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Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia

J.K. Holloway

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PROFESSIONAL READING 109

The book is written as popular, narrative history set down "soon after the cessation of hostilities." Readers may argue that none of it will happen but none can deny that any or all of it could happen. In a *tour d'horizon* the governments, policies, attitudes, armies, navies, and air forces of all the action states are found to be much as today. The changes that are evident are, for the most part, changes that most reasonable men may logically accept, particularly those that bear on the relations of nations. More difficult to accept are those changes of attitude and action resulting from the West's increasing awareness that there was a threat and that certain defense preparations were therefore made.

Readers who are familiar with some of the author's, General Sir John Hackett's, other writings will know of his opinions on the weaknesses of NATO and the insufficiency of support given it by its member states and their peoples. They will recognize this book as another call for awareness and preparation but will be pleased to find no emotional exhortation. The author's device of writing "future history" permits him to relate his recommendations and hopes as actions that have been taken. One hopes they will be taken else the conduct and outcome of the war he writes of will be decidedly different.

That war will not be redescribed here. The land battle was mostly on the Central Front (General Hackett once commanded NORTHAG); there were related (and sometime causative) actions in the Middle East, Africa, and on the Chinese border; the only nuclear feature, other than rattling, was the exchange of the destruction of Birmingham and Minsk; space was not a battleground, save for the disablement and destruction of some communications and surveillance satellites; there was resupply from America. Air and maritime aspects are well covered and naval readers will be particularly interested in the discussion and analysis that permit the authors to state:

When the outcome of the 1985 war as a whole can be assessed, it may be that the downfall of the U.S.S.R. will be attributed, ironically, to Gorshkov, the greatest Russian admiral of all time, whose forceful and successful advocacy of ever-increasing Soviet seapower led the comrades to disaster—when the seas got too rough the Bear drowned.

An interesting conclusion is that at the end of the war the world's two superpowers were the United States and the Japan-China coprosperity sphere.

The 1978 facts, doctrines, and orders of battle of the book are hardly disputable—the authors' and consultants' (Americans will recognize Generals Davison and dePuy and John Erickson) credentials insure that. The book is an excellent, readable, and thorough survey of the world that is and could easily be. If the historical projections prove inaccurate, they are at least conceivable, and even those readers for whom *Qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum* is anathema might agree that the foundations of their faith rest more on hope than reason. The most encouraging bit of the book is that the authors "have been encouraged by signs around us that among the peoples of the West the point [that the U.S.S.R. means what it says and knows what it is doing with respect to the capitalist-Communist contest] is beginning to be taken." If General Hackett (no Pollyanna) is encouraged, we all may be.

W.R. PETTYJOHN
Commander, U.S. Navy

Lebra, Joyce C. *Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. 206pp.

Shiroyama, Saburo. *War Criminal: The Life and Death of Hirota Koki*. Tokyo, New York and San Francisco: Kodansha International, 1977. 310pp.

Both these books are interesting and well-done historical studies in their own

110 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

rights. They are due even more attention because they deal with problems whose aftermaths are part of today's politics in India and Japan.

Professor Lebra of the University of Colorado has been a relentless researcher in the archives of the Imperial Japanese Army; she was at Self-Defense Headquarters that day in 1970 when Yukio Mishima made his gory but futile try at rousing the new Japanese Army to emulation of the deeds of their fathers. From her research Professor Lebra has published a series of articles and books which for the first time give us some idea of the dynamics of the Japanese military model for Asian and anticolonial armies. This study covers eight armies—India, Burma, Indonesia, Malaya, Sumatra, Indochina, Borneo and the Philippines. It is gratifying to read her conclusion on Japanese attempts in the last named country: the Japanese failed "because of local pressure and pre-war American colonial policy . . . American colonialism had encouraged rather than competed with Philippine nationalism."

In Burma and Indonesia, officers of these Japanese armies became focal points of the postwar independence armies. The officer and staff training they had received, sketchy as it was, had been far superior to any Burma or Indonesia had seen. Given the political role of armies in both these countries, the Japanese model must be counted a significant developmental force.

The Indian Nationalist Army (INA) was the most professional of the Southeast Asian armies and the only one capable of fighting alongside the Japanese in a major campaign. But in the postwar years it was the British Army model that triumphed despite Gandhi, Nehru and Congress Party backing of the INA. The refusal of General Auchinleck to countenance the return of former INA officers to the Indian Army after the Japanese surrender turned on the question of whether these officers

had violated their previous oaths to the Indian Army. The Auk insisted on courts-martial at the Red Fort in Delhi and although these were bungled, they served as a rallying point for loyal officers to take politically unpopular opposition to the wholesale reinstatement of these "freedom fighters." Many of those then went into politics (K.P. Menon, for example became Ambassador to China) where they undoubtedly had more influence. But the Indian Army was saved to become what many see today as the one sure cement of Indian unity. But the problem of the INA is not dead. On Army Day in January 1978 the Communist Chief Minister of West Bengal publicly called for a review of the Communist Party's denunciation of the INA (after June 1941 the CPI underwent a miraculous conversion to the view that the British were not fighting a dirty imperialist war). A change in CPI attitude toward the INA even 35 years after the event is no isolated political act. Professor Lebra's book gives us a fine basis for understanding the meaning of the INA and other Japanese trained armies in today's politics in Southeast Asia.

Japanese scholars until now have been reluctant to deal with the Tokyo War Crimes Trial. Richard H. Mineart, in the best study of the trial (*Victor's Justice*. Princeton University Press, 1971) wrote: "Apparently they fear that denigration of the trial will lead to a positive re-evaluation of Japan's war-time policies and leadership."

If this is indeed the case, the Hirota biography's reception is astonishing—a sale of 500,000 copies and the award of two major literary prizes.

A revisionist history of the trials could start with no better subject than Hirota. He was a career diplomat, Prime Minister in 1936 and Foreign Minister for less than a year, 1937-1938. The gravamen of the indictment against him seems to have been that as Prime Minister he raised defense budgets,

PROFESSIONAL READING 111

introduced more nationalistic elements into education and moved toward closer government control of the economy; as Foreign Minister he was in office at the time of the Marco Polo Bridge incident and the rape of Nanking. His trial was hardly a model. Hirota's lawyer, an American Quaker, was effectively banned from the trial by a choleric Australian judge. The court refused to admit any evidence from Ambassador Joseph Grew's diary; Grew had written that he could think of no one he "would have more gladly chosen to head the government with American interests in view" than Hirota. The death verdict was by a 6-5 vote. The American chief prosecutor called the sentence stupid. The Allied Council for Japan (General MacArthur as SCAP tried to avoid involvement in the trial) refused a recommendation from the court for commutation of Hirota's death sentence. Finally, SCAP refused to publish the dissenting justices' opinions; the Netherlands judge had written a telling one which has since been published.

This book seems deliberately low-keyed. Only three of the eleven chapters deal with the trial and little is made of the dignified stoicism displayed by Hirota throughout the trial and imprisonment. As far as the reviewer can infer, this reflects the tone of the original Japanese text.

How then to account for the sale of a half a million copies—large even in a highly literate society such as Japan? Are the Japanese about to take a longer look at the Tokyo trials? Will this look be taken in a mood of resurgent nationalism? In a mood of incipient anti-Americanism? The book suggests a negative answer to all three questions, but the sales figures make one wonder.

J.K. HOLLOWAY, JR.
Naval War College

Liston, Robert A. *Terrorism*. Nashville, Tenn.: Thomas Nelson, 1977. 158pp.

Robert A. Liston is a seasoned freelance writer who has decided to tackle the question of terrorism. Liston is concerned—indeed "outraged" to use his own words—about terrorism and terrorists, and the product of his outrage against this "crime against humanity" is anything but a dispassionate book. *Terrorism* is a diatribe against terrorism by states, by revolutionaries, and by criminals.

The difficulty with books like this is that they really tell us very little about the problem of terrorism, beyond the "fact" that it is almost always unnecessary when viewed from the perspective of the author. Liston does not understand why such groups as the Fedayeen (here we avoid the more inclusive term "Palestinians" that Liston favors), the Basques and the South Moluccan terrorists cannot peacefully settle their claims through negotiation, majority rule (?), and local autonomy. Were it only so simple. Liston likes the world as it is, how inconvenient that others do not share his view.

The attentive newspaper reader is likely to find little new in this short book. Perhaps the most useful chapter is a nice anecdotal overview of actions that are being taken to combat terrorism. Most disturbing are Liston's prescriptions for defeating terrorism. These include the curtailment of publicity surrounding acts of terrorism, which raises important First Amendment questions in the United States, and worse, Liston's assertion that we "must surrender a portion of our liberty and convenience to achieve greater protection." This latter development would play right into the hands of terrorist groups (e.g., the Red Brigade) who seek precisely such a curtailment of freedoms as a means to foster resentment against the ruling government.

Before terrorism can be eliminated from this world—if such a goal is even