

1979

## "The FY 1980-1984 Defense Program: Issues and Trends," and "Setting National Priorities: The 1980 Budget"

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### Recommended Citation

Walgreen, John A.; Korb, Lawrence J.; and Pechman, Joseph A. (1979) ""The FY 1980-1984 Defense Program: Issues and Trends," and "Setting National Priorities: The 1980 Budget"," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 32 : No. 6 , Article 17.  
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol32/iss6/17>

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manned by nonconformists with seemingly unlimited analytic aptitude and mental capacity, handpicked because of their unusual talents in language, mathematics, and operations. By war's end, a stiff bureaucratic organization evolved to manage a larger but probably less effective and certainly less idiosyncratic group of analysts. Woven throughout the book is a colorful anecdotal history of the war: students at Roosevelt High School in Hawaii carrying their gas masks to the stage to receive diplomas at a June graduation following Pearl Harbor; the misleading and dangerous battle damage reports sent out by both sides; the U.S. Navy's problem with predetonation and the running depth of its torpedoes; assessing the strength of garrisoned troops on the basis of the privy density of an island; the decision to eliminate Admiral Yamamoto; and the tragic and ironic loss of U.S.S. *Indianapolis*.

Intelligence collection and analysis of radio intelligence was undoubtedly a crucial factor in the outcome of the war. Without ULTRA, many more lives would have been lost and the problem of the island warfare in the Pacific would have been greatly complicated. Histories and biographies of the war will not be changed as a result of this book, but I think those who read it will agree that there were many quiet, unsung heroes whose work in support of the fleet was as important as directing gunfire or leading troops ashore. The dilemma of having intelligence that cannot be used, of being in a position where the obvious need for secrecy "constipates the flow of information" at a time when it can mean life or death, is truly the telling message of the book: "Secrecy is a double-edged weapon, and it sometimes inflicts deeper wounds on its wielder than upon his opponents." This lesson should not be forgotten.

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Korb, Lawrence J. *The FY 1980-1984 Defense Program: Issues and Trends*. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1979. 53pp. and Pechman, Joseph A., ed. *Setting National Priorities: The 1980 Budget*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1979, 229pp.

A nation's military posture, the size and composition of its armed forces, is largely the consequence of decisions to commit financial resources to defense made in a series of annual national budgets. The federal budget for FY 1980 will determine the nature of U.S. military forces through the next decade. While much is written about the defense budget, two sources of description and analysis that have proven most useful in the past have been Lawrence J. Korb's annual monograph for American Enterprise Institute and the multiauthored chapter on the defense budget in the annual Brookings Institution analysis of the federal budget proposed by the President for the forthcoming fiscal year. Readers should find these two studies as full of helpful information and stimulating policy discussions this year as they have been in the past.

Korb's work is the richer in presenting the defense budget in its various possible formats and in giving comparisons over time in relation to the national economy and the national budget. There has been and will continue to be debate over the proposal of the Carter administration to limit the growth of the overall federal budget so that in the domestic area, with the inflation rate projected when the budget was published, domestic spending would not grow overall in real terms while defense was scheduled to have its outlays grow by 3 percent in real dollars as part of NATO's agreement to try to redress the relative strength of NATO and Soviet forces in Europe.

Korb provides an enlightening discussion of the debate about increasing

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real defense spending and shows how the measured amount of real growth is sensitive to the base one uses for reference. The growth in real defense spending for FY 1980 that Korb shows (2.7 percent above the FY 1979 outlay level approved by Congress) is less than Brookings and most other sources cite. Inflation has been proceeding much more rapidly than the rate assumed in preparing the FY 1980 budget, so unless action is taken to raise outlays from the \$122.7 billion proposed there may be no real growth in FY 1980 defense outlays. (Ed. note: The administration took such action 11 September 1979.)

Most of the Brookings' chapter is spent examining key force structure and policy issues; and Korb also treats the policy and program implications of major defense spending areas. As in his earlier monographs, Korb provides a useful background on how national security policy assumptions and goals are established in the guidance used in drawing up the FY 1980-1984 defense program budget. The central program issue areas that these works analyze are the strategic nuclear forces, naval forces, and forces for NATO.

In the strategic nuclear area the United States has seen the strategic balance turn against it and has been impelled to go forward with the development of new generations of strategic systems such as the MX mobile missile. However, Korb believes that delays in starting new systems, slowing the pace of programs like *Trident* missile submarines, and canceling the B-1 strategic bomber program have eroded the U.S. strategic position. The Brookings authors see the primary concern in the strategic deterrence area essentially as a need to develop a better strategic planning framework before rushing into new commitments to strategic weapons systems that may impose prohibitive costs in the future and complicate strategic stability with the Soviet Union.

The naval balance is another area where Korb and Brookings analysts view the problem differently. Korb finds the U.S. naval position relative to the Soviet Union to have deteriorated as a result of the number of U.S. naval ships being halved from FY 1969 to FY 1979 while the Soviet Fleet has continued to grow. He believes that the current naval balance makes it problematical whether the U.S. Navy could carry out its wartime missions of sea control and projecting power on NATO's northern and southern flanks. Brookings, however, cites analysts who believe that the Soviet Navy is not designed for high seas combat with the U.S. Fleet and because this threat probably does not exist the U.S. Navy should consider buying more, but less capable, ships than it has purchased with the Soviet threat in mind. This naval program would provide the United States with the larger number of ships it needs for worldwide low threat and peacetime naval presence missions. However, as the "dissenting analysts" see the Soviet Navy attacking forward U.S. Fleets in the European theater, it would seem that the U.S. Navy will still require high-capability ships and aircraft if it is to support NATO's flanks.

Both Korb and the Brookings analysts express concern about the emphasis in designing ground and air forces for fighting a short, intense, conventional war in central Europe. Korb argues that this "NATO first" effort may still not give the United States the ability to win a conventional war, while it makes U.S. forces less flexible and capable in other parts of the world. The Brookings authors also question whether the United States should make more Army divisions heavily armored and mechanized, and invest in prepositioned equipment stocks for NATO at the expense of forces that would be needed to deal with threats to U.S. security in other regions, such as the Middle East. The Brookings chapter discusses a number of

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possible problems with the emphasis in key Army procurement programs and the need for considering trade-offs between Army and Air Force systems in such common areas as air defense and fire support. Brookings also believes that a modernization of theater nuclear forces should not be undertaken until the United States develops a coherent doctrine for the use of theater nuclear forces.

Both works contain several other sections that should interest readers, such as Korb's discussion of military retirement reform and Brookings chapters on the relationship of the federal budget to the economy in 1980, on key issue areas in the domestic budget, and on the problem of inflation. Considering the complex nature of the material they are dealing with, these publications are well written; and a reader will finish them much more knowledgeable on important areas of public policy than when he began.

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Marder, Arthur J. *Jutland and After, May 1916-December 1916. From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow. The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919*. v. III, 2nd ed. (Revised and Enlarged). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978. 363pp.

A dozen years ago, when Professor Marder completed his *Jutland and After*, historians hailed as definitive his splendid treatment of the much debated engagement between the British Grand Fleet and the German High Seas Fleet. Marder has been moved, however, by the opening of new private and public materials to undertake an extensive revision of his masterwork. The revised edition confirms the main themes of the earlier version with considerable additional evidence, but it also adds insights into personalities and into the more technical aspects of the battle.

Especially noteworthy is his thoroughly revised chapter of reflections on the battle.

Marder still holds that Adm. John Jellicoe, the Commander in Chief of the Grand Fleet, was an astute, forceful leader endowed with far more courage than his critics would concede and that Adm. David Beatty, the Commander of the British Cruiser Fleet, was more cautious than his publicized heroics might suggest. Jellicoe's offensive ardor was cooled, however, by the knowledge that his primary objective was to retain control of the sea and that one false move on his part might (in Churchill's words) "lose the war in an afternoon." Marder acclaims "the peak moment of the influence of sea power on history" Jellicoe's opening maneuver that enabled him to cross the German T and that placed the British Fleet between the inferior enemy and his home ports. He sees Jellicoe's later controversial order to turn away from the torpedoes fired by charging German destroyers as entirely within the framework of prevailing British naval thought, and he holds that probably no tactics by Jellicoe on that fateful afternoon in May could have enabled the admiral to deal decisively with the German Fleet by nightfall. Some of Beatty's actions, on the other hand, are clearly difficult for Marder to defend.

Marder is extremely critical of the overconcentration of authority in the British commander in chief's hands that discouraged his subordinates from assuming the initiative and that may explain their repeated failures even to inform Jellicoe of German movements. Indeed, failures in communication within the Grand Fleet and between the Admiralty and the Fleet were perhaps the single most important factor that enabled the High Seas Fleet to escape to its home ports.

Marder points out that neither Jellicoe nor Beatty were in the habit of calling their captains into conference, as