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Naval Air War 1939-1945

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of the ambiguous attitude of a liberal society toward its military, enjoining them to produce scholars one day, heroes the next? And perhaps the real challenge for these institutions lies not in achieving educational balance or reform, but in solving the perennial professional problem of how to instill leadership, honor, duty, sacrifice, and discipline. If this is the case, there is little guarantee that it will be done better in a 2-year graduate program than over 4 undergraduate years.

"Neither Athens nor Sparta" perhaps, but despite the academics' less than optimal attainment of these ideals, their products have been very good, and few schools in the nation demand, and receive, as much from their students mentally, physically and morally. Ironically, many of the deficiencies Lovell describes may stem from the efforts of the service schools to impart a truly liberal education of the whole person in an age of specialization.

RICHARD MEGARGEE
Naval War College

Miller, Nathan. *Naval Air War 1939-1945*. Annapolis: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1980. 223pp.

This is a fine small book that really gives the message of what airpower at sea meant in World War II. It is no complete history of the battle in the air over the oceans but it certainly highlights the role airpower played in the final decisions that helped decide the outcome at sea in the war. There can be no doubt that the author believes today that the decision at sea rests with the decision in the air.

There are some mistakes in this book but they in no way detract from its message. As examples, on page 135 Rear Adm. E.D. McWhorter is identified as "McWhater," on page 73 some SBDs are identified as F4Fs, page 134 makes the statement that an *Eidsall*-class DE is 7,600 tons.

The pictures are a very fine selection from the mass of what is available to the writer.

It is quite evident that the author covered a great deal in his research for this book without getting immersed in details. There are many fine books covering certain campaigns of the war and he has evidently decided to select those and to highlight the role of sea-based airpower. He has chosen some excellent quotations; particularly of interest is that of the Japanese Adm. Shigeru Fukudome who had put 230 fighters in the air against us on the first real raid on Formosa on 12 October 1944.

The closing chapter, "Action Report," sums up Miller's belief in sea-based airpower. He makes a point of quoting Billy Mitchell and how wrong he was and then uses Adm. Sir Arthur Hezlet's quotation to close: "The role of ships became firstly one of carrying air power to sea, secondly of co-operating with aircraft in the exercise of sea power, and thirdly of exploiting the use of the sea when command of it has been won." This is still valid today.

JOHN T. HAYWARD
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Veldman, Jan H. and Olivier, Frits Th., eds. *West European Navies and the Future*. Den Helder: Royal Netherlands Naval College, 1980. 251pp.

The steady improvement in Soviet naval capability in the past two decades has been especially troubling to the Atlantic Alliance. NATO, after all, is a maritime alliance whose strategy for fighting major war requires reinforcement and resupply by sea. Thus the possibility that the Soviet Union might be able to disrupt or even sever NATO's sea lines of communication (SLOCs) has raised serious doubts about the efficacy of NATO strategy and has caused the East-West naval balance to be the object of unusual scrutiny and concern. What is