

1979

## American Defense Policy

Stephen B. Sloane

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review>

---

### Recommended Citation

Sloane, Stephen B. (1979) "American Defense Policy," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 32 : No. 1 , Article 21.  
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol32/iss1/21>

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu](mailto:repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu).

## PROFESSIONAL READING 105

combined stringent, philological examination with a knowledge of more modern military experience. This method earned him a great deal of criticism, both by those who disagreed with his interpretation of the documents, and by those who believed it improper to allow later developments to be used to provide a critical basis for understanding earlier events. Some of the controversy generated may be seen in the footnotes in the translation of this, the third (1920) edition of Delbrück's *History*.

The modern reader may feel that the detailed discussion of numbers, weapons, and terrain is out of proportion to the philosophical points which Delbrück is making, particularly when more than a half century of research will certainly have challenged the accuracy of his facts. Yet his detailed discussion remains essential to the logical process by which he proceeds, and in the absence of any later study of similar scope, it retains its value.

Throughout the study, it is abundantly clear that the author understands warfare as a single unit, not as a series of special studies. For him, tactics, logistics, organization and strategy are all part and parcel of a single problem. For him the conduct of war involved a mental process quite unlike that used in a game of chess. Delbrück believed that warfare is not a game of refined, all-inclusive estimation, but rather it involves the mastery of that which is beyond estimation. In summarizing his views he wrote that the art of command "demands not only the intelligence, but also the entire personality of the man, who even pits himself against chance, counters it with new information, and thereby masters capricious luck and ties it to his chariot."

It is sometimes said that a classic is a book to have on the shelf, but not to read. This is certainly no easy book to read, but it should not be ignored by any serious student of military history.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF  
Naval War College

Endicott, John E. and Stafford, Roy W. Jr., eds. *American Defense Policy*. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977. 626pp.

The fourth edition of *American Defense Policy*, originally published in 1965, is 70 articles and documents compiled by the Department of Political Science and Philosophy, U.S. Air Force Academy. The editors' stated objective is the reaction of "a book especially applicable to the undergraduate level of defense policy studies" which enables students to "know the issues and understand the processes involved in determining defense policy." Associate Professors Endicott and Stafford point out that no attempt has been made to convince or to indoctrinate. They rather "hope to show the reader that there are no simple answers in the study of defense policy . . . a field dealing in large measure with the unknown—the future—and the intentions of men." Uncertainty notwithstanding, the editors predict that a knowledge of the issues and an understanding of the processes will lead to a better product.

In Chapters one through four the dominant analytical theme is the classic view of national, multinational, and international systems. The subjects include the international environment, the evolution of U.S. strategy, arms control, limited war, and insurgency. The issues here are slanted toward the post-World War II era, particularly the problems of dealing with nuclear technology in order to achieve the realistic objectives of deterrence and defense as well as the more idealistic objectives of arms control and disarmament. In these chapters the student is exposed to real defense problems and policies. These articles are useful as cases to analyze and as fundamental conceptual material. There is Truman on his doctrine, Kennan on containment, Dulles on massive retaliation, McNamara on his "era," Laird on realistic deterrence, Schlesinger on

## 106 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

flexible options, Kissinger on foreign policy as well as the problem of nuclear proliferation, and Halperin on limited war. These chapters identify many post-World War II issues and well illustrate the dynamic and complex nature of national security policymaking.

Chapters five through seven explore the inner workings and hidden mechanisms of the bureaucratic organization. It is suggested that the behavior pattern of the individual nation-state, submersed in the complex whirlpools of international relations, can best be analyzed by looking at the nation as patchwork of bureaucratic organizations, each with its hierarchical arrangement, and propensity for preserving jurisdiction, routines, hardware, action channels, and the personal power of its leading actors. These factors are, in the aggregate, considered to be organizational essence. Whereas the earlier chapters propose national interest as the unit of analysis, these examine organizational and personal interests as an independent variable. Halperin, et al., explain the organization model in detail. Haffa draws on Allison to examine the effects of the need to preserve bureaucratic power. The "wiring diagram" of organizations and their procedures are described and in some cases analyzed by Fabian (PPBS), Roherty (OSD), Bauer and White (the JCS), Halperin (the Presidency), Endicott (NSC), and Aspin (Congress). Various case studies demonstrate the pervasive effect of the organizational perspective on the decisionmaking process. Katzenbach, for example, shows that as late as 1944 the U.S. Cavalry was still organizing and training horse-equipped units for field employment because the Army faith in the horse as a weapon system resulted in a distrust of change. Head describes [the] Air Force resistance to accepting a single purpose, cost-effective attack aircraft because the A-7 did not fit the organizational image of high performance, state of the art, supersonic, multipurpose, tactical

weapon systems. Davis proposes that Navy advocates for innovation develop horizontal political alliances and expand these into vertical alliances.

These chapters bring the student down from the "moon view" and encourage him to examine the defense policymaking process with a magnifying glass rather than a telescope.

In the final chapters (eight and nine) the magnifying glass is replaced by a microscope. Here the student examines the nature and dynamics of the military profession in the United States and the relationship of this professional to American society. There is exposure to academic experts in the field of military sociology (Huntington, Janowitz, Moskos) as well as the alternative perspectives of the National War College (Taylor), the Military Academy (Bradford and Murphy), the Air Command and Staff College (Margiotta), the U.S. Air Force Academy (Freney and Wakin), U.S. Air Force Headquarters (Ralf), and the Armed Forces Staff College (Garrison).

These final chapters deal with an analysis of military professional issues ranging from the abstract (the nature of professionalism, ethics, and civil-military relations) to the more concrete (military unions, the all-volunteer force, ROTC, and civilian graduate education for military officers). The military undergraduate will come away with a clear understanding of the complexities surrounding his own future situation.

*American Defense Policy* presents a variety of frames of reference on which students can build. The book specifies and describes all significant post-World War II defense policy issues. In this respect the compilation is a useful undergraduate teaching tool but its effectiveness can only be evaluated in the context of total academic experience.

The editors are faithful to the current theoretical mode in that their selection and organization of material is

## PROFESSIONAL READING 107

clearly influenced, as well as limited, by Graham Allison's three models of rationality, bureaucracy, and power. But these models do not act independently. They interact in indeterminate and dynamic ways and are influenced by such other models and variables as those which consider the influence of historic precedence, or of particular cultures, or those which examine the significance of philosophic assumptions about the nature of man. In the final analysis, the student must realize that he can only deal with the complexities of defense policy by understanding the art of selecting and applying applicable ideas to contingencies and problems that have many variables.

If the student learns only about existing theories or models and accepts these as the basis of a scientific methodology, he may find himself in the position of the historian who discovered that the most important lesson to learn from history is that man usually learns nothing from history. It may be that the most important lesson political science has to teach is that the obsession to find universally applicable methodology may blind us to the fact that our "science" is more properly an art.

STEPHEN B. SLOANE  
Commander, U.S. Navy

Goodpaster, Andrew J. and Huntington, Samuel P. *Civil-Military Relations*. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977. 84pp.

Several new studies of civil-military relations have appeared in the last few years. This slim volume, based on a symposium at the University of Nebraska-Omaha honoring the 25th anniversary of the Bootstrap program, joins the growing body of post-Vietnam literature. The book consists of four selections. Samuel P. Huntington's "The Soldier and the State in the 1970s," an

update of his seminal study in the fifties, is the heart of the book. It is outstanding; the other three articles are of marginal value.

In *The Soldier and the State* (1957), Huntington counterposed the conflicting world views of American liberal society and the military's "conservative realism." The book, an unabashed defense of the professional military ethic, challenged liberal antimilitary bias. In his concluding chapter, the author noted that traditional liberal antipathy was declining and a more tolerant, respectful view of the military was emerging. The cold war consensus that hostile forces threatened the security of the nation spurred this change. The public and intellectual alike supported the defense establishment.

In the current article, Huntington explains that Vietnam and the "democratic surge" instigated a return to traditional liberal antimilitary bias in the late sixties. Between 1968 and 1972, antimilitary literature proliferated. Intellectuals once more depicted a strong Military Establishment as a threat to peace, justice, liberty, and military institutions and mores as antithetical to American values. The general public, particularly the politically attentive, reflected these same views. Huntington feels that the new wave of antimilitarism showed signs of abating by the midseventies but it remains uncertain whether this is "anything more than a temporary deviation from a more general trend."

The hostile climate of the early seventies imposed constraints upon the Military Establishment. It has less flexibility of response than in the past two decades. The War Powers Act and other recent congressional prohibitions make sustained limited war on the models of the fifties and sixties a legal impossibility. Korea enshrined the concept of limited war; Vietnam ended it. Huntington concludes that the United States will be slower to resort to force in the