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Neither Athens Nor Sparta: The American Service Academies in Transition

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to the pages of the *Naval War College Review* or other military journal. Professor Levie has facilitated a future author's research of this point by arranging in chronological order all formal discussion that led to adoption of this article.

No international agreement portends greater effect upon the manner in which combat operations are planned or conducted than does Protocol I, particularly for those involved in combat in densely inhabited areas such as Western Europe. Although some of the very best minds in the U.S. military worked assiduously throughout the course of the Diplomatic Conference to produce a document consonant with our military interests, the provisions of the two Protocols are the product of the very difficult give-and-take process of interagency coordination and international negotiation, and should be viewed in that light. Because of its import, Protocol I is undergoing comprehensive operational analysis prior to the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurring in its contents as part of the ratification procedure. Professor Levie's volumes contribute substantially to that evaluation process, which in itself serves as a worthy endorsement of their value.

W. HAYS PARKS

Lovell, John P. *Neither Athens Nor Sparta: The American Service Academies in Transition.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979. 362pp.

John Lovell has thoroughly described and analyzed the problems of modernization and reform at the service academies in the decades following the Second World War. His central theme concerns the tension between the Spartan conception of education (duty, honor, discipline, mental and physical fitness) and the Athenian conception (wisdom, culture, individualism, diversity).

In Part I, Lovell shows both approaches to have been present at the birth of American military education—the West Point seminary-academy. There, in addition to the Spartan emphasis, Athenian spirit was very much in evidence in a very progressive, for the times, academic concern for mathematics, science and technology. Unfortunately, by the 20th century the programs at the Military Academy and the newer Naval and Coast Guard Academies had lost their academically innovative character and ossified into routines wherein the Spartan elements overshadowed the Athenian.

The author describes the Athenian revival beginning in World War II, as the revolution in military thinking, practice and technology forced on the academies' new programs, expanded faculties and staffs, greatly increased enrollments, and new public interest and intervention in the affairs of these institutions. It became professionally imperative for the academies to adapt to changed interservice relationships, technological innovation, modern management techniques, and increased military involvement in domestic and international politics. It also became necessary to solve postwar problems of recruitment, attrition, academic deficiency and adverse public image.

Lovell devotes Part II of this study to examination of the ensuing process of modernization and reform at each of the academies. The Air Force Academy is described as both the product of the new pressures and the catalyst and model for the changes later adopted by the other institutions. West Point is represented as a less hospitable environment for many of the new ideas, a place where ingrained tradition and suspicion of technological and academic change contributed to the greatest reaffirmation of Spartan virtues. The Coast Guard Academy emerges as an institution that transcended the wartime eclipse of its mission and

academic reputation to embark on a vigorous program of modernization and scholastic reform. And finally, the Naval Academy is seen as a school where historic commitment to technical currency and a specialized faculty provided the greatest receptivity to academic reform.

The dynamic process that Lovell describes in these case studies is one of the ebb and flow of Athenian-Spartan initiatives. In the Athenian tradition, all these institutions eliminated the rigid, prescribed programs of the past in favor of more flexible curricula, including elective courses, validation of former college credits, permission for overload studies, and in some schools the introduction of accredited majors in recognized disciplines. The course offerings were expanded with the introduction of sophisticated science, social science and humanities courses, accompanied by elaborate new facilities—libraries, laboratories and computer centers—and upgraded military and civilian faculties.

But these Athenian reforms were not the only changes. Simultaneous efforts to reinforce the essentially Spartan aspects of cadet education frequently induced competing changes. All schools instituted policies calculated to enhance Spartan virtues: codification of honor codes; formal instruction in military leadership, ethics and professionalism; proliferation of administrative regulations; and reemphasis on organized athletics.

This combination of academic and military innovation produced enormous pressures upon the students, trying to satisfy two increasingly demanding masters. The results were turbulence, declining morale, increased attrition, cheating and honor scandals, overemphasis on athletics, adverse public relations, internal conflict and external investigation and intervention. All of this convinced advocates of both Athenian reform and Spartan discipline of the virtue of their particular approach and the injurious effect of opposing programs. Lovell concludes that by the 1980s the academies had failed to establish a satisfactory balance between professionalism and scholarship, between Sparta and Athens, or attain excellence in either realm.

In Part III, the author analyzes the dynamics of institutional change, examining the instruments of internal direction (superintendents, commandants and academic deans) as well as the external pressures (parent services, other service academies, the academic community at large, Congressional and Defense Department subcommittees, the General Accounting Office, boards of visitors, alumni, former staff and faculty). He concludes that by far the greatest sources of change and difficulty, and the gravest threats to the traditional Spartan-Athenian balance at the academies, are growth and bureaucratization. These have been most damaging to the Spartan aspect of "professional socialization," whereby the institutions impart organizational values and traditions, and instill a sense of identity, community and responsibility in their constitutents. The sheer doubling of enrollments at these schools (the three largest now number about 4,000) inevitably diluted the sense of personal identity and commitment to class, school and service that characterized prewar classes. The expansion, complexity and specialization of modern academic administration prompted the rise of competing subsystems involved in recruiting, public relations, academics, military training and discipline, and athletics. This introduced layers of organizational authority that confused and depersonalized relationships between students and officers, further weakening the bonds of institutional community. These are conditions that continue to produce disaffection and attrition in the student body.

How then can the Athenian goals of academic excellence be reconciled with the Spartan goals of military training and professional socialization? In his conclusion, Lovell suggests that such reconciliation is now impossible in an undergraduate institution; maintenance of the existing system has proved unsatisfactory in both academic and professional terms, and incremental changes can only palliate inherent problems. Return to the original seminary-academy model would be incompatible with contemporary society and technology; abolition of the academies would sacrifice invaluable assets, not to mention service reputation and morale. Therefore, Lovell feels the optimum solution is radical structural change.

He describes three possible options for such change—all of which segregate the Athenian and Spartan components of military education: (1) a program of general education at a combined service academy or universal service institution that would prepare students for a wide range of public service prior to specialized education in the individual military or other government services, (2) a "3-2 Plan" wherein students would take 3 years of civilian undergraduate college followed by 2 years of service academy, and (3) a simple 2-year postgraduate service academy program. It is this final solution that the author seems to prefer, arguing that such a solution would provide the academies students with sound academic background, thoroughly acquainted with the norms and values of the parent society, capable of a mature career commitment; the academies could then proceed with the work of professional training, specialization and socialization more appropriate to graduate than undergraduate education, all without the competing and often contradictory demands of academic life. Thus the Athenian elements of officer education would be left to undergraduate life, the Spartan elements assigned to graduate specialization.

This book will fascinate anyone who has ever studied or served at the academies; it also merits the attention of those interested in educational reform and societal influence on military institutions. As a former professor and coach at the Naval Academy during much of the period described by Lovell, this reviewer can attest to the accuracy of his account, at leasr for one institution, and the essential validity of his Athenian-Spartan model. The book's sections on historical background and the evolution of reform at the separate academies are excellent. Less valuable are the chapters analyzing organizational change; their unsurprising findings are essentially that the reforms of academy executives were a function of tenure and external pressure, and that the external environment provided stimuli for reform that were often ambiguous and selectively interpreted. Lovell's conclusions and solutions are reasonable, if not definitive, and guaranteed to generate passionate reaction among alumni and other interested parties.

It is difficult to quarrel with the specifics of Lovell's critique of educational reform at the service academies, but this reviewer believes that comparison with American undergraduate education in the postwar period might produce a more charitable assessment. Were academy officials significantly less aware of and responsive to the problems of growth and bureaucracy than their civilian counterparts? Were military officers more resistant to change than the civilian administrators and officials who directed and advised them? Were the products of these schools less professionally motivated and capable than their predecessors, or less "educated" than their civilian contemporaries? Are not the academies' problems less a function of military obscurantism than

of the ambiguous attitude of a liberal society toward its military, enjoining them ro produce scholars one day, heroes the next? And perhaps the real challenge for these institutions lies not in achieving educational balance or reform, but in solving the perennial professional problem of how to instill leadership, honor, duty, sacrifice, and discipline. If this is the case, there is little guarantee that it will be done better in a 2-year graduate program than over 4 undergraduate years.

"Neither Athens nor Sparta" perhaps, but despite the academies' less than optimal attainment of these ideals, their products have been very good, and few schools in the nation demand, and receive, as much from their students mentally, physically and morally. Ironically, many of the deficiencies Lovell describes may stem from the efforts of the service schools to impart a truly liberal education of the whole person in an age of specialization.

RICHARD MEGARGEE
Naval War College

Miller, Nathan. *Naval Air War 1939-1945*. Annapolis: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1980. 223pp.

This is a fine small book that really gives the message of what airpower at sea meant in World War II. It is no complete history of the battle in the air over the oceans but it certainly highlights the role airpower played in the final decisions that helped decide the outcome at sea in the war. There can be no doubt that the author believes today that the decision at sea rests with the decision in the air.

There are some mistakes in this book but they in no way detract from its message. As examples, on page 135 Rear Adm. E.D. McWhorter is identified as "McWhater," on page 73 some SBDs are identified as F4Fs, page 134 makes the statement that an *Edsall*-class DE is 7,600 tons.

The pictures are a very fine selection from the mass of what is available to the writer.

It is quite evident that the author covered a great deal in his research for this book without getting immersed in details. There are many fine books covering certain campaigns of the war and he has evidently decided to select those and to highlight the role of sea-based airpower. He has chosen some excellent quotations; particularly of interest is that of the Japanese Adm. Shigeru Fukudome who had put 230 fighters in the air against us on the first real raid on Formosa on 12 October 1944.

The closing chapter, "Action Report," sums up Miller's belief in sea-based airpower. He makes a point of quoting Billy Mitchell and how wrong he was and then uses Adm. Sir Arthur Hezlet's quotation to close: "The role of ships became firstly one of carrying air power to sea, secondly of co-operating with aircraft in the exercise of sea power, and thirdly of exploiting the use of the sea when command of it has been won." This is still valid today.

JOHN T. HAYWARD
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Veldman, Jan H. and Olivier, Frits Th., eds. *West European Navies and the Future*. Den Helder: Royal Netherlands Naval College, 1980. 251pp.

The steady improvement in Soviet naval capability in the past two decades has been especially troubling to the Atlantic Alliance. NATO, after all, is a maritime alliance whose srrategy for fighting major war requires reinforcement and resupply by sea. Thus the possibility that the Soviet Union might be able to disrupt or even sever NATO's sea lines of communication (SLOCs) has raised serious doubts about the efficacy of NATO strategy and has caused the East-West naval balance to be the object of unusual scrutiny and concern. What is