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Jutland and After, May 1916-December 1916. From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow. The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919, v. Ill, 2nd ed.

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possible problems with the emphasis in key Army procurement programs and the need for considering trade-offs between Army and Air Force systems in such common areas as air defense and fire support. Brookings also believes that a modernization of theater nuclear forces should not be undertaken until the United States develops a coherent doctrine for the use of theater nuclear forces.

Both works contain several other sections that should interest readers, such as Korb's discussion of military retirement reform and Brookings chapters on the relationship of the federal budget to the economy in 1980, on key issue areas in the domestic budget, and on the problem of inflation. Considering the complex nature of the material they are dealing with, these publications are well written; and a reader will finish them much more knowledgeable on important areas of public policy than when he began.

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Marder, Arthur J. *Jutland and After, May 1916-December 1916. From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow. The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919*. v. III, 2nd ed. (Revised and Enlarged). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978. 363pp.

A dozen years ago, when Professor Marder completed his *Jutland and After*, historians hailed as definitive his splendid treatment of the much debated engagement between the British Grand Fleet and the German High Seas Fleet. Marder has been moved, however, by the opening of new private and public materials to undertake an extensive revision of his masterwork. The revised edition confirms the main themes of the earlier version with considerable additional evidence, but it also adds insights into personalities and into the more technical aspects of the battle.

Especially noteworthy is his thoroughly revised chapter of reflections on the battle.

Marder still holds that Adm. John Jellicoe, the Commander in Chief of the Grand Fleet, was an astute, forceful leader endowed with far more courage than his critics would concede and that Adm. David Beatty, the Commander of the British Cruiser Fleet, was more cautious than his publicized heroics might suggest. Jellicoe's offensive ardor was cooled, however, by the knowledge that his primary objective was to retain control of the sea and that one false move on his part might (in Churchill's words) "lose the war in an afternoon." Marder acclaims "the peak moment of the influence of sea power on history" Jellicoe's opening maneuver that enabled him to cross the German T and that placed the British Fleet between the inferior enemy and his home ports. He sees Jellicoe's later controversial order to turn away from the torpedoes fired by charging German destroyers as entirely within the framework of prevailing British naval thought, and he holds that probably no tactics by Jellicoe on that fateful afternoon in May could have enabled the admiral to deal decisively with the German Fleet by nightfall. Some of Beatty's actions, on the other hand, are clearly difficult for Marder to defend.

Marder is extremely critical of the overconcentration of authority in the British commander in chief's hands that discouraged his subordinates from assuming the initiative and that may explain their repeated failures even to inform Jellicoe of German movements. Indeed, failures in communication within the Grand Fleet and between the Admiralty and the Fleet were perhaps the single most important factor that enabled the High Seas Fleet to escape to its home ports.

Marder points out that neither Jellicoe nor Beatty were in the habit of calling their captains into conference, as

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had Nelson and Howe, so that the juniors would know instinctively how they should act in battle. Perhaps still more surprising, British destroyers never engaged in rigorous tactical exercises before Jutland, and their captains entered battle without written orders outlining offensive destroyer doctrine. Nor were the British prepared to fight at night, given the poor quality of their searchlights and their inability after dark to recognize friend from foe. Even had he been alerted that the High Seas Fleet was breaking through the British line in a dash for home under cover of dark, Jellicoe would not have reopened battle. Instead, he would have retired eastward to a position from which he might intercept the Germans at dawn.

Material deficiencies also plagued the British at Jutland. It was powder explosions arising from inadequate anti-flash protection rather than insufficient armor that cost the Grand Fleet three battle cruisers. German ships were well built, but their ability to survive British fire is attributed by Marder to faulty armor piercing shells that exploded on impact rather than within the German ships, where they would cause the greatest damage. To its credit, the Royal Navy profited from the lessons of Jutland, quickly raising the Grand Fleet to a high level of efficiency.

Marder praises the High Seas Fleet for the quality of its ships, for the precision of its movements, and for the superiority of its gunnery in the early phases of battle. He rates Admiral Hipper, the German battle cruiser commander, the "outstanding sea officer of the war," but his estimate of Admiral Scheer, the Commander in Chief of the High Seas Fleet, is low as Scheer was repeatedly outmaneuvered by the British and as his prime objective, after learning that he confronted the entire Grand Fleet, was to flee for home. Although the Germans claimed victory on the basis of ships sunk, Jutland was surely a strategic victory for the

Grand Fleet, which retained control of the sea.

Marder's study of the battle and his superb explanation of the Grand Fleet's Battle Orders will delight every naval professional. It is safe to predict that no historian in our time will attempt a new study of Jutland, unless Professor Marder himself undertakes a third edition!

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Margiotta, Franklin D., ed. *The Changing World of the American Military*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978. 488pp.

This book of 25 essays by 34 contributors—academics, experienced defense bureaucrats and military officers—focuses on military professionalism, international and domestic influences, manpower issues, organization dynamics and change, the service academies, and the future.

It is based on working hypotheses regarding military professionalism propounded by Samuel Huntington in *The Soldier and the State* (1957) and Morris Janowitz in *The Professional Soldier* (1960). Huntington contributed a brief foreword and Janowitz the opening article. Only in a footnote at the end does one find Maj. Gen. Robert Ginsburgh's observation of Janowitz' work as a self-fulfilling prophecy, as one might argue with respect to Huntington. A number of the essays, notably those by Sam Sarkesian, B. Guy Peters and James Clofelter (coauthors), Charles Moskos, George Odiorne and James R. Golden, examine how military professionalism seems to have been eroded by various external pressures. Moskos, arguing a shift from "calling" to "occupation" and John Lovell, in his Athenian-Spartan model, make the most valiant tries at reconception, while veteran organizational theorists Odiorne's essay on the pitfalls of the