be disappointed by his concluding "Trends and Potentialities" article.

In summary, the *Journal of International Affairs* has produced a worthwhile and inexpensive "book" that deserves the attention of those concerned with the malady of terrorism.

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Carrillo, Santiago. *Eurocommunism and the State*, translated by Nan Green and A.M. Elliot. Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill, 1978. 172pp.

Eurocommunism and the State is a translation from the Spanish of *Eurocommunismo y Estado* by the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Spain. It forms a significant primary source, in English, of the political philosophy of Santiago Carrillo, the Spanish Communist Party, and Eurocommunism.

The author outlines in the book his reasons for claiming that Eurocommunism is neither traditional communism nor Social Democracy. His most essential thesis is that the world today is fundamentally different from the times of Marx, Engels, and Lenin and therefore a new political concept is needed.

Among the examples Carrillo uses to document the crucial changes in the

world is his view that the state is no longer representative of one sector of the society (the bourgeoisie) but now a much smaller technological elite. It is this elite that manipulates the state rather than an entire class. Carrillo further outlines the religious, social, political, and cultural aspects of the state that are undergoing a series of crises in Spain and Europe. He then proposes to exploit these crises and use them against the dominating elite to achieve a change in the state. Underlying this change is the premise that violence is no longer a productive method of achieving political goals in Europe.

One component of state power that Carrillo writes on in detail is the armed forces. Carrillo recognizes that change is not possible without altering the present role of the military but that it must not be directly confronted. Instead he proposes a series of actions that would tend to neutralize its influence, integrate it further with the rest of society, and attempt to replace traditional values with new ones.

The book is filled with the standard claims of Eurocommunism similar to those found in France and Italy. These include an acceptance of the peaceful road to power, a pluralistic political system, mass parties, decentralism, a reduction in both military blocs in Europe, rejection of the Soviet 1917 model for change, acceptance for long-term private property, and rejection of the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Without this last essential ingredient, a good case can be made for Eurocommunist theory being closer to Social Democracy than to communism.

Carrillo does maintain that the long-range goals of communism have not been abandoned. His writings reflect his acceptance of the Soviet Union as a fraternal leader, the basic class antagonism common to most Communist writings, dialectics, and historical materialism. He further attempts to present Eurocommunism as another in a series of revisions to the basic ideology.

The book is well organized and appears to have suffered little from the translation. It lacks an index and could be better footnoted. The work has been severely criticized by the Soviets in the journal *New Times.*

JAMES JOHN TRITTEN
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Duffy, Christopher. *Austerlitz 1805.* Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1977. 194pp.

Austerlitz was one of Napoleon's greatest triumphs. Fought precisely 1 year after his assumption of the Imperial title, it was his first victory of annihilation. His 1796-97 Italian campaign witnessed a series of rapid partial victories. No single engagement was decisive. It was the cumulative effect of numerous battles that forced the Austrians to sue for peace. In the campaign of 1800, the war went on for nearly a year after Marengo. The Battle of Austerlitz lasted one day, and the Austro-Russian Army was completely shattered. Moreover, Austerlitz led directly to the collapse of the Third Coalition. Austria sued for peace and the Russians limped home.

Christopher Duffy provides a clear, concise narrative of the campaign leading up to the battle and of the engagement itself. He also notes that Napoleon did not operate with a fixed plan that ignored the independent will of the enemy. Rather, the Emperor devised a general approach that called for his forces to lure the allies to attack the French right. Napoleon would then deliver a counterstroke with his center and left. During the battle, the left was unable to launch a decisive blow, and Napoleon switched his main thrust to the center. The Emperor's genius then was not a matter of creating and following detailed precise schemes. The essence of Napoleonic strategy was the

ability to take advantage of rapidly shifting circumstances within the framework of a general plan.

Most people interested in military history have some idea of the course of the battle and of the legends surrounding it. Duffy explodes many of these legends. For example, the story that thousands of Russians drowned in the lakes on the southern edge of the battlefield is simply not true. More important, however, is the fact that the author gives a fine analysis of both the battle and Napoleon's generalship.

STEVEN T. ROSS
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Freedman, Lawrence. *U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat.* Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977. 235pp.

This book is a valuable primer for anyone interested in understanding the issues involved in strategic arms negotiations. Although Freedman's effort leaves quite a bit to be desired, he does succeed in weaving a generally coherent picture of the process of U.S. strategic arms policy development during the last two decades. This is no small feat if one considers, as Freedman does, the long roster of "players" (Secretaries and Under Secretaries, Agency Directors, Representatives and Senators, Academics, Presidential advisors, generals and admirals, and "staffers" of every description) who were, at any given time, likely to be participants in this process. Far from being open to straightforward analysis, the interactions of these people were characterized by a complex interplay of institutional, political, and ideological motivations. Into this tapestry Freedman expertly weaves the story of the CIA and the other intelligence agencies as providers of the information and estimates of Soviet strategic capabilities and programs.

In many ways, this "revised revision" of Freedman's Oxford D.Phil. thesis is a history of the CIA's apparatus for estimating the "strategic" capabilities of the Soviet Union. He traces the rising and falling influence of this apparatus principally embodied in the Office of National Estimates (ONE) through the early years (the fifties), the overestimations known as the "missile gap" (1960), to the underestimations of the mid to late sixties, and the final demise of the ONE in 1973. We see the formation of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in 1961, and then Secretary of Defense McNamara's preference for CIA estimates to hold the military in "check." Later, Freedman describes the ascendance of the National Security Council (NSC) under Kissinger, in which the National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) produced by the ONE were changed from a coordinated effort footnoted by dissenters (DIA, etc.), to one in which competing viewpoints were much less diluted and Kissinger and his NSC staff took over the interpretive role (expressing the conclusions in National Security Study Memoranda or NSSMs). I should note at this point that if the reader is beginning to gag on the acronyms, this is only a sample of what is in the book. Unfortunately, it is unavoidable. From another viewpoint, however, it is part of the story—the amazing regularity with which intelligence boards, panels, and studies have been formed and dissolved in the last 20 years, reflecting dissatisfaction (on the parts of different people at different times for different reasons) with what had previously existed.

The author convincingly describes the problem of the analyst(s) attempting to provide useful information, on a national scale, about an adversary in an environment in which it is assumed "... that the outside world is knowable, that it is the job of the intelligence officer to know it, and that if he fails to provide warning of some

external event then that is a reflection on his capabilities rather than the nature of the world." Making things even more difficult is the fact that the intelligence estimator's world is the world of the future, and that a "... judgment on what the Soviet Union will most likely build, by way of military equipment, requires some judgment on Soviet military objectives." As Freedman describes it, the estimator's response to this challenge is to approach an analysis with a "set of expectations" about the target country, or what he aptly names an "adversary image," through which capabilities and intentions are seen as interdependent. This is markedly different from the popular image of the cold-blooded, facts-only, watchdog of enemy behavior. A major theme of the book is that this concept of adversary image has played a key role in the continuing controversy in the United States over precisely what the Russians are up to and why.

About halfway through the book, the author presents what appears to be a central thesis: that the intelligence community was not really at fault in the consistent failures to assess accurately the Soviet strategic arms buildup of the sixties. Instead, he argues, the inaccurate estimates were caused by the Soviets continual modification and alteration of the program. He then embarks on a highly speculative assessment of Soviet thinking through a series of crises (U.S. ICBM buildup under Kennedy, Cuba, Vietnam, and the Dominican Republic, U.S. ABM and MIRV development), each impelling them to make shifts in their program. Thus, the intelligence analysts were not to blame as they based projections on current capabilities that were always changing. This unnecessary defense of the intelligence community with a totally unsupported argument reflects a major weakness of the book, namely that a great deal of Freedman's analysis is highly speculative, or based upon unexplained sources. One explanation for this is offered at the beginning of the book, where the author advises that the "about 50" interviews he conducted in 1973 were confidential, that the information thus acquired was incorporated in the text without reference, and that the reader must accordingly "... take a certain amount on trust...."

Notwithstanding this criticism, the book is well worth reading for novices as well as old hands and specialists, first for its informed description of the strategic intelligence process, but more important because it grapples with the confusing, often esoteric world of modern weapons and the interaction of people and institutions that underlies U.S. strategic arms policy decisions.

G.J. KELLER
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

Gabriel, Richard A. and Savage, Paul L. *Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army*. New York: Hill and Wang, 1978. 242pp.

This is a flawed book, one that many will discount because it falls short of fulfilling its academic and scholarly pretensions. Supporting data, frequently referred to, often fail to materialize; much opinion is advanced as fact; and there is a sometimes confusing melange of description, diagnosis and highly prescriptive assertion.

But to dismiss the book on these grounds would be to miss the point. The authors have something important to say, and it has relevance for all the services in the post-Vietnam, post-Watergate, post-McNamara era. There is something terribly wrong with the leadership and the professional climate in the Army today, they believe. These two, now academicians but each with some military service to draw upon, try to explain what has caused the problems and what can be done about them. In the process they are wrong about as

often as they are right, but they nevertheless provide a wealth of provocative and useful insights. The root cause of current problems is, as they see it, the harmful adoption of a managerial or entrepreneurial ethos by the officer corps in place of the traditional ethic of service. The resultant managerial careerism led in turn to distortion and fabrication of reports, self-interest instead of concern for the troops, the frenzied rotation of leaders, the tyranny of statistics, and eventually the loss of unit coherence. It was not the stress of combat in Vietnam, they hold, that caused the Army to disintegrate. Rather it was what the Army did to itself.

What, then, should be done about it? Gabriel and Savage have many suggestions, some of which come too late; we can't go back and pattern our units in Vietnam on the French *Groupes Mobiles,* for example. But they are essentially correct when they argue that "the case for reform was never made from within the officer corps itself and has yet to be made." (With the significant exception of the Army War College *Study on Military Professionalism.*) So their suggestions that "alternatives to resignation consistent with moral protest must be developed," that we could do with fewer officers and especially far fewer senior officers, that the frantic pace of moves and reassignments must be drastically reduced, that an autonomous Inspector General's organization paralleling the chain of command and a system of ad hoc honor boards at unit level could be useful, and most fundamentally that the managerial ethos must be rooted out and specifically rejected are of real interest. And they tackle the hard problem of how an existing organization, led by those who have prospered under the existing climate, may be persuaded to adopt and implement reformed values. They outline an interesting model for effecting value change in an organization, in effect a strategy for change, that seems to have applicability far beyond the particular problems they address. Thus they have gone beyond just articulating the problems and their causes, providing ideas on how to reform "an officer corps which has lost both its ethical bearings and the ability to develop and lead cohesive combat units." These are badly needed for, as they point out, so far "virtually no institutional changes have been undertaken."

But the authors are so determined to make their point that in some cases they go beyond the facts to advance arguments they should know are not correct. It was not, for example, "personal connections, educational background (the West Point Protective Association), and the ticket-punching calculus of career advancement" that resulted in numerous reserve officers being discharged during successive reductions in force, while sometimes less able regular officers continued to serve, but rather the statutory tenure that regular officers were accorded by law. The Army sought legislative relief from this dilemma for years, finally obtaining it, but not before much damage had been done. In contrasting the drop in ROTC enrollment and the increase in size of the officer corps during a given period, they neglect to mention that the Military Academy doubled in size during that time. And while they are critical of West Point in many respects, perhaps justifiably so, they base a number of their points on incorrect characterizations of the pedagogical practices there. This list could be extended.

But taken for what it is, an extended impressionistic essay, this book has value for anyone willing to entertain the notion that Chicken Little may have been right and interested in doing something about it.

LEWIS SORLEY
Central Intelligence Agency

Grayson, Benson L., ed. *The American Image of Russia: 1917-1977.* New York: Ungar, 1978. 388pp.

Gibert, Stephen P. *Soviet Images of America.* New York: Crane & Russak, 1977. 167pp.

Those who are looking for evidence to support a theory of convergence between Soviet and U.S. societies will find very little comfort in reading these two books. And those who naturally assume from the titles, that they will be looking at mirror images will also be surprised. The two books are not at all alike. In fact, in a rather curious way, they reflect the societies that produced them. *The American Image of Russia,* edited and with an introduction by a former scholar and foreign service officer, Benson Lee Grayson, presents no recognizable "image" but rather reflects a confusing diversity. *Soviet Images of America,* by Stephen P. Gibert, an academic consultant, describes a view that has the consistency of a theology with its customary concomitants of tediousness and irrationality.

Let it be said at the outset that we must be grateful for both books. *The American Image of Russia* brings together many important, and indeed interesting, articles and speeches assessing the Soviet Union. The range is heavily on the side of the decisionmakers, presidents, secretaries of state and ambassadors—a political "elite" as popular terminology would put it—and therefore gives us a rather unusual, nonacademic, perspective. The few statements by disappointed leftists—sounding like abandoned lovers—and now outdated Soviet supporters, sounding like the children of nature, give some sense of the extremes of informed opinion but no sense of explanation.

Reading John Reed between Herbert Hoover and Bainbridge Colby, a former Secretary of State, leads to intellectual hiccups. Nevertheless, John Reed, famous for his *Ten Days that Shook the World,* holds his own. One must admire his extraordinary power to reduce complex issues to resounding, but childlike, statements. He calls the Russian revolution an adventure "the most marvelous mankind ever embarked upon, sweeping into history at the head of the toiling masses and staking everything on their vast and simple desires." "Vast" their desires certainly were, but if they were "simple" then they were simple as the desires of God are.

The problem with a book like this, at least for this reviewer, is that it is not really the American "image" of Russia. Instead it is simply a collection of interesting articles and statements selected without any very apparent principle except for chronological order and an eye to the significance of the authors. Nevertheless, all of the articles are revealing and three or four contain significant information that is still often overlooked. For example, there is an excerpt from the *Autobiography of Lincoln Steffans,* the great American muckraker, in which he reports an interview with Lenin in 1919. Lenin argued for the necessity of a terror in order to exterminate the middle class or to force it out of Russia. We have become so used to accepting terror as one of the normal methods of the Soviet leaders and to the idea that the leader of their cult, Lenin, had a compassionate and humane core, that it comes as a shock to be reminded that he was as cruel as the rest from his earliest days in power.

Another fascinating selection, "Slave Labor," comes from a trade union newspaper. The article is interesting on two counts: because it is written by a member of the proletariat, the class in whose name the revolution was fought; and because it is unusual to see the proletariat represented in a collection of articles on the Soviet Union, a field dominated by intellectuals, journalists, and politicians. What could more

convincingly underscore the alienation of Soviet communism from its Marxist ideals, the transformation of a workers' utopia into the nightmare of the indentured servitude, than this proletarian damnation that starkly, shockingly, argues that the laborers in the Soviet Union are nothing more than slaves?

It is certainly a defect of the selection principle that some more balanced views are not presented. Surely there are apologists for the Soviet Union from the new left who make some sense. Surely something more conciliatory could have been found than the article reflecting the sweet innocence of Hubert Humphrey or another showing the political rationalizations of Lyndon Johnson. As it is, the brunt of the apologia is borne by Corliss Lamont, a writer and left politician. But his credibility foundered when he argued in the late fifties that the purge trials of the thirties were "genuine."

Considering their extraordinary importance, reaction to the purge trials of the thirties is not properly represented in this book. Where, for instance, are the bizarre statements of Joseph E. Davies, our Ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1936? Based on his own extensive experience as a trial lawyer and statesman, he pronounced himself satisfied that the parade of old Bolsheviks, war heroes, and statesmen did indeed deserve to be shot for desiring to sell their fatherland to the Japanese, Swiss and Czechs.

Why is it so important to keep that incredible deception in the forefront of our consciousness? Because it shows us how prone we are to rationalize the irrational, to keep the surface of reality neat and orderly. Because he sent George Kennan out for sandwiches and was taken in by the trials, we dismiss Ambassador Davies now, but he was an adviser to Presidents, a distinguished man of his time and if he was taken in who would not have been? The answer cannot be neat.

In any case, that event, the purges, were an eruption from a rotten core of Soviet society, a core that remains unreconciled and uncontained. They were a culmination of events foreseen in the twenties by John Dos Passos and Emma Goldman, represented by two fascinating articles in this book, both idealists who wanted to believe in the Revolution, but who already saw the cruelty.

We must take the editor to task, however. Having compiled a volume of such fascinating but troubling reading, he cannot escape our legitimate demands for an explanation with the little inanity that concludes the introduction—"... the United States image of Russia will probably be determined primarily as it has for the past sixty years by the day-to-day and year-to-year actions of the Soviet Union and the responses of the United States government." If Grayson's selection of articles is not dishonest then that statement—if it is taken seriously at all, and obviously it should not be—is incorrect as well as vapid.

This book with all its defects of randomness and discontinuity may serve a major purpose, however, if it inspires a serious effort to analyze the love-hate relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States since the revolution. That task is a monumental one for which this book documents the need.

Soviet Images of America, by Stephen B. Gibert, a Georgetown professor, is a book that could not have been written in the Soviet Union. Even if speeches had been made there—and one may be fairly certain that they have not been—calling for patience, sympathy and understanding of America, they could not have been published. Thus it is up to foreign scholars to try to sort out the Soviet image of America, an image that must necessarily be doctrinaire, almost an icon of official thought.

Those who deal with primary Soviet sources must be very grateful to Gibert

for performing the very tedious job of sorting through the endless stream of parroted formulations that takes the place of political discussion in the Soviet Union. (The uninitiated may not be aware of the fact that following a year's worth of political tracts from the newspaper *Pravda* would be less interesting than reading a collection of Vatican speeches on abortion. What one watches for are variations in emphasis, changes in footnotes, renumberings of priorities. This does not make for very exciting reading, although we must all grant that it is quite essential reading if we want civilization to survive in a Western World.)

The problem Gibert faced was how to make a readable and convincing book. That is a considerable challenge, for not only is the original material tedious, but American readers tend not to believe standard Soviet statements. They seem to take the position that Comrade Marshal, two-time winner of the Order of Lenin, Central Committee Member Ivan Ivanovich Ivanov does not really mean what he says about the need to eliminate the American threat. The process by which the American reader comes to that conclusion is never clear. Nor is it ever clear what Comrade Marshal Ivanov means if he did not mean what he said. Why, one wonders, is it more comforting to the American intellectual to deal with a world in which no one means what he says? How, one wonders, does the American think that the Soviets organize their vast country so that everyone repeats the same tedious formulations that indeed no one means?

Gibert's technique for dealing with these problems was to open with some pretty big and frightening guns. He recalled the failures of perception about the Japanese, the Sino-Soviet split, the Cuban situation, the Yom Kippur war and so on. The point is well made, therefore, that we should not trust our judgments and should be wary of our preconceptions.

The reader naturally hopes that Gibert will put the problem of perceptions in some reasonable order. However that hope is soon dashed when he writes:

> With regard to Russian perceptions, however, it may be possible to affect those views which do not lie at the core of their national self image, and are not fundamental to the Marxist-Leninist belief system. And of course, as some people are more receptive to religious teachings than others, so also can it be assumed that convictions about communism and its apocalyptic view of the future vary among Soviet leaders.

How could Gibert, who, in preparing this book, must have steeped himself in little beyond war, revolution and death—60 of the cruelist years in history—propose such a bland formulation? Or is that his terrifying message? That there is nothing else to do but to try to trim around the edges?

Gibert's cullings of materials from the Soviet press is quite useful. The book is indeed "very valuable and informative," fulfilling the hope expressed for it by Richard Foster in his introduction. Methodologically, however, it does not help us to assess the degree to which the Soviets are serious about what they say. Perhaps that is an effort that Foster, the Stanford Research Institute, and Gibert will undertake next. We can hope so.

ROBERT B. BATHURST
Harvard University

Herz, Martin F., ed. *Decline of the West? George Kennan And His Critics.* Washington Ethics and Public Policy Center, Georgetown University, 1978. 173pp.

If you want a place in history, scribble! This rule has been upheld as valid back in time through Machiavelli to Thucydides at least—both statesmen and commanders out of power, left to

write about it. The silent statesman bows to the articulate scribe. Historical scholarship is built with documentary bricks and the art of the chronicler. He who writes history determines it; and ideas reshape facts.

So it has been with George F. Kennan. His contribution to the world has been his writing, not his accomplishment in action as a diplomatist. His has been a great contribution, not least because of his genius with words. There is an old story told in the State Department to the effect that Dean Acheson used to take George Kennan's memoranda on policy and assign them to an aide for rewriting. Supposedly the aide was instructed to paraphrase them into standard, pedestrian State Department prose and then return them to Acheson for consideration of the recommendations. Acheson did not wish to be seduced or beguiled by Kennan's eloquence as he considered the substance of Kennan's thought.

If you have the ability to coin an epigram, or write a truly memorable phrase, you had better be careful which way your gun is pointed. After successfully articulating the rationale of U.S. policy in the cold war, Kennan has spent the past 30 years trying to undo his handiwork and curb the onrushing enthusiasm of his disciples. The result has been that Kennan has moved from advocacy of "firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counterforce at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world," to the following position: "Let us divest ourselves of this (nuclear) weapon altogether; let us stake our safety on God's grace and our own good consciences and on that measure of common sense and humanity which even our adversaries possess . . . ."

So George Kennan has become a neoisolationist, willing even to say: "Rather red than dead." But such is his eminence and eloquence that distinguished scholars have made careers on interpreting and reinterpreting his thought. The little book under review is just such a reinterpretation.

Point by point, Kennan's opponents appear to have the better of the argument. This is largely due to Kennan's self-assurance in taking incautious positions. For example, Kennan says: "I don't believe in the ability of the Russians to control Western Europe. They just would not know how. They are too crude and clumsy for any such exploits." Having been in Prague myself in 1948, when the Communists took power there, and having seen how Soviet planes and tanks restored Soviet influence in Czechoslovakia in 1968, I am skeptical of Kennan's assertion. Czechoslovakia is an advanced nation, too.

If the foregoing is true, however, it becomes all the more worthwhile to find and savor Kennan's insights as he has much to say to all of us, as always. He speaks wisely of the limits of power. As Eugene Rostow says, "Kennan is an impressionist, a poet, not an earthling."

The book is derivative, consisting of reprints from a variety of sources. Martin F. Herz, the editor, contributes only six pages of his own to the text. That is a pity as Herz also writes well.

But the book is worth reading. It deals with the central foreign policy question of our times. Kennan's thought has dominated our intellectual perception of the Russian-American relationship for 30 years. His shadow will extend far into the future. Those who wish to understand recent history and ponder the prospects ahead must contend with George Kennan, one way or another.

AMBASSADOR NATHANIEL DAVIS
Naval War College

Johnson, David. *Napoleon's Cavalry and its Leaders*. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978. 191pp.

If you are interested in fascinating details about the French Imperial

Cavalry, this is a book for you. Moreover, David Johnson provides vignettes about the lives of Napoleon's cavalry generals and gives precise narrations of numerous cavalry engagements.

What is lacking in this book is any attempt at an analysis of the French Cavalry's organization, tactics, and development. There is no attempt to compare the social composition of the cavalry with other branches of the French Army. Finally, the author does not attempt to render any overall judgement on the utility of the mounted arm during the Napoleonic Wars.

Still, one must not be too harsh. Johnson's book is well written and profusely illustrated. It illuminates many interesting and important details of the cavalry's services.

STEVEN T. ROSS
Naval War College

Middleton, Drew. *The Duel of the Giants: China and Russia in Asia.* New York: Scribner, 1978. 231pp.

Drew Middleton, the military correspondent of *The New York Times,* toured China for 3 weeks in the autumn of 1976 as the guest of the People's Republic of China. This popularly written book chronicles his impressions of that trip. It is a book mainly about China. The flavor is sympathetic to the Chinese, although he does not hesitate to point out Chinese shortcomings. The duel is seen through Chinese eyes: they are preparing against an attack by technologically superior "polar bears" from the North.

Can the People's Liberation Army withstand a Soviet conventional attack? Middleton doesn't see how, given present Chinese doctrine, training and logistics. The Chinese advantages lie in manpower and morale. Could the Chinese nation eventually consume a Soviet Army in a protracted struggle? Middleton would not be willing to so predict. (The Russian novelist Andrei Amalrik did predict that outcome in the suppressed *1984.*)

Given the likelihood of some successful Soviet military action against China, the issue for Moscow, according to Middleton, is whether to attack before China can modernize the PLA or to wait for political change to make a military solution unnecessary. The risk in waiting is that in 20 years, after Chinese military modernization, an attack could have much less chance of success.

Although the Soviets have assembled a large force on the border and in Outer Mongolia (43 divisions (reinforced), with hundreds of tactical nuclear missiles and 900-1400 modern air defense and close support aircraft), and their doctrine and tactics are those of blitzkrieg, it is possible that the Soviet purpose is political and defensive. That is, the Red Army is so strong that if China should try any means but negotiation to resolve differences, Moscow would respond militarily with lightning speed and deadly intensity. This, of course, is only one assessment of Soviet intentions, and Middleton credits it to Lt. Gen. DeWitt C. Smith, Jr., USA, Commandant of the Army War College. Another assessment would be that Moscow's drive for détente and confirmed national borders in Europe in the early seventies was done to free Soviet forces for offensive action against China. Military operations could be imminent. Middleton discusses both the "garrison" and the "striking force" assessments, but does not choose. Instead, he falls back on the Churchillian description of Russia as an enigma.

Chapters 6 through 10 of this book are particularly good. Here Middleton analyzes the installations, organization, logistics, equipment, and tactics of, and military prospects for both sides. This kind of analysis is his forte. What becomes clear is that although the Soviets have marked advantages in almost all military accounts over the Chinese, they are nonetheless faced with

serious problems in sustaining an intense conflict with China. Perhaps the most important corrective step they have taken is to construct, at great expense, the $1.5 billion Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM) to the north of the vulnerable Trans-Siberian. Even so, their consumption could exceed their resupply capability in a war with China.

For their part, the Chinese seem to contemplate surviving Soviet conventional or nuclear strikes and winning a protracted struggle. Although they undoubtedly would fire their modest force of nuclear missiles if attacked by Soviet missiles, the Chinese strategy relies heavily on passive defense. They showed these passive defenses to Middleton. In Chapter 10 he describes the underground fortress system engineered by the Chinese people early in this decade. For those readers who have heard of Chinese tunnel technology but are not fully conversant with all the Chinese have done, Middleton provides the best information in print so far.

In an important strategic assessment, Middleton concludes that there is little hope for permanent reconciliation between Peking and Moscow. He says "The quarrel may abate. There even may be a rapprochement . . . , even though this would require a revolution in national and ideological outlooks by both parties. But this would lead only to a temporary truce, for the roots of conflict run too deep."

Although parts of this book already have been dated by the Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed by China and Japan, for the serious student of the Sino-Soviet rift it should provide eyewitness flavor and some new insights. For a reader entering this fascinating field for the first time, *Duel of the Giants* will be an eye opener.

WILLIAM A. PLATTE
Captain, U.S. Navy

Mooney, Michael and Stuber, Florian, eds. *Small Comforts For Hard Times.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. 402pp.

This collection of 25 essays deals with five broad themes: justice and human equality, private rights and the public good, technology and the ideal of human progress, war and social order, and education and the good society. The product of an extensive series of conferences on the humanities and public policy issues, the collection takes as its premise that "the humanities give light when used as aids to the understanding of current urgencies." I found no real comfort in these educators', lawyers', philosophers', architects', and doctors' debate on urgent public issues, nor light cast on the dark social problems these humanists purport to analyze. Unfortunately, the positive proposals and recommendations are often obscured by a competitive erudition that characterizes many of the selections. However, if one is interested in some novel and interesting concepts of our society, in addition to straightforward, no nonsense discussions of anthropocentricity, broethics, neomorts, the social versus the scientific meaning of buildings, embourgeoisement, the rights of rocks, and the decline of humanities in secondary education, this is definitely a book for his shelf.

As an anthology of relatively short pieces, each broken down into subsections, the book provides those with specific interests an opportunity to pick and choose by author or subject. Some of the selections are enjoyable reading and their ideas are clearly set forth in simple prose, but the book as a work requires painfully slow and detailed reading, partly because of the complexity of the subjects and partly because writers must feel a compulsion to cast their ideas in an obscure, obtuse, pedantic manner. In my view, the standout selections include:

"Justice–Compensatory and Distributive"–A thoughtful discussion of discrimination and reverse discrimination using Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics* as a base.

"Private Rights and the Public Good"–An argument that the private rights and public good are not an either/or situation and that our traditional framework for analyzing them may be outmoded.

"On Privacy and Community"–Treats the terms privacy and community as related and attempts to define privacy in terms of community.

"Do Rocks Have Rights"–Interesting argument for environmental ethics and the recovery of our traditional ethical perspective.

"Living With Scarcity"–The problems of scarcity (hunger, pain, and deprivation) will not be solved by technology alone but the author offers a plan liberally injected with both ethics and technology, for coping with scarcity.

"The Technology of Life and Death"–Fascinating approach to the implications of the traditional definition of death and effect of some suggested changes on our society.

"Reflections on War, Utopias and Temporary Systems"–Calls for the concentration of society's energies on extending the institutions that elicit man's more noble qualities, some of which are found in war and not in utopia.

"The University and American Society"–Supports the tenets of liberal education and stresses the importance of the study of humanities in the context of the development of American education and its place in society today.

"Some Questions in General Education Today"–Discusses the dilemma of technical training versus education and the reproductive qualities that a liberal education imparts to a society. Marcus offers some suggestions to reduce the reperative nature of higher education.

In sum, there are some small comforts in the book. I think that it's a handy guide to looking at macropublic issues in a different, often unique manner. The comforts, however, are sufficiently small that their availability in the local library is sufficient.

JOHN P. MORSE
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy

Morgan, William J., et al., eds. *Autobiography of Rear Admiral Charles Wilkes, U.S. Navy, 1798-1877.* Washington: Naval History Division, 1978. 930pp.

The Naval History Division has published, with a minimum of editorial comment, the lengthy autobiography of Charles Wilkes, the officer who commanded the U.S. Exploring Expedition in 1838-1842, and who removed the Confederate Commissioners Mason and Slidell from the British packet steamer *Trent* in 1862. Both events were controversial then, and remain so today. But this newly available volume does not illuminate either event so well as it does the bizarre personality of Wilkes himself, who stands condemned by his own hand in these pages as petty, sanctimonious and tyrannical.

The best part of the book is Wilkes' account of his years as a midshipman in the old sailing navy of the 1820s and 30s. But as he progresses in rank, his account assumes more and more the character of a diatribe: his commanding officers were out to get him; the Secretary of the Navy was his enemy; all his subordinates were incompetent, mutinous, or both. What is surprising is not that Wilkes was twice court-martialed for his imperious activities when in command at sea, but that he was ever *given* a command at sea.

A recent volume by William Stanton entitled *The Great United States Exploring Expedition of 1838-1842* (Berkeley, 1975) in which Wilkes is portrayed as a stiff martinet is herein

afforded ample reinforcement. Wilkes writes that his lieutenants (many of whom later signed a testimonial against him) were "scum . . . mean and cowardly." But Wilkes' accounts of his own action provide more than sufficient grounds for their protests.

As for the *Trent* affair, which so nearly brought England into the American Civil War on behalf of the Confederacy, Wilkes has relatively little to say except that he believed "I had done nothing more than my duty and should do it again if placed under similar circumstances." As for the courts-martial that followed both incidents, Wilkes claims that Secretaries of the Navy Upshur and Welles were both incompetent scoundrels who drummed up charges against him out of jealousy and political partisanship. Though the courts were packed against him, he writes, he was able to overcome their prejudice because of the manifest virtue of his actions.

Much of the volume is filled with trivial travelogues of Wilkes' summer trips and family life, but the active duty portions provide an interesting view of this 19th century Captain Queeg.

CRAIG SYMONDS
U.S. Naval Academy

Overholt, William H., ed. *Asia's Nuclear Future*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977. 285pp.

In a world of perplexing problems, nuclear proliferation stands as one of the most perplexing. Replete with ethnocentric pitfalls, technical complexities and substantial dangers for global stability, the prospect of nuclear spread has challenged the thoughtful and the thoughtless alike. Perhaps even more distressing than the specter of "living in a nuclear-armed crowd," has been the proliferation of books and articles on the subject, many with only the saving grace that they evidence short half-lives. Fortunately, this is not the case with *Asia's Nuclear Future*, which proves to be a thoughtful book that enhances our understanding of this important issue, rather than merely adding to the din.

Edited by William Overholt of the Hudson Institute, *Asia's Nuclear Future* consists of seven chapters, two of which previously appeared as journal articles. The thematic thread for the volume is provided in the opening chapter by Lewis Dunn (also of Hudson) and Overholt. Eschewing the country-by-country study and the action-reaction dyad as appropriate frameworks for the study of proliferation, they proffer a new metaphor, the "nuclear proliferation chain." Dunn and Overholt argue: "the decision by the initial country to go nuclear triggers a proliferation chain encompassing anywhere from two to ten additional proliferation decisions." Thus, one chain includes India, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Israel, Brazil and Argentina.

While the "chain" metaphor offers great promise for briefing charts, it is hard to concede that an analytical breakthrough has occurred; the "discovery" seems to be that a state's decisions in the nuclear realm are unlikely to be ignored in the international milieu. Nonetheless, the explication of interrelationships is a useful and commendable enterprise that the interested reader will find informative. In a later chapter Dunn develops the "India, Pakistan, Iran . . . " chain; however, one would have hoped that the frugal contribution (15 pages) had been considerably expanded, given the enormity of the subject matter. Overholt's subsequent chapter on Eastern Asia is somewhat meatier, and he does provide interesting discussion of both the Korean and the Taiwanese cases. In both cases he concludes that nuclear weapons would be a rather poor second to the preferred "weapon"—continuing security ties with the United States. Overholt's analysis can only remind us that a precipitous

diminution of security assistance and troop deployment may be more painful in the long run than the maintenance of such support.

Two Harvard-based contributors, Jonathan D. Pollack, a China expert, and Onwar Marwah, an authority on the Indian nuclear program, provide competent contributions on the Chinese and Indian programs respectively. Pollack demonstrates to this reviewer's satisfaction that the principled Chinese doctrine that nuclear weapons are only instruments of defense is both supported by known deployments and the product of a carefully thought out—even plodding—policy. Marwah's somewhat sympathetic account of the Indian program from 1950-1976 is a useful overview of the Indian case (which perhaps should even be traced to the establishment of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission in 1948).

In a frankly exciting 55-page chapter (that alone is worth the price of this book), Herbert Passin, a Columbia University authority on Japan, attacks and demolishes a number of preconceptions that often cloud any effort to understand the prospect of Japanese development of nuclear weapons. Using relatively recent and varied public opinion survey data, Passin argues that contrary to the common wisdom: younger Japanese are *more*, rather than less, opposed to higher levels of armament; that the Japanese public is more concerned about raw material, energy and market problems than foreign military threats (although he does seem to depreciate security concerns, thus contradicting the very data he provides); that South Korea is not deemed vital to Japanese security; that in fact, Japan is most likely to remain neutral in the event of a renewed Korean conflict; and, that the ruling Liberal Democratic Party is neither of one voice on nuclear weapons, nor the only significant force in military policy. Passin describes the broad public consensus as follows:

> The mainstream of Japanese opinion is today against the adoption of nuclear weapons. Although some conservatives may be willing to contemplate their necessity some time in the future, there is virtually complete agreement that they are not for Japan today.

Passin then concludes with an informed consideration of those factors that may lead to the nuclear decision. Notably, the loss of U.S. credibility leads the list, only to be closely followed by the not farfetched possibility of a sharp break with the United States. Seventeen thought-provoking scenarios for Japanese development of nuclear weapons are provided by Passin, several of which deserve careful contemplation. In sum, Passin's chapter is an important contribution to the literature and will no doubt be widely recognized as such.

Asia's Nuclear Future concludes with a splendid chapter by William Overholt in which he treats the U.S. nuclear posture in Asia. His keen and provocative comments on U.S. nuclear deployments in Korea are especially important. He extensively discusses the dilemma of forward-based nuclear weapons that offer only three unattractive options in the event of a serious attack: early use, capture or ignominious retreat. To correct this unsavory situation, he proposes rear-basing (outside of Korea), which while adding geographical separation would still allow delivery without delay (given the timelag for Executive approval regardless of locale). Such proposals are particularly appropriate, given the geography of Korea which is rather well disposed to a nonnuclear defense.

In conclusion, *Asia's Nuclear Future*, while somewhat uneven (this seems to be *de rigueur* for any edited work) offers a timely and informed discussion of a most important question. An index and bibliography would have considerably improved the usefulness of the book. While the book tends to be rather

more speculative and less technically informed than many readers would prefer, it is still a solid contribution to the literature.

AUGUSTUS R. NORTON
Major, U.S. Army

Smith, Charles E. *From the Deep of the Sea.* Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1977. 288pp.

Little has remained the same in the century and a half since Cunningham wrote:

The hollow oak our palace is,
Our heritage the sea.

What one hopes has not changed is the spirit of the men who can claim that heritage and can include in it the experiences of a surgeon in a 355-ton whaling ship that sailed from Hull on 19 February 1866 and returned 14 months later with what was left of a ragged, scurvy-ridden, starving crew.

The whaling done by *Diana* and indeed all of the ships of Hull was not the 2 or 3-year voyages as the Americans made to the South Seas but was a seasonal trek to the Greenland Seas, the first weeks devoted to sealing and then up through Davis Strait and into Baffin Bay for the whales. Stores were taken for a voyage of about 8 months.

Ship's Surgeon Smith, whose diary this book is, was making his first trip to sea and he recorded everything that interested him—the ship, the sea, the sailors, fish, seals, flowers, birds, literally everything, even sea stories that seemed pertinent to his activities.

By mid-July *Diana* had caught two whales, no seals, and was near the mouth of Ponds Bay in Baffin Bay's upper reaches. Where fishing should have been best, *Diana* (and other ships in the area) found nothing but gales and ice. Toward the first of August the season, such as it was, was obviously over and it was time for "haim to my ain countree." August was spent trying to find a way out through the rapidly increasing ice. Baffin Land to the West, ice to the south, and contrary winds forced the ship to make her way north and east to Melville Bay on the northwest coast of Greenland and to try to make her southing from there. But conditions were worse so she returned to the west water. Several times *Diana* was pinched in the ice and only by putting sailors with hawsers on the ice (and overfiring the boiler of her 30hp engine) did she warp herself free and often that was into a hole of water from which there was no exit. Another whaler, *Intrepid*, fell in with *Diana* and for a few days they searched together for a way out. *Intrepid*, with 60hp and 90 tons of coal, promised not to forsake *Diana* but on 1 September *Intrepid* managed to force her way into clear water and, perhaps thinking *Diana* would be able to follow, sailed out of sight.

For three weeks *Diana* sailed among the gathering floes, seeking the open ocean, but on 21 September the captain determined that his only course was to drive the ship into the icepack, from which it might be liberated in April, and drift with it into the Atlantic. The ship had already been on short rations for a month, could continue that rate of consumption for 2 months, but could expect to be in the ice for 6 months with no hope of adding fish, fowl, or animal to the larder.

The impressionable reader should read the rest of the diary in the heat of August when well fed and well rested. Fuel ran out and pieces of the ship not necessary for shelter or for ultimate safe navigation were burned. Finally, only a small fire to boil tea and thaw food was allowable. Ice formed on the cabin bulkheads, in the men's clothing and bedding; the whale-oil lamps had to be warmed before they would light; the clock refused to operate; and pumps that had to be operated continually to keep the ship afloat (ice pressure had opened many of her seams) had to be

dismantled several times each day to clear them of ice. Breakfasts were half a biscuit spread with cook's fat (which Smith described as brown axle grease), dinners the same with the addition of an ounce or so of boiled meat or oatmeal or suet. By late February, everyone on board looked forward to the twice-a-week banquet of soup made of biscuit dust and table scraps that the cook had providentially saved early in the voyage with a view to selling it as pig's food on return to Hull. The captain died the day after Christmas of cold and fatigue. Scurvy was first detected in early January (with only three gallons of inferior—later frozen—lime juice on board) and the first scurvy death occurred in mid-February.

Some breakup of the ice began in early March and after 2 weeks of struggle *Diana* was free of the ice and homeward bound on 17 March, arriving in the Shetlands on 2 April. Two of the 13 men who died (of a crew of 51) did so within sight of home.

The diary teaches no strategic, tactical, nor even seamanship lessons. It is inconceivable that any seaman of today could find himself in similar circumstances. But some men continue to be called on to cope with conditions seemingly unendurable. And some of them find something to draw on, to sustain them and that they did and do so and how they did and do it are worthy of our attention, if not to instruct us then to inspire us.

W.R. PETTYJOHN
Commander, U.S. Navy

Sobel, Lester A., ed. *Political Terrorism, Volume 2: 1974-78.* New York: Facts on File, 1978. 279pp.

Sobel, Lester A., *Palestinian Impasse: Arab Guerrillas & International Terror.* New York: Facts on File, 1977. 282pp.

The public is constantly blitzed with "barometers," "indicators" and "indexes" that purport to measure everything from the economy to morale in the military. While there is no precise index for the effect of contemporary political terrorism on our collective consciousness, there can be no doubt that the terrorism phenomena would rate very highly on any such scale. Consider for example that one standard library reference lists over 40 nonfiction books "in print" on the subject of terrorism and that this represents a doubling over a 2-year period. Or consider the hundreds of novels (ranging from literature to thrillers to pulps) that feature casts of terrorists whose aspirations range from survival to controlling the world.

Unfortunately, most works on terrorism—whether fiction or nonfiction, and sometimes a single book will be a blend of each—present a point of view that is by definition colored by the prejudices of its author. It is simply difficult to get the facts without an accompanying sermon on the depravity (or virtuousness) of terrorism by subnational groups (or governments). Thus, it is very refreshing to find sources for factual accounts that allow the reader to draw his own conclusions.

Both *Palestinian Impasse* and *Political Terrorism* are straightforward presentations of facts, and do allow the reader to draw his own conclusions. Published by the Facts on File Corporation, renowned for its standard library reference of the same name, each book represents a compilation of the significant news and developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the problem of terrorism respectively.

Palestinian Impasse treats the developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict since the 1967 war up to the middle of 1977, while *Political Terrorism, Volume 2* provides coverage from 1974 to May 1978 (the cutoff seems to have been the murder of Aldo Moro). The terrorism volume is organized geographically, with very strong sections of the Middle East and Latin America, while the other

volume is organized more or less chronologically.

As might be expected, there is considerable overlap between the two volumes in the treatment of the Middle East, but this is probably defensible. The only real deficiency appears to be the indexes, which could have been rather more complete. For example, the terrorist incident at the December 1975 meeting of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in Vienna is treated succinctly in *Political Terrorism*, but the reader would never find it in the index (whether he searched under "OPEC," "Vienna," "Austria," or any of the fedayeen organizations, or for that matter "Carlos"—who after all led the raid). This is an important criticism, as the greatest value of books such as these is as reference works. It should also be indicated, as the reader may have already noted, that *Palestinian Impasse* is far broader in scope than its subtitle would indicate.

Those who are interested in the subjects encompassed by these books—whether professionally or avocationally—will find *Palestinian Impasse* and *Political Terrorism* useful sources for the raw data. Neither of the books have great armchair reading potential, but they do deserve consideration for inclusion in private and institutional libraries.

AUGUSTUS R. NORTON
Major, U.S. Army

Southworth, Herbert Rutledge. *Guernica! Guernica!* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977. 537pp.

Herbert Southworth is a certified aficionado of the Spanish Civil War, and this 500-page study is a reflection of this interest. It is without doubt the most heavily researched and documented restatement of the ex post facto obvious since Will Shakespeare's would-be lover was subjected to literary scrutiny.

Subtitled "A study of journalism, diplomacy, propaganda and history," it is exactly that. The difficulty, if one may express this view, is that it features overkill. The subject is the devastation by Axis/rebel bombing of the Basque center of Guernica in April 1937. It was the first major application of terror bombing of civilians as Europe practiced for the tasks of World War II.

For 500 pages we refight the propaganda event following upon the murderous 3-hour attack. There is no doubt today that Franco forces were responsible, and, for that matter, even on that eventful day, there was no doubt who carried out the bombing. There were, after all, victims, survivors, and eyewitnesses. Yet, surprisingly enough, the intervening years led to a sordid battle between Spanish loyalists and rebels and their international supporters about who really carried out the raid.

The book pursues each and every lead, each and every article, and each and every charge and countercharge, down to the present. It becomes tedious as the propagandists beclouded the issue. Yet, one question remains and eventually Southworth airs it: why Guernica, a small, but historically important Basque symbol?

The answer, something of a shocker, goes back into the ideological history of the era, pitting the Catholics against the "Reds." The reality, it would seem, is to be found in the psychological contradiction, offensive to the nationalists, that Spanish Basque Catholics were largely loyal to the republic, alleged to be Communist. One could not easily mount an international campaign based on the Catholic right, if an important historic enclave of Catholic Spain remained loyal. Thus, the Condor Legion employed its skill to break the Basque morale and support.

I found the book too long, though professionally done. The viciousness of that civil war was amply demonstrated, and to me the cynicism and utter

unscrupulousness of the international defenders and detractors both to this day represents a low point in the history of ideology.

ROBERT F. DELANEY
Naval War College

Stuart, Bérault, Seigneur d'Aubigny, *Traité sur l'Art de la Guerre*. Edited by Élie de Comminges. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976. 77pp. *(International Archives of the History of Ideas*, v. 85.)

This treatise on the art of war was written in the early 16th century by a Frenchman of Scottish descent. He was a man who had had a great deal of experience in war and diplomacy during the period of the first series of wars that France fought in her attempt to dominate Italy. It was a complicated period in diplomatic and military history, but it is one that reveals the beginnings of the modern pattern in international relations.

Bérault accompanied King Charles VIII of France on the 1494 invasion of Italy and was sent on diplomatic missions to Florence, Milan, Naples, Mantua, Ferrara and Rome in an effort to secure a free hand for France in his ambitions. However, the epaliton of opposing princes in the Holy League forced France to retreat. At the high point in the first invasion, just following the French capture of Naples, Bérault was appointed commander of French forces in Calabria and later fought the army of Gonzaga de Cordoba and Ferdinand II of Spain. When Naples was lost to Spain, Bérault and his army were withdrawn, but the dream of French conquest in Italy was not forgotten. In 1500, Louis XII launched another attempt. This time, Bérault was named Governor of Milan and later, envoy to Naples and Calabria. As a lieutenant general, Bérault commanded a victorious French Army at Terranova. In the end, however, the French were defeated and Bérault, himself, surrendered at Rocca Angistola after a long siege. The final outcome of the war proved Spain's ability to defend her position as a Mediterranean power by controlling Italy as well as Sardinia and Sicily. Following the end of the war, Bérault was returned from imprisonment and resumed his service to France. He died in Edinburgh in 1508 while on a mission that combined an official embassy to England and Scotland with a personal pilgrimage to the Shrine of St. Ninian at Whithorn, the first Christian church in Scotland.

This edition of the *Traité sur l'Art de la Guerre* is a collation of six known manuscripts and one early 16th-century printed version. The scholarly apparatus, introduction, notes, and appendices are longer than Bérault's 24-page work, but they do provide fascinating and useful information with which to understand it. Élie de Comminges has edited the document with great care and erudition. All of the material presented in this edition adds something to our knowledge of Bérault and to the history of the Italian wars. The document, itself, is written in 16th century French which requires some expertise to read. However, that task is eased for us by the editor's contribution.

Bérault's study is an important example of that large body of military writing influenced by Vegetius's *Epitoma Rei Militaris*. While Bérault is certainly part of that tradition, his work is also notably different. He appears to be the first modern soldier-diplomat to cite examples of his own time and experience rather than to limit himself to the events of classical history. Bérault's work has five chapters: how to conquer a country, how to besiege a city, what to do when a country is invaded, how to defend strong places, and the order of battle for war. In addition to drawing upon classical history, he effectively illustrates his points from his own knowledge and experience in all of these areas. The result is a series of maxims

that are concise, full of sound advice for a contemporary soldier, and strictly practical. Undoubtedly they were intended to be published as a guide for future leaders.

The general views Bérault expressed were not new but the unique aspect of them lies in the personal element that he added to a work on the art of warfare. As such it is substantially different, but far overshadowed by Fourquevaux' *Instructions sur le Facit de la Guerre*, the most famous and widely quoted 16th-century military work. Élie de Comminges has made a substantial contribution to the study of military writing by making Bérault's work more widely available.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF
Pembroke College, Oxford

van Creveld, Martin. *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. 284pp.

General works on the history of logistics are few and far between, and even studies of logistics in particular campaigns are far outnumbered by tactical and strategic studies. *Supplying War* attempts to give a broad outline of the development of logistics between the Thirty Years' War and World War II. In a subsequent article ("Supplying an Army: An Historian's View," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies*, June 1978, pp. 56-63), van Creveld summarizes his argument and carries it on to the present day.

In approaching his subject, van Creveld asks some of the basic questions appropriate to a study of the influence of logistics on strategy: what were the logistics factors limiting an army's operations? What arrangements were made to move it and keep it supplied while moving? How did these arrangements affect the course of the campaign, both as planned and as carried out? These are extremely important questions, and the task of finding answers to them is an important and useful one. However, the title of the book misleads the reader into assuming that the author's subject is much broader than it is. It is not a book about supplying war, but a study of army logistics. The broader aspects of war logistics that must surely include some reference to national finance, the interrelationship of land, sea, and later, air forces, the structure of coalitions when they are used, the "friction" of bureaucracy, are not considered in any great extent. The subtitle defines the topic of supplying war as logistics from Wallenstein to Patton. The names of the men give us a clue that this is a book about armies, yet when we look into it, we discover that the subject covers only half of those 300 years. In fact, the book is about the period from Napoleon to Patton.

It is unfortunate that Dr. van Creveld has dismissed the 17th and 18th centuries summarily, for there would seem to be much more there for his subject than he allows. In terms of the British Army, for example, there are further points to be made about the operation of armies on distant stations. The operations of the army in Spain during the War of the Spanish Succession, across the Atlantic in the War for America, or in Spain during the Napoleonic wars offer additional perspectives. Some of these have already been studied by other scholars in terms of logistics. There is much more to be said about the Blenheim campaign of 1704, and these matters may be gleaned from the works of such German and Austrian historians as E. Ritter, Braubach and Mathis.

Van Creveld begins his study in earnest with the Ulm campaign of 1805 that he uses to illustrate an army living off the country. Then he begins to jump to a number of other campaigns in the following century and a half that illustrate other points. He uses the campaign of 1812 to show the inadequacy of

horse-drawn transport in the conditions of the Russian winter. The Franco-Prussian War is an illustration of the use of railroads and the inadequacy of transport from railheads. Nineteen hundred and fourteen is used to show the limitations on the military use of railroads. In World War II, he looks at the problem of the German Army in its eastern campaign struggling with the transition to a mechanized force, a transition that he shows was completed in the Allied forces by 1944. Finally, he looks at some of the unique aspects of Rommel's desert campaigns.

In the chapters on World War II, the author has made valuable use of his own research in German archives at Freiburg. In other chapters, he has supplemented published studies with reference to manuscripts in the Depot de Guerre, Vincennes, the Public Record Office in London, and the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, now at King's College, London.

Despite the qualifications that one must have concerning the 17th and 18th centuries in this book and the narrowly defined understanding of war logistics, Dr. van Creveld makes a very important contribution by showing to us the largely untouched subject of logistics in war history. It is a thought-provoking study that one hopes will encourage further studies and reinterpretations in the field.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF
Pembroke College, Oxford

Watson, Peter. *War on the Mind: the Military Uses and Abuses of Psychology*. New York: Basic Books. 534pp.

This rather hefty volume by an author who is both a clinical psychologist and an editor of the London *Sunday Times* may be just what its dust jacket proclaims, "the most comprehensive work on the psychology of warfare ever published." Peter Watson assesses his subject under five broad divisions: Combat Stress, Determinants of Loyalty and Treason, Survival, and Psychology of Counter-Insurgency. He has pursued his inquiries in eight countries and estimates that there are 146 separate institutes where the subject is being investigated, "the overwhelming majority (130) in the United States." His annotation, in the back matter, is extensive though there is no bibliography.

In a tempered, near conversational style Watson probes into the welter of experimentation in his field now ongoing across the globe (mainly non-Communist). He pinpoints the U.S. Army's psychological warfare school at Fort Bragg as "the most sophisticated institution of its kind in the world." He has interesting things to say about a variety of intriguing experiments, e.g., tactual communications, distinctions between leadership and command, assessments of the personality type liable to commit atrocities, or the manipulation potential of witchcraft and sorcery. Some of his commentary is extensive and persuasive, such as the sections on interrogation and brainwashing; some is skimpy, such as that dealing with animals as weapons.

It is in certain of his conclusions that the author may give one pause. He thinks, for example, that politicomilitary research ought "to be carried out openly, or at least to be published openly, so that it can be freely reviewed and criticized and its implications fully aired." Again: "the deliberate development of weapons of unnecessary suffering . . . is out," because ideas can be stolen and because scientists suffer from overheated imaginations anyway. Or: psywarriors come to learn so much about the makeup of a given enemy that they tend to laboratoryize him and so transform him into a "lesser human being."

But let it not be said that Watson is a fangs-bared antimilitarist. He concedes that "it has recently been shown that the military mind is *not* more ideological than the non-military mind; if any-

thing . . . it is more pragmatic." He is probably correct, too, in his belief that military psychologists could enrich their endeavors if they contrived somehow to keep fully abreast of what each was up to and toward this end Watson proposes yet another "institute."

In short, this volume may be perused with profit by all elements of the armed services. For senior officers it should fall little short of mandatory status. They will find it at once enlightening and exasperating.

CURTIS CARROLL DAVIS
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army Reserve (Ret.)

Webb, James. *Fields of Fire.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1978. 344pp.

The sound and smell of combat in Vietnam at the platoon level permeates *Fields of Fire* with a completeness that is extraordinary and a realism that is almost eerie. Webb's book reeks of gunpowder. It is unusual for an author's first work of fiction to be so real, particularly when describing combat and all its horrors. Webb also masterfully addresses the subleties of the personal relationships of soldiers at war.

This book is not only for those Americans who went to Vietnam. It will be an intense reading experience for others as well, primarily because of Webb's ability to paint a picture with words and to put his reader on the scene. Additionally, the glossary of terms included at the end of the book will translate all of the colloquialisms of marines in Vietnam into everyday language.

Fields of War is reality revisited. Set in 1968-69 in the vicinity of An Hoa, with such place names as Liberty Bridge, Go Noi Island, Arizona, Charley Ridge, and the Razorback easily recognizable to a generation of marines, the book conjures up memories long submerged.

The attitude of the "grunts" (infantry marines at the platoon and company level) in the book also portrays reality. There was a "Catch-22" feeling among marines in Vietnam that Webb accurately described in the dialogue. For example, ID cards were issued to the friendly populace so the VC/NVA could be identified. The net effect, however, was that VC/NVA acquired them, and the civilians lost them through VC intimidation or subversion. The resettlement village was set up to isolate the VC from the populace, but poeple weren't relocated there because corrupt politicians kept the village only half filled in order to pocket money intended for its support of the village. The destruction of rice was intended to starve the enemy and force him out of the mountains, but the effect was to starve the populace and alienate them, thus driving them to the enemy side.

The author's intimacy with combat marines is noticeable in his development of the grunts' outlook. For example, the grunt view of "pogues" (rear area personnel not involved in frequent contact with the enemy) was universal and vividly portrayed. The difference in attitude of grunts and pogues is reflected in the difference in priorities. What was important to a pogue didn't matter in the least to a grunt (at least generally speaking). The adjustments necessary when the platoon returned from the field to the combat base were realistic and at the same time amusing because the two areas were worlds apart. Webb sensitively portrayed the emptiness and frustration felt by men in Vietnam because of the feeling that nobody really cared. To what seemed to be the majority of the American public during 1968-69, Vietnam was just one more unpleasantness (and one that could be turned off—or at least ignored). The man in the trenches had a very hard time understanding why the America that sent him to war was not willing to support his effort in that war.

The combat in *Fields of Fire* is a mirrorlike image. The use of supporting

arms, the sweeps through the rice paddies, the anxiety of moving toward a village, the exhilaration of being shot at (and missed), the telltale signs and indicators of enemy presence, the reaction and movement during combat, the professional execution of responsibility by sometimes surprising people, all tell it like it is. Many readers of this book undoubtedly will recall the apprehension felt when the point man reported the absence of water buffalo in the fields surrounding the next hamlet. The impression that events occur in slow motion and with great focus and clarity during moments of actual combat seems, at first blush, to be odd, but the fact is that although the events are occurring at blinding speed, they are individual scenes on the screen of one's memory.

The relationships among the central characters sketched by Webb are highlights of the book, and the association of the platoon commander with his men was experienced by literally thousands of marines in Vietnam. The standoffishness and apprehension of both Lieutenant Hodges and the men in the platoon when he first arrived was a natural reaction. The description of Hodges, the central figure, growing into his responsibilities is beautifully done. His gradual acceptance by the platoon, followed by genuine comradeship with them, reflected on the professional as well as personal qualities of both Hodges and the platoon members. The dependence of these men upon each other was total and, although quietly aware of that fact, they didn't fully understand the concept and all that it portended. Webb's treatment of these relationships and the men's dependence upon each other is well done. Dependence is developed throughout the book and its lessons are brought to a convincing climax in the final chapter. Although one would not expect the combat veterans in Hodges' platoon to admit it, the central theme in the book is man's love for his fellow man and the love and mutual respect that develop among warriors in combat.

Webb's portrayal of the new man in the unit was poignantly and accurately painted. The feeling one experiences when he is the new kid on the block is unforgettable. Likewise, Webb's development of the "new guy" turning into an "old guy" over a period of time and the personal effects of combat reflect his intimacy with the environment and his sensitivity in understanding marines. Webb's presentation of the concept that combat affects different people differently is subtle but enduring.

The sadistic sense of humor displayed by the central characters is magnificently presented. There was nothing —absolutely nothing—sacred among the grunts in Vietnam, and *Fields of Fire* is chock-full of humorous (perhaps shocking for the uninitiated) vignettes.

A comparison of *Rumor of War* and *Fields of Fire* will strongly favor the latter. Both books accurately describe and reflect combat in Vietnam at the platoon level, even though the situation and terrain are different. However, there is a sense of negativism that pervades *Rumor of War* from start to finish, and the reader is left with a sense of disappointment and frustration at its conclusion. Conversely, *Fields of Fire*, despite the ultimate demise of all the central characters, is positive in tone and at the end the reader is disappointed only because there is no more good reading.

The only weakness in *Fields of Fire* is the shallow treatment given the complexities of the Vietnamese people. Lieutenant Hodges and the members of his platoon did not understand the Vietnamese people, their culture and their environment and yet this was one of the greatest difficulties of the Vietnam war—the difference between the American and Vietnamese people and their values and the inability of American money, firepower and lives to

bridge the gap. On the other hand, this lack of understanding was a common failing in Vietnam, and Webb's book deserves credit for presenting the issue as it really was. Nonetheless, some readers will undoubtedly recoil at the characters' inability to put events into perspective at several points in the book.

In summation, *Fields of Fire* is a solid piece of war fiction made better because it closely paralleled actual events. It is an outstanding war story and an accurate and detailed reflection of combat in the vicinity of Liberty Bridge in 1968-69. While the reviewer has not read all the books about Vietnam, he has read most of them. *Fields of Fire* is unquestionably the best. The rest aren't even close.

FRED T. FAGAN, JR.
Major, U.S. Marine Corps

RECENT BOOKS

Selected Accessions of the Naval War College Library

Annotated by

Ann Hardy, with Kathleen Ashook
Doris Baginski, and Mary Ann Varoutsos

Adler, Mortimer J. *Aristotle for Everybody.* New York: Macmillan, 1978. 204pp. $8.95
In this exposition Adler seeks to introduce the layman to the fundamentals of philosophical searching as well as to Aristotle's thought.

Blanchard, Benjamin S. *Design and Manage to Life Cycle Cost.* Portland, Ore: M/A Press, 1978. 255pp. $24.95
Life cycle cost analysis is a concept for management based on the total cost of a project or system rather than segments of cost, such as development or production. Case studies play a vital part in Blanchard's treatment of the subject.

British Defence Policy in a Changing World. London: Croom Helm, 1977. 295pp. £9.95
This compilation contains ten detailed thematic studies that treat significant strategic and organizational aspects of British defense policy since 1945. Taken together, the essays provide a comprehensive picture of British policy as a whole from the perspectives of economists, historians, and political scientists.

Budnick, Frank S., et al. *Principles of Operations Research for Management.* Homewood, Ill.: Irwin, 1977. 756pp. $17.95
An eight-step decision paradigm is the basis for this comprehensive survey of the concepts of operations research techniques and their application to decisionmaking.

Bupp, Irvin C. and Derian, Jean-Claude. *Light-Water: How the Nuclear Dream Dissolved.* New York: Basic Books, 1978. 241pp. $10.00

The authors, with 15 years' experience in U.S. and French nuclear power programs, explain the American light-water reactor technology domination of the global market in the 1960s. Theirs is a telling disclosure of the acceptance of expectations and shortsighted expense estimates instead of actual experiential knowledge and true costs. Misjudgments in both business and government management of the light-water reactor process led to three phases of controversy over nuclear safety. The economic, political, and social ramifications of nuclear power are considered, and remedial action for "the abuse of a technology" is suggested, encompassing compromise and open options.

Chung, Chin O. *P'yongyang between Peking and Moscow: North Korea's Involvement in the Sino-Soviet Dispute, 1958-1975.* University: University of Alabama Press, 1978. 230pp. $15.00

Poised between the two largest Communist regimes in the world, North Korea has needed to maintain a delicate balance in her foreign policy. A descriptive analysis is made of eight major stages in P'yongyang's foreign policy from 1958 to 1975, showing the adroit maneuvers with which North Korea enhanced her independence by forcing China and Russia to compete for her support.

Corson, William R. *The Armies of Ignorance: the Rise of the American Intelligence Empire.* New York: Dial Press, 1977. 640pp. $12.50

As he relates the exploits of spies from the country's early history, the beginnings of an institutionalized system during World War I, and its evolution thereafter, William Corson establishes an historical perspective for his study of the American intelligence community. During the post-World War II period, Corson's focus is on the relationship between the intelligence agencies and the presidents.

Gaddis, John L. *Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States; an Interpretive History.* New York: Wiley, 1978. 309pp. $12.95; paper $7.95

Originally U.S.-Russian relations were good, based on common interests, but in the late 19th century, ideology and public opinion adversely affected the association. After the Bolshevik Revolution, conflicting Leninist and Wilsonian doctrines led to a breaking of diplomatic ties; and later the national self-seeking manipulations and strategies within the World War II Grand Alliance generated inevitable hostility between the United States and the U.S.S.R., affecting security, political theory, and technology. Gaddis analyzes the erratic course of this cold war that involved the whole world in its phases. An outstanding bibliographic essay follows the text.

Graham, Daniel O. *A New Strategy for the West: NATO after Détente.* Washington: Heritage Foundation, 1977. 72pp. paper $3.00

In this plea for a reassessment and revitalization of NATO strategy, Graham deplores the slide from containment into détente, permitting deterioration in the balance of power between NATO and the Soviet Union. He states: "The Soviet strategy is global; NATO's counterstrategy must be global as well."

Required is a need to recognize commonality of interests and mutual and reciprocal responsibilities among the NATO allies, together with a strengthening of conventional forces and limited nuclear options; the author questions any meaningful results from SALT and MBFR.

Haber, Eitan. *Menahim Begin: the Legend and the Man.* New York: Delacorte Press, 1978. 321pp. $9.95

Here is presented a sympathetic account of the adventurous and dramatic career of Israel's prime minister. The author recounts Begin's dedication to militant Zionism from the time of his youth, his imprisonment in Siberia during World War II, his activities as a terrorist in Palestine, and his subsequent role as a right-wing opposition leader in Israeli politics.

Harkavy, Robert E. *Spectre of a Middle Eastern Holocaust: the Strategic and Diplomatic Implications of the Israeli Nuclear Weapons Program.* Denver: University of Denver. Graduate School of International Studies, 1977. 126pp. $3.50

Harkavy addresses one of the most fearsome prospects of our times—the probability of a nuclear war in the Middle East. Considering Israel's stage of nuclear development and state of mind, he contends that the likelihood of such a war must not be underestimated. He outlines several alternative scenarios and nuclear doctrines to shed some light on a very uncertain future.

Hoffman, Stanley. *Primacy or World Order: American Foreign Policy since the Cold War.* New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978. 331pp. $12.50

In his evaluation of U.S. foreign policy through 30 years of the cold war, Vietnam, and the Kissinger diplomacy, the author holds that this country always tried to maintain its primacy in the international scene. He diagnoses particularly the ills and complications of the Kissinger era, and offers a prescription for the future treatment of a world now suffering from a multitude of maladies. Rational steps toward a world order based on interdependence, cooperation, and common policies must be the first priority for the United States; there is no alternative to a joint effort to alleviate the global disorders.

Kudirka, Simas and Eichel, Larry. *For Those Still at Sea.* New York: Dial Press, 1978. 226pp. $7.95

Upon receiving his freedom, Simas Kudirka, the Lithuanian seaman who was mistakenly denied asylum by the United States, pledged to tell the world about the labor camps, isolation cells, death trains, and psychiatric tortures he encountered after being forcibly returned to the Soviet Union. Combining both immediacy and objectivity, this semiautobiographical account fulfills his promise to these political prisoners "still at sea."

Martin, Earl S. *Reaching the Other Side: the Journal of an American Who Stayed to Witness Vietnam's Postwar Transition.* New York: Crown Publishers, 1978. 281pp. $10.95

Twice assigned by the Mennonite Central Committee to voluntary agency projects in Quang Ngai province, the author became fluent in the Vietnamese tongue and made friends in both the Nationalist and revolutionary folds. Upon their urging, in 1975 when the guerrillas and Provisional Revolutionary Government forces took control, he remained to photograph and record his

observations of the Communist takeover and the people's reactions in the province and along the route he followed to Saigon.

Marx, Robert F. *Into the Deep; the History of Man's Underwater Exploration.* New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1978. 198pp. $9.95
The underwater demolition teams of World War II, the sponge divers of ancient Greece, and the inventors of the first submarine all play a part in this sweeping account of man's attempts to live and work underwater. Given the rapidly escalating demand for natural resources by a geometrically expanding world population, man must strive to develop the seas' potential to provide minerals and food for the future.

Michael, Franz. *Mao and the Perpetual Revolution.* Woodbury, N.Y.: Barron's, 1977. 326pp. $9.95
The complexities of recent Chinese history are woven into this description of Mao's early life, lengthy career, and ideological development.

Norman, Albert. *The Panama Canal Treaties of 1977: a Political Evaluation.* Northfield, Vt.: The Author, 1978. 48pp. $6.50*
This slim pamphlet contains the 1977 Panama Canal treaties and four short essays that examine the history of the Canal, the provisions of the treaties, and the sovereignty of the Canal Zone. Although the Canal's importance as an international public utility might someday overturn these agreements, the transfer of sovereignty from the United States to Panama is viewed as a charitable act of great magnitude.

*For sale by the author, Albert Norman, 3 Alpine Drive, Northfield, Vt. 05663

Sanders, Nancy K. *The Sea Peoples: Warriors of the Ancient Mediterranean 1250-1150 B.C.* London: Thames and Hudson, 1978. 224pp. $12.95
The mystery of the who, how, and why of the Dark Ages in early Mediterranean history is sought in this profusely illustrated volume in the Aspects of Greek and Roman Life Series. Egyptian historical inscriptions and archeological discoveries throughout the entire area suggest the identity of the invading forces whom the Egyptians called the Peoples of the Sea: actually a heterogeneous group from the northern regions and the islands who conducted both land and sea raids contributory to the long period of decline and destruction of much of the civilization of the era.

Smith, Philip C.F. *Fired by Manley Zeal: a Naval Fiasco of the American Revolution.* Salem, Mass.: Peabody Museum of Salem, 1977. 115pp. $10.00
On 7 July 1777 off Nova Scotia British and American ships engaged in a battle that featured poor judgment, indecision, and, especially, lack of communication between the two American captains. The obdurate animosity that estranged the two men and led to the escape of one and capture of the other is highlighted in this interesting report of the association and of the battle and its effects on the two Americans. Contemporary sketches and paintings clarify the progress of the action.

The Southern Oceans and the Security of the Free World: New Studies in Global Strategy. London: Stacey International, 1977. 256pp. $15.00
The basic premise underlying each paper presented at this international symposium on the strategic importance of the Southern Oceans in general and Southern Africa in particular is that the security of the United States and Western Europe is being seriously undermined by the growing Soviet strength in the region south of the equator.

Spencer, John H. *Ethiopia, the Horn of Africa, and U.S. Policy*. Cambridge, Mass: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1977. 70pp. $5.00
Ethiopia's domestic situation and the rapidly expanding Soviet influence in the horn of Africa are the main concerns in this critical analysis of U.S. policy toward Ethiopia for the last 40 years.

Waterbury, John and Mallakh, Ragaei El. *The Middle East in the Coming Decade: from Wellhead to Well-Being?* New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978, 217pp. $9.95; paper $5.95
Viewing their subject from the North-South perspective, the two authors of these studies consider the major issue in the Middle East to be the manner in which the great oil wealth will be employed to enhance the national economies and regional cooperation and power. They present differing opinions on the prospects, Waterbury foreseeing an era of competition, and Mallakh envisioning a period of cooperative relationships among the various countries of the area.

Wilson, Desmond P., Jr. *The U.S. Sixth Fleet and the Conventional Defense of Europe*. Professional Paper No. 160. Arlington, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 1976. 48pp.*
The European theater is used as a case in point in this study that assesses the effectiveness of the attack aircraft carrier in a conventional warfare environment. Because of the extreme vulnerability of projection forces in the Mediterranean, all evidence points to the deemphasis of carrier aviation in the Sixth Fleet and a return to the situation that existed prior to the end of World War II.

*For price information, contact the Center for Naval Analyses, 1401 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Va. 22209.