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West European Navies and the Future

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of the ambiguous attitude of a liberal society toward its military, enjoining them to produce scholars one day, heroes the next? And perhaps the real challenge for these institutions lies not in achieving educational balance or reform, but in solving the perennial professional problem of how to instill leadership, honor, duty, sacrifice, and discipline. If this is the case, there is little guarantee that it will be done better in a 2-year graduate program than over 4 undergraduate years.

"Neither Athens nor Sparta" perhaps, but despite the academics' less than optimal attainment of these ideals, their products have been very good, and few schools in the nation demand, and receive, as much from their students mentally, physically and morally. Ironically, many of the deficiencies Lovell describes may stem from the efforts of the service schools to impart a truly liberal education of the whole person in an age of specialization.

RICHARD MEGARGEE
Naval War College

Miller, Nathan. *Naval Air War 1939-1945*. Annapolis: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1980. 223pp.

This is a fine small book that really gives the message of what airpower at sea meant in World War II. It is no complete history of the battle in the air over the oceans but it certainly highlights the role airpower played in the final decisions that helped decide the outcome at sea in the war. There can be no doubt that the author believes today that the decision at sea rests with the decision in the air.

There are some mistakes in this book but they in no way detract from its message. As examples, on page 135 Rear Adm. E.D. McWhorter is identified as "McWhater," on page 73 some SBDs are identified as F4Fs, page 134 makes the statement that an *Eidsall*-class DE is 7,600 tons.

The pictures are a very fine selection from the mass of what is available to the writer.

It is quite evident that the author covered a great deal in his research for this book without getting immersed in details. There are many fine books covering certain campaigns of the war and he has evidently decided to select those and to highlight the role of sea-based airpower. He has chosen some excellent quotations; particularly of interest is that of the Japanese Adm. Shigeru Fukudome who had put 230 fighters in the air against us on the first real raid on Formosa on 12 October 1944.

The closing chapter, "Action Report," sums up Miller's belief in sea-based airpower. He makes a point of quoting Billy Mitchell and how wrong he was and then uses Adm. Sir Arthur Hezlet's quotation to close: "The role of ships became firstly one of carrying air power to sea, secondly of co-operating with aircraft in the exercise of sea power, and thirdly of exploiting the use of the sea when command of it has been won." This is still valid today.

JOHN T. HAYWARD
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

Veldman, Jan H. and Olivier, Frits Th., eds. *West European Navies and the Future*. Den Helder: Royal Netherlands Naval College, 1980. 251pp.

The steady improvement in Soviet naval capability in the past two decades has been especially troubling to the Atlantic Alliance. NATO, after all, is a maritime alliance whose strategy for fighting major war requires reinforcement and resupply by sea. Thus the possibility that the Soviet Union might be able to disrupt or even sever NATO's sea lines of communication (SLOCs) has raised serious doubts about the efficacy of NATO strategy and has caused the East-West naval balance to be the object of unusual scrutiny and concern. What is

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often overlooked, however, in the calculation of the naval balance is that America's European allies are not insignificant naval powers; indeed, Europe possesses 600 ships (as compared with less than 500 in the U.S. Navy) that can be deployed to fulfill NATO's objectives.

West European Navies and the Future draws attention to this oversight by reminding us that Europe's navies do exist, by discussing roles that they might play, and by describing some of the problems they face in the future. This book is the product of a conference held in 1979 to commemorate the 150th anniversary of the Royal Netherlands Naval College. It is comprised of the papers presented to that conference as well as transcriptions of the discussion that occurred there. The latter, unfortunately, contribute little to the volume, being typically awkward and incoherent in nature. The essays, on the other hand, have much to commend them.

The volume includes seven papers: Michael Salewski's on European attitudes toward naval power in recent history; Johan Holst's on future peacetime missions for European navies; Laurence Martin's consideration of future wartime missions; Sam Rozemond's discussion of naval arms control and strategic submarines; John Moore's on the need for NATO to exploit new naval technologies; Curt Gasteyer's description of the evolving global context in which European decisions about naval policy are made; and Catherine Kelleher, Alden Mullins, Jr., and Richard Eichenberg's detailed examination of the evolution of European navies since 1960. Though these essays do not form an especially compelling whole, each essay individually offers some interesting or controversial notion for contemplation.

The strength of this volume lies in the fact that its contributors address

they do not always do so as directly as they might, and though they sometimes shy away from the logical, if unpopular or unorthodox, conclusions that their arguments suggest. Nevertheless, it is to their credit that they tackled issues that are only rarely treated in our policy debates.

Examinations of the relationship between doctrine and capability, for example, are several times encountered in this volume. We are reminded that the doctrinal assumption underlying NATO's emphasis on naval power is that future war will (or might) be long and will (or might) be fought only with conventional weapons. This assumption of protracted conventional warfare, in which NATO would pursue a strategy of mobilization and attrition, provides the justification for literally billions of dollars of investment in naval capability.

And yet this assumption was challenged on several grounds by various of the authors in this book, notably by Laurence Martin. A short war strategy, he suggests, seems more appropriate in current circumstances, given the emphasis on short war in Soviet doctrine and the limited capability of NATO to resist on land; in such a war, American conventional naval forces would have almost no role to play. This single change of assumption thus eliminates the requirement for naval dominance in the North Atlantic, transforms American naval assets devoted to that mission from crucial to superfluous, and suggests a different structure of defense priorities. Although, as Holst points out, failure to prepare for long war may be a self-fulfilling prophecy, failure to prepare adequately for the short war ensures that a long war strategy will fail; allowing long war assumptions to distort NATO defense priorities may condemn NATO to serious inadequacies in Central Europe. Moreover, Martin emphasizes the tension between

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the long war assumption and *NATO's own policy* of escalation. One cannot help but be disturbed that despite the ambiguities of NATO doctrine and the contradictory assumptions that shape various aspects of NATO policy, procurement proceeds apace. This leads to a troubling question that is provoked by several of the essays in this volume: Can we really be buying a sensible defense posture in the absence of clear-cut criteria to guide our spending?

Another of the large issues raised is the question of escalation control. If we are to refight World War II, as the recent denuclearization of American strategy suggests we will, both sides must exercise extreme restraint with regard to nuclear weapons. But we learn here, again primarily in Laurence Martin's richly thoughtful essay, of the ambiguities of escalation in a maritime environment in which nuclear and conventional assets are mixed together, surveillance and strategic antisubmarine warfare activities occur as a matter of course, even in peacetime, and in which defensive instincts might lead to attacks on an opponent's strategic submarines. Again, one is left with a disturbing but vitally important question: Could the operational requirements of the Soviet and Western navies undermine the possibility of escalation control?

Another controversial issue addressed here is that of Soviet mission priorities. The Soviets seem to allocate most of their naval capability to defending their own strategic submarines and attacking ours, with little left with which to attack NATO SLOCs. If this is true, then how much need NATO invest to defend the SLOCs?

That question is especially germane to European navies for, as Holst, Kelleher, and Moore point out, those navies have had to face block obsolescence, declining resources, and additional missions (in particular, coastal patrol of offshore resources).

How much money should be devoted to what missions is not an abstract question for Europe's navies. Moore and Kelleher argue that changing naval technology may ease the problems faced by European navies, but hard choices nevertheless remain for European policymakers.

Enough has been said to demonstrate the type of significant and provocative issues that are found in this book. Unfortunately, there is no coherent gathering together of themes and ideas; related insights are scattered throughout; while themes, arguments, and conclusions often remain half-formed or implicit. This makes the reader's job more difficult. This book, unattractively printed by a small European publisher, seems destined for obscurity. But for those who are able to get their hands on it, it will reward a careful reading.

STEVEN E. MILLER

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Westing, Arthur H. *Warfare in a Fragile World—Military Impact on the Human Environment*. London: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1980. 249pp.

Warfare in a Fragile World is the third in a series by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI—best known for its annual Armaments and Disarmament Yearbook) concerning the effects of military activities and warfare on the environment. As noted in its introduction, the book places special emphasis on "... the disruption by war on agricultural and wild lands, and thus on the ecosystems these regions support."

The substance of *Warfare in a Fragile World* is divided among six key chapters, each focusing on a specific area: the temperate regions, the tropical regions, the desert regions, the arctic regions, islands, and the oceans. Within each chapter, the discussion is further