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Although Soviet leaders intend to fight offensively and win any war that should come to central Europe, Soviet analysts concerned with the correlation of forces in the area must include several troubling elements in their considerations—the actual status of opposing coalitions, impaired combat readiness, less than satisfactory training results, and the difficult problems of command and control. NATO may be pleased with these Soviet difficulties, considering that they contribute to the maintenance of deterrence, but NATO dare not view them complacently. This paper, presented at the 1980 meeting of the International Studies Association, discusses the Soviet view of the balance in central Europe and offers some recommendations to NATO.

THE BALANCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE: REFLECTIONS THROUGH THE SOVIET PRISM

by

Lieutenant Colonel Allan A. Myer, U.S. Army

Despite tensions in the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia and the unprecedented use of Soviet military power in Afghanistan, today is a time of no apparent imminent military danger to NATO's Central Region. Deterrence appears all-successful there. In any case, only *in extremis* would Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces strike at Western Europe. Nevertheless, today is not the time for complacency. However remote the possibility of a war might appear, there is always some chance that deterrence could fail. One day, a war in Europe might have to be faced because of an accident, a miscalculation, or even irrational design. And given recent developments in U.S.-Soviet relations, miscalculation, for example, can no longer be viewed as an inconceivable possibility. U.S. and NATO force

on the premise that although there is no real alternative to deterrence, should it fail, NATO must survive and prevail. If war comes, could NATO survive and prevail? That question is the subject of hundreds of Western assessments, appraisals, analyses and the like every year. There is a broad range of conclusions.

Disquieting reality... adverse trends... precarious balance... gross disparity in capabilities... the Nunn Report... As a result of the momentum behind conventional force defense programs, Warsaw Pact forces have undergone significant quantitative expansion and qualitative upgrading during the past decade. The result is a combat-ready force capable of launching a devastating conventional attack in central Europe with little warning... gloom and doom.¹

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NATO has the basic military assets on the ground and in the air to conduct a successful forward defense.... We could not be any more sure of stopping quick attacks than the Soviet marshals could be confident of breaking through NATO's defense.²

Assessments of the central European military balance are easy to find. In fact, if one is at all interested in or involved in national security affairs, they are almost impossible to avoid. But NATO-Warsaw Pact assessments are rarely clear-cut. Elaborate qualifiers and caveats are the rule. Even the prestigious IISS *Military Balance* concludes its detailed (and often quoted) analysis by observing that there is neither a satisfactory way to measure asymmetrical advantages nor a useful method to analyze the meaning of numerous qualitative factors that could prove dominant in a nonnuclear conflict.³ The whole process becomes rather intuitive and partially dependent on the particular bent of the analyst.

This is not to suggest that assessments are without value. But we must treat them with much caution. First of all, what is being assessed and how is it being weighed? While most studies involve comparisons of manpower, principal combat formations, major items of equipment, and production trends, other studies pick and choose from a wide range of other available static indicators: logistic support capabilities, deployment patterns, external reinforcement strengths, mobilization potential, lethality indexes, reliability of allies, geography, economic potential, munition stocks, and the status of interoperability and standardization. Secondly, some studies compare like systems (tanks versus tanks, fighter squadrons versus fighter squadrons) while others key to opposing systems (close air support versus air defense).

Finally, and probably the most difficult

factor to deal with, is the choice of scenario. Analytical techniques usually rely on a highly structured and specific hypothetical conflict to test the adequacy of NATO's defense posture. In fact, U.S. defense planning and programming is based on analyses resulting from hypothetical conflicts anchored to specific contingencies that are deemed both conceivable and of vital interest to the United States.

Scenario development is risky business. The analyst doesn't work with facts as much as with the uncertainties of the future. In a word, assumptions are the stuff of scenarios. Open to endless debate and questioning, the scenario must nevertheless visualize and define a complex, foggy future. The scenario developer is an easy target, though rarely hit with facts—only with counterassumptions. A useful NATO-Warsaw Pact scenario requires solid assumptions drawn from analyses of extremely tough questions.

- What will be the conflict boundary? What is going on in the rest of the world? What about the northern and southern sectors? What about the PRC, North Korea, Cuba?

- How much warning time will NATO have? How will it use the time?

- What precipitated the conflict? What are Soviet objectives?

- When will the war start? Will all programmed NATO force modernization and logistic upgrading be fielded on time?

- How will resupply be affected by Atlantic Ocean naval actions?

- Conventional or nuclear? Use of chemical weapons?

- Add one's own....

Yes, risky business. But there can be no doubt that the use of scenarios is essential for defense planning. They place boundaries on the uncertainties and allow planners to understand the sensitivity of war gaming results and defense requirements to changes in

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conditions and contingencies within given boundaries. Given the numerous options, the vast array of variables and methods available for assessment purposes, and the lack of complete or even accurate Soviet military-related data, it is no wonder that Central Region assessments range from hysterical gloom and doom to cautious optimism.

Where and how can we find resolution? Skillful researchers bring to bear hard-hitting evidence, incorporate relevant developments in Soviet military affairs, consider skillfully the realities of the European theater and arrive at significantly different conclusions. Only two common threads seem to be evident in most analyses. First, there is the notion that the disparity between the stated rationale for Soviet deployments in Eastern Europe and their actual posture is a valid source of political and military anxiety. Secondly, the pattern of Soviet force modernization and qualitative upgrading, when measured against the pace of NATO modernization, is significantly adverse to NATO's security interests. Other than that, numbers are masterfully massaged to support diverse conclusions. Additional research would only serve to strengthen the conclusions of each analysis. Resolution does not come easy; maybe a new approach is needed.

Despite careful use of Soviet documentation and extensive information regarding Soviet-Warsaw Pact force dispositions and armaments, in the last resort each assessment reflects realities through a Western prism. The Soviet image of any future war in Europe becomes a Western understanding of that image. Answers to the question of Soviet-Warsaw Pact force superiority in Europe is always based on a set of Western principles, a Western catalog of determinants. It might just be worth the effort to look through the Soviet prism. After all, Marshal

Sokolovskiy has made the following assertion:

War is an extremely complicated social phenomenon, and discovering its essence is possible only by using a uniquely scientific method — Marxist-Leninist dialectics.⁴

Time and again, Soviet authors have stated that their methodology is infallible, that their methods are the only "scientific" explanations of reality. Marxist-Leninist methodology is the Soviet prism, and it really doesn't matter if it is right or wrong. That can be left to the philosophers. The process of conflict and resolution, the dialectic, may not uncover the true nature of all things. But for more than 60 years the Soviet leadership has steadfastly maintained that their methodology alone explains reality and that they use it. Let's take them at their word and see where it may lead. As an important Soviet military author has noted,

Marxist-Leninist methodology provides Soviet military theory with the capability of not only scientifically understanding and revealing the role, contents and specific features of the correlation of forces of warring sides at various levels, but also for correctly substantiating the methods for the most rapid creation over an enemy of the desired superiority in forces and means, and for developing methods of accurate analysis and ways of prognosticating the required correlation of forces.⁵

The calculation of the correlation of forces (*sootnosheniye sil*) is the methodology used by Soviet analysts to derive net assessments of opposing military forces. It is not simply a methodology claimed to be scientific for use during wartime. Rather, it is an expansive concept with military and nonmilitary applications used during peace and war.⁶ Soviet literature treats the correlation of forces as a general concept that is applied to numerous

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diverse situations in order to evaluate the balance between two forces or groups of forces in conflict. However, this is neither to suggest that the correlation of forces is a setpiece formula nor that the Soviet Union claims that the concept is foolproof. They acknowledge that the methodology has flaws and that their scientific community is striving to further refine it.⁷ Among the difficulties encountered in the calculation of the correlation of forces, two are worth mentioning. First, not all data is quantifiable. While computer technology provides the capability to quantify material factors of the NATO-Warsaw Pact equation to a considerable degree, important sociopolitical, spiritual, and sociomilitary factors can be evaluated only qualitatively.⁸ The second difficulty arises with respect to those factors that have no defined position. Their influence may be significant under certain scenarios, but cannot be determined beforehand.⁹ As examples of these "wandering values" one might include the decision of France with respect to participation in a NATO-Pact conflict, the use of nuclear weapons, the alignment of nonbelligerents, and the effect of West European communist parties on NATO's effort.

The point to be made is that looking through the Soviet prism does not mean the exclusive use of high technology analytical techniques to derive precise correlations. But it does mean that appraisals of the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance must be understood in Soviet terms. Soviet perceptions, requirements, and calculation of risk must be dealt with using Soviet methodology. If we are to conclude that, on balance, the Warsaw Pact force either has superiority or is rapidly moving to acquire it, one key measurement ought to be the correlation of forces analyzed through a Soviet conceptual lens.* The remainder of this article is so directed

Pondering the Unanswerable: Conventional or Nuclear? The first obstacle encountered when treating with the military balance in Europe is the nuclear question. Western analyses normally overcome the obstacle quite easily by either ignoring it entirely or by making vague comments and then moving quickly to conventional force posturing issues.¹⁰ Winston Churchill's observation that "man will occasionally stumble over the truth, but most of the time he will pick himself up and continue on," is worthy of note. One thing is certain: Soviet analysts do not ignore the obstacle. In fact, they put it up front, face it squarely, and contend that it must receive first priority. (It is for this very reason that I have chosen to begin a perspective through the Soviet prism with the nuclear question.)

In determining the correlation of forces of the sides all factors of nuclear might require first priority evaluation In the aggregate the correlation of forces of the sides should be the distinctive resultant combined—both nuclear and non-nuclear—might of the sides.¹¹

For the Soviet analyst, the first really sticky problem has already arrived. NATO tactical nuclear weapons holdings, forward based systems, declaratory operating doctrine, systems deployments, upgrading and improvement programs, as well as the murky area of escalation control (or the lack thereof) confront the Soviet analyst with a host of confusing realities. Yet he must correlate. Given the self-evident imbalance in conventional ground forces, Soviet planners must either take NATO declaratory policy seriously or

* Colonel (now Major-General) Sergel Tyushkevich's article, "The Methodology for the Correlation of Forces in War" published in *Voyennaya Mysl'* contains the quantitative and qualitative factors which in their combination comprise the correlation of forces. This article draws heavily on Tyushkevich's article. See Note 5 for Tyushkevich's credentials.

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they must consider us nuts. NATO strategy, after all, is clear-cut. Should deterrence fail, there are three levels of response under NATO's "14/3" strategy.¹² If the Pact initiates a conventional attack, NATO will automatically respond with a direct defense. Implicitly, this is a forward defense limited to conventional weapons. If this first level is insufficient to halt and repel the aggression, NATO plans a deliberate escalation. At this second level, the response seeks to defeat the Pact by raising "the scope and intensity of combat, making the cost and risk disproportionate to the aggressor's objectives and the threat of nuclear response progressively more imminent."¹³ Presumably, within this level NATO can be expected to cross the nuclear threshold with the employment of tactical nuclear weapons. The final level, and under NATO strategy the ultimate deterrent, is a general nuclear strike throughout the Pact territorial area employing such theater and strategic nuclear systems against those nuclear, military, and industrial targets necessary to achieve NATO's war objectives.

Numerous Western critics contend that this strategy has no connection with the realities of the 1980s (or even of the 1970s). No critic is more to the point than Irving Kristol:

It is still the official military doctrine of the United States and NATO that the use of strategic nuclear weapons is not excluded, in a case of Soviet aggression with conventional military forces—or *a fortiori*, using tactical nuclear weapons—against Western Europe. There may even be American and NATO generals who believe this is so. They, and anyone else who believes it, are living in a world of fantasy.¹⁴

In short, critics who argue that NATO's 1968 strategy is a useless relic of the past base their reasoning on the

proposition that once the Soviet Union moved inexorably toward something approaching strategic nuclear equivalence, the very notion that U.S. strategic nuclear holdings were serving as a deterrent to Pact aggression became preposterous. Furthermore, this same logic applies to NATO's theater nuclear weapons inasmuch as the Soviet Union has at least effective parity in this area also.

One can agree with this logic; one can also agree with the thought that if U.S. and NATO nuclear forces deter Soviet first use of nuclear weapons, then the converse is also true *and still* conclude that when calculating the correlation of forces, Soviet planners remain troubled. In fact, with the existing nuclear balance and even with the significantly reduced credibility of a first use threat, Soviet analysts have never concluded that under all circumstances the West would remain wedded to a nonuse posture. Quite the contrary:

The book *Peace in the Nuclear Age* published in West Germany, states that "all-out nuclear war as a war in Clausewitz' meaning prevents itself by means of the new weapon." The insolvency of such arguments is beyond all doubt. To counterbalance the views of bourgeois ideologists, Marxist-Leninist methodology discards dogmatism, no matter what form it takes, and condemns the absolutization of concepts and formulas developed in the past, which have become habitual, and condemns their conversion into self-sufficing abstractions isolated from the actual changed conditions and from practical needs.¹⁵

Under the incredible tensions of a European war, can the Soviet leadership be certain that academic notions of the futility of NATO's nuclear strategy will be followed? Even if it may seem as eminently logical to refrain from nuclear warfare, will the Soviets

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conclude that we always choose a rational (Western of course) course of action? NATO strategy may not be harmonized with the dictates of nuclear parity. Logic may be askew. So what? If NATO conventional forces cannot defend successfully, does that mean that in the event of war NATO will follow logic and surrender? Is that the conclusion Soviet planners are bound to make? Is the U.S. commitment to finance NATO's long-range theater nuclear force (TNF) modernization program a multibillion dollar fraud, a monumental ruse? Do we expect Soviet analysts to believe that *Pershing II*, ground-launched cruise missiles, and existing on-line systems are simply mirror tricks that hide a nonstrategy for NATO? Probably not.

Soviet analysis contained in a wide range of Soviet professional journals consistently point to the diverse nature and size of NATO's nuclear holdings, the consistency of the nuclear component of NATO strategy through the years, the unswerving conviction by a succession of National Command Authorities and SACEURs that NATO strategy is sound, and the periodic upgrading of forward-deployed systems.¹⁶ There is no doubt that these analyses contain a healthy dose of obligatory rhetoric. But for years, the tenor of the message has been patently clear: Do not assume a nonnuclear European war; it might start that way but it probably won't end that way—there are simply too many imponderables.

It is also clear that Soviet analysis of the nuclear-conventional question is not limited to the reading of Western unpredictability and NATO strategy. Soviet military doctrine itself is unable to conclude whether the European battlefield will be, without any doubt, nuclear, conventional, or conventional then nuclear. For a decade after Marshal Sokolovskiy's work on Soviet military strategy, it was clear that the accepted

view of the political leadership, those carefully defined and promulgated statements that constitute Soviet military doctrine, was that a war in Europe would be nuclear.¹⁷ The revolution in military affairs was an accomplished fact; theater war was theater nuclear war. But as early as 1965, Soviet military writers began to express ideas that were at variance with the standard doctrinal statements contained in the Sokolovskiy study. The late Gen. S.M. Shtemenko wrote that Soviet doctrine did not exclude the possibility of nonnuclear warfare. Then, in 1967, the commander of the Warsaw Pact commented that nuclear weapons "should not be treated as absolutes, especially in theater force operations."¹⁸ Of course, these statements always contained the caveat that it would be foolish to conclude that theater war would not escalate quickly to nuclear war. Nevertheless, this more flexible approach became commonplace in Soviet writings throughout the 1970s and was also evident in such Soviet field exercises as "October Storm" (1965), "Vltava" (1966), "Dneper" (1967), and "Brotherhood in Arms" (1967). Each of these exercises included an initial phase of conventional operations. Although these developments alone signify a break with previously rigid approaches, it would be fallacious to conclude that current Soviet doctrine accepts a conventional-only notion. As John Erickson observes:

Recent Soviet developments do not mean embracing a "conventional option" in its own right, but rather must be understood in terms of admitting a conventional mode *in the initial* phase of operations and sustained for some considerable period....¹⁹

The point is that during the past 15 years, modernization of the conventional force proceeded with quantitative change followed by quantitative change. Ever so slowly, the nature of the

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conventional force was changing. As new items of equipment were integrated into existing units and as the fighting units themselves were being restructured, the force slowly began a transformation. Quantitative change began to make a qualitative difference, and Soviet military writers and strategists began to take notice.²⁰ On the one hand, Pact conventional force developments were beginning to make a significant difference in terms of the base nature of theater warfare. Earlier doctrinal statements were at variance with "objective reality." Uncertainty was now a reality. On the other hand, Soviet strategists could not find a "scientific" answer to questions relating to the nature of nuclear escalation. Considering that the Soviet Union has consistently defined war as a continuation of politics of classes and states by violent means, the use of nuclear weapons could preclude the attainment of political objectives. The industrial base of Europe could be destroyed. What would be won would not be worth winning. And, in any case, the risk of escalation would put the basic security of the Soviet Union in jeopardy. Again, uncertainty is the reality.

As if the foregoing discussion is not enough to make a Soviet military analyst feel extremely uncomfortable when grappling with his "scientific" formulations, there is an additional factor that has yet to be mentioned. The United States is not the only Western nuclear power with the capability to cross the nuclear threshold in a European war. France's *force de frappe* is on station and being rejuvenated. Now consuming 14 percent of France's defense budget, the nuclear force is becoming more potent. Yvon Bourges, the Defense Minister, has recently stated that, "France's nuclear firepower has doubled since 1977, it will have tripled in 1980 and quadrupled in 1982."²¹ French defense authorities have long been concerned by the

vulnerability of the ballistic missile silos on the Plateau d'Albion. French plans include replacing the 18 fixed missiles now in place with mobile long-range missiles. The existing strategic nuclear submarine force will be modernized with upgraded, megaton-payload warheads. A sixth submarine will go to sea in 1985 with MIRVed warheads. This new submarine will be the prototype of the French SLBM fleet of the 1990s. Finally, 15 of the *Mirage-4* strategic bombers will be modernized. These aircraft will be armed with new air-to-ground nuclear missiles which, if required, could be fitted to any future aircraft taking over the role of the *Mirage-4*.²²

Similarly, the British Government plans to upgrade its nuclear capability during the coming decade. Project *Chevaline*, a \$2.2 billion improvement package for Britain's *Polaris* fleet, will provide the *Polaris* missile a capability to maneuver after launch. Designed as a counter to projected Soviet antimissile defenses, it has been reported that the development is nearly complete after testing in the United States.²³

In calculating the force correlation, Soviet analysts do consider British and French systems and they frequently remind us of that fact.²⁴ In commenting on the current NATO initiative to upgrade long-range TNF systems, Soviet Minister of Defense Dmitri Ustinov observed that, "The implementation of this plan [long-range TNF modernization] would have the aim not simply of supplementing the approximately 1,500 units comprising the U.S. forward-based facilities already there and the corresponding facilities of Britain and France capable of reaching Soviet territory, but also thereby of altering the strategic situation in Europe in NATO's favor."²⁵ Ustinov's commentary contains two direct implications. First, the Western decision to initiate nuclear warfare is extremely complicated. Even if the

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Soviet leadership could be convinced that the American nuclear decision could be forecast, what of the British and of the French? What doctrinal conclusions should be drawn? Probably none. Secondly, NATO's decision to proceed with a substantial long-range TNF modernization effort is, in fact, of extreme concern to the Soviet leadership. Since the late spring of 1979, the Soviet-orchestrated multimedia blitz against NATO's TNF plans has made the Soviet campaign against the neutron bomb pale by comparison.

Contrary to the impression that one can receive from reading the many articles that profess to understand truly how to execute NATO's conventional forward defense, there really is no secret of how best to stop a Warsaw Pact offensive quickly and effectively. Large-scale use of theater nuclear weapons will do the trick. They will stop second echelon formations in Poland, they will destroy command and control facilities, they will disrupt utterly the lines of communication, and will stop follow-on formations still in the Soviet Union. These are elementary facts clearly understood by Soviet analysts. This is the uncertain reality that makes the Soviet leadership so nervous and Ustinov's commentary so clear.

The result is that, even as one begins to analyze "the correlation of forces of the contending sides," there is no answer, dialectics notwithstanding. Unless the uncertainties surrounding all the nuclear questions are answered resolutely, Soviet analysts cannot assure their leadership of a low-risk option. Until such time that NATO's nuclear capability is rendered totally vulnerable, is withdrawn, or when the political climate would unquestionably preclude the use of nuclear weapons under all conditions at all times, superiority remains elusive. It is nearly ironic that NATO's lack of a coherent theory of theater nuclear warfare troubles both the NATO and Pact leadership. For the

NATO leadership, it makes it difficult to modernize and then deploy any new system. Theater nuclear weapons remain in the political realm and there exists no firm decisions regarding their use. For the Soviet leadership, theater nuclear weapons are "wandering values" that defy "scientific" application. Therefore, before other factors in the correlation of forces are analyzed, we might recall the words of Colonel Tyushkevich:

All this confirms the necessity for further perfecting the scientific methodology for determining the correlation of forces of the contending sides. Soviet specialists are persistently studying new methods for evaluating the correlation of forces²⁶

Characteristics of Opposing Coalitions—The Necessary Precursor to Quantitative Assessments.

There is no doubt that any measurement of military power must be relative, time-dependent, and comparison made essentially between those forces that mutually affect each other. Before one measures, one has to decide whom to measure, what to measure, and when considering coalitions, what weight to assign individual members of each coalition. The Soviet analyst is now deeply into his correlation and "scientific" applications are still left wanting. The rigor of his profession is still confronting metaphysical requirements. Striving for socialist realism, the frustrated analyst is finding a surrealist canvas. As Tyushkevich points out, the methodology demands it:

Special attention should be directed to the character of international ties of each of the sides, their affiliation with certain military-political groupings, the viability of these groupings, etc. The combat might of the contending armies will be higher in those areas where it has reliable allies.²⁷

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Surveying NATO, the Soviet analyst does find considerable gratification. While the professional journals have duly reported coordinated NATO efforts to rationalize and standardize, to develop and implement a meaningful long-range defense program, and to increase defense spending in real terms, he has no doubt that as a coalition, NATO has serious flaws. Although the Soviet analyst is not certain how NATO might draw together during a period of rising military tension on the continent, current realities forecast some degree of disarray and degradation of military capability. Intermittent motivation and sporadic fidelity to collective defense goals seem to be the rule. Ever since the 1956 Suez predicament, when the United States chose the ideals of the United Nations over the reality of NATO, NATO cohesion has been, at best, a sometimes thing. France has not been a full NATO partner militarily since 1966; the Greek pullout from the integrated military command structure took place more than 5 years ago. Greek and Turkish animosities have crippled the southern flank. Iceland has for many years been a restless partner and support for a continuing NATO military presence on the island has sometimes appeared as very doubtful. Iceland and Britain have had two "codfish wars" over fishing rights, with Icelandic gunboats and British fishing boats and frigates playing dangerous maritime games. In arms production matters, national pride normally takes precedence over standardization. When the United States asked Turkey for the right to use Turkish soil for SALT II verification requirements, our NATO partner asked the Soviet Union for permission. After more than a year of intensive coordination on a much needed long-range TNF modernization effort, the NATO Ministerial Meeting in December 1979 issued its decision with several members attaching

tions by several NATO members against troop and nuclear weapons basing have adversely affected defense readiness. All in all, a pleasing bit of correlative analysis for the Soviet strategist.

Despite NATO's numerous shortcomings, the "correlation of forces with respect to the characteristics of opposing coalitions" is not all one-sided. The refusal of Rumania to support the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the open hostility within Czechoslovakia to the arrival of Warsaw Pact troops, and the tumultuous welcome given to Pope John Paul II during his visit to Poland give evidence of potential unreliability of Pact members in certain circumstances. This potential is not simply a matter of history; the past could be prologue. A future reliability problem is most likely to develop at the political level and not from within the Pact military organization. Although the Warsaw Pact Council of Defense Ministers and the Joint High Command serve a useful peacetime function, during a transition from peace to war, military control of the non-Soviet Pact members will be under the effective control of the Soviet High Command. However, the question of political reliability cannot be resolved so readily. East European leaders are well aware that any conflict in central Europe would devastate much of Eastern and Western Europe. From the East European perspective, there is no alternative to deterrence. Period! Even if a war is short, nonnuclear, and the Pact wins, East Europe loses. It is likely that non-Soviet Pact leaders *en masse* would seek to moderate any crisis, prevent open hostilities, and limit the conflict should it begin. These objectives would be particularly true if the source of rising tensions between the two superpowers had no direct significance to the vital national interests of non-Soviet Pact members. This cryptic assessment is indeed

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speculative, and in fact may not even be wholly accurate. Yet it really doesn't matter as long as doubt exists and reliability is not precisely assured. With the exception of Bulgaria, all other East European countries have historical ties to the West. Furthermore, the past decade witnessed growing East-West trade patterns. While the economies are far from integrated, East Europe is beginning to have a real stake in solid East-West relationships. Finally, East European defense expenditures are far less than the 11-13 percent of GNP spent by the Soviet Union. East Germany's 6.54 percent of GNP is the East European leader while Hungary at 2.68 percent of GNP and Rumania at 1.66 percent of GNP represent the low end of the scale. None seem enamored with military buildups. All told, East Europe defense expenditures in 1979 totaled \$13.54 billion. Non-U.S. NATO minus France spent \$97.87 billion during the same period.²⁸

Two final considerations require mention when the characteristics of opposing coalitions are discussed: France and the People's Republic of China. Though a number of NATO-Warsaw Pact comparisons do not include the French force, French officialdom is at a loss to understand why. As one French general asserted,

It is absurd to believe that we will remain neutral in a crisis. We have certainly not done so in recent years. Even in the mid-60s when the atmosphere was less Atlanticist than it is today, France stood with the U.S. in difficult moments. If one studies the Berlin crises or the Cuban confrontation, for instance, the reaction of our government was swift and strongly pro-Western. In fact, we have often advocated a firmer policy toward the Soviets in Berlin than have the Americans.²⁹

If some of France's NATO allies have

the French force in an East-West confrontation, neither France nor Moscow have any misunderstanding about the clarity of French policy.³⁰ French military planners began to enunciate a "forward approach" policy several years ago, in which the French military would not wait until the Pact approached the Rhine. "Anyone who thinks we would wait for the Soviets to be on the Rhine is a cretin," commented a planner at the French Defense Ministry. During Brezhnev's last visit to Paris he remarked to senior French officials that, "I do not understand this 'forward approach'.... It is to be an approach against whom?"³¹ Brezhnev's question was simply rhetorical. When quantitative correlations are developed in the Soviet defense ministry, France's 510,000-man force which includes 8 armored divisions, 4 infantry divisions, 1 alpine division, 1 marine division, 477 combat aircraft, 48 major naval surface combatants, 23 submarines, 5 SAM regiments, and nearly 1,200 tanks are included in the NATO totals.

It is impossible to understand correctly the scale of the military threat stemming from imperialism without considering the anti-Soviet, militaristic course being conducted by Beijing's present leaders.... China has closed ranks with actions of the most reactionary forces in the world and has served the interests of imperialists only. It was not in vain that modern China was termed the 16th member of NATO.³²

NATO ruling circles in their aggressive desires are now broadly employing the services of the Beijing subsidiaries.³³

Such is typical Soviet press treatment of the place of the PRC. From a starting point of mild hysteria, Soviet analysts edge closer and closer to irrationality as they try to deal with their "China problem" in terms of opposing

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coalitions. Planning is obliged to take into account a two-front threat. As *Krasnaya Zvezda* points out, China also complicates the nuclear-conventional question. Beginning with the required caveat, "In the estimate of foreign military specialists," *Krasnaya Zvezda* observed, "China has over 300 nuclear warheads with a yield of from 20KT to 4 MT. It is believed that China has missiles with a range from 1,150 to 2,800KM. Missiles with a range over 5,000KM have been tested."³⁴ China simply mucks things up for the Soviet analyst. The European correlation cannot be divorced from other non-European factors. One must see the parts in terms of the whole. China is a most troubling non-European factor; particularly after Secretary Harold Brown's January 1980 trip to China. Normalization is proceeding with vigor. Major General Yasyukov's observation that, "China's convergence with the United States is taking place on an anti-Soviet, anti-socialist basis," is typical Soviet press treatment.³⁵ Regarding the characteristics of opposing coalitions, China is not a "wandering value." Approximately one-fourth of Soviet military power is oriented toward the Sino-Soviet border. This perceived requirement not only limits Soviet flexibility in contingency planning, it also reduces confidence in the NATO-Warsaw Pact correlation.

The Quantitative Factor in the Correlation of Forces. The well-publicized Soviet conventional force buildup in central Europe has certainly been compatible with their doctrine which emphasizes the advantages of surprise, mass, concentrated firepower and shock to break through the enemy's defenses, and rapid movement to exploit the breakthroughs. Figure 1 gives clear evidence of the dynamic change in Soviet conventional forces.

The evolution of the Soviet conventional force has been reflected in new

sophisticated weapons and equipment as well as in the force structure itself. The strength, capability, and firepower of the armored forces were significantly increased. This was followed by the massive introduction of armored infantry combat vehicles to allow infantry forces to keep pace with the tank forces. Modern self-propelled artillery, possessing the mobility to move along with the strike forces, were then deployed. Tactical aircraft specifically designed for a ground attack role were developed and fielded in large numbers. Force structure changes have been no less dramatic. Though thousands of tanks, hundreds of artillery pieces and launcher tubes, and numerous air defense launcher systems have been added to the holdings of Soviet ground forces, the number of divisions has remained the same. Deployed combat divisions have been packed with more men, equipment, and firepower. Most Western analysts used to consider that one Soviet motorized rifle division was the equivalent of one-half to two-thirds of the U.S. division. That is no longer the case. Today, a Soviet motorized rifle division is now equal in firepower to the strongest U.S. mechanized division. An independent tank battalion with about 42 tanks has been added to each motorized rifle division. With similar additions to artillery, multiple rocket launcher holdings, and air defense systems and a nearly 25 percent increase in the tank strength of the motorized rifle regiment's tank battalion, the fighting value of today's motorized rifle division is probably double what it was 10-15 years ago. The tank divisions have undergone comparable change. It is probably true that today's 31 Soviet divisions in the Groups of Soviet Forces are equivalent to at least 40 "1966-equipped" divisions.

This muscle-building effort certainly must please those Soviet analysts charged with the responsibility to

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	1966	1979-1980
Divisions	140 ^a	173 ^d
Tanks	32,000 ^c	50,000 ^d
Artillery	12,000 ^c	20,000 ^d
Armored Fighting Vehicles	35,000 ^b	55,000 ^d
Ground Attack Aircraft	800 ^b	1,700 ^d
Tank Division Troop Strength	10,500 ^e	13,500 ^e
Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) Troop Strength	10,500 ^e	13,500 ^e
Tanks Per Tank Division	375 ^a	322 ^f
Artillery Pieces Per Tank Division	36 ^e	70 ^e
Tanks Per Motorized Rifle Division	210 ^a	266* ^e
Artillery Pieces Per Motorized Rifle Division	105 ^e	165 ^e
AA Artillery Per Division (Tank & MRD)	30-35 ^b	70 ^b
Multiple Rocket Launcher Tubes Per Division (Tank & MRD)	192 ^e	720 ^e

*Plus 22 PT-76 amphibious reconnaissance light tanks per division.

^aFrom International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1966-1967* (London: 1966).

^bFrom G.S. Brown, *U.S. Military Posture for FY 1978* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977).

^cFrom D.H. Rumsfeld, *Annual Defense Department Report FY 1978* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977).

^dFrom International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1979-1980* (London: 1979).

^eFrom John Erickson, "The Ground Forces in Soviet Military Policy," *Strategic Review*, Winter 1978.

^fFrom David C. Jones, *U.S. Military Posture for FY 1981* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1980.)

Fig. 1—Changes in Soviet Conventional Forces

develop the quantitative factors of the correlation of forces. On the one hand, Tyushkevich sets down a very simple proposition:

Quantitatively the combat might is characterized by the number of soldiers and officers in all the various units, and the amount of weapons and combat equipment.³⁶

On the other hand, Tyushkevich reminds his Soviet readers that it all isn't as simple as that:

But this is only one side of the problem. The other consists in studying the general mechanism and the factors of change in the correlation of forces in the dynamics of military operations

From a methodological viewpoint, the correct organization for solution of this problem is connected with calculating an entire series of propositions.³⁷

Quantitative ratios make it possible to achieve superiority; a number of scenario-dependent circumstances would either allow or deny that capability to be translated into reality.³⁸ Nevertheless, one must start with a static measure of the quantitative factors in central Europe.

Western assessment of the central European quantitative balance are commonplace.³⁹ Soviet assessments of the quantitative factors in the central European correlation of forces are "no

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place." The intent here is neither to reproduce existing Western assessments and speculate whether Soviet analysts would agree nor to provide little bits and pieces of data uncovered through the processing of Soviet press articles. The Soviets know what they and the rest of the Warsaw Pact states have in the Central Region; and our intelligence capability allows us to know what they have. We know what we have; and we tell the Soviet analyst what we have. The Pact intelligence capability no doubt pretty much verifies what we have already printed in the open press. All in all, the quantitative picture is not a very big mystery.

The MBFR negotiations are indeed an anomaly in this line of reasoning. After more than 6 years of negotiating, there still does not exist a mutually acceptable manpower data base. The Soviet Union claims that the Warsaw Pact strength in the proposed area of MBFR reductions total 987,300 with the ground strength at 805,000.¹⁰ They further claim that Soviet strength within the Pact totals 427,000.¹¹ The West claims that the Warsaw Pact strength stands at 1,162,000, ground strength at 962,000, and Soviet strength within the Pact at 475,000.¹² After countless hours at the negotiating table, the MBFR deadlock begins and ends at the numbers impasse. But this impasse should not invalidate an analysis of the quantitative factor in the correlation of forces that must be based on Western conclusions of Pact dispositions. Manning levels for both sides are very difficult to assess. A unit may be manned at 90 percent strength and the unit may still be 100 percent combat effective. Additionally, a unit at 85-90 percent strength could be brought to 100 percent with no perceptible intelligence indications. There also exist major definitional problems in determining what proportion of a given formation are actually manning weapons systems. Finally, when one

considers that NATO and the Warsaw Pact have certainly not been developed along similar lines, there is bound to be significant inconsistencies in manning philosophies. Each side has determined independently whether uniformed soldiers or civilians would perform the myriad housekeeping functions of deployed field armies, who would perform rear area service duties, and the like. In sum, it would be a minor miracle if East and West did agree on strength totals. This year, the IISS *Military Balance* concluded, "Manpower comparisons are not felt to be particularly valuable and we no longer attempt such a comparison."¹³ One can only wonder why it took them so long to drop the manpower numbers game. At any rate, when East or West looks to the Central Region, what will be found is shown in Figure 2.

From this basic overview of the correlation of forces in the Central Region, the analyst can branch out along the paths of a thousand assumptions. It is possible to choose various available mobilization periods and warning times allowing up to 115 additional Warsaw Pact divisions and 53 additional NATO divisions to enter the fray.¹⁴ NATO's Long-Term Defense Program can be assumed to have reached fruition by FY 1986 and with 2 weeks warning time the number of U.S. tactical aircraft in Europe can be tripled (to 1,900) and U.S. troop strength can be increased from 200,000 to 350,000.¹⁵ Manipulation is there for the asking: the extent of Pact modernization and projected increases in close air support, the effect of NATO maldeployments in a short or no-warning scenario, Pact decisions with regard to the use of East German and Polish divisions, the employment of the seven fully manned Soviet airborne divisions, the status of NATO air defense augmentation, and much, much more. The analyst can also insure that his machinations are totally artificial by keeping political realities out

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	NATO	(NATO w/France)	Warsaw Pact
Division Equivalents			
Armored	13 1/3	(17 1/3)	24
Mechanized	9 1/3	(11 1/3)	23
Other	3 1/3	(3 1/3)	
	26	(32)	47
Tactical Aircraft			
Light Bombers	130	(178)	250
Fighter/ground-attack	1360	(1610)	1350
Interceptors	361	(495)	2050
Reconnaissance	272	(317)	550
Main Battle Tanks	7,000	(7,900±)	20,500
Conventional Artillery	2,700	(2,900±)	10,000

Sources: International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1979-1980* (London: 1979) and *French White Paper on Defense*; figures include those forces deployed in peacetime and includes French forces in Germany and eastern sector of France; following forces excluded: Italy, Norway, Denmark, Hungary, Soviet forces in Hungary, and all forces in Southern Europe. Aircraft totals do not include dual-based U.S. squadrons and carrierborne aircraft of the U.S. Navy; tank totals do not include reserve stocks.

Fig. 2—A Quantitative Overview of the Central Region
Without Mobilization—Without Reinforcement

of the analysis, disregarding Pact chemical capabilities, and by assuming away the nuclear question. In a word, assumptions remain the stuff of quantitative correlations. One can't divorce the subjective from the objective. Political decisions will determine whether and to what extent one side will react to perceived threats or mobilizations. Quantitative ratios on the battlefield at the time a conflict starts are as much dependent on political action as they are on the quantitative features of in-place forces.

Nevertheless, several useful generalizations can be made. First, the existing quantitative balance of in-place forces provides the Warsaw Pact an advantage of approximately between 1.5 to 1 and 2 to 1 in combat power (measured in terms of armored division equivalents—a method that attempts to equalize

differences in combat power of different types of divisions).⁴⁶ The Pact also enjoys a 3 to 1 advantage in tanks, a 2 to 1 advantage in armored personnel carriers, at least a 3 to 1 advantage in conventional artillery, and at least a 2.4 to 1 advantage in tactical aircraft.⁴⁷

The Warsaw Pact is intrinsically capable of a much faster buildup of combat power. (The Soviet Union possesses a large pool of trained reserves on which to draw and the combat units in the western districts of the U.S.S.R. to absorb them; there will be inevitably a time lag between Soviet reinforcement of in-place forces, substantiated Western warning indications, and a NATO decision to react and reinforce; U.S. reinforcements have a lot further to come and are constrained by limited strategic mobility assets.) Consequently, the

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Warsaw Pact ratio advantages during the first several weeks of a buildup would improve somewhat further. Soviet analysts are well aware that if the United States is allowed to undertake an unimpeded reinforcement of the Central Region, their ratio advantages will no longer increase after the first several weeks.⁴⁸ Therefore it seems apparent that when viewing quantitative ratios, the maximum Pact advantage would be gained within several weeks after the decision to mobilize. This assumes that NATO would react firmly and decisively—the “worst case” basis for the Soviet analyst and an assumption that would have to be made. The effect of this Warsaw Pact leadtime advantage is not startling. If the Category 1 and 2 Soviet armored divisions in the western districts of the Soviet Union are mobilized and brought west and if the Polish Category 2 divisions are mobilized, the quantitative ratios would be enhanced by about 20 percent. For example, the Pact advantage in combat power would rise to approximately 2.2-2.4 to 1, the tank ratio to approximately 3.6 to 1 ratio, and the conventional artillery advantage to 3.8 to 1.⁴⁹

Considering that the Soviet operational requirement for offensive operations is a minimum advantage of 3 to 1 in armor, between 5 to 1 and 8 to 1 in conventional artillery, with the same high ratios for tactical aircraft, the peak Soviet/Warsaw Pact advantage does not meet operational norms.⁵⁰ On the surface, armor norms have been achieved but Soviet analysts are troubled by the effect of precision-guided antitank missile on tank formations and hence, on the norms under battlefield conditions.⁵¹ In concluding this rather brief look at the quantitative factor in the correlation of forces, three observations are offered:

• Secretary of Defense Harold Brown: “In the Central Region of

exists between the immediately available nonnuclear forces of NATO (including France) and those of the Warsaw Pact.”⁵² (January 1980)

• Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David C. Jones: “Given the many uncertainties and variables, only two conclusions seem warranted. First, the Warsaw Pact must contend with substantial risks that a conventional attack in Central Europe would not achieve a quick victory. In this event, the risks of escalation are great. Second, NATO cannot be entirely confident that it could defend successfully against a major conventional attack without resort to nuclear weapons.”⁵³ (January 1980)

• The hypothetical Soviet military analyst: The quantitative factor in the correlation of forces in the Central Region has continued to improve over the last several years. Despite NATO's programmed conventional force programs, the existing quantitative ratio will stay at least the same inasmuch as our programmed upgrading and modernization efforts will be fielded. But we must not be complacent. Although we could concentrate a military effort along a rather narrow sector for a limited objective and thereby achieve required operational norms, we do not possess required quantitative norms across the entire Central Region. Therefore, I cannot conclude that we have a superior quantitative position facing NATO. However, if NATO does not vigorously follow through with their long-term defense program, and because our military will receive a steady increase in defense allocations, the years ahead may hold promise for a quantitatively superior position.

The Qualitative Factors. The outcome of battle is not determined solely by the most powerful tank, the fastest interceptor, or even by the larger force. Though they will assist the battle

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captain, it will be the best combination of equipment, training, and concepts—all toward the end of adaptability—that will determine the victor. As Clausewitz so succinctly put it, "friction...is the force that makes the apparently easy so difficult."⁵⁴ Friction in war distinguishes real war from computer war games. Friction is the countless minor incidents that one can never forecast; it is the late battalion, the sudden rainstorm, the loss of communications—it is everything that makes nothing automatic. Quantitative ratios provide the capability to achieve superiority; qualitative factors translate that capability into reality. Such is the meaning of Clausewitz' "friction in War." The simple tabulations of men and equipment, regardless of the degree of statistical sophistication, furnish little real understanding of the true nature of the prevailing balance in the Central Region. The Soviet methodology of the correlation of forces, being Clausewitzian, can assist in the search for a more meaningful understanding.

Boegotovnost'—Can the Norms be Achieved? Soviet military journals such as *Voennyi Vestnik*, *Vestnik Protivovozdushnoi Oborony*, and *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil* constantly berate the Soviet reader for *boegotovnost'* (combat readiness) shortcomings. After all, these shortcomings hit right at the heart of the correlation of forces.

...combat might is characterized by the skill and state of training...by the degree they are mastered by the troops, by the organization and coordinated work of the troops....⁵⁵

...the high combat morale qualities of command personnel, their military skill and the ability to control subordinates firmly and flexibly—[are] indispensable

requirements without which it is impossible to count on the effective use of the established correlation of forces within the required limits and its chance for victory over an enemy.⁵⁶

One of the corollaries to Murphy's Law is that when all is said and done, more is said than done. That corollary is probably true for all military forces. It certainly is true of the Soviet military. On the one hand, the late Marshal Grechko's final major treatise, *The Armed Forces of the Soviet State*, analyzed combat readiness and concluded that, "The Soviet Armed Forces have everything necessary to maintain a high state of readiness."⁵⁷

On the other hand, the Soviet press anguishes over low standards of staff work, a lack of professional knowledge and initiative on the part of junior leaders, drunkenness, failure to meet combat norms, lack of training realism, failure to attain and maintain required technical expertise, and the like. Yes, there is more said than done and the military leadership is painfully aware of it. This is not meant to imply that the GSEFG is a ragtag outfit. Far from it. But it does mean that a military hierarchy that relies on weapons effectiveness norms, tempo norms, rates of fire norms, and operational ratio requirements, is troubled by the influence of human shortcomings on force correlations.

Soviet military training is given extraordinary attention and effort by the entire military chain of command. Demands are high, as are expectations. Saddled with the requirement to inject large doses of ideological, political, and moral indoctrination into an already demanding training schedule, commanders constantly try to pack ten pounds of training into an eight pound day. Results are mixed. Time and again, Soviet military writers complain that training goals are not attained. While

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this may be attributed in part to deliberately unrealistic objectives, the breadth of self-criticism is sufficiently severe and frequent to conclude that, in many respects, Soviet military training is inefficient with results not at all proportional to the intensity of the effort. In a word, when Soviet military machinery and men are married up, Soviet military leaders seem to sense a never-ending disconnection between "scientifically" established operational norms and training results. The only argument is the width of the gap.

The sense of frustration so apparent in Soviet writings must cause the chain of command to ask the whereabouts of the "new Soviet man," that "creation of high Communist devotion, unrivaled enthusiasm, and glorious revolutionary spirit," who would never allow a single disconnection between theory and practice. The answer, of course, is twofold. First of all, more than four million "new Soviet men" are serving their country and they reflect all the warts endemic to Soviet society. Secondly, the question does not get at the entire problem. There are a number of systemic problems that also contribute directly to consistent combat readiness shortfalls.

The Soviet conscript as well as his superiors are but reflections of his society. Aren't we all? It may be true that the lack of initiative displayed by the middle ranks is overplayed by Western analysts. Nevertheless, there is constant Soviet press emphasis, duly castigating the lack of initiative as a besetting sin. A most typical example was a letter to the editor of *Krasnaya Zvezda*:

Dear Editor: I often hear that a commander must display initiative and independence in combat. At the same time senior chiefs sometimes tightly restrict the activities of their subordinate officers during tactical exercises. It

independence seem unimportant, and it is useless to display them.⁵⁸

Though the problem was clearly stated, the answer provided to the young lieutenant only sharpened the horns of the dilemma. It certainly provided no answers:

... initiative and independence make up the major components of a commander's skill. . . . Of course, a commander's initiative and independence must always be sound.⁵⁹

And so it goes. Major *boegotovnost'* themes prevalent in Soviet writings also include oversimplification, training formalism, oversupervision, drunkenness, fudging performance results, and failure to assume appropriate responsibility.⁶⁰ Low labor productivity on the *kolhoz*, in the office, or in the textile mill is reflected in the military; maybe not to the same degree—after all, the level of supervision is so much different—but it is there. The failure to achieve original 5-year economic planning targets, with the ever-present fudging of figures and retargeting also has its parallel in the military. The multiethnicity of the Soviet state creates language problems in the unit. And so on. This reasoning is straightforward: Given the background of the conscript, the Soviet military gets what it deserves. The end product is that results remain below norms. Though Western analysts cannot derive statistically meaningful measurements from the effect of *boegotovnost'*—and despite a wealth of "scientific methodologies," Soviet analysts probably can't do much better—there can be no doubt that Soviet projections of combat performance give the Soviet analyst ample reason to question whether established norms can be achieved. On that basis, how does one calculate whether or not superiority can be achieved? No doubt with many caveats and a series of tentative, carefully couched conclusions.

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Systemic weakness further degrades combat readiness. The current law regulating military service has been in effect for more than 12 years. In terms of domestic and mobilization requirements, the law certainly would find few Soviet detractors.⁶¹ The lowering of the draft age from 19 to 18 coupled with reducing the period of active service from 3 to 2 years (from 4 to 3 years in the Navy) puts 20-year olds with 2 years service experience back into the civilian work force. Formerly, the ex-service-man did not reenter the job market until he was 22 years old, and with the growing labor shortage in the civilian sector, the current law better satisfies civilian requirements. The law also greatly increases the trained manpower reserve pool. Approximately 600,000 more conscripts per year are released to the reserves than under the previous law.⁶² With these resources, the capability to fill Category II and III mobilization divisions with recently trained manpower is unquestioned. Finally, the 2-year term of service increases the ratio of draft-age males that do serve in the military. Together with the national preinduction training program, military service is now more nearly universal.

These attractive domestic aspects of the military service law have negative counterparts when applied to the military. The most obvious debilitating effect of the law on the services is the rapid turnover of personnel. The loss of 1 full training year for all conscripts in the force and the loss of 1 year maturity (conscript age was lowered from 19 to 18) cannot be overcome by either the 140-hour preinduction program or by various in-service training programs. But at least it explains the extraordinary attention given to military training. As the mechanized Soviet force receives more and more sophisticated equipment, soldier proficiency is harder to achieve and maintain.

Since the mid-1960s and particularly

since the reduction in conscript service, the Soviet Government has dumped a new generation of combat equipment on the active force. Two new self-propelled howitzer systems have been fielded. Artillery strength has increased 94 percent in tank divisions (from 36 to 70) and 57 percent in motorized rifle divisions (from 105 to 165). No less significant has been the increase of multiple rocket launchers with just under a 400 percent increase in the number of launcher tubes (from 192 to 720). Soviet force developers have also been active in air defense development. Five new air defense systems have been added since 1967. Providing an integrated structure of mobile air defense, these systems possess modern target acquisition components that demand skilled operators and high quality teamwork. These systems plus the MI-24 *Hind* helicopter, the SU-19 *Fencer* ground attack aircraft, the massive deployment of two versions of armored infantry combat vehicles (BMP and BMD), and a host of other sophisticated equipment all require considerable technical skills, and extensive team training.⁶³ If the investment is to pay the intended battlefield dividends, appropriate skill levels must be acquired and a proficient logistics and maintenance capability must be maintained. All in all, the 2-year conscript is hard pressed to develop his specialty, the team chief struggles to achieve team skills, and the unit commander gets harrassed as he strains to put it all together.

But the military service law did more than reduce the term of service and age of conscript. It also replaced a single annual callup with two callup periods. This change has created problems nearly as significant as the reduced service time. Considering that nearly all individual in-service training is done in field units, the twice-yearly rotation always occurs at an inopportune time—that point in the training cycle when the

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last group of conscripts have just begun to adapt themselves to their new duties. Another way of looking at this system is to realize that even under optimal conditions the force is never more than 75 percent trained. Furthermore, during the first 2 months following each semiannual callup period, a portion of the 75 percent is focused on individual training for the untrained 25 percent. This turbulence is particularly strenuous following the fall rotation as the young graduates of the commissioning schools are also arriving at their first duty station. Young, inexperienced lieutenants join younger, even more inexperienced conscripts and the training cycle starts once again. These transitional periods are never-ending and they occur in the internal military districts as well as in the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany. Although the adverse affect of the semiannual rotation on unit effectiveness could be readily overcome by holding onstation forces in their units at the end of the cycle, it must be remembered that observation of the rotation is undoubtedly a principal activity of Western intelligence. Significant anomalies in traditional rotation patterns would be a key strategic warning indicator. As such, the result for the Warsaw Pact could well be a net loss in the correlation of forces. Systemic weaknesses do make a difference.

Adaptability—The Art of Putting It All Together. In May 1976, Gen. (and now Marshal of the Soviet Union and Commander in Chief of Warsaw Pact Forces) Viktor Kulikov published an article titled "Soviet Military Science Today."⁶⁴ In this article, Marshal Kulikov forcefully argued that Soviet military plans needed a thorough review and some revision across the entire military spectrum. Kulikov perceived that there was a growing gap between theory and practice. He

kept pace with qualitative improvements in the conventional force. In specific terms, Kulikov singled out the need to develop further the tactics for combined arms operations. Ground forces need to develop new methods of conducting military operations in order to take full advantage of newly introduced armaments. Marshal Kulikov also emphasized the pressing need to improve troop control measures, increase the efficiency of reconnaissance, and improve techniques of maneuver. Marshal Kulikov understood and appreciated the changed nature of the battlefield. However, he took his subordinate commanders to task for not keeping abreast of "objective reality."

The generals took the not so subtle hint. Since 1976 the Soviet military press has been preoccupied with discussions centered on Kulikov's very real concerns. While the debates have been put in a wide variety of guises and contexts, it is clear that "objective reality" focused on the meaning of a qualitatively different military force. For 15 years the conventional forces were upgraded for the purpose of supporting and being in harmony with the "revolution in military affairs" and hence, the nuclear forces. The conventional force matured. Quantitative changes and the sum of the many individual qualitative improvement programs began to make a real difference. The Soviet military force of the late seventies and of the eighties was not simply a modern version of the old force. Rather than being a case of old wine in new bottles, it was a force that had gone through a dialectic change. This "objective reality" had much meaning for operational concepts. As the late Marshal Grechko observed:

New types of weapons and combat equipment in their turn inevitably cause changes in tactics, operational art, strategy, and the organization of troops. These

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changes do not come all at once, but only as new weapons are further improved....⁶⁵

Indeed, changes do not come all at once. But Marshal Kulikov was arguing that the proper changes hadn't come much at all. The rub is that when "software" is not in harmony with "hardware," there is an adverse effect on the correlation of forces:

Evaluating the correlation of forces of the contending sides it is necessary to take into account the general structure of their military organization, the individual branches of the armed forces and the combat arms, the degree of independence and the capability for efficient cooperation in accomplishing operational-strategic missions.⁶⁶

Most factors in Tyushkevich's discussion receive one-time treatment. Command and control, however, is discussed time and time again:

It [combat mighr] depends also on the organizational capabilities and the political, military-technical and operational-tactical training of command personnel.⁶⁷

In determining the most important links in the mechanism for changing the correlation of forces of the sides it is necessary to take into account not only the quantity of actively operating troop groupings of the sides, but also the qualitative features: the organizational structure, the character and degree of their control.⁶⁸

The debates within the Soviet military have centered on the phrase—"the capability for efficient cooperation in accomplishing operational-strategic missions." The editorial board of *Voenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal* (Military-History Journal) initiated a command and control discussion in July

senior officers to write about the preparation and execution of military operations.⁶⁹ Earlier in the year, the journal carried articles by general officers that covered historical aspects of troop control issues. In the months following the July 1978 editorial, articles appeared that discussed the effect of time constraints on command and control, the need for operational efficiency at Army and Front headquarters, the requirements for combined arms efficiency and integration of the various combat arms during offensive operations and the procedures for dealing with a complex battlefield. The message, of course, was given using historical analogy. But Marshal Kulikov's earlier tasking must be kept in mind. The military was and still is wrestling with the complex command and control problems that have become so much a part of today's battlefield.⁷⁰ How should today's greatly increased firepower be exploited? How should the forward reaching tactical systems (*Hind* helicopter, *Fencer A*) be optimally employed? What is the operational meaning of increased mobility concomitant with the vastly increased combat service support requirements (ammunition, fuel)? How can a complex air defense grid be integrated with the assets of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact members when large-scale combined maneuvers are conducted so rarely? In other words, it isn't simply the quest for squeezing a little more out of the system; it is the search for applying sound principles to new conditions. The Soviet military has done a lot of work in this area but a lot of work remains. For the analyst attempting to derive precise statistical conclusions so that factoring can be incorporated into the correlation of forces, he is again faced with subjective analysis. "Scientific" formulations are still left wanting. Friction in war affects combat readiness; it also affects command and control—particularly if operational

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principles have not been adapted to current realities.

A Few Loose Ends—Intervening Links and Nonmilitary Factors.

Among the many threads that weave through Tyushkevich's analysis of correlation of forces methodology, none is more apparent than the recognition that qualitative analysis is extremely complex, subject to error, and in need of new approaches. Nevertheless, the analyst must persevere and tackle the two final qualitative factors in the correlation of forces methodology: intervening and nonmilitary factors.

Between the military might of a country or a coalition of states and the military actions there exists a number of intervening links, the numerous rear service organs, the system of rail, motor vehicle, water and air transport, and the signal and transportation communications.... This is a most essential factor in maintaining a given correlation of forces....⁷¹

... the depth and degree of accuracy in the analysis of the correlation of forces of the sides are conditioned not only by the complex of strictly military-technical evaluations, but also by the aggregate of evaluations of economic, socio-political and spiritual factors which play an exceptionally important role.⁷²

Unlike the tentative and somewhat frustrating conclusions that the Soviet analyst must undoubtedly draw from the combat readiness and command and control analysis, the final two factors present a welcome change. With respect to the logistics factor, the combination of comparative analysis (NATO-Warsaw Pact) and the existence of an integrated system and modern equipment complemented by sound operational concepts adds to, rather than detracts from, Soviet combat power. In a comparative analysis with the NATO

system, it may be true that nearly any other system would look quite good. Lacking secure internal lines of communication, dependent on a few, extremely vulnerable transshipment ports and airfields, hoping in a period of crisis to acquire French LOCs that have not been exercised for more than 14 years, basically relying on the philosophy that logistics is a national responsibility, lacking depth on the continent, and possessing equipment that is nowhere near standardized and not so interoperable, NATO's logistic system is hardly a system at all. By comparison, the logistic system of the Warsaw Pact is a SHAPE planner's dream. Starting with an excellent natural base (depth, continuity) on which to build supporting operational concepts and structure, the Soviet military leadership has done exactly that.

- The non-Soviet Warsaw Pact members are armed almost completely with Soviet or Soviet-designed material. Although the equipment is, in many cases, older models than that deployed with Soviet formations, the logistics network can service, repair, and provide ammunition to the entire force.

- In recent years, the Soviet logistic structure has been greatly augmented. Motor transport units are found at all levels from the front down to the regiment. The motor transport picture is paralleled by other logistic units to include sizable maintenance formations, lines of communication repair and construction units (road construction and railway), and tactical pipeline construction units.⁷³

- Though improvements in motor transport capability have not received the publicity of other Soviet combat materiel improvement programs, the record indicates that perhaps they should have. New light to medium transport vehicles include the GAZ-66, 4x4; the UAZ-469, 4x4, 1/2 ton; the ZIL-131, 6x6; and the URAL-375 and -

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377. These vehicles are more durable, have a higher payload, and require less maintenance than earlier models. The ZIL-131, for example, has a significantly higher fording depth, larger cargo area, and greater range (528 miles versus 310 miles) than its predecessor, the ZIL-157K. In heavy transport developments, the KrAZ-255B entered service in 1969 with a central tire inflation system for low-profile tires and a 25 percent increase in horsepower over previous models. A new tracked transporter has also entered the active service. The GAZ-71 provides a modern version of the GAZ-47 with longer range, better crew protection (fuel tanks are stored in the rear), and increased speed on both land and water.⁷⁴

• On another level, active-duty railway, road, and bridge construction units have been quite active internally in "civil works" projects as well as during Soviet and Pact exercises. They have been practicing their trade and, in part, have been doing it with enhanced capabilities. For example, existing bridging stocks with the Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG) have been upgraded and expanded. Each of the six bridging regiments in GSFG, previously holding 480 meters of PMP bridging, now possesses 600 meters. These regiments have also been reinforced with heavy amphibious trucks and GSP ferries. The PTS tracked amphibian with PKP trailer, for example, doubles the capacity of the amphibian it replaced. Each deployed motorized rifle and tank division has an organic engineer battalion that operates the MTU tank-launched bridge, the TMM truck-launched bridge, a GSP tracked ferry, and a PMP pontoon bridge.⁷⁵

• The capability to augment military transport assets with nominally civilian assets is probably stating the obvious. Whether it be Aeroflot, rail stocks, or civilian versions of wheeled vehicles, they can be mobilized, a will

and be directed to undertake military taskings.

• The non-Soviet Pact members also maintain logistics assets that further enhance an already solid capability. For example, Poland's paramilitary forces totaling 77,000 internal security and internal defense troops include 21,000 construction troops.⁷⁶

In sum, the intervening links are well-established and functioning. Almost as if to dramatize this very point, Soviet combat service support for the nearly 100,000-man force that invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 certainly appeared to be more than adequate for the task. Unlike conditions in Eastern Europe, logistics did not have the benefit of a previously established support structure. With Soviet forces operating in the middle of a particularly harsh Afghan winter and deployed in widely dispersed areas of Afghanistan, the Soviet Military Establishment clearly demonstrated sound operational concepts coupled with a rather well-integrated support system. Although the Western press reported a number of incidents in which Soviet soldiers bartered military supplies for rations, all in all a Soviet analyst cannot be but confident of the capabilities of his support structure. When calculating the correlation of forces, intervening links do not degrade quantitative norms.

The final qualitative factor to be considered is a rather mixed bag of nonmilitary considerations. The Soviet analyst need not spend much time pondering the nature of economic, sociopolitical, and spiritual considerations. Based on a mixture of uninterrupted declarations from his leaders coupled with an "objective reality" that has given the military a runaway first place in all economic allocations, the analyst "knows" that nonmilitary factors enhance the quantitative correlation. Or if it is not "known," at least it is accepted. Whether it be May

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Day, the 62nd anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, or just another day browsing through *Krasnaya Zvezda*, the sociopolitical and ideological message is there. In this regard, the words of Marshal Grechko are most typical:

The sources of victories of the Soviet Armed Forces are rooted in the midst of the people of our multinational country, in the superiority of the socialist system over the capitalist, in Soviet politics and economics, in Marxist-Leninist ideology, and in the correlation of sociopolitical forces in the world arena which are constantly changing in favor of socialism.⁷⁷

But the Soviet soldier is powerful and renowned not only because of his weapons. He possesses high moral-combat qualities. The Communist Party has armed him with invincible revolutionary Marxist-Leninist teachings which contain an inexhaustible source of ideological maturity and communist conviction of all personnel of the Armed Forces.⁷⁸

The analyst may be aware of Viktor Belenko's defection, the suicides by Soviet soldiers in Prague in 1968, the problems with drunkenness, the fact that disciplinary battalions exist and have their share of wayward soldiers, and that the professional military journals are replete with examples of poor performance and lack of ideological commitment. But it likely does not alter his basic conclusion that the soldier will do what he is required to do. In part, he will do it because of his belief system; in part, in spite of the system. Either way, it will not degrade existing quantitative ratios.

Economic aspects require even less analytical consideration. On the one hand, it may be true that behind a thin façade of invincibility, the Soviet

economy is shot full of serious weaknesses: a collectivized system of farming that ranks among the least efficient and most disaster-prone in the developed world, an industrial sector that must borrow high technology from the industrialized West, a consumer sector that must rely on East European and Western imports as well as on a flourishing underground counter-economy, and a ponderous bureaucracy that is both expensive and inefficient. But on the other hand, all of that really doesn't matter very much. The economic system has been built to serve State interests and, in large measure, that means the military.

In the past 3 years the Soviet Union has outbuilt the United States by a yearly margin of 2,000 to 650 in tanks, 500 to 275 in combat aircraft, 350 to 150 in helicopters, 6 to 3 in attack submarines, and 5,000 to 1,000 in armored personnel carriers and other combat vehicles.⁷⁹ In strategic nuclear forces, the Soviet Union has come from a position of unquestioned numerical inferiority 15 years ago to one of at least parity today. Similarly, since 1964, total military manpower has increased from 3.4 million to 4.4 million, tank holdings have increased from 30,000 to 50,000, and at least 25 new ground divisions have been added to the active forces.⁸⁰ This is the meaning of the Soviet economic system—a system well-suited to the development of military power—a message that is not lost when calculating the correlation of forces.

* * * *

REFLECTION THROUGH THE TRANSLUCENT SOVIET PRISM A BRIEF SUMMING UP

Seeing images through a Soviet prism always means, at best, to see through a translucent prism. There is always enough diffusion to eliminate the perception of distinct images. Not only

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is Sovietology-Kremlinology not scientific, as an art form it sometimes resembles cubism. Seeing the balance in the Central Region holds even more frustrations. In many ways, to focus on the Central Region is to establish a reality that is in artificial isolation. The whole issue of the relationship of the Center to the Northern and Southern theaters is conveniently ignored. There is also the question of whether any war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact could be limited to one theater of operations. Or, would any war on the European continent bound to have worldwide force structure requirements that, in turn, would affect directly any Central Region assessment? Nevertheless, the preoccupation with the Central Region is understandable. The basic conflicting security interests of the two superpowers converge on the European plains and are expressed clearly through the deployment of two standing armies possessing sufficient force to destroy Europe. Additionally, the linkage to strategic nuclear conflict does exist. This catastrophic potential certainly warrants current levels of attention and evaluation.

Lord Salisbury once noted that, "If you believe the doctors, nothing is wholesome; if you believe the theologians, nothing is innocent; if you believe the soldiers, nothing is safe." While worst-case analysis does have its merits, it can breed an aura of defeatism and an unwillingness to invest needed dollars (or Belgian francs or German marks) in a hopeless proposition. The worst-case analysis goes something like:

Even a cursory *tour d'horizon* of the Central Region balance gives solid evidence that past and present Soviet modernization and muscle-building efforts have produced a qualitative change in Warsaw Pact capabilities. These capabilities are far beyond any perceived defense requirement. In fact, the growth of Soviet-Warsaw

Pact forces provides a capability to overrun NATO defenses shortly after the outbreak of hostilities. At present levels, Warsaw Pact forces could successfully strike through the plains of Northern Germany from Magdesburg to the Cologne-Duisburg region with a supporting attack in the south along the Eisenach-Fulda-Frankfurt-Mainz axis. In sum, the Warsaw Pact is a poised preemptive power. As regards NATO, the picture could not be more bleak. Pact capabilities will reduce considerably, if not eliminate, warning time necessary for reinforcement. In any case, political warning time is problematic, scenario-dependent, and may preclude mobilization. Sustaining stocks are meager and West Europe remains reluctant to devote sufficient resources to the strengthening of military forces. As a result, NATO could be faced with the stark option of early first use of theater nuclear weapons with the attendant unanswered escalation questions or surrender. With these realities before us, the U.S.S.R. holds the upper hand in any escalation process within the European theater and hence, NATO's strategy of flexible response is really bankrupt.

This sort of worst-case perspective does a disservice to NATO capabilities, to nuclear linkage, and does not track with the reflections seen through the Soviet prism (even if it is translucent). What odds of a NATO nuclear response to Warsaw Pact aggression will cause correlation of forces analysts to conclude that the question, "Do we have a position of conventional military superiority in the Central Region?", simply cannot be answered. Sixty-five percent? Forty percent? Fifteen percent? Odds of thirty percent, forty percent, or even eighty percent may not convince our European allies of their

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protection but it may well convince Soviet leaders that "correlation of force" calculations have just become so foggy that the quantitative ratios just don't mean too much. The effect of the use of nuclear weapons on any projected battlefield is a complex mix of conjecture. It really "mucks up" correlative analysis. As Tyushkevich points out:

In an armed struggle without the employment of nuclear weapons the correlation of forces could change comparatively slowly and gradually according to the pattern—from the bottom upwards, that is, from operations on an operational scale to those on a strategic scale. In nuclear warfare everything will be different. In the first place, the correlation of forces will change swiftly, even spasmodically—in a matter of minutes and hours. In the second place, it is possible that the sides will begin a general nuclear war with the mass employment of nuclear weapons, and primarily strategic, striving to change the overall correlation of forces immediately and sharply.⁸¹

Soviet analysts may well look to Clausewitz for concepts—and considering Clausewitz' following observation, the same analysts may well look to Clausewitz in anguish.

In short, absolute, so-called mathematical factors never find a firm basis in military calculations. From the very start there is an interplay of possibilities, probabilities, good luck and bad that weaves its way throughout the length and breadth of the tapestry.⁸²

The Soviet leadership is resolved that if war comes to central Europe they will fight offensively and win. The structure is there to do the job. However, the pieces have not been put together as the methodology dictates. Existing quantitative ratios do not assure a Pact victory. Although future ratios may

reach accepted norms, qualitative aspects of the correlation of forces should still deeply trouble the Soviet analyst. To Western analysts, the deployed Soviet military force in Europe may have masked these troubling qualitative aspects behind the bulk of equipment and a facade of *pokazukha*, or showoff. But to the Soviet analyst, the actual status of opposing coalitions, the consistent shortfalls in combat readiness, the habitual problems in the achievement of training norms, and the dilemma of command and control and combined arms integration do cause continuing concern.

All in all, deterrence still appears all-successful in the Central Region. But NATO cannot rest on past laurels. NATO must focus its future efforts in those areas that foster uncertainty on the part of the Soviet leadership. That means:

- Theater nuclear forces must be modernized and be capable of striking Pact forces and facilities throughout the theater.
- The NATO coalition must remain united.
- The flanks must be strengthened.
- The independent nuclear forces of France and Great Britain must be modernized and remain viable.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Lieutenant Colonel Allan Myer, a Field Artillery officer, is a Foreign Area Specialist (Russia). He was educated at the University of Omaha and Georgetown University, is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and has served on the faculty of the University of Maryland, USAC&GS, and the National War College. He is the author of several journal articles on Soviet military matters. Lieutenant Colonel Myer is assigned to the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of the Army.

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- Programmed NATO force improvements must be funded, produced, and deployed on time in programmed quantities.

- A solid relationship with the People's Republic of China needs to be nurtured.

These requirements have been and remain political. For the remainder of this century, cohesive political efforts will be needed more than ever before. If Western leaders do not find meaningful

solutions to the pressing problems of today, we all will face a very uncertain tomorrow. For those who drift toward worst-case analysis it could well be deterrence failing. For those who lean toward more optimistic viewpoints, it will mean that a condition of neither peace nor war will remain the European reality with the deployed Soviet force—ground, air, and naval—gathering in significant political benefits for the Kremlin leadership.

NOTES

1. Typical fare from a wide range of professional journals, reports, and the like. For example, Senator Gary Hart, a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, stated that NATO is an "apparent failure of 27 years of collective investment on an unparalleled scale," and the Soviet Union will have "virtually a free ride to the English Channel," *The New York Times*, 13 September 1977. This excerpt reflects the notion of some that NATO confronts a monolithic giant, armed to the hilt with superb weaponry, and using a brilliant operational strategy. These same experts tend to describe NATO as a fatally flawed military alliance with extremely weak flanks, a thin center, armed with insufficient weapons, with no staying power, relying on a doctrinal concept totally inappropriate to obvious requirements, and with no meaningful interoperability between member states. From this gloom and doom, one can wonder why the Warsaw Pact has not attacked years ago. Also see Jacquelyn K. Davis and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Soviet Theater Strategy; Implications for NATO*, Report 78-1 (Washington: U.S. Strategic Institute, 1978); John M. Collins, *American and Soviet Military Trends Since the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1978); *Air Force Magazine*, March 1978 and March 1979, particularly, "The Accelerating Momentum of Soviet Military Might," March 1978, pp. 34-41 and "World Hegemony Through Military Superiority," March 1979, pp. 40-47.

2. Harold Brown, *Department of Defense Annual Report, FY 1980* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979), pp. 100-102. Also see *FY 1981 Annual Report*, "As matters now stand, even though most force and firepower ratios favor the Pact, the Soviets could not be considered to have a high probability of shattering allied resistance in the early stages of an attack," p. 113.

3. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1979-1980* (London: 1979), p. 108.

4. V.D. Sokolovskiy, *Soviet Military Strategy*, 3d ed. (New York: Crane-Russak, 1975), p. 173.

5. S. Tyushkevich, "The Methodology for the Correlation of Forces in War," *Voyennaya mysl*, June 1969, in *Foreign Digest Press*, 0008/70, translated 30 January 1970, p. 38. Now a Major General, Tyushkevich was the head of the "author's collective" that produced a new history of the Soviet Armed Forces, *Sovetskie Vooruzhennyye Sily: Istoriya Stroitel'stva* (Soviet Armed Forces: The History of their Development) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1978). In 1976, Tyushkevich, together with two generals, edited an important collection of articles, *Voyna: Armiya: Filosofskosotsiologicheskii Ocherk* (War and Army: A Philosophic-Sociological Essay). Besides coediting the work, Tyushkevich contributed a chapter on the military might of a state. He is also a frequent contributor to major Soviet professional journals.

6. "It [Correlation of Forces] is connected with many functions of strategic planning and the military-political leadership both during the prewar period as well as while a war is in progress," Tyushkevich, "Correlation of Forces."

7. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

8. "In addition to the material factors... there are factors, which do not easily lend themselves to a quantitative calculation, but their importance for their development of international relations and the balance of world forces is extremely great. Besides, they are inseparably linked with the material factors; it is often difficult to separate one from the other." Sh. Sanakoye, "The Problem of the Correlation of Forces in the Contemporary World," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, No. 10, 1974, p. 46. These factors include but are not limited to the skill and state of training, morale and discipline, organization and coordination within and among units, interaction among multinational command groups and level of political consciousness.

9. "...when calculating the correlation of forces, it must be taken into consideration that the international arena has its own type of 'wandering values,' which in each concrete case can significantly influence the outcome of events," *ibid.*, p. 87.

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10. For example R.L. Fischer's *Defending the Central Front: The Balance of Forces*, Adelphi Papers, No. 127 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Autumn 1976), begins with: "This paper is an analysis of the conventional military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact . . ." p. 1. The IISS *Military Balance, 1979-1980* makes the observation that the balance must be set within the context of the nuclear question but then goes on to limit discussion to manpower, conventional force strengths, reinforcements, airpower, logistics, and trends, p. 108. Also see Sam Nunn and Dewey F. Bartlett, "NATO and the New Soviet Threat," *Report to the Committee on Armed Forces*, U.S. Senate, 24 January 1977, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.; Justin Galen, "Restoring the NATO-Warsaw Pact Balance: The Art of the Impossible," *The Armed Forces Journal*, September 1978; Jacquelyn K. Davis, "Soviet Doctrine Implications for NATO," *National Defense*, January-February 1979.

11. Tyushkevich, "Correlation of Forces," p. 32.

12. For a more complete discussion of NATO's "14/3" strategy, see R.E. Burrell, "Strategic Nuclear Parity and NATO Defense Doctrine," *National Security Affairs Monograph Series 78-4* (Washington: National Defense University, 1978). As the author specifically states, "The meaning of flexible response is spelled out in NATO Military Committee Document 14/3 titled 'Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area, 16 Jan 68.'" Also see *FRG White Paper 1979, The Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Development of the Federal Armed Forces* (Bonn: Ministry of Defense, 1979), p. 125 details NATO's military doctrine and types of responses.

13. *Ibid.*

14. Irving Kristol, "Does NATO Exist?" *The Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 1979, p. 46. While Henry Kissinger's remarks at the Atlantic Institute for International Affairs and the Atlantic Treaty Organization Conference in September 1979 were not so blunt, the theme was the same: "And therefore I would say--what I might not in office--that our European allies should not keep asking us to multiply strategic assurances that we cannot possibly mean or if we do mean, we should not want to execute because if we execute, we risk the destruction of civilization." Remarks reproduced in *The Washington Quarterly*, *ibid.*, p. 7.

15. T. Kondratkov, "The Sinister Character of Militaristic Dogmas," *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil'*, October 1978, reproduced in U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, 72413, no. 1400, 12 December 1978, p. 40.

16. For example see Nikolai Portugalov, "The Unlucky Trumpeter," in *Sovietskaya rossiy*, August 1979. Article also broadcast by Moscow domestic radio service on 9 August 1979 (contained in FBIS, 10 August 1979, pp. G1-G-4); V. Katerinich, "NATO—A Weapon of Aggression and of a Policy of Dictation," in *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil'*, March 1979, p. 61 (in JPRS 73604, no. 1444, 4 June 1979); "Contrary to the Interests of Detente, NATO Bloc Opens to Build Up Its Military Potential," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 17 May 1979, p. 3; Kondratkov.

17. Sokolovskiy, p. 291: "The basic means for armed combat in land theaters in a future world war will be the nuclear weapon. . . ." This statement is contained in all three editions; A.A. Sidorenko, *The Offensive (A Soviet View)* (Moscow: 1970), trans. U.S. Air Force (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974) Soviet Military Thought, No. 1, p. 41: "Nuclear weapons will become the basic means of destruction on the field of battle. . . . Modern combat can be characterized as nuclear combat"; N.A. Lomov, ed., *Scientific-Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs (A Soviet View)* (Moscow: 1973), trans. U.S. Air Force (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974), Soviet Military Thought, No. 3, pp. 150-151: "The offensive starts by making nuclear strikes. . . . In modern combat, superiority over the enemy is achieved primarily by concentrating the fire efforts of the forces and mainly the nuclear strikes."

18. Marshal I.I. Yakubovskiy, *Krasnaya zvezda*, 21 July 1967.

19. John Erickson, "Soviet Ground Forces and the Conventional Mode of Operations," *Journal of the Royal United Services for Defence Studies*, June 1976, p. 46. Similar conclusions can be found in a number of other Western analyses. For example, see Jeffrey Record, *Sizing Up the Soviet Army* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1975), pp. 38, 48; Phillip A. Karber, "The Soviet Antitank Debate," *Military Review*, November 1976, p. 73; Nunn and Bartlett.

20. For a precise analysis of this dialectic process see S.I. Krupnov, "According to the Laws of Dialectics," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 7 January 1966.

21. Yvon Bourges, "Putting the frappe into the force," *The Economist*, 22-28 September 1979, p. 55.

22. *Ibid.*

23. Reported by Reuters, *Baltimore Sun*, 25 January 1980, p. 2.

24. "Unlike the USSR, the United States has allies in possession of nuclear weapons," *Novoye vremya*, 26 October 1979, p. 4, contained in *FBIS Daily Report*, 1 November 1979, p. AA4; "Moreover, the national nuclear potential of Britain and France, 'Eurostrategic' by their very nature are included in NATO's assets"; Portugalov.

25. Dmitri Uscinov, "Military Detente is the Imperative of the Time," *Pravda*, 25 October 1979, p. 5.

26. Tyushkevich, "Correlation of Forces," p. 29.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 32.

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28. *The Military Balance, 1979-1980*, pp. 14-16. East European defense expenditures for 1979 were as follows:

	Def Expenditures	% of GNP
Bulgaria	649m leva (\$720m)	2.86
Czechoslovakia	20.29bn K (\$2.41bn)	3.91
GDR	13bn OstM (\$4.76bn)	6.54
Hungary	16bn forints (\$900mn)	2.68
Poland	65.3bn Zlotys (\$3.49bn)	3.09
Rumania	11.96bn lei (\$1.26bn)	1.66
	Total \$14.54bn	

29. Reported by Kevin Michel Cape, a member of France's Institut Charles de Gaulle, in "Pressure from NATO Irritates France," *San Diego Union*, 25 November 1979, p. C7.

30. N. Glazunov, "Strategic Concepts and Development of NATO Military Forces," in *Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal*, November 1978, in *JPRS* 72685, no. 1408, 24 January 1979. The author clearly places French military forces in NATO totals, see p. 18.

31. Cape.

32. M. Yasyukov, "V.I. Lenin and the CPSU on Defense of the Socialist Homeland as One of the Most Important Functions of the Soviet State," *Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal*, no. 4, 1979, in *JPRS* 073677, no. 1446, 13 June 1979, p. 10.

33. I. Belov, "On the Path of Militarization and an Arms Race," *Zarnubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye*, March 1979, p. 4.

34. *Krasnaya zvezda*, 21 November 1978, p. 2.

35. Yasyukov.

36. Tyushkevich, "Correlation of Forces," p. 32.

37. *Ibid.*

38. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown in his FY 1981 Annual Report to Congress provided a similar conclusion in his assessment of the balance in Central Europe: "How well NATO would do against larger Pact capabilities is not so much a function of force structure as of other factors. It is conceivable that the Pact, after some preparation, would make ready all its forces in Eastern Europe, bring in additional divisions from the western military districts of the Soviet Union, and deploy aircraft from its reserve and training establishments before attacking. With ample time, NATO should have a high probability of defending against even an attack on this scale. But actual NATO performance would depend not only on Pact mobilization and deployment times, on warning (and political will in NATO to use it to reinforce), but also on how far the Alliance succeeds in its plans for modernization and rapid reinforcement," Harold Brown, *Department of Defense Annual Report, FY 1981* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1980), p. 112.

39. See IISS *Military Balance 1979-1980*, pp. 108-113; Collins, pp. 333-372; Brown, *Department of Defense Annual Report, FY 1981*, pp. 110-113; David C. Jones, *United States Military Posture for FY 1981* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., January 1980), pp. 15-24.

40. *Pravda*, 27 June 1978, p. 4.

41. John G. Keliher, "The Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions," Research Paper, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., June 1979, p. 138; forthcoming as *The Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions: The Search for Arms Control in Central Europe* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980).

42. *Ibid.*, pp. 123, 133.

43. *Military Balance, 1979-1980*, p. 109.

44. *Ibid.*, pp. 109-110.

45. Brown, *Department of Defense Annual Report, FY 1981*, p. 111.

46. Jones, p. 15.

47. *Ibid.*, pp. 15-16; Tactical aircraft ratio from John Erickson, "The European Military Balance," in Grayson Kirk and Nils H. Wessell, eds., *The Soviet Threat: Myths and Realities* (New York: Academy of Political Science, 1978).

48. In commenting on the nature of NATO's long-term defense program, one Soviet author in looking out to 1983 observed that, "The strength of American land forces in Europe can be doubled in two weeks, and the number of airplanes tripled. In case a 'crisis situation' arises, in addition to the 5 American divisions and 20 air squadrons stationed in Western Europe 150,000 soldiers and 60 air squadrons will be immediately shipped from the USA. By 1983 West European military storehouses will hold weapons and ammunition for an additional three American divisions should they be sent from the USA," A. Antonov and G. Ziborov, "NATO: Escalating the Arms Race," *International Affairs*, August 1978, p. 4; Identical view is provided by Ustinov, pp. 4-5.

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49. Percent increase and quantitative ratios have been derived from the IISS *Military Balance* as follows: Approximately 33 of the 66 Soviet divisions in the European U.S.S.R. are Category 1 and 2. With the addition of the two Category 2 Polish mechanized divisions, the in-place Warsaw Pact force could total approximately 82 divisions within several weeks. For NATO, it has been assumed that POMCUSed U.S. divisions have received their CONUS deployments, *ibid.*, pp. 6, 10, 109.

50. Erickson, "The European Military Balance," p. 113.

51. For example see Simonyan's comments in *Norosti Daily Review*, 24 September 1979, reported in JPRS Translation, *USSR Report, Political and Sociological Affairs*, no. 983, 22 October 1979, p. 1.

52. Brown, *Department of Defense Annual Report, FY 1981*, p. 112.

53. Jones, p. 16.

54. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 121.

55. Tyushkevich, "Correlation of Forces," p. 31.

56. *Ibid.*, p. 37.

57. A.A. Grechko, *The Armed Forces of the Soviet State* (Moscow: Military Press of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Defense, 1975), p. 88.

58. *Krasnaya zvezda*, 21 September 1978, p. 2.

59. *Ibid.*

60. Given 30 minutes and a stack of Soviet military literature, a Western researcher could develop a lengthy catalog of training shortcomings. The following examples simply illustrate the nature of the criticism: "The norms pertaining to the tactical, fire, and technical training, the protection against the enemy's weapons of mass destruction, engineering preparation, military topography, military-medical training, and other instructional topics at nighttime exercises and classes are poorly practiced in a number of instances." K. Kurenkov, "Improving Night Training," *Voennyi vestnik*, February 1979, p. 42; According to the results of the training year, a number of subunits, units, ships and servicemen failed to fulfill the pledges they had adopted. The standard of leadership of competition by some commanders, political organs and staffs remains low. Unattributed report titled "Experience of Socialist Competition Initiators Must be Introduced into the Practice of Troop Training and Education," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 31 October 1979, p. 1.

61. For a succinct description and analysis of the Soviet military service law see Harriet East Scott, "Universal Military Training in the U.S.S.R.," *Air Force Magazine*, March 1978, pp. 84-88.

62. See Figure 3, "U.S. and Soviet Male Manpower Pools," in Collins, p. 49.

63. For a more complete description of recent Soviet force improvements see Jones.

64. V. Kulikov, "Soviet Military Science Today," *Kommunist*, May 1976, contained in *Strategic Review*, Winter 1977, pp. 127-134.

65. Grechko, p. 138.

66. Tyushkevich, "Correlation of Forces," p. 32.

67. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

68. *Ibid.*, p. 35.

69. Editorial, *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, July 1978.

70. *Voennyi vestnik* (Military Herald) for example, spent much of the past 3 years dealing with command and control problems at the tactical level. For a concise analysis see John Erickson, "The Soviet Military Press 1978," *Strategic Review*, Summer 1979, pp. 83-96 and C.N. Donnelly, "Tactical Problems Facing the Soviet Army: Recent Debates in the Soviet Military Press," *International Defense Review*, v. 11, no. 9, 1978, pp. 1405-1412.

71. Tyushkevich, "Correlation of Forces," p. 34.

72. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

73. For a rather detailed analysis, see Graham H. Turbville, "Soviet Logistic Support for Ground Operations," *RUSI/RMAS Research Center Bulletin* (London: RUSI, September 1975).

74. *Ground Transport Vehicles*, a report prepared by the Foreign Science and Technology for DIA (Report No. ST-CS-07-280-74), January 1974.

75. John Erickson, *Soviet-Warsaw Pact Force Levels*, USSSI Report 76-2 (Washington: U.S. Strategic Institute, 1976), p. 74.

76. *The Military Balance 1979-1980*, p. 16.

77. Grechko, p. 346.

78. *Ibid.*, p. 348.

79. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown in his report to Congress, 29 January 1980, reported in *U.S. News & World Report*, 11 February 1980, p. 17.

80. *The Military Balance 1964-1965 and 1979-1980*.

81. Tyushkevich, "Correlation of Forces," p. 33.

82. Clausewitz, p. 86.

