

1979

## Book Reviews

The U.S. Naval War College


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### Recommended Citation

War College, The U.S. Naval (1979) "Book Reviews," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 32 : No. 1 , Article 11.  
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# PROFESSIONAL READING

## REVIEW ARTICLE

### *Just and Unjust Wars*

### Moral Responsibility and Conflict: A Post-Vietnam Perspective

by

Lewis Sorley

This is a book\* one would like to praise. Stemming, the author tells us, from his concerns as an activist in the antiwar movement of the Vietnam era, it attempts a comprehensive consideration of moral issues involved with the use of force. In fact, the book's title provides a far too limited indication of the range of its concerns, which are not confined to determinants of just and unjust war. How wars may be fought is also a major subject; such classic problems as neutrality, preemption, intervention, surrender, proportionality, the siege, and reprisals are addressed. Divided into five parts, the book successively deals with the moral reality of war, culminating in an examination of the "war convention"; the theory of aggression, during the course of which the war in Vietnam is determined by the author to have been a civil war; the war convention again, revisited and revised according to his views of what is moral; dilemmas of war, which includes a denunciation of nuclear deterrence; and

the question of responsibility, both individual and corporate.

But there are major problems with the book that become apparent at the very outset. The author, Michael Walzer, is a professor of government at Harvard University. Thus it seems appropriate that he has styled his work (in the subtitle) "a moral argument with historical illustrations." But the argument is based on some outlooks, understandings, and indeed self-conceptions that are at least highly contentious. An illustration is to be found in the opening paragraphs. Describing himself and his fellow members of the protest movement, Walzer asserts that they "suffered from an education which taught . . . that [such words as "aggression and neutrality, the rights of prisoners of war and civilians, atrocities and war crimes"] had no proper descriptive use and no objective meaning. Moral discourse was excluded from the world of science, even of social science."

No doubt some readers will find it surprising to learn that Walzer and his associates are under the impression that they revived philosophical discourse in contemporary America, even allowing

\*Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 361pp.  
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1979

for whatever sufferings in their own education may have deprived them of access to or even knowledge of the rich and continuing public and academic dialogues of the past three decades on a range of moral issues that included the production, possession and use of nuclear weapons; intervention, both economic and military, in many different contexts (from mainland China, Greece, Turkey, Iran, and Guatemala in the early part of the period through East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the Congo, the Dominican Republic, the Lebanon, Suez, Israel and the Middle East more generally to Vietnam and now Angola and the Horn of Africa); human rights and such constituent concerns (not first introduced by the current administration) as food, disaster relief, economic well-being, population planning, education and health care; disarmament concerns and continuing efforts to negotiate superpower agreements of restraint; establishment and development of international organizations devoted to peace and prosperity; the establishment and perpetuation of alliances whose purpose was deterrence of warfare and aggression, and which often were notably successful; and the range of foreign assistance programs throughout the period. Perhaps the Marshall Plan and even the Peace Corps were before Walzer's time. But the unbridled self-righteousness of asserting that there was no moral discourse, and in fact that education in America denied the meaning of moral concepts, until the antiwar movement made its appearance, is instructive in terms of the self-image held by the author of this treatise on moral issues.

**The Theory of Aggression.** Mr. Walzer makes extensive use of analogy in shaping his arguments, and this sometimes leads him into problems of logic. In discussing the theory of aggression, for example, he complains of the lack of discrimination between differing degrees

of aggression: "Every violation of the territorial integrity or political sovereignty of an independent state is called aggression. It is as if we were to brand as murder all attacks on a man's person, all attempts to coerce him, all invasions of his home. This refusal of differentiation makes it difficult to mark off the relative seriousness of aggressive acts—to distinguish, for example, the seizure of a piece of land or the imposition of a satellite regime from conquest itself, the destruction of the state's independence. . . ."

It is not clear that others share Walzer's difficulty in sorting all this out, or that they should. Various manifestations of aggression obviously can be and are differentiated, with the differences taken into account in determining what constitutes an appropriate response. The more appropriate analogy, furthermore, would be to say that aggression is like crime: all crimes are against the law, but not all crimes are murder. In like manner, all aggression is morally wrong, but not all aggression is of equal magnitude. Indeed even if the analogy were to murder it would be too simplistic, for murder itself is a category of crimes that involves a number of differing degrees recognized in law and ethics, with varying amounts of culpability associated with each.

The point of the author's having used the faulty analogy is apparently to permit him to go on to argue that, in the case of individuals, the nature of the crime is in part conditioned by the response of the victim, so that someone who resists may be murdered, while one who submits is only robbed. "Consider," he says, ". . . the German seizures of Czechoslovakia and Poland in 1939. The Czechs did not resist; they lost their independence through extortion rather than war; no Czech citizens died fighting the German invaders. The Poles chose to fight, and many were killed in the war that followed. But if the conquest of

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Czechoslovakia was a lesser crime, we have no name for it."

I would argue that of course we have no name for it, because again we are confronted with a poorly chosen analogy which seems to illustrate a similarity when in fact none exists. In the case of the individual, resistance or the lack thereof changes the nature of the outcome: robbery on the one hand or murder (*and* robbery) on the other. In the case of conquest of one state by another, the outcome is the same, with or without resistance: the state loses its sovereignty and the citizens lose their freedom. Just as, in the case of murder committed in the course of a robbery, the robbery becomes of secondary importance in comparison to the more serious crime of murder, perhaps it is also true that with aggression the murders committed in the course of it become of secondary importance in comparison with the more devastating crime of forcible conquest and deprivation of freedom. And there is yet another significant difference undercutting the analogy: in robbery, there is some hope of redress through appeal to a higher authority, the police power of the state. States themselves have no such higher power to which to turn; thus they must, unlike the robbery victim, either resist or inevitably suffer loss.

While there is much of interest in the author's discussion of aggression, and one must be sympathetic to his desire to reduce the extremely complex issues involved to manageable proportions through the use of analogies to situations we know how to deal with, the result is sometimes an unfortunate oversimplification that does not seem to provide the basis for morally informed decisions in the cases in point.

In the course of his consideration of aggression, Walzer assesses the matter of appeasement. What is right, he implies, depends on the circumstances. In some cases "there might even be a duty to

seek peace at the expense of justice." Alternatively, he suggests that it would be immoral to appease by giving in to "the rule of men committed to the continual use of violence, to a policy of genocide, terrorism, and enslavement. Then appeasement would be, quite simply, a failure to resist evil in the world."

This is a significant and challenging passage. It suggests that isolationism in a world where such evil exists is not morally acceptable. In illustrating his point, the author returns to Nazism: "Stability among states . . . rests upon certain patterns of accommodation and restraint, which statesmen and soldiers would do well not to disrupt. But these patterns are not simply diplomatic artifacts; they have a moral dimension. They depend upon mutual understandings; they are comprehensible only within a world of shared values. Nazism was a conscious and willful challenge to the very existence of such a world. . . ."

There is very little to choose, in these terms, between the Nazism of Walzer's example and the designs of aggressive communism in the following era. Thus opposition to the Soviets, equally dedicated to destroying the values upon which the international system of accommodation and restraint is based, constitutes a similarly morally permissible and even mandatory stance. In the author's own terms, that conclusion would seem to be inescapable unless one denied that to be the character of the Communist threat. Those who are so tempted might consider the words of the art critic of *The New York Times*—the art critic, mind—in a recent review of the concluding volume of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's powerful trilogy: "If, after 'The Gulag Archipelago,' we are still unable to imagine what the Soviet reign of terror and death signifies, both for its millions of victims and for us, too, in the precarious comfort of our freedom, it is because we do not want to—because we cannot

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bring ourselves to face the worst about the politics of our century and the murderous morals of our species."

It seems that, in a volume on morality and the use of force that can acknowledge the obligation to oppose unmitigated evil, this historian might have done well to confront the current existence of such evil in the world and the resultant imperative for American political and, if necessary, military action. I suspect that he did not, at least in part, because it would mandate some less absolutist judgments about the war in Vietnam than he has chosen to make.

America and Vietnam. Walzer's denunciation of American involvement in the Vietnamese war is unrelieved. He denies the legitimacy of the South Vietnamese government, argues that the Viet Cong had achieved legitimacy of its own, asserts that Americans ignored the distinction between combatants and noncombatants, and subsequently brands the resettlement of civilians to get them out of the path of battle as of "likely criminality." He maintains that it was a civil war, and that the American involvement belongs to a series of clear-cut aggressions in which he also includes "the German attack on Belgium in 1914, the Italian conquest of Ethiopia, . . . the Russian invasion of Finland, the Nazi conquests of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, Belgium, and Holland, [and] the Russian invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia," among others.

How does he reach this position, at least to his own satisfaction? He begins by asserting that, because it failed to hold the elections that had been scheduled for 1956, the government in South Vietnam lost its legitimacy. No consideration is given to the matter of whether those elections could have been conducted fairly in the circumstances then pertaining. Next he argues that "counter-intervention is morally possible only on behalf of a government (or

a movement, party, or whatever) that has already passed the self-help test." This seems to be literal nonsense—can he possibly be saying that outside parties can only help those governments that do not need help? Apparently he is, for he argues as well that a government that cannot put down an insurgency has no claim to popular support, and that insurgents who can survive have thereby demonstrated that they have such support.

All of this seems to belie a total innocence of the nature and reality of subversive warfare. Perhaps if his extremely brief and inadequate chapter on terrorism had been more extensive it would have provided the author some insights into the techniques of coercion and disruption that are so congenial to subversives. While undeniably effective, they are far from demonstrations of popular support. If that were not the case, then the argument would have to be that the more effective the insurgent in the use of coercion, the greater his legitimacy, a very peculiar argument to find in a dissertation on moral conduct.

In a related passage the author asserts that "what is crucial is the standing of [a] government with its own people." Yet in continuing to maintain that the South Vietnamese government was not legitimate nor supported by the people, he ignores the persistent resistance to the external aggression and internal subversion that the people carried on, clearly preferring the government they had to that which others sought to impose upon them. It is remarkable, for example, that the government that Walzer so despises was able to issue tens of thousands of weapons to ordinary citizens without fear that they would be used to overturn it. There is no necessity to portray the existing government in South Vietnam during the war as any more effective, benevolent or popular than it actually was to contrast it favorably with the threatened regime that has now come to power. Given the

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weighing of values in conflict that is the essence of ethical choice, it seems strange that Walzer is able to adhere to so unidimensional a view of the merits of this case.

**Innocence and Involvement.** A troubling inconsistency seems to appear when the issue of the ethical duty of a citizenry to restrain its government from aggression is discussed. Walzer's position is that in an ideal democracy (America's he characterizes as a flawed democracy) individual citizens who do not actively oppose aggression committed by their government are themselves morally culpable. He then portrays a kind of sliding scale of individual responsibility, determined by the degree of freedom or democracy that exists in a given state. Thus in a very repressive state, one in which a citizen could not oppose a government bent on aggression without grave personal risk in the doing, individuals are according to him absolved of such responsibility. While that may well be a reasonable view, it seems difficult to conclude at the same time that the failure of citizens in the grip of a murderous guerrilla subversion can be said to have conferred legitimacy upon that movement by their failure to overthrow it. Yet this is precisely the argument he has made in branding American assistance to South Vietnamese attempting to overcome Viet Cong terrorism as illegal intervention owing to the supposed legitimacy attained by that subversive movement.

If we are going to consider, as Walzer suggests, fundamental reformulations of the laws of war, then perhaps the provisions dealing with the status of civilians ought be addressed. At issue here is, among other things, what ethical duty a citizen has to restrain his government from committing aggression. Never mind that it be argued that the victor will inevitably determine who was the aggressor and who was not. We are concerned here, in the terms Walzer has

set, not with what is practical, but what is right. So we are entitled to ask whether the population of an aggressor nation should be indemnified from risk, and more particularly whether the soldiers of the nation which is the victim of the aggression are obliged to accept increased danger to themselves in order to provide protection to the aggressor's civilians.

The key seems to be somehow tied to the question of innocence. It is surprising, given the author's expressed concern with the duties of a citizen to refuse to participate in a war which his conscience rejects, that he does not challenge the traditional view that all civilians are innocent, regardless of their government's acts, and entitled to be protected. It does not seem such a long way from firing a rifle, which subjects the soldier doing it to the vicissitudes of war, to manufacturing that rifle, or the ammunition for it, tasks which are equally essential to the effective prosecution of a war. Yet the latter contributions have not been considered such as to forfeit civilian immunity. It would be going a long way indeed to argue that citizens share fully the responsibility of their government and its leaders for aggressive war, and clearly this could not be sustained as a general proposition. But considerations of fundamental justice do bring us back to the question of whether soldiers who have taken up arms solely to defend their nation against aggression by another have an obligation to accept greater risk, to themselves and to the success of their enterprise, simply to provide increased protection to the civilians of the enemy power.

It may be granted that the citizenry in general is often powerless to restrain an aggressive government, especially one that has systematically sought to undermine and cripple any semblance of organized resistance. But does that necessarily mean that the soldiers of the nation that has been wronged, who

would themselves very likely have remained civilians were it not for the necessity to fight that has been thrust upon them by the aggression of others, must endure greater risks for the sake of hostile and at least putatively aggressive civilians? Perhaps we need a new concept of corporate responsibility for aggression, and reconsideration of the conventions of warfare that would derive therefrom.

**Nuclear Deterrence.** In considering the central strategic issue of the modern era, that of nuclear deterrence, the author holds that "against the threat of an immoral attack, they have put the threat of an immoral response." He is speaking of the threat of nuclear retaliation, of course, and goes on to hold that "the immorality lies in the threat itself, not in its present or even its likely consequences." This view seems wrong. It is only in response to massive immorality on the part of the attacker that retaliation would take place, and the overwhelming purpose is to dissuade him from such an attack. Thus, merely by refraining from immoral massive aggression, the potential adversary can avoid destruction. Surely it is not immoral to ask this much. How can such an outcome be evil, indeed "murderous"? Yet Walzer characterizes it as "the commitment to murder."

Perhaps his use of that term stems from his subsequent assertion that "it is a feature of massive retaliation that while there is or may be some rational purpose in threatening it, there could be none in carrying it out. . . . We could only drag our enemies after us into the abyss. The use of our deterrent capacity would be an act of pure destructiveness." Yet this seems to ignore the likely subsequent effects of refraining from retaliation. A Soviet Union that had visited great destruction upon the United States, and which had itself escaped such destruction, would then be in a position to impose its will on every

other nation. Nowhere would freedom be safe or survive. Use of our retaliatory capacity under these circumstances, even if it were our final act as a civilization, would also be our last and decisive act of fealty to our allies and the prospects of perpetuating liberty and humane values. Without it, they would be doomed. There is a direct analogy with Walzer's earlier characterization of Nazi Germany, a regime so pervasively evil that the prospect of its triumph is *prima facie* a "supreme emergency."

**Conclusion.** In a passage put on the dust jacket of the book, thus giving it prominence above all else that he has to say, the author states that "war kills; that is all it does . . . the soldiers who die are, in the contemporary phrase, wasted. . . ." I take that as a political statement, and possibly an aspiration as well. But the substance of his book, historical and contemporary alike, belies the assertion. War frees or enslaves, brutalizes or ennobles, restrains or unleashes. It protects and preserves the precarious progress of civilization, or drives it back toward primitivism. But the existence of force is not the moral issue, nor even the use of it, but the purpose for which it is used, and the ways in which it is put to that purpose.

There is much more in this book than can adequately be addressed in a review. I have chosen to concentrate on some points which seemed to me in need of challenge, but both these and numerous other passages are useful in focusing thinking on the kinds of issues that in the event must be acted upon, and that one must therefore prepare for through prior contemplation. Walzer holds that "we are not usually philosophical in moments of crisis. . . ." Perhaps what he means is that there is no time in the midst of crisis to develop a philosophy, for I believe we do act philosophically in crisis, and that we do so on the strength of the values we have

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incorporated into our approach to life; indeed this is what we mean when we speak of character.

Granted it is possible under stress (or otherwise) to act inconsistently with our principles, a phenomenon we recognize when we say someone has acted "out of character." But it is the deviation from the expected norm that points up the existence of such norms, chosen and customarily adhered to by those who are concerned to live their lives purposefully. There is much in this book that is useful in those terms.

There is even a bit of humor, welcome among so many difficult and somber issues: the author cites a proscription from ancient Indian law to the effect that among those who are to be exempted from battle are "those who are asleep, thirsty, or fatigued or are walking along the road, or have a task on hand unfinished, or who are proficient in fine art." Many a Vietnam veteran would agree that that sounds pretty good.

And it is Vietnam that haunts these pages. Whatever else the book may be, it is pervasively and persistently also a work of self-justification. It may be that Walzer is right, that America's involvement in Vietnam was not only unwise and ineffectual, but also immoral and criminally aggressive. But I do not think so, nor do I think that he has made his case to that effect in this book. Perhaps that case cannot be made except to those with a broader range of shared assumptions. It brings back a line from John LeCarre's novel *The Looking Glass War*: "nothing ever bridged the gulf

between the man who went and the man who stayed behind."

Walzer would argue, no doubt, that the bases for ethical judgments transcend individual human experience, and in the abstract he would be right. But those judgments are, in the difficult and meaningful cases that put our humanity and good will to the test, matters of drawing balances among competing values, of seeking the most ethical course where values are in conflict. The weights we assign in making such judgments are, inescapably, conditioned by the lives we have lived and the personal and professional commitments that have absorbed our energies and dedications. Those who fought this war and lived to reflect upon it have etched upon their minds, whatever the pain and regret that may endure, a panoply of courage, compassion and sacrifice that defined what was best—and most typical—of the American soldier in that endeavor. No doubt others, whose convictions or self-interest led them to oppose or evade the war, find their later judgments likewise shaped by their experiences.

In this sense, at least, there can be no absolutes upon which to base moral judgments, except perhaps that of fidelity to values as one perceives them. And if that be true then, though the gulf remain, it is possible to conceive there are men of good will on both its sides who may, in better times, be reconciled in the service of worthy goals. I would like to think that that, too, is what this book is about.



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Bailey, Thomas A. *The Marshall Plan Summer*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1977. 246pp.

This book represents a distinct departure from Thomas Bailey's other works. The author begins his Foreword with the statement that "This book is not a scholarly monograph on the Marshall Plan. It is primarily a journal that describes in intimate detail conditions in the sick countries of Europe at the time the Marshall Plan was struggling to be born. The emphasis is on the patients, not the doctor." The dean of American history never cloaks his position and his 1941 observations are simple and straightforward with no implied symbolisms.

Traveling under the auspices of the National War College from June through August 1947, Bailey presents a very personal, rare historic Baedeker of the year that spawned the Economic Recovery Act for Western Europe, gave birth to the postwar containment policy, and formally announced the beginnings of the cold war. The fast moving text is punctuated with cartoons and pictures that accurately captured the temper of the time, and Bailey's recorded observations are well mixed with hundreds of personal interviews and official documents that have only been recently released.

Because of the unique "journal" style of the book, Bailey is able to give the reader an insight into the broad issues of general continental concern: food, education, government, economics and displaced persons in addition to lesser issues that illuminate the social conditions at the time: prostitution, architecture, standards of living, the media, American ethnocentrism, discrimination and political disposition of the intelligentia. *The Marshall Plan Summer* is not a chronological forced march through facts and does not rely on the traditional means of compartmenting

information. Rather, it is a whistle stop tour in which the traveler shares his 30-year old observations frankly and honestly and puts them into a casual country by country historical perspective. This is thorough history of the postwar climate in Europe without the mechanical facts that often make reading histories in general such a chore.

In his final chapter, Bailey suggests that the cold war was the inevitable product of clashing ideologies and misunderstood intentions, beginning with the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the articulation of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of world domination. The Epilogue puts the Marshall Plan into present day context and briefly discusses its place in history. That it gave the recipients the means to shorten the postwar trauma is without question. That it forestalled the westward movement of communism is probable. Thomas Bailey has added an important book to his works, one that will allow meticulous students to fill the voids that are created by the obligation many historians feel to keep history in the third person, avoiding all the unique, colorful, and descriptive sensory information they might receive firsthand. As a layman often disappointed with the cold, articulate, and erudite histories on which we are forced to subsist, I found *The Marshall Plan Summer* to be a pleasant change. Even erudite historians can get something out of it.

JOHN MORSE  
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy

Berman, Robert P. *Soviet Air Power in Transition*. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1978. 82pp.

With the widespread attention devoted to the Soviet buildup of nuclear weapons and increasing involvement in the Third World, relatively little public discussion has focused on the more

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traditional instruments of force employed by the Soviets. In this Brookings study, Robert P. Berman examines the tremendous growth of Soviet airpower and the threat that this poses for the United States, especially in Europe. Fundamental to Berman's thesis is the idea that the Soviets would be inclined more to use conventional forces than nuclear ones in a European war (at least initially), and so the need to pay close attention to Soviet air capability is urgent.

Until the mid-1960s, the primary mission of Soviet air forces was to provide defense against NATO airpower. The air defense mission, though, has been increasingly transferred to Soviet ground forces with the development of large numbers of highly accurate surface-to-air missiles. Berman believes that Soviet air forces are not now targeted against their NATO equivalent but against Allied ground forces. Instead of trying to gain air supremacy over the West, the role of Soviet airpower is to prevent an effective ground defense by NATO against a Soviet attack.

One shortcoming of the book is that while the author mentions briefly that he feels the *Backfire* bomber is primarily a threat to Western Europe and not at all to the United States, he does not discuss this controversial point in depth. To be more convincing, he should have discussed why he feels *Backfire* is not a threat to the United States and also should have stated what particular defensive measures are needed to counter this new bomber in Europe.

The author also examines the growing potential wartime uses and the rising actual "political" peacetime uses of Soviet airpower. While he outlines what the United States and NATO must do to counter the former, nothing is said about how to deal with the latter. Particularly disturbing are Soviet overflights of our allies' airspace to deliver weapons to Soviet clients in the Horn of Africa and elsewhere. This reviewer

believes that the United States must act firmly to persuade our friends to halt such overflights by forcing Soviet airplanes down if necessary. This can hardly be considered an extreme measure; it is exactly what the Soviets themselves do when Korean airliners accidentally wander over Soviet territory.

All in all, *Soviet Air Power in Transition* is a valuable work that escapes certain needless constraints in thinking that have been all too common. Instead of seeing future conflict in Europe as a series of compartmentalized battles of armies fighting armies alone while, separately, air forces are fighting air forces alone, Berman stresses the threat that Soviet air forces pose to NATO ground forces as well as to Allied sea and airpower. The book thus merits reading by all those concerned with the defense of Europe on land, sea, and air.

MARK N. KATZ

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Betts, Richard K. *Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1977. 292pp.

Most military officers will find this an interesting book, despite its probable origins as a doctoral dissertation. Mr. Betts has taken the period since World War Two to study the effect of advice offered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President in times of crisis. What makes his effort different is his use of sources. In addition to the usual published accounts and memoirs, he has employed interviews of the principal participants and their subordinates, mostly from the military side of the Potomoc. Actually, there is not much choice in this as the records of the proceedings at issue remain highly classified. And because of classification and other sensitivities, the interviews themselves are not always attributed directly either, but credit an anonymous "Military Interview" in the notes. So, this is

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not definitive history, but then it is not intended as such. Rather Mr. Betts undertook the test of some commonly held assumptions about the effect of the professional military community on the formulation of national policy. In so doing, he debunks many of the popular New-Left articles of faith.

Betts concludes that in most cases the Joint Chiefs were neither more nor less aggressive than their civilian counterparts in the State Department when considering the military option in policy formulation. However, once conflict was joined, he notes a sharp difference between the two groups: The professional military men favored an intense application of available force, while the civilian advisors tended to advocate a gradualism abhorred by the JCS.

The book would be worthwhile solely for the examination of these salient crises in such terms, but Betts then probes into the relationship between the civil and military branches to seek reasons for these similarities and differences. The greatest value of the book may be found in these subsequent chapters, which explore virtually every independent variable in the literature of decisionmaking and bureaucratic/organizational politics in this frame of reference.

With the models of Samuel Huntington, Betts explores the crises from the perspectives of the two modes of influence by which the military can affect policy decisions. *Objective Influence* is the narrowly professional approach of Huntington's preference. In this mode, the military leader is an apolitical advisor, concerned solely with the means of implementing policy conceived by his civilian masters. In contrast, *Subjective Influence* occurs when the political and military roles are combined, in a "soldier-statesman" fusion. Predictably, neither model is found to be an adequate description of historical reality, but Betts adds an interesting twist to a familiar story when he compounds the

plot with the interjection of the other side of civil-military relations—that between the Pentagon and the Congress. He points out that it is not only possible but likely that the JCS might play an "objective" role in relations with the President and his men, while being nearly totally "subjective" in their congressional dealings, as logrollers and negotiators. The opposite could be as easily true, of course. The essential recognition is that roles change with circumstances, personalities and the particular game or games being played.

The method of selecting the Joint Chiefs is also examined as a possible explanatory variable. Betts categorizes each Chief since Admiral Leahy, but is unable to draw any conclusions as the great majority of selections appear to have been made by a logic he terms "routine professional"—drawn from the most likely or senior candidate in line for the job.

Betts then views policy formulation from two intrinsic perspectives: necessities and capabilities. He concludes that these are not independent variables either, but that policy is susceptible to change from either or both. He illustrates the point with concrete examples, some of which are very revealing. In this section, he brings under attack the common contention that capability predisposes the use of military force options. There is some support for the theory, but it is found to be unconvincing.

There is more of interest here to the professional, as the author looks at organizational imperatives, personality variances, and the effects of careerism. It is all written with the familiarity of an insider at the Pentagon rather than from the isolation of some scholarship. Betts has produced a workmanlike product that simply destroys a great deal of academic conventional wisdom about recent policy. It is not the last word on the subject by any means, and skeptics will fault its inability to cite

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critical sources, as replication of the study will be difficult if not impossible. But the data will ring true to most Washington veterans, who have heard similar accounts at the bars of Officers' Clubs, or in the E ring itself. And the deft manipulation of the most popular models in organizational theory is a thought-provoking bonus for the reader.

JOHN B. BONDS  
Commander, U.S. Navy

Blainey, Geoffrey. *The Causes of War*. New York: Macmillan, 1973. 278pp.

Professor Blainey has given lay and professional readers alike a stimulating critique of traditional theories of war's causation and provided a provocative alternative interpretation of his own. In this literate essay, the author dissects conventional explanations of modern warfare (since 1700), discrediting in the process most of the popular myths concerning causal forces. When it comes to presenting his own thesis, however, he is little more convincing than his predecessors, identifying what might be called "symptoms of bellicosity," but indulging in truisms when he attempts a more definitive diagnosis of basic causes.

Considering war and peace a continuum, the author begins his analysis with an inquiry into one end—the causal forces of peace. Herein, he systematically refutes arguments that peace has been attributable to either political stability, economic prosperity, commercial intercourse, expanded communications, common culture, disarmament, power balances, international associations or international law. He further finds that neither war weariness nor magnanimous treaty terms guarantee tranquillity. And just as these conditions reveal no clues to the sources of peace, so, according to Blainey, their absence is no certain precursor of war. Domestic strife, depression, nationalism, arms races, ideological differences,

power imbalances, legal and institutional deficiencies are all shown to be equally unreliable indices of war.

Are there then no identifiable or universal causes of war? For Blainey, only one: disagreement over measurement of power. "War is [always] a dispute about the measurement of power," he asserts. It begins when two nations disagree on their relative strength and ends when agreement on this subject is reached. It is thus most likely to occur when there is a relative parity of power between competing states, and least likely in situations of great power disparity.

Beyond this, Blainey claims that there exist "recurrent clues" to this phenomenon, clues which determine the probability of conflict. The foremost of these is "optimism" and the expectation of speedy victory. This optimism is in turn the function of calculations concerning: size and availability of military force, probability of third-party intervention, prospect of internal strife at home or within one's opponent, present and anticipated state of economic health, and seasonal conditions. Favorable assessment of these factors encourages the optimism preliminary to war.

As corollary to this concept, the author claims that war occurs only when two or more powers agree that they have more to gain by fighting than by negotiating; therefore, war constitutes a form of convention between consenting states. According to this model, war is the deliberate act of all participants, never accidental or the consequences of rigid alliances, arms races, misunderstandings, or blundering diplomacy; it is not even the product of unilateral ambitions of nations or statesmen.

This reviewer, perhaps because of his suspicion of universal theories, found Blainey most rewarding in his demolition of the foundations of causation theory; the book is worth reading for

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this contribution alone. When the author assays the creation of an alternative model of war causation, he serves to provoke more than to persuade.

At first glance, his thesis that war is a dispute about the measurement of power seems to ignore the policy imperatives that induce such calculations; it also seems to neglect conflicts where measurement of power does not appear to have been an obvious factor. Blainey surmounts such objections, however, by including prestige, ideology, trade, territory, alliances, etc., as forms of power. With such an all-encompassing definition of power, war can indeed be seen as a dispute over its measurement; but such an explanation becomes almost truistic. It has little value as either a predictive or descriptive formula concerning the causation of war. It reveals nothing that will suggest the imminence of war, indicate its symptoms, or imply techniques for war avoidance. And it leads the author into the questionable generalization that war is more likely under conditions of balanced power than those where serious imbalances occur.

The contention that optimism is the most important clue to the likelihood of war appears to be another truism. Nations do not, as Blainey admits, go to war unless they believe they have more to gain by fighting than by negotiating, and certainly they will anticipate, or at least say they anticipate, quick success. But is this optimism a clue to war's causation, or simply evidence of political necessity and man's enormous capacity for misperception and self-delusion—a normal way of preparing for crisis regardless of rational expectations? Manifestations of optimism are of little relevance in estimating the causes of war, and have limited utility even as symptoms, because they appear relatively late in the escalation of crisis, after many other danger signals have become obvious.

As for the factors Blainey contends

are calculated to produce optimism, these constitute variations of the standard elements—forces, resources and will—that policymakers have traditionally used as indices of national power and readiness. And while positive estimates of these factors do produce optimism, is the probability of war a function of optimism, as the author contends, or of capability and opportunity? Certainly it is difficult to accept his view that anything that produces optimism in such calculations automatically encourages war.

Blainey's discussion of war as a convention between two consenting states presents an intriguing concept. It is useful to be reminded that war is seldom the product of accidental or unilateral action, that even surprise attacks such as Port Arthur or Pearl Harbor are not sudden unilateral initiatives but the product of bilateral actions that were directed toward conflict with considerable understanding and volition on both sides. However, this idea of war as mutual agreement tends toward a relativism that is hard to accept; just because two or more nations agree that there is no alternative to fighting, responsibility for producing such a situation does not necessarily fall equally upon all. Here again the author's analysis seems to suffer from the omission of considerations of policy motives.

Issues such as these are guaranteed to engage the reader's attention and stimulate thought, if not agreement, especially when presented in the graceful and unpretentious style that characterizes this book. In the final analysis, we can agree with Professor Blainey that the crucial question is why war instead of some other means is chosen to measure power or implement policy. That is a question still unanswered but perceptively deliberated in *The Causes of War*.

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## 100 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Booth, Ken and Wright, Moorhead. *American Thinking About Peace and War*. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1978. 240pp.

In celebration of the American Bicentennial in 1976 the University College of Wales held a conference on "American Thinking About Peace and War: Reflections Two Hundred Years On." This thought-provoking volume is one result of that conference. Each of the 10 contributors was asked to write an essay on American attitudes towards peace and war from the perspective of 200 years of American experience. Wisely avoiding generalizations, they have limited themselves to how some Americans have thought about peace and war.

These essays summarize and illuminate many broad and diverse currents of thought about peace and war in the context of specific times and circumstances over the past two centuries. If there is any one theme it is that Americans have thought long and hard on the difficult, but transcendently important, subject. They have made a notable contribution to intellectual history and in so doing they have provided concepts and ideas that have met with varying degrees of acceptance in the cold, cruel world of international relations.

The contributors are admirably qualified to discourse on their respective topics. They range from such prominent and well-known men as Inis Claude and Anatole Rapoport to such equally qualified but lesser known young scholars as James Piscatori and Catherine Kelleher, who show great promise of significant contributions yet to come. The topics covered range from international law (Piscatori) to American political institutions (Kelleher) to peace movements (Charles Chatfield) and ethical considerations (Kenneth Thompson). Moorhead Wright, one of the editors of this volume, discusses three American war novels. This essay on how individual men have responded to war is a needed foil to the

other nine. It reminds us that regardless of what scholars may write or what statesmen may do, wars are fought by individuals on a very personal level. One wishes Wright had expanded this all too short essay.

By far the most stimulating and challenging contribution is Ken Booth's discussion of American strategy. He enumerates and then disposes of a number of myths about American strategic thinking. It is by no means a debunking *tour de force* to show British and European scholars that since 1776 Americans have thought long and hard about peace and war. Rather, he carefully examines and evaluates such myths as "Americans did not think seriously about strategy before World War II" and "American strategy in the last twenty years has been characterized by overthink." Booth points out that explaining American strategy requires an appreciation of the characteristics of American society and an understanding of the American historical experience. His conclusion is fair and well-balanced: "... to the extent an American approach to strategy exists, it has been both very different and very much more complex than it has usually been portrayed."

The contributions are generally readable and well-written. With one exception, they represent a triumph of good editing and literary skill over ponderous academic prose.

The most noticeable lack is an essay on American military institutions and American attitudes towards a military establishment. The inclusion of such an essay would have given this slim volume a better overall balance. Nevertheless, it is a worthwhile collection and it provides necessary and useful background for professional military officers, civilian officials and, particularly, international officers interested in the enormous subject of American views of peace and war.

B. MITCHELL SIMPSON, III

## PROFESSIONAL READING 101

Braestrup, Peter. *Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977. 1,446pp. in 2 vols. (NOTE: An abridged edition was made available as a Doubleday Anchor paperback in 1978, 606pp.)

Vietnam was, among other things, a journalistic first in the American experience. During no previous war had the press been accorded comparable access to the war and freedom from censorship; on top of that it became our first "war on television." So-called "media coverage" of that war has come in for extensive criticism in military and naval circles; in its more extreme forms that criticism often has assumed the existence of some sort of ideological media conspiracy against any or all of the following: military leadership; U.S. "imperialism"; the war policy of the Johnson administration; and war in general. In this case study of one brief period of that long war—from 21 January through the end of April 1968—Peter Braestrup demolishes the conspiracy theory, but in the process does little to inspire confidence in our major news organizations.

The author's credentials are impressive: combat service with the Marines in Korea, followed by a career in journalism that took him to *Time*, the old *New York Herald Tribune*, a Nieman Fellowship at Harvard, *The New York Times*, and *The Washington Post*. While with the *Times* he covered Algeria (1962-65), Paris (1965), and Southeast Asia (1966-68). In January 1968, just prior to Tet, he joined the *Post* as its Saigon Bureau chief, returning to this country in 1969. Unlike many of the reporters who covered Tet and its aftermath, he had some experience of war and of foreign climes.

*Big Story* makes a big book, two in fact in the original Westview Press edition. The first volume comprises 15

chapters on such topics as: The Press Corps in Vietnam (who they were, where they came from, experience levels, etc.); Performance, Morale, and Leadership of U.S. Troops (how reported and by whom); Khe Sanh; The Debate at Home; etc. Throughout, the analysis is directed to the war as reported (and *purportedly* explained) by the principal U.S. news organizations: the wire services (AP & UPI), the television networks (CBS, NBC, and ABC), two newspapers (the *Times* and *Post*), and the major weekly news magazines (*Time* and *Newsweek*). The second volume reproduces the data base in 41 appendixes, 23 tables, and indexes to all Vietnam-related coverage from 31 January through 31 March by the organizations listed above.

Many of the appendixes are haunting in themselves as, for example, the transcript of "Meet the Press" for 4 February when Secretary McNamara sought solace, at his wife's suggestion, in T.S. Eliot—"We shall not cease from exploration. And the end of all our exploring will be to arrive where we started and know the place for the first time." The reader who tries appendix 40 (a step-by-step, person-by-person, decision-by-decision account of the filming and telecasting of the execution of a VC officer by General Loan, chief of the Vietnamese National Police) will probably never again trust *anything* he sees on the evening news. The 1978 paperback edition omits the contents of the original Volume II, but contains virtually all of the original Volume I (and brings the price down from \$50 to \$8.95, which seems a fair bargain).

In a style that is lively and engaging throughout, Braestrup demonstrates clearly that the reporting of Tet was badly flawed, but ascribes this to many causes, chief among which were institutional habits and procedures of the media as a whole. A partial list would have to include: manpower shortages; the inexperience of those on the scene,

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whether by virtue of youth or short tour policies; the incessant demands of news managers at home for "good copy" (destruction was a story; recovery was not); stateside embellishment of basic copy sent from the scene; a predilection for disaster stories ("the conventional journalistic reaction to calamity"); competition (AP vs. UPI, CBS vs. NBC, etc.) to be first in explaining events, even when the overall pattern was clouded and obscure; and finally, a certain degree of resentment stemming from the Administration's "progress campaign" of late 1967, leaving some newsmen feeling they had been used. (Braestrup makes it clear, however, that this sense of "resentment," leading to a degree of "retribution," was not widespread, was present more in New York and Washington than in Vietnam, and was too weak to support any conspiracy theory. Indeed, the reader cannot avoid feeling that the ineptness of the press as a whole in overcoming its so-called "practical considerations" was such that a conspiracy could not have been pulled off even if the press had tried!)

In short, coverage of Tet was shaped largely by habit and convention, ingrained approaches to news reporting that left newsmen ill-equipped to cope with the unusual ambiguities and uncertainties surrounding Tet. Journalism suffered from

a serious lapse of self-discipline. . . . There was no institutional system within the media for keeping track of what the public had been told, no internal priority on updating initial impressions. . . . The result was that the media tended to leave the shock and confusion of early February, as then perceived, fixed as the final impression of Tet, and thus as a framework for news judgment and debate at home. At Tet the press shouted that the patient was dying, then weeks later began to

whisper that he somehow seemed to be recovering—whispers apparently not heard amid the clamorous domestic reaction to the initial shouts.

The final chapter should be read by everyone who reads either a newspaper or a news magazine, or who watches the news on television. It even includes an informal score sheet that rates the performance of various news organizations: AP over UPI, the *Times* over the *Post*, *Time* over *Newsweek* (the latter described earlier as seemingly bent on "merchandizing the jitters"). The description of the role played by stateside news managers behind the scenes at rewrite desks, both for the press and television, will be eye-opening for many readers not intimate with the methodologies of modern American news reporting.

In the end one is led to the conclusion that the search after villains in journalism's coverage of Vietnam—rather like the search after villains in anything related to Vietnam—is essentially sterile. There is plenty of blame to go around. Far more important is Braestrup's conclusion: "The special circumstances of Tet impacted to a rare degree on modern American journalism's special susceptibilities and limitations. This peculiar conjunction overwhelmed reporters, commentators, and their superiors alike. And it could happen again."

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Cooper, Matthew. *The German Army, 1933-1945; Its Political and Military Failure*. New York: Stein and Day, 1978. 598pp.

The alleged purpose of this long, tiresome, and poorly written book is to explain Hitler's control over the German Army and the reasons for its defeat in the Second World War. Unfortunately the explanations presented by the



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author are simplistic and unconvincing, most of the evidence he uses to support his arguments (apart from errors) is well known to specialists, and his book does not really deserve to be reviewed at all except for the fact that the author and his publishers claim that it contains new and original theories and explodes some generally accepted myths. These theories and explosions require commentary if not outright refutation.

In his introduction, the author states that he proposes to concentrate on two themes. In presenting his first theme, he argues with curious logic that the German generals "were largely innocent of the blame that has so often been lain at their door, but that, at the same time, they inexcusably surrendered up their military responsibility and, knowingly, allowed an ungifted amateur to gain operational control of the Army, pervert its strategy and lead it to disaster."

What we have here is a warmed over version of the theory that Hitler's faulty military leadership was a major reason (or even the major reason) for the ultimate defeat of the German Army. This is true only insofar as Hitler was responsible for the decision to go to war in the first place. We now know that most of the German generals were quite as confident as Hitler that Germany could defeat Russia, and that their joint underestimation of the strength of the Red Army was surely the greatest military error of the war. The controversial questions of Hitler's contribution to the planning of Germany's earlier military victories are ignored or misunderstood.

As his second major theme, the author attempts to refute "the commonly accepted idea of the German Army having been well-equipped and well-trained, and having practised a revolutionary form of warfare known as the Blitzkrieg." The blitzkrieg, he says, was a myth.

Here again, the author's theories are not so novel as he appears to assume. All scholars would now agree that the

Nazi dictatorship was an inefficient complex of competing agencies, that the German Army in 1939 was in many respects poorly equipped and poorly trained, and that the concept of a rapid war of movement and encirclement of the enemy forces (i.e., a blitzkrieg) was not a revolutionary conception of Hitler or his generals. What Hitler did possess in 1939 was a *relative* superiority over his foes, especially if he could face them singly and overcome them one by one. He had the nerve and determination to seize the initiative and to take perilous risks with his troops and equipment to surprise and overwhelm the opposition. He was fully aware that he lacked the resources to wage a long war; hence his emphasis on speed and surprise. As we all know, despite the many errors committed by the German leadership, the German armies *did* win a series of lightning campaigns, often with an imaginative coordination of modern weaponry and daring tactics. It is difficult to see, therefore, how the concept of a blitzkrieg can be blithely dismissed as a myth.

Hitler's lack of equipment prevented him from conquering England or from closing the Mediterranean. Most fateful of all, he lacked the resources to conquer Russia. Once the German armies faltered there and the United States entered the war, it is impossible to see how any kind of military leadership could have saved Germany from defeat. Only the invention and employment of a miracle weapon might have done that, and it is one of the more pleasant ironies of history that scientists expelled from Nazi Germany as inferior peoples played a crucial role in the development of such a weapon. Even if the German armies had been faultlessly led and retained their conquests in Russia and North Africa, Germany in the end would have been defeated by the atom bomb.

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Delbrück, Hans. *History of the Art of War Within the Framework of Political History, Vol. I Antiquity*, translated by Walter J. Renfroe, Jr. Westport, Conn. and London: Greenwood Press, 1975. 604pp.

Walter Renfroe's translation of *Geschichte der Kriegskunst in Rahmen der politischen Geschichte* is a major contribution to the literature of military history in the English language. The students of military affairs who have limited themselves to books in English have been the poorer for not reading such classics in their field. This translation of the first volume of a four-volume work is a major step in bringing a wider readership to one of the most important German studies. One hopes that the remaining volumes will appear shortly.

Hans Delbrück was the leading civilian expert on military affairs in Germany at the turn of the century. Like his contemporaries in the field of naval theory, Mahan and Corbett, Delbrück was clearly aware of the relationship between war and politics. He saw, too, the importance of economics, geographic position, logistics, and technology. But in his analysis of history, he did not seek to find a single, universal theory of strategy. Following Clausewitz, he believed that politics determined strategy in every circumstance and that no single strategy could be correct for every era. In his work, Delbrück concentrated on the distinction, alluded to by Clausewitz, between two methods of conducting warfare. The first, which he called the strategy of annihilation, was the search for the decisive battle. The alternate strategy he called the strategy of exhaustion. By this method, a commander could obtain his objective by means other than a decisive battle: occupation, blockade, or troop movements. Both these strategies, in Delbrück's mind, were equally valid. Their appropriateness depended on the political aims and the military means available.

In exploring these ideas in terms of European history, Delbrück did not wish to write a general history of warfare. "It is not the mission of a history of the art of war to present these events in detail," he wrote, "that would lead to a constantly broadening military history, but only to examine and to establish new forms and discoveries." His history is a selective study which illustrates his understanding of the two alternative strategies.

The first volume is devoted to ancient history. It covers the Persian wars, the Peloponnesian wars, the second Punic war, and the campaigns of Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar. In his discussion of antiquity, Delbrück regards Caesar as the culmination of ancient military development. In reaching this conclusion, the author was not denigrating Scipio, Hannibal, Miltiades or Alexander. Among all of them, Caesar had at his disposition the most refined means for the conduct of warfare. The Roman art of warfare which Caesar personified was the fruit of a development which had taken centuries to create, and it was a development which lived on in the Roman world long after his death. This was a consummation in military organization, weapons and logistics, but the classical world also showed to Delbrück two workable methods of strategy. Caesar and Alexander represented the strategy of annihilation while the strategy of Pericles stood in contrast as an example of the strategy of exhaustion.

In discussing strategy, Delbrück made it quite clear that the subject could not be separated from the means of warfare. Strategy was not an esoteric matter, but only an aspect of a very practical problem. For this reason, he paid particular attention to the methods of combat, the weapons used, the terrain, and the number and organization of troops involved. In order to achieve some accuracy in this task, Delbrück critically evaluated the ancient texts and

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combined stringent, philological examination with a knowledge of more modern military experience. This method earned him a great deal of criticism, both by those who disagreed with his interpretation of the documents, and by those who believed it improper to allow later developments to be used to provide a critical basis for understanding earlier events. Some of the controversy generated may be seen in the footnotes in the translation of this, the third (1920) edition of Delbrück's *History*.

The modern reader may feel that the detailed discussion of numbers, weapons, and terrain is out of proportion to the philosophical points which Delbrück is making, particularly when more than a half century of research will certainly have challenged the accuracy of his facts. Yet his detailed discussion remains essential to the logical process by which he proceeds, and in the absence of any later study of similar scope, it retains its value.

Throughout the study, it is abundantly clear that the author understands warfare as a single unit, not as a series of special studies. For him, tactics, logistics, organization and strategy are all part and parcel of a single problem. For him the conduct of war involved a mental process quite unlike that used in a game of chess. Delbrück believed that warfare is not a game of refined, all-inclusive estimation, but rather it involves the mastery of that which is beyond estimation. In summarizing his views he wrote that the art of command "demands not only the intelligence, but also the entire personality of the man, who even pits himself against chance, counters it with new information, and thereby masters capricious luck and ties it to his chariot."

It is sometimes said that a classic is a book to have on the shelf, but not to read. This is certainly no easy book to read, but it should not be ignored by any serious student of military history.

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Endicott, John E. and Stafford, Roy W. Jr., eds. *American Defense Policy*. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977. 626pp.

The fourth edition of *American Defense Policy*, originally published in 1965, is 70 articles and documents compiled by the Department of Political Science and Philosophy, U.S. Air Force Academy. The editors' stated objective is the reaction of "a book especially applicable to the undergraduate level of defense policy studies" which enables students to "know the issues and understand the processes involved in determining defense policy." Associate Professors Endicott and Stafford point out that no attempt has been made to convince or to indoctrinate. They rather "hope to show the reader that there are no simple answers in the study of defense policy . . . a field dealing in large measure with the unknown—the future—and the intentions of men." Uncertainty notwithstanding, the editors predict that a knowledge of the issues and an understanding of the processes will lead to a better product.

In Chapters one through four the dominant analytical theme is the classic view of national, multinational, and international systems. The subjects include the international environment, the evolution of U.S. strategy, arms control, limited war, and insurgency. The issues here are slanted toward the post-World War II era, particularly the problems of dealing with nuclear technology in order to achieve the realistic objectives of deterrence and defense as well as the more idealistic objectives of arms control and disarmament. In these chapters the student is exposed to real defense problems and policies. These articles are useful as cases to analyze and as fundamental conceptual material. There is Truman on his doctrine, Kennan on containment, Dulles on massive retaliation, McNamara on his "era," Laird on realistic deterrence, Schlesinger on

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flexible options, Kissinger on foreign policy as well as the problem of nuclear proliferation, and Halperin on limited war. These chapters identify many post-World War II issues and well illustrate the dynamic and complex nature of national security policymaking.

Chapters five through seven explore the inner workings and hidden mechanisms of the bureaucratic organization. It is suggested that the behavior pattern of the individual nation-state, submersed in the complex whirlpools of international relations, can best be analyzed by looking at the nation as patchwork of bureaucratic organizations, each with its hierarchical arrangement, and propensity for preserving jurisdiction, routines, hardware, action channels, and the personal power of its leading actors. These factors are, in the aggregate, considered to be organizational essence. Whereas the earlier chapters propose national interest as the unit of analysis, these examine organizational and personal interests as an independent variable. Halperin, et al., explain the organization model in detail. Haffa draws on Allison to examine the effects of the need to preserve bureaucratic power. The "wiring diagram" of organizations and their procedures are described and in some cases analyzed by Fabian (PPBS), Roherty (OSD), Bauer and White (the JCS), Halperin (the Presidency), Endicott (NSC), and Aspin (Congress). Various case studies demonstrate the pervasive effect of the organizational perspective on the decisionmaking process. Katzenbach, for example, shows that as late as 1944 the U.S. Cavalry was still organizing and training horse-equipped units for field employment because the Army faith in the horse as a weapon system resulted in a distrust of change. Head describes [the] Air Force resistance to accepting a single purpose, cost-effective attack aircraft because the A-7 did not fit the organizational image of high performance, state of the art, supersonic, multipurpose, tactical

weapon systems. Davis proposes that Navy advocates for innovation develop horizontal political alliances and expand these into vertical alliances.

These chapters bring the student down from the "moon view" and encourage him to examine the defense policymaking process with a magnifying glass rather than a telescope.

In the final chapters (eight and nine) the magnifying glass is replaced by a microscope. Here the student examines the nature and dynamics of the military profession in the United States and the relationship of this professional to American society. There is exposure to academic experts in the field of military sociology (Huntington, Janowitz, Moskos) as well as the alternative perspectives of the National War College (Taylor), the Military Academy (Bradford and Murphy), the Air Command and Staff College (Margiotta), the U.S. Air Force Academy (Freney and Wakin), U.S. Air Force Headquarters (Ralf), and the Armed Forces Staff College (Garrison).

These final chapters deal with an analysis of military professional issues ranging from the abstract (the nature of professionalism, ethics, and civil-military relations) to the more concrete (military unions, the all-volunteer force, ROTC, and civilian graduate education for military officers). The military undergraduate will come away with a clear understanding of the complexities surrounding his own future situation.

*American Defense Policy* presents a variety of frames of reference on which students can build. The book specifies and describes all significant post-World War II defense policy issues. In this respect the compilation is a useful undergraduate teaching tool but its effectiveness can only be evaluated in the context of total academic experience.

The editors are faithful to the current theoretical mode in that their selection and organization of material is

clearly influenced, as well as limited, by Graham Allison's three models of rationality, bureaucracy, and power. But these models do not act independently. They interact in indeterminate and dynamic ways and are influenced by such other models and variables as those which consider the influence of historic precedence, or of particular cultures, or those which examine the significance of philosophic assumptions about the nature of man. In the final analysis, the student must realize that he can only deal with the complexities of defense policy by understanding the art of selecting and applying applicable ideas to contingencies and problems that have many variables.

If the student learns only about existing theories or models and accepts these as the basis of a scientific methodology, he may find himself in the position of the historian who discovered that the most important lesson to learn from history is that man usually learns nothing from history. It may be that the most important lesson political science has to teach is that the obsession to find universally applicable methodology may blind us to the fact that our "science" is more properly an art.

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Goodpaster, Andrew J. and Huntington, Samuel P. *Civil-Military Relations*. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977. 84pp.

Several new studies of civil-military relations have appeared in the last few years. This slim volume, based on a symposium at the University of Nebraska-Omaha honoring the 25th anniversary of the Bootstrap program, joins the growing body of post-Vietnam literature. The book consists of four selections. Samuel P. Huntington's "The Soldier and the State in the 1970s," an

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update of his seminal study in the fifties, is the heart of the book. It is outstanding; the other three articles are of marginal value.

In *The Soldier and the State* (1957), Huntington counterposed the conflicting world views of American liberal society and the military's "conservative realism." The book, an unabashed defense of the professional military ethic, challenged liberal antimilitary bias. In his concluding chapter, the author noted that traditional liberal antipathy was declining and a more tolerant, respectful view of the military was emerging. The cold war consensus that hostile forces threatened the security of the nation spurred this change. The public and intellectual alike supported the defense establishment.

In the current article, Huntington explains that Vietnam and the "democratic surge" instigated a return to traditional liberal antimilitary bias in the late sixties. Between 1968 and 1972, antimilitary literature proliferated. Intellectuals once more depicted a strong Military Establishment as a threat to peace, justice, liberty, and military institutions and mores as antithetical to American values. The general public, particularly the politically attentive, reflected these same views. Huntington feels that the new wave of antimilitarism showed signs of abating by the midseventies but it remains uncertain whether this is "anything more than a temporary deviation from a more general trend."

The hostile climate of the early seventies imposed constraints upon the Military Establishment. It has less flexibility of response than in the past two decades. The War Powers Act and other recent congressional prohibitions make sustained limited war on the models of the fifties and sixties a legal impossibility. Korea enshrined the concept of limited war; Vietnam ended it. Huntington concludes that the United States will be slower to resort to force in the

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future, but when it does, it will be constrained less. The emphasis will be on limiting the duration rather than the means. A future Vietnam is more likely to last 7 weeks than 7 years.

The attitude of society also affects the military profession's self-concept and its relations with society. Speaking to this issue, Huntington sets up an interesting model of congruence and interaction. Observers differ on the degree to which that profession presently defines itself as similar or dissimilar from other institutions (congruence) and the degree it interacts with the rest of society. Huntington discerns a recent trend toward low congruence, or dissimilarity, the military profession tending toward "purely military" functions, defining itself narrowly as the institution involved in "the management of violence." Although the evidence is more conflicting, interaction with society seems to be declining but to a lesser degree. In other words it appears to be turning inward, emphasizing its professional military functions. This is not necessarily bad, Huntington asserts; but it is important that the institution not insulate itself from the rest of society. The Military Establishment must be "different from but not distant from the society it serves."

A word should be said about the other articles. In a somewhat over-written paper, Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster, former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and now Superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy, discusses the relationship between the Military Establishment's objectives and responsibilities and the role of education. He attests its commitment to education and professional development in which the values of civilian society are inculcated. By bringing individuals from the military and civilian communities together, the educational process fosters understanding and appreciation of each other's goals and perspectives. Thus Goodpaster considers the deteri-

oration of relations between the military and academic communities "incompatible with the needs of a healthy democratic society." The two must work in harmony.

While Goodpaster is concerned with educating the military profession in civilian values, Professor Orville Menard focuses on the other side of the coin, educating the civilian sector in civil-military relations. He stresses that civilian control requires vigilance. He invokes his own research on the politicalization of the French military institution in the late fifties and early sixties as caution. Like Goodpaster and Huntington, he affirms the necessity of integration rather than alienation from society.

Finally, Air Force LTC Gene A. Sherrill, former bootstrapper at the host university, offers a case study of civil-military relations, the 1974 Ethiopian military coup against Emperor Haile Selassie. The paper is only tangential to the rest of the book. A brief secondary summary of Ethiopian history focusing on conditions which made the Emperor vulnerable to restive military forces, it develops little new. Although interesting, its main reason for publication appears to be filling pages in order that Huntington's article could be published in book form.

Huntington's article should be read by everyone interested in contemporary civil-military relations. It is highly commended to the military professional. The rest of the book could be overlooked with little loss.

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Converse College

Hackett, John, et al. *The Third World War: August 1985*. London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1978. 368pp.

Let it be said straightaway: the West wins the war; not easily, not without losses, and not without certain prior defense preparations and improvements taken between 1978 and 1985 by several governments.

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The book is written as popular, narrative history set down "soon after the cessation of hostilities." Readers may argue that none of it will happen but none can deny that any or all of it could happen. In a *tour d'horizon* the governments, policies, attitudes, armies, navies, and air forces of all the action states are found to be much as today. The changes that are evident are, for the most part, changes that most reasonable men may logically accept, particularly those that bear on the relations of nations. More difficult to accept are those changes of attitude and action resulting from the West's increasing awareness that there was a threat and that certain defense preparations were therefore made.

Readers who are familiar with some of the author's, General Sir John Hackett's, other writings will know of his opinions on the weaknesses of NATO and the insufficiency of support given it by its member states and their peoples. They will recognize this book as another call for awareness and preparation but will be pleased to find no emotional exhortation. The author's device of writing "future history" permits him to relate his recommendations and hopes as actions that have been taken. One hopes they will be taken else the conduct and outcome of the war he writes of will be decidedly different.

That war will not be redescribed here. The land battle was mostly on the Central Front (General Hackett once commanded NORTHAG); there were related (and sometime causative) actions in the Middle East, Africa, and on the Chinese border; the only nuclear feature, other than rattling, was the exchange of the destruction of Birmingham and Minsk; space was not a battleground, save for the disablement and destruction of some communications and surveillance satellites; there was resupply from America. Air and maritime aspects are well covered and naval readers will be particularly interested in the discussion and analysis that permit the authors to state:

When the outcome of the 1985 war as a whole can be assessed, it may be that the downfall of the U.S.S.R. will be attributed, ironically, to Gorshkov, the greatest Russian admiral of all time, whose forceful and successful advocacy of ever-increasing Soviet seapower led the comrades to disaster—when the seas got too rough the Bear drowned.

An interesting conclusion is that at the end of the war the world's two superpowers were the United States and the Japan-China coprosperity sphere.

The 1978 facts, doctrines, and orders of battle of the book are hardly disputable—the authors' and consultants' (Americans will recognize Generals Davison and dePuy and John Erickson) credentials insure that. The book is an excellent, readable, and thorough survey of the world that is and could easily be. If the historical projections prove inaccurate, they are at least conceivable, and even those readers for whom *Qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum* is anathema might agree that the foundations of their faith rest more on hope than reason. The most encouraging bit of the book is that the authors "have been encouraged by signs around us that among the peoples of the West the point [that the U.S.S.R. means what it says and knows what it is doing with respect to the capitalist-Communist contest] is beginning to be taken." If General Hackett (no Pollyanna) is encouraged, we all may be.

W.R. PETTYJOHN  
Commander, U.S. Navy

Lebra, Joyce C. *Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. 206pp.

Shiroyama, Saburo. *War Criminal: The Life and Death of Hirota Koki*. Tokyo, New York and San Francisco: Kodansha International, 1977. 310pp.

Both these books are interesting and well-done historical studies in their own

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rights. They are due even more attention because they deal with problems whose aftermaths are part of today's politics in India and Japan.

Professor Lebra of the University of Colorado has been a relentless researcher in the archives of the Imperial Japanese Army; she was at Self-Defense Headquarters that day in 1970 when Yukio Mishima made his gory but futile try at rousing the new Japanese Army to emulation of the deeds of their fathers. From her research Professor Lebra has published a series of articles and books which for the first time give us some idea of the dynamics of the Japanese military model for Asian and anticolonial armies. This study covers eight armies—India, Burma, Indonesia, Malaya, Sumatra, Indochina, Borneo and the Philippines. It is gratifying to read her conclusion on Japanese attempts in the last named country: the Japanese failed "because of local pressure and pre-war American colonial policy . . . American colonialism had encouraged rather than competed with Philippine nationalism."

In Burma and Indonesia, officers of these Japanese armies became focal points of the postwar independence armies. The officer and staff training they had received, sketchy as it was, had been far superior to any Burma or Indonesia had seen. Given the political role of armies in both these countries, the Japanese model must be counted a significant developmental force.

The Indian Nationalist Army (INA) was the most professional of the Southeast Asian armies and the only one capable of fighting alongside the Japanese in a major campaign. But in the postwar years it was the British Army model that triumphed despite Gandhi, Nehru and Congress Party backing of the INA. The refusal of General Auchinleck to countenance the return of former INA officers to the Indian Army after the Japanese surrender turned on the question of whether these officers

had violated their previous oaths to the Indian Army. The Auk insisted on courts-martial at the Red Fort in Delhi and although these were bungled, they served as a rallying point for loyal officers to take politically unpopular opposition to the wholesale reinstatement of these "freedom fighters." Many of those then went into politics (K.P. Menon, for example became Ambassador to China) where they undoubtedly had more influence. But the Indian Army was saved to become what many see today as the one sure cement of Indian unity. But the problem of the INA is not dead. On Army Day in January 1978 the Communist Chief Minister of West Bengal publicly called for a review of the Communist Party's denunciation of the INA (after June 1941 the CPI underwent a miraculous conversion to the view that the British were not fighting a dirty imperialist war). A change in CPI attitude toward the INA even 35 years after the event is no isolated political act. Professor Lebra's book gives us a fine basis for understanding the meaning of the INA and other Japanese trained armies in today's politics in Southeast Asia.

Japanese scholars until now have been reluctant to deal with the Tokyo War Crimes Trial. Richard H. Mineart, in the best study of the trial (*Victor's Justice*. Princeton University Press, 1971) wrote: "Apparently they fear that denigration of the trial will lead to a positive re-evaluation of Japan's wartime policies and leadership."

If this is indeed the case, the Hirota biography's reception is astonishing—a sale of 500,000 copies and the award of two major literary prizes.

A revisionist history of the trials could start with no better subject than Hirota. He was a career diplomat, Prime Minister in 1936 and Foreign Minister for less than a year, 1937-1938. The gravamen of the indictment against him seems to have been that as Prime Minister he raised defense budgets,



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introduced more nationalistic elements into education and moved toward closer government control of the economy; as Foreign Minister he was in office at the time of the Marco Polo Bridge incident and the rape of Nanking. His trial was hardly a model. Hirota's lawyer, an American Quaker, was effectively banned from the trial by a choleric Australian judge. The court refused to admit any evidence from Ambassador Joseph Grew's diary; Grew had written that he could think of no one he "would have more gladly chosen to head the government with American interests in view" than Hirota. The death verdict was by a 6-5 vote. The American chief prosecutor called the sentence stupid. The Allied Council for Japan (General MacArthur as SCAP tried to avoid involvement in the trial) refused a recommendation from the court for commutation of Hirota's death sentence. Finally, SCAP refused to publish the dissenting justices' opinions; the Netherlands judge had written a telling one which has since been published.

This book seems deliberately low-keyed. Only three of the eleven chapters deal with the trial and little is made of the dignified stoicism displayed by Hirota throughout the trial and imprisonment. As far as the reviewer can infer, this reflects the tone of the original Japanese text.

How then to account for the sale of a half a million copies—large even in a highly literate society such as Japan? Are the Japanese about to take a longer look at the Tokyo trials? Will this look be taken in a mood of resurgent nationalism? In a mood of incipient anti-Americanism? The book suggests a negative answer to all three questions, but the sales figures make one wonder.

J.K. HOLLOWAY, JR.  
Naval War College

Liston, Robert A. *Terrorism*. Nashville, Tenn.: Thomas Nelson, 1977. 158pp.

Robert A. Liston is a seasoned freelance writer who has decided to tackle the question of terrorism. Liston is concerned—indeed "outraged" to use his own words—about terrorism and terrorists, and the product of his outrage against this "crime against humanity" is anything but a dispassionate book. *Terrorism* is a diatribe against terrorism by states, by revolutionaries, and by criminals.

The difficulty with books like this is that they really tell us very little about the problem of terrorism, beyond the "fact" that it is almost always unnecessary when viewed from the perspective of the author. Liston does not understand why such groups as the Fedayeen (here we avoid the more inclusive term "Palestinians" that Liston favors), the Basques and the South Moluccan terrorists cannot peacefully settle their claims through negotiation, majority rule (?), and local autonomy. Were it only so simple. Liston likes the world as it is, how inconvenient that others do not share his view.

The attentive newspaper reader is likely to find little new in this short book. Perhaps the most useful chapter is a nice anecdotal overview of actions that are being taken to combat terrorism. Most disturbing are Liston's prescriptions for defeating terrorism. These include the curtailment of publicity surrounding acts of terrorism, which raises important First Amendment questions in the United States, and worse, Liston's assertion that we "must surrender a portion of our liberty and convenience to achieve greater protection." This latter development would play right into the hands of terrorist groups (e.g., the Red Brigade) who seek precisely such a curtailment of freedoms as a means to foster resentment against the ruling government.

Before terrorism can be eliminated from this world—if such a goal is even

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plausible—we must first understand the primary causes. For example, what makes a man or a woman reject non-violent means and eschew conventional morality, and turn to terrorism? Such questions must be answered; perhaps Liston will calm down a bit and try to do so in a second book on terrorism.

AUGUSTUS R. NORTON  
Major, U.S. Army

Louis, William Roger. *Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941-1945*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978. 594pp.

Perhaps the most enduring legacy bequeathed to posterity by the Second World War was the opportunity for nonwhite colonial peoples to secure their independence. In this impressively researched and solidly documented volume, Professor Louis provides a detailed account and a substantive analysis of the thinking, planning, considerations, negotiations, and circumstances that preceded the dismemberment of the British Empire. As the title indicates, the focus is on U.S.-British relations and the future of British possessions and mandates, although related questions of holdings by other nations, both allies and enemies, are dealt with in the overall context.

Trouble over these issues began with the joint statement by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill of 14 August 1941, the highly publicized Atlantic Charter, which affirmed "the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live," and expressed the "wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them." The provisions of this Charter were included in the U.N. Declaration of 1 January 1942, signed by 26 nations, and on 23 February 1942

President Roosevelt stated that the principle of self-determination was applicable "to the whole world." Yet on 9 September 1941 Churchill told the House of Commons that the Atlantic Charter did not apply to "India, Burma, and other parts of the British Empire," and on 10 November 1942 he asserted, "We mean to hold our own. I have not become the King's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire." These diametrically opposed positions taken by the leaders of the Western Allies did not disrupt the joint effort in prosecuting the war against the Axis Powers but they did provide a divisive issue in war aims and postwar settlements and created dissension in branches of the two governments. By untangling and explaining the diverse approaches taken by planners in the United States and Great Britain, the exchanges between representatives of both nations, and the eventual agreement, Louis makes his greatest contribution.

In Washington, the State Department under Secretary Cordell Hull and Under Secretary Sumner Welles worked to implement the ideas of Roosevelt in regard to trusteeship, i.e., the international supervision of colonies with accountability to the United Nations, self-government, and the objective of independence. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War and Navy Departments strove to carry out the President's concern for security in the Pacific, which required U.S. control of islands for bases and fortifications. Thus the State Department and the military were each pursuing ends that simply were not compatible.

In London a similar but not identical situation prevailed. The Foreign Office was more inclined to a compromise with the American position, while the Colonial Office was adamantly opposed to any tampering with the Empire or Commonwealth system. Australia and New Zealand were additional thorns in

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the side of the Colonial Office, for they endorsed the concepts of international supervision of colonies and accountability. Of great moment were the future of islands in the Southwest Pacific and the role the United States would play in providing security. One of the few issues on which all of the British authorities agreed, from Churchill on down, was that the American idea of "trusteeship" was merely a cover for American imperialism. The British statesmen were perfectly willing to allow the United States to take over Japanese islands, mandated or otherwise, but resented interference with portions of the Empire and Commonwealth that, among other things, would allow freer trade and the intrusion of American products. What struck the British as hypocrisy, or a double standard, was American insistence that no U.S. overseas possessions or any part of the Western Hemisphere could be included in the trusteeship system.

The intricate and tortuous course of deliberations among the departments and committees in both nations are analyzed at great length by Louis, and the factors tending toward compromise were revealed by the controversies that took place within each government. Roosevelt began to weaken somewhat before his death, especially on Indochina, but he held steadfast to his concept of trusteeship as a step toward the specified goal of independence. Harry Truman had no such commitment, and he accepted the advice of those who felt that cordial relations with England and France were more important than Roosevelt's belief that perpetuation of the colonial system would exacerbate international rivalry and provoke another war. The issue was resolved at San Francisco when pertinent provisions of the U.N. Charter were formulated and a face-saving formula was devised that completely satisfied few if any of the participants. Britain kept her colonies and mandates

with stipulations for self-government and accountability, France retained her possessions, and what amounted to lip service was paid to "independence."

Louis does not indulge in moralizing, but he is not sparing in his judgments of the protagonists or the issues. On the basic conflict, he does fault the United States. "The Americans had raised expectations that they might unfurl an anti-imperial banner," he concludes, but "When it came to the test, the United States sided with the colonial powers." In Britain, the avowedly anti-imperialist Labour Party on gaining power found Prime Minister Clement Attlee and Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin no more intent on breaking up the Empire and Commonwealth than were their Tory predecessors. Still, there was an acknowledgment in London as in Washington that conditions had changed, although few realized that the proliferation of sovereign states would occur as quickly and as drastically as it did.

This is a book not just to be read but to be chewed and digested. The writing style is clear and straightforward, although there are numerous quotations from speeches and writings of the various officials. Some readers may be distracted by the thorough detail in recounting the discussions in different echelons of the administrative hierarchy as the formulation of policy and the complexities of the decisionmaking process are revealed. The organization makes for some duplication, for Louis opens with a lengthy section on "Introductory and Parallel Themes," which provides something of an overview, then proceeds in a chronological manner through the deliberations in each country and between representatives. Also, except for Korea, little attention is given to the aspirations of the peoples whose fate was being determined with little or no consultation. These caveats, of course, are peripheral to the author's major theme, which illuminates the background of an upheaval that has

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significantly altered the world power structure. In sum, this work constitutes a landmark in the writing of diplomatic history.

RAYMOND G. O'CONNOR  
University of Miami

Mack, John E. *A Prince of Our Disorder, The Life of T.E. Lawrence*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1976. 561pp.

Patai, Raphael. *The Arab Mind*. New York: Scribner, 1976. 376pp.

Considering the increasing importance that the Arabs with their expanding postoil-embargo wealth likely are to assume, it is disquieting that we in the Western World seemingly have little knowledge about their ancient culture. There seem to be few current general works about the Arabs but there are two rather recent efforts that can provide some meaningful insights.

The first, *A Prince of Our Disorder*, is the product of a practicing psychiatrist and medical school professor. John Mack focuses on the life of a much publicized, but often esoteric, Arabist, T.E. Lawrence, probably more commonly known as Lawrence of Arabia. By examining the multifaceted personality of this unique Englishman, the author skillfully guides the reader through the mysterious mental maze in which the perplexed Lawrence struggled throughout much of his life. From Mack's probe of "El Auren" (as admiring, if not worshipping, Arabs called Lawrence) we can glean useful insights into Arabic culture.

Lawrence, a driven man, wore many hats in life. He was a tormented bastard. He toiled as a student in Jesus College at Oxford University. Shortly thereafter, he began his intense relationship with the Arabs as an archeologist traveling, often alone, throughout most of the Middle East. He later served as an unofficial diplomat and military leader at the apex of his notoriety in the

region where East meets West. During his descent as a public figure, he was a publicity-eschewing recluse who changed his name and served as an enlisted man in the Royal Air Force. Between the extremes of his life, Lawrence was a prolific, if not always profound, writer. His book, *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, reveals many discerning observations of Arabic culture.

Via some of Lawrence's experiences, Mack leads us through a period in Middle Eastern history that often directly relates to many of the present conflicts in that cradle of civilization. To those interested in learning more about the Arabic psyche, three chapters—"The Background of the Arab Revolt," "Arab Self-Determination and Arab Unity" as well as "Lawrence and Churchill: The Political Settlements in the Middle East"—are particularly helpful.

Mack's book is an excellent appetizer for those who desire more substantive information about the Arabic peoples.

In contrast to looking at the Arabic culture obliquely via Mack's study of Lawrence, the reader of Raphael Patai's *The Arab Mind* will be focusing directly on Arabic consciousness. Patai is a highly regarded anthropologist who has lived in the Middle East and spent a lifetime studying the area and its peoples. He examines the entire gamut of this crossroads civilization. The arts, languages, religions, mores and other Arabic attributes are explored. Not surprisingly, there is much attention to and discussion of the Bedouin and Islamic influences.

For those who are hopeful of a meaningful move toward a sustainable peace in the Middle East, a patient perusal of the section entitled *The Psychology of Westernization* can be quite worthwhile. Within that section there are two headings, "Egypt—A Case History" and "The Hatred of the West," that are ruefully revealing. This cultural background is essential to an under-

standing of such Arabic political motives and positions as Mr. Sadat's 1977 peace initiatives.

If Patai evinces any failing in his effort, it might be his unmasked admiration for the Arabic culture. However, one should expect any specialist, Arabist or other, to be enthusiastic in a portrayal of the subject of his competence. Overall, the book is very readable and instructive. It clearly is a "must read" candidate for all persons interested in the Arabic peoples and the political plight of the Middle East.

JOHN C. PETERS

Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Naval Reserve

Macmillan, Harold. *The Past Masters: Politics and Politicians 1906-1939*. New York: Harper & Row, 1975. 240pp.

Harold Macmillan was Prime Minister of Great Britain from 1957 until 1963. Succeeding Sir Anthony Eden in the wake of the Suez debacle, Macmillan ended conscription, accelerated the dissolution of empire, and brought England to prosperity. In the 1959 general election he carried his Conservative Party to triumph with the candid slogan, "You never had it so good." This book, however, is not about his time as Prime Minister, when political cartoons portrayed him in tights and cape as "Super Mac." Rather, it is about politics and politicians as he observed them from the first years of this century, when he was a schoolboy, to the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, when he was an experienced politician and Member of Parliament who had not yet, however, served even as a junior minister.

Harold Macmillan's great-grandfather was a poor Scottish crofter, whose son Daniel came south to London and founded a business which eventually became the great British publishing house of Macmillan. Although he has considerable pride in his humble

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Scottish ancestry, Harold Macmillan himself grew up in the eminently comfortable and self-confident world of the British upper classes just before the First World War. In this book, written in his old age (he was born in 1894), Macmillan is inevitably nostalgic for those halcyon days of his youth, when the British Empire was at the peak of its power and prestige. Although admitting that he sees his "past masters" through the haze of passing years, he nevertheless rightly observes that these men moved on a larger stage. Since the end of the Second World War Great Britain has lost her leading role in the world balance of power, and we may wonder whether she will ever again produce statesmen equal to the commanding figures Macmillan describes.

The book abounds in astute comments on British political life. Macmillan reflects on the decline of the great aristocratic Whig tradition in the 19th century, and on the decline of the Whigs inheritors, the Liberal Party, in the 20th century. His dedication to the House of Commons and to the civilities of the British political tradition is obvious. He himself started out in the progressive wing of the Conservative Party, and as Prime Minister he proved a master at carrying out change which was more real than apparent. Never an ideologue, he observes that a successful party of the right must always recruit new strength from the center, and even from the left of center.

The book's fascination, however, lies less in Macmillan's general comments than in his sketches of politicians he has known. His assessments of Britain's two great modern war leaders, David Lloyd George and Winston Churchill, are of obvious interest to the readers of this journal. His accounts of the failures of those peacetime Prime Ministers of the late 1930s, Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain, are perhaps even more pertinent today.

Before Lloyd George, British

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political leadership had been the preserve of the privileged, those who were either born to position and riches, or who had achieved academic or professional distinction. Recounting Lloyd George's devastating attacks on hereditary privilege, Macmillan credits him with creating a new type of politician, "the man of the people." Faced with the House of Lords refusal to pass the Liberal Government's 1909 budget, Lloyd George took the offensive against the inherited wealth and power of the peerage. A fully equipped duke, he observed, not only cost as much to keep up as a battleship, but was just as great a terror and lasted longer. An eloquent opponent of the Boer War, Lloyd George as Chancellor of the Exchequer fought vigorously to reduce defense spending right up to 1914. Yet Macmillan describes how in the First World War Lloyd George first created the great Ministry of Munitions and then went on to become the Prime Minister who brought Britain to victory.

In Macmillan's view, Lloyd George proved himself a far better war leader than those British cavalry officers who commanded "the finest body of infantry ever put into the field." Macmillan, of course, was part of that body of infantry, having left Oxford in the golden summer of 1914 just in time to become a subaltern in the Grenadier Guards. Many of his Eton and Oxford contemporaries were killed on the Western Front, and Macmillan just barely survived his wounds on the Somme in 1916. Looking back on that war, Macmillan's admiration for Lloyd George is tempered only by his regret that he never succeeded in imposing his authority on the generals, whose "insatiable appetite for grandiose attacks" produced only minute gains at the price of immense casualties.

Although he considers that Stanley Baldwin was in many respects an admirable peacetime Prime Minister in the 1920s, Macmillan nevertheless con-

cludes that his second administration, from 1935 to 1937, was a disaster for Great Britain. Baldwin's distaste for foreign affairs and his inability to understand defense policy led him to delay the beginning of Britain's rearmament too long, and to conduct it as a "slow motion affair" when he did begin.

Although in his criticism of Stanley Baldwin Macmillan displays a sympathetic insight into his character and temperament, there is no evidence of admiration or affection in his account of Neville Chamberlain's performance as Prime Minister. There is also nothing new in his condemnation. Chamberlain, he explains, believed he had a mission to save world peace, and pursued that mission almost fanatically and in spite of all warnings. Only Hitler's occupation of Prague in March 1939 finally forced even Chamberlain to recognize the bankruptcy of his policy of appeasement. Macmillan does remind us, however, that Chamberlain's policies were generally popular at the time, and that it was Chamberlain's fate "to be at first obsequiously praised and then extravagantly abused."

As for Winston Churchill, Macmillan gives us some personal memories of the great man both in high office in the 1920s and in the political wilderness in the 1930s. Although not disputing that Churchill as Chancellor of the Exchequer made a colossal error in bringing Britain back to the gold standard, Macmillan points out that the pressure for this move from the Treasury and the Bank of England was overwhelming. "I have often since found," he comments, "that when a line of action is said to be supported 'by all responsible men,' it is nearly always dangerous or foolish." Yet to reject conventional wisdom is not always to be right. Churchill's prestige reached its nadir in the early 1930s when he opposed—unsuccessfully, and in retrospect, foolishly—his party's policy toward India. Once he began his campaign for rearmament after the

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1935 general election, however, he began slowly to emerge from his self-imposed political isolation. Yet Churchill was not brought back into office (as First Lord of the Admiralty) until after the outbreak of war in September 1939.

In the years just before the war, Macmillan notes sadly, there were only two giants in the House of Commons, Lloyd George and Churchill, and neither could exert any effective influence upon any party, Liberal, Labour, or Conservative. Lloyd George never saw what was needed, but by the mid-1930s Winston Churchill did. In the light of the missed opportunities and tragic errors of British policy in these years, Macmillan shows us how right Winston Churchill was in calling the Second World War "the unnecessary war."

J. KENNETH McDONALD  
George Washington University

Oskenberg, Michel and Oxnam, Robert B. eds. *Dragon and Eagle*. New York: Basic Books, 1978. 384pp.

This collection of 12 essays by prominent American China scholars attempts to explain the basis for future interaction between the two nations by examining the historical background of Sino-American relations. Read individually, the essays are generally informative, if necessarily brief. Together, however, their common schema and subject matter lead to a book which is repetitive and which offers little in the way of fresh ideas.

Oskenberg and Oxnam provide introductions to five of the book's six "parts" (the sixth consists of a single article). The editors have also written three of the essays. The tone is set in the first, introductory, section, where the editors provide the "historical perspective" of Sino-American relations. The components of this interaction—military, economic, political, and cultural—are set forth, to be repeatedly addressed in the following essays.

The section entitled "Mutual Perceptions" contains essays by Warren I. Cohen and Tu Wei-ming. Both articles are well-written, and Cohen makes good use of public opinion polls in discussing American attitudes towards China. The two authors' conclusions are similar and unexceptional: the United States and China have operated and will continue to operate in different cultural and ideological contexts.

The section on "Bilateral Interactions" includes articles by Oskenberg, Lyman P. Van Slyke, Waldo H. Heinrichs, and Stanley B. Lubman. The first of these provides a brief, useful view of the Chinese foreign policymaking apparatus. Van Slyke discusses "Culture, Society, and Technology in Sino-American Relations" but offers no firm, comparative conclusions. Heinrichs attempts to survey the entire history of Sino-American military interactions but is best when discussing the 1950s. He also notes that in 1945 China held only a peripheral position among American foreign interests. Lubman addresses the trade issue and points out the similarity of the present Canton Trade Fair to the 19th-century *co hong* system used by China to control external trade. His attempt to describe China's drive for economic self-sufficiency in the 1950s and 1960s is inconsistent and appears to suffer from poor editing.

The fourth part of *Dragon and Eagle*, "Multilateral Interactions," is the most disappointing section of the book. The reader expects more from the expert Allen S. Whiting than is provided in his "Japan and Sino-American Relations." It would be particularly interesting to know with what reasoning the author concludes that significant Japanese rearmament will not occur. This points up a criticism of the book as a whole: no notes are provided to support the authors' views.

The essay by Steven I. Levine, "The Soviet Factor," is simplistic and subjective. For instance, his view that the

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United States bears the responsibility for the onset of the Korean war is a position which can, to a degree, be argued. However, Levine offers no rationale for this position. His "conclusion"—that China will continue to grow militarily, and that "the United States and the Soviet Union would be wise to recognize this emergent reality"—belabors the obvious.

The articles which form "Interactions Around China's Rim" are by Peter Van Ness, Michael H. Hunt, and Alexander Woodside. The last offers a fine view of the role of Southeast Asia in Sino-American relations, although Woodside's advocacy of formal U.S. relations with Cambodia seems unjustified in view of that country's institution of hysteria as a way of life. Van Ness rehashes Taiwan's role in Sino-American relations without offering any new ideas. Hunt's article should be important, addressing the historic and continuing importance of the northeast, the "cockpit of Asia." However, his efforts suffer from staleness—the 11 authors who precede him address many of the same topics—and end in a conclusion which is difficult to justify. Surely, if the United States withdrew her forces from the area and substituted "some less binding agreement for the current South Korean security treaty," as Hunt urges, it would *not* allow "Washington [to] gain the time and flexibility it needs in responding to any Korean crisis."

The final part of the book consists of an article by Jerome A. Cohen, "Sino-American Relations and International Law." It is the finest essay in the book. The author provides a straightforward insight into the two countries' perception of law. He concludes that both nations have a cynical view of international regulation and that international law—which he describes as a relative value—cannot by itself function to improve or even regulate Sino-American relations. It is a well-written and perceptively essay.

The articles in *Dragon and Eagle* are based for the most part on solid scholarly ground—although the essays by Levine and Hunt leave something to be desired in this respect. This is not a work for the reader who is already knowledgeable about Sino-American relations. However, it does provide a comprehensive, if unexceptional, introduction to the subject for the uninitiated student.

BERNARD D. COLE  
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Palmer, Dave R. *Summons of the Trumpet*. San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1978. 277pp.

Colonel Palmer describes his book as "a broad history—the story of America's military involvement in Vietnam." And that's exactly what it is—a most enjoyable story. No footnotes interrupt the flow of his narrative, making this a highly readable account of 20 frustrating and futile years of military operations.

The book is constrained to an investigation of our military involvement; political, economic, and psychological factors are discussed only as required to provide a backdrop for the military story. However, even though he has explicitly limited his focus, some readers will feel his treatment is still overly condensed. For example, he discusses only six battles/campaigns and even those in very little detail. But this approach serves his purpose well—he communicates the flavor of combat without the usual plethora of tactical specifics that can easily pose a confusing maze for the reader who wasn't there. And he includes these actions as necessary to show the changing faces of the war, not to chronicle specific engagements as more important than others.

Although Palmer neither whitewashes nor condemns, he has his favorites and his "goats." General Westmoreland comes off well; although he is



sometimes shown to be overly optimistic on the conduct and expected outcome of the war, no question is raised about his strategic or tactical decisions. Only Giap rates higher on Palmer's list of effective generals, with references to his execution of the first phase of Tet 68 and the masking of his real intentions prior to initiation of that offensive.

Secretary McNamara is shown as having an understanding of the true complexity and eventual futility of America's involvement but not having ability to do anything about it. The reader without a previously formed opinion of the Secretary is more likely to feel sympathy than disapproval.

President Johnson does not fare as well and if anyone in Palmer's story is meant to be shown as the "heavy," it's Johnson. He is portrayed as reluctant and indecisive, as inflicting a humiliating gesture on the Joint Chiefs of Staff by exacting a pledge from each that he could hold Khe Sanh, as a perplexed president, and as possibly our most reluctant and indecisive wartime commander-in-chief.

One is tempted to chide Palmer for his almost complete absorption with the ground war in Vietnam for, with the exception of 17 pages devoted to the bombing of North Vietnam ("yet another example of a strategic air campaign which miscarried"), there is little mention of the naval and air contribution to our military involvement. And his claim that the rather unique fighting in Dalat during Tet was more representative of the battles of Tet than either Saigon or Hue is open to serious question. It is also surprising to find that the key figures in the few battles he describes just "happen" to be well-known personalities today; e.g., Generals Haig, Starry, Berry and Depuy.

But these are minor complaints about what is a most impressive job of bringing a long and confusing period of America's history into sharp focus.

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Palmer provides clear support for Westmoreland's description, in 1966, of the conflict in South Vietnam as a protracted war of attrition with no clearly defined objective; and he demonstrates convincingly that the war's final outcome represented a political, not military, defeat for America. He closes with a trumpet summons of his own: "There must be no more Vietnams."

This is a book well worth reading and I particularly recommend it to those who are weary of the Hollywood-in-mind approaches, the half-or-worse truths, and the snide innuendoes of the Caputos, Herberts, Buntings and other pseudohistorians of their ilk. Palmer has painted a three-dimensional panorama of a frustrating military involvement that holds many significant lessons for military and political leaders of the future. One can only hope they will read this book and learn the lessons it contains.

WARREN SPAULDING  
Colonel, U.S. Army

Safford, Jeffrey J. *Wilsonian Maritime Diplomacy 1913-1921*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1978. 282pp.

This book propounds an ambitious thesis: Woodrow Wilson's was the first modern administration to recognize the merchant marine as an instrument of diplomacy. World War I provided first an opportunity to overcome earlier opposition to government involvement in shipping, then a challenge to wrest maritime supremacy from Great Britain. The author proposes to explain how the Wilson administration used the American merchant fleet "as a powerful bargaining agent in the creation of a liberal and pro-American postwar peace."

He begins by reviewing the conflicts among farmers, industrialists, shippers, and congressional leaders that previously had thwarted efforts to implement a national merchant marine

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policy. Two chapters then describe how President Wilson and his Secretary of the Treasury, William G. MacAdoo, used the war crisis to increase the size of the American merchant fleet and to secure congressional authorization for government operation of vessels. The latter one-third of the book presents a series of detailed case studies of merchant marine policy. From them the reader gains insight into the administrative complexities in trying to use global shipping shortages as a "lever" for coercing neutrals into cooperation with the United States. Safford also probes the roots of Wilson's 1918-1919 attempts to exert subtle but firm economic pressure against America's wartime associates so as to effect their cooperation in his efforts to create a League of Nations. The book concludes with an account of the efforts of Senator Wesley Jones of Washington and Rear Adm. William S. Benson, a former CNO turned chairman of the U.S. Shipping Board, to write into the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 provisions that would give American flag carriers a near monopoly on U.S. trade.

Safford exploits a wealth of new archival materials untouched by earlier historians in telling his tale. From them he fashions vivid vignettes of the problems such administrators as William G. MacAdoo, Edward N. Hurley, and William S. Benson faced in designing and implementing merchant marine policies. But the book does not measure up to William A. Williams' dustjacket claim that it presents data "in a comprehensible framework and offers a coherent and persuasive analysis and interpretation." If anything, Safford's analytical framework is too narrow. He does not correlate changes in merchant marine policies with parallel developments in the Wilson administration's naval policies. Indeed the author has not examined General Board and Naval Operations papers that shed considerable light on the interrelationship of

naval and merchant marine policies. Nor does he put Washington's fears about a commercial "war after the war" in proper perspective. While genuine, these specters haunted policymakers in Tokyo, Rome, and London as well as those in Washington. The chapters, moreover, are poorly structured, making it difficult for even the specialist to follow the author's narrative.

Safford's central thesis, much in the fashion of those found in Soviet historical studies, is frequently asserted but never quite proven. It may in fact be unprovable. As any historian who has dealt with Woodrow Wilson can attest, the President was a complex man who, despite protestations of determination and consistency, not infrequently expressed his thoughts obliquely and changed his mind. Safford also falls into the trap of labeling as Wilsonian administrators who as often as not harbored thoughts and pushed policies quite inconsistent with the aspirations of their chief. One simply cannot speak of the Wilson administration policy when, as Safford's own evidence shows, subordinates disagreed and fought with one another.

Despite these weaknesses, the book should interest the naval professional reader. If he is determined enough, the would-be strategist will find in this volume ample evidence of the difficulties governments face in implementing embargoes and other policies of economic coercion. There are also lessons in leadership to be pondered. Safford is at his best in analyzing the problems that beset the second-level administrator—precisely the type of burden that presidents frequently ask distinguished naval officers to bear. Finally, although it deals with another time and a different set of problems, this book cannot help but enlighten and sharpen the judgments of those concerned about contemporary Soviet-American merchant marine rivalries. It stands as a caution to those who would

too hastily draw conclusions about intent from the outcomes of merchant marine policy.

ROGER DINGMAN  
University of Southern California

Sharp, U.S. Grant. *Strategy for Defeat, Vietnam in Retrospect*. San Raphael: Presidio Press, 1978. 324pp.

*Strategy For Defeat* is Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp's personal account of the war in Southeast Asia during the four years (1964-1968) he directed the Pacific Command as its Commander in Chief. He arrived well-equipped for the job: he had worked both at sea and ashore in the Pacific and had served in Washington as Deputy CNO for Plans and Policy. His most recent assignment had been Commander of the Pacific Fleet. Although he exercised supervision over all military actions in South Vietnam, Sharp has limited his discussion to the air war over North Vietnam, the conduct of which "had a tremendous influence on the outcome of this conflict and was an especially revealing example of near flagrant misuse of air power."

Beginning with a brief but comprehensive history of military involvement in Vietnam, Sharp records the natural hesitancy that accompanied initial American policies in Southeast Asia and documents the evolution of the ideological schism that existed between the military (JCS, CINCPAC) and the Administration (President, SECDEF, SECSTATE). This initial difference of perspective became an ever-widening gulf separating the civilian leadership from professional military advice. His chronicle draws heavily from messages he sent to the JCS that repeatedly advised vigorous prosecution of specific targets, strikes against Hanoi, destruction of known supply routes, and the mining of Haiphong Harbor. In general, his advice and counsel were largely ignored and his recommendations were stripped of their effectiveness.

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From the time he assumed the leadership of the unified Pacific Command, Sharp strongly opposed the Administration's policy of "gradualism." He insists that airpower, unfettered with target restrictions and pauses, would have concluded the war in short order. While many will challenge this assertion, Sharp emphatically states that airpower was misused by the Administration, that restrictions amounted to fighting the war with one hand tied behind our backs. The contrasting views, I am sure, will define the fulcrum of future debates on the effectiveness of airpower in modern conflicts.

Gradualism was the adopted policy of the Administration, articulated and canonized by Secretary of Defense McNamara. This policy was based in part on the prospects of Soviet or Chinese entanglement and the political sensitivity to growing public concern, both domestic and international. It held that "carefully calculated doses of force could bring about predictable and desirable responses from Hanoi, the threat implicit in minimum but slowly increasing force . . . would, it was held by some, ultimately bring Hanoi to the (negotiating) table on terms favorable to the U.S." Sharp argues that a strategy derived from such a policy was doomed to disaster on the basis of both history and common military sense.

Because of a bureaucratic distinction between the ground war in the south and Rolling Thunder, the air war in the north, Sharp could never reconcile his views with the prevailing civilian attitude that somehow the air war was a lesser included case to which the strategy of gradualism was equally applicable.

Despite the modest expansion of the air war in 1966-1967, it remained medicinal; Sharp contends that the results of these measured doses were hardened resolve, stronger commitment, and increased military strength on the part of

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the enemy. In Sharp's view, bombing pauses were used by them for resupply, stockpiling munitions and POL in the streets of "restricted areas," building bridges and extending supply lines with each hour of each extension. Bombing restrictions underscore the crucial failure of the strategy in realizing that the air war in the north was inextricably connected to the ground war in the south. Sharp continually pressed for decisive force to be applied to the north, not only to *influence* but to *decide* the outcome in the south. While his proposed strategy and specific tactics are presented in a convincing fashion, Admiral Sharp tends to discount the possibility that real international pressures of which he was not nor could not be aware would have modified his concept of the proper strategy.

Military men who served during this most unpopular and troubling military action will recognize the frustrations and understandable bitterness of Admiral Sharp. More than anything else, his conclusions are repetitions of the lessons of history: military strategy and tactics cannot be orchestrated by rational concepts and limitations; that once committed, military force must be applied swiftly and with all the assets available; and that the civilian leaders "have no business ignoring or overriding the counsel of experienced military professionals in presuming to direct the day-to-day conduct of military strategy and tactics from their desks in Washington . . ."

Though I sat out most of the war in the prison camps of Hanoi, I did have a front row center seat during the LINEBACKER II strikes of 1972. This vantage point gave me some perspective of what airpower can do. The ashen faces of the guards, the absence of the usual chatter and laughter of the townspeople and the cessation of patriotic music and political harangues from the street corner loudspeakers were powerful evidence that the North Vietnamese

had finally recognized *commitment*. Whether the unleashing of this power many years earlier would have brought about a speedier, more favorable end to the war will be debated in the seminars of war colleges for years. I can only say that after seven years of witnessing all the on and off again, limited, airstrikes, I was back in the United States shortly after our first real show of will.

The last chapter of the book may prove disturbing to those who view Vietnam as some incomprehensible mixture of fate and circumstance in U.S. history that could not possibly be repeated. The author is hopeful that his analysis will stimulate thinking, for he fears that "we are already well on the way to our distressing, if quite human, national tendency to bury yesterday's mistakes under today's obsessions, not stopping even to mark the grave in our rush to do so."

*Strategy For Defeat* is an important piece in the puzzle of one of this country's most controversial periods. Admiral Sharp's studied assessment of waging war is very much the same as the great strategic thinkers have articulated countless times throughout history: "Once the decision has been made to wage war, that leadership must permit the war to be engaged expeditiously and full bore, not halfway. The marine who steps on a land mine that was not interdicted at the enemy's supply port does not die halfway. And the pilot hit by a surface-to-air missile whose site he was not permitted to bomb does not fall halfway out of the sky or spend seven years as a limited prisoner of war." The book is limited in scope and clearly biased in its military perspective but, when interlocked with all the other pieces of the puzzle, it will help future generations see the picture and never forget the vision of a strategy for defeat.

R. CRAYTON  
Captain, U.S. Navy

## PROFESSIONAL READING 123

Stern, Ellen, ed. *The Limits of Military Intervention*. Beverly Hills/London: Sage, 1977. 399pp.

Conventional wisdom holds that America's ability to employ military forces abroad now and in the years ahead is strongly influenced by the "Vietnam legacy." Yet the recent spate of books on Vietnam—although they have added much to our understanding of how American involvement came about—have failed to consider in any systematic way the implications of Vietnam for future foreign and defense policies. For the most part we are offered one of two quite superficial perspectives: the "never again" approach that ignores the possibility that the United States may have important interests and obligations abroad; and the "do it better next time" school that seems to accept uncritically the assumptions that led to American involvement in Vietnam some 30 years ago.

*The Limits of Military Intervention*, the 12th in a series of studies sponsored by the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, is a collection of 18 essays dealing with the issue of military intervention. The Vietnam experience, the authors suggest, is only one of a number of emerging limitations on the use of military force abroad. Other recent and ongoing developments—changes in the international system, new weapons technologies, the shrinking of America's overseas base systems, the shift to an all-volunteer force, and changes in congressional and public attitudes (partly the consequence of Vietnam)—also serve, individually and collectively, to impose restrictions on the use of military forces abroad. The conclusion, in the words of Ellen Stern, the editor, is that

The limits on . . . military intervention are real. The clearest and notably obvious conclusion . . . is that they are increasing. But the reality of the constraints does not negate the likelihood of particu-

larized military intervention. Crisis situations will arise where a military answer is deemed proper; but the decision makers will have to operate within a narrow scope and delimited time frame.

The essays in this book are uniformly excellent. The papers by Roger Hamburg, Davis B. Bobrow, and Caesar D. Sereseres are valuable in that they deal with subjects, such as command and control, that have not received a great deal of recent attention. Joseph J. Krugel's chapter, "Military Alerts and Diplomatic Signals," and Paul R. Schratz' essay, "National Decision Making and Military Intervention," provide particularly useful perspectives on policymaking and crisis management. Service readers concerned with carrying out military operations will find much of interest in the essays by John R. Pickett, Michael McCGwire, and Lewis S. Sorley. Sam C. Sarkesian's chapter, "Professional Problems and Adaptations," and John E. Mueller's essay, "Changes in American Public Attitudes toward International Involvement," offer especially good insights into changing professional and public perspectives on military intervention. Finally, Ellen Stern deserves special praise for keeping a diverse group of authors within a coherent framework of analysis and for her stimulating prologue to the book.

This book is exceptionally useful in helping to define the changing dimensions and limitations on military intervention. It fills an important gap in the literature and deserves the widest possible audience among those concerned with foreign and defense policies.

WILLIAM P. SNYDER  
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Strack, Harry R. *Sanctions: The Case of Rhodesia*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1978. 296pp.

Sanctions have not compelled white Rhodesians to end their rule. It has been

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the barrel of a guerrilla-held gun, not the effect of a U.N.-sponsored boycott, that has driven white Rhodesians to negotiate with Africans and transform their minority into some kind of a majority regime.

If Strack had published *Sanctions* a few years ago, its message would have been clear: boycotts are impossible to maintain in a world where nations (whether of the West or the East blocs) and individuals trade. The mechanism of the market (which includes barter) has helped sustain Rhodesia. Before the cost of war rose and base metals prices fell in 1976, Rhodesia had in fact flourished behind the artificial barrier of sanctions.

There is a second message: Short of ringing a pariah country with troops or occupying its main air and rail stations, there is almost no way in which sanctions can be sustained over a period of years. If imports and exports cannot be halted in the first weeks or months, prime time is lost.

And a third: The threat of sanctions, if not immediately shown to be real and tough, has little likelihood of mandating the policy results that are desired and anticipated by outsiders. One of Strack's main conclusions from the Rhodesian case must be that sanctions are a blunt and unwieldy instrument. They never frightened white Rhodesians sufficiently to encourage more than strenuous and ingenious evasion.

There have been previous studies of Rhodesia since its declaration of independence in 1965 but none has so thoroughly examined the effect of international sanctions upon the economy of Rhodesia, and upon Rhodesia's policies regarding tourism, sport, international involvement generally, etc. Strack shows in some detail how Rhodesia managed to import and export—how such large, visible, and expensive items as diesel locomotives and jet aircraft were purchased overseas; how cotton became a major export commodity; how, in sum, the effects of sanction were easy to

cushion. If the United Nations had managed to sunder all communication facilities, however, the maintenance of international commerce would have been much more difficult, if not impossible. Future boycotters should, Strack implies, quickly end most, if not all, postal and telegraph links between the outside world and the nation being boycotted.

In the case of Rhodesia only a few African states cut vital communication links. Britain tried halfheartedly to make postal ties more costly, and many nations sought to prevent international travel by Rhodesians. But these efforts were easy to circumvent, Rhodesians were adept at making mockery of artificial constraints, and, thanks mostly to Portugal and South Africa, Rhodesia proceeded merrily along its prosperous way despite (and sometimes because of) the effect of U.N. resolutions. Even the freezing of Rhodesian accounts in Britain and the United States proved beneficial to capital-hungry Rhodesia, which froze British assets inside Rhodesia and was relieved of the obligation of paying its international sterling debts.

Strack is exceptionally thorough in reviewing every ramification of sanctions. He devotes a chapter to Rhodesia's legal status, another to the theory of sanctions and its application to Rhodesia, a third to the ways in which Rhodesia avoided sanctions politically and diplomatically, a long chapter to all aspects of the economic effects (without benefit of recent research on the subterfuges used by subsidiaries of British and American oil companies knowingly to sell petroleum products to Rhodesia), and then shorter chapters to the ways in which sanctions destroyed Rhodesia's international sporting role but otherwise had little effect on tourism, transportation links, entertainment, labor migration, etc.

Such adjectives as solid, exhaustive, and well-researched describe *Sanctions*. They do too little justice to the care

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with which the book was put together and the objectivity of the author. At the same time, Strack has been comparatively unimaginative, for the most part relying upon official sources, newspaper reports, and interviews with participants. He has hinted at but not investigated the official legerdemain that was necessary to combat sanctions and, with some minor exceptions, the elaborate subterfuges used by Rhodesians to minimize the bite of mandatory sanctions.

ROBERT I. ROTBERG  
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Thompson, W. Scott. *Power Projection: A Net Assessment of U.S. and Soviet Capabilities*. New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1978 (Agenda Paper No. 7). 83pp.

Following a preface by Frank R. Barnett of the National Strategy Information Center and a foreword by Adm. E.R. Zumwalt, Jr., U.S. Navy (Ret.), the author devotes the first chapter to his definition of "power projection." Necessary for understanding both the title and the remainder of the book, a very broad definition is given that includes "the overall capability to *develop an infrastructure of influence*" as well as "the capacity to *inject appropriate instruments of influence and force*" in distant areas. The focus is on power projection below the strategic nuclear level, although the author readily acknowledges that the credibility and effectiveness of projection at these lower levels are very much dependent on the state of the strategic nuclear balance.

The main theme of the book is that, although the United States still possesses projection capabilities superior to those of the U.S.S.R., a combination of increased Soviet capabilities, weakened Western alliances, Third World instability and lack of American will has established a trend in recent years that favors the interests of the Soviet Union. These factors are discussed in chapters 2

through 5 in an interesting manner, but the level of generality and admitted ambiguity inherent in some of the evidence make clear that the author's assessments are based more on perception than on rigorous empiricism and analysis.

In his treatment of the Third World, Thompson is impressed by Soviet successes in projecting influence and he credits them with understanding the desires of Third World leaders. Yet, he later presents a somewhat contrary view and claims most of these leaders would prefer not to be aligned with either superpower and that the Soviets might well be viewed as new colonialists. Indeed, given that short-term successes in the Third World could become mixed blessings and even be the cause of serious problems for the Soviets in the long run, it would seem that caution is in order on direct U.S. involvement in Third World turmoil. However, Thompson is very critical of the U.S. failure to take action in such places as Angola and assails what he calls the current "So-What School of American Foreign Policy." Of course, asking "So-What?" and then going on to give the answer is far better than automatic and unthinking responses to the many crises which occur. Indeed, it is probable that the question was asked in the case of Angola and that the answer was that costs of involvement were likely to outweigh the benefits to be gained.

The final chapter of the book is devoted to prescriptions for remedying the perceived adverse trend. These include: increased efforts to restore strategic parity; ensure retention of existing bases and basing rights; strengthen and coordinate our alliances; advocate non-alignment for the Third World and educate leaders of those states in the dangers of Soviet colonialism; and, of course, work to rebuild U.S. domestic consensus and will.

Both the problems he discusses and the prescriptions he presents are worthy

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of continuing examination and discussion. Although this book provides no conclusive answers, it should serve to stimulate thought on these matters and,

one hopes, might spur investigation and analysis of greater depth.

A.T. ISAACSON  
Commander, U.S. Navy

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### RECENT BOOKS

#### Selected Accessions of the Naval War College Library

#### Annotated by

Ann Hardy, with Kathleen Ashook  
Doris Baginski and Mary Ann Varoutsos

Alexander, Lewis M. *Regional Arrangements in Ocean Affairs*. Kingston: University of Rhode Island, 1977. 332pp. (AD-A 041 518) \$10.50; microfiche \$3.00\*

Ocean affairs can be conducted through either geographical, management, or operational marine regions. The general acceptance of the 200-mile economic zone could greatly affect these regional systems. This report examines present regional arrangements, views the various thorny problems confronting them, and then projects possible substitute maritime regional plans, considering how such changes as restrictions in semienlosed and other confined water areas could effect U.S. requirements and concerns.

\*For sale by the National Technical Information Service, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Va. 22161.

Bell, J. Bowyer. *A Time of Terror*. New York: Basic Books, 1978. 292pp. \$10.95

Bell studies the responses of democratic societies to terrorism during the last decade to analyze what influence terrorism has had upon them. He feels that free societies must develop a more analytical and methodical attitude toward terrorism in order to combat it more effectively.

*The End of the Keynesian Era: Essays on the Disintegration of the Keynesian Political Economy*. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1977. 114pp. \$18.00

Maynard Keynes died in 1946. The renowned political-economic theory and system of aggregate demand management and intergovernmental cooperation that he evolved for the 1930s and the World War II period—but which continued to be applied into the 1950s and 1960s—are here introspectively and retrospectively critiqued by 12 authors. The consensus is that in today's unstable economy, with the change in balance between labor and capitalism, Keynes' short-range policies are no longer applicable. One author foresees an era of corporatism succeeding the Keynesian era.

Eren, Nuri. *Turkey, NATO and Europe: a Deteriorating Relationship?* Paris: The Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1977. 54pp. \$4.00

Although Turkey remains committed to the NATO Alliance and to full membership in the European Economic Community, her ties with her