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A budget that has over 1700 program elements and over 5000 line items and that is managed with 137 different accounting systems cannot even be contemplated with equanimity. Such is the budget of the Department of Defense, however, but this is only the apparatus. Force planning decisionmaking requires an understanding and integration of economic and political factors whose complexities may eclipse those of the mechanics of the budget.

THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RESTRAINTS ON FORCE PLANNING

by

George Brown and Lawrence Korb

Recent debate regarding the defense budget has largely been categorized by questions regarding the allocation of the budget across various force options. This shift from the acrimonious debates regarding the absolute size of the defense budget that characterized, for example, the 1972 Presidential election campaign, can be attributed to two principal factors: the waning of anti-military passions that evolved during the final years of the war in Vietnam, and, of greater importance, a recognition of the need for a reappraisal of U.S. military strategy in light of evolving international interests and threats. To a considerable extent, this reappraisal has been stimulated by concerns regarding the continued accuracy of the overall assumptions upon which post-World War II military forces were structured.

In that such reappraisals are always difficult, not only for gaining consensus regarding military strategy itself but

also because of their effect on existing organizations, budgets, and special interests, the strains placed upon the planning and budgeting processes can be expected to be severe. This paper first addresses the interrelated issues of changing force planning bases and the responsiveness of the defense budgeting process as a means of identifying those factors likely to generate debate. The next section examines generally the changing force planning bases, and the third section discusses the budget process and its ability to react to new conditions.

Evolution of the Force Planning Bases. While it is always difficult to identify the specific bases of military force planning, an examination of defense planning literature, and, more importantly, the actual evolution of U.S. force structures, suggests that post-World War II planning has been guided

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by six interrelated factors. These factors are briefly summarized below.

First, the United States enjoyed overwhelming superiority in nuclear weaponry, with an initial postwar monopoly on the technology and, later, general superiority as the Soviet Union entered the field. As a result, U.S. planners could reasonably assume that the threat of countervalue strikes against an enemy's population and industrial targets was sufficient to deter attacks against the United States itself and, to a significant degree, military actions against its principal allies. The strategic nuclear umbrella also provided insurance against conventional force deficiencies, allowing, for a period of time, reduced emphasis in this category of forces.

Secondly, views of conventional warfare were shaped by the experiences of World Wars I and II, both of which involved drawn-out campaigns whose outcomes were largely determined by national abilities to replenish reduced forces. The United States entered the post-World War II period supreme among the world's nations in terms of the industrial and reserve mobilization base upon which the military could draw should war ensue. As had been demonstrated during the two World Wars, this imposing capability permitted planners to size conventional forces for the purpose of delaying enemy success only long enough to allow industrial supremacy to assert itself, after which the advantages of extended warfare and the associated attrition would accrue to the United States and its allies.

Third, the United States enjoyed a dramatic absolute advantage in naval forces relative to those of any potential adversary. This advantage allowed the United States freedom of maritime operations and the ability to deny the same to any hostile state. Additionally, because of the lack of any credible threat to U.S. naval forces, planners were able to allocate naval capabilities

away from the traditional sea control mission and to the mission of power projection. Because naval projection forces (both carrier air and marine amphibious forces) had evolved to levels of technical capability relatively commensurate with those of corresponding land-based forces, the ability to exploit secure sea-based forces led to several advantages, including flexibility and mobility, rapid responsiveness, independence from foreign influence, and ease of insertion and disengagement of forces. Naval projection forces became a substitute for land-based forces in many theaters, and an important complement to it in others, including central Europe.

Fourth, the potential adversaries of the United States, including the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, were generally restricted in their use of military force to geographic areas contiguous to their own boundaries. Only the United States (and her allies in Western Europe) emerged from World War II with the overseas bases and logistics support facilities necessary to sustain operations distant from her homeland. As a result, potential conflict scenarios could be geographically limited. Within most of the developing world, no major power threat to U.S. interests could be identified.

Fifth, the United States emerged from World War II as the world's only economically strong and independent state. The previously industrialized nations of Europe and Asia emerged from the war with dramatically reduced industrial bases and labor forces, and Communist nations generally suffered from the war and previously fragmented processes of industrialization. The United States, on the other hand, sustained notable levels of nonmilitary production during the war and suffered no industrial attrition from the war itself. In addition, U.S. resource wealth was itself sufficient to leave the nation largely self-sufficient in strategic materials, at least for moderate periods of

time. The U.S. economic advantage was so strong that it was able to embark on programs to rebuild the economies of Europe and Japan through support of the international trade and monetary system and direct grants.

Finally, the United States emerged from the war with general national consensus regarding the nature of the military threat facing the nation. The Communist movement, led by the Soviet Union, was generally perceived to be hostile, expansionist, and the antithesis of fundamental U.S. values and objectives. As a result, barriers were erected thwarting essentially all economic, cultural, and political intercourse between the world's superpowers.

Clearly, much has changed to suggest the need for a reappraisal of a military strategy predicated upon an international environment characterized by these circumstances. In virtually every category of the traditional components of force planning—national interests, the threat, technology, the nature of conflict, resource availability, the domestic and international political environment, etc.—significant changes have occurred that suggest the need for a reexamination of force structures and strategy.

U.S. national interests, while remaining worldwide, have evolved considerably since the end of World War II. Western Europe, having recovered from the war and developed into a set of modern industrial economies, remains a key U.S. ally, economically as well as militarily. Warsaw Pact forces remain poised on the boundaries of Western Europe, representing in one sense the one continuous threat since the end of World War II. The rest of the world has not remained so stable. Asia and the Pacific may be generally viewed as in a state of flux, with the recent normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China, the end of the U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, and the planned withdrawal of forces from

Korea dramatically changing the picture there. Similarly, the developing world, including the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, Africa, and Latin America, has emerged as a growing economic force as the result of U.S. (and allied) requirements for energy supplies and raw material resources. The Communist nations themselves have become trading partners, albeit on a scale much smaller than that of the other free world nations. Economically, the United States has evolved from a position of dominance and independence to the present state of extensive linkages. Certainly as a result, the global nature of U.S. interests has been magnified.

The Soviet Union, which has itself enjoyed considerable economic growth, has evolved into a military threat with capabilities not dissimilar to those of the United States. Three dimensions of the Soviet military buildup are particularly critical in assessing the need for changes in the U.S. force structure: Soviet strategic force capabilities, naval capabilities, and projection capabilities.

By most assessments, Soviet strategic nuclear forces have reached a position of parity with those of the United States, a parity that has in fact been formalized through the SALT treaties. As a result the strategic umbrella over conventional forces that existed during the first several decades of the post-World War II period no longer exists, requiring new analysis of the conventional force balance. More importantly, perhaps, Soviet nuclear capabilities have evolved to the point that counterforce applications of their forces are within reasonable grasp. Secretary of Defense Brown noted this fact in the FY 1979 Department of Defense (DOD) Annual Report, stating the "... the Soviets are acquiring capabilities that will give their nuclear forces some of the flexibility that we have associated previously with only the more traditional military capabilities."

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Soviet force evolution has been significant in the naval and projection areas as well. The Soviet Navy has progressed from a coastal defense force to one with open-ocean capabilities through growth in their submarine forces, surface forces, and maritime air forces (although the latter remain mostly land-based). Coupled with the numerical decline of U.S. naval forces, the Soviets have reached a position where, at minimum, they can significantly impede and delay U.S. naval operations. Their overseas projection capabilities have similarly advanced rapidly in recent years, with the development of allied and proxy forces operating in distant nations. While the Soviets have had difficulty in sustaining any system of overseas bases, their capabilities are at least sufficient to extend the number of regions within which military options are feasible. In addition, their ground and air forces in Europe and Asia have grown progressively and been modernized throughout the postwar period.

Coupled with the overall rapid growth of Soviet military capabilities has been a technologically induced evolution in the nature of conflict itself. Through technological improvements in weaponry (principally missile systems that require only modest platform support) the nature of war has changed dramatically in terms of the levels of violence and destruction that can be unleashed over short time periods. This newly emerging feature of high intensity conflict has among its implications for force planners the rapid attrition of forces on the modern battlefield and the potential for one side rapidly to gain a decisive advantage.

This evolution of the nature of conflict has significant implications for the economics and military use of the various elements of mobilization. In recent years, the U.S. mobilization base can be divided into three segments. First are the resources allocated during peacetime

directly to defense activities. These active forces provide the initial and largest source of military power when it is required. Second are those resources devoted to civilian purposes during peacetime that can be readily diverted to military purposes during wartime. Among such resources are manpower within the reserves, lift resources such as ships and aircraft, and a broad range of energy supplies, foodstuffs, consumables, and common equipments. The third element of the mobilization base includes the industrial facilities for producing military hardware and support equipment and the induction/training facilities for producing military personnel. Unlike the first two categories of mobilization resources, this one requires the marshalling of resources to create new military capabilities. The allocation of resources among these three categories of the military base (and the implied dependence upon each component) is affected by viewpoints regarding the nature of conflict. A short and intense "come as you are" war with the potential for a rapid decisive outcome implies the need for emphasis on the active force component, while a protracted conflict implying extensive attrition of forces emphasizes the importance of the reserve and productive components of the mobilization base.

Additional factors complicating the force planning process include the debate regarding the appropriate level of defense resources and the changing nature of international political relations. While defense budgets have increased in recent years, the pressures to restrain spending will continue and perhaps increase as a product of the drives to restrain overall government spending, fight inflation by bringing the budget into balance, and continue the provision of social services. Similarly in the international political system, changes have occurred that complicate the force planning process. First is the fact that

relations between the United States and her adversaries have evolved from the cold war pattern of minimum intercourse to one in which economic and political interaction have become routine; among the byproducts of this evolution has been the attempt to transit from direct force confrontation to negotiated arms limitations in both the strategic and conventional force areas. A second factor, stemming from the Guam Doctrine, involves the potential substitution of allied military forces supported by U.S. military assistance for direct U.S. military presence and involvement.

This discussion of the evolution of the force planning bases from the immediate postwar period to the present suggests many of the major decisions required within the current appraisal of U.S. military posture. Among the major decisions requiring resolution as a result of these changes are the following:

- The response to growing Soviet strategic capabilities, spanning decisions regarding the replacement of our older systems with those of newer technologies and the emphasis placed within our strategic forces on counterforce capabilities.

- The response to growing Soviet naval capabilities that have served to require a reorientation of our naval forces away from the projection mission that dominated the postwar period and back toward the traditional mission of sea control.

- The response to technologically induced changes in the nature of warfare that suggest the possibility of rapidly decisive conflicts largely decided by forces available at the initiation of hostilities rather than by the existence of a sustaining mobilization base.

- The response to increased dependence on overseas sources for strategic materials and energy coupled with increased Soviet (and Third World) capabilities for military operations in Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere.

- The balance between military forces and negotiated arms limitation agreements in shaping overall force requirements.

Because each of these general decisions spans a wide variety of individual force units, the budgetary implications of the alternatives are significant. The next section of this paper will examine the budgetary process itself to identify factors that affect the ability of force planners to resolve central issues such as those suggested in this section.

Budget Realities and Force Planning Decisions. In theory the budget process should provide for a force structure closely related to the national security policy of the nation and, as discussed above, the policy should take into account the evolving threat facing the nation. However, in practice the fit between the threat, the policy, and force structure is quite loose. This lack of symmetry among these elements is caused by eight interrelated economic and political factors. This section of the essay will focus on these factors.

First, in spite of our great wealth, this nation simply does not have the resources to support fully our present military policy. Our current policy, as enunciated in Presidential Decision (PD)-18, is based upon the assumption that our armed forces should be equipped to fight a major conventional war with the Soviet bloc in Europe while simultaneously handling a minor contingency elsewhere in the world, for example the Persian Gulf. To support this "one and a half war" policy,¹ the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) estimate that our general-purpose or conventional forces need a minimum of 750 ships, 30 Army and Marine Corps ground divisions, and 35 Air Force tactical air wings. The annual cost of such a force would be about \$250 billion. The FY 1980 budget of approximately \$125 billion can support a force of 458 ships, 19 ground divisions, and 26 tactical air

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wings. Some analysts argue that with its present force this nation would have a difficult time just handling a major conventional war in Europe with the Warsaw Pact nations,² let alone a simultaneous contingency somewhere else in the world.

The gap between policy and budget caused by resource constraints has existed all through the post-World War II period. Its existence was vividly illustrated by the events that took place during the decade of the 1960s. At that time the force structure supported by our defense budget supposedly was capable of handling simultaneously a major war with the Soviets in Europe and with the Chinese in Asia and another contingency elsewhere (2-1/2 war doctrine). Yet in order to handle just the "half" war or minor contingency in Southeast Asia, DOD had to decrease forces in Europe. Moreover, in 1968, when the North Koreans seized *Pueblo*, our lack of a military response was primarily attributable to the inability of the armed forces to fight a war in Korea while deeply enmeshed in Vietnam.³ Similarly, in October 1973, the only way in which we could resupply the beleaguered Israelis was to deplete our equipment in Europe. Further, because of resource constraints, these stocks were not fully restored to their pre-October 1973 levels until 1978.

Second, responsible political leaders are rarely able to provide concrete guidance to our military leaders on how this country will respond in specific situations. This situation occurs for two reasons. First, our elected officials usually do not know in their own minds how they will react to certain contingencies. People succeed in political life by keeping their options open. Politicians usually do not like to tie themselves down to specific courses of action in advance. Second, it is very difficult to provide such guidance in the abstract. There is so much uncertainty and room

for misperception in international politics that any guidance that might be offered can easily prove erroneous. However, when the military planner in the Pentagon is developing his force structure he should have the answers to such questions as: will the United States become militarily involved if the People's Republic of China takes offensive action against the Republic of China on Taiwan; how much territory in Western Europe will NATO forces have to yield before the United States will resort to the use of tactical nuclear weapons; will this nation intervene militarily in the Middle East if there is another Arab oil embargo? The answers to questions such as these can have a significant effect on the forces that are bought. Usually the defense planner must be content with only the vaguest of guidance and is forced to guess about our intentions and those of our adversaries. Often he guesses wrong, and then the armed forces are not adequately equipped to carry out the actual policy.

The ambiguity of the guidance currently being offered to military planners by political leaders can be illustrated by analyzing some sections of PD-18.⁴ According to this document, DOD will not allow the present military balance with the Soviet Union to deteriorate. However, PD-18 does not provide defense officials with any way to measure or operationalize the balance. Similarly, one part of PD-18 instructs the military planner to configure his conventional forces primarily to wage a short intensive war on the central front in Europe. However, elsewhere the document proclaims that this nation will fulfill all its military commitments in the Pacific and will continue to protect the flanks of NATO. Because the battlegrounds and situations of the Pacific and the NATO flanks are so radically different from those of the central front in Europe, and because the defense planner does not have sufficient forces to accomplish all these missions, he is thus left to his

own devices on how to structure forces.

Third, the length of time involved in the production of the defense budget can make outmoded or irrelevant any policy guidance that may have been given. The budget process within the executive branch takes 20 months from beginning to end. It then takes the Congress another 9 months to authorize and appropriate funds for DOD. Consider, for example, that President Carter took office 3 months into FY 1977. Work on the FY 1977 defense budget, which was supposed to support his military policy, began in May 1974 when Richard Nixon was still President. The executive phase of that process was concluded in December 1975 by Gerald Ford who, at that time, was uncertain that his own party would give him its Presidential nomination. Congress completed action on the FY 1977 budget in late September 1976 as Gerald Ford appeared to be overtaking Jimmy Carter in the race for the Presidency.

Fourth, because of its enormous size, the defense budget can have a dramatic effect upon the economic health of the nation. Expenditures for defense in FY 1980 represent about 25 percent of the entire federal budget and approximately 5 percent of our Gross National Product (GNP). Of the 15 functions for which the Federal Government spends money, the national defense function absorbs the second largest amount of funds. Only the income security function, which provides direct financial assistance to individuals, consumes more money. Similarly, of the 12 major agencies in the Federal Government DOD is the second most expensive. Only the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) has a larger budget than DOD.

At the present time, about 80 percent of the people employed by the Federal Government work for DOD. In addition, it is estimated that approximately 1.2 million jobs in the private

sector are directly dependent upon defense spending.⁵ Since 1976, when the size of the defense budget began to rise by about 4 percent per year in real terms, about 240,000 military-related jobs were created. For many areas of the nation, employment generated by defense spending is crucial. Such cities as Los Angeles, Seattle, Wichita, Kansas and Lynn, Massachusetts, and such states as Texas and Connecticut are almost totally dependent upon defense contracts for their economic well-being. Moreover, changes in the size of the defense budget can severely distort the economy of the nation as a whole. According to Michael Evans of Chase Econometrics Associates, real GNP would fall by twice the amount of a Defense Department budget cut if there were no compensating tax cut or government expenditures.⁶ Similarly, increases in defense spending tend to exacerbate the inflation rate because military spending puts money into the hands of workers without expanding the supply of goods that they can buy. Thus, political leaders can be loathe to make drastic changes in the size or shape of the defense budget even if these changes are deemed necessary to support policy.

In addition to its size the defense budget is more controllable than any of the other departmental budgets; that is, DOD's funding level can be changed substantially without changing substantive law. This is in stark contrast to the situation that prevails in most areas of the federal bureaucracy. The budgets of agencies like HEW or the Veterans Administration (VA) are basically uncontrollable. If people meet the criteria established for such programs as social security, medicare, or the GI bill, by current law, the government has no choice but to pay them. This is not the case with defense. For example, in the FY 1979 defense budget, which totaled \$115 billion, almost \$74 billion was controllable. The defense budget thus

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represented 57 percent of all of the controllable or discretionary funds within the entire federal budget.

Therefore, if a Chief Executive needs to vary the size of the total federal budget in order to achieve a particular economic or monetary goal, he usually alters the defense total somewhat. Generally this means reducing the size of the defense budget, but on occasion Presidents have increased the defense total. Throughout the entire post-World War II period, every administration has used the defense budget to achieve domestic economic goals without making corresponding policy changes.

President Truman cut defense spending for FY 1951 below the level of the previous year despite that fact that in the interim the Communists had taken over China and the Soviets had exploded an atomic bomb.⁷ The President took this action because of the importance he placed upon the need to achieve a balanced budget. In 1957, President Eisenhower refused to raise defense spending to speed up our missile program in spite of the fact that the Sputnik launch had shown the Soviets to be far ahead of the United States in intercontinental missile capability. The former general argued that allocating more than 10 percent of the GNP to defense would ruin this nation's economy.⁸

In his first 6 months in office President Kennedy increased defense spending by 12 percent because in his opinion that was the quickest and most politically acceptable way of pumping money into the economy. According to his press secretary, Kenneth O'Donnell, his own inclination was to spend more in the social areas.⁹ In 1971, President Nixon added \$6 billion to the expected level of the defense budget to stimulate the economy during the 1972 election year.¹⁰ Four years later President Ford cut \$7 billion from DOD in order to keep his election year budget below \$400 billion.¹¹ Finally, in 1978,

President Carter was forced to reduce defense spending for FY 1980 by some \$3 billion below projected levels in order to keep the federal deficit for FY 1980 from going above \$30 billion.¹² In taking these steps, none of these six Chief Executives modified his military policy to conform to the altered size of the defense budget.

Fifth, there exists no purely scientific way of allocating the limited resources to support a particular national security policy. Theoretically the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), which views results, costs, and goals together, and the techniques of zero-based budgeting (ZBB) and systems analysis provide the framework and tools for making such decisions in the defense budget process. While PPBS, ZBB, and systems analysis can help in making budgetary decisions, they are only a partial aid. Many of the crucial variables that affect such decisions are not quantifiable. For example, how does one decide what percentage of the Soviet population and industrial base this nation must have the capability to destroy in order to support our policy of deterring the Soviet Union from launching a nuclear strike against the United States or our allies, or even whether countervalue strikes actually will serve as a deterrent. Moreover, even when one is dealing with variables that can be reduced to numbers, there may be no criterion that can reduce alternatives to a commensurate base. For example, how does the decisionmaker compare the damage potential and cost of a surface ship with that of an airplane or a tank. Thus, many of the decisions in the defense budget must be the product of judgment and intuition. Such kinds of budgetary decisions do not necessarily provide the best support to the established policy.

Sixth, even if all the right decision-making tools were available, the scope of the defense budget is simply too vast for any one central authority to

administer in a coherent manner. Presently, the defense budget has approximately 1,700 program elements, over 5,000 line items, and 137 different accounting systems. Each of the services and the 10 defense agencies prepares its own separate budget request. Further, none of those units shares a common view of strategy and force structure. For example, because of interservice rivalries each of the military services tries to buy a force structure that will permit it to carry out its functions independently and that emphasizes its glamorous missions. Theoretically, it is the function of the Secretary of Defense and the JCS to ensure that all of the separate inputs are molded into a coherent, balanced, and responsive force structure. However, the Secretary has neither the time nor the staff to accomplish such a herculean task. All the Defense Secretary can do is catch some of the more glaring inconsistencies. The JCS are similarly encumbered. Congressional myopia about a general staff limits the size of the Joint Staff to 400. This number is hardly sufficient to perform the task of integrating the budgets of individual services and agencies, let alone carry out the planning and operational responsibilities of the JCS.¹³ In addition, it is impossible to expect a service chief, acting in his corporate capacity, to analyze objectively the inputs of his own service, which he, acting in his own service capacity, had just formulated.

The case of the neutron bomb provides an excellent example of how an individual program at variance with administration policy can end up in the defense budget. In August 1976 the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) requested a small amount of funds for FY 1978 to begin production of a neutron warhead for the Army's Lance missile. In late 1976 the outgoing Ford administration approved that request and included information on the new weapon in the large number of briefing books prepared

for the incoming Carter administration. However, neither the new President nor any of his advisors noticed that there were a few million dollars for this weapon in the \$120 billion FY 1978 defense budget that they submitted to Congress in February 1977. The existence of this weapon in their budget was first brought to their attention in June 1977 by an article in the *Washington Post*. This discovery brought great embarrassment to a President who in his Inaugural Address had spoken of "riding the earth of nuclear weapons."¹⁴

The Secretary of Defense's difficulties in formulating a coherent and consistent budget are also compounded by the fact that before his budget goes into effect, it must be reviewed and acted upon by no less than 10 separate committees within the Congress. The Secretary attempts to control and coordinate the inputs of the various subunits of his department by using 10 program categories such as strategic forces, general-purpose forces, and research and development. This device enables him to eliminate much of the unnecessary duplication and glaring gaps in the force structure proposals of the separate subgroups in DOD. However, Congress authorizes and appropriates funds to DOD's subunits by line item, for example, "procurement Navy." Thus, when changing a particular line item, the Congress can and often does distort a carefully balanced program designed to support a particular policy. For example, in 1975 Congress nearly wrecked DOD's ship maintenance program by putting a ceiling on the number of civilian employees for the Navy Department.

Seventh, the output of the defense budget process is severely constrained by political realities. In the final analysis the size and distribution of the defense budget are affected strongly by the positions and relative influence of the players involved in the process. For example, in the 1969-75 period

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Congress responded to the antidefense mood in the nation by slashing some \$50 billion from the defense budget requests of Presidents Nixon and Ford. This led to a real decline of 40 percent in the size of the defense budget and a diminution of U.S. capabilities at the same time that the size of Soviet expenditures and their military capabilities were increasing markedly. Approximately 300 unnecessary bases are now kept open because they happen to be in areas represented by influential Members of Congress. Marginally useful weapon systems, like the F-18 aircraft, are built because of the influence of certain sectors of business and labor. Outmoded weapon systems programs, like the A-7 aircraft, are continued in production because they are built in the districts of powerful legislators. Duplication of effort in our tactical air programs exists because the separate services seek to preserve their own identities and have sufficient influence within the political system to maintain their separateness.

Political effects force the Department of Defense not only to modify the size of the budget but also to allocate resources to areas that do not necessarily support our military policy. These resources are then not available for developing the required force structure. For example, about 5 percent of the defense budget is consumed by the unnecessary bases. These funds could be better utilized to cure the shortage of equipment for our forces in the European theater.

Political considerations also prevent DOD from implementing specific policies even when resources are available. For example, in order to protect our ICBM force from increasingly accurate and powerful Soviet missiles, DOD wishes to make some of its land-based missiles mobile either by placing them in trenches or by digging additional silos and rotating the missiles among them. However, elected officials from the

likely sites in Iowa, Nebraska, Colorado, and Kansas are already putting pressure on the Carter administration not to dig the trenches or the decoy silos in their states.¹⁵ DOD has run into a similar problem when it has tried to find a suitable location for its low-frequency transmitting facility for communicating with its fleet ballistic missile submarines (FBM). Intense pressure from elected officials from proposed locations in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Texas made it impossible for DOD to build Project Seafarer in any of these locations. Lack of a reliable facility for communicating with our FBMs has prevented DOD from increasing its reliance on this most survivable retaliatory system.

Eighth, present policy options are often constrained by past budgetary decisions. A weapon system funded in a particular budget takes about 6 years before it becomes operational and then can last up to 30 years. Thus, the bulk of the force structure upon which the policymaker must now rely to support his policy was initially procured a decade ago, typically in response to conditions that have dramatically changed since the decision was made. Some of the weapon systems, like the B-52 bomber, were developed as far back as World War II. In addition, if a policymaker wishes to alter the present force structure in response to changed conditions, it will take him at least a decade to change it substantially. Because no policymaker ever comes into office without a force that is already in-being, he often is in the paradoxical position of having force structure determine his policy rather than vice versa.

The effect of past decisions on current policy is vividly illustrated by the attempt of the Carter administration to alter our maritime policy. The President and his advisors wish the Navy to be configured primarily for sea control rather than power projection; that is, they want the Navy to provide protection for critical sea lines of communica-

tion rather than for projecting sea-based military force against objectives on the shore. However, because of decisions made in the 1950s and the 1960s, the Navy is configured primarily for power projection. Moreover, the Navy's 12 aircraft carriers will last until the next century. Providing funds for merely maintaining and protecting these carriers and their aircraft will leave limited funds for altering naval force structures towards sea control.

Conclusion. Despite these problems, national security policy and the supporting force structure, which is developed through the defense budget process, normally are not completely out of phase. Many of the economic and political impediments to force planning affect defense policy on the margin. For example, economic policy considerations may result in a change as high as 10 percent on the level of defense expenditures without a policy change, but it is hard to envision a 50 percent change without a policy alteration. Nonetheless the existence of these limiting factors should make the policy-maker and the scholar cautious about expecting to implement changes rapidly to military force structures in response to changing conditions in the environment. In a period in which major reappraisal appears necessary, these economic and political factors emerge as

significant forces in understanding the realities of national security decision-making.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



George F. Brown, Jr. is presently employed by Data Resources, Inc. in Washington. His position includes management responsibility for all consulting and research done by DRI in support of DOD and NASA clients. Prior to joining DRI, George Brown was Theodore Roosevelt Professor of Economics and Coordinator of the Quantitative Factors course at the Naval War College.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Lawrence Korb is Professor of Management, Naval War College and an Adjunct Scholar of the American Enterprise Institute. He has been a consultant to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, and the Office of Education and has served on the faculties of the University of Dayton and the U.S. Coast Guard Academy. He specializes in national security organization, process, and policy and his most recent publication is *Fall and Rise of the Pentagon: Defense Policies of the 1970s*.

NOTES

1. The best source on the National Security Policy of the Carter Administration is a speech by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to the Thirty-fourth Annual Dinner of the National Security Industrial Association, Washington, D.C. 15 September 1977.
2. See for example, International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1978-1979* (London: 1978), pp. 108-119.
3. Lyndon Johnson, *The Vantage Point* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 536.
4. PD-18 is a classified document. However, its contents are summarized in Brown's speech to the National Security Industrial Association; Harold Brown, *Report of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to the Congress on Authorization Request of FY 1979* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1978), pp. 1-10; Bernard Weinraub, "Brown Seeks to Cut Involvement of the Navy in Nonnuclear War," *The New York Times*, 26 January 1978, p. 1; and George Wilson, "New U.S. Military Plan: European Persian Focus," *Washington Post*, 27 January 1978, p. A1.
5. For two excellent summaries of the Analyses of the Impact of Defense Spending on the Economy see Ann C. Winters, "Economic Causes to Military Will Cut Jobs, Fuel Inflation," *The*

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New York Times, 19 November 1978, p. 17; and Donald Rumsfeld, *Report of Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld to the Congress on Authorization Request of FY 1978 and FY 1978-1982 Defense Program* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977), pp. 323-324.

6. Quoted in Crittenden.

7. Walter Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: Viking, 1951), p. 415.

8. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings on the FY 1959 Defense Budget* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1958), p. 353.

9. Kenneth O'Donnell and Dave Powers, *Johnny We Hardly Knew Ye* (New York: Viking, 1972), p. 167.

10. Interviews with Officials in the Office of Management and Budget, July 1972.

11. Richard Levine, "The Pentagon Loses a Talented Leader," *The Wall Street Journal*, 3 November 1975, p. 3.

12. "Defense Cuts Eyed by Boss of Budget," *The New York Times*, 19 November 1978, p. 3.

13. The Service Staffs each have over 2,000 people.

14. The Neutron Bomb snafu is well summarized in Walter Pincus, "Neutron Warhead Wouldn't be Deployed Until '79, Hill Told," *Washington Post*, 8 July 1977, p. A3.

15. See for example, Mary Kay Quinlan, "Decoy Missile Silos Worry Bedell, Others," *Omaha World Herald*, 20 September 1978, p. 4.

