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Civil-Military Relations

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clearly influenced, as well as limited, by Graham Allison's three models of rationality, bureaucracy, and power. But these models do not act independently. They interact in indeterminate and dynamic ways and are influenced by such other models and variables as those which consider the influence of historic precedence, or of particular cultures, or those which examine the significance of philosophic assumptions about the nature of man. In the final analysis, the student must realize that he can only deal with the complexities of defense policy by understanding the art of selecting and applying applicable ideas to contingencies and problems that have many variables.

If the student learns only about existing theories or models and accepts these as the basis of a scientific methodology, he may find himself in the position of the historian who discovered that the most important lesson to learn from history is that man usually learns nothing from history. It may be that the most important lesson political science has to teach is that the obsession to find universally applicable methodology may blind us to the fact that our "science" is more properly an art.

STEPHEN B. SLOANE
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Goodpaster, Andrew J. and Huntington, Samuel P. *Civil-Military Relations*. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977. 84pp.

Several new studies of civil-military relations have appeared in the last few years. This slim volume, based on a symposium at the University of Nebraska-Omaha honoring the 25th anniversary of the Bootstrap program, joins the growing body of post-Vietnam literature. The book consists of four selections. Samuel P. Huntington's "The Soldier and the State in the 1970s," an

update of his seminal study in the fifties, is the heart of the book. It is outstanding; the other three articles are of marginal value.

In *The Soldier and the State* (1957), Huntington counterposed the conflicting world views of American liberal society and the military's "conservative realism." The book, an unabashed defense of the professional military ethic, challenged liberal antimilitary bias. In his concluding chapter, the author noted that traditional liberal antipathy was declining and a more tolerant, respectful view of the military was emerging. The cold war consensus that hostile forces threatened the security of the nation spurred this change. The public and intellectual alike supported the defense establishment.

In the current article, Huntington explains that Vietnam and the "democratic surge" instigated a return to traditional liberal antimilitary bias in the late sixties. Between 1968 and 1972, antimilitary literature proliferated. Intellectuals once more depicted a strong Military Establishment as a threat to peace, justice, liberty, and military institutions and mores as antithetical to American values. The general public, particularly the politically attentive, reflected these same views. Huntington feels that the new wave of antimilitarism showed signs of abating by the midseventies but it remains uncertain whether this is "anything more than a temporary deviation from a more general trend."

The hostile climate of the early seventies imposed constraints upon the Military Establishment. It has less flexibility of response than in the past two decades. The War Powers Act and other recent congressional prohibitions make sustained limited war on the models of the fifties and sixties a legal impossibility. Korea enshrined the concept of limited war; Vietnam ended it. Huntington concludes that the United States will be slower to resort to force in the

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future, but when it does, it will be constrained less. The emphasis will be on limiting the duration rather than the means. A future Vietnam is more likely to last 7 weeks than 7 years.

The attitude of society also affects the military profession's self-concept and its relations with society. Speaking to this issue, Huntington sets up an interesting model of congruence and interaction. Observers differ on the degree to which that profession presently defines itself as similar or dissimilar from other institutions (congruence) and the degree it interacts with the rest of society. Huntington discerns a recent trend toward low congruence, or dissimilarity, the military profession tending toward "purely military" functions, defining itself narrowly as the institution involved in "the management of violence." Although the evidence is more conflicting, interaction with society seems to be declining but to a lesser degree. In other words it appears to be turning inward, emphasizing its professional military functions. This is not necessarily bad, Huntington asserts; but it is important that the institution not insulate itself from the rest of society. The Military Establishment must be "different from but not distant from the society it serves."

A word should be said about the other articles. In a somewhat over-written paper, Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster, former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and now Superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy, discusses the relationship between the Military Establishment's objectives and responsibilities and the role of education. He attests its commitment to education and professional development in which the values of civilian society are inculcated. By bringing individuals from the military and civilian communities together, the educational process fosters understanding and appreciation of each other's goals and perspectives. Thus Goodpaster considers the deteri-

oration of relations between the military and academic communities "incompatible with the needs of a healthy democratic society." The two must work in harmony.

While Goodpaster is concerned with educating the military profession in civilian values, Professor Orville Menard focuses on the other side of the coin, educating the civilian sector in civil-military relations. He stresses that civilian control requires vigilance. He invokes his own research on the politicalization of the French military institution in the late fifties and early sixties as caution. Like Goodpaster and Huntington, he affirms the necessity of integration rather than alienation from society.

Finally, Air Force LTC Gene A. Sherrill, former bootstrapper at the host university, offers a case study of civil-military relations, the 1974 Ethiopian military coup against Emperor Haile Selassie. The paper is only tangential to the rest of the book. A brief secondary summary of Ethiopian history focusing on conditions which made the Emperor vulnerable to restive military forces, it develops little new. Although interesting, its main reason for publication appears to be filling pages in order that Huntington's article could be published in book form.

Huntington's article should be read by everyone interested in contemporary civil-military relations. It is highly commended to the military professional. The rest of the book could be overlooked with little loss.

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Hackett, John, et al. *The Third World War: August 1985*. London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1978. 368pp.

Let it be said straightaway: the West wins the war; not easily, not without losses, and not without certain prior defense preparations and improvements taken between 1978 and 1985 by several governments.