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This paper examines the interaction of two cultures—Islam and the West—in order to derive some insight into the process of response and adaptation of Islam to Western challenges. Several basic incongruities between the cultures are identified and some of their concrete manifestations are described. An understanding of likely Islamic responses to Western actions is essential to coherent international security planning.

ISLAMIC RESPONSES TO WESTERN CONTACT

by

Colonel Jay C. Mumford, U.S. Army

I would solicit... a lenient consideration [of the East]; knowing well... that the ways of the East and West are wide asunder as the poles; that what we call civilization and sometimes rashly confuse with progress, is viewed by Oriental peoples in a wholly different perspective; and that different nations have their own peculiar way of finding salvation.¹

This sage advice, given by Curzon to those who would understand the Persian scene of the late 18th century, has regrettably been more often ignored than followed in the relations between the Christian West² and the Islamic Middle East. This is so partly because inquiry into the philosophical foundations of Middle East cultural norms is largely shunned by Western policy-makers. They, and their advisors, pressed by crises and limited time find it easier to focus on the more measurable factors of physical power. The result is in best transient policies and programs

flawed by false assumptions about Muslim reactions, and at worst further exacerbation of relations and deepened hostility toward the West and its offerings.

Some Philosophical Incongruities Between Islam and Christianity.

To focus on cultural and philosophical incongruities between Islam and Christianity is not to suggest the absence of significant parallels. Islam emerged from and developed in an environment much influenced by the then existing religions, among which were both the major monotheistic faiths of Judaism and Christianity. Commonalities exist in the doctrines of the single life (no reincarnation), a judgment that decides man's fate in eternity, a revealed book, monotheism and a personal god.³ It is the sad nature of things, however, that whatever differences remain between otherwise similar theological orderings of man and his universe either are, or are made to be issues of

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great importance. The incongruities between Islam and Christianity are numerous and fundamental.

In Islam the central event of history is the granting by God of the Koran. It is man's duty to accept and be guided by it.⁴ Growing directly out of this core event of history is the Muslim's personal responsibility for the moral ordering (conformance to and acceptance) of the natural world in which no original sin exists to defile man and his environment.⁵ To the Muslim the creation of the earth *ex nihilo* is the action of a God of absolute transcendence, unencumbered by law. His creation, man and the universe, are therefore likewise subject to no law save that which He might temporarily will. There is therefore no natural law, no *necessary* consequences of cause and effect, no free will, and no knowing of God through the use of human reason.⁶ In short the Islamic theology is, in theory, transcendentalist, intuitive, nonrationalist and determinist (fatalist).⁷

The concrete consequences of this theological foundation of life can be seen in the feature of atomism so characteristic of Islamic society. Atomism is the perception of reality as a series of conditions and events that are only loosely linked in casual (not causal) association without any necessary organic interrelationships. This "mind set" led to simple religious structures, absence of clerical hierarchies and a direct, individual (vice Church) contract between each believer and his God.⁸ The social form this contractual norm takes is clientelism.⁹ In state structures it was reflected in distrust of political elites, dependence on personality-based support and critical dependence on the quality of a single man or small group of men in leadership positions. It was this atomistic nature of the Islamic state that made it so vulnerable to internal attack by movements that had both coherent rationalist philosophical explanations of reality and effective organization of

The influence of atomism is also seen in Muslim music which is a series of repeated and elaborated themes never reaching a climax, without contrasting movement or harmony or any effort of integration into a whole. It is seen in art where composition and perspective is absent along with representations of the human figure proscribed by the *hadith* tradition.¹¹ In poetry it is seen in the separate and detachable lines and the absence of epic poems in the Arabic tradition. Finally it is seen in an aversion to the thought process of rationalism and resistance to synthetic thought constructions.¹² Of course the struggle between intuitive and rationalist thought processes was always present,¹³ but the intuitive approach has the clear theological support of Islam.

By comparison, the central historical event in Christianity was the death and resurrection of Christ; and it is man's duty to repent and accept His atonement.¹⁴ This duty is to be performed in a world in which both man and his environment are corrupted by an Adamic sin. While Christian precepts differ markedly, the God who created the world of preexisting matter is an immanent being operating in accordance with law.¹⁵ His creation, man and the universe, are also subject to law. There is therefore a natural law, *necessary* cause and effect, free will and the feasibility of knowing God through the use of human reason.¹⁶ In short the Christian theology is, in theory, immanent, rationalist and nondeterminist.

The concrete consequences of this theological basis of life are reflected in the never-ending, guilt-burdened search by the Christian to solve the personal and societal problems that his and Adam's sins have caused.¹⁷ The methods used are rooted in the application of human reason. They stress highly integrated hierarchies and attempts to explain the specific in terms

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of the organic whole. Complex institutions and mystical creeds are the norm.

Despite several common features, Islam and Christianity, which provide philosophical sources of Middle East and Western cultures, are in direct conflict on the central issues of the nature of man and his relationship to God. The consequences for efforts at accommodation of the two cultures forced into intimate contact by the realities of the modern world are enormous.

Philosophical Roots of Islamic and Christian Cities. The divergent effect of the philosophical foundations of the cultures of East and West are to be seen in virtually every aspect of life but perhaps nowhere is the difference more stark than in the towns and cities of the Middle East and Europe. The marked differences in physical and procedural norms of the city serve first to demonstrate that the philosophical underpinnings have concrete societal manifestations and, secondly, that the two cultures are distinctive in their external operations. The two governing "mind sets" that were at work were rationalism in the West and atomism in the East.

Even though the European medieval town grew out of organic planning, it reflected rational considerations and deliberate forethought.¹⁸ Thus the medieval urbanist Alberti in his *De Re Edificatori* as early as the 15th century showed concern for functionalism. His radial city plan anticipated and reflected a centralization of power in a despotic prince.¹⁹ With the Renaissance was introduced the "ideal town" concept that supplanted organic (yet rational) planning with governmental commissions charged with systematic and methodical planning.²⁰ The European city was organized as a commune that reflected a highly institutionalized

urban clusters assured group cohesion. The cohesion was in turn reflected in well ordered physical arrangements and layouts of towns.

The Muslim urban scene could hardly be in greater contrast. Instead of the near straight streets, open gardens and above all evidence of central planning typical of the European city, one encounters in the Muslim city a "... tangle of blocks badly ventilated by a labyrinth of twisted alleys and dark courts, the low houses endlessly broken up along their little courtyards."²¹

Explanations abound for the most striking qualities of Islamic towns—irregularity and anarchy. Some explain them as natural outgrowths of a nomad's ignorance of city building.²² The blind alleys and "L"-shaped entrances to private homes can be justified as functionally useful in defense and concealment of private life. Even the Islamic legal system can be credited, with its lack of an effective system of fines to discourage private encroachments on the public domain.²³ These are, however, largely descriptions of what is, rather than why it is. A search for a truly core reason leads ultimately to specific Islamic philosophical tenets. The Islamic city is a reflection of the distrust of complex institutions; the willingness, even desire to accept nature and life as it was destined to be; and to the rejection of any need for rationally planned entities with predetermined interrelationships in a clear organic whole.

The tangible consequences of this view are seen in Muslim cities in the lack of municipal cohesion. This is not to say that well-defined rules did not develop regarding the placement of the mosque (city center), the bazaar (close to the mosque) and groups based on their trade, ethnic and religious character. The point is that these rules were not civilly directed and the general framework they gave was obscured in the atomistic entanglement of indi-

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vidual construction. Municipal cohesion simply was not a central value as it was in Europe. Thus the municipal official (*muhtasib*) did not supervise urban growth or planning, but acted only in the police and surveillance of the bazaars. Clearly city life was not defined in terms of institutions (as was the case in Europe) but in coordinating diverse interests through patronage relationships. In such a relatively undifferentiated society, hierarchical management of urban growth and life was impossible.²⁴ What is still more important, it was neither necessary nor desirable in terms of the basic Islamic philosophical view.

Historical Western Challenges to Islam. The historical experience of Islam with the Christian West has been in the main one of hostility, suspicion, derision and condescendence. Even so, the relationship was not totally negative. That the Muslims discovered and reintroduced Hellenistic science, medicine and thought—with Muslim accretions—into a Europe blighted by a dark age of intellectual stupor is well known. Even during periods of open conflict, substrata of commercial, intellectual, and cultural contacts were maintained between East and West.

Three major waves of Western influence are discernible; the Hellenistic wave of the 9th century, the Crusades of the 11th and 12th centuries, and the industrialized wave generally of the 19th and 20th centuries. An understanding of the early contacts and Islamic reaction is important because they set historical patterns that are being seen again in the current Middle East response to the West.

The Hellenist Wave. Islam arose out of the deserts of Arabia and quickly spread via *jihād* (holy war against the unbelievers) into the lands of the war-weakened Persian and Byzantium

carried Islam across North Africa. After conquest a distinctive Islamic culture began to take form and reached its apex during the golden age of the 'Abbāsid dynasty.²⁵

During the ninth century the desire to learn what the Greeks had learned became intense.²⁶ The process led to a clash between Islamic orthodoxy and Greek rationalism which was of great historical significance and which remains critical even today in Islamic adaptation to modernization. The first wave was not foreign imposed, nor was it primarily a Christian challenge as would be the case in latter waves. The Christian Church was itself reeling from northern barbarian invasions as well as from Muslim pressures in Spain, Sicily and Italy. Genoa was sacked in 934, and in Rome Pope Leo IV fretted behind the Vatican Leonine Wall he had built as a defense against the Saracens.

The first wave of Western influence resulted primarily from Muslim internal preference. It grew out of a massive effort of translation of Greek texts and crested in the reign of the Caliph al Ma'mun (813-833) when the Mu'tazilite theological school based on Hellenistic rationalism received official state recognition.²⁷ The philosophy of "reason as a guide" reached maturity with al Fārābī (875-950) to whom man, endowed with free will, must order his own life and his society to conform with a rational, ordered universe.²⁸ Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā) (980-1037), who further synthesized Western rationalist and Eastern intuitive philosophy, had substantial influence on the natural sciences of medieval Europe.²⁹

A reaction set in owing to excesses of the Mu'tazilite school that used Aristotelian logic in even claiming that the Koran was not eternal. Al Ash'arī, in his "A Vindication of the Science of Kalām" (speculative theology) sought a middle road. He justified rational inquiry and analysis of the Koranic texts to include even the sacrosanct issues of

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the oneness of God, the resurrection of the body and the nature of the Koran.³⁰ He warned, however, that rationality must not be stretched beyond the point of human intellect into an area where revealed word must rule. The Ash'arite school, a ninth-century example of selective adaptation, had its more modern parallel in such men as the Persian al Afghâni and his Egyptian disciple 'Abduh. They also sought to find an appropriate indigenous mixture of rationalist elements and Koranic citation in devising a Muslim philosophy to meet a more modern Western threat to Islam.³¹

This early Islamic adaptive school did not prevail against the assault by orthodoxy. The Mu'tazilite rationalist denials of the attributes of God brought a collision with the hard core of Islamic orthodoxy located at the Nizâmiyah *madrasah* (seminary) in Baghdad.³² The most renowned orthodox rejectionist was al Ghazâlî whose critical study of Greek philosophy and its depressing effect on faith turned him against intellectualism.³³ In his devastating attack in "The Inconsistency of the Philosophers," he used Aristotelian logic to argue successfully for an orthodox (if Sûfist) Islamic theology.³⁴

The first wave of Western challenge, that of Hellenist rationalism, was first met with ready acceptance. This ultimately turned to rejection and the enshrinement of an orthodoxy that has even to this day retained much of its influence. The second wave was to come by the sword as a Christian counter-attack against Islam.

The Crusade Wave. The Crusades to recover the Holy Land were only a part of a broader historical challenge of a Christian West that had recently been strengthened by its consolidation of control of Europe. The challenge was more successful in Islamic Spain than in the lands of the eastern Mediterranean.

Ibn Khaldûn observed in the Kingdom of Valencia a Muslim majority submerged by a Christian colonial force. He wrote:

Civilization there has deteriorated and the enemy has gained control over most all of it, except for a few people living along the coast who are more concerned with making a living than with the things that come from it.³⁵

The Christian attacks in the eastern lands were motivated by concerns of sacramental and papal power that were used to fan bitter resentment of Muslim occupancy of the Holy lands.³⁶ The inherent incongruities between Christian and Islamic philosophies and the resultant cultural norms were apparent in the vitriolic propaganda used to recruit for the Crusades. The Koran was pictured as a deliberate contrivance and a plagiarism of Christian scriptures; Muhammad was seen as being raised to the same spiritual level of Jesus, who was in turn denied His deity as the Son of God. The peaceful origins of Christianity were compared to the warlike rise of Islam, and the facts surrounding the Prophet and Arabia were in general grossly distorted.³⁷

The Muslim's propaganda was no more objective. It stressed the corruption of God's prior revelations (the Bible) by the Christians; emphasized the Koranic denunciation of all who would make companions (i.e., a son) for Allah; and denounced Christian pretenses of monotheism.³⁸ Even the great 14th-century Muslim historian Ibn Khaldûn was not averse to obvious subjectivity in his writings. After a brief listing of Christian sects of his age he demurred from describing their major doctrinal differences with: "We do not think that we should blacken the pages of this book with discussions of their dogmas of unbelief. . . . It is for them to choose conversion to Islam, payment of the poll tax, or death."³⁹

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That the Crusades had only minor effect on Islam but major cultural, economic and political effect on Europe is well established. The significance for this inquiry lies, however, in the Islamic response to this first major military-religious assault by Christendom. The response was largely rejectionist in nature and served to harden antagonisms, mutual distrust and Muslim abhorrence of Western culture. The next major challenge was not to come until Europe had undergone the twin revolutions of enlightenment and industrialization.

The Modern Wave. It was at once a far more lethal and a far more effective West that challenged the Islamic domains in the last major wave beginning in the late 18th century and continuing to the present day. The nature of the Western thrust was both secular and religious. In the economic realm it offered improved agriculture through permanent irrigation; state support for an industrial sector using modern technology; and significant advances in transportation and communications. In the social realm its enticements included military techniques and discipline that destroyed with frustrating ease the Muslim defensive forces; legal codes made and enforced by secular agencies; state controlled public education; health care and attendant population growth; and a new middle class based on the professions. Its political tools were nationalism and Western liberalism.⁴⁰

The challenge would have been formidable under any conditions, but it was aided by an Islamic world that in its own turn had lost to orthodoxy its power to reason in scientific and causal terms. Worse yet, the alternative of intuitive perception in which Islamic thinkers had traditionally excelled was blunted. The massive cultural assault of the West, backed by military, economic

and scientific techniques were perhaps subsumed within them) broke upon an unprepared Middle East. Before inquiring into the accommodation modes employed by Islam in response to this assault, it is necessary to briefly identify the major internal challenge of Sûfism and Ismâ'ilism that continues to have substantial influence on Islam's adaptive capabilities.

*Sûfism and Ismâ'ilism.*⁴¹ Sûfism evolved from the need for a more personal spiritual relationship with God than the orthodox Sunni doctrines allowed. Sûfism, the mystical path with saints, orders, secret signs and hidden meanings of Koranic passages, spread most rapidly in those areas where Shî'ite Islam had supplanted the more orthodox branch.

The origins of the Ismâ'îli or Bâtini (esoteric or hidden meaning) movement were closely connected with revolutionary Shî'ism. The Ismâ'îli sect gained political importance because of its connection with the powerful Fâtimid dynasty in Egypt. Its activist proselyting effort stirred up rebellion against the Sunni 'Abbâsid Caliphs, offering in place of their orthodox religious thought an immanent neoplatonic philosophy. Both of these movements are still strong in the modern Middle East and tend toward increasing the adaptive capabilities of the region to Western thought and practice.

Islamic Response to Modern Western Influence. The Muslim reaction and adjustment to the challenge of a modern West has been extremely varied, but for analytical purposes three responses can be identified, i.e., active (preemptive) acceptance, active (spasmodic) rejection and selective adaptation. There are of course no "pure" examples of any of these cases inasmuch as each society and nation modifies its response over time in relation to the evolving Western

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relationship, the perceived hazard the relationship poses and the goals, effectiveness and opportunities of the competing elements.

Preemptive Acceptance. The philosophical underpinnings of this response have the ring of Western rationalism and call for outright secularism. But even in this comparatively extreme case, Islam *per se* will not be openly suppressed. Instead, certain of its institutions may suffer in the effort to reduce religion from the prime factor in policy to only one in a series of factors.⁴² The methodology of this approach thus aims at a sharp reduction in the social, economic and political influence of Islam. Mustafa Kemal's (Atatürk's) Turkey is the best and, with the exception of Muslim India (and perhaps the post-1953 Pahlavi dynasty of Iran), the only case of this approach of preemptive acceptance in the Muslim world.

Atatürk rejected the claims of the pious that the demise of the Ottoman Empire as the embodiment of militant Islam was because of the failure to observe the Faith. Rather, to him the very cause of Turkey's backwardness in relation to Europe was to be found in orthodox interpretations of Islam.⁴³ It is in this formulation that the concept of preemptive acceptance is best understood. Islam and its associated social institutions were viewed as inadequate instruments with which to meet the challenges of a Western dominated world. It was argued that only by acquiring skill in building and using the tools of the West could Turkey cope with that West.⁴⁴ Atatürk stated in 1924:

Surviving the world of modern civilization depends upon changing ourselves . . . nations cannot maintain their existence by age-old rotten mentalities and by tradition-worshipping . . . Superstitions and nonsense have to be thrown out of our heads.⁴⁵

That this process of change would be hindered by the threatened traditional religious elite was certain, and necessitated a thoroughgoing secularization of both state structures and processes. The programs of secularization were to be carried out not as an atheistic attack on Islam but as the policy of a nationalist Turkish polity, whose continued existence was perceived as dependent upon the speed and effectiveness of the modernization drive.⁴⁶ It is critical to the understanding of Turkish modernization (and to Middle East modernization in general) to remember that even in this comparatively extreme case, religion was not rejected *in toto* and that considerable effort was expended by the Turkish modernizing elites in attempts at conciliation of European political and religious concepts with those of Islam.⁴⁷

An analysis of the selected policies of language, education and the Caliphate will demonstrate the methodology employed in the preemptive acceptance response. In each case the effort focused on reduction or eradication of nonsecular aspects of society that were viewed as critical blockages to modernization.

Arabic Script. Tanin, an exponent of both Ottoman national unity and modernization, wrote:

We love Arabic as the language of the Koran and the Prophet.

We love it because Muslim civilization and Arabic are inseparable . . .⁴⁸

This expression, which was representative of the unsuccessful efforts to hold the Arab portions of the Ottoman Empire, represented a temporary relaxation of government and Turkish cultural aversion to Arabic. It also posed a danger to both the preemptive acceptance of Western modernization and to Turkish nationalism. After WWI, Atatürk had no need to court the Arab peoples, who were by then largely

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lost to the Empire anyway. Even more importantly, Arabic was seen as a cord that bound the nation to traditional Islam. The cord had to be cut.

Stressing as a rationalization the inherent problems of the use of Arabic script in writing Turkish, particularly the incongruity of consonant and vowel systems, a law was enacted in November 1928 banning the use of Arabic letters and replacing them with a Latin script.⁴⁹ The intended result was the cutting off of the younger generation from the extensive Ottoman literary heritage and its nonsecular, Islamic view of life. It concurrently denied the people the religious language of the Islamic faith for it was widely held that the true meaning of the Koran could not be conveyed in translations.⁵⁰

Religious Education. Recognizing the critical role of education in socialization, Atatürk severed the Turkish youth from religious education by closing the Islamic *medreses*, replacing them with a secular, nationalistic system of popular instruction.⁵¹

The next step was aimed at reducing the supply of trained religious teachers. Government policy encouraged the demise of the religious schools for *Imam-Hatip* (prayer leader-preacher) and by the time teaching of religion was stopped in public schools in 1935, both the Islamic Theological Faculty and the original 29 *Imam-Hatip* schools set up at the start of the Republican period had been abandoned.⁵² Not only did these actions deny effective formal education-based religious socialization, but they also complicated the perpetuation of traditional values even among the clerics themselves.

The Caliphate. The demise of the Caliphate came in March 1924 as a culmination of a very long struggle of Turkish secular reformers stretching back long before Atatürk.⁵³ The

justification was based on the certain clash between Islam (seeking welfare of individuals) and the secular state (seeking welfare of the collectivity). To the extent that nationalism developed (or was created as a pillar of Turkish identity) concurrently with secularization it sharpened the demand for transfer of full allegiance to the secular state. It seemed probable that the Caliphate, if allowed to remain, would serve as a marshaling point for opposition.

Although the list of secular reforms aimed at decreasing the influence of Islamic-based social, economic and political norms could be extended almost indefinitely, the most important additional steps were the replacement of cannon law (*Shari'ah*) with civil (secular) codes from Europe and the outlawing of the powerful Sûfist dervish orders.⁵⁴

There is no doubt that the well-coordinated and aggressive assault on Islamic institutions succeeded in more than merely removing some of the political symbols of Islam. Not only did the outward forms undergo revolutionary change but the roots of secularism sank deep. Still, Islam was and is, at least in the ideal, an all pervasive faith reaching via the *Shari'ah* into virtually every crevice of human endeavor. Its resiliency, even in the face of the thoroughgoing secularizers of Turkey, was to be seen as early as 1950 with the revival of both the *Imam-Hatip* and Theological Faculty.⁵⁵ By 1976 religious education in junior high school was compulsory and a graduate of the reemerged Islamic high schools could be assured of growing acceptance of his education as equivalent to the secular student.⁵⁶

In summary, the preemptive acceptance response to the West tends to reject those traditional values of Islam that are viewed as hindering the adoption of Western norms. Government-controlled programs in education,

agriculture, commerce and politics seek to secularize society, reaching with varying degrees of success even into areas of *Shari'ah*-controlled interpersonal relations. Nationalism, economic development and calls for modernization as essential to continued viability in a Western dominated world are the psychological tools used to retain support despite the wrenchings that the broad reforms inevitably cause. Finally the reforms that sought to restrict the role of Islam are eroded over time as the deep-rooted cultural norms reassert themselves.⁵⁷

Spasmodic Rejection. At the other end of the reaction/adjustment continuum is the sweeping rejection of the West and its accoutrements. This response is usually accompanied by emotional diatribes against foreign cultural inroads and a call for a return to the pure way of the Prophet. No national example of this response in its theoretical or pure form is available as every Muslim state has, to a greater or lesser degree, adjusted to the realities of an interdependent world in which the geopolitical value of the Middle East has made it unavoidably an area of major power interest and involvement. The rejectionists, therefore, are often to be found in subnational groups of traditionalists.

The attraction-repulsion alternatives are by no means unique to this current age, but have parallels in the early period of Islam.

What do these books matter? If they support the Koran they are superfluous; if they disagree with it, they lie.⁵⁸

With this (possibly apocryphal) haughty reflection of disdain for foreign knowledge and culture, and lofty Islamic self-sufficiency 'Umar, the second of the *rashidun* (rightly guided) Caliphs destroyed the Graeco-Egyptian libraries of Alexandria in 634.

method that were to be used repeatedly and that are even now typical of the spasmodic rejectionists. Their arguments vary widely from purely pragmatic justifications to careful applications of Koranic-based legal rationale. In the final analysis, however, all are reflections of the incongruities between the core values of East and West as reflected in their great religious codes. The logic and organization of the rejectionists are represented by the *mahdist* and *ikhwan* (brotherhood) examples.

Mahdism. Foreign encroachments such as the abolition of the Caliphate and the adoption of Western secular institutions that infringed with seeming impunity on the sacred *Shari'ah* caused a moral crisis in the minds of pious Muslims. Their response was often a rejection with religious zeal of the foreign element.⁵⁹ In its extreme form the rejectionist approach turned to primitive Islamic romanticism calling for purification and reunification by the sword. The immediate goal, in near total oblivion to historical realities, focuses on expunging an affliction that can simply be borne no longer.⁶⁰

Yet the *mahdist* call for purification need not be, and indeed is not normally, a *jihad* in the physical sense. Religious fervor need not blind one to a modern state's coercive capabilities. The appeal rather is likely to be psychological using the verbiage of the *jihad* to prod the masses to exertion and strike fear in the degenerate groupings in the society. Thus Ayatollah Khomeini threatened to declare a *jihad* and symbolically called for "cutting off the hands" of representatives of European nations if they ventured to hinder Iran's return to the true Faith.⁶¹ Islamic courts have tried in secret and directed the execution of several former military, public security and government officials. Public whippings for theft and alcohol usage have also been reported.⁶² The

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Ayatollah in interviews repeatedly insisted that the "only reference for us... is what was practiced during the time of the Prophet and Imam Ali."⁶³

Moderating influences have been at work, however. Middle-class women, loath to return to the dress code of the past, poured into the streets in opposition to Khomeini's call for mandatory use of the *chadur*, and a contest for power was evident between Khomeini's Islamic *Komiteh* and the several basically secular cabinets. By mid-April 1979, oil was flowing again, and the great majority of the labor force had returned to work. Khomeini had withdrawn to the holy city of Qum and indications were that the *mujtabids* (Shi'i scholars qualified to interpret the Koran) might restrict their role to passing on legislation of a popularly elected assembly within the framework of an Islamic republic.

The Brotherhoods. The Koran was sent down on a night when *all things* were made clear (K 44:3) and it therefore overlooks *nothing* (K 6:38). The teachings of the brotherhoods, based on these and like verses insist that Islam is complete. The Brotherhoods resist Koranic reinterpretations as *bid'a* (heresy), rejecting the very concept that would suggest that that which God revealed through His Prophet could ever be in need of "updating." They often reject nationalism as "infidel patriotism," a "loss of Islamic faith," and a "plot against God's religion."⁶⁴ Separation of religion from the state is also anathema and vigorously attacked.

The most significant of the brotherhoods is the Egypt-based *Ikhwan al Muslimun* (Muslim Brotherhood) founded in the 1920s by Hassan al Banna.⁶⁵ Al Banna, deeply influenced by his former membership in a Sûfi order, defined the Brotherhood as "...an orthodox way, a Sûfi reality, a political body... and a social idea."⁶⁶ In short, it provided a full way of life. It was of

course inevitable that any state, especially one seeking to modernize through secular reform and nationalist propaganda, would clash with an organization that militantly asserted the relevance of traditional values. Thus, the history of the Brotherhood is one of recurrent periods of favor and repression by governmental agencies. For example, it had ties to the Free Officer Association, but later was suppressed when it sought to assassinate Nasser for his failure to live up to its perceptions of Islamic ideals.⁶⁷ There is considerable evidence that the appeal of the Brotherhood's fundamentalist Islamic position is still strong. The threat was great enough that as late as March 1979, President Sadat of Egypt felt it necessary to denounce the Brotherhood for its change from a religious to an underground terrorist organization and to warn it to stay out of politics.⁶⁸

Rationale for Rejectionist Response. Rejectionists tend toward distorted descriptions of the depths of godlessness and barbarism to which the culture of the Christian West has supposedly plunged. They agree with Lewis Mumford that the cult of antilife, grown out of scientific rationalism, is attacking the entire human tradition.⁶⁹ Why, then, they ask, when modern humanists of the West are themselves rejecting the consequences of Western rationalism should Islam—in the name of modernity—follow the same path to destruction?⁷⁰

While the rejectionist appeal is highly emotive, it is not without its own philosophical bases. Representative of these are the cases against secularism and the division of power between political and religious sectors.

The antisecularist philosophical argument faults the former's claim of the efficacy of rationality in explaining reality. The logical end of the secularist approach is the rational explanation of

all things that are real—a clear impossibility as some portion of reality lies outside of man's perception. Thus, reality is a fiction, and rational thinking based on a search to define reality is ultimately specious.⁷¹ The logic process is highly reminiscent of the 11th-century rejection of the rationalist interpretations of the Koran.⁷² Indeed it is not uncommon to find the rejectionists marshaling to their aid the famous name of al Ghazâlî. His successful refutation of the Aristotelian tradition in Islam is generally credited by historians as the beginning of a long period of orthodoxy—and ultimately cultural decline.⁷³

Equally disquieting to the pious Muslim are the inroads made by the modern Western norm of differentiation of secular and religious spheres. This concept is seen most clearly in the doctrine of separation of church and state that slowly replaced European Renaissance absolutism under the influences of the evangelical movement and the decline of religion's personal hold on the people.⁷⁴ Predictably one of the Western cultural transplantations was a circumscribed role for religion.

Rejectionists expended much effort attacking this infringement on Islam for it would give only spiritual authority to the *Imâm* and deny him the physical (i.e., state apparatus) capability to protect the faithful from internal error and external threat. Further, to its adherents, Islam was not simply one sector of their lives, regulating some aspects and ignoring others. Rather it was an all-encompassing director and interpreter. Although short lived, the early unity of religious and political life had the effect of fusing political and moral obligations and of hindering the development of clear civic obligations separate from religious prescriptions.⁷⁵ Thus it was not until Christian converts of the 19th century adapted Arabic terms (or assigned new meanings to old terms) that the typically Christian

religious dichotomies of lay-ecclasiastical, spiritual-temporal and secular-religious were brought into Arabic language usage.

Nor is it acceptable, as some have urged, to modernize Islam itself by establishment of an Islamic spiritual directory with *ex cathedra* powers akin to the Papacy. Such action is anathema to the core values of Islam, for it would result in an intolerable religious hierarchy with power to "loose and hind" rather than the individual contract each believer had with God.

The Iranian Ayatollah Khomeini's actions and statements serve to show the traditional Islamic relationship between religious and government leadership. The former are to guide, not rule. The latter is not to reign either, but to serve the people in building a society described in the revelations of the Koran. Thus Khomeini denounced the secularizing Shah with, "The King of Kings—*Shahanshab*—is the most detestable word to me..." as it is a transgression to elevate a man to a position held only by God. This was the cry of the early *Imâms* against tyrannical kings and sultans who "...enjoyed and ate like animals. Gehenna [Hell] is their abode."⁷⁶

The spasmodic rejectionist response to the West is more an analytical construct than a reality. Those groups near this extreme tend to exaggerate the decline of Western values; to elevate the life and times of the Prophet; to reject attempts at moderate reinterpretation of Koranic guidance; and call for a return to Islamic fundamentalism.

Selective Adaptation. By far the most common response mode to the Western incursion has been selective adaptation. This is true because any two cultures in contact unavoidably give to and take from each other. Indeed it is only for their analytical utility that the extreme modes of acceptance and rejection were identified. The middle

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ground in the acceptance-rejection continuum poses familiar methodological problems of classification. As in the extremes of the continuum, the selection of any country as the pure example of selective adaptation is not possible. Still there are characteristics of philosophical justifications and political formulations that typify a wide range of Middle East nations as they seek to cope with a world in large part dominated by the industrialized West.

Justification for Selective Adaptation. Three schools can be identified. The first recognizes that the real personal agonies of modernization occur in the humanistic fields of art, literature, religion and general cultural awareness more than in the major political upheavals so typical of the region.⁷⁷ To minimize these agonies it moves closer to the rejectionists in claiming that the West is indeed culturally benighted and that its history, philosophy and literature hold little or no value for Islam. That which can and should be adopted from the West is its technology and certain exterior forms of statecraft. The fallacy of this approach is of course evident. Technology rises from and reflects its own cultural roots. It carries a "cultural train" into the very core of the receiving society.⁷⁸ Nor do the political forms of nationalism, socialism and representative government necessarily remain culturally benign because their adopters wish it so. Constitutions, secular laws, political parties, hierarchically structured bureaucracies and planning agencies provide a framework for the ready expansion of cultural imports from the West.

The second, and more typical justification for selective adaptation focuses more inwardly than outwardly on the society from which the borrowing is to occur. This approach seeks to change or reject those behavioral patterns that are judged

incompatible with modernization through redefinition of underlying cultural values. For the apologist of this approach, Islam and the Muslim nations have no cause to fear the 20th century or its problems. All that is required is a proper interpretation of the Koran and the traditions *in the current historical context*.⁷⁹

Ijmâ' and *ijtibâd* are favorite concepts for this second type of Middle East moderate reformer.⁸⁰ He stresses that *vox populi (ijmâ')* is a basic tenet of Islam in addition to *vox dei* (Koran) and *vox prophetæ (hadîth)*. This "consensus of the community" concept was of course largely confined to the first generations of Muslims and stoutly rejected by the stricter theologians throughout the ages. But it remains a valuable device in balancing the orthodox voice of the Koran and *hadîth*, because it would allow behavioral changes if a community consensus can be secured. Theoretically *ijmâ'* can be argued to be embodied in the representative bodies of popularly elected legislatures.⁸¹ Starting from the Koranic direction that "... their affairs are subject to consultations among themselves," (K 42:36), many have followed the logic train of al Afghânî to declare that the right of the consent of the governed is an Islamic doctrine and that representative institutions are doctrinally justified.⁸² Although subject to criticism, the problem arises not so much in justifying their Koranic legality, but in making these democratic exterior structures work in a political culture largely lacking in the requisites of liberal democratic government.⁸³

A companion concept to *ijmâ'*, that of *ijtibâd* (exercise of judgment), also often serves as the basis of the modernizer's rejection of former theological constructions and the reinterpretation of the Koran and *hadîth* in light of modern thought and circumstances. Discussions with Saudi students in U.S. schools have revealed

that this concept gives considerable solace to them. It provides both self justification for their Western study and acculturation and concurrently reduces the psychic ambivalence by assuring them that they are not abjuring their Islamic faith.

The concept of *ijtihād* can of course be used by advocates of orthodoxy as well in calls for return to the primitive community and the rejection of the intervening traditions and *ijmā'*. Thus modernizers decrying the interference with secular life of the mystic Sūfī cults often find an odd alliance with both Western rationalist and orthodox spokesmen.

The third school seeks its justification in attempting to discern the appropriate boundaries between secular and religious spheres in modern life. Apologists of this school often see themselves as devout Muslims and reject claims that secularism is irreligious. For example, Sati al Husri, a prominent exponent of secular, pan-Arab nationalism, argued that nonclerical rather than irreligious was the proper term to define secularism.⁸⁴ His task, and that of the school of modernizers, was not to explain away Islam, which intruded at every turn upon secular nationalism, but to demonstrate compatibility of the two by defining the limits of the secular sphere.

A technique employed is to distinguish between social and divine elements of the *Shari'ah* and make the former the subject of elected secular legislatures. The result of this technique is seen most clearly in changes in the system of law. The expositions of Islamic jurists had relatively less effect on political and administrative institutions and large-scale commercial concerns than on personal relationships. It was on these former areas and classes that Western influences first fell and from which most liberal modernists were drawn. Additionally, the secular sphere as defined by these modernizers

began and spread within these same areas as evidenced by the early adaptation of European civil, administrative and commercial codes.⁸⁵ The real crises of modernization of course occurred when the secularists attempted to expand the boundaries of the secular sphere into personal relationships for which specific Koranic directions had been given. In fact, one methodological tool of use in classifying reactions along the rejection-acceptance continuum is to determine the degree of secular expansion into the area of the *Shari'ah's* guidance on personal relationships, such as divorce, inheritance, marriage and the role of women.

Saudi Arabia: A Case of Selective Adaptation. Saudi Arabia offers a unique example of selective adaptation. Here religion is still operative in many areas normally given over to secular control; but in other areas a series of policies and programs reflect planned acceptance of Western rationalist norms together with the necessary adjustments of Koranic-based tradition.

The founder of the nation, which still bears his family name, was 'Abdul Aziz Ibn Sa'ud. His rule was marked by a close alliance with the Muslim puritan reform movement of Wahhabism and was held together by the organizational frame of a huge royal family and the *Ikhwan* (Brotherhood) movement. Through the latter Ibn Sa'ud converted the narrow clan loyalties into support of himself and his national programs.⁸⁶ Ibn Sa'ud's early régime could be safely placed near the rejectionist extreme of the response continuum. It began with the threat of *jihād*; it called for a social and moral regeneration by returning to the ancient religious life; it rejected both Western and *Sūfist* teachings; and it established a militant Islamic theocracy.⁸⁷ Even the discovery of oil and its early revenues were channeled into the same political and social goals of

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preservation of the traditional system.⁸⁸ But new forces were at work in the form of massive oil wealth and increased influence in both regional and world affairs that this wealth brought. These factors, combined with a far more receptive attitude toward Western influences by Ibn Sa'ud's successors, shifted Saudi Arabia away from the rejectionist camp toward selective adaptation responses.

A brief look at policies in education, economic planning and the role of the *'Ulamâ* may illustrate the comparative spheres of secular and religious influence.

The Role of Education. Ibn Sa'ud had hesitated to start the education of a backward people partly out of concern for the forces such action might unleash and partly because of the lack of any indigenous educational system capable of the task.⁸⁹ But Ibn Sa'ud's successors, at first hesitatingly and then with an aggressiveness seldom equaled in the Middle East, contracted with Western universities to develop a Saudi Arabian national vocational education system,⁹⁰ built schools, sent thousands of the nation's best students to Western universities, and made plans to sharply increase the number of girls enrolled in schools.⁹¹ This rapid expansion of educational assets tends, however, to focus on gaining technological and managerial skills. Further, Saudi programs of instruction routinely include religion as a core topic.

The Role of Planning. The five-year plans of the Saudi Government are excellent reflections of the selective adaptation of Western rationalism in the economic sectors of national life. The overall 1975-1980 plan has subplans that are interlocking, nonconflicting and attainable. The role of foreign contractors is explicitly recognized. Emphasis is placed on errors of previous plans and required

corrections.⁹² The true significance of such action is realized when these plans are compared with the typical Middle East development plans which retain the atomistic, noncausal, discrete factor approach so reflective of the Islamic-based mind set. It is emphatically clear that the Saudis have intentionally and selectively adopted the Western norms of rational analysis and management of money and economic development

Yet, even in this most clear case of importation of Western norms, the role of Islam is protected. At least in principle overriding everything else in national planning is the preservation of Islamic values and traditions. The national plan's first objective is to "maintain the religious and moral values of Islam," and each additional objective is defined with an eye to its effect on the family, the community and Islamic tenets.⁹³

The Role of the *'Ulamâ*. Reflecting the continued strength and role of religion is the *'Ulamâ*, a body of religious leaders that has the legitimate task of observing Saudi society for evidence of serious religious deviation. It is true that the zealots of the Committee for Public Morality are now less evident than in the days of Sa'ud in suppressing public behavior in contravention of the *Shari'ah* (smoking, drinking, music playing and short dresses). But still religion remains a center focus of public life and the institution of the *'Ulamâ* is its guardian. Government decisions are reviewed for conformity with religious codes by this body which issues *fatwâ* (decisions) on its findings. Thus in Saudi Arabia not only do the broad sectors of life dealing with personal relationships remain firmly in the nonsecular sphere, even those aspects that are increasingly the business of secular decisions are subject to *'Ulamâ* critiques.

The selective adaptation response is, in summary, typified by a variety of

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philosophical justifications, the most common of which is the attempt to define the appropriate limits of secular and religious spheres. This often requires reinterpretations of the Koran and *hadith* in light of modern conditions. Those aspects of the Western World most widely welcomed are science and technology. These, however, are accompanied by a cultural train, the effects of which Middle East nations attempt to minimize or to modify to fit the unique local situation.

Conclusions. Islam was born not only in the full light of history but into a world already partly occupied by the monotheistic faith of Christianity. Islam has been challenged repeatedly by a Western culture based on the philosophical tenets of that faith. The forms of the challenge have varied from intellectual inroads welcomed, even sought, by the Muslims to medieval and modern conquest and colonialization using the coercive agents of soldier, missionary and bureaucrat.

The long history of contact and conflict has resulted in Islamic techniques of adjustment and adaptation that vary from overt rejection of the West and its norms to the slavish copying of that West. But by far the most common response has been that of selective adaptation in which Western science, technology, and other legal, political and social institutions are adopted together with protective devices to buffer the core Islamic values

from the perceived secular excesses of the West.

The current challenge is a projection of industrialized, highly organized Western societies employing modern techniques based on science and technology. The current contact is occurring in a world in which Islamic lands are of critical geopolitical importance. The resulting challenge is the most pervasive yet faced by Islam, its philosophical tenets and its Muslim culture. This most recent Western wave of influence cannot be ignored.⁹⁴ It will demand the best of Islamic intuitive and adaptive qualities. The West can both help the Middle East and concurrently enhance its own security and future economic well-being by following Lord Curzon's advice: "I would solicit... a lenient consideration...."

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Colonel Jay C. Mumford was educated at Weber State University and the University of Utah. He has served in intelligence assignments in Germany, Vietnam, Finland, and in the Department of the Army and commanded a PSYOP battalion. He has taught at the U.S. Military Academy, University of Maryland, and the U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance. Colonel Mumford is the author of several journal articles. He is a recent distinguished graduate of the College of Naval Warfare, Naval War College, where he is now assigned to the faculty.

NOTES

1. George N. Curzon, *Persia and the Persian Question* (London: Frank Cass, 1966), v. 1, p. 464.
2. Although the focus of this paper will be on the challenge to Islam of the Christian West, it is recognized that this West is the repository of numerous Jewish elements.
3. G.E. von Grunebaum, "Byzantine Iconoclasm and the Influence of the Islamic Environment," *History of Religions*, Summer 1962, p. 7.
4. Koran 14:1-5. When faced with the problem of transliteration of Arabic proper names, Lawrence's attitude of "She was a splendid beast" is appealing. Still, I shall use Hodgson's diacritical system, except where the more common forms are readily recognized such as Koran (vice Qur'an). T.E. Lawrence, *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1926), p. 25.

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6. Bernard Lewis, *The Arabs in History* (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 141.

7. In the perennial clash in all religious systems between free will and determinism (predestination), the Koran comes down firmly on the latter side. [K 10:51]: "Nothing can befall us but what God has destined." Even disobedience is God willed. [K6:39]: "... God will mislead whom he pleaseth...." The Ash'arites sought to find in other *suras* some responsibility for men even though he was predestined by God's will. See Zake Naguib Mahmoud, "Rational Aspects of the Classical Arabic Culture," in George N. Atiyeh, ed., *Arab and American Cultures* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1969), p. 90.

8. Marshall G.S. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam: Vol. 2, The Expansion of Islam in the Middle Periods* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), p. 342.

9. Samuel P. Huntington, "Modernization and Corruption," in Arnold J. Heidenheimer, ed., *Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), pp. 492-495.

10. Such a movement was the Ismâ'îli. A later offshoot, the Assassins, spread terror throughout the Islamic world at the time of the Crusades. It is instructive to note that the Assassins did not attack the Western Orders (Templars and Hospitaliers) inasmuch as their institutional structures would merely replace those killed. The Muslim system could not adjust with such ease. See Bernard Lewis, *The Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam* (New York: Basic Books, 1968).

11. The Koran itself does not proscribe figural representations but the *hadith* is very hostile, regarding the artist as a blasphemous competitor with God. Richard Littinghausen, *Arab Painting* (Cleveland, Oh.: World, 1962), p. 13. A scholarly inquiry into the broader issue of symbolism in Islam is in Marshall G.S. Hodgson, "Islam and Image," *History of Religions*, Summer 1963, pp. 220-260.

12. Hamilton A.R. Gibb, *Modern Trends in Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), p. 109

13. For example, Aristotelian approaches to science were adopted and improved upon during the Hellenist period. Even when confined to a subordinate status and kept out of theological inquiry, however, such methods were rejected by the stricter theologians. See Gibb, p. 8. Another example of an Arabic neoplatonic system was the Ismâ'îli concept of time. It was the only Islamic sect whose theory of history allowed astrological calculations of time. It was in sharp contrast to the Koranic concept of history as a mass of separate instants, not one of duration. This concept produced historical texts (Ibn Khaldûn excepted) of a disconnected series of descriptions of discrete events. See Paul E. Walker, "Eternal Cosmos and the Womb of History: Time in Early Ismaili Thought," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, August 1978, pp. 356-365.

14. Matt. 1:21; Isa. 53:5; Heb. 9:15.

15. Doctrine and Covenants 130:20-21. A typical opening statement of the rationalist Christian doctrine of a God governed by law is "...Järkevä ajattelu johtaa siihen, että Jumala ei voi olla epäjärestyksen Jumala...." (Reason leads to the conclusion that God cannot be a God of disorder....) LeGrand Richards, *Kummita Tekoja ja Ihmeitä* (Lahti, Finland: Lahden Kirjapaino, 1963), p. 27.

16. Pyhä Raamattu, Evankeliumi Johanneksen mukaan, Luku 17:3; Evankeliumi Matteuksen mukaan, Luku 5:48. Pious Christians often are so sensitive to their sinful state and the attendant guilt that they are deterred from seeking to know God through reason lest that reason fail them by leading to disbelief. That is, to question the existence of God (by seeking to prove His existence) is precluded by guilt that such questioning would arouse. Lewis S. Feuer, "God, Guilt and Logic," *Inquiry*, Autumn 1968, p. 257. The result of this situation is to make God transcendental. Thus the Christian faith has the same conflicting inmitive-rationalist forces as does Islam.

17. The relatively lower incidence of mental disorders (particularly among women and the non-Westernized) attendant upon such a focus on sin, guilt and punishment is suggested by data in John Racy, "Psychiatry in the Arab East," in L.C. Brown and N. Itzkowitz, eds., *Psychological Dimensions of Near Eastern Studies* (Princeton: Darwin Press, 1977), pp. 318-329.

18. The medieval European town layout is seen as "the most systematic achievement in the history of city planning" in E.A. Gurkind, *International History of City Development: Vol. 1, Urban Development in Central Europe* (London: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), p. 169.

19. Lewis Mumford, *The City in History* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961), pp. 302-303.

20. Gurkind, pp. 196-197.

21. The analysis of the Muslim city is based primarily on Xavier de Planhol, *The World of Islam* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1959), p. 1.

22. Ibn Khaldûn, *Muqaddimah* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967), p. 271.

23. Oleg Grabar, "Cities and Citizens," in Bernard Lewis, ed., *Islam and the Arab World* (New York: Knopf, 1976), p. 93.

24. Ira Marvin Lapidus, *Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. vii, 185-191.

25. Desmond Stewart, *Early Islam* (New York: Time-Life Books), p. 61.

26. A parallel to this commitment to translation of Western (Greek) texts can be seen in the decades that followed the French invasion of Egypt in 1798 when Muhammad Ali launched a massive translation program of Western (primarily French) texts. See Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, *Arab Rediscovery of Europe: A Study in Cultural Encounters* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 28-45.

27. Fazlur Rahman, "Islamic Philosophy," *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), v. 4, pp. 219-224.

28. Michael E. Marmura, "God and His Creation: Two Medieval Islamic Views," in R.M. Savory, ed., *Introduction to Islamic Civilization* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 50-51.

29. Hodgson, v. 2, p. 365. A thorough analysis of Avicenna as a product of Greek thought and Islamic teachings against a 10th-century Persian Renaissance is given in Soheil M. Afnan, *Avicenna: His Life and Work* (London: Unwin Books, 1958).

30. Abūl Hasan al Ash'arī, "A Vindication of the Science of Kalām," *The Theology of Al-Asharī* (Beyrouth: Imprimerie Catholique, 1953), pp. 122-123.

31. Nikki R. Keddie, *An Islamic Response to Imperialism* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968), p. 47. See also Elie Kedourie, *Afghani and Abdoh: An Essay on Religious Unbelief and Political Activism in Modern Islam* (London: Frank Cass, 1966); Nikki R. Keddie, *Sayyid Jamāl ad-Dīn 'Al Afghānī: A Political Biography* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).

32. Phillip K. Hitti, *Islam and the West: An Historical Cultural Survey* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1962), pp. 42-44.

33. Syed Nawab Ali, *Some Moral and Religious Teachings of Al Ghazzali* (Lahore: Kashmiri Bazar, 1920), pp. 1-5.

34. Montgomery W. Watt, *Islamic Surveys: Vol. 1, Islamic Philosophy and Theology* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1962), p. 118.

35. Ibn Khaldūn, pp. 288-350, cited by Robert I. Burns, *Islam Under the Crusaders: Colonial Survival in the Thirteenth Century Kingdom of Valencia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 418-419.

36. Kenneth Cragg, *The House of Islam*, 2nd ed. (Encino, Calif.: Dickenson, 1975), p. 73. Other reasons included the desire to unite Christendom under the Western Papacy by saving the Byzantine Empire; a relatively secure route through the recently Christianized Balkans; a growing manpower base; and the crossbow that held out hope of reversing the Islamic conquests of earlier times. See also Daniel Da Cruz, "Sword for God: The Story of the Crusades," *Aramco World Magazine*, May-June 1970, pp. 4-6.

37. Norman Daniel, *The Arabs and Medieval Europe* (London: Longman, 1975), pp. 320-362. The same author provides extensive details on the techniques of Christian denunciation of Islam in *Islam and the West: The Making of an Image* (Edinburgh: The University Press, 1958).

38. The Muslim counterarguments to the major Christian attacks on Islam are given in Albert Hourani, *Western Attitudes Towards Islam* (Southampton: The University of Southampton Press, 1974).

39. Ibn Khaldūn, p. 188.

40. These and other factors of the Western culture impinging on Muslim society are detailed in Hamilton A.R. Gibb, "The Reaction in the Middle East Against Western Culture," in S.J. Shaw and W.R. Polk, eds., *Studies of the Civilization of Islam* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), pp. 320-335.

41. A short history of the emergence and spread of the Sūfī orders and fraternities is given in Annemarie Schimmel, *The Mystical Dimensions of Islam* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975), pp. 228-258. The Ismā'īlī movement is detailed in Bernard Lewis, *The Origins of Ismailis* (Cambridge, Eng.: W. Heffer and Sons, 1940). See also Sami Nasib Makarem, *The Political Doctrine of the Ismailis* (Delmar: Caravan Books, 1977).

42. Only a narrow fringe of Marxists call (ineffectually) for formal suppression of religion as the opiate of the subjugated class. It is not surprising that these Marxists are often non-Muslim and/or members of non-Arab minorities.

43. Eleazar Birnbaum, "Turkey: From Cosmopolitan Empire to Nation State," in R.M. Savory, ed., *Introduction to Islamic Civilization* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 186.

44. Dr. Abdullah Cevdet's contention that there is but one civilization (Western) and Turkey had no alternative but to become part of it was adopted by Atatürk and can be seen in his reforms. Muhammad Wahbi, "The Arabs and the Civilization of the Century," in *Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East* (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 235-236.

45. Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), cited in Guenter Lewy, "Technical Report #6: The Atatürk Revolution in Turkey," University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Mass., p. 15. (Typewritten)

46. Karpaz describes this drive as a "...rationalist, scientific minded, anti-traditionalist, anti-clericalist secularism. An official dogma of irreligion...." In short a dedication to removal of the traditional blockages to modernization using a Western model. Kemal H. Karpaz, *Turkey's Parties: The Transition to a Multiparty System* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 271-272.

47. An excellent book that traces this effort and gives insights into the mental wrenchings experienced by the early Turkish modernizers is Serif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*:

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A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962). See especially Chapter X.

48. Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), p. 136.

49. Geoffrey Lewis, *Turkey*, 3rd ed. (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 97-99.

50. Anwar G. Chejne, "Arabic: Its Significance and Place in Arab-Muslim Society," *The Middle East Journal*, Autumn 1965, pp. 451-455.

51. Frederick W. Frey, "Observations on Political Development, Power and Communications in Turkey," Publications Office manuscript #C/63-9, Mass. Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass.: 1963, p. 26. (Mimeographed)

52. Frederick W. Frey, "Education and Political Development in Turkey," Publications Office manuscript #C/63-1, Mass. Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass.: 1963, p. 20. (Mimeographed)

53. Frederick W. Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1965), p. 40.

54. N.J. Coulson, *Islamic Surveys: Vol. 2, A History of Islamic Law* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1964), pp. 149-162. See also the chronological table of the more important legal reforms in Joseph Schnacht, *An Introduction to Islamic Law* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), p. 213. Sûfiist tekke (hospice, convent or monastery) numbered 258 in Constantinople alone in 1921. Their proclivity to play political roles and their excessive devotion to their leaders (vice the secular state) made them a natural target for Atatürk's attacks. J. Spencer Trimingham, *The Sufi Orders of Islam* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), pp. 253-254.

55. Gotthard Jäschke, "Der Islam In Der Neuen Türkei," *Die Welt Des Islams* 1 (1951), pp. 130-146.

56. Interview with Ephraim E. Waller, Deputy Director, School of International Studies, U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance, Fort Bragg, N.C., 8 March 1979.

57. It seems apparent that Turkey has moved toward the center of the continuum as the role of Islam reexerts itself. The justifications of less slavish copying of the West vary, but one popular approach argues that the Western culture Turkey set out to imitate in the early 20th century has changed; "... its principles destroyed, its science bankrupt...." Mümtaz Turhan, *Where Are We In Westernization?* (Istanbul: Robert College Research Center, 1965), pp. 67-69.

58. G.M. Wickens, "Khatimah," in Savory, ed., p. 190.

59. Majid Khadduri, *Political Trends in the Arab World* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), pp. 55-56.

60. Gibb, p. 113.

61. "Ayatollah's First Step: A Challenge," *Christian Science Monitor*, 2 February 1979, p. 1.

62. For example, "Oil and Stability in Iran? Yes, If....," *Christian Science Monitor*, 28 February 1979, p. 7.

63. Terry Povey, "From Absolute Monarchy to Islamic Democracy," *The Middle East*, December 1978, pp. 44-45.

64. Muhammad al-Ghazzali, *Our Beginning in Wisdom* (New York: Octagon Books, 1975), p. 35. This work gives the full range of the fundamentalist argument.

65. Other parallel groupings include the Fidayani Islam (a Marxist group in Iran), the Tijaniyya Brotherhood in Turkey, the Organization of Algerian Ulama and even the Basmach movement in Soviet Uzbek.

66. Michael Gilsenan, *Saint and Sufi in Modern Egypt: An Essay in the Sociology of Religion* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), p. 203.

67. Bernard Lewis, "The Return of Islam," *Commentary*, January 1976, pp. 41-43.

68. Thomas W. Lippman, "Islamic Fundamentalists in Egypt Given a Stern Warning by Sadat," *Washington Post*, 2 March 1979, p. 24.

69. Lewis Mumford, *The Pentagon of Power* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Javanovich, 1970), pp. 356-358.

70. Suggestive of the Western humanist concern over the influence of science and technology is the fact that two prestigious societies of liberal scholarship both have featured the issue in their journal and newsletter. See John Compton, "Science, Anti-Science and Human Values," *The OBK Key Reporter*, Winter 1978-79, pp. 2-4, 8; and Kai Nielsen, "Some Theses in Search for an Argument: Reflections on Habermas," *National Forum: The Phi Kappa Phi Journal*, Winter 1979, pp. 27-31. Both reject "scientism" as humanly destructive.

71. Arnold E. Loen, *Secularization: Science without God?* (London: SCM Press, 1967), pp. 31, 35.

72. F.E. Peters, *Aristotle and the Arabs: The Aristotelian Tradition in Islam* (New York: New York University Press, 1968), p. 118.

73. See for example Sydney Nettleton Fisher, *The Middle East: A History* (New York: Knopf, 1965), p. 98 and Peter Mansfield, *The Arab World: A Comprehensive History* (New York: Crowell, 1976), pp. 80, 106.

74. One of the best, brief descriptions of the emergence of this doctrine still remains in R.M. MacIver, *The Modern State* (London: Oxford University Press, 1926), pp. 169-182.

75. Morroe Berger, *The Arab World Today* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1962), p. 288.
76. Ruhollah (Ayatollah) Khomeini, "Fundamental Contradictions Between Islam and the Empire," *Collection of Speeches and Position Statements of Ayatollah Khomeini* (Arlington, Va.: Joint Publications Research Service, 29 January 1979), Report No. JPRS 72717, pp. 17-18.
77. I.M. Kenny, "The Modern Arab World," in Savory, ed., p. 158.
78. An incisive inquiry into the cultural, political and physical consequences of technology is Victor Ferkiss, "Technology Assessment: The Political and Moral Dimensions," *National Forum: The Phi Kappa Phi Journal*, Fall 1978, pp. 3-7.
79. This is the drumbeat message of a number of editors of Middle East publications. See for example 'Abd Al-Khaliq Hassunah, "Islam and the Atomic Age," *The Islamic Review and Arab Affairs*, January 1969, pp. 5-7 in which the author, through selective interpretation of the Koran, seeks to prove the rationalism and practicality of Islam for the problems of a nuclear world.
80. See for example Ishaq Musa al-Husayni, "The Causes and Crises in Arab Thought," in Kemal H. Karpat, ed., *Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East* (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 243.
81. Formal declarations to this effect are seen in the constitutional provisions of Egypt as early as 1923 (Art. 78), Jordan in 1952 (Art. 64) and Iran in 1906. Monika Tworuschka, *Die Rolle Des Islam in Den Arabischen Staatsverfassungen* (Waldorf-Hessen: Verlag für Orientkunde, 1976), p. 36.
82. Khadduri, p. 30.
83. One of the more effective *Sbarīab*-based attacks on the idea of constitutionalism is Shaykh Fazl Allāh Nūrī's criticism of the 1907 Iranian constitutional regime. Abdul-Hadi Ha'iri, "Shaykh Fazl Nūrī's Refutation of the Idea of Constitutionalism," *Middle East Studies*, October 1977, pp. 327-339. An analysis of the requisites for liberal democratic government is given in Charles Issawi, "Economic and Social Foundations of Democracy in the Middle East," in Walter Z. Laqueur, ed., *The Middle East in Transition* (New York: Praeger, 1958), pp. 33-51.
84. William L. Cleveland, *The Making of an Arab Nationalist: Ottomanism and Arabism in the Life and Thought of Sati al-Husri* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 152.
85. Gibb, *Modern Trends in Islam*, pp. 88-90.
86. James A. Bill and Carl Leiden, *The Middle East: Politics and Power* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1974), pp. 125-133.
87. Derek Hopwood, "A Pattern of Revival Movements in Islam?" *The Islamic Quarterly*, October-December 1971, pp. 155-158.
88. A sympathetic biography that nonetheless faults Ibn Sa'ud for his refusal to adjust to the modernizing forces is H. St. John B. Philby, *Arabian Jubilee* (New York: Day, 1953).
89. David Howarth, *The Desert King: Ibn Saud and His Arabia* (London: McGraw-Hill, 1964), pp. 280-281.
90. Robert Arndt, "Partners in Growth: Saudi Arabia," *Aramco World*, January-February 1977, p. 23.
91. Robert C. Vasile, "The Impact of Modernization on Saudi Arabia," M.A. Thesis, Monterey Institute of Foreign Studies, Monterey, Calif.: 1978, p. 82.
92. See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Saudi Arabian Affairs, *Summary of Saudi Arabian Five Year Development Plan (1975-1980)*.
93. Robert D. Crane, "Planning Islamic Style," *Fortune*, 31 July 1978, pp. 114-116. In practice, however, necessity often is overriding. Thus failure to meet housing goals has resulted in opting for high rise, high density prefabrications that are not particularly appropriate for Islamic culture. They not only run counter to the proscriptions of Islam against luxurious dwellings—especially lofty ones—but are not well adopted to the *bavemlik* (women) and *selamlik* (male) internal divisions of Muslim households.
94. Nor is the "... a civilization has a right, in fact a moral right to die, or commit suicide... in defense of its own ideals and values," a realistic alternative. James W. Daley and R. Puligandla, "Islam and the Concept of Progress," *The Islamic Review and Arab Affairs*, February 1970, p. 35.

